Thesis
Power maximization, hegemony and the unipolar international structure
BRIGHENTI, Olivier
Abstract
Définir la structure internationale contemporaine comme unipolaire est devenu un fait accepté par l'ensemble de la communauté scientifique. Cependant, qu'entend-on par unipolarité? En d'autres termes, comment la structure unipolaire affecte-t-elle le comportement de la puissance hégémonique? Cette thèse tente d'apporter un cadre d'intelligibilité permettant de mieux comprendre l'unipolarité et ses conséquences sur la politique internationale. Pour ce faire, elle propose une nouvelle approche théorique intitulée "Hard-Line Realism" mettant en exergue certaines "tendances lourdes" de l'unipolarité. En se basant sur deux grandes études monographiques, à savoir, la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ainsi que la guerre en Iraq, cette thèse met en exergue le fait que l'unipolarité a des conséquences importantes sur les stratégies de maximisation de puissance de l'hégémon. Elle teste également la logique causale de théories alternatives (réalisme offensif/défensif et libéralisme structurel).
Reference
BRIGHENTI, Olivier. Power maximization, hegemony and the unipolar international structure. Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2007, no. SES 644
URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-24057 DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:2405
Available at: http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:2405
Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.
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Power Maximization, Hegemony and the Unipolar International Structure
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l’Université de Genève
Par Olivier Brighenti
Pour l’obtention du grade de Docteur ès sciences économiques et sociales Mention : science politique
Membres du jury de thèse :
Monsieur Philippe Braillard Professeur, Genève, directeur de thèse Monsieur Pierre de Senarclens Professeur, Lausanne, membre du jury Monsieur Frédéric Varone Professeur, Genève, président du jury
Thèse no 644
Genève, 2007
La Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales, sur préavis du jury, a autorisé l’impression de la présente thèse, sans entendre, par là, émettre aucune opinion sur les propositions qui s’y trouvent énoncées et qui n’engagent que la responsabilité de leur auteur.
Genève, le 1er octobre 2007
Le Doyen Bernard MORARD
Impression d’après le manuscrit de l’auteur
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
1. Unipolarity in the Study of World Politics: Exploring the Debate------1
1.1. The Significance of the Debate ------10 1.2. Why the United States? ------16 1.3. The Research Design ------17 1.4. The Plan of the Dissertation------20
PART I : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2. Theorizing Unipolarity: Hard-Line Realism and the Understanding of power maximization strategies In Contemporary International Politics------22
2.1. Hard-Line Realism: A Realist Theory of Unipolarity ------22 2.1.1. The Hegemon’s Behavior in a Unipolar World ------25 2.1.2. Unlimited Hegemony------28 2.1.3. The Limits of Power Maximizing Strategies------33 2.1.4. Power Maximization and Cooperation ------34
2.2. Alternative theories for the understanding of power politics in a unipolar world------39 2.2.1. Offensive and Defensive Realism ------39 2.2.2. The Quest for Power ------40 2.2.3. The Question of Hegemony ------44 2.2.4. The Question of Security------45 2.2.5. The Alternative: A Structural Liberal Approach ------47
2.3. Hypothesis in Unipolarity------48
2.4. Conclusion------53
UNIGE / SES - i - Olivier Brighenti Table of Contents
PART II : CASE STUDY EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
3. The European Security and Defense Policy from the End of the Cold War to 1993------55
3.1. The European Defense in a Historical Perspective------59 3.1.1. The “European Pillar”: A History ------61
3.2. The End of the Cold War, Unipolarity and Security in Europe: Changing Patterns, Recurring Strategies?------65
3.3. The United States and the NATO Transformation: Unipolarity and Power Maximization in the Aftermath of the Cold War------70
3.4. From the End of the Cold War to Maastricht ------77 3.4.1. The Franco-German Initiatives in the Early 1990’s: Implications for Negotiations in the Political Union and Consequences on the Transatlantic Partnership------77 3.4.2. The Dumas-Genscher Initiative ------79 3.4.3. The Second Franco-German Proposal------85
3.5. The Maastricht Treaty on Political Union------93 3.5.1. The Petersberg Summit------97
3.6. New Security Architecture: Recurring patterns, contending visions?------98
3.7. The United States’ Power Maximizing Strategy and the European Security Architecture from 1989 to 1993: An Interim Assessment ------104
4. A European Defense Identity within the Atlantic Alliance: Competition or Temporary Setback? ------110
4.1. The 1994 Brussels NATO Summit Breakthrough------110 4.1.1. The Franco-American “Rapprochement”: Implications for the ESDI and NATO 113
4.2. The Positive Rapprochement Phase: 1993-1996------115 4.2.1. The Berlin Summit: High Point of the ESDI ------120 4.2.2. The CJTF: A U.S. Power Maximizing Tool? ------123
4.3. The Negative Rapprochement Phase: 1996-1997------127 4.3.1. The AFSOUTH Command ------127 4.3.2. NATO Enlargement: Strengthening America’s Preponderance on the Alliance 134
UNIGE / SES - ii - Olivier Brighenti Table of Contents
4.4. The Amsterdam Treaty: The “Architectural Debate Strikes Back”------137
4.5. The United States and European Security 1993-1997: Power Maximization an Interim Assessment------142
5. The ESDP and Transatlantic Relations: The End of the Atlanticist/Europeanist Clash? ------144
5.1. The British Policy “Revolution”: Blair’s New Strategy for Europe------146
5.2. France: Promoting Yet Another European project?------150
5.3. Germany: One More Step Towards Normalization?------153
5.4. The United States and the ESDP Project: The “Autonomy” Issue ------154 5.4.1. St-Malo and the United States: An Ambiguous Support------155
5.5. From St-Malo to the Washington Summit: ESDI and ESDP------160
5.6. Cologne: Reaffirming the Autonomy Issue ------162
5.7. The Helsinki Summit and the Headline Goal: Towards “Genuine” EU capabilities------166
5.8. The United States and the ESDP Project: Maximizing U.S. Power in European Security Affairs? ------169
6. European Military Integration 1945-1961: Bipolarity and The United States’ Offshore Balancing Strategy ------178
6.1. The United States and European Military integration: From the EDF to the EDC------181 6.1.1. The European Defense Force: McCloy and the creation of a genuine European Army------182 6.1.2. The Pleven Plan for a European Army: Preventing German Rearmament------185
6.2. The European Defense Community and the U.S. Offshore Balancing Strategy. ------186
6.3. The Nuclear Sharing Policy: Eisenhower and the Ultimate Strive Towards Offshore Balancing------194
UNIGE / SES - iii - Olivier Brighenti Table of Contents
6.4. Conclusion------199
7. European Security after the End of the Cold War: A Hard Case for Hard-Line Realism?------201
PART III : CASE STUDY 2002 NSS AND THE WAR IN IRAQ
8. The U.S. National Security Strategy, The War in Iraq: Power Maximization Strategies and the Unipolar International Structure - 209
8.1. The Bush Doctrine: A Unipolar Strategy? ------214 8.1.1. Inside the Bush Doctrine: Structural Incentives and the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ------217 8.1.1.1 American Exceptionalism, Hegemony and Democracy Promotion------218 8.1.1.2 The Unipolar Distribution of Power and Forcible Democratic Imposition in Iraq 225 8.1.2. Preventive War and the Unipolar International Structure: A Power Maximization Strategy? ------232 8.1.2.1 Preemption and Preventive War: The NSS and the Rationale for Invading Iraq 235 8.1.2.2 Preventive War: A Strategy of Unipolarity? ------239
8.1.3. Deterrence, Containment and the Bipolar International Order: Is a Global Strategy of Preventive War Possible? ------243 8.1.3.1 Bipolarity: A Clear-Cut Definition------244 8.1.3.2 Bipolarity: Structural Constraints and Superpower Rivalry ------246 8.1.3.3 Bipolarity and Superpower Rivalry: An Assessment of Deterrence and Containment ------248 8.1.3.4 Implementing the Hegemonist agendas and the bipolar/unipolar international distribution of power: Recurring Patterns, Different Outcomes? ------251
8.2. The Invasion of Iraq and the United Nations Security Council: International Cooperation and Power Maximization in a Unipolar World ------266
8.3. The Invasion of Iraq: A Hard Case for Hard-Line Realism?------282
PART IV
9. Conclusion ------287 -
UNIGE / SES - iv - Olivier Brighenti INTRODUCTION
Unipolarity in the Study of World Politics : Exploring the Debate
Introduction
1. Unipolarity in the Study of World Politics: Exploring the Debate
Defining the contemporary international structure as unipolar has become a standard assertion for nearly all scholars in international relations. The United States possesses such a margin of power over other states, especially but not just in the military realm, that it stands as the sole global actor. As
Kenneth Waltz outlined: “The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how well they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability and competence.”1 Indeed, such power asymmetries have never existed in world history. Does this overwhelming power make the international structure unipolar? I argue that the current international structure is unipolar and highly imbalanced. Paul Kennedy, the leading scholar of the once influential
“declinist school” forcefully revised his judgment. “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power, nothing” he wrote, talking about America’s current overwhelming power. “The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap. […] Charlemagne’s empire was merely western European in its reach. The Roman Empire stretched farther afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. There is therefore no comparaison.”2 Drawing from neorealism, the school of thought most concerned with power, I strongly believe that a system is unipolar and imbalanced when a state is overwhelmingly preponderant since its capabilities are such that it can preclude any balancing tendencies.3 On the other hand, capabilities are not so concentrated as to create a global empire. An empire as defined by
Michael Doyle would require an effective control whether formal or informal, of a subordinate society by an imperial society.4 Empires exercise power territorially through effective and centralized command.
For several centuries, the world under Rome was ruled by this imperial pattern. There is now one sole superpower but that does not mean that it is an empire. Tautologically speaking a unipolar system is
1 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 131. 2 Kennedy Paul, "The Eagle has Landed," The Financial Times, London, Saturday 2 February 2002, p. 1. 3 The United States is not overwhelmingly powerful in every area, specifically in the economic realm, but as pointed out by John Ikenberry it is the multifaceted character of its power that make it far reaching and unbalanced. Ikenberry rightly asserts: “We live in a one superpower world and there is no serious competitor in sight. Other states rival the United States in an area or another but it is the multifaceted character of American power that makes it so commanding, far reaching and provocative.” Ikenberry John G, ed. America Unrivalled; The Future of the Balance of Power, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002. p. 1. 4 Doyle Michael W, Empires, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1986, p. 30.
UNIGE / SES - 1 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction one comprised of only one pole that has the capacity to address important international issues alone and no combination of states have enough power to prevent the hegemon from doing so.5 Although
China and India are rising powers and the European Union is a great economic power roughly equal to the United States, they do not constitute poles.6 In other words there is no other pole in sight that can by itself counterbalance the hegemon.7 Thus we are years away from any balancing coalition and even more remote from the emergence of a new pole. The whole dissertation will draw along this line and rest on the unipolar unbalanced character of the contemporary international structure. Within the international relations scholarly community most of the debate on unipolarity and American hegemony has focused on the stability of the system. In other words, if a unipolar world configuration is peaceful or more prone to instability and war.8 Realists have also paid attention to the durability of a unipolar configuration, i.e. if unipolarity was only a “moment” in history, a structural anomaly or if this type of
5 A unipolar world refers to a distribution of power comprising a single pole in the international system. It is opposed to a multipolar world i.e. three or more great powers as before the Second World War with Germany, Japan, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. A bipolar world is one with two great powers. The classical example is the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The bipolar world ended in 1991 and led to the current unipolar world. For the best definition of bipolarity see: Wagner Harrisson R, "What Was Bipolarity?," International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, (Winter 1993), pp. 72-106. Although I do not agree with Huntington’s uni-multipoar classification, he offers a very good set of definitions in: Huntington Samuel P, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, (March/April 1999), pp. 35-37. 6 According to Neorealism and mainly Kenneth Waltz only states, not alliances can be poles: Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979,pp. 98-99. The most interesting example is the European Union. Although it integrated its economic and monetary system it cannot be a pole unless it aggregates the military capabilities of its member states. 7 Randall Schweller asserts that a state: “to qualify as a pole must have greater than half the military capabilities of the most powerful state in the system.” Schweller Randall L, Deadly Imbalance: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1997, p. 17. In other words, in a unipolar world a potential pole must have 51 percent of the power of the unipole. The estimates for the American military expenditures for 2005 is $ 518 billion. The total 2005 military spending of other major states is $ 81.5 billion for China, $ 45 billion for France, $ 44 billion for Japan. American military expenditures represents roughly 50 percent of the world military expenditures. In order to only match their military power the next 50 states would have to combine their military capabilities. Real balancing (not protesting) involves real economic and political outlay, which none of the 50 first ranked states have been willing to bear. These figures are for 2005: Central Intelligence Agency, The world Fact book, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2067rank.html (09.05.2006). For John Mearsheimer a state qualifies for great power status in a nuclear age if it has a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional force. If a state gained nuclear superiority over all its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 5. On the conventional forces, the numbers speak for themselves and the U.S. conventional superiority is undisputable. On the nuclear aspect scholars argue that the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War and that the United States now stands on the cusp pf nuclear primacy. Nuclear primacy means a situation in which one country with primacy can destroy its adversary’s nuclear retaliation capabilities in a disarming strike. These arguments are advocated by Lieber Keir A & Press Daryl G, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," International Security, vol. 30, no. 4, (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44. See also: Lieber Keir A & Press Daryl G, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2, (March/April 2006), pp. 42-54. 8 For the best account on the question of stability see Wohlforth William C, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, vol. 24, no. 1, (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.
UNIGE / SES - 2 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction configuration could be sustained at length.9 Until the beginning of the new millennium, it was widely believed that the unipolar world configuration would not last and that the balance would be restored.
Kenneth Waltz echoes this view: “Theory enables us to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say how long it will take. National and international conditions determine that. Those who refer to the unipolar moment are right. In our perspective, the new balance of power is emerging slowly, in historical perspectives it will come in a blink of an eye.”10 Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and Krauthammer’s path-breaking article,11 there is no sign of a balancing tendency and we are still in a unipolar world order comprising one sole superpower i.e. the United States. First of all, the unipolar structure of world politics is not a temporary setback due to vanish only because international politics abhors unbalanced power. It is an uncontested reality and no one can predict when the disrupted balance will be restored.12 Secondly, a unipolar world dominated by a sole hyperpower, in the words of former French Minister Hubert Védrine, does not imply a dramatic change in the study of international politics. Power is always at the center of political life. The end of bipolarity has in no way “hoisted high the colors” of a Wilsonian world approach through peaceful cooperation and interdependence.
Realpolitik remains the rule and states always see their foreign policy options pragmatically with security and power as primary goals. The strive for power is always the central issue in world politics. Although merely everyone has now acknowledged and taken for granted that the current world configuration is unipolar, there has been no in depth analysis of how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. This is what I call the “unipolar theoretical puzzle”. This assertion from Brooks and Wohlforth nicely illustrates my concerns: “If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will. The only things left for dispute are how long it will last and what the implications are for American foreign
9 See Mastanduno Michael, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 21, no. 4, (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88. and Layne Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, (Winter 1993), pp. 5-51. 10 Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41. 11 Krauthammer Charles, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, (Winter 1990-1991), pp.23-33. 12 The debate on how long unipolarity and American primacy will last can be quite simply addressed. If unipolarity is defined by the overwhelming military imbalance of the system, then as long as no other state builds up its military capabilities in order to “catch up” with the hegemon and disrupt the contemporary asymmetrical balance, unipolarity and American primacy will endure.
UNIGE / SES - 3 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction policy.”13 Although the questions of stability and durability are all interesting and above all fundamental ones, I will address another set of fundamental theoretical questions.
How does a hegemon behave in a unipolar world? How does the unipolar world structure affect the hegemon and provide it with incentives to act in a way or another? Which are the strategies that the hegemon will adopt in order to promote its national interest? Will the hegemon constantly strive to maximize its power or will it choose to restrain itself? In other words I ask this question: What effect does the unipolar distribution of power have on the behavior of the hegemon, particularly in its power seeking behavior? Since the end of the Cold War the “unipolar theoretical puzzle” has been one of the most important and unresolved question in the study of international politics. This study tries to answer these questions by testing various theories of international politics against the historical record of
American “behavior since” the end of the Cold War.
My chief goal in this dissertation is to provide a power-based theory of unipolarity and by examining the post Cold War “security architecture”, to demonstrate not only that unipolarity provides incentives for power maximization strategies, but also that my theory offers a better explanation than the existing ones. The existing theoretical approaches do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world.
I am going to propose a theory that can deal with this fundamental question. If the realist research program successfully made predictions about state behavior in a distribution of power comprising two poles, three poles, ten poles etc. what can it say about state behavior in a unipolar distribution of power? Thus, the dependant variable is the political behavior of a hegemon when confronted with strategic decisions to enhance its interests. It asks what kind of political options the hegemon chooses to maintain and improve its position in the system. The independent variable is therefore the distribution of capabilities in the international system in other words, the unipolar world configuration. Finally, I will emphasize the consequences of the political strategies the hegemon chooses to adopt on the prevailing international order.
13 Brooks Stephen G & Wohlforth William C, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, (July- August 2002), p. 21.
UNIGE / SES - 4 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction
As every social science research requires, I have to place actions, in the case at hand, the behavior of the hegemon in a unipolar world, in the context of abstract, generalizable theories of international politics. This is to my knowledge, the first attempt to address this specific question in a reasonably parsimonious and generalized form. A relevant research must necessarily be based on solid theoretical assumptions. Hence, foreign policy debates can tend towards flawed predictions unless they are embedded into strong theoretical approaches that provide a coherent framework on how international politics work. Theory remains essential for diagnosing events, explaining their causes prescribing responses and evaluating the impact of policies.14 Consequently, which are the theoretical models I chose to test one against the other as explanatory realms for my case study findings? In short, we are confronted with an international system “dominated” by a sole superpower ensuring its primacy and duration by maximizing its power and narrow national interest. Consequently, international politics remains what it has always been: a competitive arena in which every state strives for its own power or security. As emphasized by David Callahan: “[…] strategy has not been dramatically overhauled in the
Cold War’s wake because realism remains dominant in the foreign policy establishment. In the realists’ view, the end of the Cold War changed the structure of world politics but not its essential nature.”15 The literature in international relations is wide and one can find a host of theories and research programs that can be used as explanatory realms. First of all, the realist research program in its structural acceptance perceives pressures from the international system as the main factor to shape a state’s foreign policy. In other words, pressures from the structure help define the strategy. Realist theories of all strands predict that statesmen and political leaders, trying to cope with these pressures, will make strategic choices. In the case at hand, to choose between power or security maximization, cooperation, restraint or status quo policies. The logic at stake here is power and how it is used according to the
14 A good IR theory should be logically consistent and empirically valid. It should not leave scholars wondering about the causal relationships at work. A good theory must also have a high explanatory power, i.e. its ability to account for phenomena that would otherwise seem mystifying. Put differently, a good theory should make odd or surprising events seem comprehensible. For a very good account on the imperatives between theory and empirical implications see: Walt Stephen M, "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8, no., (June 2005), pp. 23-48. 15 Callahan David, Between Two Worlds: Realism, Idealism, and American Foreign Policy After the Cold War, (New York: Harper Collins), 1994, p. 2.
UNIGE / SES - 5 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction distribution of capabilities in the international system. Within the structural realist research program or neorealism two sets of theories dominate the debate on the crucial question of power.16
First of all, defensive realism concurs with the importance of power but asserts that states need only the amount of power necessary to ensure their security. Defensive states are security seekers. As Fareed
Zakaria says: “defensive realism assumes that the international system provides incentives only for moderate, reasonable behavior.”17 Offensive realism, on the other hand, parts ways with its defensive
“cousin” in the sense that international anarchy pushes states’ to maximize their power in order to ensure security.18 Since states can never be sure of other state’s intentions, power maximization is the only way to ensure a state’s security with regional hegemony as a final goal. In short, whereas for defensive realism states are security seekers, offensive states are power maximizers. Secondly, I have chosen another structural approach that offers an alternative explanation of world politics: the structural liberal approach. Structural liberalism or theories of constitutional order also see the pressures from the international system as the main factor to shape a state’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, dramatic disagreements occur both in the prescriptions as well as in the underlying logic of the theory. Structural liberalism predicts that when statesmen and political leaders are confronted with power they will decide to restrain it rather than to maximize it.19 In other words, when they are in a position to shape the fundamental character of the international order, statesmen will opt for the multilateral and institutional
“way” in order to create rule-based agreements and institutions. These are the ways to signal restraint
16 Realists throughout history have argued that power is the decisive determinant in the relations among separate political units and of crucial importance in order to understand the dynamics of international politics. For a very good account on realism and the notion of power see: Schmidt Brian C, "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," Millennium, vol. 33, no. 3, (2005), pp. 523-548. In short, the struggle between tenants of offensive and defensive realism is not a general quarrel within realism as a general research program but a dispute among the followers of Kenneth Waltz. Offensive realists assume that states continuously strive to maximize their relative power with the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since not every state can maximize its relative power at the same time, conflict is frequent in the international system. By contrast, defensive realists assume that states aim at maintaining their relative position of power in the international system, but do not aim for hegemony since this would disrupt the prevailing balance and might in the end lead to war and defeat. 17 Zakaria Fareed, "Realism and Domestic Politics (A Review Essay)," International Security, vol. 17, no. 1, (Summer 1992), p. 180. 18 The fullest statement of offensive realism is Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, 555 p, Mearsheimer John J, "The False Promise Of International Institutions," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49, Mearsheimer John J, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, vol. 15, no. 2, (Fall 1990), pp. 5-56. 19 John Ikenberry is the prominent scholar of this theoretical framework. He has synthesized his thought process in the single most important treatment of constitutional orders in: Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001, 293 p.
UNIGE / SES - 6 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction and commitment to other states, thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of adversaries, potential competitors or long standing allies. According to advocates of this approach, this constitutional architecture provides the hegemon with a certain degree of legitimacy and ensures the consent of minor states. Structural liberalism rejects the constant strive for power and the logic at stake is restraint and cooperation rather than power maximization, unilateralism, and coercion. From this perspective, multilateralism should increase rather than decrease as power asymmetries rise in a unipolar world configuration.
Each of these theories, although having proven highly compelling in the understanding of international politics, mainly for bipolar and multipolar world structures, do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. We are back to my “unipolar theoretical puzzle”. First and most important of all, both strands of realism, as we will see in the following chapter, make a certain number of predictions. These predictions have been derived from a bipolar or multipolar world configuration. Thus there has been no attempt so far to derive predictions for a unipolar world. Defensive states, emphasizing on security and the inalienable logic of the balance of power, seek to maximize their security by preserving the status quo. Caution is the master-word for defensive states and they have no incentives to disrupt the status quo. On the contrary they, will seek by all means to preserve the prevailing balance. Defensive realism falls short in explaining power driven policies in a unipolar world since the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system. According to Waltz, offensive and expansionist behavior often proves to be counterproductive because it triggers counterbalancing coalitions.20 Defensive realist states tend to be “defensive positionalists” in the terms of Joseph
Grieco.21 In other words, defensive states will seek power only to minimize international gaps and not to maximize their own position in the system.
On the other hand, although offensive realism has been designed to account for power driven strategies, it also falls short in explaining the current unipolar world configuration. In effect, according to offensive realism, states strive to maximize their power in order to become the most powerful state in the system. Drawing from this logic, the United States is the dominant power in the Western
20 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, pp. 125-128. 21 Grieco Joseph M, "Realist International Theory And the Study of World Politics," In. New Thinking in International Relations Theory, edited by Doyle Michael M & Ikenberry John G, (Boulder: Westview Press), 1997, pp. 167-168.
UNIGE / SES - 7 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction
Hemisphere. Since global hegemony is virtually impossible to achieve according to offensive realism, the U.S. is the hegemon in its own hemisphere and acts as an offshore balancer in the rest of the world.
Resting on this status of regional hegemon, the United States does not strive for additional power and does not seek to maximize its power in other regions of the world. It only seeks to preserve its dominant position in its sphere of influence. Drawing from this prediction, we can say that the hegemon becomes a “defensive positionalists” in a unipolar world. Structural liberalism is probably the most puzzling theoretical framework that will be used. In reality, it asserts that the hegemon, when confronted with overwhelming power, tends to restrain its power and build a constitutional order. Since the end of the
Cold War, restraint has not been the rule. Contrary to its predictions, as we will discuss in the following chapters, rather than restraining its power, the hegemon adopts maximizing strategies whenever it can.
In this dissertation, I seek to provide an answer to the different theoretical aspects that have been outlined above. The three sets of theories are compelling but do not provide the most convincing theoretical framework for the understanding of the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world. Offensive and defensive realism rightly outline some of the fundamental core assumptions that are relevant to the current international configuration.22 Their predictions have been though for multipolar and bipolar world.
The reason why predictions have not been made for a unipolar world configuration remains a puzzle.23
22 A theory cannot be considered flawed as long as its core assumptions remain relevant. Terry Moe summarizes this argument very well when claiming: “Every theory are inherently unrealistic because they abstract from the rich complexity of the real world only a significant and few of its infinite aspects. […] The proper question is not whether theoretical statements exhaustively account for everything but whether they make true or false assertions about only those aspects of the world that are singled out for special attention.” Moe Terry M, "On the Scientific Status of Rational Models," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 23, no. 1, (February 1979), pp. 222-223. The predictions drawn from these assumptions may be inaccurate given a particular distribution of power even if its core assumptions remain relevant. Although realism has been highly challenged by various other theoretical approaches, it is hard to find even among its detractors, somebody that asserts that the core assumptions of anarchy, survival etc are irrelevant. Robert Keohane, distinguished representative of the liberal institutional thought process, grudgingly accepted the importance of realism as a general theory of world politics. He argues: “Understanding the general principles of state action and the practices of governments is a necessary basis for attempts to refine theory or to extend the analysis to non-state actors. Approaches using new concepts may be able to supplement, enrich, or extend a basic theory of state action, but they cannot substitute for it. The fixation of critics and reformers on the Realist theory of state action reflects the importance of this research tradition. In my view there is a good reason for this. Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world politics because its focus on power, interests and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject. Thus any approach to international relations has to incorporate, or at least come to grips with key elements of Realist thinking.” Keohane Robert O, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," In. Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Keohane Robert O, (New York: Columbia university Press), 1988, p. 159. 23 I cannot explain this theoretical puzzle but one hypothetical argument could be that the balance of power has traditionally been treated as a law of nature, wherein the whole universe is pictured. In the words of Randall
UNIGE / SES - 8 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction
Thus, I will outline the alternative theories. I elaborate the logic of each theory and from each one, I extrapolate specific sets of predictions for the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world.24 I thus review the causal logic of every theory and integrate within them the new independent variable, i.e. the unipolar distribution of power. Then, I will discuss my realist theory of unipolarity and test its logic against the historical record.
The theory I lay out in the next chapter, what I have labeled hard-line realism is based on the same assumptions common to most strands of realism.25 As outlined by Stephen Walt: “far from being a narrow intellectual monolith, realism is a large and diverse body of thought whose proponents share a few important ideas but disagree about many others.”26 Hard-line realism is a power-driven theory that emphasizes the fact that the hegemon maximizes its power ad infinitum. Staying on the sideline is not the goal of a hegemon. Once it has achieved regional hegemony, it wants more than what it has. It will seek more power and maximize its strategies in order to achieve global preeminence. The theory also shows that the hegemon does not adopt strategies in a frenzy way, but calculates the costs and benefits of each strategy at stake. The theory shows that when the costs outweigh the benefits, the hegemon adopts strategies of conciliation and does not seek by all means to maximize its power. Hard-line
Schweller as: “gigantic mechanism, a machine or a clockwork, created and kept in motion by the divine watchmaker.” Schweller Randall L, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, (Fall 2004), p. 159. Balance of power apostolates such as Kenneth Waltz assert: “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it.” Waltz Kenneth N, "America as a Model To The World," Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, (December 1991), p. 669. Likewise, Christopher Layne writes: “Notwithstanding the predictions derived from hegemonic stability theory, balance of threat theory, and the liberal approach to international relations, it is doubtful that America’s hegemony will endure. Neorealist theory predicts that states will balance against the hegemons, even those like the United States that seek to maintain their pre-eminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion.” Layne Christopher, "The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony," In. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, edited by Paul T.V, (Standford: Standford University Press), 2004, p. 115. Drawing on the same logic Mearsheimer claims: “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.” Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 21. In short, it may be this balance of power logic, developed in the context of the European Westphalian system applied to the current international structure, that is at the source of this international relations theoretical puzzle. 24 Extrapolation is necessary since the existing theories do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. We are back to my “unipolar theoretical puzzle”. 25 Hard line offensive realism will be developed in depth in chapter II. It will provide us with the core assumptions and predictions to understand the hegemon’s behaviour in a unipolar distribution of power. Offensive defensive, and structural liberalism will also be shortly discussed in chapter II. All the theories predictions will be tested and confronted in chapter III, IV and V. 26 Walt Stephen M, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, (December 1997), p. 61.
UNIGE / SES - 9 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction realism is a theory of international politics that seeks to outline and explain what effects the unipolar distribution of power has on the behavior of the hegemon, particularly on its power seeking behavior.27
Hard-line realism follows Waltz’s old adage: “States actions are not determined by structure. Rather structures shape and shove, they encourage states to do some things and refrain from doing others”28
Hard-line realism does not wish to supersede the prevailing structural realist theory. Moreover, I base my arguments on the same assumptions. Nevertheless I propose an alternative approach to understand unipolarity and its consequences on international politics. In short, I will emphasize the hierarchical character of world politics as opposed to the equilibrium strand championed by traditional neorealist theories. It is not an attempt to put yet another label in the already existing realist jargon. As outlined by
Charles Glaser: “The divergences are important to understand and resolve because the different strands of realism can provide quite different policy prescriptions.”29
1.1. The Significance of the Debate
The chief goal in writing this dissertation is to refute the conventional wisdom that the post Cold War international order is benign and that the United States hegemony is restraint and benevolent.30 My argument is straightforward: the U.S. position in the international order and its role in shaping the international system is driven by power considerations. This is a outcome of the asymmetries in the international distribution of power i.e. unipolarity. Thus, the unipolar distribution of power has dramatic
27 Hard Line realism, like all its structural counterparts is a theory of international politics. Nevertheless it can help us understand foreign policy issues. Kenneth Waltz argues that a theory of international politics can explain international outcomes but cannot account for the foreign policy of individual states. Hard-line realism as a structural theory helps us understand the foreign policy that states choose to adopt given the particular pressures from the system. For a good overview on the debate between a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy see: Elman Colin, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?," Security Studies, vol. 6, no., (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-51 and Waltz’s response: Waltz Kenneth N, "International Politics is not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (Autumn 1996), pp. 52-55. 28 Waltz Kenneth N, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, (December 1997), p. 915. 29 Glaser Charles L, "Structural Realism in a More Complex World," Review of International Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, (July 2003), p. 404. 30 American officials tend to see the United States as a benevolent superpower. This is quite a logic way to see world politics by policy makers. Unfortunately it does not reflect the true nature of international politics. For example former Deputy Secretary of Treasury Lawrence H. Summers asserted: “The chief challenge of the United States today is maintaining its unprecedented role as the world's first outward-looking, nonimperial superpower.” Summers Lawrence H, "America: The First Nonimperialist Superpower," New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2, (Spring 1998), Although the international structure is heavily in favour of the United States, politics are always about power and the struggle for power.
UNIGE / SES - 10 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction effects on the hegemon’s power seeking strategies. In other words, when cooperation does not meet the hegemon’s strategic power calculations, it will use unilateralism and go it alone policies as an alternative strategy to promote its national interest and maximize its position in the system. From this perspective, power maximization strategies should increase rather than decrease as power asymmetries rise in a unipolar world configuration.31
It is a widely spread belief that a significant difference exists between past hegemonies and the current
American one. Past hegemonies were highly based on coercion and the assertive use of power. It fostered a high degree of resentment and great power rivalry. As theories of hegemony and great power politics predict, these hegemonies led to war and open conflict as soon as revisionist states had built up their military capabilities and accumulated enough power to balance the hegemon. The American hegemony since World War II totally reversed the “natural course” of hegemonies and gave birth to a new kind of domination based on an allegedly strategic restraint and cooperation order. The United
States usually gave considerable weight to its partners and its policies resulted often from a wide consensus within its sphere of influence.32 This “historical anomaly” often labeled benevolent hegemony engendered an un-coerced peace accepted by most states. This is a theoretical puzzle that does not fit well in with the realist logic of power. Indeed, according to most strands of realism, and above all offensive realism, no such animal (benevolent hegemony) exists in international politics.33 In fact, during
31 As I will show in chapter 2, power maximizing strategies can be pursued by acting unilaterally but also by using international institutions and multilateral frameworks in order to enhance one’s position. 32 On this aspect I totally disagree with John Ikenberry’s claim that the institutional order created after World War II was intentionally made by the U.S. to check and restrain its own power. Why would a state that has won the war and enjoys overwhelming power asymmetries build institutions for the purpose of intentionally limiting the exercise of its power? Ikenberry provides three major explanations. First of all, the leading state reinforces its power and lowers its enforcement costs in a constitutional order by giving the weaker states a stake in the system. A constitutional settlement reduces the necessity of the costly expenditure of resources by the leading state on bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement. Secondly, a constitutional order seals the fleeting power advantages and locks in favourable arrangements that persist beyond the zenith of the hegemon’s power. Finally, institutions are sticky and they are likely to persist and continue to shape the international order. See Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001, 54-57. On the third aspect see: Jervis Robert. Nau Henry R & Schweller Randall L, "Correspondence: Institutionalized Disagreement," International Security, vol. 27, no. 1, (Summer 2002), pp. 174- 177. 33 Indeed, according to Christopher Layne a benign hegemony does not exist in international politics and it is a construction that suits policymakers. A hegemony is a threat to the security of others simply because it is so powerful. The United States is not immune to the kind of geopolitical blowbacks experienced by previous hegemonic aspirants. Thus in a self-help world, the United States must perform the strategic equivalent of threading a needle. It cannot abrogate its freedom to act unilaterally to defend its interests but Washington simultaneously needs to find a grand strategy that reduces fears of U.S. preponderant power. Layne Christopher, "Offshore Balancing Revisited," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 243-244.
UNIGE / SES - 11 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction the Cold War, what restrained American power was not the so called “benevolent hegemony” but the
Soviet threat. What really restraint American power and also made it legitimate in the eyes of its allies was the Soviet threat and the need to cooperate within multilateral agreements and institutions in order to contain it. In other words, a common threat and a shared strategy to contain it made the American post-war international order seem benevolent, and in fact a high degree of concentration and cooperation existed. This cooperation, however, was the means to implement military containment of the Soviet Union through the projection of American power. As outlined by Robert Jervis: “The desire for survival and autonomy leads states to join together temporarily in order to stop a potential hegemon even though they have severe conflicts with each other and even if many would like to be hegemons themselves.”34
A closer examination of the U.S. hegemony since the end of the Cold War reveals some interesting aspects. Indeed my hypothesis claims that since the collapse of bipolarity the nature of the American hegemony is more and more driven by power considerations, although the threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared. Put differently, it “appears” less restraint and more power oriented.35 As power asymmetries resulting from the unipolar world structure grow deeper, and the common threat of the
Soviet Union vanished, self interest and power politics have become a central component in American foreign policy. There is a rather simple structural explanation to that. Unipolarity offers the hegemon unprecedented freedom of action. The huge asymmetries in power set out a new pattern of behavior that is dictated by choice rather than necessity. As brilliantly outlined by Brooks and Wohlforth:
“Historically, the major forces pushing powerful states towards restraint and magnanimity have been the limits of their strength and the fear of overextension and balancing. Great powers typically checked their ambitions and differed to others not because they wanted to but because they had to in order to win the
34 Jervis Robert, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," The American Historical Review, vol. 97, no. 3, (June 1992), p. 718. 35 The United States has been power oriented ever since the World War II. Nevertheless structural aspects of the Cold War and the bipolar distribution of power highly limited America’s hegemonic aspirations to the Western Hemisphere. Now that the distribution of power is unipolar, the whole international system is its own “backyard”. On American hegemony since World War II see: Zakaria Fareed, From Wealth To Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999,199 p. and Layne Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University press), 2006,pp. 39-51.
UNIGE / SES - 12 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction cooperation they needed to survive and prosper.”36 Unilateralism is thus the default strategy of great powers and the United States is not immune to that trend. Indeed, the pressures and temptations of great powers create incentives to act more aggressively. According to Robert Jervis: “The forceful and unilateral exercise of U.S. power is not simply the by-product of September 11, the Bush administration, or some shadowy neoconservative cabal, it is the logical outcome of the current unrivaled U.S. position in the international system. Put simply, power is checked most effectively by counterbalancing power and a states that is not subject to severe external pressures tends to feel few restraints at all.”37
This may seem misguided and counterproductive but it is a normal pattern for hegemons, and even more compelling in a unipolar world. I claim that the U.S. is currently shifting towards a more coercive hegemony in accordance with the traditional realist predictions. Indeed, the United States has the means to adopt power maximizing strategies and its political leaders, as well as members of the
Congress, show no restraint in doing so, even on issues that are not vital for its national interest or its national security. As clearly outlined by Richard Lebow: “In fifty years we have come full circle in our foreign policy discourse. The Cold War ended more than a decade ago, but the discourse it empowered continues to exercise its hold over American foreign policy. The Clinton and the Bush administration have refracted almost every important foreign decision through the prism of narrow self-interest, and have had no compunction, quite the reverse, about publicly justifying their policies on this basis.”38
Power maximization and hegemony will be in the foreground and serve as a catalyst for the doctoral research. The concept of hegemony is well known in the field of international politics. Its theoretical conceptualization has been argued by scholars from broad range of theoretical approaches such as realists, neo-realists, Marxist, liberals etc. It had a widespread audience in the academic debate during the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, hegemonic theory was neglected and underestimated by a large number of scholars and students in international relations. As underlined by William
Wohlforth: “Hegemonic theory has received short shrift in the debate on the nature of the post Cold War
36 Brooks Stephen G & Wohlforth William C, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, (July- August 2002), p. 31. 37 Jervis Robert, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy, vol. 137, no. 1, (July/August 2003), p. 84. 38 Lebow Richard Ned, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interest and Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2003, p. 18.
UNIGE / SES - 13 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction international system.”39 Paradoxically, the concept of hegemony and particularly American hegemony is widespread in the journalistic language. Gradually, hegemony has lost its academic legitimacy and has turned into a widely used and misused “catch all” concept. It is not simple to understand the reasons underlying the neglect of the concept of hegemony as a heuristic tool. First of all, the notion of unipolarity has a wide audience in the post Cold War academic debate pushing the notion of hegemony to the sidelines. Scholars, reluctant to the use of this concept, wrongly link it to the notion of empire.
Others, embracing the neorealist approach of the anarchic nature of the international structure, reject this notion that emphasizes a hierarchical approach to power politics rather than equilibrium.40 As
Michael Cox suggests: “The case against hegemony was certainly a powerful one, and clearly convinced many commentators that they were better off sticking to the theoretically simpler, perhaps politically less controversial notion of unipolarity, rather than risking their reputation defending something that even its supporters agree was ambiguous and potentially misleading.”41 Thus hegemony as well as unipolarity are the key concepts. As previously stated, the neorealist balance of power approach voluntarily or not, omits unipolarity as a possible world configuration. Some leading neorealist scholars such as John Mearsheimer states that the current world order is not unipolar since the United States is not a global hegemon. Kenneth Waltz argues that unipolarity is a momentary “anomaly” of the system and the balance of power will soon be restored.42 Thus, much of the neorealist debate on unipolarity is fostered on its durability rather than on its implications to understand world politics. John Ikenberry is partly right when he asserts: “The durability of American hegemony and Western world order is a puzzle primarily because scholars of international relations have tented to rely on realist theories of balance and hegemony to explain it. […] To understand the continued primacy of the United States and the continued durability and cohesion of the advanced industrial world, we need to go beyond our existing
39 Wohlforth William C, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, vol. 24, no. 1, (Summer 1999), p. 23. 40 In the hierarchical view the international system comprises an overwhelming powerful state that the other states do not and can’t counterbalance. States are able to translate their power resources into political preeminence. The equilibrium tradition, i.e. tenants of the balance of power logic argue that any concentration of power in the hands of one state is bound to fail because states will balance against the rising hegemon. 41 Cox Michael, "September 11th and U.S. Hegemony - Or will the 21st Century Be American Too," International Studies Perspectives, vol., no. 3, (2002), pp. 53-70. 42 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 381, Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
UNIGE / SES - 14 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction theories of hegemony and balance.”43 Nevertheless, I advocate that hard-line realism and its power maximizing component in a unipolar world provides crucial aspects for the understanding of the debate.
Since hard-line realism is based on a hierarchical rather than an equilibrium approach, it will provide us with elements to understand hegemony and how the distribution of capabilities within the international structure affects the hegemon’s strategies. I will focus solely on the hegemon’s strategy and will thus not address the reactions of weaker states to the hegemon’s overwhelming power.
Both hard-line realism and the concept of hegemony will provide us with important heuristic and conceptual tools. Thus, hegemony as a theoretical concept must be adapted to the complexity of post
Cold War geopolitics. Indeed, post Cold War American foreign policy and especially the current Bush administration can be characterized as “hegemonist”44. It rests on five pillars which are familiar to anyone stepped in the realist tradition. First of all, the United States lives in a dangerous world (anarchic world order). Second, self-interested nation-states striving for power maximization are the key actors in world politics (VS liberalism). Third, power and mainly hard power is a sate’s main asset in the anarchic world structure (power maximization). Fourth, multilateral agreements and institutions are neither essential nor necessarily conducive to American interests (unilateralism). 45 Finally there is a sole super- hegemonic-power in the international system (hegemony).
To this day, a conclusive attempt to theoretically highlight and understand the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world does not exist. Here lies the originality of my approach. By developing a realist theory of unipolarity, I go beyond the existing analysis, emphasizing on the international structure and its effects on world politics. The resulting asymmetries in the distribution of power confers a hegemonic status to the United States. This status implies that the hegemon can act according to its broad national interest and use a wide range of strategies and first and foremost, power maximization.
43 Ikenberry John G, "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order," In. International Order and the Future of World Order, edited by Paul T.V & Hall John H, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1999, pp. 123- 124. 44 John Van Oudenaren clearly defined this fact by characterizing the hardliners of the Bush administration unipolar unilateralists: “They see the distribution of power in the international system as essentially unipolar. They also embrace unilateral policies as the means by which the United States must protect its interests and act for the greater good of humanity.” For a conclusive overview of the different intellectual approaches towards unilateralism and polarity see: Oudenaren Van John, "Unipolar Versus Unilateral," Policy Review, vol., no. 124, (April-May 2004), pp. 1-10. 45 See Daalder Ivo H & Lindsay James M, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press), 2003, pp. 41-46.
UNIGE / SES - 15 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction
1.2. Why the United States?
Power maximization is not a political strategy used solely by the United States. Every state, and more specifically the most powerful ones have at some point or another sought to promote their interests through power maximization strategies. Therefore, why focus this study essentially on the United
States? Why is the case of the United States more relevant than other great powers?
As we will see in the following chapters, effective power maximization strategies are a matter of both relative power and scale. The current asymmetries in power are such that the United States has no peer competitors. The U.S. is the only state in the system that can rely on its own tools in order to influence as well as seek to shape the world order according to its interests. These tools include multilateral agreements and institutions but also unilateralism when it best serves its interests. The United States is preponderant in all aspects of power, i.e. economically, technologically, politically, and above all militarily.46 Thus, its capacity to globally project its power is unprecedented. Whether the U.S will be able to sustain its preponderant power and remain the sole superpower on the long term is uncertain, but we can predict that for at least the next decade the United States will stand aloof. Which are the alternatives and potential challengers to U.S. preeminence and what are the consequences for my study? A host of scholars tend to see the European Union, China, Russia as well as India as tomorrow’s would-be hegemons.47 Although each of these states has a huge potential in one or the other components of power, none of them is able to match or counterbalance the United States. Russian power has been declining since the end of the Cold War. It has a hard time keeping its preeminence in its sphere of influence. Indeed, the United States maintains two military basis in Central Asia, formerly
Russia’s strategic “backyard”.48 Although Russia is slowly recovering, its capacity to project power are relatively weak. China and India are fast-growing powers and their regional influence is strong. They have far-reaching ambitions and are developing their economies on a wide scale. Nevertheless, for the
46 On the military aspects of U.S. preponderance see: Posen Barry R, "Command of the Commons : The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security, vol. 28, no. 1, (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46. 47 For an interesting view on Europe as a peer competitor see: Kupchan Charles A, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century, ( New York: Knopf), 2002,368 p. 48 Karshi-Khanabad Air Base is located in southern Uzbekistan not far from Tajikistan; Manas Air Base is situated just north of Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The United States began leasing both Soviet-era bases during the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. They are used primarily to station soldiers, refuelling jets, and cargo planes. Each airfield houses roughly 1,000 U.S. troops and civilian contractors. For more information about U.S. basis in Central Asia see: http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/asia.html#2
UNIGE / SES - 16 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction time being they are focusing on their economic development. Finally, the European Union is a regional power that must be taken into account. In the economic realm its capacity is roughly equal to that of the
United States. Even when acting in common, the EU does not have the capacity to wield its influence on a global scale and its power projections capabilities are marginal at least in their effectiveness.
Thus when looking at the existing powers, it is clear that only the United States has the sufficient amount of power to project and maximize it on a large scale. On the other hand, I wish to analyze the effects of the current distribution of power on the hegemons behavior. Hence only the case of the United
States provides us with both a hegemonic position and an unprecedented use of power maximizing strategies.
1.3. The Research Design
In order to test my theory with my case studies, I will use the case processing tracing method through observation.49 Testing my theory means I am going to test its causal logic.50 A good theory contains a hypothesis that emphasizes an association between a dependant variable, in the case at hand, the political behavior of great powers when confronted with strategic decisions to enhance its interests, and an independent variable i.e. the unipolar distribution power. The causal logic explains the connection between these two variables. I must determine whether the dependant and independent variables are interconnected. Theories indicate what is connected with what and how the connections are made. They convey a sense of how things work, of how they hang together.51 In the case at hand, the optimal tool to test the interconnection is process-tracing. Process-tracing methods seek to find “causal mechanisms” by drawing out the observable implications of each theory’s hypothesis while testing empirical observations against historical evidence. In the case at hand, if the predictions of hard line realism are
49 I chose case studies rather than large-n and statistical analysis because the latter are not relevant for my topic. I analyzed a small number of cases in detail in order to see if events unwrap as predicted by the theory. I also used observation instead of experimentation because it is the prime method for testing in political science. The observer infers predictions from the theory. He then observes the data without imposing an external stimulus on the situation and asks whether the observations are congruent with the predictions. 50 I drew my approach from : Van Evera Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1997, pp. 1-88, George Alexander L & Bennett Andrew, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT Press), 2004,pp. 115-124. and Quivy Raymond & Campenhoudt Luc Van, Manuel de recherche en sciences sociales, (Paris: Dunod), 1995, 282 p. 51 Van Evera, p. 12.
UNIGE / SES - 17 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction true, one can make the observations called for in the empirical statement to see whether or not they are true.52
I will explore the chain of events of the decision making process in order to see which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variables and outcomes is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps. I will then look for observable evidence of each step. In the case at hand, the unipolar international structure provides incentives for the hegemon to maximize its power. We should find, in cases of high asymmetries of power, evidence of intervening phenomena that form the causal chains by which unipolarity favors power maximization strategies. The process-tracing method is highly relevant in my case. Indeed, by disaggregating the dependent variable into multiple discrete outcomes, I will be able to have an in-depth test of my hypothesis. For example, the White House and the Pentagon might have different options on a given case. Put simply which one won the case and does that correlate the initial hypothesis?
Ideally, I must examine the sequence of events as well as the claims of actors about why they acted as they did. Did events unfold in the order that the theory’s logics predict? Did relevant decision makers act as the causal logics would expect? The more these predictions are corroborated, the more credible the theory becomes, and the more they turn out to be false, the more skeptical we ought to be about the credibility of the theory from which they were derived.53
In order to test my theory, I will check the historical record in order to find out if there is good evidence to support the causal logics. On the other hand, I will go through an alternative series of tests by confronting my causal logic to the other approaches. Causal hypothesis deduced from each of the four general theories will be subject to multiple tests to see if they can withstand repeated assaults by the empirical evidence. The predictions made by offensive and defensive realism, structural liberalism as well as hard-line realism are conflicting. This is very interesting for my research since the more empirical support I will find for my theory, the better it will stand as an alternative explanatory realm.
In order to test the causal logic of my hypothesis, I will examine some important case studies that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. A special emphasis will be made on the first and second W.
52 Stinchcombe Arthur L, Constructing Social Theories, (Chicago: Chicago University Press), 1987, p. 17. 53 Rosato Sebastian, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 4, (Novembre 2003), pp. 585-586.
UNIGE / SES - 18 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction
Bush administrations. Even though Clinton’s records on all the cases were also compelling, the Bush administration has an impressive record in power maximizing strategies. Since this period, America’s inclination towards power maximizing strategies has dramatically increased. At the the end of the Cold
War, partnerships, concentration and cooperation were still the norm. By the turn of the millennium,
America’s vision of world politics, reinforced by the unipolar world structure can be characterized by power seeking strategies. Through my case studies, I will analyze when and why the hegemon pursues power maximizing strategies.
This dissertation covers fifteen years of post Cold War international politics and will focus on two major events that either led to war or to “international crisis.” I will go through two consecutive case studies, which both have different characteristics, in their nature, their political process as well as their outcomes. Chronologically, the first case will emphasize the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP). I will analyze what was the underlying U.S. logic behind the ESDP. The second case will deal with the long march to the war in Iraq. With this case, I seek to provide a parsimonious explanation that challenges the various current interpretations of events. Since I focus on a single case i.e. the United
States, it is of the utmost importance to test the logic of my argument against alternative theories.54
Thus the causal logic deduced from hard-line realism will be tested against the causal hypothesis deduced from alternative theoretical approaches such as offensive and defensive realism and structural liberalism. Hard-line realism and the alternative theories will be subject to multiple tests in order to see if they can stand the empirical evidence.
54 Since 1991 we are confronted with the first unipolar era in history. It is thus impossible to have a comparative historical approach between two or more unipolar eras. Nevertheless, even if I can only rely on American unipolarity, I have two important cases to test the causal hypothesis of my theory. As outlined by Stephen Van Evera: “One tests a theory by asking if the empirical evidence confirms the theory’s predictions, not by asking how many cases the theory can explain. A theory may explain few cases because its causal phenomenon is rare or because it requires special hothouse conditions to operate, but can still operate strongly when these conditions are present. Such a theory explains few cases but is nevertheless valid. The number of cases a theory explains does shed light on its utility: the more cases the theory explains, the more useful the theory, other things being equal. Still, even theories that explain very few cases are valuable if these cases are important and the theory explains them well.” Van Evera Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1997, p. 39.
UNIGE / SES - 19 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction
1.4. The Plan of the Dissertation
The first part (Part I) of the dissertation will be devoted to set up my theoretical framework. It will focus mainly on the realist research program. Indeed as I pointed out, the realist research program and its core assumptions is the ideal heuristic approach to grasp power politics and power driven strategies in international politics. I will propose a realist theory of unipolarity I have labeled hard-line realism. This theoretical framework brings us to the heart of the doctoral thesis, i.e. power maximizing strategies in a unipolar world. I will focus on the use of power by the hegemon in the post Cold War international order.
It will propose a straightforward definition and will discuss its importance in understanding the contemporary international system. It will lay the main conceptual aspects and discuss the importance of clarity and the need to embed power maximizing strategies in a wider theoretical approach to unipolar world politics. I will then test it against alternative realist and non realist theories. Special attention will be given to the offensive and defensive approach as well as the liberal structural approach.
The second and third part (Part II & III) are devoted to empirical analysis. I will focus on two case studies. I will analyze these cases through my theoretical “lens”. I will first use the case of the European
Security and Defense Architecture since the end of the Cold War. Secondly, I will focus on the case of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) and the war in Iraq. Part II devoted to the European Security Architecture will be divided in five sub-chapters corresponding to different historical periods, each having its own logic. Part III will focus on the 2002 NSS and its consequences on the war in Iraq. As pointed out previously, my case studies are based on the sole unipolar era in history. Thus there will be no historical dialectic with previous unipolar eras. To palliate this aspect and correctly test the validity of my causal hypothesis, I will test it against alternative theories. Nonetheless I will compare my findings to historical cases of the Cold War. This will enable me to highlight that
“comparable” cases do not produce similar outcomes when the distribution of power is unipolar or bipolar. I focus primarily on security issues, since security is the primary goal of states. After each case study, I will carry out an empirical evaluation of the hard-line realist approach. I will test the strengths and weaknesses of my theory and the relevance of its core assumptions and predictions. I will also discuss the alternative theories and their capacity to enlighten the current distribution of power and its implications on the hegemon’s behavior. This is a crucial task since it will test the relevance of my
UNIGE / SES - 20 - Olivier Brighenti Introduction approach and its validity as a theoretical tool to understand the contemporary unipolar world structure.
Part IV concludes this dissertation and provides some prescriptions for future analysis. It will also summarize my arguments and findings and give an assessment of the alternative theories.
UNIGE / SES - 21 - Olivier Brighenti PART I
Theorizing Unipolarity: Hard-Line Realism and the Understanding of Power Maximization Strategies in Contemporary International Politics
Part I
2. Theorizing Unipolarity: Hard-Line Realism and the Understanding of power maximization strategies In Contemporary International Politics
My central claim is that the hegemon in a unipolar world maximizes its power ad infinitum. Thus, the unipolar configuration of the international system sets out a new path for the study of power politics and power maximizing strategies. Hard-line realism goes beyond the classical balance of power theory and embraces the idea that there is no status quo power in a unipolar international system. Thus, once the hegemon has achieved regional hegemony it will strive for global domination. Hence the international system is composed of a single regional hegemon that has overwhelming power over the other minor powers but is not satisfied with its current hegemonic position. Consequently, it will always seek more power. Thus, the motto of hard-line realism is the trust in global hegemony and a hierarchical approach to international politics. The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the causal logic of this claim and unfold my theory. There is no explicit alternative theory of unipolarity. Therefore secondly, I will take the underlying logic of both offensive and defensive realism as well as structural liberalism in order to see what they would predict in a unipolar world. I will stress on how their predictions diverge from those of hard line realism and how that can affect the understanding of unipolarity. Once unipolarity has been set as the “common denominator” of all four approaches, I will provide a finer grained comparative layout of these competing theories. This will provide us with the indispensable comparative causal hypothesis.
2.1. Hard-Line Realism: A Realist Theory of Unipolarity
Hard-line realism is based on the principles of realism and it embraces most of its core assumptions.55 It parts ways with offensive and defensive realism on the issue of balance of power and on the existence of a global hegemony as well as a hierarchical approach to world politics.56
55 Although there are competing visions within the realist research program, all the key tenants from the various strands of realism subscribe to a minimal common denominator. They confer a different degree of importance to one assumption over the other, but realist scholars regardless to their school of thought adhere to some degree to these common assumptions. In other words, these core assumptions set the grassroots of the discipline. The predictions they will derive from these common core assumptions will differentiate from one strand of realism to another. 56 As with every theory, hard-line realism is a simplification of reality. Simplification implies that the theory cannot account for every single aspect of the question at stake. For a good overview on the parsimony of Neorealism see: Snyder Glenn H, "Process Variables in Neorealist Theory," Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, (Spring 1996), pp. 167-
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My theory draws on six main assumptions. These assumptions are similar to most strands of realism. 57
First of all, the international system is anarchic. That means that the system is made of independent states each beholden to no higher authority than itself.58 In other words, a world with no “central government” to enforce rules and ensure state security can be characterized as anarchic. Anarchy, thus, has nothing to do with “chaos”, instead it entails that there is no power above the state capable of regulating the international system.
The second assumption is that states are the most important actors in the conduct of international politics. States must be seen as politically organized bodies with clear political arrangements and apparatus that structures the political life of a geographically delimited entity. States are a distinct entity from the sum of particular interests; as an entity with the capability and inclination to pursue its own agenda; and as the principal actor in international relations.59 Interactions between nation-states, not between individuals, classes, firms, transnational corporations or international institutions, best enlighten the international reality.60
192. Having an overall and in-depth view of power maximizations strategies in a unipolar world would require to use other sets of theories accounting for foreign policy behavior. I have voluntarily limited this research to deal with the question of how the hegemon behaves in a given situation when pressures from the system provides it with incentives to choose one strategy or the other. 57 The following is based mainly on : Grieco Joseph M, "Anarchy And The Limits Of Cooperation: A Realist Critique Of The Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, (Summer 1998), pp. 485.507, Gilpin Robert G, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," In. Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Keohane Robert O, (New York: Columbia university Press), 1988, pp. 301-321, Gilpin Robert G, "No One Loves a Political Realist," Security Studies, vol., no. 5, (Spring 1996), pp. 6-8, Schweller Randall L & Priess David, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, vol., no. 41, (1997), p.6, Glaser Charles L, "The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism," In. Realism and the Balancing of Power, edited by Vasquez John A & Elman Colin, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall), 2003, p. 267, Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, pp. 30-32, Mearsheimer John J, "The False Promise Of International Institutions," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 9-12, Keohane Robert O, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," In. Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Keohane Robert O, (New York: Columbia university Press), 1988, pp. 164-165, Frankel Benjamin, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, vol., no. 5, (Spring 1996), pp. xiv-xviii. 58 Mastanduno Michael Lake David A & Ikenberry John G, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4, (December 1989), p. 459. 59 Kirshner Jonathan, "The political Economy of Realism," In. Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, edited by Kapstein Ethan Mastanduno Michael, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1999, p. 72. 60 The state-centered approach has been widely criticized by tenants of the liberal institutionalism. They advocate that the nation state has become less central and is being challenged by non-state entities as important actors in international politics. Even if realism and its state-centered vision is not the best in accounting for the role of non- state actors, this does in no ways mean that the state is not relevant anymore. States structure foreign policy, they set the agenda of the major events that are taking place in the international arena. Non-state actors do play a role in international politics, but it remains marginal and indissociable from state action. First and foremost non-state actors must not be overestimated as it has been throughout the 80’s and at the end of the Cold War. Stephen Krasner brilliantly put this problem into perspective asserting: “In recent years, students of international relations have multinationalized, transnationalized, bureaucratized and transgovernmentalized the state until it has virtually
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The third assumption, is that states cannot be certain of other states’ intentions. This does not mean that states continuously aggress each other and that there is a perpetual state of war. International politics is made above all of uncertainty and no state, even an ally, can be totally reliable.
The fourth assumption underlines that every state has some offensive military capacities. Most realists focus solely on military capabilities to evaluate state power. It is true that military capabilities are of the utmost importance, but they cannot alone explain the amount of power a state has accumulated. Hard line offensive realism states that explaining great power status needs to take into account economic power as well. In fact, military power is greatly related to the economic resources of a state. In other words, a state with scarce economic resources cannot aspire to great power status.
The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors. States are aware of the dangers existing in the international system and choose adequate strategies to respond to those dangers. States adopt rational policies in order to achieve power. States do not adopt mad frenzy politics. On the contrary, they think about their actions in a rational manner to minimize the costs while maximizing the benefits.
Miscalculation is possible and has dear consequences, but in general terms, states act in a rational way.
The sixth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of states.61 Indeed, if a state cannot guarantee its survival it will be unable to pursue other goals. This very basic assumption is without contest the most important of all realist assumptions. As stated by Waltz: “Beyond the survival motive, the claims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone. Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities.”62
Taken together, these core assumptions provide us with an interesting pattern of state behavior in a unipolar world.
ceased to exist as an analytic construct. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading.” See: Krasner Stephen D, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, (April 1976), p. 317. 61 For a full statement on the aspect of survival see: Howes Dustin E, "When States Choose to Die: Reassessing Assumptions About What States Want," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 4, (December 2003), pp. 669- 692. 62 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979,pp. 91-92.
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2.1.1. The Hegemon’s Behavior in a Unipolar World A unipolar world configuration has its own logic that differs strongly from that of a multipolar or bipolar one. Hence consequently, the behavior of a great power in a unipolar world is bound to be different than a bipolar or multipolar world. Indeed the underlying logic of a unipolar world depends on the maintenance of asymmetrical power relations as well as the capacity of the hegemon to maximize its power whenever it is in its strategic interest. In a multipolar or bipolar world, there is a logic of equilibrium. In both power distributions, the underlying principle is the balance of power. A unipolar world, on the other hand, is based on an unequivocal hierarchy of power and an overwhelming dominant hegemonic power.63 Hard-line realism is based not on the equilibrium conception of balance of power but on hierarchy. In a unipolar configuration led by a sole superpower, there is no place for equilibrium and balance of power.64 David Lake writes that: “in anarchy, each party of the relationship possess full residual rights of control […] in hierarchy, one party, the dominant member, possess the right to make residual decisions, while the other party, the subordinate member, lacks this right.65
In a unipolar world order, the architecture of the system is dictated by hierarchy and power capabilities.
They ensure not only security to the hegemon, but also power and influence over other states. William
63 Hierarchy does not mean total control. As Robert Gilpin underlines : “When we speak of control over the international system, this term must be understood as ‘relative control’ and ‘seeking to control’. No state has ever completely controlled an international system; for that matter, no domestic government, not even the most totalitarian, has completely controlled a domestic society.” Gilpin Robert G, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981, p. 28. Thus the hegemonic power does not have a total control over the system. The system is just less anarchic than it would be in the absence of a hegemonic power. This does not mean that the hegemon will have the ability to get its way all the times. It will just get its way more often than others. As outlined by Waltz: “The more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing with the les powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how.” Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 194. 64 Kenneth Waltz as the “chef de file” and all the tenants of equilibrium balance of power call equilibrium a “law”. Consequently as already outlined before, an equilibrium tends to emerge in response to a hegemon. Each state acts in accordance to prevent another state from taking the lead in the system. Such an equilibrium is possible in a multipolar or bipolar world, but merely impossible in a unipolar world such as the one resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other words, the dominant state is too powerful to be balanced in a unipolar world. Since states are rational actors they will try to balance the dominant state, measuring risks, opportunities and benefits. Since the costs exceed the benefits, there is no balancing and consequently no equilibrium. For an in depth debate on balancing in a unipolar world see: Brooks Stephen G & Wohlforth William C, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, (Summer 2005), pp. 72-108, Paul T.V, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, (Summer 2005), pp. 46-71, Pape Robert A, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, (Summer 2005), pp. 7-45, Lieber Keir A & Alexander Gerard, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, (Summer 2005), pp. 109-139 and Art Robert J. Brooks Stephen G. Wohlforth William C & Lieber Keir A, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," International Security, vol. 30, no. 3, (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 177-196. 65 Lake David A, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," International Organization, vol. 50, no. 1, (Winter 1996), p. 7.
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Wohlforth nicely summarized hierarchical view of world politics: “In most periods one state or group of states will enjoy pre-eminence, or hegemony, which in the final analysis rests on power. The important thing that happens in world politics revolve around the struggle for influence, occasionally called the struggle for power or prestige.”66
A genuine hierarchic system with an uncontested hegemon does not engender counterbalancing because the hegemon is simply too powerful to be balanced. This view dramatically contradicts the balance of power logic, but it is the sole realist approach to world politics that can understand unipolarity and its consequences on the conduct of world politics. In effect, despite the huge gap in the distribution of power, no state or coalition of states have responded in the way anticipated by balance of power theory.67 Hard-line realism offers an alternative explanatory realm. In effect, in a hierarchical view, the hegemon is capable of transforming its overwhelming power into global pre-eminence. Thus, in a unipolar world, the natural tendency of minor states is to bandwagon with the hegemon since balancing is virtually impossible.68 As I will highlight further in this section, bandwagoning enables minor powers to
“have a share of the pie”.
Although a unipolar world is based on a more hierarchic system, anarchy as a basic feature of the international system has not vanished. The use of force is always a possibility. Thus as phrased by
Joseph Grieco: “international anarchy implies that there is no overreaching authority to prevent others from using violence or the threat of violence, to dominate or even destroy them”69 International politics are then, in one sense, always power politics. Common usage applies the term ‘political’ not to all activities of the state, but to issues involving a conflict of power. It is in these terms that E. H. Carr introduces his chapter on power in international politics.70 In a world characterized by extreme rivalry,
66 Wohlforth William C, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1994, 12. 67 For a wide range of contrasting views on this aspect see: Ikenberry John G, ed. America Unrivalled; The Future of the Balance of Power, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002. 317 p. 68 Bandwagoning is a term used in the American electoral process. When a candidate seems to distance himself from his rivals, neutrals, undecided voters and even some adversaries tend to follow the rising candidate to share and take advantage of his victory. Bandwagonners tend to maximize their gains by siding with the strongest candidate. This logic can be transposed to international politics where weaker states will join the rising hegemon in order to take advantage of the potential victory. 69 Grieco Joseph M & Katzenstein Peter J, ed. Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1990. p. 38. 70 Carr Edward H, The Twenty Years' Crisis, (Wiltshire: Palgrave), 2001, p. 97.
UNIGE / SES - 26 - Olivier Brighenti Part I political anarchy and highly conflicting interests in a wide range of states prerogatives comprising military, economic, cultural, and political competition, interests defined in terms of power is unquestionably the most important common feature of the realist tradition. What do I intend by power?71
I define power as the material capabilities a state possesses.
States are well aware of the vulnerability of the system and that no international governing body will guarantee its security and survival in the long term. Thereby, states are motivated primarily by the accumulation of power whether they seek world mastery or simply to be left alone. In Stephen Walt’s words: “The realist tradition places power at the center of political life: It sees the acquisition and management of power as the main issue that political actors face.”72
In an international system characterized by anarchy, states fear each other and can never be sure of other states’ intentions. There is no place for trust, even from traditional allies. Hard-line realism outlines that the imperative of survival forces the hegemon to adopt strategies that maximize its military, economic as well as political power relative to the other states in the system. The notion and the definition of power is central for all aspects of social interactions. In a world divided into competing states, political, economic, and security dimensions are backed by power and competing groups will seek to maximize their power.
For hard line realism, a hegemon can never be a status quo power.73 Hence states can never afford to be satisfied with a given amount of power. Once they have achieved regional hegemony, they do not turn into status quo powers74. On the contrary, they strive for preeminence with global hegemony as the
71 The Anglo-Saxon conception of Political Power seems much more accurate than the French terminology of “pouvoir politique” or “force politique”. The definition proposed by Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations, enlightens this ambiguous concept: “By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large. Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exert on the latter’s minds. The impact derives from three sources: the expectation of benefit, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men or institutions. It may be exerted through orders, threats, the authority or charisma of a man or of an office, or the combination of any of these.” Morgenthau Hans J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1993, p. 30-31. 72 Walt Stephen M, "The Enduring Relevance Of The Realist Tradition," In. Political Science: The State Of The Discipline, edited by Katznelson Ira & Milner Helen V, (New York: Norton Press), 2002, p. 200. 73 Status quo states seek self preservation and the protection of values they already possess. They are security maximizers not power maximizers. On this aspect see: Schweller Randall L, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing The Revisionist State Back In," International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, (Summer 1994), pp. 85-88. 74 Christopher Layne who probably wrote the most pertinent critic on Mearsheimer’s seminal work asserts: “Here we get to the nub: the causal logic of offensive realism suggests that regional hegemons cannot be status quo powers. That is, they cannot afford to rest on their twin laurels as the dominant power in their own regions, and as an
UNIGE / SES - 27 - Olivier Brighenti Part I ultimate goal. Based on the principle that states can never afford to be satisfied with a given amount of power, hard-line realism stresses that states having achieved regional hegemony look for every opportunity to gain more power and attain global hegemony. In unipolarity the hegemon is a revisionist state. Revisionist states value what they covert even more than what they already have. They will use all the means in order to extend their values. Given this fact, they will do it at the expense of rivals and allies alike. The only way to be certain about security and other states intentions is by eliminating competitors and every revisionist intention. Only global dominance and the perpetuation of unipolarity can provide the hegemon with this kind of security. To achieve this goal, the hegemon has at its disposal quantity of options. Since it is the most powerful state in the system it can eliminate, subjugate, subordinate, weaken potential rivals, and would-be competitors. It can do so through pure military tactics, threats, economic retaliation or incentives, aggressive diplomacy, cooperation, and unilateral power maximizing strategies. In other words, the constant quest for power pushes invariably the regional hegemon towards global status. Once it has attained global hegemony it does not turn into a status quo power. It must always “look over its shoulder”, wave sticks or give carrots in order to maintain its position in an uncertain world. Even when a state attains global hegemony, its quest to maximize its relative power does not stop, and it cannot relax its guard. Hegemons cannot be status quo powers because they want to maintain their preponderance, they fear the emergence of new rivals who could challenge their preeminence and revert the international structure. Power is never given because there is no guarantee that the distribution of power will not change adversely in the future.75
2.1.2. Unlimited Hegemony As I have highlighted earlier, the hegemon in a unipolar world strives to gain even more power over its rivals in order to attain global domination. Once the hegemon has achieved this dominant position it does not become a status quo power because it has to maintain its position, in the system and defeat any revisionist moves to take its place. Thus, status quo powers do not exist in a unipolar international configuration since they strive for primacy and once they attain primacy they struggle to keep that
offshore balancer with respect to distant regions. Layne Christopher, "The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon," Security Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, (Winter 2002/2003), p. 130. 75 Layne Christopher, "American Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 23, no. 3, (September 2000), p. 65.
UNIGE / SES - 28 - Olivier Brighenti Part I dominant position by all means. What exactly is a global hegemony and what are the implications for the conduct of world politics?
A global hegemon in one that dominates the entire international system. Its power is such that it has no peer competitor that can challenge its dominant position. In other words, this means that there is no other hegemon in the system. A global hegemony can be characterized by its ability to mobilize large capabilities, be they economic, military or technological all over the world in a limited amount of time. It can project its power throughout the world without being challenged. A global hegemon is capable of dominating the international system through its capabilities and its strategic behavior. Global hegemony is the ability to control effectively important international outcomes. A global hegemon is capable of shaping the international system in accordance with its strategic interests.76
There has been no global hegemony throughout history. This can be explained by the fact that there has been no unipolar world configuration prior to the one established at the end of the Cold War. For a global hegemony to be possible, the world structure must be unipolar. If the world is not unipolar, in other words dominated by a single pole, global hegemony is virtually impossible. If there are other poles in the system, the best a state can achieve is regional hegemony in its own sphere of influence.
What is a regional hegemon and what are its basic characteristics as opposed to a global hegemony? A regional hegemon dominates a distinctive geographical sphere. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a hegemon in its “backyard” namely the Soviet Union and its satellites from the Warsaw Pact.
Nevertheless, it was never capable of dominating Europe and become the continental European hegemon. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere since the beginning of the twentieth century.77 There has been no other regional power capable of challenging its preponderance in the region. Its neighbors on the continent do not have the sufficient amount of power, nor the will to strive for regional hegemony and compete on that ground with their powerful neighbor.
Will a great power that has achieved regional hegemony strive for global hegemony? My argument states that unipolarity sets out a new pattern for a great power to achieve global hegemony. In a
76 This definition is inspired by the seminal work of : Kindleberger Charles P, La grande crise mondiale 1929-1939, (Paris: Economica), 1988, 339 p. & Krasner Stephen D, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, (April 1976), pp. 317-347. 77 On this aspect see : Zakaria Fareed, From Wealth To Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, 199 p.
UNIGE / SES - 29 - Olivier Brighenti Part I unipolar world, once a great power has achieved regional hegemony it will strive for global hegemony which is the ultimate warrant for its security. Contrary to offensive realism, I argue that there is no impediment for the hegemon to pursue global domination. This does not mean that it is a good grand strategy and that the hegemon will succeed.78 Nevertheless, the unipolar structure provides the hegemon with incentives to pursue such a strategy. In contemporary international politics, the “stopping power of water” is a puzzle. It refers to the ideas developed by George Modelski in the late eighties.79
Modelski emphasized that the oceans were “protective shields” against the projection of power and the hegemonic tendencies of states. It is obvious that the United States, as a continental power, enjoys the advantages of maritime protection. Nevertheless, this does in no way mean that the United States cannot achieve global status and certainly not because of the stopping power of water. First and for all, technology has considerably changed the nature of military power projection. Secondly, the global military presence of the United States makes the stopping power of water unlikely. Thus, from a strict military standpoint, oceans are not anymore an obstacle to hegemonic inclinations. American military dominance is overwhelming and unmatchable. Its ability to project military power all around the globe is unprecedented. As outlined by Barry Posen: “The U.S. military currently possesses command of the global commons. Command of the commons is analogous to command of the sea, or in Paul Kennedy’s words, it is analogous to “naval mastery”. […] Command of the commons is the key enabler of the U.S. global position. […] Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even when it has had little permanent military presence.80 Hence, American hegemony is
78 The purpose of this dissertation is not to provide policy prescriptions and to analyze whether global hegemony is a viable grand strategy or not. My claim is that a regional hegemon will automatically want more power and strive for global domination. Robert Art stresses on the political implications of a strategy of dominion. He defines dominion as a way to transform the world into what the hegemon thinks it should look like. This strategy would use the hegemon’s military power in an imperial fashion to effect that transformation. (p. 85) Dominion would create a global hegemony, it would be an aggressive, interventionist, unilateralist and transformational strategy (p. 87). He argues that dominion is not politically feasible because it violates the logic of balance of power, it is far too costly and inherently self-destructive. According to hard-line realism, in a unipolar world characterized by hierarchy, no balancing is possible, thus dominion does not violate the logic of balance of power. It may be a misleading strategy but that does not mean it is not what the hegemon aims at. On this aspect see : Art Robert J, A Grand Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2003,pp. 87-92. 79 Modelski George & Thompson William R, Seapower in Global Politics: 1494-1993, (London: Macmillan), 1988, 80 Posen Barry R, "Command of the Commons : The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security, vol. 28, no. 1, (Summer 2003), pp. 8-9. Clyde Prestowitz brilliantly summarized the amazing power gap that ensures America’s military power projections. “Whether it is bombers, working ballistic missiles, strategic submarines, laser-guided smart bombs, ground-hugging cruise missiles, pilot-less drones, or gun ships, American dominance is more or less the same. Moreover, these forces are scattered at more than seven hundred U.S. installations around the globe, with 120,000 American troops in Europe: 92,000 in East Asia and the Pacific;
UNIGE / SES - 30 - Olivier Brighenti Part I determinedly singular in world history. Even the Roman empire pales by comparison. As huge as it was, it was a regional empire that did not possess the material capabilities enjoyed by the United States.
A regional hegemon in a unipolar world thus strives for global hegemony because only a misguided hegemon would pass up the opportunity to completely dominate the system. In a unipolar distribution of power, a hegemon has no other choice than striving for more power. A regional hegemon cannot be a status quo power in a unipolar world, nor can it be an offshore balancer.81 It is an undisputable fact that the United States has played a key role in preventing Imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi
Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional Hegemony.82 It has acted as an offshore balancer for nearly a hundred years. Nonetheless, offshore balancing in a unipolar world is a misguided strategy.
If offshore balancing was a strategy a hegemon adopted in a unipolar world, then it would be in favor of multipolarity. Indeed, offshore balancing is a strategy based on burden shifting and not burden sharing.
It transfers to others the task of maintaining regional power balances, checking the rise of potential global, and regional hegemons, stabilizing different regions of the world.83 In a unipolar world, there is no other great power than the hegemon. In other words, there is nobody to catch the buck.84 If the hegemon were to “create” a buck catcher, this would only engender competition in the region and the
around 15,000 in the Western Hemisphere outside the United States. […] In terms of sheer military dominance, the world has never seen anything like this.” Prestowitz Clyde, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, (New York: Basic Books), 2003, p. 26. 81 An offshore balancer, according to Sebastian Rosato, is the only great power on a large body of land that is surrounded by water. Thus two types of states fit into this category: any great power that dominates an entire region of the world (the United States) and any great power that inhabits its own island (Great Britain until World War II). Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, p. 24. Offshore balancing is an equilibrium strategy, based on the logic of the balance of power not on hegemony. It thus is a strategy for a multipolar or bipolar world structure. It rejects any ambition of global hegemony as well as the perpetuation of strategies of preponderance. Consequently it is at odds with a unipolar world. On offshore balancing see: Layne Christopher, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security,, vol. 22, no. 1, (Summer 1997), pp. 112-123, Layne Christopher, "Offshore Balancing Revisited," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 233-248, and Art Robert J, A Grand Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2003,pp. 172-197. 82 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 41. 83 Offshore balancing is a response for insular great powers confronting two potential peer competitors in the same region. It is a buck-passing logic that forces others to assume the costs and risks of going in first. see: Layne Christopher, "Offshore Balancing Revisited," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 245-247, Layne Christopher, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security,, vol. 22, no. 1, (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124. and Layne Christopher, "Less is More: Minimal [US] Realism in East Asia," The National Interest, vol., no. 43, (Spring 1996), pp. 73-75. 84 Buck passing means to hold back and take no action. Put differently, it means shifting the burden of resistance or containment onto an ally or another state. Josef Joffe uses the historical analogy of eighteenth century Britain to illustrate offshore balancing in the contemporary international structure. He assesses: “Benign neglect à la Britain works well only when regional balancers takes care of themselves most of the time. But today most of them do not do so.” In other words, there is no potential buck catcher in a unipolar world. Joffe Josef, "Bismarck Or Britain: Towards An American Grand Strategy After Bipolarity," International Security, vol. 19, no. 4, (Spring 1995), p. 109.
UNIGE / SES - 31 - Olivier Brighenti Part I potential rise of a peer competitor and the premises for the advent of a multipolar world. In a unipolar world a great power has virtually no incentives in promoting a multipolar world, it is best served by a strategy of preponderance using power maximizing strategies in order to prevent any would-be competitors as well as the return of multipolarity. Thus, offshore balancing is an effective strategy in a bipolar and multipolar world structure, not in a unipolar one.
In a multipolar or bipolar world where two rival powers confront each other, power distribution and hegemonic competition make offshore balancing a compelling strategy. The best strategy is to pass the buck or create a “buck catcher” to prevent a rival power to achieve regional hegemony in its hemisphere. In a bipolar world, the offshore balancer will want to sponsor a “buck catcher” because it believes it is the best possible arrangement for ensuring that the region does not fall under the domination of a potential regional hegemon.85 Thus, the United States played a key role as an offshore balancer in the European integration process. It was present since the premises of integration that started with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, to the Rome Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community in 1957, and the consecutive steps of European integration. Boldly put, the United States sponsored the successive stages of integration. By sponsoring a federation of
European states, the United States sought to establish an anti-hegemonic bloc capable of deterring the
USSR. The United States persuaded the minor powers of Europe to federate in order to deter the Soviet
Union by creating a powerful military and economic entity. On the other hand, integration prevented
Germany from dominating Western Europe. If bipolarity put considerable constraints on the hegemon’s strategies to prevent the emergence of another regional hegemon, the patterns differ dramatically in a unipolar configuration. In a bipolar world, the hegemon’s imperatives is consistent with offshore balancing. Creating or sponsoring a “buck catcher” would mean setting the grassroots for a reversion to multipolarity as well as the emergence of a new pole.
To sum up, the ideal situation for a regional hegemon is to maximize its power in every corner of the world with global hegemony as its final goal. Preponderance and global hegemony, not offshore balancing or restraint, is the logical behavior of the hegemon in a unipolar world. Striving for global
85 For the most compelling account on the notion of sponsored coalitions see: Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006,. pp. 27- 76.
UNIGE / SES - 32 - Olivier Brighenti Part I hegemony means widening the power gap with potential would-be hegemons and is the ultimate warrant for its security.
2.1.3. The Limits of Power Maximizing Strategies As outlined above, the hegemon strives for global power and there is no place for status quo powers in a unipolar world. The hegemon will always look for every opportunity to increase its relative power and achieve its hegemonic goals. Nevertheless, the hegemon will not pursue power maximizing strategies at all costs. Even if the hegemon has overwhelming military capacities, it will be careful in the strategic choices it will adopt. Even though the hegemon has the capability to gain advantage over an adversary, it will think thoroughly about the appropriate strategy to adopt. In other words, states are not relentless aggressors, even when there are likely opportunities. On the contrary, they calculate the costs and benefits of each opportunity to maximize their share of power. If the benefits do not outweigh the costs, the hegemon will think over its strategy and seek other ways to meet its expectations or stand still waiting for the appropriate opportunity. Bismark, for example, avoided war with other great powers between 1871 and 1890 because he knew that the other great powers would coalesce against Germany if it attempted further expansion.86
In a unipolar world, it is less the concern of a balancing coalition than the effective costs of a power maximizing strategy that the hegemon takes into account. By costs I mean the military casualties, treasure, national acceptance, etc. The hegemon is so powerful that even if there is a de facto “balance of protest”87, it will not stop it from pursuing its strategies. It will maybe render its tasks more difficult, but it will in no way impeach its actions. As it is the case in a bipolar or multipolar world, misperception or miscalculations can always occur. The hegemon can never be sure to which degree it will be easy or hard to achieve its goals. Thus when confronted with too much uncertainty, especially in the presence of non-conventional weapons, the hegemon will have to choose the best strategy. Although the hegemon has overwhelming power compared to its adversaries and allies alike, caution remains the masterword
86 Labs Eric J, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, (Summer 1997), p. 14. 87 I use the term “balance of protest” to illustrate the absence of balance in the traditional sense. In fact, longstanding disagreements and big institutional clashes in various international institutions are not the corollary of effective balance of power. Crisis and balancing occur not when a state or a coalition of states tend to resist the action of another states, but when they have the effective means to meet their ends.
UNIGE / SES - 33 - Olivier Brighenti Part I in a unipolar world. Offense can be sometimes very costly and can fail, but sometimes it is relatively easy and provides the hegemon with good returns on its power maximizing strategies.
2.1.4. Power Maximization and Cooperation The assumption of anarchy, in other words, the absence of central government to enforce international agreements, makes cooperation among states difficult and some scholars would say unlikely. States will tend to exploit each other and will fear to be exploited. Can hard-line realism account for cooperation and what are the effects of unipolarity on the basic patterns of cooperation? Two aspects of the unipolar distribution of power change the perception of cooperation: the absolute versus relative gains dichotomy combined to the absence of balance of power.88
The realist literature is generally very reluctant towards cooperation and multilateral institutions. Most structural realists have stated that multilateral institutions are of little importance in world politics.89 I assert on the contrary, that cooperation is important for hard-line realism, more specifically in a unipolar world. Indeed, cooperation is compelling because it is a strategic tools of power maximization.
Multilateral institutions are the structural means by which potential winners pursue their own interest, often at the expense of the political losers.90 They are one of the alternatives in the hand of the hegemon. As highlighted by Waltz : “Realists have noticed that whether institutions have strong or weak effects depends on what states intend. Strong states use institutions as they interpret laws, in ways that
88 As most realists, I focus on relative power and not on absolute power. Relative power means that states try to accumulate as much power as possible over potential rivals. States that care about relative power care whether rival states also achieved gains and whether those gains are large or not. States focusing on relative power are concerned if the power they have accumulated is greater or lesser than the power accumulated by rivals. The ultimate goal is to prevent other states from achieving advances in their relative capabilities. On the other hand, states concerned with absolute power do not care whether rival states achieve or do not achieve gains in power. They strive to attain the largest possible individual gain or payoff. It is the logic accumulation of power per se. For a good account on the issue of relative vs absolute power see: Krasner Stephen D, "Global Communication and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 3, (April 1991), pp. 336-366, Powell Robert, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 4, (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320, and Grieco Joseph M, "Anarchy And The Limits Of Cooperation: A Realist Critique Of The Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, (Summer 1998), pp. 485-507. 89 The clearest statement is Mearsheimer John J, "The False Promise Of International Institutions," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49. 90 For an interesting view on this aspect see: Moe Terry M, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 6, no. 3, (1990), pp. 213-253.
UNIGE / SES - 34 - Olivier Brighenti Part I suit them”.91 International institutions and multilateral agreements have been designed and championed to project the power of the leading state, when this strategy best suits its interest.
Is cooperation possible in a unipolar world? Like in every other power distribution configuration, states that wish to cooperate are concerned about how the gains will be distributed among the different parties.
In a bipolar or multipolar world, states are concerned above all with relative power rather than absolute power.92 This is mainly due to the fact that states are primarily concerned about the balance of power. In other words, the relative gain argument posits that international cooperation is limited because states will worry about how they will do relatively to each other. In a bipolar world, cooperation is very unlikely because the two states are exclusively relative gains seekers. The two-actors world is a zero sum game and cooperation is merely impossible.93 In a multipolar world, cooperation is more plausible, but states are concerned above all by the balance of power. They focus on relative gains since they have to be sure they make a better deal than their rivals. In a unipolar world the hegemon is also concerned with relative gains. The distribution of power is so asymmetrical that the hegemon is not so deeply concerned with the balance of power as in a bipolar configuration. It is concerned above all by maximizing its relative gains. Power maximization is a relative gains strategy. Although the distribution of power is overwhelmingly asymmetrical and the hegemon has a “high margin” of leverage, it must not undergo successive relative losses on the long run or it will cease to be the hegemon. If the hegemon cannot maximize its relative gains through cooperation it will opt for other strategies. In a unipolar world, there is a single power and a large number of other minor states. The minor states seek cooperation in order to improve their relative gains while seeking to lock-in the hegemon, whereas the hegemon seeks to maximize its position.
91 Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), p. 24. 92 On the relative versus absolute gains debate see: Busch Marc L & Reinhardt Eric R, "Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy," Journal of conflict Resolution, vol. 37, no. 3, (September 1993), pp. 427-445, Powell Robert, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 4, (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320 and Snidal Duncan, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 4, (December 1991), pp. 387-402. 93 Snidal Duncan "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 3, (September 1991), p. 714.
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Hence, in a unipolar world, the hegemon has a broad range of options to cooperate or to go it alone depending on its national interest. Robert Gilpin’s now classical statement is compelling: “As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy”.94 The power gap between the hegemon and the rest of the world gives it a high leverage in bargaining. In other words, the political influence and domination of the international system is such that the hegemon’s strategic options are unprecedented. In a unipolar world, it will seek to broaden its interests through its favorite political institutions. By creating multilateral frameworks the hegemon ties weaker states into stable and predictable institutions. It does not need to constantly “look over its shoulder” in order to secure its interests. International institutions and multilateral frameworks discourage minor states from pursuing independent policies that could challenge the hegemon’s strategic interests and undermine its preeminence in the international arena. On the other hand, the weaker states are convinced that their interests are taken into account and that their “voice” counts within an institutional framework of shared values. Minor states are convinced that they are getting a certain portion of the pie. Thus in a unipolar world where states strive for power, bandwagoning, not balancing, is the basic pattern. Minor states do not have other choice than to bandwagon with the hegemon. Balancing is impossible due to the overwhelming asymmetries in power. Hence states will bandwagon in order to secure at least some benefits. They expect to make some gains through cooperation. They prefer to be on the winning side. Cooperation in a unipolar world is a positive-sum game, while opposition entails unnecessary costs and balancing is doomed to fail.
According to liberals, the corollary to this “lock-in situation” is the reduction of the hegemon’s autonomy.
John Ikenberry outlines: “When a state agrees to tie itself to commitments and obligations of an interstate institution, it is agreeing to reduce its policy autonomy. A leading state that has created an institutionalized order that works to its long-term benefit is better off than a leading state operating in a free-floating order in which it must relay on constant and costly exercise of power to get its way”.95
Nevertheless, this does not reflect the true nature of cooperation, especially in a unipolar world. History
94 Gilpin Robert G, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981, 106. 95 Ikenberry John G, "Multilateralism and U.S. Grand Strategy," In. Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, edited by Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers), 2001, p. 124.
UNIGE / SES - 36 - Olivier Brighenti Part I shows us that international institutions have above been championed to promote the hegemon’s interests. The Atlantic Alliance, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations and a wide range of international agreements the United States sponsored were used to project
American power throughout the globe. Thus, cooperation and multilateral institutions are one of the political options a hegemon has at its disposal to maximize its power. The hegemon will bind itself to multilateral agreements only in the case and as long as they serve its interests and that the costs are low in terms of political autonomy. Throughout the Cold War, the United States consistently violated the multilateral agreements it had designed.96 Indeed, every time its core interest was in contradiction with the multilateral framework it acted unilaterally without prior consultation of its allies. Indeed as outlined by Randall Schweller: “It would be hard to find any solid evidence throughout the entire Cold War period of institutions restraining the arbitrary use of American power.”97 Minor powers tend to be very favorable to multilateral agreements in order to circumvent the power asymmetries. In a unipolar world, the hegemon has such a high bargaining degree that it can opt out of merely any agreements or institutions.
Since the costs of non cooperation are low for the hegemon in a unipolar world, it can select when it wants to cooperate or go it alone. Cooperation is thus a tool to accommodate the hegemon as long as it does not undermine its autonomy and serves its national interest. Susan Strange, in her introduction of the Retreat of the State, captures this aspect very clearly: “The truth as any student of intergovernmental organizations is well aware, is that the limits and the nature of any intergovernmental bureaucracy’s decision-making power are set by the most powerful of its member governments. The
96 After World War II the United States was a founding member and supporter of the creation of the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and it intensely sponsored the creation of a united Europe. At the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the expansion of NATO to former states of the Warsaw Pact, the creation of NAFTA, APEC, the WTO following the Uruguay Round. 97 Schweller bases his claim on historical facts The U.S. Senate rejected the International Trade Organization treaty in 1947 in order to promote a less institutionalized arrangement (GATT). The Eisenhower administration unilaterally ended the imperial careers of Britain and France during the 1956 Suez War. The Kennedy administration adopted the doctrine of flexible response against the wishes of West Europeans, who, for obvious reasons, did not want to increase the likelihood of tactical, limited nuclear war or conventional defense on their territory. The United States similarly ignored the wishes of its NATO allies and fought unpopular wars in the Pacific against North Korea and North Vietnam. The Nixon administration shocked Japan on July 15 1971, when it unilaterally unexpectedly announced that it was normalizing relations with China. Mere months later, it once again stunned Japan and the other industrial democracies when it unilaterally and without consultation decided to close the gold window. The Bretton Woods agreement, which had regulated international monetary arrangements since 1944, was suddenly made irrelevant because it was no longer seen as serving American interests, narrowly defined. See Schweller Randall L, "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay," International Security, vol. 26, no. 1, (Summer 2001), p. 179.
UNIGE / SES - 37 - Olivier Brighenti Part I international organization is above all a tool of the national government, an instrument for the pursuit of national interest by other means”.98
Hence, most of the international regimes have been promoted by the most powerful state in order to enhance its core interests.99 As long as the hegemon can advance its interests, it will choose to cooperate. Unipolarity strongly enhanced this fact. Indeed the disparities of power and the absence of traditional balancing engender radically divergent interests. Consequently whenever the multilateral framework is not considered relevant, the hegemon will choose not to cooperate. Thus, the empirical record will show us if hard-line realism provides a framework to understand cooperation as a means to maximize power in a unipolar world.
I have now laid out my theory of the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world and the reasons why the most powerful state adopts strategies to pursue power ad infinitum. As I have already stated, there is no explicit alternative theories of unipolarity that provides us with a comprehensive theoretical framework and predictions to understand the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world. The existing theories in their offensive and defensive strands are based on the same core assumptions as my hard-line approach to unipolarity. What differentiates them is their predictions. Deriving from these core assumptions, both offensive and defensive realism have set out a series of general predictions to account for state behavior in a bipolar or multipolar world. What these theories would predict in a unipolar world remains a puzzle. I will, in the following section, use their core assumptions in order to see which predictions can be inferred from both theories in a unipolar world.
98 Strange Susan. Smith Steve & Biersteker Thomas, ed. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996. pp. xiii-xix. 99 This great-power approach was at work in the creation of the U.N.. At the San Francisco conference, many small and middle powers were unhappy with the special status given to permanent members of the Security Council. But the realists among them argued that the veto was a necessary inducement to gain the support of the USSR, the United States and others. The weaker powers could only hope that, in the long run, the new institution would reduce the role of force and power in international affairs. This same prospect, however, made the most powerful states more ambivalent in their commitment to the organization. See Holloway Steven, "U.S. Unilateralism at the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists," Global Governance, vol. 6, no. 3, (July-September 2000), p. 365.
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2.2. Alternative theories for the understanding of power politics in a unipolar world
2.2.1. Offensive and Defensive Realism Both strands of realism are based on a certain number of core assumptions. They differ from each other and from hard-line realism not only on the fundamental assumptions but also on the predictions they make for a peculiar distribution of power. There is an ongoing debate between what has been called offensive and defensive strands of realism.100 Power is the central aspect of this debate. In other words, the fundamental question is how much power do states want when they compete for it. For offensive realists, the international system fosters conflict and aggression. Security is scarce, making competition and war likely. For defensive realists, the international system does not necessarily generate conflict and war. Security is plentiful and states are best served by defensive strategies. In other words, the international system provides incentives only for moderate and cautious behavior.101 In the next section, I will focus on both strands of realism. I will use their core assumptions and see what predictions can be drawn from these assumptions in a unipolar world configurations.
The table below (Table 1) summarizes the debate and highlights the subtleties of the offensive- defensive dichotomy. It emphasizes both the differences and the common features. I will not treat all the characteristics, but rather focus on the aspects that are important for the understanding of unipolarity. In order to give the best overview of this debate, I will base my work on the realist literature and combine it with my own approach to the debate. 102
100 There are several semantic differences in the realist literature. Offensive realism can also be labeled “aggressive” realism. This term was originated by Jack Snyder in: Snyder Jack L, Myths Of Empire: Domestic Politics And International Ambition, ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1991, pp. 11-12, Stephen Brooks uses “postclassical” for offensive realism and neorealism for defensive realism in: Brooks Stephen G, "Dueling Realism," International Organization, vol. 51, no. 3, (Summer 1997), pp. 445-447, Charles Glaser uses “contingent” for defensive in: Glaser Charles L, "Realists As Optimists: Cooperation As Self-Help," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994-1995), p. 50-90. I will stick to the offensive/defensive nomenclature which gains in clarity. 101 According to Stephen Walt, if balancing is the norm in international relations then security is plentiful. Walt Stephen M, The Origins Of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1990, p. 35. 102 Examples of offensive realism include: Gilpin Robert G, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981, Huntington Samuel P, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83, Labs Eric J, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49, Lobell Steven E, "War is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics, and Security Strategies," Security Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 165-195, Lee Guenwook Gerald, "To Be Long or Not To Be Long - That Is The Question: The Contradiction of Time Horizon in Offensive Realism," Security Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 196-217, Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, Mearsheimer John J, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, vol. 15, no. 2, (Fall 1990), Mearsheimer John J, "The False
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Table 1: offensive and defensive realism in a multipolar and bipolar world
Themes Offensive Realism Defensive Realism
Quest for Power There are no limits in the quest of Power The quest of Power is limited
(Power maximization)
Distribution of There is no Status Quo in international Preserving the Status Quo in the
Power politics distribution of Power
Question of States strive to attain hegemony which Ensuring state security by preserving the
Hegemony guarantees security Balance of Power. Hegemony is a self
defeating strategy
Security Constant quest for security which is The quest for security is less aggressive
scarce. The state has an aggressive because security is plentiful
attitude
2.2.2. The Quest for Power Regarding the continuous quest for power in a bipolar or multipolar world, the two approaches diverge considerably. In the offensive view, states strive to maximize their power.103 The more powerful a state
Promise Of International Institutions," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994/1995), Schweller Randall L, Deadly Imbalance: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1997, Schweller Randall L, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing The Revisionist State Back In," International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, (Summer 1994), Zakaria Fareed, From Wealth To Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, Zakaria Fareed, "Realism and Domestic Politics (A Review Essay)," International Security, vol. 17, no. 1, (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198. Besides Waltz “Theory of International Politics” other examples of defensive realism include: Christensen Thomas J. & Snyder Jack "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, vol. 44, no. 2, (Spring, 1990), pp. 137-168, Glaser Charles L, "The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism," In. Realism and the Balancing of Power, edited by Vasquez John A & Elman Colin, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall), 2003, Glaser Charles L, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, vol. 50, no. 1, (October 1997), Glaser Charles L, "Realists As Optimists: Cooperation As Self-Help," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994-1995), 171-201, Jervis Robert, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, (January 1978), pp. 167-214, Lynn-Jones Sean M, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, vol. 23, no. 2, (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182, Taliaferro Jefferey WC, "Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery," Political Psychology, vol. 25, no. 2, (August 2004), pp. 177-211, Van Evera Stephen, "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War," International Security, vol. 22, no. 4, (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43 and Walt Stephen M, The Origins Of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1990, 103 Fareed Zakaria in: Zakaria Fareed, From Wealth To Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 19, argues that states do not strive to maximize their power, but their influence. Although this is an interesting claim, I
UNIGE / SES - 40 - Olivier Brighenti Part I is, the more secure it will be. It is the self-help system dear to most realists.104 In such a world, the continuous strive for power maximization is the keystone of state survival.105 The offensive strand is a structural state-centered approach that can be resumed as follows: states interact in an anarchical environment and power maximization is precisely what the system encourages because the stronger a state is in the system, the more likely it is to survive and ensure its security. Maximizing power means ensuring its survival in a hostile international environment while confronted with revisionist states.
Jeffrey Taliaferro summarizes this aspect: “Offensive realism holds that anarchy – the absence of a worldwide government or universal sovereign – provides strong incentives for expansion. All states strive to maximize their power relative to other states because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. States under anarchy face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or conquer them. This compels states to improve their relative power positions through arms buildups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion.”106
Both offensive and defensive realists agree on the need for security. They diverge on the type of action or “inaction” to ensure security. Whereas offensive and defensive realists seek to explain the same phenomena, they fundamentally diverge on the implications of anarchy. Offensive realists seek to maximize their security by maximizing their power, defensive realists seek to maximize their security by preserving the status quo. For defensive realists, cautiousness in action is the master word. Power is a means and not an end in itself. As outlined by Waltz: “In anarchy security is the highest end. Only if
will stick to the notion of power. As outlined by Eric Labs: “I think this is a semantic point. Power is influence; and influence is power. In the anarchic international system you need one to have the other”, Labs Eric J, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, (Summer 1997), p. 11, note 33. 104 Waltz defines a self-help system as : “a system in which those who do not help themselves, or who do less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 118. 105 This refers in some respects to Morgenthau’s approach that defined international politics as a perpetual quest for power. Nevertheless Morgenthau had a “Hobbesian” appraisal of world politics. He emphasizes the human nature and its inherent quest for power and supremacy whereas for classical realism state behavior is determined by individuals rather than by the structure of the international system. On the other hand, for Morgenthau, states pursue power per se whereas neorealists pursue power in order to ensure survival. Morgenthau Hans J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1993, p. 3. 106 Taliaferro Jefferey WC, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, vol. 25, no. 3, (Winter 2000-2001), p. 129.
UNIGE / SES - 41 - Olivier Brighenti Part I survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of the two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security.”107 Thus defensive oriented states have no incentives to disrupt the balance of power, they seek by all means to preserve it. Defensive realists rely heavily on the notion of balance of power.
Balance of power implies that states will “interact” in the international arena to ensure their position and impeach the rise of revisionist states ensuring the status quo and the stability of the system. The main bias in this approach lies in its incapacity to explain the rise of revisionist states.108 In other words, defensive realism cannot explain when states do not follow the balance of power logic and seek to maximize their power to become more powerful in the system,. Defensive realism and Waltz in the front line, seem to straddle the expansion aspect. While asserting : “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system”109 there is no concern of the revisionist strategy. In diametrically opposed views, offensive realism clearly emphasizes the resort to power and the necessity to act offensively to ensure survival. As John Mearsheimer outlined: “On the contrary, they
[offensive realists] believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security. In other words, survival mandates aggressive behavior. Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival.”110 Offensive realism can also explain when states do not act aggressively and don’t seek to disrupt the balance of power. States act aggressively only when the benefits surpass the costs. They do not seek domination in a “foolish” and blind strategy.
To summarize the question of power in a bipolar or multipolar world structure, we can say that the defensive approach is about maintaining the status quo and the stability of the system. For offensive realists, the state’s ultimate goal is the accumulation of power in order to attain great power status and above all a hegemonic position in the system, hegemony being the decisive warrant for its security.
107 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 126. 108 For a very good discussion and contradiction of this aspect see: Schweller Randall L, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?," Security Studies, vol., no. 5, (Spring 1996), p. 90-121. 109 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 126. 110 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, p. 21.
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How do states behave in a unipolar world according to both strands of realism? Are the predictions alike when the international structure is composed of one pole? Drawing from the same core assumptions what can be inferred about state behavior in a unipolar world?
According to offensive realism, states strive to maximize their power and gain power over their rivals in order to be the hegemon, in other words the only great power in the system. Given the difficulty of determining the right amount of power a state needs, the best way to ensure its security is to amass as much power as possible. On the other hand, global hegemony is virtually impossible. As stated by John
Mearsheimer: “there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon.”111 Since global hegemony is impossible to achieve, the regional hegemon is satisfied with its position. Put differently, in a unipolar world the regional hegemon is a status quo power that does not strive for more power. In a unipolar world, the hegemon, according to offensive realism becomes an
“defensive positionalist”. Once a great power has become a regional hegemon it has achieved the
“pinnacle of power” as Mearsheimer says. Thus, in a unipolar world, the hegemon is satisfied with its position in the system. It strives to preserve its preponderance in its sphere of influence and does not seek additional power and global domination. Even though the theory asserts that states can never afford to be satisfied with a given amount of power and must constantly seek to increase it, once a great power has achieved regional hegemony it becomes a status quo power. In order to maintain its position as the only regional hegemon, it acts as an offshore balancer. In other words, it adopts a strategy of
“burden shifting”. If a potential hegemon arises in the strategic regions of the world such as Europe or
Asia, the hegemon will pass the buck and stay on the sidelines while the regional powers ensure the balancing. The hegemon will intervene only if the regional powers fail to overthrow the hegemonic aspirations of a revisionist state. The strategy adopted by the hegemon in a unipolar world, is one of counter-hegemonic.
111 Ibidem, p. 41.
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As for offensive realism, defensive realists also predict that the hegemon will act as an offshore balancer. According to the defensive logic, states will not pursue power maximizing strategies and strive for hegemony because those policies are self- defeating.112 As outlined by Fareed Zakaria: “Defensive realism posits that states seek security rather than influence and so predict that nations expand their interests abroad when threatened. They expand in times of insecurity, against powerful nations with aggressive intentions. Absent a threatening environment, states have no systemic incentives to expand: they expand not when they can but when they must.”113 In other words, the hegemon in a unipolar world will act as an offshore balancer to maintain its position in the system and preserve the balance of power. It will stay on the sidelines and act only when threatened by powerful aggressors. Thus in a unipolar world, defensive realism predicts that the hegemon will try by all means to prevent balancing coalitions by revisionist states. In other words, for defensive realists, the preservation of the balance of power and the quest for the international status quo is an end in itself.
Although offensive and defensive realism have very different predictions in a multipolar and bipolar world, the gap between the two rival theories may not be as large as it appears in a unipolar one. In unipolarity both defensive and offensive states are status quo powers.
2.2.3. The Question of Hegemony The question of hegemony is closely linked to the quest for power developed above. When applied to a unipolar world, it reinforces the existing similarities in the offensive/defensive debate.
For defensive realism, hegemony is not the ultimate guarantee for a state's security. On the contrary, the strive for hegemony is perceived as extremely dangerous. It is a destabilizing process that disrupts the balance of power and endangers the stability of the system as a whole. According to the defensive credo, states balance against the rising state and restore the disrupted balance and the equilibrium of the system. Once this stability is guaranteed and a sufficient degree of security assured, states have no
112 Balance of power theory predicts that when a state acquires overwhelming power and becomes too powerful in the system, other states or a coalition of states will balance against the rising state in order to refrain its hegemonic ambitions. It is a sort of theory of international regulation. States act in reaction to specific threats that exist in the international system and that gives states incentives to preserve the balance of power, not change it. 113 Zakaria Fareed, From Wealth To Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999,pp. 9-10. See also: Glaser Charles L, "Realists As Optimists: Cooperation As Self-Help," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994- 1995), pp. 70-72.
UNIGE / SES - 44 - Olivier Brighenti Part I incentives to strive for hegemony. For this strand of realism, the quest for hegemony is counterproductive and dangerous. Defensive realists and mainly Kenneth Waltz seem to have permanently closed the door to the question of hegemony given that he confines his theory to the narrow definition of the immutable balance of power logic. Asserting that states do not need more power than the minimal amount required to ensure their security, balancing is given as a dogma of the system.
In the words of Waltz: “If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system.”114
According to the offensive strand of realism, the approach to hegemony is diametrically different since hegemony is the “paramount” of the security process. Emphasizing that states strive to maximize their power, offensive realism provides scholars with the theoretical foundations to understand a hegemony at least in its regional acceptance. According to this logic, the power maximization in the system enables the state that has accumulated the largest amount of power to aspire to a hegemonic position in the system. Nonetheless, Mearsheimer gives a restricted definition of hegemony. He argues that only regional hegemony is possible. A state can achieve at best a regional hegemony in a given geographical subsystem. Mearsheimer relies on the protective power of water. Geography and the stopping power of water makes it impossible for the regional hegemon to achieve global power status.
Consequently, in a unipolar world, the hegemon remains a regional hegemon in its own hemisphere. It is thus a status quo power contented with its current power and its regional hegemonic status.
2.2.4. The Question of Security The last aspect I wish to highlight is the question of security in both strands of realism. what differentiates both approaches can be summed up in a single question: what is the amount of security a state needs to ensure its survival? As pointed out when analyzing the quantity of power a state needs, the defensive approach contends with a restricted amount of security. The “Waltzian” states are in a position to “play” and “calculate” in the international system. Defensive realists argue that aggressive and expansionist policies are counterproductive and even dangerous because security is easy to
114 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 126.
UNIGE / SES - 45 - Olivier Brighenti Part I measure and acquire. On a defensive standpoint, defense is easier than offense in most cases. To explain this aspect, defensive realists rely heavily on the concept of “offense-defense balance”. As defined by Glaser and Kaufmann: “Offense-defense theory is a quite optimistic theory of international politics, since it argues that when states defense has the advantage over offense major wars can be avoided.”115 Offense-defense balance determines the intensity of the security competition and offers states a tool to read and measure the international security “situation”. It is a ratio of the cost the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of the forces the defender has deployed. As the advantage of offense increases states are less secure and competition will be the rule. Defensive realists believe that defense, i.e. the capacity of a state to protect its territory is always stronger than offense i.e. a states capacity to conquer territory. This makes expansionist strategies not only expensive, but also hazardous. The absolute quest of security is not an obsession and there is a large part of uncertainty.
They are inclined to seek for their security in the alliance patterns and through the Balance of Power.
Thus, the corollary is a less aggressive and war prone state. The defensive state is more tempted by cooperation and compromise and seeks its survival through other means than intimation, unilateralism and war.
For offensive realism, striving for security is tightly linked to the quest for power. The more power a state has accumulated regarding the other states in the system, the more it will be capable of maximizing its security. This vision has immediate consequences on state’s behavior in the international arena. In fact according to this logic, a state tends to be more aggressive and in a constant conflicting position to maximize its security. Hence, power, intimation, aggression and unilateralism will be the main tools to meet its end. Glenn Snyder correctly outlines this dichotomy: “Mearsheimer’s states seem perilously close to Arnold Wolfers’s “hysterical Caesars”, states that, haunted by fear, pursue the will-of-the-wisp of absolute security. Waltz’s states are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more oriented toward particular non-security interests, and more willing to live with only a modest amount of security”.116
115 Glaser Charles L & Kaufmann Chaim, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Mesure It?," International Security, vol. 22, no. 4, (Summer 1998), p. 44. 116 Snyder Glenn H, "Mearsheimer's World - Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security," International Security, vol. 27, no. 1, (Summer 2002), p. 153.
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Taking this logic to a unipolar world configuration, the hegemon is satisfied with its dominant position in its sphere of influence. It is not haunted by fear and will not strive for absolute security. Contrary to the offensive credo strategies for security will be pursued through the perpetuation of the prevailing balance of power rather than through power maximizing strategies. Since the hegemon has become a status quo power, its strategies are very close to those outlined by the defensive strand of realism.
Table 2: Offensive and defensive realism in a unipolar world
Themes Offensive Realism Defensive Realism
Quest for Power Quest for power is limited (regional The quest for Power is not an end in
hegemony) itself
Distribution of Preserving the Status Quo in the Preserving the Status Quo in the
Power distribution of Power distribution of Power
Question of States strive to attain regional hegemony Ensuring state security by preserving the
Hegemony and become status quo powers Balance of Power. Hegemony is
misleading
Security Limited quest for security Security is plentiful
2.2.5. The Alternative: A Structural Liberal Approach In the following chapters, I will confront my theory not only against the offensive and defensive strands of realism, but also against the structural liberal approach as developed by John Ikenberry.117 The structural approach tries to cope with the same questions that are at the basis of this dissertation: What do victorious states do with their newly acquired power? In other words, how does the hegemon behave and how does it use its overwhelming power? Structural liberalism asserts that states in this situation have sought to hold onto that power and make it last. In order to do this the hegemon puts limits on its
117 Ikenberry has developed his approach in numerous articles and publications. His overall approach appears in his path-breaking book: Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001,293 p.
UNIGE / SES - 47 - Olivier Brighenti Part I power by creating a “constitutional order” to make it acceptable to other states. Constitutional orders involves bargaining: the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on rules and institutions. It obtains acquiescence by weaker states, which in turn allow it to conserve its power. In return, the leading state agrees to limits on its own actions and to open itself to a political process in which weaker states can actively press their interests upon the more powerful state. Institutions play a double role: they must bind the leading state when it is initially stronger and subordinate states later when they are stronger. Why would a hegemon want to restrict its power when it is overwhelming?
Structural liberalism asserts that it is because the hegemon has an interest in conserving its power. By giving up some freedom of action on its use of power, the hegemon ensures a durable and predictable order. Thus the structural approach is based on the idea of restraint rather than power politics. Or put differently, a liberal structural power maximization strategy can be verified empirically through strategies of restraint.
2.3. Hypothesis in Unipolarity
In this chapter, I have laid out my theory, outlined the underlying logic of both strands of realism and the structural liberal approach as well as extrapolated general predictions in a unipolar world. Nevertheless the latter remain general predictions that need to be refined. To strengthen my case, I shall now lay down a certain number of “finer grained” hypothesis. This will enable me to compare my hard-line realist approach to the three alternative structural approaches. Doing this will provide the research with the causal hypothesis that will be tested against each other in the various case studies.
In order to clarify the debate, I will reiterate the underlying logic of my argument. The contemporary distribution of power, i.e. unipolarity is the independent variable. This peculiar distribution of power as well as the highly asymmetrical degree in the abovementioned distribution of power produces conditions for the hegemon to choose between various tactics and policies in order to “manage” its position in the system. Taken together unipolarity and asymmetries in power push the hegemon towards power maximization strategies. Paraphrasing Owen: “A causal mechanism such as I describe may be logically
UNIGE / SES - 48 - Olivier Brighenti Part I coherent yet empirically false.”118 Thus I will try to analyze if such a causal logic really exists: given a specific argument what would we expect to observe according to each theory’s predictions in a unipolar world? In other words, I will lay down the causal logic of each theory and observe what happens in a particular distribution of power. These causal hypothesis will then be tested against the historical record.
The following chapters will reveal if my hypothesis are empirically verified or falsified.
1. In a unipolar world, the hegemon will pursue power maximizing strategies in any region outside of its traditional “backyard” whenever it is in its interests and when benefits outweigh the costs. If this is true how should we expect the hegemon to behave?
Hard-line realism: Hard-line realism argues that the hegemon will try by all means to dominate every region of the world with global hegemony as a final goal. The hegemon in a unipolar world maximizes its power ad infinitum. It will do so in order to enhance its strategic interests and maintain or maximize its dominant position. It will try to avoid by all means the resurgence of any would-be competitor and above all the emergence of a pole. The highest danger for the hegemon is the shift from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar configuration. The hegemon will be highly involved in those regions and ensure its interests are well protected.
Offensive Realism: Offensive realism argues that the regional hegemon acts as an offshore balancer in other areas of the world. The regional hegemon will not try to maximize its power in far-off regions of the world because global domination is virtually impossible. The hegemon will stay on the sidelines and pass the buck to the regional powers in order to preserve the balance of power. It is the strategy of buck passing. Only if the local powers cannot restore the balance of power will the regional hegemon intervene to restore the balance. In other words, in a unipolar world configuration, the offensive state pursues a status quo strategy and ceases to maximize power.
Defensive Realism: For defensive realists, the power maximization strategy is first of all counterproductive and renders states less secure. Since security is plentiful, there is no need to pursue
118 Owen John M, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, (Fall 1994), p. 131.
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“expensive expansionist” policies in far reaching regions of the world. Thus, the hegemon will also act as an offshore balancer and pursue expansionist policies only when threatened.
Structural Liberalism: The overall logic of this theory is that power is based on restraint not on maximization. The hegemon restrains its power in order to make it acceptable to other states and ensure there will be no balancing coalitions. Thus, the hegemon will not try to maximize its power in any region of the world but rely on the constitutional order it created.
2. In a unipolar world, the hegemon will oppose and/or try to undermine any regional security agreement or cooperation framework that is not placed under its custody. If this is true how should we expect the hegemon to behave?
Hard-Line Realism: Hard-line realism argues that the hegemon will oppose any security agreement that would lead to an autonomous and independent military power in the hegemon’s zones of strategic interest. By favoring or helping to create independent security agreements or institutions, the hegemon would pursue a self-defeating strategy. Its goal is to prevent any new pole to emerge that could be capable of challenging its dominant position. The hegemon’s main goal will be to avoid reverting to a bipolar/multipolar world.
Offensive Realism: The offshore balancing argument would say that the hegemon is best served by a strategy of “buck passing”, in other words regional powers should take care of their own security. The hegemon only acts as a balancer of last resort if a single state becomes powerful enough to dominate the system. In a unipolar world, the hegemon should favor security institutions that would support the offshore balancing strategy and enable the hegemon to shift the security burden to its allies. An offshore balancing strategy in a unipolar world would mean that the hegemon would withdraw its presence
(military troops and facilities) in Europe and Asia and encourage a multipolar balance of power in these respective regions. It would sponsor a multilateral coalition of states to contain any would-be hegemon.
According to that logic, major security institutions designed during the Cold War should have disappeared when bipolarity collapsed.
Defensive Realism: For defensive realists, security institutions in the hegemon’s strategic zones should not be opposed. These are yet another set of institutions that do not challenge the status quo. Opposing the creation of security institutions would maybe lead to security competition and upset the balance. The
UNIGE / SES - 50 - Olivier Brighenti Part I hegemon enjoys a sufficient amount of security and there are no systemic imperatives for the hegemon to maximize its power. Asserting its power would be highly counterproductive and create more insecurity. It would not render the hegemon more secure and would inexorably lead to counterbalancing coalitions.
Structural Liberalism: Institutions are always favorable and enable the hegemon to exercise its power in a restrained way. According to this logic, the sharper the power asymmetries, the greater the chances will be that the weaker states will worry about domination and abandonment. This gives the possibility for an institutional bargain, particularly if other circumstances exist that allow states to be confident that institutions will in fact restrain power and lock in policy commitments. This is what makes the institutional deal attractive as John Ikenberry outlines: “The leading state agrees to restrain its own potential for domination and abandonment in exchange for greater compliance by subordinate states. Both sides are better off with constitutional order rather than a world order based on constant threat of the indiscriminate and arbitrary exercise of power”.119
2. In a unipolar world cooperation is a strategic tool of power maximization for the hegemon. If this is true how should we expect the hegemon to behave?
Hard-line Realism: Hard-line realism argues that cooperation is important, more specifically in a unipolar world. Indeed, cooperation is compelling because it is a strategic tool of power maximization.
Multilateral institutions are the structural means by which potential winners pursue their own interest, often at the expense of the political losers. They are one of the alternatives in the hand of the hegemon.
In a unipolar world, the hegemon feels less restraint and can “shop” in the institutions. It can rely on them when it is in its interest and will give it a higher leverage to pursue its goals. It can also withdraw from binding institutions and agreements with few risks of retaliation or counter hegemonic reactions.
Benjamin Frankel summarizes this view: “[…] Conventions and agreements merely reflect the interests of the states subscribing to them (especially the most powerful ones)120. When it is no longer in a state’s interest to abide by certain conventions, the state withdraws from – indeed, most conventions
119 Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001,pp. 258-259. 120 Emphasis added.
UNIGE / SES - 51 - Olivier Brighenti Part I have provisions for such withdrawal. More often, however a state would find it more useful to ignore the convention while continuing to play lip-service to it.”121 In a unipolar world, where hierarchy is constitutive of the system, the hegemon is less concerned about the balance of power and thus can cooperate more easily as long as it maximizes its relative gains. In a unipolar world, the hegemon will have many incentives to use cooperation and take advantage of weaker states.
Offensive and Defensive Realism: In cooperation, offensive and defensive realism do not dramatically part ways with hard-line realism. They both assert that cooperation takes place in a world which is competitive and some states can take advantage of other states through cooperation. They slightly differ in its intensity: whereas, for hard-line realism, unipolarity fosters cooperation as a way to maximize the hegemon’s power, offensive and defensive realists argue that cooperation is very hard to achieve, and above all, to sustain.
Structural Liberalism: My hard-line approach and the structural liberal approach converge on the means but not the ends. Whereas for hard-line realism, cooperation is favored as a way to maximize the hegemon’s power when it best serves its interests, for structural liberalism, cooperation is a way to restrain the overwhelming power of the hegemon.
3. In a unipolar world, the hegemon will pursue aggressive policies and ultimately resort to the use of force against any potential challenger. If this is true, how should we expect the hegemon to behave?
Hard-line Realism: Hard-line realism argues that the hegemon will try to overthrow “rough regimes” and maximize its power in those regions in order to control them whenever the benefits outweigh the costs. It will also dissuade the rise of any potential challenger, be it an ally or a foe. It will not pursue these policies in a frenzy way, but balance the costs and benefits before taking action. Being the sole superpower in a unipolar world, the hegemon can use its overwhelming power in order to gain access to strategic regions outside of its hemisphere and prevent the rise of any peer competitor.122 Hard-line
121 Frankel Benjamin, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, vol., no. 5, (Spring 1996), p. xv. 122 Robert Gilpin explained the use of preventive wars for declining states. He says: “The first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem. By launching a preventive war, the declining power destroys or weakens the rising challenger while military advantages is still with the declining power.” Gilpin Robert G, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981,p. 191. Hard-line realism adheres to this logic, even if the hegemon does not have to be a declining power to resort to
UNIGE / SES - 52 - Olivier Brighenti Part I realism states that the power maximization logic of the hegemon does not require a specific threat. The use of force and military action can also be a way to assert the hegemon’s power. Power maximization strategies is a very persuasive strategy the hegemon can rely on to say: “don’t mess with us”. The hegemon will rely on existing security and multilateral agreements only if they serve its purpose. The hegemon will not be restraint by any type of institutions if the latter are contrary to its interests. It will pursue unilateral policies if they serve its interests better than cooperation or multilateral agreements.
Offensive and Defensive Realism: Offensive, as well as defensive realists, would favor a strategy of restraint in the use of force. They would advocate traditional patterns of containment and deterrence.
The hegemon should not launch any attacks on a state unless it is a direct threat to the hegemon’s interests or unless the revisionist state can dominate an entire region and thus can become a threat to the hegemon’s own hemisphere.
Structural Liberalism: The structural liberal approach rests on the “liberal bargain” that addresses the uncertainties of the hegemon’s power. The weaker states agree with the hegemon’s leadership and operate within an agreed-upon system. In return, the hegemon binds itself to its partners. The hegemon builds an institutionalized coalition of partners that reinforces the stability and minimizes the negative effects of these asymmetrical relations. In other words, the hegemon and its partners play by the agreed-upon rules.123 Theoretically, the hegemon is thus committed to the liberal order it has created and will not pursue aggressive policies and use force outside this institutional framework.
2.4. Conclusion
The four theories laid out in this chapter offer very different explanations of how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. The fundamental differences between my hard-line approach and both offensive and defensive realism is that for hard-line realism the hegemon is never a status quo power nor an offshore balancer. The hegemon is a strong power maximizer that pursues hegemonic strategies. Secondly, my approach does not rest on the balance of power equilibrium logic but on hegemony and hierarchy. Thus,
such aggressive policies. The hegemon can use preventive wars and intimidation to assert its power and make clear to every potential competitors that the costs of non compliance are high. 123 Ikenberry John G, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," Survival, vol. 43, no. 4, (Winter 2001-2002), pp. 20-21.
UNIGE / SES - 53 - Olivier Brighenti Part I hard-line realism explains why states choose to bandwagon rather than try to counterbalance the hegemon in vain. With respect to the structural liberal approach, hard-line realism focuses on opposite predictions. Hence the hegemon will not act with restraint, but with power maximizing strategies, whenever that best suits its interests. If my theory is correct, then we should see the hegemon pursuing power maximizing strategies. We should see the hegemon striving for the greatest amount of power in order to attain global status. If the defensive approach is correct in the unipolar world configuration, we should have a hegemon acting as a status quo power. In the case of the offensive approach, the hegemon should be a status quo power, satisfied with the amount of power it has on its sphere of influence. This is what can be labelled “a defensive positionalist bias”. It would want to hold on to what it has and maintain its position in the system. The hegemon should be acting as predicted by offshore balancing with respect to Europe and Asia, in particular, as well as, the rest of the world. Finally ,if the structural liberal approach is right, we should expect the hegemon to act with restraint within the constitutional order it has created. The following chapters will evaluate the plausibility of each of these approaches and see if their predictions are consistent with the empirical record.
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Case Study I: The European Security Architecture Since the End of the Cold War
Part II
3. The European Security and Defense Policy from the End of the Cold War to 1993
Why has the United States tried by all means to undermine every single attempt to create some form of
“autonomous” European security and defense policy, although the end of the Cold War represents a unique opportunity to pursue a strategy of offshore balancing since the failure of the EDC in 1954? My central claim is that this can best be explained by the particular distribution of power resulting from the end of the Cold War and the structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity it induces. My argument unfolds as follows: Unipolarity provides the hegemon with incentives to pursue power-maximizing strategies.
Simply put, the United States opposed an “autonomous” European security architecture because the only remaining threat on the European continent is a strong, autonomous, politically and militarily integrated European Union. Pushing for an autonomous “EU force” would mean creating a buck catcher that could, in the long run, turn into a peer competitor. Structural constraints do not provide the hegemon with incentives to pursue such a strategy.
The international system shifted from a bipolar world during the Cold War, characterized by a harsh competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, to a unipolar structure characterized by
U.S. preponderance. While during the Cold War the Soviet Union was luring on Europe as a potential hegemon, the United States strongly backed European defense and security initiatives in order to create an uncompromising “third force” capable of containing the Soviet Union by itself.124 The underlying logic was America’s hope to act as an offshore balancer vis-à-vis Europe and pass the buck of containing the
Soviet Union to the Europeans.125 As history shows us events did not unfold as foreseen and the United
States had to balance the Soviet Union on the European continent on its own and ensure the largest
124 Scholars such as Melvyn Leffler have argued that the United States’ primary goal throughout the Cold War was to prevent the emergence of a “third force” on the European continent. He argued: “Neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as a third force or a neutral bloc”. See: Leffler Melvyn P, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, (Standford: Standford University Press), 1993,p. 17. I do not agree with this vision that contradicts the European integration process and America’s role as a sponsor. I subscribe to the vision put forth by James McAllister that: “although it is true that the United States did not want a neutral Western Europe or, needless to say, a united Western Europe actively opposed to the United States, they did want a Western Europe strong enough to defend itself externally against the Soviet Union and internally against either a divided or united Germany.” See McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 20. 125 For the best account on the offshore balancing strategy of the United States and the European integration process see: Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, Chapters 3 to 6.
UNIGE / SES - 55 - Olivier Brighenti Part II part of the burden.126 As a consequence, Europe is best understood as an “American protectorate” since the failure of military integration in 1954. The shift to unipolarity dramatically changed the geopolitical distribution of power, but not the underlying logic of America’s post-1954 preponderance on the continent. The absence of the Soviet Union as a possible hegemon in Europe makes offshore balancing as a general strategy of “burden shifting” irrelevant in a unipolar world. As an offshore balancer, the United States would remain on the sidelines with respect to European security affairs.
Why would the United States encourage an autonomous European military capacity that could, on the long term, challenge its interests in Europe and elsewhere? Simply put, unipolarity has enabled the
United States to be the most powerful state in the world, thus dominating Europe. It is not in its strategic interests to “create” a peer competitor. This reflects the longstanding ambivalence of the U. S. policy towards European integration. While they had hoped to see Europe stand on its own against the Soviet
Union without American support in the aftermath of World War II, they feared that Europe might do just that, thereby weakening the preponderance of the United States in Europe. A strong military integrated
Europe operating “autonomously” from the Transatlantic Alliance would by definition challenge
America’s hegemony in Europe and, on the long term, elsewhere.127 A military aggregated Europe would not become a more effective partner of the United States, but a force in international affairs that could provoke a shift from the unipolar world configuration to a multipolar world. In other words, while
Washington wanted Western Europe to be strong enough to help contain the Soviet Union in a bipolar
126 One of the guiding principles of American grand strategy between 1900 and the end of the Cold War was to prevent Europe’s resources coming under the control of one single power. The reasoning behind this policy was the belief that any state or organization in control of Europe’s resources would be able to threaten the United States. In 1904 Halford Mackinder argued that: “The oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight.” Mackinder Harold F, "The Geographical Pivot in History," In. The World of General Haushofer edited by Dorplan Adreas T, (New York: Kennikat), 1966, p. 200. In the same vein, in 1942, Nicholas Spykman asserted: “Who controls the rimeland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. In other words, that a Germany in security command of Europe would be in a position to embargo the United States and weaken it so much that it would be vulnerable to conquest. Spykman Nicholas J, The Geography of the Peace, (New York: Harcourt), 1944,p. 43. Early in the Cold War, President Truman argued for balancing against the Soviet Union because if the “potential” power of Europe were added to “existing Soviet strength,” then “the prospect for the survival of the United States as a free nation would be slight.” See also: Leffler Melvyn P, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948," The American Historical Review, vol. 89, no. 2, (1984), pp. 346-381. 127 Henry Kissinger outlined this aspect in 1982 when he asserts: “to suppose that Europe would unite in order to share our burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views. Europe’s main incentive to undertake a larger cooperative role in the West’s affairs would be to fulfill its own distinctive purposes.” Kissinger Henri A, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little Brown), 1982, p. 131.
UNIGE / SES - 56 - Olivier Brighenti Part II world, it does not want the European Union to become strong enough to challenge its hegemony and leadership in a unipolar one. Thus, my central argument is that the strategy of the United States in a unipolar world draws along the lines of hard-line realism and can be seen as the exact opposite of offshore balancing. In fact, the U.S. pursues a double strategy of power maximization in order to maintain, strengthen and deepen its hegemony in Europe while preventing Europe from any autonomous enticement. I argue that this double strategy is at the heart of the U.S. opposition to an autonomous European security and defense policy (ESDP). An “acceptable” ESDP has to be developed within NATO because the Atlantic Alliance remains the essential “tool” of America’s hegemonic strategy in Europe. In other words, the United States supports the continued existence of NATO even though its
“core business”, i.e. containing the Soviet Union, is now irrelevant. Interpretations have been multiple, but the clearest explanation can be derived from hard-line realism. American policymakers used NATO in order to ensure that the United States would retain its hegemonic position in Europe notwithstanding the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union as a hegemonic threat on the European continent. NATO was the instrument the United States used to implement its continental preeminence over Europe. Thus abandoning such an important power maximization tool that enables the U.S. to remain a “European hegemon” is irrelevent. The United States championed the perpetuation and enlargement of NATO to prevent both the re-emergence of multipolarity in Europe and the emergence of a rival and European defense Policy. Thus ,the traditional U.S. preponderance strategy in Europe has survived the end of the Cold War. The Cold War famous “adage” that NATO was created to keep the
Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in, can be translated in a unipolar world into: keeping the United States at the top, the Europeans down while preventing the resurgence of a multipolar international structure. Simply put, a solid and, above all, autonomous European Security and
Defense Policy operating outside the Transatlantic framework could have settled the premises of a serious peer competitor. No wonder that the United States was reluctant and opposed to an autonomous ESDP operating outside NATO.
What of the offensive claim that the United States is not pursuing power maximizing strategies in
Europe and acts as an offshore balancer on the old continent? The evidence appears to contradict the underlying logic of the offensive claim. Simply put, the United States is still in Europe with troops and
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NATO is still operative even though its core business, i.e. the containment of the Soviet Union has ended for nearly two decades.128 There is no hegemonic threat to contain on the European continent.
The only threat to American interests in Europe and by consequence on the rest of the world is a politically united and militarily strong European Union that could rise as a peer competitor and challenge its preponderance and disrupt the unipolar world configuration. That is why the United States has continuously opposed an ESDP independent and autonomous from NATO. They insisted that any efforts to create a European defense initiative must not duplicate NATO’s capabilities and must be part of an effort to strengthen the Alliance’s “European Pillar”.129 There is little evidence that an offshore balancer would have adopted such a strategy, especially when there is no potential hegemon in sight.
For defensive realism, ESDP would just be another institution “out there” that would not endanger the hegemon’s security. Security is plentiful and opposing the ESDP would largely be counterproductive. In other words, adopting power oriented strategies in the process of the ESDP could engender competition and thus upset the balance. Thus, the United States should be pursuing a strategy of offshore balancing. According to the logic of the structural liberal approach, the United States should be in favor of the ESDP since it is in the logic of institution building. The United States should be willing to accept some limits on its own autonomy in the European security affairs in order to maintain its power on the continent. The remainder of this case study is organized as follows. I will start by providing a historical background of the European security debate since the end of World War II. Then I will analyze every initiative that promoted a European defense architecture. I begin with the early 1990’s and see how events unfolded until the Nice Summit in 2000. I am interested not in the effectiveness of a European
128 John Mearsheimer argued in 1991 and again in 2001 that the United States remained in Europe to prevent Germany from dominating Europe. Given Germany’s strong economic and demographic power, an American decision to withdraw its troops from the continent would set the basis for Germany to emerge as a potential hegemon, capable of dominating the entire European continent. See: Mearsheimer John J, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, vol. 15, no. 2, (Fall 1990), pp. 5-56 & Mearsheimer John J, "The future of the American pacifier," Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 5, (September-October 2001), pp. 46-61. Similarly, Robert Art has argued that the United States must remain engaged in Europe to prevent the re- nationalization of security competition among European states. Art Robert J, A Grand Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2003, pp. 214-216. This explanation of the American presence on the European continent 15 years after the end of the Cold War is unconvincing. NATO is the tool preventing Europe from pursuing an autonomous foreign and defense policy while enabling the United States to remain the “European Hegemon.” 129 Layne Christopher, "America as European Hegemon," The National Interest, vol., no. 71, (Summer 2003), p. 27. Layne also outlines that: “The United States is also encouraging European NATO members to concentrate individually on carving-out “niche” capabilities that will complement U.S. power rather than potentially challenge it.”
UNIGE / SES - 58 - Olivier Brighenti Part II security architecture but in the Transatlantic bargaining process. I will then compare the case of the
ESDP to the European Defense Community from 1948 to 1954 as well as various other attempts to integrate European military capabilities. I will focus, first and foremost, on the Eisenhower approach to
European security. The last section will evaluate my theoretical approach.
3.1. The European Defense in a Historical Perspective
After the end of World War II and the bipolar resulting world order, the United States was confronted with the double problem of the Soviet Union and its will to dominate Europe as well as the “German question”. The United States wanted to make sure that the Soviet Union could not dominate Western
Europe and that Germany would not rearm on a nationalistic agenda and decide to dominate the other
European states. This would have represented a threat not only to its European allies, but to the United
States security itself. Since the Soviet Union was the only great power left in Europe, it could become powerful enough to pose a direct threat to the United States. Thus, Washington had to prevent them from dominating the continent by all means. In order to contain the Soviet Union, the United States could choose between two basic strategies. They could have opted for a buck-passing strategy consisting in passing the burden of containing the Soviet threat to the Europeans. The European
Defense Community (EDC), often seen as a minor event in European integration, was the cornerstone of the U.S. offshore balancing strategy. The EDC, represented for American policy makers of both the
Trumann and the Eisenhower administration, the genuine solution to the German problem and a way of passing the buck of containing the Soviet Union to the Europeans. For Dean Acheson, the EDC: “May well prove to be the most important and most far reaching events of our lifetime. We have seen the beginning of the realization of an ancient dream: the unity of the free peoples of the Western Europe.”130
Thus, the American position on the European military integration between 1948 and 1952 rested on a single and straightforward strategy: the creation of a “third force” capable of containing the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the EDC would prevent Germany from dominating its European neighbors. Hence, the United States, as I will show later on in this chapter, backed unreservedly the creation of the EDC,
130 Acheson Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton Publishing), 1969,p. 647.
UNIGE / SES - 59 - Olivier Brighenti Part II since it was a win-win situation both for Europe and for the United States. Thus, as outlined by
McAllister, the EDC was an essential element in transforming the basic power structure of the international system.131 The political unity of Europe would enable the advent of a powerful third force that would transform the bipolar world into a tripolar international system with Europe as a political and military power capable of containing the Soviet Union. Once the double problem of the Soviet Union and
Germany solved by a politically united Europe, the United States could achieve the primary goal of the
Eisenhower administration: the withdrawal of all American troops from Europe. As history shows us, this strategy revealed irrelevant for two main reasons. First of all, although France had signed the EDC treaty in May 1952, the French National Assembly rejected the Treaty in August 1954 shattering the existence of a viable European military integration. Secondly, and as a result, no European state or politically integrated coalition of states were capable of containing the Soviet Union without the United
States. In other words, in the aftermath of the War and the destruction of European military and economic capabilities, there was no buck catcher in Europe. The failure of political and military integration through the EDC, had a dramatic effect on the U.S. grand strategy. Although offshore balancing was the favored strategy, it became virtually irrelevant in the aftermath of the collapse of the
EDC. Thus, the United States had to rely on another strategy which revealed the exact opposite of
“burden shifting”. The U.S. had to balance directly against the Soviet Union, assuming the responsibility of containing the potential hegemon by itself. As John Mearsheimer argues: “With balancing, a great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power.
The initial goal is to deter the aggressor, but if that fails, the balancing state will fight the ensuing war”132
This strategy of balancing placed the United States in a dominant position in the European continent.
The failure of a Western European military integration resulted in the United States being the
“indispensable nation” for European security. Through NATO, the United States ensured its leadership and hegemony in European security and military affairs. As a result, for nearly five decades of the Cold
War, Europe had to rely on the Atlantic Alliance and the United States for its security. Although the
United States backed every single European initiative to create a politically integrated Europe until 1954,
131 McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002,pp. 172-173. 132 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, p. 13.
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Europe was unable to achieve this goal and become a politically strong “third force”. Eisenhower’s vision of an effective tripolar world comprising the Soviet Union, the United States, and Europe never occurred and the distribution of power remained resolutely bipolar. As a result, NATO became the cornerstone of the American strategy on the European continent. The United States thus reversed its strategy and sought to promote a U.S. dominated Atlantic Community. NATO became its tool to promote its interests in Europe and above all, the warrant for its leadership in European security affairs.
Thus, with the failure of the EDC, the U.S. strategy in Europe shifted from offshore balancing in the early aftermath of the War to a strategy of preponderance throughout the entire Cold War. This period was punctuated by an ambivalent rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic on the imperatives and means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.
3.1.1. The “European Pillar”: A History The “European pillar” rhetoric has been at the heart of Transatlantic relations for more than six decades.
Understanding the European security architecture and Transatlantic grand bargain cannot go without analyzing the roots of the European pillar and what are its implications for Europe and the United
States. Finding the roots of the “European Pillar” brings us as far as the creation of NATO itself.
Two years after the end of World War II, France and Great Britain signed a bilateral mutual defense agreement known as the Treaty of Dunkirk.133 In reaction to various threats from the Soviet Union,
France and Britain decided to convey five European states (Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to sign the Treaty of Brussels in March 1948. The 1948 coup in
Czechoslovakia, as well as the blockade of Berlin that started in April of the same year, were key factors
133 On 4 March 1947, France’s Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and UK Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin signed a pact of mutual assistance in Dunkirk. The two signatories agreed to ensure mutual assistance in case of a renewed German aggression. While the German question seemed to be central for both countries, it is less Germany than the Soviet Union that was at the source of the Treaty. As outlined by Michael Crosswell: “They [the French] believed that the Soviet Union represented the primary danger to their security. Beginning to suspect Soviet intentions and clash with Moscow over the future of Germany, French policy makers took refuge in Western collective arrangements. Their first move was to establish an alliance with Britain. Signed on March 4, 1947, the Treaty of Dunkirk was ostensibly directed against Germany. In truth however, the anti German clauses were merely cosmetic – the treaty actually targeted the Soviet Union. The agreement identified Germany as the principal threat because neither France nor Britain wanted to antagonize the Soviet Union given the poor state of Western defenses. In the words of French Foreign Minister Bidault, the German threat was a useful myth.” Croswell Michael, "A Question of Balance: How France and the United States created the Cold War Europe," Harvard Historical Studies, vol. 153, no. 1, (2006), pp. 9-10.
UNIGE / SES - 61 - Olivier Brighenti Part II in the creation of this first ever fully integrated military organization.134 The Brussels Treaty marked the common will of the Western European states to create a defense system that would enable them to resist politically and militarily to threats to their security, namely the Soviet threat. The Europeans knew too well that their organization was nothing but an empty shelf without the involvement of the United
States.135 The Brussels Treaty made it very clear to the American planners that economic recovery was impossible without military security and that only the United States could provide that security.136 The
Europeans highly pressed the United States to join an alliance that would bind both sides of the Atlantic into a mutual assistance framework. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin made it clear when he proposed U.S. Secretary of State Marshall “to launch some form of union in Western Europe, backed by the Americans and the Dominions”. This idea was warmly welcomed by Marshall but a complicated U.S. approach to entangling alliances was in process in Washington.137 Along the same line, the day the
Brussels Treaty was signed, French Foreign Minister George Bidault sent a message to Secretary of
State Marshall stating: “The moment has come to strengthen on the political level and, as soon as possible, on the military level, the collaboration of the old and of the new world, both so closely united in
134 In February, 1948 Czechoslovakia, a Westernized country whose leaders Eduard Benes and Jan Masarky had close ties with the United States, fell under a military coup backed by the Soviet Union. In June of the same year, the Soviet Union used its presence in East Germany to blockade Berlin, which led the United States to organize the Berlin air lift. 135 This aspect is very well outlined by Don Cook: “The British knew full well, better than the Americans, that they could no longer hold a European balance of power. The primary aim of British postwar policy, therefore, had to be to ensure that American power was not withdrawn from Europe. America would have to take up in Europe a role that Britain had played for nearly two centuries.” Cook Don, Forging the Alliance: NATO 1945-1950, (London: Secker and Warburg), 1989,p. 11. 136 By emphasizing the principles of self help and mutual aid, the Brussels Pact powers appealed to the cause that American assistance served the ends of European political, economic, and military unification. The assistance the Europeans wanted was the participation of the United States to that organization. 137 A fierce debate was going on between traditional isolationists and advocates of an Atlantic Alliance. The American planners had trouble “selling” an entangling military alliance to the nation. Being a “European Alliance” made things worse since it went both against Washington’s warnings of 1796 and the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, the restrictions of the founding fathers were directed against permanent alliances with the very countries that would be at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance. The last U.S alliance with a European nation (Franco-American alliance) had been ended by the Convention of Mortefontaine in 1800. Secondly the possible entanglement in a future war as a consequence of obligations to the new allies was a major point of discord. This could clash with the constitutional power of the Congress to declare war. Harry Truman wrote in his memoirs: “The Brussels Pact nations wanted the North Atlantic pact to state that, if a member was attacked, the other members would supply all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. This of course, implied going to war … This was an obligation which in the view of our constitution, we were not prepared to assume.” Truman Harry S, Mémoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, (New York: Doubleday), 1956,p. 249. This debate opposing isolationists and atlanticists from all political affiliation lasted until the signature and the ratification of the Atlantic Alliance Treaty by the Senate. The atlanticitsts largely won the “battle of ideas” when the Senate by a vote of 82 to 13 approved the North Atlantic Treaty on July 21 1949. On the United States and the Origins of NATO and the Senate and Congress debate on the accession to an entangling institution, see: Kaplan Lawrence A, "The United States and the Origins of NATO 1946-1949," Review of Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, (April 1969), pp. 210-222.
UNIGE / SES - 62 - Olivier Brighenti Part II their attachment to the only civilization which counts” M. Bidault declared that France, along with Great
Britain, was determined to do everything in its power to organize the common defense of the democratic countries of Europe. He expressed great gratitude for the economic assistance given by the United
States but stressed, as Bevin had done previously, that the resolve of the European countries to resist aggression could be effective only with American help. He proposed political consultations and the examination of technical problems concerned with common defense against a peril which can be immediate.138 In his reply to M. Bidault, General Marshall clearly outlined the basic idea that Europe should participate in its own defense and that the United States would help Europe if Europe was ready to help itself in the first place. He told M. Bidault that although the United States entirely shared the preoccupations of the French, the countries of Western Europe must show what they were prepared to do for themselves and for each other before asking for further assistance. The same day, President
Truman told the American Congress: “I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them”139 In his 1949 second term inaugural address Truman stated: “We are now working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area. Such an agreement would take the form of a collective defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations charter.
[…] The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter. He stressed once more that Europe must do its share in the forthcoming alliance. “Each country participating in these arrangements” he said,
“must contribute all it can to the common defense.” He concluded the third point of his address by saying: “I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan.” The
North Atlantic Treaty followed three months later and was accepted with a margin sufficient to suggest that the United States had turned the page of Isolationism.140 The Western European Organization of
1948 was thus the first step in the process leading to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty one year later. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that the North Atlantic Treaty was not inspired by the United
138 Ibidem 139 Ibidem 140 This is also due to Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty: “This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” It made provision that enabled the respect of the American Constitution.
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States but by European states, in particular France and Britain. In fact, as I highlighted, most Europeans saw that the containment of the Soviet Union was virtually impossible without the help of the United
States. Hence, the Washington Treaty resulted in a shift from a strict European security organization to a Transatlantic approach to European security. This shift laid the grassroots of the so-called European
Pillar. As I will analyze later on in this chapter, in parallel to this European pillar, the Europeans under
American impulse sought to promote a European Defense Community as part of the European integration process.141 With the failure of the EDC following the vote of the French national Assembly in
1954, the idea of a European defense was set aside for a long time. In the place of the EDC, under
British suggestion, the Western European Organization of 1948 was updated and transformed on the 23
October 1954 into the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU set a new and very important path for
European Security as well as for transatlantic relations. Indeed on the first hand, Germany accessed to normal membership to NATO as well as full membership in the WEU. More important, the Brussels
Treaty and the Washington Treaty were formally linked. The crucial implication for any future European defense initiatives is that the WEU countries would not build up any military co-operation separated from, duplicating or competing with NATO. In other words, the fate of European security was sealed to the Transatlantic framework, NATO, or put differently the United States.142 The 1954 WEU Treaty was seen as a way to overcome the failure of the EDC. On the long run, however, the WEU became an
“empty shell”and lived entirely in NATO’s shadow. As outlined by David Yost: “During the Cold War, the
WEU served primarily as a mechanism to reassure West Germany’s neighbors and Alliance partners that Bonn’s military capabilities would respect agreed constraints. Although the WEU’s member governments made some efforts during the 1980’s to give the WEU greater practical significance, it was
141 When the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty the 21st July 1949, Senators were reassured by President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the United States would not be required to deploy large number of troops in Europe. The Korean War changed everything. President Truman seized the occasion and deployed four divisions in Europe. In return of the U.S. commitment to Europe’s security France promised to lead the way to a European Defense Community. The EDC was a proposal of French Prime Minister René Pleven in 1950 as a counterproposal to the U.S. call for the rearmament of Germany. Thus, the first attempt to create a EDC was a response to U.S. insistence not to commit too many troops in Europe. That would enable to rearm Germany on a non-nationalistic agenda and supply military troops to the protection of the European continent. If successful, this initiative would reduce the necessity for large scale U.S. forces in Europe. 142 Article IV of the Brussels Treaty (amended at the Paris agreements in 1954) linked closely the WEU to NATO: “In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.
UNIGE / SES - 64 - Olivier Brighenti Part II not until the end of the Cold War that the concept of building a European Security and Defense Identity won a wider and more substantial consensus.”143 On the one hand, it had the authority to monitor
German rearmament, but on the other hand, most security aspects were already under the authority of
NATO. As a consequence, the failure of the EDC put aside the development of a political union and the idea of a European defense for several decades.
3.2. The End of the Cold War, Unipolarity and Security in Europe: Changing Patterns, Recurring Strategies?
As was the case with the end of World War II, the end of the Cold War produced a major change in the global distribution of power. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the major threat to America’s interest in Europe vanished. Besides, Europe in the early 90’s was undertaking major steps towards further integration. The combination of these two elements rose important questions about the Alliance’s continued relevance in the post Cold War European security architecture. The United States had long advocated the creation of a strong European Pillar within NATO. The underlying logic was that an economically and politically strong Europe would be capable of contributing equal military capabilities to the Alliance. After four decades of European reliance on the United States, the end of the Cold War marked a new era for the “European pillar”. In fact, the notion of a common foreign and defense policy only regained the top of the European agenda, with the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989. The
United States gave strong support to the development of a viable European Pillar within the Atlantic
Alliance. This was in accordance with an important school of thought in U.S. strategy towards European security. The defense burden-sharing approach sought to pressure the Europeans to take more responsibilities for their own security in order to assume a larger share of the burden. This burden- sharing approach which was consistent with the fifty-year-old commitment made by the European NATO founding members as a counterpart to U.S. efforts rests on a recurring ambivalence. As outlined by
143 Yost David S, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace Press), 1998,p. 77. Once West Germany joined the WEU in 1955 and was actively encouraged to rearm against the Soviet threat, the WEU virtually became irrelevant. It was revived in the mid 1980’s to improve arms production in Europe and as a forum to discuss Reagan’s policies towards the Soviet Union. It was revived again in 1987 to coordinate naval activities during the Iran-Iraq War and in 1991 during the Second Golf War.
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Fred Bergsten: “The U.S. suffers from schizophrenia on the international front. On the one hand, it claims that Europe (and during better times Japan) should assert greater international responsibility and share the burdens of leadership. On the other hand, its revealed preference is to try to maintain
American dominance – even while asking others to pay the bill – and to exploit national differences within Europe: whenever possible.”144 Although the United States had supported a strong European
Pillar since the early days of the Cold War, the nature of this pillar would have important implications for the Transatlantic Alliance and the United States. The United States could be affected by the debate on a stronger European implications in the security realm, not only for its leadership role in the Alliance, but also for its interests in Europe.
Strangely the patterns of American strategy regarding a politically integrated Europe have not dramatically changed from the strategy of preponderance that has prevailed since 1954. If the United
States had fully backed European military integration during the first years of the Cold War and especially the EDC as part of its offshore balancing strategy, this cannot be verified since the end of the
Cold War. Why is it that the United States did not modify its grand strategy towards Europe once the
Soviet threat disappeared? Why is it that the best occasion to pursue an offshore balancing strategy since the EDC was not embraced by Washington? My central claim is that the answer to these questions lies in the distribution of power resulting from the end of the Cold War. In other words, the structural change that appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union gave birth to a hierarchic international structure dominated by the United States. In a hierarchic system such as the actual unipolar one, the hegemon has a high degree of leverage on the system and its power is such that it is unlikely to be challenged by any state or coalition of states. As a result, the hegemon in a unipolar world will constantly exploit the large asymmetries in the distribution of power to organize international politics in a way that suits its interests. Thus, it is not in the interest of the hegemon to create or help create a
“buck catcher”. In other words, in such a system the hegemon has virtually no incentives to pursue a strategy of offshore balancing, and this for two major reasons. First of all, when you stand aloof at the top, pressures from the system will drive you to pursue a strategy of preponderance. Put differently,
144 Bergsten Fred C, "America and Europe: Clash of the Titans," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, (March/April 1999), p. 30.
UNIGE / SES - 66 - Olivier Brighenti Part II there is no other great power or coalition of powers capable of opposing the hegemon’s “agenda”. Thus, the strategy of a hegemon is to oppose multipolarity and prevent the rise of a peer competitor, not to favor multipolarity by creating a “buck catcher”. Consequently, offshore balancing as a strategy of
“burden shifting” is a bipolar/multipolar strategy not a unipolar one. An offshore balancing strategy would mean that the United States would have fully backed the ESDP and accommodate with the rise of a potential new great power, in the case at hand a politically and military “autonomous” strong Europe. Put differently, the United States would agree to abandon its unprecedented position as the sole pole and shift the burden of European security to the Europeans. Boldly said, that would mean that the hegemon would stand on the sidelines, while contemplating the rise of a potential peer competitor. An offshore balancer in a unipolar world would advocate and support a transformation of the basic power structure from a unipolar to a multipolar world. In international politics where power is the main aspect driving state interaction, only a misguided actor would favor such a strategy. As my theory predicts, the hegemon’s strategy in a unipolar world is one of preponderance not one of offshore balancing.
The central aspect to bear in mind is that the aspiration to pursue a “European” security project relatively “autonomous” from the United States is by no means a post St-Malo phenomenon. Although the ESDP is the single most relevant European initiative since the EDC, its developments have gone through various “chaotic” initiatives since the early 90’s. Number of countries were already actively pursuing strategies to develop some form of “autonomous” security and defense component of the
EC/EU. Every initiative failed until the St-Malo breakthrough. It is thus fundamental to understand why they failed previously and why the ESDP succeeded in 1998-1999. In effect, the idea of a European foreign and security policy (CFSP)145 was present in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, but very little was done to render the CFSP effective with some military “backing”. The ESDP breackthrough came well after Maastricht and Amsterdam and these achievements, as I will show throughout this chapter, can be tied to the distribution of power resulting from the end of the Cold War.146
145 The Maastricht Treaty gave the European Union a common foreign and security policy. In principle it included also the “eventual framing of a common defense policy” which could “in time lead to a common defense”. (Art. J.4.) 146 The development of a European Defense Identity is a direct response to the shift in the balance of power. The U.S. supported the continuation and adjustment of NATO as its principal claim to leadership in Europe, while the Europeans supported NATO’s adjustments as a way to lock in American contributions to European security. The absence of a major threat to Europe, gives the Europeans less reasons to surrender to U.S. leadership. This has pushed the Europeans to develop alternatives that may challenge US leadership. The two sides of the Atlantic
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In order to understand this “work in progress,” I will analyze how events unfolded from the early 1990’s and highlight that the United States has pursued a strategy of preponderance in European security affairs. In the second part, I will compare the case of the ESDP to the European Defense Community from 1948 to 1954 as well as various other attempts to integrate European military capabilities in order to confirm that the distribution of power has a dramatic effect on the hegemon’s behavior. In effect, different distributions of power imply different grand strategies. What are the consequences of unipolarity on European Security? Does the unipolar distribution of power have a dramatic effect on the hegemon’s strategy on the Old Continent? Can recurring patterns be observed in the hegemon’s behavior and what are the consequences for the ESDP? Did the United States pursue a strategy of offshore balancing, trying to pass the buck of European Security to its European allies, or on the contrary did it pursue a strategy of preponderance reinforcing its hegemonic position in Europe? Did events unfold as my theory predicts?
My central claim about the overall process of a “European defense capacity” is that the ESDP is a response to fifty years of missed opportunities and disenchantments. It is an answer to half a decade of debate on burden sharing and stronger European involvement for their own security.147 It fulfils the commitment made by the Europeans in the late 1940’s when they pledged to combine defense efforts in order to make a substantial counterpart to the efforts of their North American Allies. NATO was initially not meant to be dominated by the United States. On the contrary, it was designed to be a positive-sum relationship. Indeed, the burdensharing issue was deeply rooted in the negotiations that led to the
Washington Treaty. The deal was very simple: The United States would help defend Europe if Europe made a serious effort to defend itself.148 This was very clear for Secretary of States Dean Acheston
have visions that are not irreconcilable, but they are far less convergent than during the Cold War. Thus conflict across the Atlantic will be inevitable. 147 Paul Cornish brilliantly captured the “European Dilemma” when he asserts: “If the European were neither able to organize themselves into a more efficient wing of the Alliance nor willing to commit more resources to the common cause, then the very idea of a security partnership could be at stake. If the Europeans could at least organize themselves better, while remaining reluctant to open their wallets, US critics might see the beginnings of a caucus of free-riders intent on unbalancing the partnership and undermining US leadership. But if the European allies could make both an efficient and well-funded contribution to their own defence, what need would there be for US assistance and leadership, and indeed for NATO?” Cornish Paul, "European Security: The End of the Architecture and the New NATO," International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2, (Winter 1996), p. 754. 148 Stanley Sloan points out a crucial aspect when he outlines: “It is important to recall that when the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty, Senators were reassured by the Truman Administration, and by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in particular that the United States would not be required to deploy large troops to Europe to implement the commitment. This all changed in September 1950, when President Truman seized of the Korean war to commit
UNIGE / SES - 68 - Olivier Brighenti Part II when he was asked in 1949 during a Senate hearing: “Are we going to be expected to send substantial number of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to these countries’ capacity to resist?” Dean Acheston’s answer was straightforward: “The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute No.”149 As outlined by Joylon Howorth: “It was obvious that the European security could only effectively be underwritten by the United States, which was urgently enjoined by France and
Britain to enter into an entangling alliance, binding the destinies of the two continents in an Atlantic security community. Even so, it was not the intention of those who framed the Washington Treaty in
1949 that the United States should emerge as the undisputed hegemon within the Alliance, the one which was considerably more equal than all others. Indeed The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at its outset, seemed predicated on the development of two roughly equal pillars, whose combined articulation was perceived as creating a clear positive sum relationship.”150 The Korean War changed the rules of the game and the United States became the uncontested hegemon within the Atlantic
Alliance throughout the entire Cold War.151 Now that the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United
States is in an unprecedented position with no peer competitor at sight. Creating an autonomous, combined European capacity for military action could substantially change the balance and dynamics of the Transatlantic Alliance. The hegemon in a unipolar world will try, by all means, to preserve if not improve its power position and will be very upset with any form of “autonomous” action that may improve the power position of others even when they happen to be its closest ally. My argument is that the United States objected and will continue to do so, to any form of “autonomous” European Security and Defense Policy outside NATO (put differently under U.S. custody) because it can reduce its power advantage in the Old World. In other words, although the ESDP is a direct response to Washington’s
to the deployment of four divisions to Europe. In return, France promised to lead the way towards a European Defence Community. […] Senate resolution 99, approved by the Senate on April 4, 1951 by a vote of 69 to 21, supported the deployment, but also declared that the joint Chiefs of Staff should certify that the European allies were making realistic efforts on the behalf of European defense; that the Europeans should make the major contribution to allied ground forces; and that provisions should be made to utilize the military resources of Italy, West Germany and Spain.” Sloan Stanley R, "Burdensharing in NATO: The US and Transatlantic Burdensharing," Les notes de l'ifri, vol. 12, no. 2, (1999), pp. 11-12. 149 Acheson Dean, Testimony to U.S. Senate, North Atlantic Treaty, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1949,p. 47. 150 Howorth Jolyon, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?," Chaillot Papers, vol. --, no. 43, (November 2003), pp. 9-10. 151 On how the Alliance was gradually dominated by the United States see: Harrison Michael M, The Reluctant Ally: France and the Atlantic Security, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), 1981,pp. 15-30.
UNIGE / SES - 69 - Olivier Brighenti Part II longstanding claims for a European involvement in its own security, the United States has firmly opposed any “autonomous” strive. To quote Barry Posen: “Who better to code the behavior of the EU than the state most obsessed with power relations”152
3.3. The United States and the NATO Transformation: Unipolarity and Power Maximization in the Aftermath of the Cold War
The European security environment dramatically changed in the months following the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, and the demise of the Soviet Union. The absence after nearly fifty years of a superpower adversary, capable of conducting conventional and nuclear warfare, has forced the North Atlantic Treaty allies to reevaluate the Cold War assumptions and the basic structure of their security policy. Many analysts and policy makers questioned what would
NATO’s place be in the European security environment once the Soviet threat vanished. Many thought the Alliance wouldn’t survive long after the end of the Cold War. Its main goals as well as the basis of its existence did not exist anymore.153 Glenn Snyder argued during the Cold War that: “The Atlantic
Alliance cannot break up since NATO is a product of the bipolar structure of the system, it cannot collapse or change basically until the structure changes.”154 The structure has dramatically changed but
NATO has been reinforced. The new unipolar international structure led to divergent views on European security. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the special EC Summit in Paris on 18 November
152 Posen Barry R, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?," Security Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, (April-June 2006), p. 165. 153 Most structural realists agreed that alliances without an enemy make no sense. In 1993 Structural pundit Kenneth Waltz concluded that: “NATO’s days are not numbered but its years are” Waltz Kenneth N, "The Emerging Structure Of International Politics," International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, (Fall 1993), p. 76. Seven years later he somehow confirmed his prediction when asserting: “I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War’s end and ultimately to disappear. In a basic sense, the expectation has been borne out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee because one cannot answer the question, guarantee against whom? Functions vary as structures change, as does the behavior of the units. Thus the end of the Cold War quickly changed the behavior of allied countries. Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), p. 19. Similarly Steven Walt asserts: “Although they [allies] retain certain common interests and will undoubtedly continue to cooperate on a variety of issues, consensus will neither be as significant nor as automatic in the future as it was in the past. Instead, the Atlantic Alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray, appearing robust and youthful as it grows older and ever more infirm. […] The danger is that NATO will be dead before anyone notices, and we will discover the corpse only at the awkward moment when we expect it to show signs of life.” Walt Stephen M, "NATO's Fragile Future," In. What NATO for Canada?, edited by Haglung David G, (Kingston: Queen's University Center for International Relations), 2000, p. 81. 154 Snyder Glenn H, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, (July 1984), pp. 494- 495.
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1989 that: “all military matters should continue to be conducted through NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”
President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told the European Parliament three days later that the most appropriate response to the changes in Eastern Europe was the strengthening of the bonds that bound members of the EC together.155 Some argued that the Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should deal with European security. Others argued that it was time for a
Europeanization of NATO and that Europeans should take over the burden of their own security.
Although the contrary was often said, the Bush administration was the only one to have developed a clear-cut strategy for the US position in Europe. As outlined by Robert Art: “This was because President
Bush, Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft came into office with the sense that there were opportunities for decisive change in Europe, and they were intend on overthrowing the old political-military balance there”156 The Bush administration wanted to bring an end to the Cold War, help the German reunification and keep a united Germany entangled within NATO, while transforming the alliance in order to ensure its survival and strengthen the American leadership.
Secretary of State James Baker, in a speech at the Berlin Press Club announced: “We propose that the
United States and the European Community work together to achieve a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links […] We will create a new Europe on the basis of a New
Atlanticism.”157 The main message of James Baker was to assert the continuing relevance of NATO as the main bridge between the United States and Europe as well as the main tool for American influence in the Europe. It was obvious for him, that the security of Europe remained indissociable from the United
States. He warned the EC Member states that the EC could never be an alternative to transatlantic cooperation. He asserted that the deepening of European integration had to go in parallel with the deepening of transatlantic link. Integration should be seen as an instrument to strengthen the links between Washington and Europe and not a means to divide the allies. Baker’s speech set in 1989, the position that Washington will adopt throughout the whole post Cold War Era. He pledged that the United
155 Quoted in : Menon Anand. Forster Anthony & Wallace William, "A Common European Defense?," Survival, vol. 34, no. 3, (1992), p. 103. 156 Art Robert J, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 111, no. 1, (Spring 1996), p. 11. 157 Baker James A, "A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era", Berlin, 1989, Department of State Press Release,
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States will remain a European power, and that the main instrument for implementing its power in Europe would be NATO. However, the very polished speech left no doubt that Washington was concerned, above all, about safeguarding and strengthening its influence in Europe.
Regardless of the different visions and trends in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic all the leaders agreed that the Alliance should survive the end of the Cold War. As history shows us, the transatlantic option to European security prevailed and NATO turned out to remain the principal transatlantic tool for security. It even reinforced its leadership position with the enlargement to many former Warsaw Pact countries. Thus NATO, was a product of the bipolar structure, but the structural changes didn’t alter its existence and preeminence in the European security architecture.
With the end of the Cold War, the longstanding debate of a strong European pillar within NATO resurfaced. In the early 1990’s the renewal of the alliance resulting from the structural changes that occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall gave rise to many speculations, notably on the French side. In effect, France wished that the European Community would acquire some form of autonomous security capacity within the Atlantic Alliance. The “autonomy” issue had been set aside during fifty years due to the constraints of the Cold War. It is not surprising that most initiatives came from France. Paris had always sought to promote a more balanced Alliance with roughly two equal pillars158. Following that logic, only five months after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disagreements between
French and Germans on the reunification, President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, issued a common letter to the Irish Presidency of the EC.159 The letter called for an
158 The Washington Treaty in 1949 was designed to have two roughly equal pillars, a European and an American one. Because of the rise of the Soviet threat and the incapacity of the Europeans to guarantee their own security, the equal pillar logic never happened. As a consequence, the United States emerged as the uncontested hegemon in the Alliance. As long as Europe was threatened by the Soviet Union, American hegemony remained unquestioned, apart from some initiatives that revealed unsuccessful. Thus, France, throughout the fifty years of existence of the Alliance, tried on various occasions to pursue a more balanced partnership with various initiatives that revealed all inaccurate. Contrary to what is often claimed, France never tried to weaken or undermine the Alliance, but thought to promote a more equal balance. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the new international structure thus gave France the occasion to promote a new version of its past plans (EDC, Fouchet Plan…) for a more autonomous Europe and “sell” that plan to its European partners as well as Washington. 159 The joint Franco-German initiative that eventually led to the ICG on political union was possible only after France completely changed its attitude towards the German reunification. Although France had always supported the reunification, it was very upset when this occurred. In November 1989 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl laid out his ten point plan for the eventual reunification of Germany. He didn’t consult his allies on that matter. This upset French President François Mitterrand and the Franco-German relations, as a result, were in crisis. Mitterrand even flew to Kiev on December 6 in order to meet with President Gorbatchev in order to try to slow down the reunification process. To make things worse for the French, President Bush supported the German reunification and tried to work on the French and the also reluctant British. See: Marsh David, "Bonne Initiative Behind
UNIGE / SES - 72 - Olivier Brighenti Part II intergovernmental conference on political union that would develop a common foreign and defense policy. The text emphasized the direct link between the structural changes that occurred with the end of the Cold War and the need for a common foreign and defense policy. In effect, it stated: “In the light of far-reaching changes in Europe and in view of the completion of the single market and the realization of economic and monetary union, we consider it necessary to accelerate the political construction of the
Europe of the Twelve. We believe that it is time to transform relations as a whole among the member states into a European Union … and invest this union with the necessary means of action, as envisaged by the single act. […] The European Council should initiate preparations for an intergovernmental conference on political union. In particular, the objective is to define and implement a common foreign and security policy.”160 Although this letter was only a “call” for a political union, it emphasized four crucial aspects. First of all, it is the first official European declaration of intentions to develop some kind of “autonomous” European foreign and security policy. Secondly, this Franco-German initiative successfully pushed for a second Inter-Governmental conference to negotiate the political union and put the common foreign and security policy on top of the agenda after almost four decades. Thirdly, German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was a full partner in this initiative. Thus, the initiative was not solely a French one.161 Fourthly and most importantly, France and Germany agreed on the fundamental point that the best way to end fears about a strong united Germany was to push European integration towards political and monetary union.162
The same day, President François Mitterrand flew to Key Largo Florida to discuss the future of NATO and European security with President Bush. Although this meeting was “informal”, it is nonetheless
Ambitious Target; Franco-German Declaration on European Political and Monetary Union," The Financial Times, London, Friday 20 April 1990, p. 4. The main reason behind French fears was that the fragile balance which had prevailed would collapse with a strong reunified Germany. France assumed the role of political leader in the EC while Germany was the economic leader. President Bush bypassed the Franco-British worries about German reunification by publicly backing Kohl. He put pressures on France and Britain to reiterate their support for reunification. Consequently at the meeting of the European Council on December 8 in Strasbourg, the European Heads of States, including France and Great Britain supported German Reunification. See: Moens Alexander, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," Survival, vol. 33, no. 4, (Nevember/December 1991), pp. 531.535. 160 Letter by the German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand to the Irish Presidency of the European Community, 19 April 1990. 161 Under other circumstances this letter would have been seen in Washington as a traditional French initiative. The German backing means that this initiative cannot be dismissed by the United States as a narrow French viewpoint as in the past. 162 See : Graham George. Marsh David & Stephens Philip, "Bonn and Paris Move to Speed European Unity," The Financial Times, London, Friday 20 April 1990, p. 1.
UNIGE / SES - 73 - Olivier Brighenti Part II important since it highlights the major “misunderstandings” between the French and the American vision. In some ways, it outlines the antagonism that will prevail throughout the whole post Cold War transatlantic debate on a more autonomous European common foreign and defense policy. The basic logic underlying the French position was to gradually decouple Europe’s dependence from
Washington’s security “umbrella”. Indeed, according to the French position, the Alliance must focus on its article 5 collective defense responsibilities and not be transformed in a more political alliance that would serve to reinforce American political hegemony. Secondly, Europe would gradually take on responsibilities for collective security in Europe, through what would be labeled a European Security and
Defense Identity. Thirdly, there would be a new dialogue between the EC/EU and the United States about military and institutional restructuring.163 Although it may have seemed that the French and the
American President agreed on fundamentals, the Key Largo “summit” highlighted the main gap in
Transatlantic approaches to security that would prevail until the creation of the ESDP. On the one hand, the United States was concerned with ensuring continuity in U.S. international leadership including leadership of NATO, while the French and in a larger way the Europeans were concerned with the strengthening of the political role of the EC/EU, in managing European security affairs and a more balanced role for European partners within the Atlantic Alliance.
In July 1990, the London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance which took place set the main goals for the 1999 “New Strategic Concept for the Alliance”. While the Allies showed no will to disband the historical alliance, decisions had to be taken on the nature of a “renewed partnership” and whether it would fit in the new European security architecture.164 The main outcome of the overall renewing process of the Alliance regarding a European Pillar was that the Europeans allies would assume more responsibilities in the Alliance. The idea of a European Defense Identity (EDI) was one of the major outcomes of the London Declaration. The heads of states and governments of the Alliance
163 Howorth Jolyon, "Ideas and Discourse in a Construction of a European Security and Defense Policy for the Twenty-first Century," In. NATO and European Security - Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, edited by Moens Albert. Cohen Lenard J & Sens Allen G, (Westport: Praeger Publisher), 2003, pp. 40-41. 164 The best account on the “Renewal” of the Alliance in the early 1990’s is: Harris Scott A & Steinberg James B, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation, (Washington DC: RAND Publications), 1993,pp. 1- 14. See also: Legge Michael, "The Making of NATO's New Strategy," NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 6, (October- December 1991), pp. 9-14.
UNIGE / SES - 74 - Olivier Brighenti Part II endorse: “The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.”165 Although the declaration welcomed the creation of a European Defense Identity, it did not define its roles and main purposes. In other words, no substance was given to the EDI. As outlined by Howorth: “the grand summit of NATO, for which both presidents (Bush and Mitterrand) had called, instead of being properly and carefully prepared by intensive discussions aimed at agreeing on long-term diplomatic and political objectives, was hastily convened in London for early July on the basis of short term military reforms aimed primarily at reassuring the Russians.”166 The lack of “ambition” of the so-called Grand-Summit can be partially explained by the impossibility of Europeans and Americans to agree on fundamentals.
In fact from a U.S. perspective, the London Summit would help to define the new role for NATO and the dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact Countries. For France the London Summit was to define what would be the future EDI. But it was also used to discuss the ways of stabilizing Eastern and Central
Europe, mainly through an institution that had been designed exactly for that purpose: the OSCE. The strategy of division played by Washington finally succeeded in launching NATO’s transformation and guaranteed that NATO would remain the primary security institution in the post Cold War Europe. On the other hand, this strategy opened the door to the various Franco-German initiatives that were to take place in the early 1990’s. In the year following the London Summit, radical changes occurred and the
Alliance strategy was set on a new path. At the North Atlantic Council Meeting held on June 7 1991 in
Copenhagen, NATO leaders in a statement on the “Core Security Functions in a New Europe” emphasized the political role of the Alliance. They stated that NATO was one of the security components, but not the only one, while asserting in the end section that NATO remained the “essential forum”. Paragraph 6 outlines: “Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The
165 NATO Council of Ministers, "London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance", London, July 6, 1990, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm, (Accessed: 03/10/2006). Paragraph 3. 166 Howorth Jolyon, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?," Chaillot Papers, vol. --, no. 43, (November 2003), p. 18. As I will outline later, the informal Key Largo meeting between President Bush and President Mitterrand was aimed at defining the Agenda for the London Summit. The London Declaration dedicated 13 paragraphs to reassure the Soviet Union and to define new links with the former Warsaw Pact countries, while only paragraph 3 was dedicated to the European Defense Identity.
UNIGE / SES - 75 - Olivier Brighenti Part II creation of a European identity in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the
Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity.” In the second part of the statement, NATO leaders underline the “primacy” of
NATO: “However, the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.”167 In the Final Communiqué of Copenhagen, NATO ministers: “welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognize the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European
Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the
Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.”168 They agreed to:
“develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complimentarily between the European security and defense identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.”
They also agreed on an aspect that will lead to major disagreements in the future and most notably on the Franco-German initiatives that followed the Copenhagen Council Meeting. In effect: “There will be a need, in particular, to establish appropriate links and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defense should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security.”169 Thus, on a “theoretical standpoint” the end of the Cold War and the new international environment set the path for a more meaningful type of European pillar within the Alliance.170 As I will
167 NATO Council of Ministers, "NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe", Copenhagen, June 7, 1991, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607b.htm, (Accessed: 04/10/2006). 168 NATO Council of Ministers, "Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", Copenhagen, June 7, 1991, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607a.htm, (Accessed: 04/10/2006). Paragraph 1. 169 Ibidem, Paragraph 3. 170 As outlined by Joylon Howorth: “These initiatives include the “reactivation” of the WEU in the 1980’s, via the Platform on European Security of the Hague (October 1987), to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels (January 1994) and on to NATO’s Berlin Ministerial meeting (June 1996), which gave the green light both to a new project – European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) – and to the military instrument underpinning it –
UNIGE / SES - 76 - Olivier Brighenti Part II highlight further on there have been various scenarios for the emergence of a more significant European pillar, but they gave rise to tensions between Europe and the United States. The underlying logic of these initiatives is based on a historical dichotomy. The agreement on security fundamentals within the
European Union comes into conflict with the longstanding U.S. ambivalence on a more accurate role of the Europeans in the Alliance coupled with its strive to maintain leadership within the Alliance. During the first half of the 1990’s, two distinctive phases illustrate the dichotomy and the competition within the transatlantic framework to “reshape” the European post Cold War Security architecture. The first period started with the end of the Cold War and ended with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The second period began right after the “relative failure” of Maastricht and ended with the NATO Brussels summit in 1994.
In the following section, I will focus on the first period. I will analyze the second period in a subsequent section. Nothing better than the Franco-German initiatives of the early 1990’s illustrate the tensions between, the Atlanticist and the Europeanist components of the EC/EU, the United States, NATO as an
Alliance, and the WEU as the possible defense component of the EC/EU.
3.4. From the End of the Cold War to Maastricht
3.4.1. The Franco-German Initiatives in the Early 1990’s: Implications for Negotiations in the Political Union and Consequences on the Transatlantic Partnership As outlined above, the end of the Cold War marked an important change in the European Integration process. In fact, two major issues, i.e. the “deepening” of the EC/EU integration and the European defense where dealt on a separate basis. European integration was a “European matter”, whereas
European security was a “transatlantic matter”. The Franco-German initiatives of the early 1990’s coupled with the structural changes in the international system, entailed that both questions should be dealt within the European integration process by the Intergovernmental Conference. On December 14 and 15 1990, the Heads of states and governments of the twelve members met in Rome to open the
ICG on economic and monetary union and political union. The well-prepared ICG on economic and monetary union contrasted with the vagueness of the ICG on political union. Unlike the EMU, there was
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). Howorth Jolyon, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?," Chaillot Papers, vol. --, no. 43, (November 2003), p. 4.
UNIGE / SES - 77 - Olivier Brighenti Part II a lack of consensus on what Political Union should be. In fact, during the extraordinary summit held in
Dublin in April 1990, following the Franco-German letter to the Irish Presidency, it became clear that every single capital had its own definition of what a political union should be.171 The British reaction to that letter was very clear and highlights London’s position on the European defense architecture. In effect, the Franco-German call for a ICG on political union received a frosty reaction from Mrs. Thatcher.
The British Premier said that “the proposal had not been properly defined” and she made it clear that she did not want the EC Summit in Dublin to become preoccupied with proposals for political union. “It would be better” she said, “for the heads of states to spend their time on more practical issues such as
German reunification than on more esoteric things.”172 Throughout the year of negotiation on political union, many proposals were made by member states, but France and Germany clearly took the lead on the development of a common foreign and security policy. For the purpose of this study, I will focus mainly on the Franco-German initiatives for two reasons. First of all, France and Germany were the most committed European states in the development of a European defense identity. Secondly, they had a decisive impact both in the negotiation process and on the outcomes. French Foreign Minister
Roland Dumas made it clear at the outset of the Maastricht negotiations that France was highly committed to political union. He said: “It is inconceivable to leave security aspects at the margin of this process [of political union]. Defense is both an object of cooperation and an element of sovereignty, with which the federal [European] entity, which is our long term objective, will or should be endowed”173
171 The wide variety of proposals put forward at the opening session of the ICG in Rome illustrated the divergence of member states on the matter. The job of the Italian Presidency in the second half of 1990, prior to the beginning of the ICG was to give substance to a variety of initiatives aiming to establish a foreign and security component of the EC. The Italian proposal of 18 September 1990 was the most ambitious. The president of the Italian Council Gianni de Michelis proposed a far-reaching initiative to incorporate all security aspects into a common foreign and security policy as well as the merger of WEU and the EC. Great Britain, Denmark (Danish memorandum of 14 October 1990) and Portugal (Portuguese memorandum of 30 November 1990) took the opposite stand and advocated some esthetic changes in the EPC. France and Germany supported the Italian proposal (Franco-German letter to the Italian Presidency, 6 December 1990) which called for a true common security policy which would in turn lead to a common defense. 172 Quoted in : Graham George. Marsh David & Stephens Philip, "Bonn and Paris Move to Speed European Unity," The Financial Times, London, Friday 20 April 1990, p. 1. 173 Quoted in : Buchan David, Europe: The Strange Superpower, (Dartmouth: Aldershot), 1995,p. 161.
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3.4.2. The Dumas-Genscher Initiative The Dumas-Genscher Initiative of 4 February 1991 sets the path for a deepening of defense matters in the European integration process. It emphasizes on three crucial aspects for the furthering of the transatlantic debate. Namely, it sets that the common foreign and security policy must offer the prospect, in time, of a common European defense. Secondly, it stresses the fact that the Atlantic
Alliance will benefit from this development and that a European security and defense identity will have to be reflected in the development of a European pillar within NATO. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, a clear organic relationship between the Political Union and WEU will be developed progressively in prospect, in time, of the integration of WEU in the Political Union. In other words, the
WEU would become an integral part of the European integration process and the defense component of the Union. It would constitute the channel of discussion between the Union and NATO.174 Echoing the
Franco-German approach, the Italians came up with their own proposal emphasizing a more vigorous stance on the question of defense. They emphasized that a common European system of defense and security should imply strengthening and extending the WEU with a view of integrating it into the EU before 1999. They also wanted the WEU to be placed under the authority of the European Council.175
The United Kingdom, in line with of Washington strongly opposed any European defense outside of
NATO. While the French sought to entangle a unified Germany in a more politically integrated Europe, the British chose to balance Germany by doing whatever was possible to keep the United States in
Europe and ensure the preeminence of NATO. After the Rome NATO summit, the British in close tie with Washington, worked to deflect any form of European Defense identity outside NATO.176 A fortnight later, British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in a Churchill Memorial lecture stressed that: “The defense of Europe without the United States does not make sense. The common foreign and security policy can include some general security questions but it cannot replace the military functions of
NATO.”177 Thus, the best way to counter the Franco-German initiative was to come up with a counter proposal. The British proposed to transform the moribund WEU into a European Defense Identity. They
174 For the texts of the Franco-German proposals see: http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai08e.html (20/09/2006) 175 Ibidem: 176 On that aspect see : Art Robert J, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 111, no. 1, (Spring 1996), pp. 19-22. 177 Quoted in : Duke Simon, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP, (Oxford: St Anthony's Press), 2000,p. 88.
UNIGE / SES - 79 - Olivier Brighenti Part II chose this strategy because the WEU had interesting characteristics. It was not part of the European
Community, it had an organic link to NATO, and most important, this organic link was one of subordination. As outlined previously, according to article IV of the Brussels Treaty (amended by the
Paris agreements in 1954) the WEU would not build up any military “authority” separate, duplicating, or competing with NATO. Thus, the choice of the WEU was very well thought and enabled the British to advocate an alternative solution that would not undermine NATO. They stressed that WEU must be a bridge between the future EU and NATO. The WEU should become Europe’s defense arm, but under the leadership of NATO. The WEU being a treaty-limited institution, this would guarantee British and
American aspirations for a European defense identity under the leadership of NATO.
Not surprisingly, the American response to the first Franco-German initiative was very harsh. In effect, with a “reformed alliance” as the center of its European policy and influence, Washington was very nervous about any security initiatives that could undermine the primacy of NATO. Without any restraint in interfering in European affairs, the United States was looking for any opportunity to influence the debate. Despite the unanimity of the London Summit for a new security architecture in Europe, the
American reaction highlighted Washington’s usual ambiguity. Hence, encouraging a European security and defense identity, but in the terms that would suit American interests. Washington used all its leverage and political weight to try to undermine the initiative, warning its allies that any separate initiative would undermine NATO and, as a consequence the American presence in Europe. US
Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft, in a speech he delivered in February 1991, supported a stronger
“European Pillar” in the Alliance based on a revival of the WEU but cautioned that the European Pillar should not relax the central transatlantic bond, should not duplicate current cooperation in NATO and should not leave out countries that were not members of the EC.”178 Quasi simultaneously, the United
States issued its famous warning to the Europeans the so called “Bartholomew letter” also known as the
“Dobbins Démarche”. In February 1991, the Bush administration got worried about the negotiations going on in Europe over the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union and above all the first Franco-German initiative. The warning was formally issued by Undersecretary Reginald Bartholomew and assistant
178 Quoted in: Sloan Stanley R, "The United States and European Defense," Chaillot Papers, vol. 39, no. 1, (April 2000), p. 6.
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Secretary of State for European Affairs James Dobbins.179 The warning stated: “We are concerned over the proposal that the WEU should be subordinated to the European Council, thereby developing a
European security component … solely within the EC … that could lead NATO’s marginalization. In that the EC is clearly not ‘within the Alliance’, subordinating the WEU would accentuate the separation and independence of the European pillar from the Alliance … We feel it is not productive to stress the separateness of US and European security. This divisive tendency could undermine forty years of efforts in building and maintaining Alliance solidarity…We can speak with frankness engendered by forty years of our Alliance relationship. In our view, efforts to construct a European Pillar by redefining and limiting NATO’s role, by weakening its structure, or by creating a monolithic bloc of certain members would be misguided. We would hope such efforts would be resisted firmly”180 Catherine McArdle
Kelleher perfectly captured the essence of the American position when she asserts: “There could be no
European autonomous decisions that would commit an unconsulted United States to preserve security outside the existing NATO area or NATO membership. Nor would a free-standing WEU […] be permitted to entangle the United States in guarantee or missions to which it had not been consented.”181
In other words, a European security “caucus” within the alliance, a caucus possibly based on the WEU was not acceptable for Washington. America does not want the accelerating drive for European unity to result in a European bloc that makes its own decisions on defense policies and then presents those decisions as a fait accompli to Washington.182 A viable European defense identity would entail that the
Europeans would reach agreements in a “caucus” and then defend it within the Alliance. This is exactly what Washington wants to avoid because the United States would not take part in the European deliberations. The consequences for NATO, and above all for American leadership, would be dramatic since NATO would not be the main forum for deliberations on European security. NATO would gradually
179 Until recently, this document was unavailable, but it caught much attention and was widely commented by European Defense analysts. It is still unclear who wrote the memorandum. Speculations assert that Bartholomew and Dobbins formally issued the declaration, but that National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and State Department Counsellor Robert Zoellick were also involved. 180 Willem Van Eekelen, former Secretary Genaral of WEU was the first to make the Bartholomew Declaration public in: Van Eekelen Willem, Debating European Security, 1948-1998, (The Hague: Sdu Publishing), 1998,pp. 340-344. 181 Kelleher McArdle Catherine, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press), 1995,pp. 57-58. 182 The United States had already been confronted with a “European caucus” in the GATT. They had experienced pre- arranged European positions in the area of trade and certainly didn’t want to renew that experience in the security and defense realm where they had a high bargaining leverage and enjoyed European “internal disagreements”.
UNIGE / SES - 81 - Olivier Brighenti Part II be replaced by the European defense identity. Two months later a new warning, this time by Secretary of State James Baker, highlighted the parameters of US support for a ESDI. This letter, also known as
“Baker’s five points on the ESDI”, was first given to WEU Secretary General Willem van Eekelen during a visit to the White House. It was then handed over tn European capitals on 16 April 1991. These five points can be summarized as follows: The United States is ready to support arrangements which the
European allies decide are needed for the expression of a common European foreign, security and defense policy. But NATO must remain the essential forum for consultation and venue for agreements on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic
Treaty. NATO should retain its military integrated command. The ESDI should develop the capacity for involvement beyond Europe’s borders and European members of NATO that do not belong to the EC should not be excluded from European deliberations. At the White house, Brent Scowcroft told van
Eekelen that the US was fully supportive of European political integration but his concern was to see that it did not adversely affect NATO or marginalize the U.S. role in Europe. In the same vain, David
Gombert Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on the NSC, pointed out that the “Bartholomew Démarche” had been designed to forestall any misunderstandings which might have arisen had the US remained silent in the European debate, but this demarche was not to be taken as a desire to slow down European integration.183 The Bartholomew warning provoked many angry reactions in Europe and was seen as a direct incursion into EC internal affairs. The United
States rapidly realized that this type of action was largely counterproductive. Thus Washington backed from overt protests and concentrated on a strategy of more subtle diplomacy. The US sought to use some of its influence and leverage on its traditional allies (Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Portugal and to a lesser extent Italy) in order to ensure that the definition of European security and defense identity that would emerge from the Maastricht treaty would be compatible with US interests in NATO and Europe.
The Dumas-Genscher proposal shed light on the difficulty of finding a common European position.
While negotiating on the Maastricht Treaty, Europeans are split in two camps: On one side, the
183 Quoted in : Van Eekelen Willem, Debating European Security, 1948-1998, (The Hague: Sdu Publishing), 1998,p. 84.
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Atlanticists led by Britain, constituted by the Danes, the Dutch, and the Irish who advocate a WEU under the custody of NATO, and on the other side the Europeanists, led by France, Germany, Spain, Belgium
Greece, the Luxembourg, and Italy promoting the WEU as the defense arm of the EU under European leadership.184 Although the Atlanticists and the Europeanists shared many of the views on the future dangers for Europe and the means to prevent them, the institutional designs favored are different.
Rober Art correctly captures the national positions: “The United States wanted NATO to remain
Europe’s central security forum, but it did not oppose the development of the CSCE and the WEU as long as those two did not challenge NATO’s central role. France favored the development of a strong
European Defense Identity, but a residual role for NATO. Britain preferred a strong NATO and a more modest EDI. For their part Germany by necessity straddled the fence, trying to please all their allies. […]
As a consequence of their respective preferences the United States pushed NATO, France, the
European Political Union, with a security dimension in the form of either the WEU or the Eurocorps, whichever tactically best advanced EDI; Britain, NATO and a WEI outside of the Political Union and subservient to NATO; and Germany, all four institutions.”185
The Council of Ministers of the WEU held in Vianden, (Luxembourg) on 27 June 1991 prior to the
European Council in Luxembourg highlights the same difficulty to find a common position on the role of a “renewed” WEU as well as the dichotomy between a genuine European Defense and the European
Pillar of the Alliance.186 In Luxembourg, the Ministers: “confirmed their desire that WEU be fully part of the process of European Integration while enhancing its contribution to the solidarity within the Alliance”.
184 Buchan David, "A Gulf in Europe: The Impact of the War on EC Political Union," The Financial Times, London, Friday 8 February, 1991, p. 14. 185 Art Robert J, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 111, no. 1, (Spring 1996), p. 10. 186 Secretary General of WEU van Eekelen drafted a paper that outlined the current debate on the role of the WEU with respect to European integration and NATO. He wrote: “that two questions had characterized the debate so far: first, are the Europeans prepared to make a fundamental political choice that security and defense should form part of their progress towards Union; and, second, how in practice can a European defense role be developed in a way which reinforces the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance.” He wrote: “that in attempting to answer these questions the main aim of WEU’s relationship with the EU should be to ensure that Europeans speak with a coherent voice across the whole range of foreign, security and defense policy issues and that they have the military arrangements necessary to back up that voice…In this perspective WEU formed an integral part of the European integration process. With regard to the Alliance, WEU members should now consider how to give effect to WEU’s objective of expressing a more coherent European voice in re-invigorating the Alliance.” Van Eekelen Willem, Debating European Security, 1948-1998, (The Hague: Sdu Publishing), 1998,p. 97. This is exactly what the United States didn’t want. They feared, above all, that the United States might be marginalized if greater European cohesion in defense led to the creation of an internal ‘European caucus’ within NATO. This will be clearly stressed later on during the year in the so-called Dobbins démarche.
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The Foreign and Defense Ministers made a major step in repeating the wording of the 1987 Hague
Platform.187 They “agreed that European Political Union implies a genuine European Security and defense identity and thus a greater European responsibility for defense” and “therefore agreed that the
WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defense component”. However, “they also agreed that the development of a genuine European security and defense identity will be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance”.188 This ambiguous compromise sets a new path in the relations of the WEU and the EC/EU. In effect, the
British had always favored the status quo, opposing an institutional link between the WEU and the EC.
The compromise opens the door for a double role for the WEU. i.e. the defense component of the EU as well as the means to strengthen the pillar of the Alliance. In the line of the Vianden Communiqué and in order to signal to its European partners that the British were not totally opposed to a link between WEU and the EC, they issued a declaration known as the Anglo-Italian declaration. The declaration signaled that the British were prepared to accept a link between the WEU and the EC, but in no ways a merger of the WEU into the EC. It emphasized that a European defense could be considered on the long term, but not outside NATO’s umbrella. The aim of Italy and the United Kingdom was to demonstrate that despite their disagreements on the concept of European defense, the Member States were not at odds. The idea put forward jointly by Italy and the United Kingdom, was that the WEU should become Europe’s defense arm under the leadership of NATO.189 As a practical consequence the Anglo-Italian declaration
187 On 27 October 1987 in the Hague, WEU Ministerial Council adopted a “Platform on European Security Interests”. This Hague Platform also set out general guidelines for WEU’s future programme. Its preamble stated: “We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.” Stressing that the security of the Alliance was indivisible, Ministers expressed their resolution to “strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance”. WEU Council of Ministers, "The Hague Platform on European Security Interests", 27 October 1987, (Western European Union), http://www.weu.int/documents/871027en.pdf#search=%22hague%20platform%22, (Accessed: 10/10/2006). 188 WEU Council of Ministers, "Vianden Communiqué", 27 June, 1991, (Western European Union), http://www.weu.int/documents/910627vi1en.pdf, (Accessed: 10/10/2006). p. 7. 189 At the heart of the debate is the question of the relations between the EC, WEU, and NATO. The British, traditionally opposed to any link between the EC and the WEU are ready to accept the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force under the WEU and the strengthening of the European Pillar within NATO. They propose that the WEU should become the strong arm of Europe, but that the alliance should remain the principal forum for any agreement on European defense matters. The Italian backing to the British position is somewhat of a puzzle. One of the first European statesman to suggest merging the existing WEU into the future European Union was Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis, in September 1990, during the Italian presidency of the EC. After the first Franco-German proposal to support the development of an “organic” link between the EU and the WEU, Italy reiterated its position implying an ambitious schedule for integrating the WEU into EU structures. Siding with Great Britain can be explained in different ways. First of all, it can be explained by the weight of the Franco-German
UNIGE / SES - 84 - Olivier Brighenti Part II proposed the creation of a European reaction force to respond to threats outside of the NATO area.190
This rapid reaction force is very limited in scope, both as a theater (outside the NATO area) and as to command (autonomous from but subordinated to NATO).191 The decision to create the rapid reaction force was considered by Paris as a way to perpetuate U.S. hegemony in Europe. In fact, the French saw multinational units under SACEUR as politically undesirable. Such a structure they feared, could perpetuate and deepen integration under U.S. authority. In their view, this arrangement was meant to undermine West European defense cooperation efforts.192 In May 1991, the DPC agreed on the creation of an Allied Reaction Force Corps (AARC). Paris was very upset with the fact that NATO had adopted an Anglo-Saxon strategy devising that NATO should have the lead over other institutions. Paris also reacted harshly at the proposal of “dual hatting” of the rapid reaction force, in the sense that it could be used in certain circumstances under WEU command. The use by WEU and NATO forces ran directly against the idea of an independent European defense. Since France was not part of the DPC, it had no leverage to block the decision.193 This was a great maneuver by the United States which used both its influence on the Atlanticists and its dominance on the Alliance to pursue its agenda and undermine the
French initiative.
3.4.3. The Second Franco-German Proposal The Anglo-Italian proposal was yet to be entirely questioned by the second Franco-German proposal.
This proposition for a common European foreign and security policy (14 October 1991) goes even further than the Dumas-Genscher proposal in setting a whole new basis for the WEU and European
“couple”. In fact Rome fears that the European defense process will be dominated by France and Germany leaving little space for “smaller” countries. Secondly, the Bartholomew Warning had a deep impact on Italian attitude towards the Alliance. Thirdly it was a subtle way to convince a particularly reluctant Member States (Great Britain) of the need for a Political Union to gradually include a common foreign security policy in the Union. For a very good account of Italian perceptions on transatlantic matters see: Nuti Leopoldo, "The Richest and Farthest Master is Always Best: US-Italian Relations in Historical Perspective," In. The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Realtions After Iraq, edited by Andrews David A, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2005, pp. 177-198. 190 Great Britain and France could have agreed on the principle of constituting an out of area force. But Britain wanted one composed of troops normally assigned to NATO but operating under WEU command out of the NATO area. The French on the contrary wanted a separate force free to operate in the European theatre under the authority of the EC. Anything else, according to the French, would undermine the notion of an independent European defense. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas qualified the British and Italian project of “operational project without authenticity”. 191 See: Anonymous, "Europe's Stage Armies," The Guardian, London, 17 October 1991, p. 22. 192 See: Yost David S, "France in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 5, (Winter 1990/1991), p. 119. 193 Menon Anand, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and the European Security," International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, (1995), p. 24.
UNIGE / SES - 85 - Olivier Brighenti Part II defense. It underscores another set of obstacles for the Political Union negotiations and gave rise to concerns and harsh criticism across the Atlantic. It reaffirms the idea of a “construction in stages of
WEU as a defense component of the Union”. It incorporates the idea of “setting-up military units answerable to WEU”. It enhances the “regular cooperation between WEU member states with the aim of achieving a common position on all the essential issues within the Alliance”. In other words, France and
Germany consider the WEU as Europe’s arm but totally integrated within the framework of the political union. They want Europe to develop its defense strategy step by step, in cooperation with the Alliance, but not under its dependence. The proposal goes even further, incorporating the idea of the
Eurocorps.194 Indeed, they state that: “The strengthened Franco-German units could thus become the nucleus of a European corps which would include the forces of other WEU member States. This new structure could also become the model for closer military cooperation between WEU member states.”195
The novelty of the Eurocorps initiative lies in the fact that it can be considered as a major step towards an “autonomous” European nucleus where decisions could be taken outside of NATO and come up with a single position. The Eurocorps initiative sought to promote the backbone of an eventual common
European army. The Eurocorps initiative highlighted the main dichotomy between Atlanticists led by the
British in close tie with the United States, and the Europeanists led by France. In other words should the defense component of the European Community be considered as a genuinely European project, or was it the building up of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (through the WEU) as a transatlantic project.196 The Franco-German proposal set the basis for major disagreements across the Atlantic, as
194 In 1989, France and Germany had created a Franco-German Brigade. The underlying logic was to evaluate if a genuine European force could be developed. The Eurocorps initiative drives along this logic and will replace the Franco-German Brigade. 195 In 1988, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, proposed to create a mixed Franco-German Brigade. It had an integrated military staff under alternating command with a few integrated support units. A few other European countries seemed interested in joining this Brigade. This Brigade the brigade has remained a rather detached part of the overall NATO-dominated defense structure. 196 From mid 1991, the French were starting to change their mind about the WEU as a “bridge” between the European Community and NATO. They preferred a more European, autonomous, and equilibrated project. While working on the political Union the Winter of 1991, President Mitterrand talked of the WEU as a “bridge” between the Community and NATO. This statement seemed to reveil a “honeymoon” between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists. This “Honeymoon” was rooted in the idea that the French could join the integrated military command of NATO, if it were reshaped and headed by a European. British Foreign secretary Douglas Hurd agreed that the European Council should give guidance to the WEU. He proposed the WEU to become the “European Pillar” of the Alliance. He proposed that the WEU Rapid Reaction Force could act outside Europe, and suggested that the commander of NATO’s military command should be a European. The “honeymoon” turned short when French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, asserted that France no longer wanted the WEU as a bridge with the Alliance, because “the bank is so much firmer that it would dominate the bridge”. Roland Dumas said that it would be
UNIGE / SES - 86 - Olivier Brighenti Part II well as within the European Community. The first aspect to be outlined is that the Franco-German proposal to transform the Franco-German Brigade into the “nucleus” of a European Army is confusing.
The proposal is very parsimonious and voluntarily or not, omits to highlight important aspects such as the link between the WEU and the Eurocorps as well as the relation the Corps would have with NATO.
Clearly, the intention of the proposal was to create a structure outside the WEU or NATO, laying down the foundations for a European Defense rather than strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.
The Franco-German proposal set a wide debate at the wake of the North Atlantic annual summit to be held in Rome. In theory, all the members converge towards a common objective: i.e. give Europe a more pronounced role on its security. In practice, dramatic points of discord remain. The Franco-
German proposal exacerbates the positions between NATO conservationists led by the United States and Great Britain and Europeanists led by France and Germany. French President François Mitterrand argued that there were no major contradictions between the Franco-German Proposal and the competing British-Italian plan. They both called for the strengthening of the Western European Union, but the latter underlined its ties to NATO. The two plans, he said: “deal with the same problem in different ways but they have the same objectives.”197 Drawing on Washington’s and London’s objection to the Franco-German proposal, it is clear that the Atlanticists were not as optimistic. Washington’s opposition to the proposal can be divided among two lines. First of all, it opposes WEU becoming an integral part of the process of the European Community, implying that a common defense policy would eventually be elaborated in the EC’s institutions rather and at the expense of NATO. Second, it firmly opposes the Eurocorps, which would be able to operate within as well as outside the NATO area, thus duplicating NATO’s tasks in Europe.198
ridiculous to symbolize Europe’s defence in a rapid reaction force that could not fight in Europe. What really matters is the long-term commitment to European Defence rather than the immediate steps towards it.” Quoted from: Anonymous, "In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word Was Defence," The Economist, London, May 18, 1991, p. 59. 197 Quoted in: Riding Alan, "U.S. Wary of European Corps Seeks assurance on NATO Role," The New York Times, New York, October 20, 1991, p. 12. On this aspect, it is interesting to give a closer look to the Italian position. On the eve of the Franco-Italian summit of 17-18 October 1991, Italy, which had sought to distance itself by signing the joint declaration with the United Kingdom, described the Franco-German proposal as interesting and worthwhile. At the end of a working lunch with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, his Italian counterpart Gianni de Michelis said that with these two texts the Member states were very close to reaching a compromise on the common foreign and security policy. 198 Mauthner Robert & Barber Lionel, "An Alliance Still in Search of a Role," The Financial Times, London, November 6, 1991, p. 21.
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The most revealing evidence of American hostility towards the “European project” came during the
November 1991 Rome Summit. In effect, the Franco-German proposal clouded what was to be a moment of triumph in the renewal of the Atlantic Alliance and gave rise to anger among officials. In a now famous speech, President Bush called its European allies to clarify their position on a European defense and the role of NATO. He bluntly challenged his Allies and asked: “If your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, then the time to tell us is today.” He went on to argue that:
“We do not see how there can be a substitute for the Alliance as a provider for our defense and
Europe’s security” 199 With the always ambiguous American approach to Europe, he also pledged that the United States would remain fully committed to NATO and continue its strong support for the process of European integration. He stressed that the American support for European integration was significant.
The US backed a political Union as well as a European Defense Identity. He argues that the United
States supported the development of the WEU as the expression of Europe’s Defense Identity since it could complement and strengthen NATO. This support, of course, was conditional to the enduring primacy of NATO. He argued that the WEU could and should not be an alternative to NATO. “Our premise” he stressed, “is that the American role in the defense and affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European Union”. He went further and argued that “the US could not abandon its place in Europe” and stressed that “NATO was not a vehicle of US power, nor did the United States claim the monopoly of ideas for the Alliance. What we want are partners”. At the end of the summit, Secretary of
State James Baker commented on President’s Bush’s speech and said that the President was not issuing an ultimatum to the allies, but “that the US wanted to lay its cards on the table.” 200 The United
States clearly laid down its cards and made it very clear that an EDI outside NATO (under American leadership) was unconceivable. A fortnight later at the Taormina NATO Minister of Defense meeting
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in a suave but straightforward declaration reaffirmed NATO’s primacy in American strategy on the old continent. “We understand full well the desire of our European friends and allies to address the security dimension as they simultaneously come to grips with the very important issues of economic and political integration”. He then stressed that NATO should remain the
199 Quoted in : Buchan David, Europe: The Strange Superpower, (Dartmouth: Aldershot), 1995,p. 155. 200 All quotations from : Mauthner Robert & Barber Lionel, "Bush Calls on Europe to clarify role in NATO," The Financial Time, London, Friday November 8, 1991, Front Page.
UNIGE / SES - 88 - Olivier Brighenti Part II essential tool of Western European Security and that the United States was relying on that tool and no other in order to guarantee its presence in Europe. “NATO is the mechanism by which the United States has been involved and will stay involved in the question of European security” he said.201 Although
Cheney’s speech was very diplomatic, it was regarded by many European officials as reflecting the view that NATO is the best vehicle to maintain America’s influence in Europe and that U.S. troops might be withdrawn if the Alliance, for any reason, fell into disrepair. The American position can thus be summarized as follows: In principle, the administration favored an invigorated WEU, but only as long as the WEU was NATO’s European pillar and not part of a European community bloc. The good side about the WEU was that it could help in burden-sharing, particularly outside the NATO area. The bad side was that a strong WEU could lead to greater European independence and even threaten the supreme role of
NATO.202
The Eurocorps initiative was even more unpleasant for Washington. The Bush Administration reacted allergically to the Franco-German proposal. As outlined by Catherine Kelleher: “The design of the
Franco-German military unit, freestanding and eventually to be supplemented by force contributions from other states, proved especially galling to the NATO stalwarts not only in Washington but also elsewhere. Political and military figures alike protested the creation of a Eurocorps outside NATO, especially one involving German troops already pledged to NATO.”203 During the NATO’s Nuclear
Planning Group in Taormina, Germany’s Minister of Defense, Gerhard Stoltenberg, faced intense questioning about the initiative. He explained the details of the planned force had still to be worked out, but insisted that it would be complementary to NATO.204 At the closing press conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner and British Defense Secretary
Thomas King made clear that the explanations of the plan by German Defense Minister Stoltenberg
201 Riding Alan, "U.S. Wary of European Corps Seeks assurance on NATO Role," The New York Times, New York, October 20, 1991, p. 12. 202 See : Lundestad Geir, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945-1997, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1998,pp. 116-117. 203 Kelleher McArdle Catherine, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press), 1995,p. 58. 204 Riding Alan, "U.S. Wary of European Corps Seeks assurance on NATO Role," The New York Times, New York, October 20, 1991,
UNIGE / SES - 89 - Olivier Brighenti Part II over the past two days had failed to calm their concerns. Cheney said : “It is our very strong feeling that whatever is done in the area of developing the European security identity should not detract from or undermine or in any way weaken the cohesion or coherence of the NATO structure that’s been so effective for the past forty years”205 The Eurocorps was a top-down initiative decided by the two heads of states, with little or no involvement of their administration. On the other hand, the initial proposal of the Eurocorps contained very few details, (only three lines as an appendix to the Franco German proposal), it remained for the bureaucracies of both France and Germany to work out its concrete implementation for NATO, WEU and the EC/EU in subsequent discussions. It is not a surprise that it was virtually impossible for German Defense Minister Stoltenberg to address the allies’ concerns in
Taormina. Washington also argued that the Eurocorps violates the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept reached at the 1991 Rome summit. In paragraph 2, the Allies had agreed that: “The development of a
European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.”206 They argue that the Franco-German proposition was in total contradiction with this paragraph. The United States was also very concerned with the fact that the
Eurocorps would undermine Germany’s commitment to NATO. In fact, the proposal involved expanding the existing 1989 Franco-German Brigade from roughly 5000 French and German soldiers to a 35’000-
40’000 strong corps. In other words a French and a German division will be added to the existing brigade. France has not been part of NATO’s integrated military structure since General de Gaulle withdrew in 1966, so the French contribution would not be subtracted from NATO forces. For Germany, the question was how it coul provide a “brand new division” in addition to its NATO commitments.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney addressed this point at the 21 October 1991 North Atlantic Assembly held in Madrid. “I think our concern would be” he said, “that whatever forces are assigned to the new entity would not be subtracted from those assigned to NATO.”207 As a consequence, the United States
205 Quoted in : Smithe Jeffery R, "NATO's Outlook Clouded by French-German Plan," The Washington Post, Washington D.C., Saturday October 18 1991, p. A 20. 206 NATO Council of Ministers, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", Rome, November 7-8 1991, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm, (Accessed: 12/10/2006). Paragraph 2. 207 Quoted in : Bellamy Christopher & Gooch Adela, "NATO Unease on Franco-German Plan," The Independent, London, Tuesday October 22, 1991, p. 12.
UNIGE / SES - 90 - Olivier Brighenti Part II pursued a strong campaign in order to convince Germany of the dangers of its joint initiative with
France. The campaign attained its climax with a harsh letter sent by National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl suggesting that Germany was not making enough efforts to undermine the French “autonomous” temptation. The United States feared that Germany may be following the French down the path of gutting NATO, so that the EC could assume European Defense responsibilities. Washington officials argued that Bonn’s maneuvering between Paris and Washington ignored the seriousness of decisions that might hurt NATO many years before Europe was capable of providing for its own security.208
Along with the United States, concerns about the Franco-German initiative also came from other
“Atlanticists” as well as from NATO officials. It is no surprise that, Great Britain, Washington’s closest ally, had serious misgivings about the initiative. In an interview on BBC radio on 16 October 1992,
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said: “We don’t believe there is any point in duplicating what NATO does and what members of NATO have decided should be renewed and continued”.209 As for the United
States, the British were concerned with the parsimony of the proposition and wanted clarifications on the link between the Eurocorps and NATO. Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal were also very skeptical towards the Franco-German proposal. Portugal asserted it was too early to include a European defense policy in the political union and that the decision to include WEU in the Union should be decided by the
ICG acting unanimously and be ratified by the national parliaments. Denmark, which is not a member of the WEU was not in favor of a WEU acting as the strong arm of the Union independently from NATO.
Concerns also came from high rank NATO officials. NATO’s Secretary General Manfred Woerner, speaking at the North Atlantic Assembly in Madrid reiterated that it made no sense to have a separate
European force to operate in the same territory as NATO. He said: “NATO is the alliance for the security and defense of its members in Europe and North America. It does not make sense to have a rival force for the same purpose.” He said that Eurocorps could operate outside the NATO area. Mr. Woerner
208 Privately, American officials warned the Germans that moves such as creating a corps outside NATO could undermine domestic support for America’s role in Europe, which could accelerate U.S. withdrawal from Europe. “The French have a second-rate nuclear deterrent, a third-rate intelligence capability and a third-rate conventional army” said one U.S. official. “For many years to come, European security will exist only with Americans in place” Quoted in: Kempe Frederick, "U.S., Bonn Clash Over Pact with France: Franco-German Agreements for Non- NATO Corps Pits Bush Against Kohl," The Wall Street Journal, New York, May 27, 1992, p. A 9. 209 Quoted in:
UNIGE / SES - 91 - Olivier Brighenti Part II strangely speaking in the name of NATO, as well as the United States, stressed that NATO welcomed
European initiatives and a more important role for institutions such as the WEU as long as it did not supplant NATO. “We do not see European Defense identity as a competitor: neither do the Americans”.
He was concerned with the parsimony of the proposal mainly regarding the operability of the corps and its missions. “Since the German-French proposal leaves a question of the mission and area of employment of its proposed European force open, it needs further clarification”. He also warned any country trying to dominate or subvert the Alliance. “Nobody can monopolize the European defense pillar” he said.210 The 1991 Eurocorps proposal was clearly parsimonious and left a large feeling of uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic. By late 1991, the one-year negotiations that led to the
Maastricht Treaty resulted in a very confusing picture. The European bargaining process has historically been very complex. Reaching a common agreement between twelve capitals has always produced declarations drawing on the smallest common denominator rather than considerable achievements.211
The period preceding the Twelve’s decision in Maastricht was even more complicated given
Washington’s constant incursion in the debates. Although strictly speaking the United States was not a direct participant in the Maastricht negotiations, it was present at every single stage of the process, speaking for itself or through the ‘Atlanticists’. It is clear that as the main guarantor of European Security since the end of the Cold War, Washington was one of the prime parties concerned when it came to discuss European security architecture and the future of NATO. Thus, according to the U.S. the picture before Maastricht was: primacy of NATO as the essential forum for consultation among the allies. A
European defense identity can be possible, but under the umbrella of NATO. The Franco-German corps was described by Germany as a means of bringing France closer to NATO and by France as the means
210 Quoted in : Bellamy Christopher & Gooch Adela, "NATO Unease on Franco-German Plan," The Independent, London, Tuesday October 22, 1991, p. 12. 211 The European integration process and particularily political integration has always progressed in very small steps. As history shows us since the end of World War II and the initial discussions on political integration in 1954, small steps were successful while major initiatives such as the EDC failed. The Maastricht achievements draws along the usual pattern of small steps. Richard Corbett captures this aspect very well when he asserts: “Negotiations on the future direction of the EC is, in fact, the norm rather than the exception in the life of the Community. Since the Schumann Declaration, Member States have been engaged in such a process in more years than not. The process of integration has been one of almost continuous negotiation between Member States wishing to advance more rapidly and those more reticent. Usually they result in a compromise acceptable to all in the short run. Negotiations then reopen some years later, usually on a new facet of integration. There is thus nothing surprising in finding Member States yet again locked in talks about the future of the Community.” Corbett Richard, "The Intergouvernmental Conference on Political Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, (September 1992), pp. 271-272.
UNIGE / SES - 92 - Olivier Brighenti Part II of asserting an independent European security identity. Britain preferred to play the balancer by promoting the WEU as a European option, but under the custody of the Alliance, in other words the
European pillar in NATO, while France saw the WEU as fully integrated in the ongoing European political union process. Germany was somewhat caught in the middle of the French Europeanism and the British Atlanticism. At the Rome NATO Summit in November 1991, the allies opted for a “non choice”. They chose to compromise with a rather neutral declaration that in the end favored the
American position.212 The Rome Declaration on Peace and development welcomed: “the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defense component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.”213 Bearing this very unfortunate picture in mind what was the main achievement of Maastricht and what are the implications on one side for a European defense identity and on the other hand for the United States and its strategy of preponderance on the Alliance?
3.5. The Maastricht Treaty on Political Union
After a year of difficult negotiations in the framework of the ICG on Monetary and Political Union, the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the twelve Member states signed the Treaty on Political Union on 7
February 1992 in Maastricht.214 The Treaty’s main feature is that it outlined a relative “bargain” between the Atlanticist and the Europeanist approach. The Treaty includes, as part of the new political union a commitment to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.” The Treaty designed the WEU as the organization responsible for implementing defense aspects of the EU. The
212 The endorsement of a European Defense Identity that should be developed within the Alliance as a means to strengthen the ties of the Alliance and the ability of the allies to work together, were clearly in favour of the American approach that the EDI would naturally serve the European Pillar of the Alliance. 213 NATO Council of Ministers, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Development", Rome, 8 November 1991, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm, (Accessed: 24/10/2006). Paragraph 7. 214 The ICG on political union centred on how to go beyond simple co-operation and coordination of national foreign policies. It also centred on how much the common security and foreign policy should include defense policy and what would be the relation with WEU and NATO. The whole ICG was characterized by the division between M ember States on the degree of political integration they wanted and if the Atlantic framework was to be predominant or not.
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Treaty “requests the Western European Union which is an integral part of the development of the Union
… to elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defense implications.” 215
Maastricht was for the Europeanists a way to shift the balance from a US led integrated Alliance to a somehow more integrated Western European security. For the Atlanticists Maastricht was a means to come up with a stronger European pillar within the Alliance. The resulting Treaty is a typical ambiguous
European bargain that does not change much in the European security environment and leaves the door open, both for future intra-European and Transatlantic disagreements. As outlined by Menon
Foster and Wallace: “These are brave words, carefully crafted to maximize agreement among the twelve negotiating governments. However, this is also ambiguous language, which promises much, but immediately delivers little.”216 In short, Maastricht can be read as a small victory for the Atlanticists since it recognized the supremacy of NATO in European security architecture. It was also a “small victory” for the Europeanists because a reference was made to an eventual common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense. Maastricht also marked a move away from the European Political
Cooperation. Maastricht ,must above all, be seen as a cease-fire between the two positions rather than a major breakthrough in the European security architecture. In the words of van Eekelen : “The debate on the two alternatives was resolved by including both, but the result was a double conditional.”217 In the
Maastricht Treaty, the Atlanticist architectural identification of the WEU was persevered, and the planned political union turned out to be a failure for many Europeanists because the full incorporation of the WEU within the EU did not take place.218 A host of ambiguous points remain and will rise throughout the coming years.219 Thus, given the nature of the Maastricht compromise, the debate on organizing
European security was far from over. This is also true of the role of the Western European Union. In two
215 Treaty on European Union, Article J. 4. Paragraph 2. It is very ambiguous as to whether all decisions in the defense field have to be reffered to the WEU. 216 Menon Anand. Forster Anthony & Wallace William, "A Common European Defense?," Survival, vol. 34, no. 3, (1992), p. 98. 217 Van Eekelen Willem, Debating European Security, 1948-1998, (The Hague: Sdu Publishing), 1998,p. 118. 218 Formally the WEU became part of the EU process, however its dual role made it difficult to implement. 219 The Economist in its 14 December edition captured very well the “Maastricht bargain” on WEU and its consequences for the future. It stated: “The deal on defense said Britain, involved France accepting the thrust of October’s British-Italian paper. France said Britain had bowed to the Franco-German paper of the same month. […] The French said that it meant the WEU (which, the summit decided, all EC members could join) was subordinated to the European Union; the British said the wording didn’t mean that. France got its review of defense arrangements in 1996, but Britain got the Treaty to say that these arrangements should be compatible with NATO.” Anonymous, "The Deal Is Done," The Economist, London, 14 December 1991, p. 55.
UNIGE / SES - 94 - Olivier Brighenti Part II declarations attached to the Maastricht Treaty, the nine members of the WEU echoed the June 1991
Vianden Declaration and identified the WEU as “the defense component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”220 This declaration gave the WEU a dual role. According to Maastricht, the WEU seemed to have a very large function in the formulation of a common defense policy. This was not the case since it was also a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. This unfortunate compromise clearly outlines the tensions between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists on whether the WEU should be distinct from NATO or subordinated to NATO.
Hence the WEU ended up representing little more than a “bridge” between the EU and NATO, implying equidistance from the two bodies and subordination to neither.221 This confusion came largely from the formulation of Article J. 4. of the Maastricht Treaty and from the WEU declaration itself. According to
Julia Myers: “Article J. 4 allows one to understand that it was the intention of the signatories that the
WEU become integrated into the European Community, acting as its defense arm”222 However, the provision in paragraph 4 says: “The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework”223 This provision was included to make the title more acceptable for the Atlanticists and to avoid further disagreements with the United
States. Van Eekelen summarizes this when he asserts: “The paragraph dealt with the respect for obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty and compatibility with the common security and defense policy established within that framework. So there would be a common foreign and security policy of the
Union and a common security and defense policy within the alliance, hardly the epitome of clarity.”224
This dual role was clearly emphasized during the preparation of the WEU Spring ministerial meeting in
220 WEU Council of Ministers, "Maastricht Declaration on The Role of the WEU and its Relations with the European Union and with The Atlantic Alliance", 10 December 1991, (Western European Union), http://www.weu.int/documents/911210en.pdf, (Accessed: 25/10/2006). Paragraph 2. 221 Luoma-Aho Mika, "Arm versus "Pillar': The Politics of Metaphors of the Western European Union at the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union," Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, (February 2004), p. 120. 222 Myers Julia A, The Western European Union. Pillar of NATO or Defence Arm of the EC?, (London: Center for Defence Studies), 1993,p. 35. 223 Treaty on European Union, Article J. 4. Paragraph 4. 224 Van Eekelen Willem, Debating European Security, 1948-1998, (The Hague: Sdu Publishing), 1998,p. 118.
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Germany (Petersberg). The Europeanists, and mainly France, saw the role assigned to the WEU as a temporary “pause” towards a common European defense policy. It is interesting that France proposed to duel-hat its permanent representative in Brussels to both the EU and the WEU. In total opposition, the
Atlanticists, led by Great Britain, saw the WEU as complementary to NATO. Great Britain proposed to dual-hat its permanent representative to NATO and the WEU. The famous French adage “plus ça change plus c’est la même chose” seems to suit well to the Maastricht compromise.
How did Washington react to the Maastricht Treaty? Not surprisingly President Bush was very favorable to the Maastricht bargain, since it sanctioned the primacy of NATO and the status quo was more or less ensured. There was no agreement whether the WEU would duplicate some aspects of NATO, whether
WEU would serve as the defense arm of the Union. The final decision was the result of a trade-off on whether the WEU was to be the defense component of the EU or the European pillar of NATO. This aspect was far from settled, but the primacy of NATO was safeguarded. After the Maastricht meeting
Bush welcomed: “a historic step towards economic and political union.” He proclaimed that: “The United
States has long supported European unity because of our strong conviction that it was good for Europe, good for the Atlantic partnership, and good for the world. I have made clear from the very outset of this administration my view that a strong, united Europe is much in America’s interest. A more united Europe offers the United States a more effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities.”225 In a written statement the President said: “The results of the E.C. Summit in Maastricht represent a milestone which we celebrate along with our European partners. The United States has long supported European unity because of our strong conviction that it was good for Europe, good for the United States and good for the world.”226 Although President Bush declared: “support for the EC’s member’s efforts to strengthen the WEU”, he was careful to stress: “that the NATO Alliance would remain the essential forum of consultation among its members on security matters and defense commitments.”227
225 Quoted in: Lundestad Geir, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945-1997, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1998,p. 116. 226 Quoted in: Bradsher Keith, "The European Summit: U.S. Endorses Pact on European Unity," The New York Times, New York, Thursday 12 December 1991, p. 18. 227 Quoted in: Barber Lionel, "US Pleased by Deal at Maastricht," The Financial Times, London, Friday December 13 1991, p. 3.
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3.5.1. The Petersberg Summit In order to secure a favorable outcome at the Petersberg WEU meeting in Bonn, Great Britain, backed by the United States, pursued an aggressive campaign to take the lead. In a speech at King’s College, the new British Foreign, Minister Malcolm Rifkind, outlined the British idea for the WEU. Drawing on the agreements of Rome and Maastricht, he stressed the importance of developing a European security and defense identity role that reinforced the Alliance. The WEU should be the focus for an emerging
European defense capability. According to his logic, the WEU should be independent but closely linked to the EU and NATO. Malcolm Rifkind offered an extensive definition of the WEU’s role that would, later on, serve as the basis for the Petersberg tasks. The mission included: “responses to threats in Europe, in instances where NATO chose not to be involved, international crisis management outside of Europe, peacekeeping missions inside and outside of Europe as well as humanitarian and rescue missions.”228
The Rifkind proposition was an Atlanticist attempt to counter the Europeanists and jugulate the
Eurocorps initiative by trying to integrate it in the Transatlantic Framework. The United States fully backed the Rifkind proposition. Addressing the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Eurogroup
22June in Washington, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood said: “the alliance's integrated command structure is embedded in NATO, that allied military forces are committed to it, and that the alliance has proven it works.” “At the same time,” he said, “the alliance recognizes that NATO is part of an interlocking network of mutually reinforcing institutions that keep Europe strong," including the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC) and the
Western European Union (WEU). Collective security was "at the heart of our victory" in the Cold War, he said, and it "will be at the heart of our ability to make continued progress in the years ahead." The
United States thus supports British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind's recent proposal, Atwood said, to develop a military capability for the WEU which would include "the Franco-German corps in a way that it is fully compatible with our NATO objectives."229
The WEU Ministerial Council held in Petersberg (Germany) on 19 May 1992 defined more clearly the
WEU’s role. Largely drawing on the Rifkind proposition, the WEU ministers decided, to give the
228 This draws on : Harris Scott A & Steinberg James B, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation, (Washington DC: RAND Publications), 1993,pp. 32-33. 229 Atwood Donald J, Address to a Conference on the Future of NATO, 22 June 1992, http://www.fas.org/man/nato/news/1992/2050461.txt, (Accessed: 25/10/2006).
UNIGE / SES - 97 - Olivier Brighenti Part II organization a more operational role. The WEU agreed to make forces available for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks as well as tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The WEU declaration made clear that the Petersberg tasks were complementary to the traditional common defense tasks. The declaration stated: “Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and article 5 of the modified Brussels
Treaty respectively, military units of the WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU could be employed” for the various tasks cited above.230 The signatories also agreed to “support on a case-by case basis and in accordance with their own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United States Security Council.”231 The Petersberg declaration made it clear that for all practical purposes, WEU and as a consequence European defense would limit itself to a range of crisis management and peacekeeping missions. The Petersberg declaration closed some of the most important WEU-NATO rivalries and ended some of the duplication aspects with NATO.
3.6. New Security Architecture: Recurring patterns, contending visions?
Maastricht and later on Petersberg seemed to have temporarily settled most of the disagreements between Europeanists and Atlanticists as well as with the United States. Tensions arose again with the next step which was to establish the Eurocorps. At the Franco-German presidential Summit held in La
Rochelle on 21-22 Mai 1992, French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Kohl reached a final agreement onestablishing the Eurocorps. It was decided to create a Joint Committee to coordinate policies and to direct the corps. This Joint Committee was also in charge of the relations with the WEU and NATO. The Corps had four main functions: first of all, common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty; second, humanitarian and rescue tasks; third, peacekeeping tasks and fourth, tasks of combat forces in crisis management. The document is based on the French conception of a European defense identity as a pillar of the EU. The declarations states: “The European Corps is to allow Europe to have its own means for military action at
230 WEU Council of Ministers, "Petersberg Declaration", Bonn, 19 June 1992, http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf, (Accessed: 30/10/2006). Paragraph II. 4. 231 Ibidem. Paragraph I. 2.
UNIGE / SES - 98 - Olivier Brighenti Part II its disposal. By its creation the states participating in the European Corps manifest their intent to jointly fulfill their responsibility in the area of security and the preservation of peace within the framework of a
European Union, which in the long run will also involve a joint defense policy.”232 Once again the division between Atlanticists and Europeanists is exacerbated after the La Rochelle summit. Belgium,
Spain, and the Luxembourg welcomed the creation of the Corps and expressed their interest in joining.233 Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark opposed the initiative as another French attempt to undermine NATO. Answering Secretary of State James Baker’s blunt interpellation “Are you for us or against us?” French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas had made it clear during a trip to Washington a fortnight earlier that the Eurocorps was not a “war machine” against NATO but rather a means to develop a European defense identity for the future.234 President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl in the same vein insisted in a joint statement that the corps “will contribute to strengthening the Atlantic
Alliance.”235 Despite this, Britain’s reaction was harsh since the Eurocorps was to be complementary to
NATO and a way to create a European defense identity. Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind said: that
“the criteria we will apply is whether it will strengthen or weaken NATO.” But a senior official in Prime
Minister John Major’s office said the corps could create “confusion and uncertainty” and he asked, “what precisely is it there for?”236 Former British Defense Secretary Thomas King qualified the Corps as an
“interesting political solution but useless on a military standpoint.”237
232 Franco-German Council on Defense, "La Rochelle German and French Presidential Declaration on the Creation of the European Corps", La Rochelle, 22 May 1992, http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actu/articletxt.asp?ART=30242, (Accessed: 31/10/2006). Paragraph B. 1. 233 Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes clarified the position of his country and said: “In theory we have no objection in participating, but there should be a clear structural link to the Western European Union and there should be no disagreement with NATO.” Mr Claes Stressed that “since the Maastricht Treaty does not include any kind of European defense community/identity we must have some prospects going in that sense even it is not clear for the moment where we are heading on that matter.” Quoted in: Opsomer Marc, "Bonn et Paris vont créer un Eurocorps," La Libre Belgique, Bruxelles, 21 Mai 1992, p. 6. 234 Dumas Roland, Conférence de Presse du Ministre Français des Affaires Etrangères, 11 Mai 1992, http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/epic/www/doc/DDD/996392967.doc, (Accessed: 29/10/2006). 235 Quoted in : Riding Alan, "French and Germans Plan an Army Corps Despite NATO fears," The New York Times, New York, 23 May 1992, p. 1. 236 Ibidem 237 Quoted in: Anonymous, "Eurokorps soll NATO Unterstellt werden," Süddeutscherzeitung, München, 18 November 1992, p. 7. Once again Great Britain denounced the Eurocorps as a French tool to destroy NATO. As outlined by Edward Mortimer in the Financial Times: “Britain’s obsession with the supposed danger to NATO from the Eurocorps is such that Whitehall bridles even when a non-governmental US think tank, the John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, dares to suggest that the US should take a more relaxed attitude on the matter. Yet the ostensible objection to the Eurocorps is that it will antagonise the Americans. Not for the first time, London seems determined to be more royalist than the King, or rather more Atlanticist than Washington.” Mortimer Edward, "Europe Bares its Claws," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 15 July 1992, p. 25.
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Although the United States can always count on Great Britain to defend its point of view, they criticized it vehemently. The fact that the Eurocorps could also be used for the defense of European territory, normally the prerogative of NATO, was considered by Washington as a direct assault against the
Alliance. American Ambassador to NATO, William Taft, declared in a speech at the Center for European
Policy Studies: “undermining the alliance’s integrated military structure in the uncertain process of developing a European security identity would be the height of folly. Like Othello, who threw a pearl away / richer than all his tribe, Europe would regret its carelessness too late.”238 U.S. Senator Malcolm
Wallop said that “the idea surrounding the Eurocorps sounded in the United States like a diplomatic version of Yankees Go Home.”239 President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl tried to answer American criticism by arguing that Washington had often demanded greater “burden sharing” by its allies.
Chancellor Kohl said: “We are doing what the Americans have asked us to do for years, be able to assure our own defense.” Sitting beside, President Mitterrand added: “We want the presence of
Americans in Europe. We know what we owe NATO.”240 As for every single European initiative the main question for Washington was what will the Corp’s relationship with NATO be?241 For the United States, the Franco-German initiative remained unacceptable as long as it was not clearly stated that the
Eurocorps would be placed under the custody of NATO. Although Mitterrand and Kohl stressed the compatibility of the Corps with NATO, the La Rochelle agreement was unclear on that matter.
Paragraph B. 3.2.2 stated that future agreements would be worked out at the political and operational levels between NATO and the Corps. The underlying idea was to use the corps as a European Corps.
In other words, the French sought to use the Corps as a unit, even if placed under NATO command.
This unit could fight as a unit similarly to the French Daguet division during the Golf War. It was also
238 Taft William H, "The NATO Role in Europe and the U.S. Role in NATO," Centre for European Policy Studies, 21 May 1992, 239 Quoted in Anonymous, "Eurokorps soll NATO Unterstellt werden," Süddeutscherzeitung, München, 18 November 1992, p. 7. 240 Quoted in : Riding Alan, "French and Germans Plan an Army Corps Despite NATO fears," The New York Times, New York, 23 May 1992, p. 1. 241 While Germany has always insisted that the Eurocorps should complement NATO, Washington and London have been openly critical, apparently fearing that France’s long term objective was to replace the United States domination on the Alliance. This has never been the French goal. They never wanted a “Europeanization” of NATO and that was made very clear when they refused to join NATO’s integrated commandment, even under a European supreme commander. What the French really wanted was a genuine two pillar alliance with a clear independent European role in the decision making process.
UNIGE / SES - 100 - Olivier Brighenti Part II feared in Washington that such an architecture would reduce the number of German units available to
NATO. Thus Washington put enormous pressure on the German Government. Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s
National Security Advisor, sent a strong worded letter to his counterpart at the German Chancellery, suggesting that Germany was not taking a strong enough position in the face of French obstacles to allied initiatives. At a NATO meeting of Defense Ministers in Brussels, German Defense Minister, Volker
Rühe, tried without much success to convince his NATO counterparts that the Corps would help the
Alliance. He sad it would be available to NATO in crisis, and that its troops wouldn’t be attached exclusively to the corps but would serve a double role within the Alliance.242 During a private meeting preceding the summit, Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, discussed the Eurocorp’s role with his
German counterpart Volker Rühe. U.S. officials said: “questions remained unanswered about the ultimate allegiance of the corps.”243 Addressing the opening session of an international strategic conference in Paris, French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe echoed Rühe’s idea. He stated: “that the
Eurocorp’s first duty was to defend the alliance and that its troops would come under NATO command in case of emergency.” He noted that “talks would begin to work out the modalities of the Eurocorp’s relationship with the alliance.” At the same meeting Volker Rühe underlined that” creation of a European defense identity must not be considered as competition for NATO.” Speaking for the United States,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, echoed Washington’s skepticism emphasizing that “only NATO had an all-embracing security structure.244 During the summer and fall of
1992, French and German officials searched a way to meet the expectations of the Eurocorps as a
“European unit” while finding a formula to reassure NATO. In mid-November German Defense Minister,
Volker Rühe, already announced at a CSU meeting that a memorandum would be ready for negotiations at the NATO December meeting. He said that a strong transatlantic partnership and the development of a European defense identity where not at all contradictory.245 A Franco-German agreement was reached in November 1992. It opened the doors to the negotiations with NATO allies on
242 See : Kempe Frederick, "U.S., Bonn Clash Over Pact with France: Franco-German Agreements for Non-NATO Corps Pits Bush Against Kohl," The Wall Street Journal, New York, May 27, 1992, p. A9. 243 Quoted in : White David, "Bonn Fails to Satisfy U.S. on New Corps," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 27 May 1992, p. 2. 244 See : Riding Alan, "France Moves to Take Bigger Part in Defining New Role for NATO," The New York Times, New York, 30 September 1992, p. A 3. 245 Anonymous, "Eurokorps soll NATO Unterstellt werden," Süddeutscherzeitung, München, 18 November 1992, p. 7.
UNIGE / SES - 101 - Olivier Brighenti Part II the place of the Eurocorps within the Transatlantic security framework. France ceded to the American pressure, and acknowledged that the Eurocorps could be placed under NATO command in case of a general attack on the Alliance or of a decision by NATO governments to dispatch a peacekeeping force outside the Alliance territory. The Franco-German joint memorandum served as the basis for the negotiations with General John Shalikashvili, the US general head of SACEUR. France ceded on the subordination to NATO, but did not want to cede on the fact that the Eurocorps should be understood as a unit. As a French official said: “the condition is SACEUR must keep the Eurocorps together as an expression of a European defense identity, and not break up the French and German units and attach them to different formations. On the other hand, in peace-time there would be nothing to stop Germany temporarily detaching its units from Eurocorps for different duties. German troops would come under
NATO’s command in peace-time.”246 The 21January 1993 a formal agreement was reached between
SACEUR chief General John Shalikashvili and French and German Chiefs of Defense Staff Admiral
Jacques Laxandre and General Klaus Naumann. This agreement ended Washington’s fears that the
Eurocorps would undermine NATO. Under the agreement, the Eurocorps would be available to NATO for Article 5 contingencies as well as non-Article 5 tasks, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. The agreement also detailed SACEUR’s responsibilities for operational planning and command arrangements as well as relations between SACEUR and the Eurocorps in peacetime. Thus, the agreement was a “victory” for both Atlanticists and Europeanists. For Washington, the Eurocorps was to be placed under NATO command in crisis period and the Corps would not undermine Germany’s contribution to NATO. The German troops will continue to receive NATO assignments as part of NATO’s integrated command in addition to their role in the Eurocorps. For NATO, the Eurocorps represented the first time France placed its troops under NATO’s operational command since De Gaulle withdrew
France from NATO’s integrated command in 1966.247 For France, the agreement secured that NATO would use the Eurocorps as a unit, thus keeping the idea of a “genuine European defense component”.
German Minister Volker Rühe clearly summarized the idea of the agreement during the inauguration of
246 See : Buchan David, "Paris Says Eurocorps Can Come Under NATO," The Financial Times, London, Tuesday 1 December 1992, p. 2. 247 Although France retains the final decision whether to commit troops or not and that the final decision to commit the Eurocorps to NATO is subject to Franco-German approval, Germany’s Defense Minister Volker Rühe’s argument that the Eurocorps was a mean to bring back France closer to NATO revealed pertinent.
UNIGE / SES - 102 - Olivier Brighenti Part II the Eurocorps headquarters in Strasbourg when he hailed the Eurocorps: “as the central building stone of a European defense”, while saying “we do not want to act separately from our American friends.”248
This agreement also clarified many aspects that were still pending in the decisions of other European states to join the Franco-German initiative. French and German Defense Ministers Pierre Joxe and
Volker Rühe issued a joint statement inviting: “our partners in Europe to participate in the corps because
France and Germany do not consider their initiative as exclusive.”249
The “Eurocorps agreement” highlighted an important aspect four years after the end of the Cold War.
Placing the Eurocorps under NATO command in case of crisis as well as the “non-decision” of
Maastricht on security and defense clearly indicated that the Europeans continued to rely primarily on
NATO for its security. Secondly, the United States were far from ready to accept any type of
“autonomous” European force. In conclusion, the first phase of the post-Cold War European architecture was very rich in declaration and very interesting for scholars, but in practical terms, neither the precise nature of the European defense architecture, nor the relation between a hypothetical European defense identity and the Atlantic Alliance were solved. The United States was able more or less to ensure the status quo and its preeminence on European security. Given the relatively timid character of European initiatives in this first phase and the fact that the United States had been advocating for decades a more active European role in the European security architecture, why did the Bush Administration object systematically to these initiatives?
248 Quoted in : Buchan David, "Vorwarts, Marchons, Advance Eurocorps Set To Go," The Financial Times, London, Saturday 6 November 1993, p. 2. 249 Quoted in : Buchan David, "NATO Blessing for the Eurocorps," The Financial Times, London, Friday 22 January 1993, p. 2. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes had stressed in May that his country would participate in the Eurocorps provided it had some command linked with NATO. The agreement clarified the position for Belgium and Brussels announced its participation in the Eurocorps with a 12’000 men mechanized division on 25 June 1993. In November 1993, Spain decided to assign a brigade of 3’500 men to the Eurocorps. Luxemburg contributed 180 soldiers in May 1996. Pierre Joxe’s July 1992 prediction: “Maybe soon it will be a four-country corps” revealed correct. Cohen Roger, "U.S. - French Relations Turn Icy After the Cold War," The New York Times, New York, 2 July 1992, p. A 10.
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3.7. The United States’ Power Maximizing Strategy and the European Security Architecture from 1989 to 1993: An Interim Assessment
The main aspect we can draw from this first phase of the case study is that the United States was not a direct participant in the common foreign and security policy that led to the Maastricht Treaty on political union. Nevertheless, it was omnipresent and used all its leverage in order to promote its interests. US
Ambassador to NATO William Taft made this very clear at an address to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies when he said: “While it is not for an American to prescribe the means by which
Europeans should exercise their collective authority or assume greater responsibility” he immediately added: “if you do not assume this role in association with the United States, we will be disappointed.”250
Washington used a “direct tactic” until the Bartholomew Démarche. This was resented in European capitals as a direct intrusion in internal European affairs. It provoked angry reactions and was largely counterproductive. The Bush administration changed its strategy and quickly understood that it could rely heavily on the Atlanticists to pursue its agenda. The United States found important allies in London,
The Hague, and Lisbon. These countries defended the American point of view that supported the fact that European security arrangements should take place within the Transatlantic framework. The case of the WEU and the Eurocorps, developed at length above are striking. The United States as bluntly outlined by Jennone Walker “insisted that WEU become in effect a subcommittee of NATO rather than the security arm of the European Community, and remains nervous about the prospect of multinational
European units [Eurocorps] that might conduct exercises with NATO’s integrated military command but not part of it. Both attitudes suggest ambivalence about whether the United States is more interested in a Europe able to do more for Western security or whether it simply wishes to maintain America’s lead role.”251 The role of the WEU advocated by the Europeanists or by the Atlanticists and strongly supported by Washington was of crucial importance for the continued preeminence of the United States in European security affairs. If the WEU became fully emerged in the European Union or if it were to be the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, it would have hadhad dramatic consequences on American policy in Europe. If the first scenario had prevailed, a genuinely
250 Taft William H, "The US Role in a New Europe," Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 9 February 1991, 251 Walker Jenonne, "Keeping America in Europe," Foreign Policy, vol. 83, no. 1, (Summer 1991), p. 141.
UNIGE / SES - 104 - Olivier Brighenti Part II independent European security policy identity would have gradually emerged undermining U.S. strategic interests in Europe. The latter scenario succeeded, subordinating WEU, thus European security policy to NATO. Hence, Maastricht can be seen as an “interim victory” for Washington since nearly all its claims for NATO preeminence were fulfilled. Throughout the whole Maastricht process, the Bush administration stuck to the position that NATO was the sole warrant for European security and the main tool to maintain America’s preeminence on the old continent. Washington continuously argued that there was no viable European alternative to NATO for the security of the European continent. Although
Washington’s skepticism on the capacity of the Europeans to develop a viable alternative to NATO was partly founded, this was not the main cause of Washington’s concerns. The fact that an independent
European security and defense policy could jeopardize America’s hegemonic role in Europe was the main source of concern for Washington.252 The Bush administration pursued a policy of power maximization as the one I developed in my hard line realist approach in order to ensure that the United
States would remain a European power and retain the lead on security and defense in the post Cold
War European architecture. The United States did in no way pursue an offshore balancing strategy, although the early 1990’s was certainly the most propitious time since the end of World War II. In effect, a strong European “autonomous” security identity would provide the United States with an opportunity to bring its “European” troops back home and pass the buck of European security to the Europeans.
Discouraging and undermining every single initiative going in that sense is in no way the hallmark of an offshore balancing strategy. On the contrary, the United States opposed every single European initiative because its concern is that a stronger Europe could actually become a competitor and undermine
NATO’s (put differently U.S.) leadership in Europe. U.S. military presence in Europe has always given
Washington a de facto political presence in Europe which they are reluctant to give up. The American
252 Using European internal divisions was the main tool in promoting America’s interests and undermining the Europeanists vision of a common security and defense policy. There is a constant call from Washington for a more proactive European role in its own defense. The answer to these calls came from the Europeanists, which sought to develop a more vigorous European defense identity to fulfil its share of the burden. A more active European role was perceived in Washington as a threat to the Alliance and to American Leadership. Here lies the fundamental dilemma of European security. If Europe remains too divided and therefore weak to make a significant contribution for its own security, U.S. congressional resentment will grow and as a consequence, American administrations will be less inclined to carry the burden of European security. On the other hand, if the Europeans do get together to construct a viable European security and defense identity to share the burden of their defense, it will inevitably be perceived in Washington as a challenge to U.S. leadership.
UNIGE / SES - 105 - Olivier Brighenti Part II position is very well summarized by a U.S. official who stated: “We’re still in the process of considering exactly what we want our security relationship within Europe to be. But we’re still attached to the NATO concept because it’s what we understand. We look at the discussions on European security policy and we see a potential competitor. We see a relationship in which we would become an unequal partner, instead of an equal partner, or admittedly, a more than equal partner, as at present.”253 The Bush administration was above all committed to U.S. leadership in NATO. Thus, the European defense identity favored by Washington was one in which Europe shared more the burden rather than enjoying a greater decisional independence. As I outlined in the beginning of this study, the various initiatives of the early 1990’s must be seen as an attempt by Europeans and mainly the Europeanists to fulfill the commitment made to the United States prior to signing the Washington Treaty in 1949. These initiatives are all grounded in the burden sharing debate and must be seen as a European attempt to play a larger role for their own security now that the Soviet threat has vanished. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century NATO has been the main framework to promote American interests in Europe.
General John Calvin, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe made this very clear when he said:
“The US is committed to NATO with a fully deployed force. For that commitment, we get a seat at the table. We get an influence in the shaping of the security situation in Europe, and that’s what we want”254
A more active European role in European security and an “autonomous” European security architecture would certainly undermine U.S. preeminence and on the long term certainly leave the United States on the sidelines with a stronger Europe, capable of assuming its own security. This is exactly what the
United States wanted to avoid.
Despite continuous support for a more active European role in security and defense,255 Washington’s
“double-language” is clearly highlighted in a draft version of the Pentageon Defence Planning Guidance
253 Quoted in : Lichfield John, "Fears for NATO Muddy the Issue in Washington," The Independant, London, 28 November 1991, p. 12. 254 Quoted in : Vanhoonacker Sophie, The Bush Administration (1989-1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity, (Aldershot: Asgate), 2001,p. 142, fn 133. 255 Paragraph 9 of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Oslo on June 14 1992 and in Brussels on December 17 of the same year reaffirm the support for the development of a common European foreign and security policy and the emergence of a defense identity. See paragraph 9: NATO Council of Ministers, "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", Oslo, 4 June 1992, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b920604a.htm, (Accessed: 07/11/2006). and NATO Council of Ministers, "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ", Brussels, 17 December 1992, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b921217a.htm, (Accessed: 07/11/2006).
UNIGE / SES - 106 - Olivier Brighenti Part II for fiscal years 1994 to 1999.256 The United States Defense Department asserted that America's political and military mission in the post cold war era was to insure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territory of the former Soviet Union. The classified document drafted by
Zalamy Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis “Scooter” Libby makes the case for a world dominated by one superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy. To perpetuate the role, the United States: “must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order” and the United States “must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” The document states that part of the
American mission will be: “to convince potential competitors (coalition of allies or foes alike) that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.”257 This document is a clear statement of the Bush Administration’s willingness not to tolerate any greater “autonomous” aspirations for regional leadership from the European Union.258 In Europe, the Pentagon paper asserts: “NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European
256 The Defense Planning Guidance is a classified document rewritten every other year. It describes America’s military strategy and serves as the basis for defense budgets. The 1992 DPG was an early draft of this document. It was written by Zalamy Khalilzad a member of Scooter Libby’s staff and a long-time aid to Paul Wolfowitz. Khalilzad asked Libby for the permission to circulate the draft to other officials of the Pentagon for comments. Libby gave his consent without even reading the document. Within three days, the draft was leaked to the New York Times. For a very good account on the DPG and its revised version see: Mann James, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet, (New York: Viking), 2004,pp. 108-215. 257 Tyler Patrick E, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World," New York Times, New York, 8 March 1992, p. 1. 258 Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman characterized the document as a “low level” draft, but at the same time he defended its concepts. Although the final draft was “softer” in rhetoric, the document is a very good summary of the Administration’s vision of the post Cold War world and the role of the United States. The 46 memorandum describes itself as “definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense. The document represents a response at the highest levels of the Pentagon to a growing call in the American political debate for retrenchments abroad. Although Senior Officials said the document had not been given final approval by Wolfowitz and Cheney, they acknowledged that both had played a substantial role in the document’s creation and endorsed its principal views. See: Gellman Barton, "Keeping the U.S. First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower," The New York Times, New York, Wednesday 11 March 1992, p. A 1, & Tyler Patrick E, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunitions for Critics," The New York Times, New York, Tuesday 10 March 1992, p. 12.
UNIGE / SES - 107 - Olivier Brighenti Part II integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure.”259 Neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer clearly understood and summarized Washington’s strategy in Europe.
He says: “here is where the Pentagon Paper gets provocative – to prevent currently friendly powers from presenting new threats in the future. The logic is simple. If America’s allies believe that they can rely on American power, they will have no reason to turn themselves into military superpowers. If, on the other hand, the United States gives up its worldwide predominance, Germany and Japan, military midgets today, will quite reasonably seek to ensure their own security by turning themselves into military giants.”260 What the United States wants to avoid above all, is reverting to a multipolar world where its preeminence would be challenged by a military strong and autonomous Europe. The final version of the
Pentagon Paper states: “It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance.”261 In the revised document following the deluge of criticism in the U.S. and abroad, the tone was smoothed down but in essence the document contained most of the same ideas as the original. A senior Pentagon official, commenting on the April 16 draft, said that: “it more carefully reflects” the thinking of Mr Cheney, but that additional refinements and editing changes have been made since that version was circulated. He said: “major elements remain”262 Although the final version didn’t talk about stopping allies from emerging as rivals, it emphasized strongly on unilateralism as a strategic tool. The later draft retreats to a more narrow formulation of potential threats which calls for the United States to prevent: “any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests.”263 It raised significant questions on collective action and multilateralism and stressed on the possibility to go it alone whenever the United States decided it was in its strategic interest. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney made it clear when he said: “We will,
259 Anonymous, "Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival," The New York Times, New York, Sunday 8 March 1992, p. 14. 260 Krauthammer Charles, "What's Wrong with the Pentagon Paper? It's an Impressive Blueprint for the New World Order," The Washington Post, Washington D.C., Friday 13 March 1992, p. A 25. 261 Tyler Patrick E, "Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers," The New York Times, New York, Sunday 24 May 1992, p. 1. See also Gellman Barton, "Pentagon Abandons Goal of Thwarting U.S. Rivals; 6 Year Plan Softens Earlier Tone on Allies," The Washington Post, Washington D.C., Sunday 24 May 1992, p. A 1. 262 Ibidem 263 Ibidem
UNIGE / SES - 108 - Olivier Brighenti Part II therefore, not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary. A future President will need options allowing him to lead, and where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act independently to protect our critical interests.”264
Throughout the first period I analyzed, the United States remained wary of every single development that could undermine its influence in Europe. Through pressures and constant reliance on the Atlanticits’ vision of European security, Washington pursued its goal of preserving NATO as Europe’s primary security institution. The constant quest for primacy in European affairs overlooked some crucial aspects that would lead to further transatlantic disagreements. In fact, the Maastricht “settlement” as well as the agreement on the Eurocorps must be understood as a “cease fire” between Atlanticists and
Europeanists rather than a permanent solution. The Alliance remained completely dominated by the
United States and the new strategic concept was far from a new partnership between a stronger Europe and a more “benign” United States. Sophie Vanhoonacker captures very well the 1993 situation that will lead to further debates and clashes between the United States and Europe throughout the end of the century. She says: “Its policy (U.S. primacy policy on NATO) however overlooked one factor of crucial importance for its ultimate success, namely the question of how the Alliance could be developed into a real partnership, with the Europeans not only assuming a larger part of the burden, but also playing a more important role in the decision making process. If the US had advocated that European security initiatives should have been launched within the framework of the Alliance, it could have been expected that Washington would have taken certain initiatives to make it more attractive for the Europeans to do so. The Bush administration was however so obsessed with safeguarding its own predominant role on the European security scene that this issue was entirely neglected.”265
264 Cheney Richard. "Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy"," Pentagon, January 1993. P. 9. 265 Vanhoonacker Sophie, The Bush Administration (1989-1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity, (Aldershot: Asgate), 2001,p. 133.
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4. A European Defense Identity within the Atlantic Alliance: Competition or Temporary Setback?
4.1. The 1994 Brussels NATO Summit Breakthrough
As I have outlined in the first part of this case study, Transatlantic rifts have occurred on the European security architecture since the end of the Cold War. The United States, in total opposition with the
Europeanists led by France, has stressed that it will accept no European security identity outside the
NATO framework. The Bush administration had employed all its leverage to prevent France and its
Europeanist allies to pursue some form of independent EDI. It has become legion for the Alliance to issue declarations supporting EDI as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. The
United States always stressed that the Alliance remained the essential forum for consultation among allies. The North Atlantic Council meeting held in Brussels in 1994 drew along these same recurring patterns but had dramatic effects on the European security architecture. NATO Secretary General
Manfred Woerner called the Brussels Summit: “a historic turning point toward a more mature transatlantic relationship.”266 The Brussels meeting must, above all, be seen as a technical-military arrangement permitting Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions through access to those NATO assets and capabilities which European Member States did not possess.
The Brussels agreement was essentially designed to solve a number of structural and military problems within the Euro-Atlantic community. The crucial aspect of the Brussels 1994 meeting is that it
“unofficially” gave birth to the European Security and Defense Identity.267 As outlined by Howorth, the
Brussels summit also had: “a transformative political dimension in that it posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution and on the part of the United States, as the foremost NATO member state, to countenance a greater security role for the EU. Ultimately, the political message of ESDI (that a clearer, bigger European role was both acceptable and desirable) acquired more importance than the
266 Quoted in : Drozdiak William, "Summit Shows U.S. Easing Grip on NATO," The Washington Post, Washington, Wednesday 12 January 1994, p. A 15. 267 See : Croft Stuart. Howorth Jolyon. Terriff Terry & Webber Mark, "NATO's Triple Challenge," International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, (July 2000), pp. 503-504.
UNIGE / SES - 110 - Olivier Brighenti Part II technical-military arrangements designed essentially to provide access to NATO/US assets.”268 Unlike the previous Franco-German initiatives, in order to understand the future developments in the European architecture, it is crucial to bear in mind that the ESDI is a pure NATO project. Major steps were achieved both in the definition of a ESDI within NATO as well as the military means to address this project. WEU was finally given some form of operational role. The final communiqué stated: “We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defense Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defense policy within the European
Union, might in time lead to a common defense compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the
Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.”269 By far the most important achievement of the summit was the question of the role of the WEU. The Heads of states decided to: “support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defense component of the European Union. The Alliance's organization and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this.”270 In other words, NATO would provide the WEU with the operational capabilities it lacked to be the credible defense component of the EU. The declaration makes this crucial aspect very clear: “We, therefore, stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their
Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. Better
European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself.”271
The Alliance endorsed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a means to: “facilitate
268 Howorth Jolyon, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?," Chaillot Papers, vol. --, no. 43, (November 2003), pp. 22-23. 269 NATO Council of Ministers, "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ", Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm, (Accessed: 14/11/2006). Paragraph 4 270 Ibidem, Paragraph 5. 271 Ibidem, Paragraph 6.
UNIGE / SES - 111 - Olivier Brighenti Part II contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.”272 It was decided that the North Atlantic Council would develop the CJTF concept and establish the necessary capabilities in co-ordination with WEU, in a manner that: “provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU.”273 In other words, NATO’s collective assets can be used under the CJTF to cope with security crises led by the Europeans. The idea behind the
CJTF is to provide a framework within which NATO can continue to provide command and organizational means necessary for multinational, wide-ranging missions that would mot always include the entire NATO membership. Put differently, when the United States decides it was not in its interests to participate in a mission.
What are the main outputs of the Brussels summit and what are the consequences on the European architecture and on transatlantic relations? First of all, the Brussels summit temporarily addressed the question of burdensharing, though mostly in American terms. The decisions taken at the summit made some significant changes by shifting some of the burdens to the Europeans. As stated by Secretary of
State Warren Christopher at the Istanbul NATO Summit in June 1994: “NATO has taken important decisions to support the efforts of allies to develop a more capable European Security and Defense
Identity. That identity should maintain and build popular support in Europe for meeting European commitments and responsibilities and strengthen our collective capacity to respond to future security needs. It should also reinforce the trans-Atlantic relationship. We continue to look to our allies for a more balanced sharing of responsibilities.”274 Although the ESDI was supposed to accelerate the shift toward a lower American profile and growing European defense responsibilities on the old continent, the usual
American logic of burdensharing made the Europeans share more of the financial burdens, but didn’t provide them with more responsibilities. Secondly, one of the summit’s most important consequence is to make NATO military assets available for European peacekeeping operations that would not necessarily involve U.S. troops. Thirdly, an important output is the emergence of a relative coherent plan that seems to temporarily solve the antagonisms between Atlanticists and Europeanists. The ESDI,
272 Ibidem. Paragraph 9. 273 Ibidem 274 Christopher Warren, "Transforming the NATO Alliance to Meet New Security Needs", 20 June 1994, (US Department of State), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n25_v5/ai_15663582, (Accessed: 19/11/2006).
UNIGE / SES - 112 - Olivier Brighenti Part II as a pure NATO project, is thus a complete victory for the Atlanticist vision of European security architecture and for the United States. Although U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrook stated that: “The
United States does not believe that the NATO Alliance can or should be the universal security structure in Europe”275 NATO remains, after the Brussels Summit, the central forum on European security and
American primacy in European security affairs is guaranteed. As outlined in the United States Security
Strategy for Europe and NATO, it is clear that the United States and NATO remain dominant in
European security Affairs, since: “for many major threats, including nuclear threats, the Europeans will continue to look to the United States and to NATO as the principal guarantors of their security.” The
ESDI, as a NATO project, is not perceived by the United States as a threat to its leadership, since, as the document states: “some European states will push hard to develop a European Security and
Defense Identity, but few will increase their capabilities for independent military action.”276 The Brussels summit can thus be interpreted as a “victory” for the Atlanticists and the United States. How was this compromise possible bearing in mind the Europeanist constant quest for a stronger European
“independent” role? What where the conditions that made it possible to accommodate France with a
European security architecture under the custody of NATO? I will analyze in the next section the conditions that made the ESDI possible given the traditional antagonisms between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists on the one hand, and the United States, on the other hand.
4.1.1. The Franco-American “Rapprochement”: Implications for the ESDI and NATO Since General de Gaulle withdrew his country from NATO’s military integrated command in 1966,
France has always pursued a policy of self sufficiency based on a nuclear deterrent force comprising both tactical and strategic weapons. From de Gaulle to Mitterrand, France has carried on with a three- pronged policy, aiming at protecting its status and rank as a world power and at promoting European integration in a number of areas including defens. These objectives were conceived as supporting each other, though sometimes in reality at cross-purposes, while at the same time standing by its allies in
275 Hollbrook Richard, "Creation of a New European Security Architecture Under Way", 1995, (United States Information Agency), http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/95-02/feb21.usia, (Accessed: 21/11/2006). 276 United States Security for Europe and NATO, p. 35, quoted in: Duke Simon, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP, (Oxford: St Anthony's Press), 2000,p. 191.
UNIGE / SES - 113 - Olivier Brighenti Part II times of crisis.277 Until the end of the Cold War, France’s defense policy worked out pretty well, although it engendered tensions across the Atlantic.278 As outlined by Anand Menon: “Safe in the second line, enjoying the protection afforded by the American nuclear guarantee to West Germany, France could play at military self reliance, placing a premium on funding its ambitious nuclear program. The declaratory emphasis on independence, together with a rejection of military integration, allowed France to portray itself as offering an alternative model of foreign policy based on virulent criticism of the Yalta system of superpower domination and successive French leaders to slake their thirst for a certain rank in world affairs.”279 The end of the Cold War and the resulting imbalanced distribution of power altered the French position in the international system. As I outlined earlier, at the immediate end of the Cold
War, France sought to promote an “only European” security architecture for two main reasons. First of all, France feared an American withdraw from Europe once the Soviet threat had disappeared. France had always enjoyed the protection of the United States during the Cold War and it feared that an
American withdrawal would jeopardize its security. President Mitterrand, during the Eurocorps 1992 meeting in La Rochelle, very clearly summarized France’s fears. He said it was only prudent for
European countries to take more responsibility for their own security. “We don’t want,” he said, “to see
American troops leave, but who knows what decisions will be made because of the economic difficulties facing the American leadership?”280 Thus the likelihood of U.S. withdrawal as well as the reunification of
Germany made it imperative to develop a European security architecture both to fill the vacuum of the
U.S. security guarantee and to contain a strong reunified Germany by integration. Second, France saw the end of the Cold War as a unique moment in history to deepen integration and transform the
European Community from a common market to a more integrated political union. For these two
277 Le Gloannec Anne-Marie, "Europe by Other Means?," International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1, (January 1997), p. 87. 278 The ambiguity of the French position in the Alliance caused many irritations in the United States. Dealing with the “French exception” was harsh and often resulted in long compromises. After a NATO Summit in Paris, U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz could not contain his anger when he declared to the press: “'You are constantly in the process of saying: 'The allies think such and such,' and then, the French say: 'We agree with that, so that's no problem, but that's something the unified command did and we can't touch that. And then you struggle around with language not to weaken the point, and at the same time, protect the precision of the French view.” Quoted in: Gwertzman Bernard, "Schultz Complains French as Allies are Aggravating," The New York Times, New York, Sunday 12 June 1983, p. 1. 279 Menon Anand, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and the European Security," International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, (1995), p. 20. 280 Quoted in : Drozdiak William, "France, Germany Unveil Corps As Step Toward European Defense," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Saturday 23 May 1992, p. A 15.
UNIGE / SES - 114 - Olivier Brighenti Part II reasons, France positioned itself as the champion of political integration and advocated a European security architecture within the European Union. Having analyzed the French propositions and their maximalist position on an “independent” European security identity how can we explain the shift in
French approach towards NATO and the embracing of a ESDI as the expression of the European pillar of NATO? The French “rapprochement” took place in two distinctive phases. First of all, from 1993 to the 1996 Berlin Summit, which I call the “positive rapprochement”. This period enabled the emergence of the ESDI. Secondly, the period from summer 1996 to summer 1997, whicht I call the “negative rapprochement” which highlighted the impasse in Franco/American perspectives on a renewed NATO.
In this section, I will focus on the “positive rapprochement” phase that led to the Berlin Summit. The
“negative rapprochement” phase will be analyzed in a subsequent section.
4.2. The Positive Rapprochement Phase: 1993-1996
France first started to come closer to NATO under the socialist government and, first and foremost under Defense Minister Pierre Joxe. The experience of the Gulf War, which obviously showed the effectiveness of NATO and the leadership of the United States, and later the crisis in Yugoslavia, made it clear to the French that the way towards an effective autonomous European security identity outside
NATO was far from paved. The French “isolationist policy” theoretically became irrelevant at the crucial turning point of the Gulf War. President Mitterrand implicitly accepted U.S. hegemony and backed
Washington in Operation Desert Storm. The military deployment in Bosnia, temporarily erased the
French autonomous velleity and acknowledged the U.S. preeminence on the Alliance. France recognized the U.S. as the sole military superpower in the unipolar world configuration.281 Indirectly, by backing the military offensive in Croatia in Summer 1995, Paris favored the American initiative in
Dayton. Thus, in the mid 1990’s, France pursued apparently contradictory policy consisting in getting closer to the United States and NATO, while promoting a European defense identity and the central role of France in Europe.282 The French, though they still believed in the development of a European
281 France participated in the Gulf War as a member of the Western Coalition. It had also been an important actor at the various stages of the interventions in former Yugoslavia. This led France to operate under NATO procedures and in the Yugoslavia case under NATO command. 282 See : Aguirre Mariano, "Une alliance en quête d'ennemi: L'OTAN au service de quelle sécurité," Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris, April 1996, p. 11.
UNIGE / SES - 115 - Olivier Brighenti Part II defense identity, became less dogmatic and saw the ESDI as a complement rather than an alternative to NATO and the U.S. presence in Europe.283 Therefore, the example of the Eurocorps/NATO agreement is striking. The Eurocorps debate had been very harsh, but the new pragmatic attitude in
Paris made it relatively easy to find an agreement on the relationship between the Eurocorps and
NATO. But probably the most important reason for the shift in French attitude towards NATO is the awareness in Paris that its “independence” policy was isolating France from the rest of its allies. As
Paris had already experienced during the NATO Rapid Reaction Force episode, pursuing “strategic independence” had a high political price. If Paris wanted to have a word to say in NATO’s redefinition, it could not stand aloof anymore. Hence, France was unable to influence the debate on the shifting
European security architecture. The French understood that although a ESDI outside NATO was still desirable, it could not count on its European partners for support and did not have the means to pursue that goal alone.284 Advocating an independent European defense identity against the United States and most of its European allies would mean that France would no longer have the means to influence the debate on NATO and open the door to a pure “Anglo-Saxon” approach to Transatlantic relations.
Defense Minister Pierre Joxe clearly understood this when he stated in September 1992: “France must be present in decision-making and discussion forums where present day crisis are managed and where our future security is worked out.” He said that France would stay outside NATO’s integrated military
283 It is important, though, to underline that France’s rapprochement with NATO and the United States is not perceived by the French Government as jeopardizing the constitution of a genuinely European defense identity for two main reasons. First of all, NATO has formally recognized the need for a ESDI in numerous declarations. NATO’s reforms among other aspects are meant to set an ESDI in NATO. Second, France made it very clear that the corollary to its participation in NATO’s Military Committee would be an in-depth reform of the Alliance in order to enable the advent of such an Identity. That means that the French Government wants to turn the WEU into the defense arm of the European Union, subordinated to the European Council, which would be the decision-making body of the CFSP and at the same time the European pillar within NATO. Thanks to the CJTF, Europe would be able to undertake operations in which the United States chose not to participate. Thus, as outlined by Anne-Marie Le Gloannec: “The French Government is pursuing its avowed aim to build a European defense policy. This European defense appears to have three aspects. It is now conceived of as being part of NATO, with CJTF as its main building block; it is also European as such, focused on the WEU and its link to the European Union; and it stems from intergovernmental (bilateral or multilateral) ventures. These various dimensions are not thought of as mutually exclusive but rather as built on a common logic which weaves the various threads together.” Le Gloannec Anne- Marie, "Europe by Other Means?," International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1, (January 1997), p. 88. 284 France and its European partners cannot find a common ground on what Europe should be. The gaps are huge with the British, but they are also considerable with the German ally. Despite the very strong Franco-German cooperation I analyzed in the early 1990’s, France and Germany still part ways on the role that Europe should play in the future. Although Germany is an “engine” of the European integration, it is very prudent when it comes to Transatlantic relations. Where France plays open confrontation with Washington, Germany is very cautious of the fact that an open confrontation with Washington might precipitate American departure from the Old Continent.
UNIGE / SES - 116 - Olivier Brighenti Part II command and would retain an independent nuclear deterrent. But he added: “why not imagine that
France will participate more tomorrow than yesterday in political-military discussions?”285 Speaking before an audience of senior alliance military officials, Mr Joxe’s remarks were interpreted as an effort by France to end both its isolation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its bickering with
Washington over Western Europe’s new military role. In contrast to Mitterrand’s annoyance with the
NATO Rome Summit, Joxe seemed to agree that NATO should increase its political role. With the victory of the right-wing coalition in March 1993, French rapprochement became even clearer. Leading figures of the right, including Alain Juppé, Edourad Balladure and François Léotard had spoken openly for the need to reassess France’s defense policy and deepen the rapprochement with NATO.286
Jacques Baumel, RPR member of the French defense commission, declared in 1993: “It is obvious that when the first salvo in any major military operation will occur, French forces will be placed without reservations under the operational control of NATO, as it was the case in the Gulf War.” The Gaullist leader went on asserting: “it is in France’s interest to be on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and on the Military Committee. Military integration in the NATO framework, does not have the same consequences as in the past, since we are heading towards a more modular integration adapted to the new missions of the Alliance.”287 It is thus a Gaullist government that was reconsidering the Gaullist doctrine and changing the French “independence policy” that had prevailed since 1966.288 Alain Juppé, in an interview to the French Newspaper Le Monde prior to his nomination as foreign minister, criticized the socialist approach towards NATO. He said: “Can we maintain at the heart of NATO such a “grumpy” and conservative attitude we had until now? NATO has set about a reform, and France is a mere spectator. She is trying to slow the process down without being able to influence it. […] Shouldn’t we
285 Quoted in : Riding Alan, "France Moves to Take Bigger Part in Defining New Role for NATO," The New York Times, New York, 30 September 1992, p. A 3. 286 For a complete analysis of the right-left debate on NATO and the Gaullist approach to NATO see: Menon Anand, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and the European Security," International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, (1995), pp. 25-33. 287 Baumel Jacques, "Membre de la commission de Défense M. Baumel invite la France à se rapprocher de l'OTAN," Le Monde, Paris, Friday 26 March 1993, p. 26. 288 RPR President Alain Juppé refused to acknowledge that his Gaullist party was walking away from the Gaullist doctrine. “To break of the Gaullist policy is a formula I reject” he said “How can we compare the world configuration of 1966 with that of 1993. One of the main features of Gaullism is its ability of adaptation. What worries me are those neophytes of ultra-Gaullism who cling to certainties which today are completely outdated.” Juppé Alain. Trean Claire & Vernet Alain, "Espace Européen: Un entretien avec M. Alain Juppé," Le Monde, Paris, Saturday 6 March 1993, p. 7.
UNIGE / SES - 117 - Olivier Brighenti Part II pursue a double strategy: first of all the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance and second an open attitude towards this more equilibrated alliance? Why not participate, without returning to the integrated command, to some organs of the Alliance such as the Defense Planning
Committee.”289 After a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, his French counterpart
François Léotard echoed Juppé’s convictions. He said: “Participations of the French Defense Minister in
NATO meetings as well as the Army Chief of Staff in the Military Committee are currently being discussed by the Government. […] France will have a new attitude in a renovated NATO.”290
As a consequence of this radical shift in French policy towards NATO, the Government of Alain Juppé declared its intention to pursue a more constructive and open relationship with NATO. On December 15
1995, France announced that it would resume active participation in NATO’s military structure almost three decades after the General de Gaulle pulled the country out of the military command of the alliance and ordered American forces out of France. The decision came as NATO Foreign and Defense
Ministers formally approved the deployment of 60’000 troops for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.
Paris reclaimed its seat on NATO’s Military Committee and wished to be active again in the Defense
Planning Committee. French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette declared: “France has decided from now on to participate much more fully in all NATO bodies.”291 He said the French decision showed his country’s determination to “facilitate the reform of the Alliance” and suggested that “if the reform went ahead, France was ready to move still closer to NATO”. The reform France seeks is centered on what de Charette has called the “European pillar of defense” within NATO, giving the European Union the military backbone it has lacked in its failed diplomatic efforts to end the war in Bosnia. The Western
European Union, Mr. de Charette said, should become “the European pillar of the Alliance.”292 French chiefs of staff will take part in NATO’s Military Committee, will improve its relations with the alliance’s military staff and work more closely with NATO’s European command structure SHAPE. France will not take part in the Defense Planning Committee nor in the Nuclear Planning Group. France will remain
289 Ibidem 290 Anonymous, "A l'issue d'une rencontre avec le secrétaire américain à la défense M. Léotard prône une attitude nouvelle de la France dans une OTAN rénovée," Le Monde Paris, Monday 25 October 1995, p. 5. 291 Quoted in : Atkinson Rick, "French Pledge Greater Role in NATO," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Wednesday 6 December 1995, p. A. 28. 292 Quoted in : Cohen Roger, "France to Rejoin Military Command of NATO Alliance," The New York Times, New York, Wednesday 6 December 1995, p. 1.
UNIGE / SES - 118 - Olivier Brighenti Part II formally outside of the alliance’s military structure. “Our initiative” said de Charette “does not mean that
France will return to NATO’s integrated command and this for a simple reason: our quest for the reinforcement of the European pillar of the Alliance is subject to reforms of the Alliance’s structures.”
The French Minister invoked the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit and recalled that in parallel of the NATO reforms, the United States had acknowledged the necessity of a European security and defense identity. “Since then” he said “those two aspects have not evolved in the same way. The adaptation of the Alliance and the development of a ESDI have not progressed sufficiently.”293 U.S. Secretary of State
Warren Christopher said he warmly welcomed the French decision, adding: “It is particularly significant that France will now again be a full member of the Military Committee”.294 Shortly after his election,
President Chirac in an address to a joint session of Congress praised for a more equal partnership with the United States in which a united Europe will assume greater responsibilities for its own security. “I believe” he said “that the Alliance is a permanent cornerstone of our security. But its military structure corresponds to a time when the world was divided in two, and East confronted West. Today, things have changed. France has moved closer to NATO recently because it wants to play an active role in a reorganized Alliance. We need to reflect on a new long-term vision, one that is based on a more equal partnership. With Europe doing more for its own security.”295 Thus after the Brussels 1994 breakthrough and at the wake of the Berlin 1996 Summit, French policy towards NATO can be summarized as follows. After France understood that its European allies were not ready for a genuinely European defense identity and that the United States would never accept an ESDI outside the NATO framework,
Paris decided to change radically its strategy. France still thought of an autonomous ESDI but refused to accept the current status quo. Thus, in order to push the idea of ESDI, France accepted to meet the conditions laid down by its European partners and the United States, namely that the ESDI should be a
NATO project. France calculated that this concession would enable to build in the short term a genuine
293 Quoted in : La Gueriviere Jean, "La France reprend sa place au comité militaire de l'OTAN," Le Monde, Paris, Thursday 7 December 1995, p. 2. 294 Quoted in : Atkinson Rick, "French Pledge Greater Role in NATO," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Wednesday 6 December 1995, p. A 28. Some U.S. officials expressed concerns that renewed French activism in the Alliance could exacerbate the rivalry that so often characterized U.S./French relations in Europe. These concerns, as we will see in the following sections, proved to be right. 295 Quoted in : Drozdiak William, "Chirac Seeks to Equalize U.S. European Security Roles," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Wednesday 31 January 1996, p. A 11.
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European defense project. As a result, Chirac’s strategy is not a rejection of the Gaullist principles. On the contrary the aim of the French strategy is to seek the same European goal, i.e. a genuinely
European defense project, but through other means. It is the adaptation of Gaullism to the new constraints of the unipolar world configuration.296 Returning to NATO would be a way to strengthen
Europe’s position within the Alliance and its military structures. It was seen in Paris as a strategy to reform the Alliance giving Europeans responsibilities they never had before (leading positions in the various regional commanding structures). The downside to this strategy is an Americanization of NATO rather then its Europeanization. As outlined by Paul-Marie de la Gorce: “This is tantamount to becoming further integrated into, rather than more independent of the Alliance.”297
4.2.1. The Berlin Summit: High Point of the ESDI The main output of the “positive rapprochement” phase and the high point of the ESDI was NATO’s
June 1996 Ministerial meeting. The main characteristic of the Summit was a two way deal where the
United States accepted to support a meaningful European military capacity through the CJTF and other means, while France committed to move towards a full integration of a restructured Alliance. Thus, the
Berlin meeting appeared to be a major breakthrough after years of architectural competition and
Transatlantic disagreements. It is the latest stage in a long and bitter process of bargaining across the
Atlantic over the primacy of NATO and the United States in European security affairs, as well as the never ending burdensharing debate. Javier Solana, the newly elected secretary General of NATO saw
1996 as an outstanding year for the Transatlantic partnership. He stated: “The period since the end of the Cold War has been a tumultuous one. One in which our hopes of creating enduring security order for a democratic and undivided Europe were often confounded by the grim reality of warfare in Europe’s midst. It has been a period of highs and lows, of creative thinking and institution-building, and of much rhetorical flourish. This time of talk and transition now is coming to an end. Indeed, 1996 could be the
296 As I will highlight later on in this chapter, the failure of the “negative rapprochement” phase culminating in summer 1997, by the impossibility to find an agreement with the United States on the Southern Command of NATO is a key indicator. In fact, French policy was in no way the volte face cheered in 1995, but rather the continuation of “Gaullism by other means”. On the other hand, the apparent openness of the Clinton administration for a bigger European role in NATO was nothing else then a concealed power maximization strategy. 297 De la Gorce Paul-Marie, "Europe Says No to a Defense System of its Own," Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris, July 1997, p. 10.
UNIGE / SES - 120 - Olivier Brighenti Part II year in which practice finally replaces theory and the pieces of a new European security architecture can begin to come together.”298 The Berlin Communiqué endorses the “renewal” of NATO as decided at the 1994 Brussels Summit. The Communiqué is very extensive and deals with every issue being currently discussed in the NATO renewing process. It is the part dedicated to the ESDI that is of the utmost interest for this research. Paragraph seven sets out the three fundamental objectives in order to improve the Alliance’s capabilities. The first objective is: “to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment facing Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective defense and through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances.” The key issue of the first objective is the CJTF. It would permit: “to mount NATO non-
Article 5 operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions. […]
The CJTF concept is central to our approach for assembling forces for contingency operations and organizing their command within the Alliance.” These adaptations should permit the creation of the ESDI within NATO and give European partners a larger role in the decision making process: “Consistent with the goal of building the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO, these arrangements should permit all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the Alliance”299 The second objective deals with the preservation of the Transatlantic link. Using a now familiar formula, NATO is designated: “as the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.” Most important, it is stressed that there will be a continued involvement of the United States in all European security affairs:
“further development of the strong partnership between North American and European Allies, both politically and militarily, and including a continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure.”300 Thus, the United States has the guarantee not to be marginalized in the European security debate. The third objective is the creation of the ESDI within NATO. The
298 Solana Javier, "NATO in Transition," Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, (January 1996), p. 9. 299 NATO Council of Ministers, "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ", Berlin, 3 June 1996, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm, (Accessed: 28/11/2006). Paragraph 7. point. 1. 4. 300 Ibidem, point. 2. 2.
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Communiqué states: “The third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence
Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.”301 It was decided that “separable but not separate” HQ’s, assets and forces would be identified which could be used for WEU-led operations. Their availability would be subject to decision by the NAC. The CJTF, in theory, provides the WEU with the means to conduct its operations when NATO as a whole does not intervene. Hence, two or more NATO countries will be able to launch military operations with their own troops while borrowing from other members assets they lack such as transportation aircrafts, satellite intelligence, communication equipments etc. The main problem is that most of these assets do not belong to NATO, but to the United States, and it is not yet clear how the “lending” of such strategic assets will be managed. Much is left to be worked out until this new concept can be operational, but the Berlin Summit seems to have settled down the architectural competition that was going on between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists as well as the United
States. The Europeanists and above all France had obtained in the negotiations that specific NATO posts held by non-Americans be identified in advance as potential positions within a joint task force operation. The Atlanticists obtained the return of France as well as the abandonment of a European pillar outside the NATO framework. The WEU would thus become the bridge between NATO and the
EU: a solution that the British had always favored. British Foreign Secretary made it clear that the British option had been accepted when he said at the issue of the Summit: “This is not the kind of European force that France has been clamoring for, nor that which Britain has fought against. There was a suggestion at one stage that there should be a separate European command structure, it did not survive, nor did it deserve to.”302 Every single declaration at the end of the summit seemed to assess
301 Ibidem, point. 3. 302 Quoted in : Karacs Irme & Dejevsky Mary, "Shedding of US Ties Satisfies NATO Members," The Independent, London, Tuesday 4 June 1996, p. 9. While everything seemed settled in the Berlin Summit, the British official declarations let an open door for future disagreements notably on the nature of the WEU. While Malcolm Rifkind was in Berlin, British Secretary of State for Defense was in Paris. He underlined that defense, armaments and armies are matters to be decided primarily by sovereign governments and not by supranational institutions such as the EU. He sought to differentiate between defense groupings such as NATO and the WEU on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. He made it clear that for the British, neither the new European pillar within NATO nor the WEU were or could become the defense arm of the EU. Addressing an audience at the French military academy,
UNIGE / SES - 122 - Olivier Brighenti Part II that the Berlin Summit was the deal that sealed the new NATO. French Foreign Minister Hervé de
Charette who has pressed for a stronger European pillar declared: “France is satisfied because for the first time in alliance history, Europe will really be able to express its personality […] for the first time we have gone from words to deeds.”303 His U.S. counterpart Secretary of State Warren Christopher said:
“There is real substance in today’s decision. This provides for a stronger NATO, a more flexible NATO and allows our European allies to take more responsibilities.”304 Robert Hunter, U.S. Ambassador to
NATO, said the agreement marked: “the first significant change in a way the alliance does business since 1966, when French left the military structure.”305
Despite the unanimous optimism of the NATO leaders after the Berlin Summit, the ESDI began to go wrong immediately. How can this be explained? How did events unfold after the “success” of the Berlin
Summit? I have identified four main reasons that jeopardized the ESDI and that can account for its
“relative failure.” First of all, the NATO renovation and the CJTF, far from being a Europeanization of the
Alliance reinforced America’s preponderance on the institution and on European security affairs.
Secondly, there was the quarrel between France and the United States over the AFSOUTH command and the subsequent crisis it engendered in France’s full reintegration of NATO. Third, the question of
NATO enlargement which far from giving more responsibilities to the Europeans, extends American preponderance on the continent. Fourth, the British opposition to any kind of merger of the WEU and the
EU. In the next section I will analyze successively these four aspects that damaged the newly born
ESDI.
4.2.2. The CJTF: A U.S. Power Maximizing Tool? The CJTF is probably the most important outcome of the Berlin Summit. It was already discussed at the
1994 Brussels Summit but its official acceptance resulted from the Berlin Summit. The CJTF is the essential tool enabling the WEU to pursue military operations on its “own” whenever the United States
he insisted that neither NATO nor WEU could submit itself to policies made by the EU. He stressed that the WEU is not and will not be, a European substitute for NATO, but it is the right body to provide political authority and direction for European operations in the future. 303 Quoted in : Atkinson Rick, "NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Tuesday 4 June 1996, p. A. 14. 304 Ibidem 305 Quoted in : Anonymous, "NATO Acquires a European Identity," The Economist, London, Saturday 8 June 1996 p. 51.
UNIGE / SES - 123 - Olivier Brighenti Part II chooses not to take part in the operation. The CJTF program allows groups of states within the alliance to operate together on specific missions, other than traditional article five. In fact, since its creation,
NATO’s military organization has been based on Article Five of the Washington Treaty which commits each allied party to defend each other’s territory in case of attack. Allies agree in time of war to put their forces under an integrated military structure, a hierarchy of multinational headquarters that report in
Europe to SACEUR. This was a very effective framework for Article Five missions but it is of little use for
NATO’s new post Cold War missions. Hence, the CJTF was designed to provide ad hoc headquarters and new command structures to run non Article five missions. These headquarters will answer to NATO or in the case the United States would not take part, to the WEU. The CJTF will become the normal way to deal with non-article five missions. It will help to foster the ESDI by enabling the WEU to lead operations.306 Thus, although the CJTF provides the WEU with military capabilities to launch operations on its own, it confirms NATO’s primacy in European affairs and American leadership. At the outset of the Berlin Summit, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said: “In the long run it is neither in the
American nor the European interest that we have to call our American friends each time something flares up somewhere.”307 Klaus Kinkel’s optimism can hardly be translated into facts. Although the CJTF theoretically gives the Europeans the possibility to mount operations led by the WEU, it remains highly theoretical for three main reasons. First of all, according to the Berlin communiqué, NAC has a veto power over any missions employing NATO assets: “As an essential element of the development of this identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European
Allies if they were so to choose.” It will be based on: “identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for
WEU-led operations, separable but not separate HQs, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject
306 Anonymous, "A New Kind of Alliance?," The Economist, London, 1 June 1996, p. 19. 307 Quoted in : Atkinson Rick, "NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Tuesday 4 June 1996, p. A 14.
UNIGE / SES - 124 - Olivier Brighenti Part II to decision by the NAC.”308 Put differently, any use of the CJTF would require agreement of NAC, in other words, of the United States. Secondly, the CJTF agreement is based on the logic of borrowing important assets from NATO. Essentially what was agreed in Berlin was a procedure under which the
United States may lend important equipments to its European allies. In theory, one would expect the
United States officials to look favorably on European requests to borrow or lease such assets as strategic lift, intelligence, or command-and-control facilities for use in task forces led by Europeans. In return, Europeans would assume the direct risks and costs of carrying out certain peace operations. It is important to recall, as outlined by Philippe Gordon, that the NATO assets referred to in all references to
WEU-led CJTF’s are very limited in scope.309 Thus the “borrowing concept,” is a useful theoretical step, but a practical “murky” one. All WEU operations outside Europe would have to rely not on NATO assets but on American national ones. It is quite clear that the use of CJTF would be based on U.S. infrastructure and logistics, and would consequently be dependent on the support the United States would be willing to provide. The United States may lend material to its European allies, but if it does so, it will ensure a follow up of how its assets are used and reserve the right to recall them, which seems quite obvious.310 Put differently, the United States would indirectly supervise the mission. Thirdly, according to some official declarations after the Berlin Summit, it is not quite clear that the United States sees the CJTF as a revolutionary and viable concept and that it will ever be implemented. Officials minimized the importance of the “structural revolution” of Berlin, underlying that “with more than 100’000 troops stationed on the Old Continent, the U.S. was a European power”.311 Thus, as a European power
308 NATO Council of Ministers, "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ", Berlin, 3 June 1996, (NATO Press Service), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm, (Accessed: 28/11/2006). 309 Philip Gordon draws a list of the NATO assets. He says: “NATO has an air defense system; some command, control and communication assets (which are mostly fixed and therefore of little use for outside interventions); oil pipelines (equally irrelevant for force projection); a system of bunkers and shelters; and about eighteen Airborne and Control systems (AWACS). What NATO does not have, however, are independent forces, the means of force projection (such as airlift, sealift, and airborne refuelling capabilities), and satellite intelligence systems. Only the United States has these in sufficient amounts.” See: Gordon Philip H, "The United States and the European Defense and Security Identity in the new NATO," Les notes de l'Ifri, vol. 1, no. 4, (1998), p. 29. 310 Let’s take the case where an operation would effectively be led by the WEU, borrowing NATO (US) assets and have the tacit cooperation of the United States. What would happen if, for internal reasons, the United States chose to withdraw its tacit cooperation and its assets? The WEU led operation would be totally irrelevant. The case of Operation Sharp Guard is striking. Fundamental differences occurred between the United States and its European allies about the continued need to stop ships carrying arms to the Bosnian Muslims. The operation was jeopardized and the Europeans were not able to handle it alone. 311 Quoted in : Haski Pierre, "Washington et l'Europe réforment l'OTAN sans l'élargir," Libération, Paris, Tuesday 4 June 1996, p.5.
UNIGE / SES - 125 - Olivier Brighenti Part II the United States will be directly or indirectly present in every single case scenario. As a senior U.S. official declared after the Berlin Summit: “It is very difficult for us to look around the landscape and see any situations where the United States would not be involved. In the real world, where real threats develop, the United States will be there.”312 Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, was clear on what he thought of the new flexible structure when he told allied Ministers: “The qualities that have made
NATO the most successful alliance in history, its core purpose of collective defense, its integrated command structure and the transatlantic link, must and will be preserved.”313 Thus, if a mission is important and has the support of the United States it is very likely that Washington will take part in it. It would then be a NATO mission led by the United States. If the United States disagreed completely with a mission, they would not lend their assets, would veto the CJTF and the use of NATO assets, and as a result there would be no WEU-led mission. The briefing by a senior official of the U.S. Department of
Defense at the end of the summit best summarizes how the United States saw the CJTF and what are the possible advantages for the U.S. of a WEU led CJTF. He bluntly asserted: “The ultimate commander
(SACEUR) is American and it’s staying that way. In appropriate circumstances, Europe could lead and if there was a situation which for whatever reason, as I said it’s hard to anticipate with any precision what it might be, Europe could go forward and the US could provide support. That would have to be done with the consent of the NAC.”314
The CJTF seems thus to be a perfect tool in the hands of the United States to monitor European security at a very low cost, leaving some illusions to the Europeans and mainly France that they made the best possible deal.315 Hervé de Charette’s statement talks for itself: “I am not surprised that those who made most of the concessions now try to minimize their impact.”316 In Berlin, the United States
312 Quoted in : Atkinson Rick, "NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Tuesday 4 June 1996, p. A 14. 313 Ibidem 314 Quoted in : Gordon Philip H, "The United States and the European Defense and Security Identity in the new NATO," Les notes de l'Ifri, vol. 1, no. 4, (1998), Footnote 14, p. 30. 315 For France the Berlin Communiqué is a reward for its strategy to reintegrate some of NATO’s military structures. Reality is a bit different. As a high rank French official clearly understood: “France paid in advance. On the one hand, concessions were made to NATO with the idea of playing a large role in the reform process. On the other hand, nor tangible and immediate counterparts, nor a clear timetable have been fixed. At this point our only payoff is an “informal” commitment by the United States. France is thus engaged in a process that depends on the goodwill of the United States.” Delmas Philippe, "Quatre questions sur un gambit," Le Monde, Paris, Tuesday 11 June 1996, p. 14. 316 Quoted in : Haski Pierre, "Washington et l'Europe réforment l'OTAN sans l'élargir," Libération, Paris, Tuesday 4 June 1996, p. 5.
UNIGE / SES - 126 - Olivier Brighenti Part II accepted everything that integrated more Europe into the Alliance and refused everything that would give Europeans more independence. In effect, since “autonomous” actions under the command of the
WEU require Washington’s approval, the United States won the deal in Berlin and control the destinies of the European defense policy. This control will be even easier, knowing that most European Allies are ready to hand it over. Taking the CJTF logic even farther, it means that the United States as a non-
European and a non-WEU member has increased its power in the establishing of initial missions in the
European decision making process . As outlined by French Socialist Deputy and former member and
President of the Defense and Armed Force Commission Paul Quilès: “The triumphant declarations and the auto-congratulations of the Government must not forbid us to question the realities of the so-called achievements of the Berlin agreement. […] This “Europeanization of NATO”, which has nothing to do with a European defense, is equivalent in reality, as to “acknowledge” the United States as the sixteenth member of the European Union when it comes to decisions related to defense. It is not really in that way that the European identity will be forged.”317
4.3. The Negative Rapprochement Phase: 1996-1997
4.3.1. The AFSOUTH Command After the “1993-1996 positive rapprochement phase”, troubles in the Franco-American relationship resurfaced within weeks after the Berlin Summit. In return for reintegrating some of NATO’s military structures, and accepting a European Identity within NATO and U.S. sponsored CJTF’s, France insisted that there should be some structural reforms and redistributions in the Allied Commands. In the mind of most European members, the Berlin Communiqué and the ESDI meant a bigger European implication in sharing the burden of European security. Thus, efforts by the Europeans to assume more responsibilities should be reflected in a readjustment of command responsibilities. In the period leading to the Berlin Summit, France, backed by some other European states, began discussing the possibility of naming French officers to senior positions in the command structure. This was understood in Paris as a counterpart to France’s realignment with NATO. For Paris full reintegration of the Alliance meant that
317 Quilès Paul, "Défense européenne et OTAN: la dérive," Le Monde, Paris, Tuesday 11 June 1996, p. 14
UNIGE / SES - 127 - Olivier Brighenti Part II there should be a more balanced NATO and that France should have the same political weight as
Germany and Great Britain. The New NATO command structure that came effective in 1994 gave the
United States three of the most important commands of the Alliance. In effect, Supreme Allied
Command Europe (SACEUR) located in Mons, Belgium, as well as Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
(SACLANT) located in Norfolk Virginia are under American Command. A major change in 1994 was the creation of three subordinate commands under SACEUR. AFSOUTH (southern region), the most strategic and important command is located in Naples and run by an American four star General.
AFCENT (central region) located in Brunssum, Netherlands is run by a German four star General and
AFNORTHWEST (northwestern region) located in High Wycombe, UK is run by a British four star RAF officer. Thus, within few months after the Berlin Summit, this new institutional architecture led to a major dispute between France and the United States. This quarrel is crucial, since the outcomes of the agreement will determine whether France will rejoin NATO’s integrated military command or will stop its reform halfway through. Thus the cause of the Franco-American dispute was a direct consequence of the Berlin compromise.318 The reform of NATO’s command structures was for the French the counterpart of the bargain. It would be a way to express a certain degree of European autonomy and reflect a step towards the “Europeanization” of NATO decided in Berlin. In the Summer of 1996, French officials started to draft proposals to transform and “Europeanize” NATO’s military structure.319 Since
Washington had agreed to give the Europeans more visibility and Europeanize NATO, France opted for an ambitious strategy that was firmly rejected by the United States. In August 1996, Paris sent its
Defense Minister Charles Millon to London to discuss with his American counterpart William Perry the possibility that SACEUR could be led by a European.320 Secretary of Defense Perry politely turned down
318 France sought to obtain in Berlin a clear U.S. commitment for an in-depth reform of the Alliance as well as a genuine ESDI that would give WEU an effective role. The hard negotiations on the implementation of the Berlin agreement highlighted the divergences across the Atlantic. 319 France had the support of Germany from the beginning. German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe reiterated Germany’s support for the French position in a press conference in December 1996. He claimed: “it is not a French demand, but a European demand” stressing that France did not want to have a French admiral but a European one in command at Naples. Chancellor Helmut Kohl told Madeleine Albright in Bonn: “The French request is legitimate, I hope you can satisfy them in the best possible way.” Quoted in: Amalric Jacques, "OTAN: Comment Washington a coulé Paris," Libération, Paris, Thursday 27 February 1997, p. 9. Great Britain backed the French proposition in the beginning. When London felt that the United States was opposed to any further concessions to France, they no longer supported the French initiative. 320 President Chirac had made a first proposal that was promptly rejected by the United States. He proposed that NATO’s top commands SACEUR and SACLANT be organized around a U.S. designated “super” allied command. The SACEUR would be held by a European. See: Anonymous, AFSOUTH and Command Structure Reform: How
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Charles Millon’s offer. As an official recalls: “Perry always a gentleman, was polite but not blunt.” 321
Charles Millon registered that his idea had been rejected, but he failed to understand that this idea had never been taken seriously and that Washington was not going to go any further on the road of
“Europeanization”. Thus the London meeting is the starting point of a long Transatlantic misunderstanding. Since France thought it nearly got what it wanted in London, President Chirac confidently claimed the Southern Command in Naples. Noting that the United States provided command for the two major NATO Supreme Commands, France insisted that the subordinate commands be headed by Europeans. This was already the case for AFCENT and AFNORTHWEST, but France argued that this should also be the case for AFSOUTH. The United States insisted to keep the control of
AFSOUTH because of the strategic interests of the Southern Command for U.S. policy in the
Mediterranean Basin, and above all because the Sixth Fleet was based in Naples. Given this impasse,
France decided not to reintegrate fully NATO’s integrated command and the ESDI was deeply compromised. How did the events unfold? How can we explain the shift from the positive rapprochement of Berlin to the 1997 deadlock? The failure of the rapprochement between France and the United States can best be explained by the high asymmetry existing in the distribution of power and
America’s hegemonic role in the Alliance. The United States had accepted the CJTF and the ESDI as a counterpart to the “Europeanization” of the Alliance and France’s rapprochement to NATO. As said earlier on, this meant that the United States agreed to give Europeans more visibility in NATO. On the other hand it did not mean that the United States would agree to give Europe more responsibilities.
Consistent with hard-line realism, the United States welcomed efforts by the Europeans to contribute more to NATO, but they had little constraints to share power and commanding structures in an Alliance they so overwhelmingly dominate. The AFSOUTH crisis is a perfect example to illustrate Washington’s power maximizing strategy. President Chirac had announced that France would rejoin NATO’s integrated command only if the United States agreed to give the Europeans a greater role in the
AFSOUTH Fits In, (National Defense University), April 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20- %201997/Allied%20Command%20Structures%20in%20the%20New%20NATO%20-%20April%2097/afsaf.html, (Accessed: 30/11/2006). p. 4. Chirac knew in advance that his proposition would be rejected. What Paris had already clearly in mind as early as July 1996 was to obtain a major regional command. See: Isnard Jacques, "La France tente d'obtenir un grand commandement régional de l'OTAN," Le Monde, Paris, Monday 22 July 1996, p. 3. 321 Quoted in: Fitchett Joseph, "Early Elections in 1997 Halted France's Long Journey Back to NATO," International Herald Tribune, London, Friday 3 July 1998
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Alliance. Paris had committed itself in Berlin but had got in return no formal commitment from the United
States. For Washington the “concessions” made in Berlin were the last steps they would agree to make on the road of “Europeanizing” NATO. France did not see it in the same way. Thus, for President Chirac it became a matter of internal politics to get the Americans to accept a larger role for Europe and
France. President Chirac had made a big gamble in Berlin and was accused by the Socialist opposition at the National Assembly of having jeopardized France’s traditional Gaullist defense policy and abandoned the idea of a genuine European defense. The Franco-German Strategic Concept adopted in
December 1996 in Nuremberg by President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl gave rise to harsh debates in the National Assembly. The classified document322 leaked to Le Monde made it clear that the future
European defense system was a part of the Atlantic Alliance in terms of its inspiration, its doctrine and its future development. Every paragraph of the Concept confirmed the supremacy of NATO. It stated: “it is a matter of giving a fresh impetus to Franco-German cooperation in a European and Atlantic perspective.” Whar it emphasized was a way of “placing the Trans-Atlantic partnership with North
America on a new and solid foundation.” The “durability and inviolability of the Alliance as the vital guarantee of Europe’s stability and Security” is proclaimed.323 The Socialist opposition, largely hostile to
France’s rapprochement with NATO was infuriated. The First Secretary of the Socialist Party Lionel
Jospin said: “with such an agreement we are shifting from a quest for a European security to a
“Natoization” of Europe.”324 Former Secretary General of the Elysée and future Foreign Affairs Minister
Hubert Védrine commented: “Regarding the Atlantic Alliance our position has shifted dramatically.
François Mitterrand preserved scrupulously France’s autonomy of decision towards NATO, and had a step-by-step rapprochement policy. The rapprochement was possible when the United States diminished their hostility to a European Defense. This is what happened between François Mitterrand and George Bush before the 1991 Atlantic Summit in Rome. […] France came back to NATO in 1995 and sought to have leverage on the American position as well as its European partners. But it laid down
322 The text adopted on 9 December 1996 was kept secret as long as it was not communicated to the French and German Parliaments, the EU and the NATO members. Save the President of the National Assembly and Senate, as well as the President of the Defense Commission, no parliamentary was aware of the document. Members of Parliament learnt about the agreement in Le Monde. 323 Anonymous, "La gauche dénonce une dérive atlantiste dans l'accord de défense franco-allemand," Le Monde, Paris, Thursday 30 January 1997, pp. 12-13. 324 Ibidem, p. 2.
UNIGE / SES - 130 - Olivier Brighenti Part II all its cards at the same time and is now embarrassed with the United States. The latter are more reluctant than ever to share power in a Alliance soon to be enlarged but not renovated.”325 Confronted with such hostility from the opposition, Chirac had no other choice than come up with a genuine counterpart for France’s rapprochement policy. In other words, Chirac was condemned to deliver.
Thus, in summer 1996, Chirac launched a bilateral campaign to obtain a regional command. After the
August Perry/Millon meeting, France wrongly intimated that the United States might be willing to give up
AFSOUTH. On 28 August 1996, President Chirac sent a letter to President William Clinton defining the degree of “Europeanization” that would be acceptable for France in order to fully reintegrate NATO. The letter was an answer to Clinton’s August 14 letter about the Alliance’s enlargement agenda. The letter also confirmed Washington’s refusal to abandon SACEUR. Chirac’s answer acknowledged
Washington’s refusal and states: “I understand that it is hard nowadays to consider a European
SACEUR.” He then outlines the need for a European Deputy-SACEUR in the event of a European led operation within the framework of the WEU. In order to make the Alliance’s new European identity, he also asks that AFSOUTH be commanded by a European. “If these propositions can be adopted” he wrote “France is ready to take its full place in the renovated Alliance.”326 He stressed that the Sixth Fleet would stay under American command but a compromise would have to be found since the AFSOUTH commander is also the commander of the to Sixth Fleet. Washington was stunned. The American assumption was that France, having finally acknowledged the importance of NATO and its American leadership, had accepted that NATO was a US-led alliance and would complete its integration according to the terms of the Berlin grand bargain. France was asking more visibility for Europe and the United
States felt it had gone far enough in Berlin. The letter was leaked to the Italians in order to make it public and blackmail Paris. Within hours a NATO official said: “The French were carpet-bombed by
Washington, often very unfairly, including U.S. distortions such as the insinuation that the French were somehow trying to get their hands on the Sixth Fleet.”327 It took President Clinton one month to answer.
325 Vernet Daniel, "Entretien avec Hubert Védrine," Le Monde, Paris, Thursday 30 January 1997, p. 2. 326 Quoted in : Amalric Jacques, "OTAN: Comment Washington a coulé Paris," Libération, Paris, Thursday 27 February 1997, p. 9. 327 Quoted in : Fitchett Joseph, "Early Elections in 1997 Halted France's Long Journey Back to NATO," International Herald Tribune, London, Friday 3 July 1998 p. 8. The French were sensitive to the importance Washington attached to the Sixth Fleet as the primary instrument for U.S. power projection in the Mediterranean basin. They assured Washington that the Sixth Fleet would remain in American hands no matter what. As outlined by Michael
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In a letter dated September 26, Clinton made it clear that AFSOUTH would remain in American hands.
Although he acknowledged the need to reinforce the role of the Deputy-SACEUR and hand it over to a
European, he refused the AFSOUTH proposal. He clearly wrote: “Jacques, I must be franc, concerning the Southern Command: the answer is no.”328 Chirac did not disarm and wrote a new letter on October
10. He argued: “Since the two NATO strategic Commands are remaining for a foreseeable future in
American hands, then it is only legitimate for the two Regional Commands to be delegated to
Europeans. Developments in the Mediterranean basin hold new importance for Europe, and it is essential that Europeans shoulder their responsibilities in this crucial region.”329 Once again,
Washington refused. It is thus very clear that the French have made a direct linkage between rejoining the military command and a fuller expression of ESDI within the Alliance. For them, a fuller expression could be demonstrated only by a change in the command structures. In December 1996, Washington and Paris started secret negotiations to tune down the disagreement. A French proposition was brought to Washington on January 24 by Jean-David Levitte, Chirac’s diplomatic advisor. Paris proposed a double-commandment with equal responsibilities for the Southern Command. The Deputy-SACEUR, in charge of European-only operations would be given alternatively to France, Germany and Great Britain.
The Southern command would be divided between an American and a European. The Americans would retain the command of the Sixth Fleet. The Europeans, would have the task of organizing and integrating European forces in the region and take the lead in European-only missions. By April 1997, an agreement seemed plausible between Washington and Paris. This compromise finally failed for two major reasons. First of all, the United States wanted the American Commander to be a little “more equal” than the European. Secondly, Chirac’s dissolution of the National Assembly in May 1997,
Brenner: “Overshadowing these operational concerns was a core political consideration. The command’s military assets serve as instruments of U.S. diplomacy in the Balkans, the Middle East, and indirectly in the Gulf as well. The Sixth Fleet is the jewel of the crown, part of a constellation of power U.S. strategic planners wanted to keep together for maximum effect, and flexibility. The French think along the same lines. Paris eyed AFSOUTH for the leverage it would give them to influence Alliance policy throughout the theater. Shaping the field of diplomatic action, along with the command’s symbolic value, figure larger in its strategic vision than any actual combat operations.” Brenner Michael, Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity (Wesport: Greenwood Publishing Group), 1998, p. 42. 328 Quoted in : Amalric Jacques, "OTAN: Comment Washington a coulé Paris," Libération, Paris, Thursday 27 February 1997, p. 9. 329 Quoted in : Anonymous, AFSOUTH and Command Structure Reform: How AFSOUTH Fits In, (National Defense University), April 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20- %201997/Allied%20Command%20Structures%20in%20the%20New%20NATO%20-%20April%2097/afsaf.html, (Accessed: 30/11/2006). p. 4.
UNIGE / SES - 132 - Olivier Brighenti Part II jeopardized the whole process. But more in depth political reasons can explain the failure of the rapprochement and the Europeanization of NATO. France was convinced that its return to NATO was strongly wished in Washington. It sought to transform NATO in a radical way that neither its European partners nor the United States were ready to accept. As an American official said: “It’s in France’s interests to rejoin, and France’s problem if it does not.”330 France was discouraged by the backlashes it encountered from the United States and the lack of political support from its allies. The United States, on the other hand, focused on the enlargement process and, above all, on reassessing their leadership on the Alliance. The Berlin bargain revealed a failure for a very simple reason. The key assumptions of
Berlin were flawed. The current impasse between Paris and Washington has its roots at the beginning of NATO and more specifically since 1966 and de Gaulle’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command. NATO’s pseudo-reform and the ESDI have not resolved this genuine dilemma. French and
American approaches to NATO’s military system represent a genuine divergence of interests that cannot be resolved by mere military adaptations. Rather than being the downfall of the Gaullist model, the 1995-1997 rapprochement is a renovation and an adaptation of the 1966 doctrine. Chirac’s strategy consisted in promoting by other means the same interests and objectives defined by General de Gaulle.
The first phase can be seen as a radical shift in French objectives. Since summer 1996 it is pretty clear that France’s strategic objectives are unchanged.331 The 1997 dilemma can be summarized as follows:
“unchanged French objectives, unchanged American reluctance and constant quest to assert leadership on the Alliance.” Thus, French interests and US-led NATO interests are so dramatically opposed that reforming the essence of the integrated military system revealed virtually impossible. Therefore, as outlined by Alexander Moens: “Constructing a European defense inside NATO appeared logical and efficient. But it has so far turned out to be a false assumption. In fact, it was the key weakness of Berlin.
To assume that such an entity can develop inside the command structure is to assume either that US influence can be reduced without losing US involvement, or that French involvement can be regularized in a system that functions on a day-to-day basis under the dynamic of US domination. It is to assume
330 Quoted in : Anonymous, "Riling NATO," The Economist, London, 21 June 1997, p. 53. 331 On this aspect see : Bozo Frédéric, "La France et l'Alliance Atlantique depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide (1989- 1999)," Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes d'Histoire de la Défense, vol. 17, no. 1, (2001), pp. 47-60.
UNIGE / SES - 133 - Olivier Brighenti Part II that the power of military inequality can be managed in a politicized command system.”332 Thus, as a consequence of this “pathological” divergence of interests, Defense Minister William Cohen told
American Journalists before the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels on 12-13 June 1997,: “In my point of view, the question is settled. The AFSOUTH Command is American.”333 Thus the NATO
Madrid Summit in July 1997 maintains the 1995 status quo. The Franco-American rapprochement is frozen although the 1995 progress remains unchanged. The conditions of France’s full return to NATO having been rejected in Madrid, Chirac’s only option was to postpone reintegration indefinitely. In
Madrid, President Chirac said NATO must be made: “lighter, cheaper, more flexible and more effective.”
He called: “for a new balance between Europe and America over the leadership of the Alliance.”334 At the October first NATO Defense Minister meeting in Maastricht, the French Minister of Defense put an end to the French rapprochement. He declared: “The reform does not go, according to us far enough.
The re-balancing of responsibilities between Europeans and Americans in the organization of commandments, notably in the Southern region, is unsatisfactory for France.” The Minister continues:
“The door is not definitively closed and the French Authorities are available for new propositions.”335
4.3.2. NATO Enlargement: Strengthening America’s Preponderance on the Alliance The NATO enlargement process can also be understood as one of the main setbacks for the ESDI and the full reintegration of France in the Alliance. Since the 1990’s and mainly under the Clinton
Administration, NATO enlargement became a high priority for the United States.336 As outlined by
Robert Art: “Subsequently, under the determining leadership of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake
332 Moens Alexander, "NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defense Identity," Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 4, (Winter 1998), p. 468. 333 Quoted in : Isnard Jacques, "Les Etats-Unis entendent mettre fin aux discussions avec les Européens sur le commandement Sud de l'OTAN," Le Monde, Paris, Friday 13 June 1997, p. 32. 334 Quoted in : Anonymous, "Chirac Bows to Anglo-U.S. Deal," The Times, London, Wednesday 9 July 1997, p. 44. 335 Quoted in : Rosenzweig Luc, "La rénovation des commandements de l'OTAN sera achevée au sommet de décembre," Le Monde, Paris, Friday October 3 1997, p. 3. 336 President Clinton’s enlargement policy was not unanimously embraced by Washington’s foreign policy and academic establishment and gave rise to one of the bitterest debate in the post Cold War era. In an open letter to President Clinton released on June 26, fifty former senators, cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, as well as arms control and foreign policy analysts, called for a postponement of NATO expansion while other options for European security were explored. NATO expansion, as it was currently envisioned, risked undermining the alliance itself and could require an "indeterminate, but certainly high, cost". The continued failure to articulate the scope of the future NATO could seriously jeopardize the ability of the alliance "to carry out its primary mission" says the letter. The full letter is available on the Eisenhower Institute website: http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/coalition/usandnato/OpenLett er.htm (Accessed: 02/01/2007)
UNIGE / SES - 134 - Olivier Brighenti Part II and Assistant Secretary of States for European Affairs Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. government officially embraced NATO enlargement, even though no formal meeting of Clinton’s top foreign policy and defense officials had taken place to debate its merits or even endorse it. By late 1994, enlargement was the official position of the U.S. Government.”337 Enlargement was seen as a means to contribute to a unified and peaceful Europe under the umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance. Clinton’s strategy consisted in enabling in the short term, to do for the Oriental part of Europe, what the Alliance had done for the West since 1945. In other words, to repeat for Eastern European states the post-war success of binding
Germany in the institutions of the West. The Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski clearly understood Clinton’s strategy when he told the American President: “President Reagan helped to hasten the demise of the Soviet Union, President Bush contributed to the reunification of Germany, you,
Mr. President have the historical task to enlarge NATO, and in doing so to unify Europe and carry on the long term the historical changes occurred in 1989. It is in no ways a policy against Russia, but a policy for European integration and stability.”338 It is interesting to highlight that although the enlargement process was seen as being motivated by security priorities in Eastern Europe it is absolutely not the case.339 The enlargement process is part of Washington’s grand strategy in Europe as well as the role the United States wants to play in European integration. Madeleine Albright made it very clear when she said: “NATO’s enlargement is not an answer to a threat from Russia, it is motivated by the imperative to create an integrated Europe.”340 What are the consequences of Clinton’s enlargement policy on the
ESDI on the one hand and on France’s full reintegration of the Alliance on the other hand? I have identified four major consequences. First of all, NATO enlargement relegates the ESDI, and future plans for a genuine European security architecture, to a lower degree of priority. With the enlargement to
Eastern countries, NATO is bound to strengthen its role as the paramount organization for security in
337 Art Robert J, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," In. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, edited by Paul T.V. Wirtz James J & Fortman Michael, (Standford: Standford University Press), 2004, pp. 191-192. 338 For a very good overview of the NATO enlargement debate in the United States see: Asmus Ronald D, "L'élargissement à l'OTAN: présent, passé, futur," Politique Etrangère, vol. 67, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 353-376. Quote, pp. 358-359. 339 French political scientist Pascal Boniface says : “Never in the course of their tumultuous history, have Poland, the Czeck Republic and Hungary, been less threatened then today. Enlargement is motivated by U.S. internal politics, (20 million American voters are from Eastern European origin and most of them are concentrated in 14 key states, representing 194 Presidential Electors) as well as an American strategic objective, but in no way by the needs of Europe. Boniface Pascal, "Un triomphe américain en trompe-l'oeil," Le Monde Paris, Thursday 10 July 1997, p. 14. 340 Ibidem: p. 14.
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Europe. It reinforces its position as the main forum for discussions on security issues. As outlined by
Paul Brenner: “Its confirmation as Europe’s preeminent security body means that its internal structures
(military and political) and procedures will directly influence dealings across the continent. Relations among western powers, including the link between NATO and various expressions of an ESDI will evolve in a markedly different setting from that which existed when NATO was a more exclusive club.”341 Secondly, since NATO no longer has a definable enemy, enlargement enables Washington to institutionalize and lock-in American presence in Europe. Enlargement is an indispensable means to help keep the United States deeply involved in the security of the Continent. The most powerful incentive for this deal is the significant benefits for the United States. From Washington's perspective, enlargement promotes European stability and maintain U.S. leadership on the Eurasian landmass.
Moreover, Washington would gain credible and reliable partners to assist it in addressing security contingencies outside Europe. The renovated alliance would be clearly aimed at ensuring American vital interests and thus more likely to enjoy long-term elite and popular support in the United States.342
Thirdly, following this logic, enlargement deepens American hegemony on the Alliance as well as its durable leadership in European security affairs. The new members to access, i.e. the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary are very strong Atlanticist countries. They are aware that they owe the United
States a lot both for having precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union and for enabling them to join NATO.
It is very unlikely that these countries will openly oppose or challenge the U.S. predominance in the
Alliance. It is also very unlikely that they will, in a foreseeable future, push for a more genuine European
“autonomous” defense. Washington understood very well that the more members join the Alliance, and in a second phase the European Union, the less likely a genuine European defense identity will develop within it. Fourthly, the Franco-American struggle during the preparation phase of the Madrid NATO
Summit is a landmark case to explain America’s hegemony on the institution and its power maximizing strategy. The consequences of this dispute are important since it achieved to convince France that fully reintegrating NATO’s structures was not worthwhile. Shortly after William Cohen had told France
341 Brenner Michael, "The United States and the Western European Union," In. Europeanizing Security: NATO and an Integrating Europe, edited by Lankowski Carl & Serfati Simon, (Washington D.C: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, John Hopkins University), 2000, p. 14. 342 See: Asmus Ronald D. Blackwill Robert D & Larabee Stephen F, "Can NATO Survive?," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2, (1996), pp. 90-95.
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(through the press) that the AFSOUTH matter had been settled according to America’s way,
Washington made it clear that it would support enlargement only to the Czech Republic Poland, and
Hungary. France backed by Belgium, Italy, Germany, Canada, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg and Turkey, sought to promote a “southern enlargement” by taking in Romania and Slovenia. Strobe
Talbott, prior to the 1997 G 8 Summit called the Ambassadors of NATO member states to tell them: “it is time to stop whining and accept the American decision. The Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians would be invited into NATO at the Madrid conference next month, and that is it.”343 Thus, after imposing enlargement to its European partners, Washington also imposed the countries. That was too much for
France. At the Madrid Summit a month later, Chirac weighed what he had obtained and chose not to fully reintegrate NATO. The consequences were dear. Without French involvement, all the Alliance’s hard work over the creation of a ESDI within NATO is strongly jeopardized.
4.4. The Amsterdam Treaty: The “Architectural Debate Strikes Back”
The Amsterdam Treaty and the “Europeanist/Atlanticist” struggle on the role of the WEU can be understood as another stepping stone for the failure of the ESDI. Only one year after the enthusiastic
Berlin meeting, the ICG leading to the Amsterdam Treaty highlights the divergence of approach between Atlanticists and the Europeanists. As outlined earlier on, the (mis)-achievements of Maastricht on the common foreign security policy and the failure of Europeans to agree on how to build a European defense resurfaced seven years later in Amsterdam. One of the main goals of the Amsterdam Treaty was to improve the functioning of the European common foreign security policy and provide the EU with better tools to promote its role in international politics.344 The Amsterdam Treaty aims at overcoming contradictions between the particularly ambitious objectives of the CFSP and the means available to the
Union for achieving those objectives. This treaty once again, did not live up to expectations or provide
343 Quoted in: Walker Martin, "With Friends like These Who Needs Enemies?," Manchester Guardian Weekly, Manchester, Sunday 6 July 1997 344 The reform of the CSFP seemed urgent after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. The tragic course of events and the EU incapacity to deal with them made it clear that the CSFP in its Maastricht acceptant was irrelevant to deal with such problems. The EU needed a policy capable of acting rather than reacting to international crisis in its backyard. The Yugoslavia crisis highlighted the damage of uncoordinated member state reactions.
UNIGE / SES - 137 - Olivier Brighenti Part II adequately for the matters at stake.345 As with the Maastricht tratey, it is much easier to outline the benign achievements of the Amsterdam treaty rather than deal with what could have been achieved. It was decided that member states could exercise “constructive abstention” on CFSP matters. Article J. 13 states: “Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by
Members present or represented shall not prevent the adaptation of such decisions”346 One of the major innovations of the Amsterdam treaty is the creation of the new post of High Representative for the
CFSP. Article J. 16 states: “The Secretary General of the Council, High Representative for the CFSP, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decision and when appropriate acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.”347 Furthermore the Petersberg Tasks, on the initiative of non-WEU members, Finland and Sweden, were incorporated in the Treaty, significantly broadening the scope of the CFSP.348 Article
J. 7 states: “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.”349 This was a crucial step at the time when the disintegration of former Yugoslavia threatened European security.
Although those marginal changes were of some significant importance, the crucial aspect of the WEU and its role in the European integration process was once again postponed. How can this be explained and how does this affect the newly founded ESDI? The answer to this question is straightforward; It lies in Great Britain’s refusal to go beyond the “achievements” of Maastricht. In the preparation phase for the
Amsterdam ICG, the Irish Presidency proposed a general outline for a draft revision of the treaty to be discussed at the 1996 ICG. The document states: “The Union ought to have an improved capacity to
345 Anonymous, The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide to an Effective and Coherent External Policy, (European Union Press Services), 1997, http://europa.eu/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/a19000.htm, (Accessed: 20/12/2006). 346 Article J 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. 347 Article J 16 of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. 348 The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam was probably the only substantive concession made by Great Britain on the CFSP. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks was championed by Sweden and Finland in an April 1996 Memorandum entitled: The ICG and the Security and Defense Dimension Towards an Enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management. The British accepted since their vision of WEU was to provide the framework for the development of operational capabilities to enable it to engage in Petersberg Tasks operations. 349 Article J 7, Paragraph 3 of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997.
UNIGE / SES - 138 - Olivier Brighenti Part II pursue EU objectives which may involve the use of military means on the basis that the implementation of such tasks would be a matter of the WEU in a development of the already existing Treaty relationship between the EU and the WEU.”350 The text proposes, therefore, a closer institutional link between the
EU and the WEU. In March 1997, the Dutch presidency, which was favorable to merge the WEU and the EU, circulated a new draft version. It stated: “The WEU is an integral part of the development of the
Union with the objective of a gradual integration of the WEU into the Union. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with it.”351 The British Conservative position in the ICG leading to
Amsterdam is summarized in the White Paper on the ICG: A Partnership of Nations: The British approach to the Treatment of the European Defense Issues at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.
The government’s position was that the European Union should not develop any common position on defense matters and stick to what was decided at Maastricht. It was imperative for London that the EU institutions should not play a role in defense decisions. European defense cooperation should be organized through NATO. European members should use the CJTF as developed in Berlin for any operations to which the United States should choose not to participate. The position on the WEU is very clear. The WEU should provide the framework for the development of operational capabilities to enable it to engage in Petersberg Tasks operations, and remain an organization separated from the EU but closely linked to NATO. 352
In order to improve the functioning of the CFSP, a number of states, namely France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece, put forth a proposition for the gradual merger of the WEU and the EU. In an open letter in Le Monde before the Rome ICG of March 1997, French Foreign Minister
Hervé de Charette and his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini proposed a gradual merger of the EU and the WEU. They state: “The Albanian crisis highlighted the size of the task that the EU still has to fulfill, if it wants to play an important role in international politics, and if it wants to pursue a genuine common
350 CONF/2500/96: Irish Presidency, European Union Today And Tomorrow - Adapting the European Union for the Benefit of its Peoples and Preparing it for the Future - A general Outline for a Draft Revision of the Treaties, (5 December 1996), p. 80. 351 CONF/3848/97: Dutch Presidency, Conference of the Representatives of the Government of the Member States: The European Union Today and Tomorrow, (19 March 1997), p. 37. The circulation of the various drafts highlight the determination of the British Government to block any involvement of the EU in defense matters. 352 For an overview of the key elements of the British White Paper see: Whitman Richard G, "Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Goverment's Initiative and the Future of Western European Union", WEU Occasional Papers, The Institute for Security Studies, January 1999, pp. 9-10.
UNIGE / SES - 139 - Olivier Brighenti Part II foreign security policy that was only briefly sketched in Maastricht. It confirms the imperative that the EU needs to pursue credible tools of analysis and prevention. […] In order to implement effective operational tool, it is clear that the WEU reveals often weak. The Rome ICG is the perfect forum to give the ongoing discussions a decisive impulse.” How do they propose to achieve the objective of a genuine
CFSP? The idea is a gradual merger of the WEU and NATO. They say: “The common foreign and security policy will provide the EU with legitimacy and will diminish skepticism. […] The final stage has to be reached with the full insertion of the WEU in the EU, in order that the latter can be transformed into a security and defense community.”353 At a first stage the relation between WEU and the EU could be analogue to those of the Steel and Coal Community and Euratom. They have common institutions but are distinctive in their functioning. The full convergence between the EU and the WEU would be finalized at the end of the process. The final achievement would be the transfer in the treaty on
European Union of article 5 of the WEU treaty. The formal text sent to Dutch Foreign Minister Van
Mierlo by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was presented at the Rome ICG. It proposed the amendment of Article J. 4. It reads: “The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the European Union and the Member States have therefore made it their aim to integrate the WEU progressively into the European Union. They will work actively in the Union and the
WEU to achieve that aim. Integration shall be achieved in several stages which shall be defined in greater detail in a Protocol appended to this Treaty. The first stage shall commence with the entry into force of this Treaty; the transition to the further stages shall be determined by Decision of the Council, meeting at Head of State and Government level.”354 As was the case in Maastricht, this proposal was blocked by Great Britain. London remained committed to keep defense outside the EU framework and ensure the leading role of European security to NATO and the United States.355 Later in the year at the
Paris 12 May 1997 meeting of WEU Foreign Ministers, the new British Foreign Minister Robin Cook declared: “We do not see the EU as being a defense organization, this would undermine NATO and
353 de Charette Hervé & Dini Lamberto, "Innover pour progresser," Le Monde, Paris, Tuesday 25 March 1997, p. 15. 354 CONF/3855/97: France & Italy, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States: Proposed Amendments to Article J.4 of the TEU, (1997), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/cig1996/03855en7.pdf. (24/12/2006) Paragraphe J. 4 (2). 355 On the British position see : Howorth Jolyon, "Les relations Union/OTAN: le point de vue du Royaume-Uni," In. Etats-Unis/Europe:réinventer l'Alliance, edited by Beltran Jacques & Bozo Frédéric, (Paris: La Documentation Française), 2001, pp. 133-156
UNIGE / SES - 140 - Olivier Brighenti Part II create complications for EU and NATO partners.”356 Amsterdam was thus a full victory for the British position. Although the Conservatives lost the elections in May 1997 and Tony Blair’s new Labor
Government took over negotiations, the British position remained unchanged.357 At a meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers in The Hague on May 20, Robin Cook declared: “I do not come to The Hague in order to wreck a deal” he said, drawing a contrast with the previous Conservative Government’s hard-line negotiating stand in the EU’s intergovernmental conference. “I come in order to get a good deal which is in the interest of Britain and of Europe.” Robin Cook made it clear that he was unwilling to support any proposals which undercut the position of the NATO Alliance as the guarantor for security in Europe.358
Thus, on defense and security matters, the Treaty of Amsterdam can be considered as a full acknowledgment of the British White Paper and a perpetuation of the status quo. On the Franco-Italian merger of the WEU and the EU, the Amsterdam Treaty retained the separation of the EU and the WEU.
It reads: “It (WEU) supports the Union in framing the defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the
European Council so decide.”359 After the Summit, Mr Blair declared to the press: “What matters is what works; and what works for Britain and for Europe is NATO.” The Franco-German plan was “like an ill- judged transplant operation.”360 Upon his return from Amsterdam, Prime Minister Blair told the House of
Commons that: “while retaining our veto, we have taken steps to improve the effectiveness of foreign
356 Quoted in: Buchan David, "UK Takes Firm Line Over EU Military Role," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 14 May 1997, p. 3. 357 The Labour position paper on the 1996 ICG is quite clear. It states: “Labour cannot support the idea of a European army nor the broader notion of endowing the EU with some form of military competence. To give Brussels a defense role would involve expensive and unnecessary duplication of efforts.” The Labour advocates the WEU as “the European pillar of NATO”. The merger of the EU and the WEU was rejected. Labour Party, The Future of the European Union: Report on Labour's Position in Preparation for the Intergovernmental Conference 1996, (London: Labour Party Conference Papers), 1995, p. 5. In the same vein, the Labour’s 1997 election manifesto made it clear that Tony Blair would not take the opportunity of his forthcoming election to strike a new position on the relation between the EU and WEU. The Manifesto states: “Labour has always been a staunch supporter of NATO.” Labour supports: “a stronger European component to the Alliance. While Labour does not support the establishment of a European army or proposal to give the EU a military competence, we are committed to greater European defense cooperation. We believe that efforts to develop a common defense policy should concentrate on strengthening the WEU as the European contribution to NATO.” Labour Party, A Fresh Start for Britain: Labour's Strategy for Britain in the Modern World, (London: Labour Party Road to the Manifesto Series), 1997, p. 12. 358 Quoted in: Barber Lionel, "Cook Asks for Concessions From Europe," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 21 May 1997, p. 1. 359 Article J 7, Paragraph 1 of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. 360 Quoted in: Helm Toby & Lockwood Christopher, "Blair heads off European Army," Electronic Telegraph, London, Wednesday 18 June 1997, p. 5.
UNIGE / SES - 141 - Olivier Brighenti Part II policy co-operation with better planning and coordination. That is an important British interest, but getting Europe's voice heard more clearly in the world will not be achieved through merging the
European Union and the Western European Union or developing an unrealistic common defence policy.
We therefore resisted unacceptable proposals from others. Instead, we argued for—and won—the explicit recognition, written into the treaty for the first time, that NATO is the foundation of our and other allies' common defence.”361 Thus the idea of a progressive merger of the WEU and EU was durably postponed and the Atlanticist vision of European defense prevailed. This means in practice, that the EU is barred from developing a military component of its own. Thus, the issue of the WEU’s relationship to
NATO, at the heart of the development of a European defense identity, is bound to resurface since it was not settled in Amsterdam and that it remains the main competingpoint between France and the
Atlanticists.
4.5. The United States and European Security 1993-1997: Power Maximization an Interim Assessment
The second phase after the end of the Cold War can be characterized by a high degree of power maximization by the United States. Unlike the first phase analyzed earlier, the United States did not intervene directly in European affairs, but was able to institutionalize its position as a European hegemon through a set of well thought strategies. Unlike what many scholars predicted, America’s role in NATO and European security affairs has increased since the end of the Cold War. Initially thought as a means to Europeanize NATO, ESDI sanctioned the Americanization of the Alliance and strengthened the American hegemonic role in European defense. How are we to explain these events? Why did the
ESDI deepen the Americanization of NATO when the main output should have been precisely the
Europeanization of the Alliance? My central claim is that these events can best be explained as a consequence of the peculiar distribution of power resulting from the end of the Cold War. Namely, that the United States, as the sole superpower and the European hegemon strongly dominating the Alliance, got its way on almost all the important issues of ESDI. Furthermore America’s preponderance on the
361 Committee on Defense, "The Future of NATO: The Washington Summit", 31 March 1999, (House of Commons), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39/3915.htm#n135, (Accessed: 08/01/2007). Paragraph 63.
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Alliance was further reinforced by European internal divisions and its inability to create a credible alternative to a US dominated NATO. As in the 1990-1993 phase, the traditional Europeanist/Atlanticist enmity on defense issues is a blessing for Washington’s power maximizing strategy in European security affairs. The evidence from the ESDI case lends strong support for my theory. Not surprisingly, it is the United States that has mostly benefited from the ESDI process. Consequently, Washington, in its now familiar approach to European security affairs, welcomed greater European unity and efforts to contribute more to NATO both in Brussels and Berlin. Nevertheless, its preponderance on the Alliance gives it little if no incentives to accommodate European positions in an Alliance it so overwhelmingly dominates. Thus, its attitude on the Southern command and enlargement is consistent with hard-line realism. The United States agreed to some “cosmetic” Europeanization of the Alliance’s command structure, but refused to concede control of the Southern command. It had three of the four commands, thus virtually dominating the whole commanding structure. There was no real threat to its leadership and the AFSOUTH dispute was merely a Franco/American one. As for every Franco/American quarrel, all the European allies ended up backing the American position. The price Washington had to pay for securing the Southern Command was relatively low. France would not fully reintegrate NATO and remain on the 1995 position. So be it. Giving up the Southern Command would have been contrary to the interests of the hegemon. Why would the country having the greatest military power give up the most important military command? Why should the United States choose to jeopardize its position on the continent for the sole return of France in the Alliance? The same logic lies behind the enlargement process. The United States promoted enlargement in order to maximize its position in Europe. Having more allies that are favorable to its policy secures both its continuing preponderance on the Alliance and renders a future European autonomous defense identity difficult to implement. Sharing power when one enjoys such preponderance would have been an anomaly in international politics. A hegemon does not make compromises if these are not in its national interest. A hegemon leads the process, usually in an assertive manner and does not give away the power margins it enjoys. Thus, the United States vision of the ESDI is consistent with hard-line realism: A Europe that contributes more to the Alliance but that does not enjoy greater responsibilities in its commanding structures.
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5. The ESDP and Transatlantic Relations: The End of the Atlanticist/Europeanist Clash?
The relative failure of the ESDI and above all the Transatlantic gaps after the Berlin Summit were at the heart of the Franco-British 1998 declaration and the advent of the ESDP as a “genuine European project.” As sketched out in the previous chapter, the struggle over AFSOUTH paved the way to a
European project and re-launched the Transatlantic debate on European security. As outlined by
Ronald Asmus: “He (President Clinton) came within one sentence of agreeing to an understanding that would have brought France into NATO and reharmonized the Atlantic and European projects. That sentence was a compromise formula on who in NATO would lead the Alliance’s Southern command.
One cannot help but wonder how much of the subsequent European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) debate and the difficulties between the EU and NATO might have been muted if the deal had been consumed.”362 Thus as a consequence, on 4 December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared, in the name of their respective countries, that: “The
European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage.” Most important, the St-Malo Franco-British declaration added: “To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis.”363 A week later, the presidency conclusions to the European Council held in Vienna fully endorsed the St-Malo declaration : “The
European Council welcomes the new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on security and defense. The European Council considers that in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities.” It continues by asserting that: “It welcomes the Franco-British declaration made on 4
December 1998 in Saint-Malo. The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European States, including the obligations of some Member States within NATO.”364
362 Asmus Ronald D, "Rethinking the EU: Why Washington Needs to Support European Integration," Survival, vol. 47, no. 3, (Autumn 1995), p. 95. 363 Joint Statement by the British and French Governments. "Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense," St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998. 364 European Council Presidency Conclusions. "Presidency Conclusions," European Council Vienna, 11-12 December 1988.
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At the issue of the meeting, Tony Blair sought to reassure the United States when he asserted: “I believe this is a historic agreement.” He stressed that the common European defense policy would not replace existing British commitments to NATO or its military ties with Washington. “The two can live together” he said.365 Secretary of Defense George Robertson echoed the Prime Minister and said: “A stronger European defense was something the United States and other NATO allies had long been calling for. The agreement means a strengthening of NATO.”366 Although the St-Malo declaration responded in many respects to the longstanding calls from Washington for the Europeans to get more involved in their own security and was meant to strengthen NATO, it was not endorsed unreservedly by the United States. On the contrary the “autonomy” issue gave rise to many concerns on Capitol Hill.367
In fact, Washington stressed that the ESDP would be supported by the United States as long, and only and as long as it took place within NATO. In other words, any European defense capability that would not respect the basic principle of “NATO first” would not have the consent of the United States.368 How are we to explain these events? Why did the British and the French agree on the need of a “capacity for autonomous action” in St-Malo? How can this be explained when the biggest wedge for the setting of a common defense policy since the European Defense Community (EDC) in the 1950’s had always been the inability of France and Great Britain to agree on fundamentals? Why are the Americans reluctant to the ESDP, although they restlessly asked Europeans to increase their defense capacity and to share the burdens of collective defense more fairly? Whether an autonomous ESDP was possible depended on the capacity of Great Britain and France to agree on fundamentals. The discrepancies between
London and Paris had been the main setback in building a common European Defense strategy. What made St-Malo possible? What was the basic strategy underlying this agreement and what the perceived
365 Quoted in: Graham Robert & Parker Andrew, "Britain and France to Press for EU Defense Pact," The Financial Times, London, Saturday 5 December 1998, 366 Quoted in: Whitney Craig G, "Britain Joins France's Call for European Force," The New York Times, New York, Saturday 5 December 1998, p. 6. 367 After the St-Malo meeting, a U.S. diplomat speaking on the condition of anonymity said: “The United States has been calling for years for a stronger European defense capability, with budgets to back it up and the political will to deploy it. But an ‘autonomous’ defense capability, that is something that will worry Washington a little bit.” Quoted in Whitney Craig op cit. 368 The now famous “3Ds” US Statement by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made this case very clear: “As Europeans look at the best way to organize their foreign and security policy cooperation, the key is to make sure that any institutional change is consistent with basic principles that have served the Atlantic Partnership well for 50 years. This means avoiding what I would call the three Ds: decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.” See Albright Madeleine K, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future," The Financial Times, London, December 7 1998, p. 22.
UNIGE / SES - 145 - Olivier Brighenti Part II benefits of a European Defense policy for Great Britain, France, and Germany? The whole ESDP process unfolded precisely as my theory would predict. In other words, the Europeans with very different motivations showed some aspirations for autonomy with respect to the American hegemon. For the first time in European “defense history” the leading European states seemed to have agreed on fundamentals. As outlined by Pascal Boniface: “Saint-Malo has shown a new trust between Paris and
London. France ceased to see the United Kingdom only as a U.S. Trojan horse inside Europe, and the
United Kingdom realized that the ultimate goal of French diplomacy is not to expel the United States, its troops, and its influence from Europe.”369 America’s response could not have been clearer. Autonomy was not an option and the whole process resulted in the creation of an ESDP within NATO, or put differently under American custody.
5.1. The British Policy “Revolution”: Blair’s New Strategy for Europe
Great Britain’s choice to join the French in the St-Malo declaration is probably the most striking and puzzling change in the British attitude towards a “European role” in defense.370 Although this shift in strategy may seem puzzling, the potential benefits are obvious for Great Britain as well as for Europe. In effect, the United Kingdom has always been reluctant to a strong European defense for a very simple
369 Boniface Pascal, "European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-First Century," In. NATO and European Security - Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, edited by Moens Albert. Cohen Lenard J & Sens Allen G, (Westport: Preager Publishing), 2003, p. 59. Although the three main traditional protagonists in European defense matters are France, Great Britain and Germany, Italy also has a clear position. Rome favors and supports the creation of the ESDP as long as it does not decouple from NATO. Italy fears that a ESDP that is independent from NATO could leave Italy on the sidelines with respect to the “defense triumvirate”. Thus, NATO remains the guarantee that Italy has a place at the table when important issues are at stake. Despite this fact, Rome fully supports the Franco-British initiative. As outlined by Massimo D’Alema, then Italian Premier: “The Italian government is convinced that developing a European defense identity would strengthen inter-Atlantic relations, not least because it would move towards overcoming a division of labor among allies that is obsolete, thereby allowing for more effective management of current crisis.” D'Alema Massimo, "A New Nato for a New Europe," The International Spectator, vol. 34, no. 2, (April/June 1999), p. 31. 370 Although, the St-Malo Declaration is the first official document laying down the British new vision towards European defense, it is not the first move in that direction. The first allusion of this change in policy was made by Prime Minister Tony Blair at an informal meeting of the Heads of States and Governments held in Pörtschach (Austria) on the 25th and 26th October 1998. He did not fully endorse an “autonomous capacity” but he signaled a dramatic change in UK’s approach to European Security. In a press conference after the Pörtschach informal summit, Tony Blair stated: “Security and Defense Identity within NATO, which as I say was agreed in Berlin in 1996, was the recognition that there needed to be some form of European Identity within NATO. Now that is where it is at the moment. All I am saying, and I am not saying more than this, is that we need to allow fresh thinking in this and it is important for Britain to be part of that thinking and not for us simply to stand there and say we are not.” Quoted in: Rutten Maartje, "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense Core Documents," Cahiers de Chaillot, vol. 47, no. 1, (May 2001), p. 5.
UNIGE / SES - 146 - Olivier Brighenti Part II reason. Great Britain feared that if Europe had a credible defense and could manage by itself its security affairs, the United States would be reluctant to remain in Europe and ensure a leading role in
European security. This would mean that the U.S. would retreat into isolationism and NATO would become irrelevant without the American military power and its indispensable leadership. In other words, since the first talks on the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and Brussels in 1948, the British position on a
European Defense has been unchanged: a “genuine” European defense would endanger NATO and could provoke an American withdrawal from European Security Affairs. The change in the British approach to European defense in October 1998 (Pörtschach) and December 1998 (Saint-Malo) can be seen as a puzzle, but the British acted precisely as my theory would predict. The demise of the Soviet
Union and its importance for American presence and engagement in European security affairs dramatically shifted. With now no tangible threat in Europe and a unipolar world configuration led by the
United States, the British feared an American disengagement in Europe. In other words, the British feared above all a strategy of offshore balancing. The British saw that cooperation with its EU partners on defense matters was in its national interest and above all was a way to maintain and strengthen the
Atlantic Alliance and its relation with the United States. 371 Thus, the key raison d'être for the historical shift in the British approach to European defense can best be explained by the particular distribution of power resulting from the end of the Cold War and the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity. As outlined by
Joylon Howorth, the primary reason is: “the British government’s conviction that the U.S. will no longer automatically underwrite European Security in the same way as during the Cold War. London now believes that the maintenance and strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, far from being threatened by
ESDP, is in fact dependant on it. Enhanced European military capability is now perceived by the UK as the most effective means of silencing the voices of isolationism or, more importantly, the advocates of
371 Great Britain sought to play a new role in Europe, in order to ensure that the French plans for a European Defense would not jeopardize NATO. Furthermore, the ESDP would give the UK a strong lead in European Defense and would strengthen London’s position in Washington. Tony Blair made it very clear when he said: “For Britain, the biggest decision we face in the next couple of decades is our relationship with Europe. For far too long British ambivalence to Europe has made us irrelevant in Europe, and consequently of less importance to the United States. We have finally done away with the false proposition that we must choose between two diverging paths - the Transatlantic relationship or Europe. For the first time in the last three decades we have a government that is both pro-Europe and pro-American. I firmly believe that it is in Britain's interest, but it is also in the interests of the US and of Europe.” Blair Anthony L, "Doctrine of the International Community", 22 April 1999, (Global Policy Forum), http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/blair.htm, (Accessed: 22/12/2006). p. 9.
UNIGE / SES - 147 - Olivier Brighenti Part II burden sharing on Capitol Hill.”372 As stated by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1999 at the Economic Club of Chicago: “At the end of this century the US has emerged as by far the strongest state. It has no dreams of world conquest and is not seeking colonies. If anything Americans are too ready to see no need to get involved in affairs of the rest of the world. America's allies are always both relieved and gratified by its continuing readiness to shoulder burdens and responsibilities that come with its sole superpower status. We understand that this is something that we have no right to take for granted, and must match with our own efforts. That is the basis for the recent initiative I took with President Chirac of
France to improve Europe's own defense capabilities.”373 The second reason why Great Britain suddenly chose to back a European defense it had opposed for nearly fifty years can also be explained quite simply with the help of hard-line realism. Great Britain, which enjoyed a special relationship with
Washington throughout the Cold War, could face problems if the Americans decided that Europe was no longer a number one priority and decided to disengage. The special position it had enjoyed in European
Security affairs would be jeopardized. Thus, taking the initiative in the ESDP meant that the British could have the lead on defense issues. Hence, unlike economic or monetary aspects, defense is the key area where the British have the capacity to take and ensure the leadership.374 In other words, by promoting the ESDP, Britain wanted both to preempt the loss of American interest in the Alliance given other areas of importance such as the Middle East or Asia as well as maximize the British position in European security affairs. It was less an attempt to shift security and defense from NATO to Europe than a way to maximize the British position with respect to its European partners as well as the Atlantic Alliance and the United States. This gives support to my theory that second-tire major powers bandwagon with the hegemon in order to maximize their position in a unipolar world. Tony Blair expressed his strategy in an interview with The Financial Times in April 2003. As outlined by Barry Posen his bandwagoning strategy
372 Howorth Jolyon, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative," Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, (June 2000), p. 34. 373 Blair Anthony L, "Doctrine of the International Community", 22 April 1999, (Global Policy Forum), http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/blair.htm, (Accessed: 22/12/2006). p. 6. 374 As outlined by Pascal Boniface: “If they do not want to set aside Europe, and yet do not want to be a member of the European zone, and are reluctant to be involved in fiscal or social issues, defense is a good choice, in fact the best one. NATO is no longer the unique power multiplier for Great Britain. Europe is now perceived as a second one. The British government understood that European progress is unavoidable, and the only choice consists of trying to have a leading role or being left standing on the platform as the train pulls out.” Boniface Pascal, "European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-First Century," In. NATO and European Security - Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, edited by Moens Albert. Cohen Lenard J & Sens Allen G, (Westport: Preager Publishing), 2003, pp. 58-59.
UNIGE / SES - 148 - Olivier Brighenti Part II is a mixture of: “firm support for the United States but through the vehicle of a strengthened European
Union.”375 Blair stressed: “I don’t want to see a situation develop again in which either Europe or
America sees a huge strategic interest at stake and we are not helping each other. And I think there is a different vision. Some want a so-called multipolar world where you have different centers of power, and I believe will quickly develop into rival centers of power; and others believe, and this is my notion, that we need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America.” He wants: “A stronger Europe, more capable of speaking with a unified force” but one that will not challenge the United States hegemony. A central aspect of his bandwagoning strategy lies in this sentence:
“Those people who fear unilateralism – so-called in inverted commas – in America should realize that the quickest way to get that is to set up a rival polar power to America.”376 A third reason for the British shift can be explained by the failure and embarrassment of the Kosovo war. Although there has been a lack of cohesion from the Western allies on that matter, London saw the triangular security architecture it had promoted as an obstacle to European cohesion in defense matters. At the informal meeting of the
EU Defense Ministers held in Vienna, Defense Secretary George Robertson told his European colleagues: “The EU must reform both its military forces and the decision-making process controlling them.” “For too long” he said: “The debate over European defense has been dominated by questions of theology and obscure institutional distinctions. They do not impress our publics and they certainly do not impress the likes of Milosevic.”377 He called as “cumbersome” the current decision-making process for military matters within Europe based on a complex matrix involving the EU, NATO, and the Western
European Union. Thus, after having promoted throughout the whole post-Cold War period the “bridge” architecture for the WEU, London suddenly saw that this formula was self-defeating and could only damage British policy’s on the long run.378 This was confirmed later on in February 2000 by Richard
375 For a very good account on Britain’s strategy in the ESDP see: Posen Barry R, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?," Security Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, (April-June 2006), pp. 167-170. 376 Quoted in: Newman Cathy & Stephens Philip, "Interview with Prime Minister Anthony Blair," The Financial Times, London, Monday 28 April 2003, p. 4. 377 Butcher Tim, "Britain Leads Call for EU Defense Shake-Up," Daily Telegraph, London, Thursday 5 November 1998, p. 11. 378 In interviews conducted by Robert Art in 2000, high-level British Minister of Defense officials declared: “Blair thought the WEU was useless and it was. We British used it to prevent an effective European security personality from emerging precisely because it was useless.” Another official declared: “Yes, we used the WEU in the early 1990’s as a fireback, to prevent a European identity that could challenge NATO from emerging. In short, the WEU had become a joke, and we made it even more of one by using it as a fireback.” See: Art Robert J, "Europe
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Hatfield during a hearing held by the House of Commons Select Committee on Defense. Questioned on the genesis of the British policy dramatic shift Mr. Hatfield declared: “I think the easiest way of answering your question is that a major part-impetus for this developing policy came from the Ministry of
Defence because the purely practical arrangements that had been developed did not give us a great deal of confidence. You had a system where the EU, as one political organization, although a very important one, was going to, if it got into crisis management (and that was in Amsterdam, and, indeed, it was envisaged at a point earlier in Maastricht) avail itself of another organization, the WEU, which had a very limited military infrastructure and capability, which, in turn, would turn to a third organization, which we all think is a very good organization—NATO. Essentially, the Ministry of Defense started to think about this, and our view was we ought to try and simplify this into a pragmatic arrangement and get a proper relationship between the two big players. That played into a wider debate that was going on inside government and that, in brief, led to the start of the process we have got now.”379 In a speech at the Royal United Services Institute in March 1999, Secretary of Defense George Robertson clearly summarized the dramatic shift in British policy: “Our ultimate aim is not so much a European Security and Defense Identity but something altogether more ambitious, namely a European Defense Capability to strengthen the ability of the European Union to pursue foreign policy objectives. To give the European
Union a place in international affairs worthy of its size, experience and economic strength.”380
5.2. France: Promoting Yet Another European project?
Although Britain and France have agreed to launch a convincing European Defense and Security Policy in Saint-Malo, this does not mean that their aims are totally convergent. In fact, although both London and Paris agree on the necessity of a viable ESDP the basic motivations of both countries differ. As I have outlined, for the United Kingdom, the ESDP is a tool to reinforce NATO and ensure the American commitment on the European continent. It serves British national interest and gives it a leading position
Hedges Its Security Bets," In. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, edited by Paul T.V. Wirtz James J & Fortman Michael, (Standford: Standford University Press), 2004, p. 197 and Footnote 35. 379 Committee on Defense, "Examination of Witness", Wednesday 16 February 2000, (House of Commons), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/264/0021602.htm, (Accessed: 08/01/2007). Paragraph 17. 380 Robertson George, "NATO at Fifty," Paper presented at the The Royal Unites Services Institute, London, 19 March 1999,
UNIGE / SES - 150 - Olivier Brighenti Part II in European security affairs and in Washington. For France, on the other hand, NATO and the American commitment in Europe is not the starting point of the ESDP. ESDP is the continuation of the longstanding French European ambition. A strengthened EU with a credible defense component has always been favored by Paris. The French approach to ESDP can be easily summarized. First of all, for
France ESDP is the logical continuation of the European Integration process. After the economic and monetary integration, defense is the next logical step for the EU. Secondly, France was always convinced, that an effective European foreign policy had to be backed by credible military capabilities.
French Minister of Defense Michele Alliot-Marie reiterated this concern in 2002 in an interview to the
German newspaper Der Spiegel. She said: “Europe has no foreign policy weight without the corresponding military potential.”381 Thirdly, France always sought to promote a more equilibrated international order were Europe would have a strong position in world affairs along with the United
States. As stated by President Chirac in 1999 before the Assembly of Atlantic Societies in Strasbourg:
“Every time I meet with our European partners, I observe a new state of mind that can be summarized in one wish: that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, and first and foremost in our continent’s affairs. That Europe can fulfill its responsibilities, that it work in favor of a balanced, multipolar, and law respecting world.”382 France’s motivations to create a ESDP came from two events in 1998. First of all, the French had been disappointed by the ESDI and above all the AFSOUTH episode as well as
America’s attitude towards the Alliance. NATO’s reforms were according to Paris, not convincing and thus opened the door for new reflections on the future of European defense. Secondly, the WEU
Brussels Treaty was due to expire in 1998. Thus, 1998 provided Paris with a great opportunity to consider once again the future of the WEU. President Chirac saw a unique opportunity to propose his
European colleagues to merge the WEU into the EU. This had been impossible until then, given the
British veto. With London’s strategy, France’s longstanding approach could become reality. In an address to French Ambassadors in Paris, President Chirac asserted: “For France the WEU is destined
381 Quoted in: Leick Romain, "Es gibt keine Kriegsautomatik," Der Spiegel, Hanover, 2 December 2002, p. 142. 382 In 2003 during the debate on Iraq, President Chirac reiterated his vision of a multipolar world with a united Europe acting as a counterweight to the United States in world affairs. He said: “Any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions," he told Time magazine in an interview this week. “That's why I favor a multipolar world in which Europe obviously has its place.” Quoted in: Ford Peter, "Between Bush and Iraq - Jacques Chirac," Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Friday 21 February 2003, p. 1.
UNIGE / SES - 151 - Olivier Brighenti Part II to become the European Union’s defense agency, progressively integrated into its institutions, while, of course, retaining its links with NATO. In this context, we shall have to see whether we need to establish, when the times comes, a Council of EU Defense Ministers to affirm our solidarity in this sphere.”383 For
France, the ESDP is above all a European project which can, but not necessarily has to, be embedded in the Euro-Atlantic partnership and more specifically NATO. For France the ESDP is in the continuum of the integration process. Thus, with the completion of the Single Market and the Common Single
Currency, the “mechanism” of integration makes it logic to satisfy the demand for an effective foreign security policy, including the ability to use force whenever it is necessary, with or without resorting to
NATO (in other words the United States). Put differently whereas the British see the ESDP as an
“Atlanticist” instrument, France views the ESDP first and foremost as a European instrument. As stated by President Chirac in 1999 before the Assembly of Atlantic Societies in Strasbourg: “Europe has to be able to take action in support of these goals together with its American Ally when the United States wants to be involved on the field. But it must also be able to operate on its own when it wishes to. This defense capacity will complete the economic, humanitarian, and political instruments the European
Union disposes already.”384 Whereas for the British, ESDP is a strategy embedded in unipolarity, for
France it is a way to promote a multipolar world.385 Thus, France’s strategy cannot be seen as one of balancing (soft or hard) as some commentators have suggested.386 Although France has an interest in a powerful Europe, it doesn’t have the means to do it alone. They have to work within the ESDP
383 Speech by the President of the French Republic Jacques Chirac to the Meeting of the French Ambassadors at the French Embassy in London 1998. Quoted in: Latawski Paul & Smith Martin A, "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. CESDP since 1998: The View from London, Paris and Warsaw.," Journal of European Area Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, (November 2002), p. 214. 384 Chirac Jacques, "A Responsible Europe in a Renewed Atlantic Alliance", Tuesday 19 October 1999, (Elysée Press Services), http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/root/bank/print/3083.htm, (Accessed: 10/11/2006). p. 2. 385 As outlined by Michael Brenner: “The present French conception of multipolarity differs from traditional notions of balance-of power in that there is no presumption that the power rivalries of a zero-sum game are its mainstream. Rather it implies a concert, to a considerable extent institutionalized, whose members share a core commitment to maintaining international peace.” Brenner Michael, "The CFSP Factor: A Comparison of United States and French Strategies " Cooperation And Conflict, vol. 38, no. 3, (September 2003), p. 199. Thus France’s claim for a multipolar world is an expression of intent, closer to wishful thinking than effective balancing. It is what I have called a balance of protest. Longstanding disagreements and big institutional clashes in various international institutions are not the corollary of effective balance of power. Crisis and balancing don’t occur when a state or a coalition of states tend to resist the action of another states, but when they have the effective means to meet their ends. Dominique de Villepin, France's Foreign Minister, made this very clear during the Iraq crisis when he said that: “France wanted a multipolar world based on co-operation, not rivalry”. Quoted in: Adams Christopher, "IISS Warns Europe Must Accept US Predominance," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 14 May 2003, p. 13. 386 On that matter see: Art Robert J. Brooks Stephen G. Wohlforth William C & Lieber Keir A, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," International Security, vol. 30, no. 3, (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 177-196
UNIGE / SES - 152 - Olivier Brighenti Part II framework that does in no way supplant NATO. On the contrary, a reinforced Europe is sought to improve NATO and ot weaken it. France has learnt too well since the end of the Cold War that its strategies to build an “autonomous” European defense have revealed impossible and that a ESDP competing with NATO is bound to fail. The French government has understood that a “powerful” Europe cannot be built as an “opposition tool” to Washington. The Saint-Malo declaration gives the ESDP a high degree of legitimacy because it is no longer perceived as a French national project under the European umbrella.
5.3. Germany: One More Step Towards Normalization?
Although Germany was a fairly marginal player in the initial process of the ESDP and the Saint-Malo declaration, Berlin endorsed without restrictions the Franco-British declaration.387 Germany played a very large role in 1999 when it held the Presidency of the EU. The first institutional settings of the ESDP were decided at the Cologne Summit under German Presidency. At the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Eltville held in March 1999, a German proposal for guiding principles stated: “The aim is to strengthen CFSP and complement it by the development of a Common European policy on security and defense. This requires a capacity for action backed by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. Decisions to act would be taken within the institutional framework of the
European Union. The European Union Council would thus be able to make decisions on the whole range of activities in the external relations of the Union (trade, CFSP, defense).”388 As for all defense initiatives since the European Defense Community in 1954, Germany saw the ESDP as a way to
“normalize” its position in the world. No longer under the threat of military attacks on its soil, Germany welcomed the ESDP as an additional step to be recognized as a “normal power”. With the ESDP,
387 An important aspect to underline is that the French delegation had lined up support from German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder prior to the St-Malo meeting, giving the declaration even more weight. 388 Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, "German Proposal", 13-14 March 1999,. p. 1. The German’s full acquiescence of the fundamentals of the ESDP has also been outlined in the Franco-German Defense and Security Council Declaration, held in Toulouse on 29 May 1999. It states: “Nos deux pays réaffirment leur détermination d’y contribuer de tout leur poids afin que l’Union européenne se dote des moyens autonomes nécessaires pour décider et agir face aux crises. Nous sommes déterminés à créer les conditions nécessaires afin d’atteindre cet objectif ».
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Germany is on its natural course of “Europeanizing Germany” rather than “Germanizing Europe.”389
Given its power in European affairs, the ESDP is a win-win situation for Germany. It can play a central role in the future ESDP. It can be more “autonomous” from the United States in security and military affairs, while regaining more of its defense and military sovereignty. Unlike France, Germany did not see the ESDP as a mean to counterbalance the United States and create a multipolar world. On the contrary, for Germany, endorsing ESDP is a bandwagoning strategy. Germany was strongly interested in reinforcing cooperation between NATO and the European Union. For Berlin the fact that Great Britain was a leader in this initiative made prospects for Transatlantic cooperation promising.390
5.4. The United States and the ESDP Project: The “Autonomy” Issue
The U.S. reactions to the ESDP initiative have drawn upon the usual line adopted since the end of the
Cold War. Although Washington supports European efforts to develop its defense and share a larger part of the burden, it is worried by the notion of “autonomous action” and on its consequences on the
Alliance.391 The United States is concerned that the ESDP might endanger its hegemonic position on the Alliance and its leading role in European security affairs. The St-Malo initiative is the first step towards the “institutionalization” of the ESDP in the European security architecture. It is considered a major step forward, but it is only the starting point of a larger Transatlantic debate which is still going on.
In this section, I am going to highlight the main events and decisions that took place in the aftermath of the St-Malo initiative. In a succession of European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki, and Nice. The EU members and the Commission moved to put flesh on the ‘St-Malo bones’ and provide the ESDP with an institutional framework. I will focus on the successive developments and achievements of the ESDP and
389 See: Duke Simon, "Germanizing Europe: Europeanizing Germany?," Security Dialogue, vol. 25, no. 4, (1994), pp. 425-436. 390 On the German approach to ESDP see: Overhaus Marco, "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy," German Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, (December 2004), pp. 551- 268. 391 Although the St-Malo is the logical continuation of the CFSP started in Maastricht and is consistent with the Amsterdam Treaty, the United States understood very well that the St-Malo initiative was different from what had occurred throughout the early 1990’s. The collective will of the European members to build a genuine European project, and above all the Franco-British agreement, made the whole project sound different. Up to that moment the United States could count on the Atlanticist/Europeanist division as the principal impeacher for a European defense. Britain’s strategic shift enabled Europe to forge ahead on the defense front. Furthermore contrary to what had been done previously, decisions to use ESDP for missions abroad would be made by the EU and not the WEU. Thus, the triangular system that impeached an effective European defense policy and that served U.S. interests has been discarded.
UNIGE / SES - 154 - Olivier Brighenti Part II analyze the U.S. reactions. Thus, I will focus on the period from the St-Malo declaration to 2003 and its implication on the Alliance and the United States. I will not focus on the achievements of the “ESDP missions” but on the Transatlantic bargain resulting from the ESDP. I will show throughout this analysis that events unfolded as my theory predicts. Although the United States has been supportive of a ESDP that could reduce America’s financial burden, it has sought to ensure that it remains subordinated to
NATO. Throughout the whole “ESDP bargain” the United States has sought to ensure the subordination of ESDP by seeking political guarantees and by insisting that Europe should not duplicate NATO command control and assets. Thus, Washington clearly works along the same lines of power maximization in the European integration process. The United States has always encouraged European integration as long as it consolidates regional security. But it has resisted the temptation to produce an
“autonomous” Europe, that might challenge and resist U.S. hegemony on the continent. Geir
Lundestadt’s historical analysis: “has demonstrated Washington’s general support for European integration, but this support has always been conditioned on Europe being fitted into a wider Atlantic framework. If this framework is questioned, Washington’s response can be dramatic […] The end of the
Cold War may have widened the perimeters of the Atlantic framework, but there are still limits to how far
Washington will permit a friendly EU to move.”392
5.4.1. St-Malo and the United States: An Ambiguous Support The American reaction just after the St-Malo meeting was as usual ambiguous. Stanley Sloan captured the U.S. position very well with his “yes but” formula.393 Although the declaration was the first genuine answer from the EU to Washington’s calls for a greater European role, it was not endorsed irreversibly.394 First of all, Washington was “surprised” by the British participation in a plan that could have been designed by neo-Gaullists. The United Kingdom, as I highlighted throughout this study, has always been the most reliable and predictable U.S. partner on defense matters. It has been the key
Atlanticist and the main advocate of Washington’s strategies for European defense throughout the
392 Lundestad Geir, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945-1997, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1998, p. 169. 393 Sloan Stanley R, "The United States and European Defense," Chaillot Papers, vol. 39, no. 1, (April 2000), p. 16. 394 Although there have been numerous bilateral or multilateral attempts throughout the 1990’s, the St-Malo declaration is the first bilateral initiative that was endorsed unanimously by the member states of the European Union.
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1990’s. With the British leadership in St-Malo, as well as the unanimous endorsement of the declaration by the European Council in Vienna some days later, the Atlanticist/Europeanist disagreement seems temporarily settled. Thus, Washington cannot count on traditional European divisions to promote its strategy of preponderance. The first official U.S. reaction to the St-Malo initiative was drafted by
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, three days after the Franco-British Summit and one day prior to the NATO’s Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels. At first sight, Albright acknowledges, in principle, the existence of a ESDP with the condition that it is “within the Alliance” and does not damage or compete with the Transatlantic partnership. She said: “We welcome the call from Tony Blair, the UK Prime
Minister,395 for Europeans to consider ways they can take more responsibilities for their own security and defense, our interest is clear: we want a Europe that can act.” She acknowledges the efforts of
Europeans to do more for their own security and encourages the initiative as a means to share the burden of European security: “European efforts to do more for Europe’s own defense make it easier, not harder, for us to remain engaged.”396 Although these are rather positive reactions, she then establishes three criteria of evaluation of the Franco-British declaration. She declared: “As Europeans look at the best way to organize their foreign and security policy cooperation, the key is to make sure that any institutional change is consistent with basic principles that have served the Atlantic partnership well for
50 years. That means avoiding what I would call the Three Ds: Decoupling, duplication and discrimination.”397
Duplication is probably the most important of the three Ds. In effect, the “duplication of existing efforts” lies at the heart of the U.S. preponderance on the Alliance. The St-Malo declaration stated: “In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication
[emphasis added], taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations
395 The official statement by Madeleine Albright omits voluntarily or not, to talk of the St-Malo initiative as the Franco/British initiative although the St-Malo declaration is a joint declaration from French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 396 Albright Madeleine K, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future," The Financial Times, London, December 7 1998, p. 22. 397 Ibidem
UNIGE / SES - 156 - Olivier Brighenti Part II with the EU.”398 Thus, the declaration is very clear on the question of unnecessary duplication of existing structures. The United States argued that duplicating existing assets would be a waste of defense resources, more specifically at the time when European defense spending was in decline.399 The underlying logic behind Albright’s duplication “rhetoric” is the 1996 Berlin Grand Bargain. The reason for creating an ESDI inside NATO rather than outside, as is the case of ESDP, was to use NATO assets i.e.
US assets, through the CJTF. The principle of “separable but not separated” military capabilities decided in Berlin is absent from the declaration. Furthermore, although the St-Malo declaration acknowledges the need to maintain “the collective defense commitments to which member states subscribe (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty),”400 it is silent on the
Brussels-Berlin agreement about NATO’s primacy as well as the ESDI within NATO. Thus, after a more thorough reading, the “duplication rhetoric” is not all about spending scarce defense resources. It is primarily about the primacy of NATO in the European defense architecture. As I have highlighted in the previous section, the CJTF is a tool meant to maintain and reinforce American hegemony in European security affairs. Duplicating the assets that could be obtained from NATO through the CJTF would mean that the EU “could” acquire a certain degree of autonomy that could enable ESDP to bypass the Berlin
Grand Bargain. This would certainly be prejudicialble for America’s hegemony in Europe. Christopher
Chivvis captured this aspect very well: “While this demand is perhaps defensible on ‘cost savings’ grounds, the most obvious reason why it is desirable from the American view is that it assures that
ESDP will be as dependent on NATO as most individual European states were during the cold war. In other words, it ensures that America maintains a degree of control over Europe, and that Europe has little reciprocal control over America.”401 The second aspect highlighted by Madeleine Albright relates to
398 Joint Statement by the British and French Governments. "Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense," St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998. Paragraph 3. 399 The duplication of expensive logistical and war-fighting assets is unlikely to raise objections in the United States and NATO. The U.S. has always asked the Europeans to spend more on defense, and the benefits to all seem obvious. What Washington fears above all is the duplication of NATO’s planning role and planning structures. The United States has military staffs independent from NATO for planning, organizing, training equipping and employing its military force. It is exactly that kind of duplications that Washington does not want the EU to create. This would be a real threat to the cohesion of the Alliance and to America’s hegemonic role. 400 Joint Statement by the British and French Governments. "Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense," St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998., Paragraph 2. 401 Chivvis Christopher S, "ESPD and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Political and Geopolitical Considerations," Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, (Spring 2005), p. 24.
UNIGE / SES - 157 - Olivier Brighenti Part II decoupling. This means that the ESDP should not in any way decouple the United States from Europe in the Alliance or the European defense efforts from those coordinated through NATO. Thus, this emphasizes the fact that ESDI is a NATO project whereas the ESDP is a European one. It is clearly related to the “capacity for autonomous action” introduced in the St-Malo declaration. Washington has always been opposed to any form of autonomy that could jeopardize the Alliance and as a consequence its leadership. The United States is highly concerned that the ESDP could produce scenarios where the
Europeans could see their security as decoupled from that of the Alliance and the United States.402 The decoupling issue has haunted the Alliance throughout the Cold War. The Alliance has always been characterized by asymmetries that lie at the very heart of the Alliance’s security arrangements. There is a militarily super-powerful, politically controlling and strategically global United States that guarantees the security of a militarily weak, politically divided and strategically regional Europe. Given the threat of the Soviet Union, the Europeans accepted the domination of the United States and the latter dealt with the free-riding attitude of the Europeans. The end of the Cold War and the advent of a unipolar world changed the rules of the game. European security is not anymore at the top of the US agenda and the
Europeans are less concerned by the necessity of an American security guarantee that jeopardizes a
European identity. As outlined by Frederic Bozo: “More than a decade after the end of bipolar confrontation, the prospect of decoupling ceases to be solely theoretical.”403 Therefore it is some degree of decoupling, in other words of greater European autonomy, that will ensure the future of a strong
Atlantic partnership. Only a more assertive European Union can help guarantee that the Transatlantic partnership will be “re-balanced”, and only a strategic rebalancing will strengthen NATO. In other words, a certain degree of decoupling is crucial to respond to America’s calls for a more responsible Europe.
402 Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter rightly highlighted that the quarrel over decoupling is political and not military. He argued: “Given the relatively small size and limited range of actions that might be undertaken by any European ESDP force, at least as formally presented in the Petersberg Tasks, this risk (decoupling) should have appeared to be minimal. But as a political matter, it gained greater currency in Washington and, rightly or wrongly, has been a source of concern ever since. This is so despite the fact that U.S. speculation about the risks of decoupling posed by ESDP, including St-Malo and its aftermath, goes against two clearly positive aspects of ESDP, welcomed by the United States: (1) the Europeans would be doing more for defense and hence for intra- allied burden sharing and (2) some European military capacity, not solely bound up in NATO, could actually reassure Europeans of their ability to take some actions in circumstances in which the United States chose not to become engaged.” Hunter Robert E, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND Publishing), 2002, p. 35. 403 Bozo Frédéric, "The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling," In. Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, edited by Howorth Jolyon & Keeler John T.S, (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan), 2004, p. 70.
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For the EU, to be more responsible in security and defense matters requires changes in the patterns of
Transatlantic relations. French Defense Minister Alain Richard understood very well the “decoupling issue” when he stated: “If Europe takes on more responsibility by building up its military strength, that will contribute to the long-term equilibrium of the Alliance. Now the European Union is stepping up to its responsibilities and over the next few years will become a genuine actor on the scene, one that didn’t exist before.” He continues: “What fear of duplication really conceals is worry about the appearance of a new political partner, the European Union. It’s a new situation that’s a bit disturbing, that upsets old habits because at the moment, inside the Atlantic Alliance, there are only dispersed European states, the only common, cohesive element is NATO itself.”404 It is exactly this “more responsible” Europe that
Washington fears with its “decoupling rhetoric”. The last D developed by Madeleine Albright is discrimination. She insisted that there be no discrimination against NATO allies who were not members of the EU. This applies more specifically to Turkey, Norway, the United States, and Canada and to a lesser degree Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It is probably the less problematic of the three
Ds, although there are some important aspects notably regarding the use of NATO assets and possible veto’s from non-EU members. It is not quite clear why the discrimination issue was raised.405 The most plausible answer to this puzzle is once again the question of “autonomous action”. Would the non-EU
NATO members be able to participate in WEU led operations? According to the Maastricht Treaty, non-
EU members are able to take part to WEU operations.406 A second aspect is related to the use of NATO assets by the EU. Would the non-EU NATO members be put on the sidelines on this aspect? The answer is clearly no. In effect, as defined by the Brussels-Berlin agreement, a necessary condition for the leasing of NATO assets is the approval by consensus by all NATO members. Thus, countries like
404 Quoted from: Whitney Craig G, "Military Posture of Europe to Turn More Independent," The New York Times, New York, Monday 13 December 1999, p. 1. 405 For this aspect, I draw on: Hunter Robert E, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND Publishing), 2002, pp. 36-40. 406 According to the Maastricht declaration on the role of the WEU annexed to the Treaty on European Union: “States which are members of the EU are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modifies Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating in the activities of the WEU.” WEU Council of Ministers, "Maastricht Declaration on The Role of the WEU and its Relations with the European Union and with The Atlantic Alliance", 10 December 1991, (Western European Union), http://www.weu.int/documents/911210en.pdf, (Accessed: 25/10/2006). Point II. Paragraph 2.
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Turkey have a veto on such a matter. In addition, as outlined by Robert Hunter: “NATO’s Berlin-Brussels agreements specifically provided for the development, with the participation of all European Allies, of the
ESDI within the Alliance. It had already been agreed that the non-EU members of NATO could take part in various aspects of WEU activities, including planning through a permanent liaison arrangement”407
Consequently at this stage of the ESDP development, there is no discrimination towards non-EU members, and it seems that the “discrimination rhetoric” is clearly addressed towards the “autonomy” component of the St-Malo declaration.
Thus, Sloan’s formula of “yes but,” revealed relevant. Madeleine Albright’s three Ds summarize
Washington’s position regarding the St-Malo initiative. After a thorough analysis of her statement, there is no doubt that the Clinton administration does not fully support the Franco-British initiative. The most critical aspect for Washington lies in the quest for autonomy. It is quite striking that the three Ds are, on several aspects, not that different from Bush’s reaction to the Franco-German initiative on Eurocorps.
The schemes seem always the same. Washington views the relation between NATO and the ESDP as a zero-sum game. Washingtons fears a ESDP that could reveal efficient and could reinforce itself to the detriment of the Alliance and above all to U.S. leadership. That is the reason why the 3 Ds are meant to define the ESDP in Washington’s terms. Although the three Ds could be seen as an approval of the
ESDP with some minor elements to work out, it is not the case. The three Ds are the non-negotiable aspects that will design the relationship between the ESDP, NATO, and the United States.
5.5. From St-Malo to the Washington Summit: ESDI and ESDP
The NATO Summit held in Washington in April 1999 shed the light on the parallel development of the
ESDP and the ESDI. It highlighted that ESDI was a NATO project and the ESDP was clearly a
European one. It also emphasized how difficult it would be to develop both entities simultaneously while avoiding Transatlantic clashes. The main outcome of the Washington Summit is the so called “Berlin
Plus” agreements. The key feature of the Summit was the Allies’ recognition of the solution adopted in
St-Malo and confirmed by the Vienna Council. The final communiqué states: “We acknowledge the
407 Hunter Robert E, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND Publishing), 2002, pp. 36-37.
UNIGE / SES - 160 - Olivier Brighenti Part II resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”408 After having acknowledged the “capacity for autonomous action,” the declaration stresses once again that the ESDP would be built within the Alliance. The declaration reads as follows: “The NATO of the 21st century starts today - a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships. To this end, we have: completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness.”409 The Washington communiqué also acknowledged that it would be from now on the
EU and not the WEU that would be the European institution for defense matters. The communiqué made clear that the Allies had decided to further and fulfill the arrangements decided in Berlin and to give the EU ready access to NATO assets. It states: “On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in
Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure.”410 Thus, the Washington summit clarified some aspects that were not taken into account in the St-Malo declaration. The Berlin-Plus agreement reaffirmed the primacy of NATO while restating the “separable but not separate” military capabilities. As a result, although the Washington Summit clarified some crucial aspects such as the access to NATO assets and the recognition of the EU as the European institution operating the ESDI, it paved the way for further Transatlantic tensions. The Washington Summit was understood in Washington as the
“ultimate solution” to the problem of the European security architecture. The subsequent European
Councils in Cologne and Helsinki will highlight that the “Transatlantic bargain” on ESDI/ESDP is far from over.
408 NATO Council of Ministers, "Washington Summit Communiqué", 24 April 1999, (NATO Press Services), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, (Accessed: 20/01/2007). Paragraph 9. 409 Ibidem, Paragraph. 4. 410 Ibidem, Paragraph. 10.
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5.6. Cologne: Reaffirming the Autonomy Issue
Although the Alliance’s Strategic concept adopted after the Washington Summit seemed to have appeased Transatlantic tensions after the St-Malo declaration and settled once and for all the future of the European security architecture, the Cologne Summit provoked harsh comments in Washington.411
Controversy remained over the exact meaning and how to implement the “autonomous action,” the
“ready access” and the “presumption of availability to NATO assets”. The war over Kosovo became a crucial factor in the evolution of the European defense architecture. It emphasized the European understanding of its efficiency in crisis prevention and conflict management. Even with the lessons of
Bosnia still fresh in the collective memory, Europeans failed to take any meaningful joint action in
Kosovo, forcing them to acknowledge that only the United States could effectively act in times of crisis.412 The United States determined the entire strategy and led most of the military operations whereas the Europeans played a low-key role. As stated by NATO’s new Secretary General Lord
Robertson: “The European Security and Defense Identity is no longer just an attractive idea; it has become an urgent necessity. Simply put, the burden of dealing with European security crisis should not fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the U.S. We need to create a more balanced Alliance with stronger European input. This is eminently possible. Collectively, the European members of NATO spend almost two-thirds of the United States’ defense budget, but Kosovo made clear that they have nothing like two-thirds of the real capability of the U.S.”413 Thus, the European governments were confronted with their impotence in crisis management and their entire reliability on the United States to solve conflicts in their own backyard. This made two aspects very clear. First of all, Europe was totally dependent on the United States for military intervention in Europe. Second, the U.S engagement in future “European conflicts” was not guaranteed. The Europeans understood that their free-riding attitude
411 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept outlined : “On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and, subsequently, the European Security and Defense Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.” North Atlantic Council, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept", 23-24 April 1999, (NATO Press Services), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, (Accessed: 22/01/2007). Part III, paragraph 30. 412 See : Mathiopoulos Margarita & Gyarmati Istvan, "Saint Malo and beyond: Toward European Defense," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 4, (Autumn 1999), pp. 5-7. 413 Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General, at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, 15 November 1999. Reproduced in: Rutten Maartje, "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense Core Documents," Cahiers de Chaillot, vol. 47, no. 1, (May 2001), pp. 61-65.
UNIGE / SES - 162 - Olivier Brighenti Part II in European defense was a failing strategy and that the United States were unwilling to commit troops in every “European conflict”. Thus, Europe had to build up some form of credible military capability to intervene in conflicts as well as ensure that the United States would remain committed to European security. British Prime Minister Tony Blair made this very clear in a statement at the Royal United
Services Institute when he said: “We, Europeans, should not expect the US to have to play a part in every disorder in our own backyard. The EU should be able to take on some security tasks on its own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.”414 As stated by Peter Van Ham: “The main lesson of Kosovo has therefore stimulated a rethinking of European defense cooperation, not as a way to undermine NATO but to provide the EU with the military means to back up its diplomatic efforts.”415 Thus, at the EU Summit in Cologne, the
European Heads of states, for the first time, committed themselves to a genuine defense policy. The EC
Declaration states: “We are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersberg tasks’. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” In order to achieve this goal it was decided in Cologne: “to reinforce our capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. This also requires efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces.” 416 For Washington, the Cologne conclusions were taken very cautiously. It is the notion of “autonomous action” and the absence of crucial aspects decided at the
Washington Summit that provoked reactions in Washington. The Clinton Administration was so vexed with the Cologne phrasing that it protested vigorously. The points in contention were summarized in a
“Sins of Cologne” memorandum, prepared by the State Department, that compared the wording of the two declarations.417 First of all, the usual acknowledge to NATO’s primacy is absent. The only phrasing
414 Blair Anthony, NATO, Europe, and Our Future Security, (London: Royal United Services Institute), 8 March 1999, p.1. 415 Van Ham Peter, "Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship," Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 2, (June 2000), p. 218. 416 European Council Presidency Conclusions. "Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense," European Council Cologne, 3-4 June 1999. p. 1. 417 See : Brenner Michael, "Europe's New Security Vocation," McNair Papers, vol. 66, no. 1, (May 2002), pp. 42-43.
UNIGE / SES - 163 - Olivier Brighenti Part II about the position of the ESDP with respect to NATO is: “in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO”418 Thus the right of “first refusal” decided during the Washington
Summit was absent. It does not repeat the wordings of the Washington declaration: “it (EU) can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”419 Secondly, nowhere can we find that the ESDP will be built within NATO. Thirdly, for the first time the German
Presidency Report outlines the case of “EU led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.”420 This would mean, according to Washington that the Cologne declaration treated EU-only operations as equal with EU-led operations using NATO assets in conformity with the CJTF arrangements. The U.S. reaction to Cologne was not benign, on the contrary. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution that was voted unanimously on 8 November 1999.421 The resolution reminded the
Europeans that NATO was the primary institution for European security and that NATO should have the right for first refusal on all military tasks.422 The aim of the resolution was that a U.S. backing for ESDP was dependent on its contingency with the three D’s and the “NATO first” concept. The strongest
American statement after Cologne is the famous speech by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott. In a now familiar American way of approaching the debate, Strobe Talbott said: “I’ll start by reiterating what I hope is a clear, unambiguous statement of American Policy. It’s a policy of support: the U.S. is for ESDI. It’s in our interest for Europe to be able to deal effectively with challenges to
European security well before they reach the threshold of triggering U.S. combat involvement.”423
Talbott makes it clear that the United States will back the ESDP only under certain conditions424. Thus, the two key U.S. questions to evaluate the European project are: “Will it work? Will it be able to do what it’s supposed to do?” And secondly: “Will it help keep the Alliance together and that means the whole
418 Ibidem 419 NATO Council of Ministers, "Washington Summit Communiqué", 24 April 1999, (NATO Press Services), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, (Accessed: 20/01/2007). Paragraph 9. 420 German Presidency. "Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense," European Council Cologne, 3-4 June 1999. p. 2. 421 Anonymous, "The EU Turns its Attention from Ploughshares to Swords," The Economist, London, 20 November 1999, p. 51. 422 For a complete analysis of Congress reactions to ESDP see : Sloan Stanley R, "The United States and European Defense," Chaillot Papers, vol. 39, no. 1, (April 2000), pp. 26-33. 423 Talbott Strobe, "America's Stake in a Strong Europe," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, October 7 1999, p.3. 424 Strobe Talbott never uses the word ESDP. He always refers to ESDI. He makes a difference with a ESDI that evolves within NATO and an ESDI that evolves independently from NATO.
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Alliance, European and non-European, EU and non-EU?”425 Consequently, Talbott makes clear that the
United States fully backs a ESDI within NATO as decided during the Berlin Summit. He, then, warns the
Europeans against the “autonomy issue” that lies at the heart of the ESDP project. “We would not want to see an ESDI” he said “that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.”426 Thus, it is quite clear that the ESDI supported by Washington draws along the lines decided in Berlin. ESDI had to be for the United States a European pillar within NATO and the subsequent meetings in St-Malo and Cologne had derived from that line. He declared: “Our ministers committed themselves to precisely these principles (ESDI within NATO) first in Berlin in 1996 then again in Washington this past April. However, two other meetings seem, to our ears at least, to have emitted a somewhat different set of signals. The Anglo-French Summit at St-Malo last December raised concerns among non-EU Allies that they might not be sufficiently involved in planning and decision-making structures. Then came the EU leaders’ declaration at Cologne in June, which could be read as implying that Europe’s default position would be to act outside the Alliance whenever possible, rather than through the Alliance.”427
As a result, the U.S. position regarding the Cologne Summit is consistent with my theory. Washington favored ESDI because it is fully defined within the NATO framework. With the ESDI, the U.S. preponderance in the Alliance is guaranteed. The CJTF ensures that the United States will maintain its preponderance and will preserve its right of “first refusal”. A ESDP defined as autonomous from NATO and under the custody of the EU can endanger the U.S preponderance. The Clinton administration is keenly aware that if the European Union acquires a full range of capabilities, the U.S. preponderance guaranteed by the CJTF could be seriously jeopardized. Hence, the United State’s position is very clear.
It fully supports the ESDI within NATO, and is very skeptical of a ESDP and its “autonomous” capacity.
425 Talbott Strobe, "America's Stake in a Strong Europe," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, October 7 1999, p. 3. 426 Ibidem 427 Ibidem
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5.7. The Helsinki Summit and the Headline Goal: Towards “Genuine” EU capabilities
The Helsinki Summit marked the continuation of the process started in St-Malo. The main achievement of the Summit lies in its decision to create a European crisis intervention force, capable of intervening in conflicts in Europe’s backyard. Thus, for the first time in European integration history, all European
Member states agreed that Europe’s common foreign policy had to be reinforced by credible military capabilities. This would give the European Union a stronger role in international affairs because of its own genuine military force. In other words, after fifty years of European integration Europeans defined the military dimension of the economic and political union. How did events unfold? How did the United
States react to this new drive towards a more “autonomous” European security architecture? What are the consequences for the Transatlantic relationship and for the United States preponderance over the
Alliance?
The most important innovation of the Helsinki Summit was the setting of the Headline Goal. In other words, the EU had to implement by 2003 military capabilities able to pursue the full range of Petersberg tasks. This idea was first put forth by President Chirac and British Premier Tony Blair at the Anglo-
French Summit in November 1999. They “crossed the Rubicon” of European defense by calling: “On the
European Union at the Helsinki Summit to set itself the goal of Member States, cooperating together, being able to deploy rapidly and then sustain combat forces which are militarily self-sufficient up to
Corps level with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and combat support and other combat service support (up to 50’000-60’000 men) and appropriate naval and air combat elements. All these forces should have the full range of capabilities necessary to undertake the most demanding crisis management tasks.”428 Both Blair and Chirac sought to reassure Washington that the initiative would not undermine NATO and the Transatlantic partnership. They insisted that their plan would strengthen the Alliance by addressing some of the European military weaknesses that were highlighted during the Kosovo conflict. They also noted that NATO leaders had endorsed the principle of a separate European Defense Identity at the Washington Summit. British Premier declared: “It is not an
428 Anglo-French Summit, "Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defense", London, Thursday 25 November 1999, http://www.rcpbml.org.uk/ww99/ww29-22.htm#declaration, (Accessed: 20/01/2007). Paragraph. 5.
UNIGE / SES - 166 - Olivier Brighenti Part II attempt in any shape or form to supplant or compete with NATO. NATO for Britain remains the cornerstone of our defense. But it is necessary for us, in circumstances where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged [emphasis added], that we are able to act in circumstances where it is in our interest to do so.” President Chirac echoed this view: “The Anglo-French defense proposals have absolutely no negative consequences for NATO. They reinforce NATO, in reality.”429 Although the declaration does not endorse the “NATO first” concept wished by Washington, it states: “NATO remains the foundation of our collective defense and will continue to have an important role in crisis management. We expect
NATO and the EU to develop a close and confident relationship.”430 Thus, the question of the “right of first refusal” and the place of NATO in the new European security architecture is omnipresent and will be at the heart of the “Helsinki debate”. When asked in London if NATO would be given an effective right of first refusal to intervene in a crisis, President Chirac dismissed the question as “very theoretical.”
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook echoed this pragmatic view: “In any developing crisis, there would be parallel discussions in NATO and the EU. America has a very clear choice if it wants to be involved.
There is no decoupling.”431 Therefore, the declaration contains language that creates concerns in
Washington. At the heart of the “Transatlantic disagreement” lies inevitably the concept of autonomy.
Washington still refers to the ESDP as the ESDI decided in Berlin and stresses on the “separable but not separate capabilities” according to the terms of the Berlin and Washington Summits. At the wake of the Helsinki Summit, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen reiterated Washington’s concerns about the
“subordination” of the ESDP to the Alliance and the degree of “autonomy” that the United States was ready to accept. While stressing on the importance of improving Europe’s military capabilities, he outlined: “Allies will have to spend more on defense, if they want to measure up to NATO’s military requirements and establish a European Security and Defense Identity that is separable but not separate from NATO.”432
429 Quoted in: Buerkle Tom, "EU Force No Threat To NATO, Allies Say: Blair and Chirac Want Europe to Have Rapid Reaction Capability," International Herald Tribune, London, Friday 26 November 1999, p.1. 430 Anglo-French Summit, "Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defense", London, Thursday 25 November 1999, http://www.rcpbml.org.uk/ww99/ww29-22.htm#declaration, (Accessed: 20/01/2007). Paragraph. 4. 431 Quoted in : Buerkle Tom, "EU Force No Threat To NATO, Allies Say: Blair and Chirac Want Europe to Have Rapid Reaction Capability," International Herald Tribune, London, Friday 26 November 1999, p. 1. 432 Cohen William S, "Europe Must Spend More on Defense," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Monday 6 December 1999, p. A. 27.
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The Helsinki Summit formally endorsed the Franco-British proposals and can be considered as the
“founding act” of the ESDP. Although many decisions had already been taken at the Cologne Summit, the Helsinki declaration formally outlined Europe’s future defense architecture. As outlined by Philippe
Gordon, one of the major breakthrough of the Helsinki declaration: “Is that it is not a call to revive the eternally moribund WEU, Europe’s ostensible defense arm, but a plan to transfer responsibility for defense and security to the EU, an organization backed by real political will and momentum.”433
Unlike the Cologne Declaration, the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions were more cautious on the relationship between the ESDP to NATO. Although the “NATO first” concept and the “right of first refusal” are absent, the declaration makes it clear that the EU missions will take place where NATO is not engaged. It reads: “The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged [emphasis added], to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.” Furthermore the document states: modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO taking into account the needs of all EU Member States.” Concerning non-
EU European NATO members the Presidency conclusions are relatively clear: “Appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management”434 In order to implement the ESD,P the Member States committed themselves to what has been labeled “headline goals”. It was decided that by the year 2003, the EU “should be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the
Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or
50’000-60’000 persons).” These forces should be “self sufficient with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements”. EU Member States “should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high
433 Gordon Philip H, "Their Own Army?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4, (July/August 2000), p. 12. 434 European Council Presidency Conclusions. "Presidency Conclusions: Common European Policy on Security and Defense," European Council Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. Paragraph. 27.
UNIGE / SES - 168 - Olivier Brighenti Part II readiness. They must be able to sustain such as deployment for at least one year”435 The main aim of the Headline Goal is that EU states should have enough forces available to form an army corps which should be self-sufficient in terns of logistics, intelligence and communication. This army corps should be ready for use in cases where NATO as a whole or the United States chose not to be involved. To make the Headline Goal task force possible the EU decided: “to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit.”436 Thus, the creation of the Headline Goals with the necessary structures for decision-making, operational management and coordination with NATO is a very clear and concrete commitment that the
EU wants to pursue a “genuine European security architecture”. For the first time, the EU, as a whole seems to have become serious about defense.
5.8. The United States and the ESDP Project: Maximizing U.S. Power in European Security Affairs?
My central task throughout this section has been to explain how events have unfolded since the St-Malo declaration in 1998. I have tired to highlight why the United States was reluctant to the creation of an
“autonomous” ESDP launched in 1998 in St-Malo. I have analyzed the period from the St-Malo declaration to the Helsinki Summit, voluntarily ending this research at that period. I chose to focus on that specific phase since it is the “founding act” of the ESDP. A lot has been done from the year 2000 to nowadays, but it is mainly in the realm of implementing the Helsinki Headline Goals. Therefore, the interesting part for this dissertation is not the operational phase of the ESDP but how events unfolded until the Helsinki breakthrough. In this section I will focus on the United States reaction to this major shift
435 Ibidem, ANNEX,1 Military Capabilities for Petersberg Tasks. Paragraph 2. 436 Those areas are covered by the 1996 Berlin agreement, and come principally from the United States. Thus the EU is enhancing its capabilities in case “NATO as a whole” would not be engaged. It was decided: “to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means; to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States; to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command; to increase the number of readily deployable troops; to enhance strategic sea lift capacity. In order to implement the Headline Goals the EU decided to set up new permanent political and military bodies within the EU Council. Thus the decision-making process will be intergovernmental and not supranational. They decided to create: A) A standing Political and Security Committee in Brussels, including national representatives at senior / ambassadorial level. B) The military committee of chiefs of defense, represented by military delegates. C) The military staff to provide military expertise and support to the CESDP. Furthermore as it was decided in Cologne, the EU designed former Secretary Genera of NATO Javier Solana as high representative for the CEFSP as well as Secretary General of the WEU.” Ibidem, ANNEXE 1, Decision Making.
UNIGE / SES - 169 - Olivier Brighenti Part II in the Transatlantic Partnership. I will analyze the United States’ reaction to the ESDP initiative as well as the implications for the Transatlantic partnership and for the U.S. hegemony in European security affairs.
As it is now the case after every European attempt to reinforce its defense architecture, the official language in Washington in one of support. Just after the Helsinki Summit, Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott argued that: “there should be no confusion about America’s position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own, period, end of the debate. At Washington we reached a basic understanding. We would look to NATO as the preferred institution to act "wherever possible." At the same time, we recognized that the Alliance might not act. And in those circumstances, we agreed to make NATO assets and capabilities available to the European Union.”437 The decisions taken in Helsinki were all designed to take into account the concerns expressed by the United States. The Helsinki Declaration can be viewed as a direct answer to
Madeleine Albright’s three D’s as well as a call for greater burdensharing within the Alliance.
Consequently, the Helsinki Summit made it clear that the role of ESDP and more specifically the
Headline Goals were not designed to compete with NATO, but to have an autonomous capacity to launch military operations in crisis where NATO, as a whole, was not engaged. As outlined by Stanley
Sloan, the United States was the invisible guest at the table of each of these meetings (St-Malo,
Cologne, Helsinki).438 Europeans, including France, clearly understood that the only way the EU could develop a ESDP that would not jeopardize NATO’s role and the American commitment to Europe would have to take U.S. interests and concerns fully into account. Although Strobe Talbott’s speech seemed to have acknowledged the creation of an “autonomous ESDP,” the Transatlantic debate on the European architecture is far from over. On the contrary, the United States views the “European autonomy strive” in very negative terms. The EU efforts to create a CESDP backed by credible military means naturally provoked concerns in Washington about key elements of the relationship between ESDP and NATO and its consequences on the American hegemonic role in the Alliance.
437 Talbott Strobe, "The State of the Alliance: An American Perspective", Brussels, 15 December 1999, (Speech to the North Atlantic Council), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991215c.htm, (Accessed: 02/02/2007). 438 Sloan Stanley R, "The United States and European Defense," Chaillot Papers, vol. 39, no. 1, (April 2000), p. 19.
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Three key elements remained unclear and caused U.S. uneasiness with the ESDP project. First of all, the aspect related to NATO’s primacy. Although the Helsinki Presidency Report and the Presidency
Conclusions addressed Washington’s concerns on the role of NATO, it did not contain the idea of
“NATO first”. The United States is concerned whether NATO will be consulted before any independent
European military action will be undertaken. At the insistence of Great Britain, Germany and the
Netherlands, European leaders agreed in Helsinki that Europe would deploy forces on its own only in situations where the Alliance, i.e. the United States, had decided not to get involved. Although British and French officials have been very clear on that matter, Washington requests guarantees that its
European allies will always discuss security crisis in NATO before trying to tackle them on their own through the ESDP. French Defense Minister Alain Richard said: “that’s the condition, that’s the agreement.”439 British Premier reassured the United States when he stated: “My vision for Britain is as a bridge between the EU and the US, The EU and the US standing together, coming closer, is the single most urgent priority for the new international order, for reasons of economic development and for reasons of global security”440 The problem of order in the decision making process is crucial for the
United States since the “right of first refusal” is at the heart of its preponderance on the Alliance. The
“Berlin Plus” agreements stated that the EU would have a presumed access to Alliance assets in case the United States were not involved in military operations. Thus if the EU used NATO assets, the U.S. preponderance would not be questioned.
In case the EU would not rely on NATO assets is also a source of concern for Washington. In fact, the
Helsinki pledge for dialogue, consultation and cooperation is subject to: “the full respect for the decision- making autonomy of the EU”.441 In the case of a EU operation without the recourse to NATO assets, the non-European NATO members would have to be invited on a decision of the Council.442 Hence although the Helsinki Summit clearly pledges that the ESDP is based on the principle of “where NATO as a whole is not engaged,” Washington fears that this mechanism might endanger its preponderance and that
439 Quoted in: Whitney Craig G, "Military Posture of Europe to Turn More Independent," The New York Times, New York, Monday 13 December 1999, p. 1. 440 Quoted in: Parker Andrew, "U.S. Makes NATO Plea Despite Blair Speech," The Financial Times, London, Tuesday 23 November 1999, p. 2. 441 European Council Presidency Conclusions. "Presidency Conclusions: Common European Policy on Security and Defense," European Council Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. Paragraph 28. 442 Ibidem, Annexe 1, Consultation and Cooperation with non-EU Countries and with NATO.
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ESDP operations can be conducted outside of Washington’s leadership. The United States dreads that, on the long run, NATO (the U.S.) will endure as Europe’s pivotal security organization. Europe could be, on the long term, capable of taking autonomous military actions without NATO assets and without first asking the United States. This could spell the end of NATO dominated by the United States. Although a capable Europe would relieve the United States of some of the military weight in European security, the long term consequences are dear. The combined economic, political and military influence would enable
Europe to become a powerful rival to U.S. hegemony on the world stage.443 In order to maintain its influence on the ESDP, U.S. officials made it very clear that: “even if Washington decides not to send troops, we still want to be involved in the decision-making process from the beginning.”444
The second source of concern is closely linked to the question of “NATO first”. The United States is concerned about the degree of autonomy of the ESDP and its further development. The United States sees the ESDP as an independent European security policy without U.S. input and control. In other words, the Helsinki conclusions implies that the EU was preparing for at least two types of capabilities and operations. First of all, its own operations without the recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, and EU-led operations with NATO assets. Thus, the ESDP is seen in Washington as a rival to the ESDI within NATO decided at the Washington Summit. As defined by Alexander Moens: “The ESDP definition of “autonomous action” includes a much greater degree of its own mission and control over decision- making and NATO assets once they have been assigned to the EU operations by the Alliance.”445 At the
EU Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels in November 2000, the EU Defense Ministers gave the ESDP a concrete expression by announcing the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).446
This created a major Transatlantic clash on the degree of Europeanization that was acceptable for
Washington. The United States viewed the RRF with strong skepticism. For Washington, the RRF could jeopardize its position on the continent, depending on how it was implemented.447 The United States
443 See : Van Ham Peter, "Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship," Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 2, (June 2000), p. 224. 444 Evans Michael, "U.S. Insists on NATO Priority over EU Force," The Times, London, 23 November 1999, p. 4. 445 Moens Alexander, "ESDP, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance," In. Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy, edited by Howorth Jolyon & Keeler John T.S, (New York: Palgrave McMillan), 2003, p. 31. 446 See : European Defense Ministers. "Capabilities Commitment Conference," Brussels, 20-21 November 2000. 447 Secretary of Defense William Cohen pointed out in October 2000 that the EU draft “catalogue of forces” for meeting the Headline Goal included requirements that were very similar if not identical to those identified in the
UNIGE / SES - 172 - Olivier Brighenti Part II had argued that operations undertaken under the new European force had to be coordinated and planned under the mantle of NATO. It was unclear whether Europe would develop its own planning and commanding structures. Although French Defense Minister Alain Richard had been very clear on that matter, France had an ambiguous language and pushed the autonomy issue further. French Defense
Minister Alain Richard said: “We certainly have a different view, that all military planning must be done through NATO.”448 French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin said: “The Nice Summit this weekend will put in effect the resolution of the Fifteen to create new institutions and autonomous military capabilities.”449
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen made a very strong statement at the meeting of NATO defense Ministers in Brussels. He made it clear that the new RRF had to be subordinated to NATO and if it was not the case, the United States could re-evaluate its committment to European security. William
Cohen couldn’t be more straightforward when he said: “The United States is strongly committed to
NATO as an institution, but much will depend upon how the Europeans, in fact, shape their plans for military force that could work with NATO and also handle small crises alone.”450 The United States stressed that it would not accept a distinct planning structure that could duplicate NATO. For
Washington, the Deputy SACEUR would be in charge of planning the EU-led operations even if the EU decided to act without NATO assets.451 He said: “As long as there is openness, transparency and a non- competitive relationship, then the United States will remain committed. But if, in fact, the capabilities that were identified as being needed are not filled, if, in fact, we only have verbal commitments or lip service being paid to developing capabilities, if, in fact, we have a competing institution that is established, then
Defense Capabilities Initiative of NATO. Capabilities such as strategic lift, deployable C31, precision-guided munitions etc that were needed for the Petersberg tasks, would logically be the same as those needed by the Allies for NATO in leading crisis operations. Thus, the Europeans had to carry out their promises before trying to duplicate NATO’s capabilities. 448 Quoted in: Hamilton Douglas & Aldinger Charles, "EU Force Could Spell NATO's End," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Wednesday December 6 2000, p. A. 28. 449 Quoted in: La Guardia Anton & Smith Michael, "France Snubs America over Euro Army," The Daily Telegraph, London, Thursday 7 December 2000, p. 14. 450 Cohen William S. "Speech to the NATO Defense Ministers," Brussels, 5 December 2000. 451 William Cohen proposed at the informal meeting of Defense Ministers in Birmingham that ESDP should be able to count on NATO operational and defense capabilities at all times, whether NATO is involved or not. In addition, he called for one collaborative, unitary defense planning system for all the scenarios other than the defense of NATO territory and with the participation of all twenty-three countries (EU and NATO members). Finally he advocated that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander be the ‘strategic coordinator and force generator’ and thus the linchpin in the new ESDP-NATO arrangement. The underlying logic behind Cohen’s proposal is clear. If planning remains centralized in NATO’s integrated military command, the planned EU defense force would never be likely to develop a role outside of the Alliance. For a good overview see: Moens Alexander, "European Defense: The Case for New Governance," International Journal, vol. 56, no. 2, (Spring 2001), pp. 270-273.
UNIGE / SES - 173 - Olivier Brighenti Part II it would be inconsistent with military effectiveness. If, in fact, there was any element of using the force structure in a way to simply to set up a way to set up a competing headquarters, a competitive headquarters not being the most militarily efficient or desirable. If all of these factors are not taken into account, then NATO could become a relic of the past”452 The U.S. vision was backed by London and most of the EU members. A British official commented the French approach and said: “This is about internal French politics. Jospin is talking about defense to increase his profile, because defense is traditionally a presidential issue. What France has signed up to in its capacity as president of the EU is that the EU force is tied to NATO.”453 French President Jacques Chirac opened the summit in Nice on
December 7 by insisting that the new rapid reaction force must be independent of NATO and not subordinated to it, shrugging Cohen’s warnings.454 The Nice Summit final declaration made the usual bows to NATO. Although it did not use the term of “NATO first”, the RRF will operate only when NATO as a whole is not engaged.455 NATO will be consulted prior to any military action undertaken by the EU.
The Presidency Conclusions state: “In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged [emphasis added], to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace- keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This does not involve the establishment of a European army [emphasis added]. The commitment of national resources by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions. As regards the
452 Cohen William S. "Speech to the NATO Defense Ministers," Brussels, 5 December 2000. 453 Quoted in : La Guardia Anton & Smith Michael, "France Snubs America over Euro Army," The Daily Telegraph, London, Thursday 7 December 2000, p. 14. 454 At a press conference on December 7, President Chirac seemed again to be pressing for a European military force separated from NATO. “Coordinated, but independent” said Chirac. President Chirac found little support for his vision of an independent European force, with Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands pushing to ensure NATO remained the cornerstone. At another press conference two days later, Chirac backed off his previous assertion. When asked why “independent” had not appeared in the declaration, Chirac replied: “The word independent makes no sense. It was not the point. It was not the issue at all. The point was for the European Union to be able to step on the world stage and play a role. The development taking place is in perfect harmony with the Atlantic Alliance.” He called NATO: “The very foundation of our defense” and added: “We feel the European Defense Initiative strengthens the Atlantic Alliance and does not weaken it.” Quoted in: Richburg Keith B, "European Military Force To Cooperate with NATO," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Saturday 9 December 2000, p. A. 22. 455 The RRF will have its own military staff. But in accordance with Washington’s wishes, it will number fewer than hundred most of them acting as advisers based at the EU headquarters. The RRF will have no proper planning, logistics or operational capability of its own.
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Member States concerned, NATO remains the basis of the collective defense of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management. The development of the ESDP will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Transatlantic link. This development will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the management of crises with due regard for the two organizations decision-making autonomy. [emphasis added]”456 Here lies a major point of discord with
Washington. It is the question of the primacy of NATO over EU autonomy. The Nice Declaration made a very clear distinction between situations where NATO assets and capabilities would be involved and where the EU would act with its own capabilities. In the first case: “operational planning will be carried out by the Alliance’s planning bodies. For autonomous EU operations, planning will be carried out within one of the European strategic headquarters.”457 Thus, for EU-led operations without the recourse to
NATO assets, the EU will be entirely autonomous. This is directly linked to the famous “right of first refusal”. It poses a serious problem to the United States since it questions the nature of the primacy of
NATO over the EU. As Robert Hunter outlined: “This issue of the locus of planning could create serious impediment to making decisions on the basis of the agreed principle of where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. That bridge could not be crossed until NATO had a chance to review a situation, plan for it, and then judge whether it would or would not be engaged; the ESDP proposal for a bifurcated planning system pre-supposed that the ‘NATO engaged’ issue had been decided even before the locus for planning could be agreed upon.”458 Washington would have preferred this distinction to have been made by NATO. It would have reaffirmed the primacy of NATO and delegated to the EU the missions where NATO would not have been engaged as a whole. For the EU, the decision to act without recourse to NATO assets is clearly a European one. Thus, the debate on the degree of European autonomy and the primacy of NATO is an enduring one and has not been solved yet. For the United
States, the primacy of NATO is non-negotiable. Although the Nice phrasing may give the impression that the EU has achieved a high degree of autonomy, it remains very theoretical. In practice, NATO and
456 European Council Presidency Conclusions. "Common European Security and Defense Policy," European Council Nice, 7-9 December 2000. Annexe VI. 457 European Council Presidency Conclusions. "Common European Security and Defense Policy," European Council Nice, 7-9 December 2000. Annexe VI to VI, Arrangements concerning Non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidate for accession to the EU, Title III, point B. 458 Hunter Robert E, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND Publishing), 2002, p. 112.
UNIGE / SES - 175 - Olivier Brighenti Part II the United States still have the main planning and operational capabilities the EU needs if it wants to undertake important military operations. Therefore, in practice the primacy of NATO is guaranteed and there is no independent European planning structure that could jeopardize and duplicate NATO’s planning and command structures. British Premier Tony Blair said at the issue of the Summit: “We wouldn’t agree to anything that meant that you were setting up European defense as a rival to NATO.”
British foreign Minister Robin Cook echoed this idea: “The document gives us all Britain wants. In the terms of the basis of the link to NATO, the access to NATO planning capacity, the use of a NATO chain of command, it also gives everything Bill Cohen wanted as well.”459 In the “real world,” the Nice
Declaration gave NATO the right of first refusal over military operations. Thus, as planning remains centralized in NATO’s integrated military command, the ESDP remains under the custody of NATO and the leadership of the United States. By relying on NATO’s headquarters for planning and military capabilities, Europeans have implicitly decided to give the United States veto power over European military operations.460 Although the Nice Declaration is NATO-friendly and enables the EU to fulfill important operations and share more equally the burdens of European defense, there will always be attempts for greater autonomy in the EU. As a corollary, the United States will always block initiatives that can jeopardize its preponderance in European security affairs. This can be explained very simply. In a unipolar world with no major threats on the European continent, the United States has a virtual monopoly on NATO’s military capabilities, commanding and planning structures. In a unipolar world, the hegemon will be jealous of its power and will strive to maximize its position in the system. It will oppose every development that might improve the relative power of the EU. As outlined by Charles Kupchan:
459 Quoted in: Groom Brian, "Leaders in Accord over Military Plan Defense Unanimous," The Financial Times, London, Saturday 9 December 2000, p. 5. 460 At the press conference in Nice a European diplomat correctly summarized the situation: “You could theoretically think of a possibility of an operation in which NATO didn’t want to be involved and did not want to have happen. The U.S. led organization could block if it did not offer backup support. For the French, even the idea of an implicit American veto is difficult to take.” Another senior diplomat said: “What the Brits are saying, and what most other NATO countries are saying, is that if you want to have NATO assets, then the planning and control has to be NATO. What we don’t need to do is set up some kind of shell operation that duplicates NATO’s command and control and planning.” Quoted in: “Richburg Keith B, "European Military Force To Cooperate with NATO," The Washington Post, Washington D.C, Saturday 9 December 2000, p. A 22.
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“At the end of the day, the U.S. is essentially saying that it welcomes more European defense capability, but that it really is not interested in sharing power with the EU; Washington enjoys calling the shots.”461
461 Kupchan Charles A, "In Defence of European Defence: an American Perspective," Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, (June 2000), p. 28.
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6. European Military Integration 1945-1961: Bipolarity and The United States’ Offshore Balancing Strategy
Throughout the previous chapters I have shown that in a unipolar world the hegemon pursues a strategy of power maximization. The international distribution of power determines the hegemon’s strategy because power concentration and the peculiar balance of power produce constraints, temptations and incentives. The unipolar distribution of power provides the hegemon with the structural incentives to pursue power-maximizing strategies. This is not the case in a bipolar or multipolar distribution of power where different poles co-exist and can constraint and check one another’s strategic choices. Contrary to what I claim, scholars such as Melvyn Leffler and Christopher Layne have argued that the United States pursued a strategy of preponderance in the immediate aftermath of World War II and not one of offshore balancing.462 Although it is true that the United States was the most powerful state at the end of the war,
I argue that at least until the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, and to some extend until 1961, the United States has pursued a strategy of offshore balancing and unreservedly pushed for military integration in order to create a “third force” as a way to withdraw its troops from the
European continent. Layne writes: “The obvious alternative to hegemony would have been an offshore balancing policy of restoring as quickly as possible Western Europe’s capacity to act as an independent pole of power, and thence passing to it the buck of containing the Soviet Union. […] What is revealing, however is that American strategists were hostile to the very notion of adopting an offshore balancing
462 According to Layne : “The core assumption of U.S. post war European grand strategy was that either a revision to multipolarity within Europe, or Western Europe’s re-emergence as an independent pole of power in international politics would be inimical to American interests. To prevent these outcomes, the United States followed a sophisticated grand strategy of subordination, or denationalization, that established U.S. hegemony over Western Europe. One track of this grand strategy was to transform Western Europe into an American protectorate and thereby negate Western Europe incentives to acquire the capabilities that would allow it to act autonomously in the realm of defense and foreign policy.” Layne Christopher, "The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon," Security Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, (Winter 2002/2003), p. 147. Leffler argues that the United States had such important stakes in Europe that it would have established its hegemony even with the absence of the Soviet threat. See: Leffler Melvyn P, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, (Standford: Standford University Press), 1993, 711 p. My argument borrows much from Trachtenberg, Rosato and McAllister, who all argue that until 1954, far from searching hegemony, the United States promoted a strategy of offshore balancing. My argument from 1954 onwards is very similar to the one developed by Christopher Layne. See: McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, 283. p, Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, 515. p, Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, 424. p.
UNIGE / SES - 178 - Olivier Brighenti Part II strategy. This is evidenced by their firm rejection of the very idea of Europe becoming an independent
‘Third Force? In international politics.”463 I reject his claim and argue that the failure of the EDC as an offshore balancing strategy marked the beginning of the U.S. grand strategy of preponderance on the
European continent. The failure of European military integration combined with the unresolved German question and the Soviet threat turned Western Europe into an American protectorate. The United States had never sought until 1954 to build a European hegemony. The empirical evidence brought throughout this section will strengthen my claim that pressures from the international structure pushed the United
States to pursue a strategy of offshore balancing until 1954 in order to reverse the structure from a bipolar to a multipolar configuration.464 The United States and the “NATO solution” were in fact reluctantly “invited” to dominate Europe.465 As early as 1948, the Director of the office of European
Affairs John Hickerson had: “envisaged the creation of a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say ‘no’ both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should seem so to require.”466 As outlined by Trachtenberg: “The
American government had long favored the ‘European Solution’. To be sure, Byrnes in Stuttgart in 1946, and then Marshall and Truman in 1948, had given certain assurances about long-term American commitment to the defense of Europe. But many American policymakers had come to think of the U.S. presence as a king of crutch. It might be necessary for the time being, but eventually the Europeans needed to come together and take over primary responsibilities for their own defense. America could then withdraw all or most of their forces.”467 The distribution of power resulting from the end of World
War II required the United States to pursue an offshore balancing strategy. Thus, a least until 1954 and in some respect until 1961 the United States was the primary supporter of a supranational European
463 Layne Christopher, "The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon," Security Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, (Winter 2002/2003), p. 148. 464 My claim is that Europe as an “integrated third power block” was favored in the U.S. offshore balancing. On the contrary, reversion to a multipolar balance of power system within Europe was Washington’s worst nightmare. The integrated European pole of power is the first step for promoting the evolution towards a multipolar international structure. 465 For the “Empire by Invitation” formula see: Lundestad Geir, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe: 1945-1952," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 23, no. 3, (1998), pp. 263-277. 466 Memorendum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), Washington D.C, 28 January 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,, p. 11. 467 Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 114.
UNIGE / SES - 179 - Olivier Brighenti Part II defense community that could become a “third power block” alongside the United States to contain the
Soviet threat. In other words, in the mid-fifties, the United States actively promoted a multipolar world.
Acting as an offshore balancer meant that the United States promoted a European supranational pole of power capable of defending Europe while “solving” the German problem. In other words, Washington could have passed the buck of containing the Soviet Union to the Europeans and stay on the sidelines regarding European security affairs.
Thus my central question is why did the United States pursue a strategy of offshore balancing when the
United States emerged from the war in a position of unparalleled geopolitical preeminence? Why did the
United States unreservedly back European military integration if its aim, as some argue, was to establish U.S. preponderance on the continent? Why did the United States push for a “third force” in the early fifties while systematically opposing every single attempt to create an “autonomous” European defense since the end of the Cold War? The answer to these questions lies in the peculiar distribution of power resulting from the end of World War II. In order to answer these questions I will focus on the various attempts of military integration that took place from the early 50’s to the early 60’s. Drawing on these cases, I will demonstrate that the structure affects the hegemon’s strategic choices. I will show that the bipolar distribution of power coupled with the Soviet threat and the “German Question” pushed the United States towards a strategy of offshore balancing and the creation of a third force. In other words, as outlined by McAllister: “Since from the U.S. perspective, political unity was all Europe needed to become a fully capable third force in the international system, the EDC was a crucial element in transforming the structure from a latent tripolar to a fully tripolar system.”468 I will highlight how, in a bipolar world configuration, the United States pushed to strengthen European unity in defense matters while it unreservedly tried to divide Europeans throughout the 1990’s. Thus, in other words, I will show that bipolarity and multipolarity make offshore balancing as a general strategy of “burden shifting” possible and advantageous while the absence of a peer competitor coupled with the unprecedented
468 McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, pp. 171-172.
UNIGE / SES - 180 - Olivier Brighenti Part II primacy of the hegemon in world politics, make my theory of power-maximization the “logical” grand strategy in a unipolar world.469
6.1. The United States and European Military integration: From the EDF to the EDC
In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s the double question of the Soviet threat and the German rearmament became a central aspect of the Transatlantic dialogue. Although Washington had always favored economic integration as the first stage of a European Western federation, the international tensions of the early 50’s made military integration a priority.470 Hence, the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 as well as the explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 changed America’s plans. Thus, for
Washington, the underlying logic was that the Western powers had to build up a system that would provide for the defense of Europe against the Soviet threat, while enabling Germany to rearm on a non- nationalistic basis. By July 1950 the general consensus was that Germany had to be rearmed in order to help contain the Soviet Union. For President Truman, the issue was characteristically very clear:
“Without Germany” he said, “the defense of Europe was a rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic
Ocean. With Germany there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East […] Any map will show it, and little arithmetic will prove what the addition of
German manpower means to the strength of the joint defense of Europe.”471 The central question in
Washington was not whether Germany should be rearmed, as it had been the case since the end of the war, but how could Germany be rearmed without endangering the European balance of power.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson told President Truman: “The question is not whether Germany should
469 I do not mean that the outcomes are always those wished by the hegemon. Thus, in some cases, power maximization is not the best grand strategy to adopt. What I mean by “logical” grand strategy is that the international distribution of power pushes the hegemon to adopt power-maximizing strategies although it could sometimes be best served by restraint or cooperation. 470 American planners thought that economic recovery was the number one priority. Quite logically, Europe had to recover its economic power to be able to build up its military apparatus. On the other hand, before September 1949, a Soviet attack on Europe seemed remote. The Soviet Union had been devastated by the war and its economic and military capabilities were ruined. Secondly the United States had the monopoly of the nuclear weapon to deter any Soviet attack. The explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb dramatically changed the balance of power in Europe. Suddenly the American atomic superiority was of less importance and the imbalance of conventional forces between Europe and the Soviet Union became clear. 471 Quoted in: Fursdon Edward, The European Defense Community: A History, (New York: St Martins Press), 1980, p. 83.
UNIGE / SES - 181 - Olivier Brighenti Part II be rearmed but rather how this could be done without disrupting anything else we are doing and without putting Germany into a position to act as the balance of power in Europe.”472 So how did the United
States react to this change in the international balance of power? The answer is straightforward. The
United States pursued a strategy of offshore balancing and promoted the creation of a strong military united Europe in order to contain the Soviet Union. As outlined by Sebastian Rosato: “They [The United
States] responded to heighten international tensions in 1950 by calling for the creation of a European
Defense Force, rejected the Pleven Plan as a disguised attempt to prevent rather than further military integration, and endorsed the EDC … This consistency of behavior reflected a clear strategic logic: the federation of Western Europe would create an entity capable of balancing the Soviet Union while simultaneously preventing the Germans from dominating their western neighbors. And this would in turn, enable the Americans to achieve their primary goal of withdrawing from the European arena.”473
6.1.1. The European Defense Force: McCloy and the Creation of a Genuine European Army The first attempt to create a “third force” capable of containing the Soviet Union while firmly anchoring
Germany to Europe was the European Defense Force proposed by the American High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy. Although his initiative failed, it is nevertheless very interesting for this research since it proposed the creation of a “genuine European Army”. Thus, contrary to what has been done since the end of the Cold War, McCloy’s initiative was a genuine attempt to pursue an “offshore balancing strategy.” McCloy’s European Defense Force was the first American attempt to create a supranational defense force with the ultimate goal of creating a European power bloc. McCloy thought to embed German rearmament within the framework of a unified Europe. In a cable to Secretary of
State Acheson, McCloy wrote on 3 August 1950: “Many factors have led me to conclude that the time in now ripe for a basic solution of the problem of defense of Western Europe. […] We must recognize that if Russia overruns Western Europe we will have no real chance to re-create its civilization by liberating it months or years later. Thus we must plan an effective defense to prevent invasion by the Soviets. I think there is no other alternative solution.” McCloy makes it very clear that it is imperative to rearm Germany
472 Acheson Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton Publishing), 1969, p. 132. 473 Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, pp. 233-234.
UNIGE / SES - 182 - Olivier Brighenti Part II in order to guarantee an effective Western European Security. On the other hand he is firmly opposed to the creation of a German national army that could on the long run threaten its neighbors. He continues:
“To defend Western Europe effectively will obviously require real contributions of German resources and men. I am absolutely opposed to re-creating any German national army now or in the foreseeable future. In my opinion to do so would be a tragic mistake. It would undermine much that we have so far achieved in democratizing German society.” Thus McCloy proposes the “creation of a genuine
European Army” in order to “convert our present weakness into real strength.” With the EDF initiative
McCloy solves two of the major U.S. problems. “In addition to defense against Russia” he says “this action [European Army] would contribute to our basic objectives in Western Europe. At one step it would fully integrate Germany into Western Europe and be the best possible insurance against further German aggression.”474 As a result, McCloy’s call for a European Army is a real attempt to integrate European military forces. In a note to President Truman, McCloy said: “We should make certain that the European army is genuine and not merely a hollow shell or façade and that there are adequate safeguards against its later transformation into national forces. We should visualize this European Defense Force as a step on the road to European federation or integration.”475 Working in parallel, the State Department came to the same conclusions as McCloy. The document states: “The creation of a more effective defense system in Western Europe is of critical importance. The inability of the Western forces to protect this vital area of Western civilization from possible Soviet aggression, though realized as a security matter, has now created a problem which is rapidly becoming acute in the psychological and political field.” The document states further, that the “world situation has caused a rapid increase in the feeling to unite
Europe in all fields possible including military.” Like McCloy, the State Department document tends to see military integration as a way to guarantee security in Europe and the full assimilation of Germany within a Western European federation. “We have long conceived, however, that an effective European integration, including Western Germany, would provide the basis for eventual German contribution to
474 The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State (Acheson), Frankfurt, 3 August 1950, 11p.m, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,, pp. 180-181. 475 Quoted in: McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 187.
UNIGE / SES - 183 - Olivier Brighenti Part II the common cause in Europe, even in the security field.”476 Thus McCloy’s plan as well as the State
Department document for a EDF, presented a way to prevent the emergence of an independent
German Army by integrating it within a European framework. The State department’s plan was to be
“sacked” by the military establishment that was firmly opposed to McCloy’s plan to rearm Germany. In the view of the Department of Defense, the underlying logic of the EDF would be an administrative nightmare and would heavily delay German rearmament. The Pentagon emphasized that the international situation was so dramatic that they needed German forces to contain the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. They argued that the best way to rearm Germany would be an immediate restoration of German sovereignty coupled with membership to NATO. The underlying logic is that if control over the German units was needed, this could be done through the existing structures of
NATO.477 Along this new line of thinking, Acheson proposed an American plan for Western European defense.478 This is what has been called the “one-package” proposal. In clear, if the Europeans wanted an increase of American troops on the continent and a guarantee of American commitment to Europe:
“they would have to accept German rearmament along the lines worked out in Washington, that is as part of an integrated NATO force, with the Germans having no capacity for independent action.”479
Thus, the American proposal referred to a European Defense Force but not in the terms that had been advocated by McCloy. The integration of European forces would be minimal and German troops would be incorporated with other European forces. The plan didn’t express the initial Pentagon idea of restoring Germany’s sovereignty and admitting it to NATO, but it seems that the general idea would go along those lines. In a cable to the President Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense, Johnson said:
“We are agreed that the European defense force should be subject to political and strategic guidance under NATO. This of course implies eventual German participation in the Treaty Organization. From a
476 U.S. State Department, "Establishment of a European Defense Force: Estimate of the Situation", Washington D.C, 16 August 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,. pp. 212-213. 477 On that aspect see : Schwartz Thomas A, "The 'Skeleton Key': American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, 1949-1954," Central European History, vol. 19, no. 4, (December 1986), pp. 375-377. 478 Dean Acheson describes the American proposal as a “complete revolution in American foreign policy and in the attitude of the American people. The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, New York, 17 September 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,. p. 316. 479 Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 108.
UNIGE / SES - 184 - Olivier Brighenti Part II military viewpoint, it would be desirable that this be done as soon as possible.”480 In New York, the
American proposal was rejected by France. Schumann rejected the rearmament of Germany invocating the impossibility to sell that idea to the French public opinion. So the American strategy of rearming
Germany in the framework of a European Defense Force failed. Acheson understood that the best solution to gain French approval to German rearmament was to give France the initiative. Dean
Acheson hoped that this strategy would come up with a French initiative that would not depart too much from the American proposal. American officials were surprised when the French came up with an entirely new proposition that proved unworkable and was seen in Washington as a way of delaying
German rearmament.
6.1.2. The Pleven Plan for a European Army: Preventing German Rearmament In late October, French Prime Minister proposed the “Pleven” plan for a European Army. The main idea was the creation of a European Army based on the same supranational principles as the Schumann
Plan. Jean Monnet and his staff drafted the French proposal drawing on the model of the Steal and Coal proposal. In order to ensure the European character of the force, the French proposed that integration of the participating national forces would take place at the smallest possible unit. The army would be integrated at the level of a Battalion. The explicit purpose of the French proposal was to prevent the creation of a German Army. West Germany would contribute units to the European Army, but these units would not be allowed to form divisions. There would be no independent German staff or Defense
Minister.481 The idea behind the plan is that it would delay German rearmament for the foreseeable future. Since the basis of the proposal was to prevent German rearmament, it was accepted by the
French National Assembly. As noted by McAllister: “The real significance of the vote was in the concurrent resolution passed by the Assembly noting its approval of the government’s determination not to permit the creation of a German army and General staff.”482 The Pleven plan can be seen as a strategy against German rearmament rather than a plan for a European Army. Therefore, the United
480 The Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the President, Washington D.C, 8 September 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,, p. 277. 481 See: Winand Pascaline, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, (New York: St-Martin's Press), 1993, pp. 26-27. 482 McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 194.
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States and all the NATO members rejected the Pleven plan. They saw it as an attempt to slow down the
German rearmament and prevent military integration. As outlined by Rosato: “Although the Pleven Plan appears to have been based on the same principles as those underlying the ECSC proposal, American officials rejected it on the grounds that it was militarily inefficient and that it constituted a barely concealed attempt to delay German rearmament and consign Germany to second-class status.”483 The
United States rejected the French proposal because they thought it was militarily unsound and jeopardized its plans for an effective European Army that could achieve its main objectives, i.e. containing the Soviet Union while embedding German rearmament in a European security framework.
Acheson dismissed the French proposal because he considered it as: “a plan which is considered militarily unsound by military experts of the NATO countries.” He viewed the plan as: “politically unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of other NATO members, particularly UK, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy; all of whom point out that the French plan in its present form as unacceptable, and even anything remotely resembling it would take at least several years to negotiate and obtain the necessary individual parliamentary approval.” He warned France that a rapid solution had to be found in order to secure the American support. “While we continue to hope” he said “that
France will be both the cornerstone and leader of the Continent, it would be dangerous for France to base their policy on the assumption that American Congress and people or other European countries for that matter will continue to give full support to France, regardless to France’s actions.”484
6.2. The European Defense Community and the U.S. Offshore Balancing Strategy.
In Summer 1951, Acheson reached the conclusion that a European Defense Community would be acceptable as long as it did not delay Germany’s contribution to the defense forces of Europe. My point is not to make the history of the EDC, but to analyze why the United States unreservedly backed a
483 Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, p. 239. 484 The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Embassy in France, Washington D.C, 3 November 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,, pp. 428-429.
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“European solution” instead of the “NATO solution”.485 The U.S. strategy in 1951 remained unchanged.
The goal was to get the Europeans to balance the Soviet Union on their own so the United States could stand on the sidelines and act as an offshore balancer in European security affairs. The only way to accomplish this was for the Europeans to delegate some portions of their sovereignty in military matters to a central and supranational authority. As a consequence, European foreign and military policy would be conducted in a unified matter.486 After the refusal of the Pleven plan by the U.S. Administration,
McCloy and Bruce sought to promote their idea of a genuine European army to General Eisenhower.487
Eisenhower had always been skeptical about the idea of a European Army that he had described as a:
“political unity that does not yet exist”. Privately, Eisenhower had described the European Army as being as: “cockeyed an idea as a dope friend would have figured out.”488 By June 1951, McCloy and Bruce had won the General over their position.489 Eisenhower became increasingly enthusiastic about the idea of European unity and he called for the creation of the United States of Europe. His full support to the
EDC came from his obsession of withdrawing troops from Europe by creating a “third power mass.” He saw in the EDC the permanent solution to the European security problem as well as the only and best way to pass the buck of containing the Soviet Union to the Europeans. European unity was an essential
485 For the best account on the history of the EDC see: Fursdon Edward, The European Defense Community: A History, (New York: St Martins Press), 1980, 360 p. 486 The United States attached enormous importance to the political unification of Europe and supported every single initiative in that direction. It is quite striking that since the end of the Cold War, the exact opposite is happening. As I have highlighted earlier, Washington’s nightmare in a unipolar world is a politically and military united Europe that would generate a “European caucus” inside the Alliance. 487 The successive failures to create a European Army had pushed Acheson to support the rearmament of Germany outside a European force in the so called “Spofford compromise”. This does not mean that Acheson had turned his back to the idea of a European Army, but the imperatives of the moment were such that there was a shift in U.S. priorities. Raising German troops to contain the Soviet Union became the number one priority. Thus, the European Allies would begin at once to develop plans for a European Army, but while these arrangements were being negotiated, German units would be formed and placed, for the time being, under direct NATO command. A European army was seen by Acheson as a long term project. In a cable to Bruce Acheson said: “We favor this solution [European Army] as a long term approach to problem of Eu defense as long as it is clearly a part and under NATO umbrella […] We hope, therefore that a complete and workable Eur army concept can be perfected. All practical steps should be taken in this direction as long as in short run they do not unduly interfere with efficiency of forces for defense of Eur” The Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Embassy of France (Bruce), "German Defense Contribution", Washington D.C, 28 June 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,, p. 802. 488 Quoted in : Schwartz Thomas A, "The 'Skeleton Key': American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, 1949-1954," Central European History, vol. 19, no. 4, (December 1986), pp. 379-380. 489 In June 1951, McCloy arranged for Eisenhower to meet with Jean Monnet. Eisenhower was impressed with Jean Monnet’s arguments. He saw in Monnet’s vision of a united Europe arguments similar to his own conception of post World War II European politics. Since that meeting Eisenhower became the most important proponent of European unity in the U.S. military establishment. He saw the EDC as the best way to implement his ultimate goal: offshore balancing and the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
UNIGE / SES - 187 - Olivier Brighenti Part II solution to the long-term problems facing NATO and the United States. In June 1951 he wrote: “I am coming to believe that Europe’s security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a U.S. of Europe […] it seems scarcely necessary to enumerate the problems that arise out of or are exaggerated by the division of Western Europe into so many sovereign nations.”490 Eisenhower was now willing to take an active part in negotiations, pushing the idea of a European Defense Community.
So by August 1951 the EDC became the official position of the United States.491 Trachtenberg captured very well the essence of the Eisenhower offshore balancing strategy. “There was the initial emergency period when a sizeble American army would be stationed in Europe, lasting perhaps five to ten years.
There would be a second period when Europe would take over the burden of providing for her own ground defense. America at that time would continue to underwrite the defense of western Europe with her strategic nuclear force, but would station only token ground forces, perhaps only a single division, on the continent. And finally there would be a third period when Europe, while remaining friendly with
America, would stand on her own militarily and would emerge as a truly independent ‘power mass’ in world affairs.”492 Thus, along the same logic as for the EDF, the EDC was backed as a means to create a “third force” in Europe in order to contain the Soviet threat. At the lowest price, and with the fewest troops possible in Europe, the U.S. needed to contain the Soviet Union and anchor Germany within a
European framework. Thus, the bipolar world configuration pushed the United States to favor a powerful
European bloc capable of ensuring its own security on the long run. The Europeans, according to
Washington’s strategy, would need to play a more active and independent role in their defense. The corollary to this “degree” of independence means that the United States would have less control over
490 Quoted in: McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 213. Eisenhower understood that the potential of a unified and integrated military Europe would be very capable of containing the Soviet Union by itself. Unity was the only answer to the Soviet threat and the only solution for an American offshore balancing strategy. In a White House meeting in 1951 Eisenhower said: “In Western Europe there are about 350 million people, tremendous industrial capacity, and a highly skilled and educated population”. So why the General asked: “since Europe has all of these resources, is there so great fear of the Russians. Why should Europe be afraid of 190 million backward people?” He said the answer was simple: “there is unity on the part of the Russians and disunity on part of the West.” Every place he went, Eisenhower said: “he recited to officials the advantages which the West possesses. He got everybody to agree that the Western nations could tell Russia to go to hell if they only would get together, raise enough men, and produce enough equipment.” Notes on a Meeting at the White House, Washington, 31 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3, Part. 1,, pp. 450-451. 491 Memorendum from the Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President, Washington D.C, 30 July 1951, Foreign Relations of The United States Vol. 3,, pp. 849-852. 492 Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p.148
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European Security Affairs and that Europe would be capable, on the long run, to act independently.
Some scholars have argued that the United States wanted to maintain its overwhelming leadership in
European security affairs and maximize its position through a EDC under firm NATO (American) control.
I totally disagree with this approach, since the EDC was meant to relieve the United States from the
European burden and enable, on the longer term, to withdraw troops from Europe. The new NATO commander wrote from his European Headquarters: “There is no defense for Western Europe that depends exclusively or even materially upon the existence, in Europe, of strong American units. The spirit must be here and the strength must be produced here. We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What we must do is assist these people [to] regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.”493 In the short term, Eisenhower agreed that there was no alternative to placing American forces in Europe, but he was also convinced that American power was not and could not become a permanent substitute for the development of indigenous European power. He stated: “In any event the present question is how to inspire Europe tp produce for itself those armed forces that, in the long run, must provide the only means by which Europe can be defended.” When questioned on the withdrawal of U.S. troops he said: “While I do not know the length of time that some occupational troops may necessarily be in
Germany, I would say this: If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed.”494 Thus the U.S. idea was to create a power block to share world policing responsibilities and pass the buck to the Europeans. Hence, the U.S. Administration and more specifically the Eisenhower administration consciously intended to make Europe a partner in world affairs. Acheson’s claim was quite clear, the
United States strategic vision was to endorse a European Army and act as an offshore balancer.
Although he saw a European Army as the “long term solution to the problem of European defense as long as it is clearly part of and under the NATO umbrella”, he also claimed that: “it is probably neither practical nor in the best interests of Europe or the US that there should be a US commander in Europe
493 Quoted in: Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 147. 494 Quoted in: McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 213.
UNIGE / SES - 189 - Olivier Brighenti Part II or substantial numbers of US forces on the Continent.”495 Thus as outlined by Rosato: “There is no question that the Americans envisaged a continental commitment in the short term. It is important to note, however, that Acheson spoke of ‘association’ over the longer term. The evidence suggests that what he envisaged was a European defense force that would cooperate closely with the United States, not a transatlantic force manned by Americans and Europeans.”496 Acheson made it clear that the
American presence in Europe was a necessity given the lack of a genuine European defense and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding, he was still thinking in terms ultimately of a purely
European solution. He thought that eventually a European system might evolve out of the U.S. dominated NATO structure enabling the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Europe. In a secret memorandum he stated: “The object should be in the military field, to build on what we have under
General Eisenhower, doing nothing which would confuse that military organization, but using it and stressing it for the purpose of creating a European force in the field. It would be true that at the present and for some time to come, perhaps for a long time, that force would be strengthened and stiffened by
British and American contingents. But it would be a force which, as a military force, would not have to be changed in any fundamental way when ever the time came that the overseas contingents might be withdrawn.”497 The signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952 was a huge victory for Acheson and Truman.
Their long term objectives of third power block seemed at reach.498 Speaking before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Acheson declared that the agreement might lead : “towards the unification of
Western Europe into a federal organization which will be large enough to be strong, vigorous and, we hope in time, to take over its own defense on the basis of strong economic foundations.”499 Thus in
1952, American officials continued to see the EDC and the “third power” hypothesis as the only viable situation. This trend became even clearer when Eisenhower took office in January 1953. For different
495 The Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Embassy of France (Bruce), "German Defense Contribution", Washington D.C, 28 June 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3,, p. 802. 496 Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, p. 243. 497 Memorendum by the Secretary of State (Acheson), "German Rearmament and Problems of the Defense of Europe", Washington D.C, 6 July 1951, Foreign Relations of The United States, vol. 3,, p. 816. 498 Acheson knew well that victory was still far since the EDC Treaty had to be ratified by the 6 nations. He knew too well that ratification in France would be a huge problem. Until the 6 nations had ratified the Treaty, Germany was prohibited from rearming. In other words, the U.S. victory on the EDC was dependent on the French ratification. 499 Quoted in : McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 222.
UNIGE / SES - 190 - Olivier Brighenti Part II reasons, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles were convinced that a failure of the EDC would be a major disaster in European politics. Dulles focused on the internal balance of power in European politics. The failure of the EDC would mean the return of great power rivalries. He claimed: “The history of the past two hundred years in Europe showed that Western Europe would tear itself to pieces unless the Franco-German problem was resolved.” At that moment, he said: “it almost looked as if this were our last chance which would be followed by a return to the Dark Ages if we failed.” He continued by stressing: “it is impossible to exaggerate the importance which we attach to European integration, and the tragic effects which would result if it appeared the movement were dead.”500 Eisenhower, on the other hand, was more concerned about the international balance of power and the containment of the
Soviet Union. He saw the EDC as the only way of ensuring that Europeans could develop the capabilities to fulfill that mission on their own and make it possible for American forces to withdraw from
Europe in a near future.501 Dulles declared: “he and the president thought the EDC was a step which must be taken now for reasons of security against the Soviet Union.”502 Thus, Eisenhower and Dulles were united from the start in the ratification of the EDC as their most important objective. Neither of them were willing to tolerate or accept the idea that there was such a thing as an alternative to the EDC.
Trachtenberg captured very well the essence of Eisenhower’s understanding of the EDC: “If there was a
European Army, there would eventually have to be European political institutions to control that army; the war-making power would have to be centralized; there would be no way to avoid certain pooling of sovereignty. So the EDC would pave the way toward a political unification of Europe, and since a unified
Europe was by far the best solution to the basic strategic problem, the EDC could not be allowed to fail.
Thus the EDC was now considered to be of vital importance, for fundamental political reasons, and not because it was the only structure that would permit German forces to be raised.”503 When Dulles and
Eisenhower were pressed on the need to consider alternatives to the EDC due to the possible failure of the French ratification, Dulles reaction was quite straightforward: “That is just the sort of defeatism which
500 McBride Minutes, Washington, 11 July 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 5,, pp. 1622-1623 501 Eisenhower Library, International Meeting series, File: Bermuda, State Department Report, 5.00 pm, 5 December 1953, p. 1783. 502 Ibidem, p. 1622. 503 Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 122.
UNIGE / SES - 191 - Olivier Brighenti Part II the Eisenhower administration is not going to tolerate in any of its representatives in any position of responsibility for foreign affairs at home or abroad. Livy [the then assistant secretary of state for
European affairs], put out of your mind any concept that there is an alternative or that we’re considering one to the EDC. The EDC is going to go into effect, and it will do so by utilization of the full influence and power of persuasion of the United States government under President Eisenhower and myself.”504
Eisenhower and Dulles knew too well that their long term strategy of withdrawal depended on the ratification of the EDC. The withdrawal might be possible only after the EDC had been established and
European fears about Germany diminished. They knew it would be impossible if the EDC failed and
Germany and France remained antagonists.
Despite America’s constant pressures and although the EDC was a French idea, the French National
Assembly rejected the Treaty on 30 August 1954. This can be seen as the most spectacular American foreign policy defeat in the 1950’s. The failure of the EDC had dramatic consequences on the European security architecture. The United States had favored a strategy of European military integration over the
NATO solution. Thus, the EDC failure ended America’s offshore balancing strategy and opened the door to the NATO solution and the American predominance over the European security architecture. It is interesting to note that Dulles and Eisenhower were not happy at all with the NATO solution and accepted it reluctantly. Dulles made the Administration’s position very clear using a bitter language at the meeting which prepared the “NATO solution”. He declared: “I cannot say at this moment that a renewal of that commitment [US presence in Europe] is possible. I can say, and must repeat that as things stand to-day it is not possible. But if, out of the elements of the situation with which we are
504 Quoted in: McAllister James, No Exit: America and the German Problem 1943-1954, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 225. The determination of the Eisenhower Administration to obtain the ratification of the EDC was so strong that he implemented his claim to use the full influence and power persuasion of the U.S. government. Dulles was using the menace of U.S. retreat from Europe to threaten France and force the ratification. At a meeting of the State-Mutual Security Agency Joint Chief of Staff Dulles said: “From the negotiations standpoint, it is useful to have alternatives. If the French and Germans should come to see that the military position would be tolerable for us if we could hold Turkey, Spain, etc, that would create pressures on them which would not exist if they think we are so committed that we must carry the entire load in the area.” Memorendum of Discussion State-Mutual Security Agency Joint Chief of Staff, Washington D.C, 28 January 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 5, Part 1,, p. 713. At the Paris North Atlantic Council, Dulles made it clear that the failure of the EDC would mean dramatic changes in U.S. policy. He stated: “If, however the European Defense Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonising reappraisal of basic United States policy.” Statement of the Secretary of States (Dulles) to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, 14 December 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 5, Part 1,, p. 563.
UNIGE / SES - 192 - Olivier Brighenti Part II dealing, if using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied to the European Defense Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew a pledge comparable to that which was offered in connection with the European
Defense Community.”505 The idea of strengthening NATO as an alternative to the EDC emerged rapidly after the failure of the EDC. Finally, the NATO solution was settled with the “so called” Paris agreements and provided Germany’s accession to NATO and created the framework for the establishment of the
German army. The new German army was to be integrated into the NATO structure and the SACEUR
(American) power was considerably strengthened. Thus the whole “NATO solution” was based on a very simple premise. American power was at the heart of the system which meant that its viability depended on American leadership and its long term presence on the continent. Thus, the Paris agreements set the roots of the U.S. dominance over European security affairs and put an end to the strategy of offshore balancing favored by Washington. Another dramatic consequence of the French failure to ratify the EDC is that it set the grassroots for the “Franco-American” skepticism and the special
Anglo-American relationship. As early as February 1954, Dulles wrote to Eisenhower: “If France acts negatively on EDC, United States will have to do its best to salvage what it can from wreckage of our policy toward Europe and to reshape its policy. In particular, this will mean coordinating out policy with
United Kingdom so that at least United States and United Kingdom can act together to take important decision on matters relating to European and world affairs. Whether one likes it or not, inevitably under such circumstances, United States and United Kingdom by necessity forced on them by France, will revert to that form of bilateral cooperation which existed during war years and which by its very nature would exclude France from an equal place.”506 Thus, the inability of France to promote some form of autonomous European security architecture after the end of the Cold War can be seen as a direct combination of the non ratification of the EDC. Hence, the combined consequences of U.S.
505 Extemporaneous Statement by the United States Secretary of Defense (Dulles) at the Fourth Plenary Meeting, Washington D.C, 6 October 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 5. Part 2,, p. 1360. 506 Quoted in: Anderson Stephanie B, "Developing Europe into a 'Third Great Power Block': The United States, France and the Failure of the European Defense Community," Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association, Austin Texas, 2005, p. 15.
UNIGE / SES - 193 - Olivier Brighenti Part II preponderance since 1954 and the reinforcement of the special relationship between Great Britain and the United States had dear consequences on the European security architecture until the radical shift in
British policy in St-Malo.
6.3. The Nuclear Sharing Policy: Eisenhower and the Ultimate Strive Towards Offshore Balancing
In this section, I wish to develop briefly Eisenhower’s nuclear sharing policy.507 The nuclear sharing policy can be seen as Eisenhower’s ultimate attempt to pursue his offshore balancing strategy as a means to withdraw U.S. troops and pass the buck to the Europeans. The Paris agreements had finally settled the German question and the containment of the Soviet Union. But to be effective, the “NATO solution” depended on massive American “long term” presence and leadership in European security affairs. Put differently, a non-multilateral NATO that would equate on the short run to an American protectorate. This represented for Eisenhower the worst case scenario. After the failure of the EDC,
Eisenhower was still convinced that America’s Grand Strategy had to be designed along the lines of an autonomous “Third Great Force” capable of ensuring Europe’s security by itself. His statement at the
1955 NSC meeting made no doubt that he was still thinking along the same line. Eisenhower strongly encouraged his cabinet to endorse military integration both privately and publicly: “with even greater emphasis the President repeated the desirability of developing Western Europe as a third great power block, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat.”508 From the mid 1950’s onwards, it became clear that the military balance of power had shifted from a conventional balance to a nuclear one. Thus the question of nuclear weapons became central in protecting Europe from a Soviet aggression. Because if there was to be a war between the
West and the Soviet Union, it would be a nuclear war. NATO’s MC 8 strategy relied entirely on that
507 Scholars have paid little attention to Eisenhower’s nuclear sharing strategy. Seminal works on this aspect are: Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, pp. 272-277, Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, pp. 146-200, Weber Steve, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," International Organization, vol. 46, no. 3, (Summer 1992), pp. 633-680, and Bluth Christoph, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1995, pp. 52-105. 508 National Security Council Meeting, Washington D.C, 21 November 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 19,, p. 151.
UNIGE / SES - 194 - Olivier Brighenti Part II hypothesis. The strategy was based on the assumption that the only way of overcoming the Soviet
Union in case of war was to rely on the very massive use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Eisenhower quickly understood that if the United States was to progressively withdraw from Europe, Europeans had to have a nuclear capability of their own in order to be militarily self-sufficient and emerge as an “independent power mass” in world affairs. That was the only possibility of avoiding that Europe relied heavily on the
United States and the American “urgency presence” in Europe be transformed in an American protectorate. American troops, Eisenhower pointed out in 1956, had been sent to Europe to: “bridge the crisis period during which European forces were building up.”509 Eisenhower complained that the United
States was carrying all the burden to protect Europe and that Europeans were adopting a strategy of free riding. He also understood that this growing free riding attitude was a consequence of the current imbalance of power within the Alliance. America controlled all the strategic weapons and was in command of what was unquestionably the dominant form of military power, i.e. nuclear weapons.
Eisenhower understood that the Europeans would not embark in a costly military buildup if that would not provide them with greater control over their own destiny. Because Eisenhower was convinced that:
“our allies were not going to be willing to fight with bows and arrows while we have guns,” he agreed that the United States should: “be prepared to provide what the NATO nations truly need for their defense.”510 If the United States continued to have the monopoly and the high hand on the strategic weapons, the Alliance would reinforce itself as a “no-multilateral institution” and as a consequence, the
United States would be “trapped” in Europe forever. Thus, in order to get the Europeans to take responsibilities and to create an “independent power block”, the Europeans had to be armed with nuclear weapons. As the evidence proves it, in the mid 50’s Eisenhower was favoring the “multipolarity scenario” over the “deterrence” scenario that had prevailed since the birth of NATO. It is obvious that sharing was above all a political question, not a military one. Nuclear deterrence was credible and
Europe would not be more protected if they had their own nuclear arsenal. Offshore balancing was the underlying logic of that political question. If the United States was willing to share their nuclear arsenal, it would have the unique opportunity for reshaping the post World War international structure from a
509 Quoted in: Weber Steve, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," International Organization, vol. 46, no. 3, (Summer 1992),p. 656. 510 Ibidem: p. 655.
UNIGE / SES - 195 - Olivier Brighenti Part II bipolar to a multipolar world. Nuclear sharing could revive European integration and place Eisenhower’s multipolarity scenario back on the track after the failure of the EDC. It was fully consistent with
Eisenhower’s larger vision of an integrated Europe, independent from the United States. Nuclear integration would have permitted to fulfill the “third force” scenario and as a consequence Eisenhower’s offshore balancing strategy. For Eisenhower, deterrence was a policy that might encourage European on the United States and that was a scenario that had to be avoided. As outlined by Steve Weber: “
From about 1956 to early 1961, the Eisenhower administration spearheaded a direct move towards multilateralism in NATO, through the sharing of nuclear weapons within the Alliance. The rational behind this effort had little to do with the credibility of extended deterrence or other strategic arguments. It was first and foremost a political move which was designed to speed the transformation of Europe into an integrated defense community with an independent nuclear force and which would recast the nature of the balance between East and West.”511 The imbalance of power within the Alliance and the European’s increasing reliance on the United States was precisely due to the fact that the United States had asked the Europeans to pay for conventional forces when security in the end rested on strategic nuclear weapons that only the United States controlled. It is this fundamental paradox that Eisenhower was willing to resolve. In a press conference, Eisenhower stated his idea very boldly: “From the beginning …
I have always been of the belief that we should not deny to our allies what the enemy, what your potential enemy already has.”512 Eisenhower thought that the imbalance within the alliance had to be mended as quickly as possible and the only way to do that was to treat the Allies as such and supply them with the weapons they needed. Eisenhower exclaimed: “For God’s sake let us not be stingy with an ally. We should for instance give our NATO allies the chance to use some of our modern weapons
[…] In point of fact, however, instead of being generous, we treat many of our NATO allies like stepchildren, and then expect them to turn around and commit themselves to fight with us. By such actions we cut our throats.”513 Thus, although the Americans were initially concerned simply in getting nuclear weapons into European hands, their ultimate goal was the creation of an integrated West
511 Weber Steve, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," International Organization, vol. 46, no. 3, (Summer 1992), p. 634. 512 Quoted in Weber, op cit. 513 National Security Council Meeting, Washington D.C, 21 November 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 19,, p. 151.
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European nuclear force independent of the United States.514 Eisenhower’s favored strategy was finally summarized in the so-called “Bowie Report”. It represents the paramount of his offshore balancing strategy: an integrated European nuclear force absent of a US veto.515 The document is based on two proposals. First of all, the strengthening of the U.S. deterrence capabilities. The document states: “The need for strategic deterrence must continue to be largely met by US strategic forces, which should be maintained in a high state of effectiveness.” The second proposal suggests the creation of a collective force controlled by the European Allies. “A supplementary NATO strategic deterrent,” the report reads,
“would assure our allies that they were able to deter Soviet all-out attack on Western Europe by means under their own control.” Bowie thought it undesirable that the multilateral forces should be based on national forces such as the British, French, and Americans. According to him, the political circumstances required a truly collective force to build up a unified alliance. In Bowie’s perception, the problem of nuclear participation in the Alliance was principally a political problem. Thus, what was needed was not merely new military hardware, but a new institutional arrangement.516 Bowie’s strategy also sought to avoid national nuclear forces to emerge.517 The crucial element is Bowie’s recommendation that the
United States relinquish its veto on the use of the nuclear power. It states: “A veto-free strategic force under command of SACEUR would meet many European concerns.” Eisenhower recognized the values of this document that highly concurred with his own vision. He saw it as an important step toward an integrated European nuclear force that would soon graduate to full independence status. The
American’s strategy was that the multilateral force would create a viable strong buck catcher in Europe.
That would be the paramount of Eisenhower’s vision for Europe and the United States. It would provide
Europeans with the means to defend themselves and enable the United States to sit back. The NATO
514 Rosato Sebastian, "The Strategic Logic of European Integration", PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2006, p. 274. 515 Report Prepared by the Consultant of the Department of States (Bowie), "The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960's", Washington D.C, August 1960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960. vol. 7. part 1,. Some sections have been sanitized from the document published in the FRUS. As outlined by Trachtenberg: “The censors might have been trying to conceal the degree to which the American government during the Eisenhower period was thinking in terms of a veto-free European nuclear force.” The sanitized sections can be found on Trachtenberg’s website: http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/documents/bowie.html 516 On that matter see: Bluth Christoph, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1995, pp. 69-70. 517 The report states: “Independent national strategic forces are not suitable answer to this need.” In effect, such forces would have limited capability, would divert resources from the common defense of Europe. Furthermore, if the United States were to assist Britain and France to develop their nuclear weapons, West Germany would be in a position of inferiority in the Alliance.
UNIGE / SES - 197 - Olivier Brighenti Part II nuclear force was thought to be centrally controlled, but in the end it was not meant to be run by the
United States. The SACEUR would have the command of the multilateral force and could act on its own.
The launch authority would rest with the SACEUR and not with the President of the United States as commander in chief. The nationality of the SACEUR was, thus, at the heart of the question. As long as the SACEUR was American it seemed that there would not be any major problem. Looking back at five decades of NATO history, the NATO commander has always been an American. This was not as clear in the 60’s. By 1959, Eisenhower was thinking increasingly in terns of “making the Europeans furnish the Commander for the European NATO command” In December 1959, he told de Gaulle flatly that he wanted a European, indeed a French, SACEUR. “When there was an American Commander” he said
“other countries looked too much to the United States to help them and did not accept their own responsibilities.” In September 1960, he was still thinking of “saying that we are ready to let a European take over the command of NATO in Europe.”518 Thus, in 1960 and 1961 the goal, as stressed by Under
Secretary of State Herter, was to create a nuclear force: “truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control […] that would have immense political significance for the cohesion of the NATO alliance.”519 At the end of the Eisenhower administration, the offshore balancing strategy was at its highest point. Eisenhower found it natural that the former great powers of Europe aspired to the status they had lost during the War. To be a great power in the 1960’s international structure meant having nuclear weapons. It was in America’s best interest to transform Europe into an integrated, independent nuclear “Third Force” that would not be subject to American veto. This idea, for various reasons that are not of the utmost importance for this dissertation, was abandoned by President Kennedy when he took office in 1961. He favored the “deterrence” and preponderance scenario over the multipolar one. In total opposition to Eisenhower’s offshore balancing vision, he advocated European dependency on the
United States. As he stated in 1963: “It is through the multilateral concept that we increase the dependence of the European nations on the United States and tie these nations closer to us.”520 This
518 All quotations in: Trachtenberg Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, pp. 214-215. 519 Quoted in : Weber Steve, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," International Organization, vol. 46, no. 3, (Summer 1992), p. 668. 520 Record of the 508th Meeting of the NSC, Washington D.C, 22 January 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 8,p. 159.
UNIGE / SES - 198 - Olivier Brighenti Part II strategy has driven the Transatlantic relationship from the end of the Eisenhower administration throughout the Cold War and has survived the end of the bipolar international configuration. If
Eisenhower’s offshore balancing strategy had been implemented, it would have accelerated Europe’s integration in the military and security realm. As a consequence, Europe would have emerged as a powerful third force capable of containing the Soviet Union without depending on the United States. We would certainly have been confronted with an entirely different international structure and the bipolar post World War II configuration would have gradually been transformed into a multipolar one. The unique chance to promote Eisenhower’s “multipolar dream” failed with the end of his second mandate and NATO’s non-multilateral character prevailed.
6.4. Conclusion
My challenge throughout this chapter devoted to the immediate aftermath of World War II was to highlight that, unlike a unipolar world configuration that favors power maximization strategies, the bipolar distribution of power provides the hegemon with the structural incentives to pursue offshore balancing strategies. The empirical evidence brought powerful support to my theory. The bipolar world and more specifically the Soviet threat pressed the United States to adopt offshore balancing as a grand strategy.
Indeed, offshore balancing as a “burden shifting” strategy was the best approach to deal with the Soviet
Union. Washington’s main objective was to bring the troops home after the “emergency period” of the end of the War. Hence, in order to fulfill its main objective Washington had to favor integration both in its economic and military aspects. The successive plans, EDF, Pleven, EDC and the nuclear sharing approach were meant to create a powerful integrated “third force” capable of containing the Soviet
Union while relieving the United States from the burden of European security. Thus, the restoration of a multipolar world was the only solution to fulfill Washington’s post-war imperatives. The successive failures of military integration paved the way for America’s preponderance on the Alliance. It transformed Europe into an American protectorate that survived the end of the Cold War. As the evidence shows us, the United States spared no efforts to implement its offshore balancing strategy until 1961. The United States had favored the “European solution” over the NATO one and it was pulled into the NATO system reluctantly. Contrary to the views expressed by scholars such as Christopher
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Layne and Melvyn Leffler, U.S. hegemony was never thought as an end in itself until the failure of the offshore balancing strategy. U.S. hegemony is a consequence of the failure to pursue Eisenhower’s multipolar stratagem. Once, and only once every attempt to create a “Third Power Mass” failed, did the preponderance strategy become Washington’s policy on the old continent. In the absence of a third force, there was no alternative to a massive U.S. involvement in Europe and it is quite logical that under these circumstances the United States wanted to be sure of having control over European security affairs. As a consequence, the “NATO solution” became the linchpin of America’s strategy of preponderance in Europe. Through NATO, and contrarily to Eisenhower’s strategy, Washington made certain that Western European integration was harnessed to American interests and leadership.
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7. European Security after the End of the Cold War: A Hard Case for Hard-Line Realism?
Throughout this case study I have sought to provide evidence for my systemic theory of unipolarity. My central task has been to seek to explain why the hegemon has tried by all means to undermine every single attempt to create an “autonomous” European defense system since the end of the Cold War, although this period represented the unique occasion since the failure of the EDC to pursue a strategy of offshore balancing. My theory predicts that the peculiar unipolar distribution of power resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union provides the hegemon with incentives to pursue power maximizing strategies. More generally, I argue that power-maximization is the normal pattern of behavior for the hegemon in such a power distribution. Thus, the policies pursued by the hegemon from the 1990’s onwards do not represent an anomaly in international politics. The evidence of this empirical chapter lends powerful support for my theory. Furthermore, there is a significant amount of evidence that contradicts the arguments of the alternative theories I chose to test. Hard-line realism enables to account for evidence left unexplained by other theories. Hard-line realism being a theory of international politics and not a theory of foreign policy, I have focused my research on the broad constraints of unipolarity on the hegemon’s behavior. Moreover, as the evidence shows, the key periods of the post
World War II European security architecture and the post Cold War European security “grand-bargain” were both driven by dynamics of relative power. As a systemic theory of international politics, hard-line realism has determined to what extent behavior and international outcomes can be explained with reference to systemic constraints. Thus what are the contributions of my theory to the understanding of the contemporary unipolar international politics? The analysis of the European security architecture since the end of the Cold War has shown how the unipolar distribution of power has had dramatic effects on the hegemon’s behavior, and as a consequence on European security and Transatlantic relations. The analysis of the overall “ESDP” process since the 1990’s has shed light on some very important aspects. First the evidence proves that offshore balancing as a general strategy of “burden shifting” is irrelevant in a unipolar world for two main reasonsThe first reason is that offshore balancing requires a “buck catcher”. By definition, under unipolarity there is no “buck catcher” since there is one
UNIGE / SES - 201 - Olivier Brighenti Part II single pole. In order to pursue an offshore balancing strategy in a unipolar world, the hegemon would have to create a buck catcher. In other words, the hegemon would have to favor a strong militarily integrated Europe that would take over the burden of European security. Voluntarily creating a peer competitor whilst enjoying an unprecedented power “differential” would be tantamount to “shooting in one’s foot”. Only a misguided hegemon would pursue such a strategy. Why would the United States encourage an autonomous militarily integrated Europe, that could on the long term, challenge its preponderance and provoke a shift from unipolarity to bipolarity/multipolarity? The second reason is that the United States has pursued a double strategy of power maximization in order to maintain, strengthen and deepen its hegemony in Europe while preventing it from any autonomous enticement. The U.S. maximizes its power through the logic of “NATO first” policy I have described throughout this chapter.
The United States is willing to facilitate the creation of a European “defense arm” but only within NATO since the Alliance remains Washington’s essential tool for its hegemonic strategy on the continent. A
European defense acceptable to Washington is one that shares more of the burden without enjoying more of the command. The successive attempts to create some form of “autonomous” European entity, from the Franco-German Eurocorps to the post-St-Malo ESDP have all been agreed along
Washington’s line. Indeed, the “grand bargain” reached at NATO’s 1996 Berlin summit permitted the creation of the so-called ESDI, but only within NATO. The CJTF concept reaffirmed America’s de facto veto on European military operations. The use of NATO assets have to be approved by the NAC and the EU would have to rely on NATO for military planning. Those structures are at the heart of US primacy on the Alliance and are non-negotiable. As outlined by Kori Schake: “The duplication of expensive logistical and war-fighting assets is unlikely to raise objections in the United States or NATO, the benefits to all concerned are obvious. The difficulties will start when EU initiatives duplicate NATO’s planning role.”521 The attempt in April 2003, by France, Germany Belgium and Luxemburg to create a
European planning and operational headquarter for EU missions is striking.522 President Chirac
521 Schake Kori, "The United States, ESDP and Constructive Duplication," In. Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy, edited by Howorth Jolyon & Keeler John T.S, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2003, p. 126. 522 See: Réunion des chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernement de l'Allemagne de la France de la Belgique et du Luxembourg, "Réunion sur la Défense Européenne," In. De Copenhague à Bruxelles: les textes fondamentaux de la défense européenne, edited by Missiroli Antonio, (Bruxelles: Cahiers de Chaillot 67), Tervuren, 29 avril 2003, pp. 76-80
UNIGE / SES - 202 - Olivier Brighenti Part II said : “We are not threatening the Transatlantic Alliance, we want to reinforce Europe and the
Transatlantic Alliance.” In reality in the aftermath of the Transatlantic crisis over Iraq, Chirac was willing to reinforce Europe in order to balance the United States. He clearly stated: “There is a multipolar world next to the U.S., with Europe and China. We need a strong EU to have balance.”523 The United States reacted very violently to that initiative. The U.S. called an extraordinary meeting of NATO to challenge the proposal. U.S. Ambassador Burns said: “The EU defense plans represented one of the greatest dangers to the Transatlantic relationship".524 He went on to say that: “Tervuren is a symbol of competition between the EU and NATO.”525 With the help of British diplomacy, the European headquarters plan was dropped. This episode shows that more than a decade after the Eurocorps initiative, nothing has really changed on both sides of the Atlantic. France is always striving to give
Europe more autonomy and the United States seeks by all means to maintain its hegemony over the
Alliance. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. American insistence on the continuation of NATO is very well illustrated by my theory. In a unipolar world, where the only threat is a militarily integrated independent Europe, the United States has to maintain and strengthen its position in Europe as the uncontestable hegemon. Doing that means preventing the emergence of an autonomous ESDP since this could create a situation in which European capabilities, far from constituting a European pillar within
NATO, would become a force used to balance American power in Europe and elsewhere. Therefore,
NATO as an institution has to last so that the hegemon can maximize its power. William Cohen’s warning that an autonomous ESDP could “make NATO a relic from the past”526 is instructive. NATO is already a relic of the past since there is no threat to Europe and to the United States. NATO’s only role is to perpetuate U.S. hegemony on the continent and prevent the rise of an integrated, autonomous and militarily strong Europe. NATO is vital for the U.S. global hegemonic role since it would have no legitimate political foundation for its bases in Europe. These bases are of the utmost importance in its strive for global domination. At the same time, NATO provides the United States with an oversight over
523 Quoted in: Dempsey Judy, "EU Leaders Unveil Plan for Central Military Headquarter," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 30 April 2003, p. 11. German Chancellor Schroeder said that there was: “very little Europe within NATO that is why we want a change” 524 Quoted in: Dempsey Judy, "U.S. Calls NATO Meeting on EU Defense," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 17 October 2003, p. 6. 525 Quoted in: Anonymous, "A Lull Between the Storms," The Economist, London, 27 September 2003, p. 7 526 Cohen William S. "Speech to the NATO Defense Ministers," Brussels, 5 December 2000.
UNIGE / SES - 203 - Olivier Brighenti Part II military Europe. An “autonomous” European force could escape from U.S. command and jeopardize its preponderance strategy. Madeleine Albright’s statement to the Senate’s Armed Service Committee couldn’t have been clearer: “Clearly” she said “if an institution such as NATO did not exist today we would want to create one.”527 The United States is aware that the European Union is too rich, too much of a commercial and financial competitor and potentially too powerful to let the Europeans develop their own military capabilities. Thus, the NATO advocated by the hegemon is an organization with large asymmetrical relations, in which a more self-reliant Europe will not undermine the old NATO tradition of
US hegemony.528 In some respects, it is the post 1954 NATO that American policymakers have so far promoted. It is a NATO with a European appendage, sharing the financial burden, rather than a true
European pillar. In this type of structure, the United States remains dominant. The EU will have its small military arm that can act and deal with minor crisis while remaining highly dependent on the United
States. The structural constraints of a unipolar world are permissive to such a conceived policy.
Unipolarity provides the United States with the incentives to shape the European security architecture and maximize its position. Thirdly, the historical analysis of the immediate post World War II period also lends strong support to my theory. Indeed, as I have shown, the structural constraints of a bipolar world pushed the United States to favor a “third force” that would eventually evolve towards a fully independent European army with the ultimate goal of restoring a multipolar international balance of power. This strategy required that the Europeans integrate their military capabilities and ensure a high degree of unity. While the bipolar configuration pressed the hegemon to unreservedly push for
European unity, unipolarity provides the United States with the incentives to pursue the exact opposite strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has sought to maximize its power on the European continent through strategies of division. As I have shown, since the “Bartholomew letter”, the United
States constantly played on the division between Great Britain and France in order to ensure its interests. The special relationship developed with the United Kingdom after the failure of the EDC helped Washington to pursue its hegemonic agenda in European Security Affairs. Thus, Tony Blair’s
527 Albright Madeleine K. "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee," 23 April 1997. http://fas.org/man/nato/congress/1997/s970423a.htm 528 Whereas the WEU has always been an unequal partner for NATO in the defense field, the EU is bound to play a much more assertive and forceful role in shaping Europe’s institutional security landscape. That is exactly what the United States wants to avoid.
UNIGE / SES - 204 - Olivier Brighenti Part II dramatic shift in St-Malo placed the United States in a whole new situation where it could not entirely rely anymore on the Great Britain. Secretary of Defense Cohen said, for the first time, that Great Britain was endangering the Alliance because it pursued a leadership role in Europe.529 Similarly by pushing for
NATO and EU enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the United States tried to disrupt “European unity” hoping that the former Eastern countries would advocate Atlanticist interests over European ones. Thus, the United States pursues a strategy of cultivating a set of bilateral ties with
European member states to ensure that its interest are acknowledged and respected on any matter
Washington deems necessary. This strategy towards the EU has the effect of weakening the community bonds and hampering the building of a credible ESDP.530 In order to assert its primacy in a unipolar world, the hegemon tries to divide rather than unite Europe contrary to what was the case in a bipolar world configuration. Indeed, European unity was the key strategy to counter the Soviet threat in a bipolar configuration. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the United States had promoted the idea of an even closer union in Europe. As evidenced throughout the whole post Cold War “ESDP process”,
Washington’s long standing support to European integration shifted towards a policy of “divide and rule.”
Washington’s worst nightmare became a “European caucus” that would enable Europeans to speak with a single voice and highly influence the decisions taken in the Alliance. In other words, the history of post Cold War European security can be summarized by America’s overall refusal of a European caucus that could endanger its preponderance on the Alliance. As outlined by Layne: “For the United
States, a Europe that speaks with many voices is optimal, which is why it is trying to do what it can to ensure that the EU’s ‘state-building’ process fails, thus ensuring that a united Europe never emerges as
529 Quoted in: Pfaff William, "NATO: Obfuscation in Washington and Hypocrisy in Europe," International Herald Tribune, Paris, Tuesday 12 December 2000, p. 6. This clearly illustrates America’s fear of a United Europe. Although Tony Blair promoted the ESDP, Great Britain remained Washington’s staunchest ally. The build-up to the war in Iraq proved that the United States could rely on the “special partnership”. A European Ambassador captured very well Washington’s “paranoia”. “Somehow” he said “the U.S. believes that because Britain is considered its staunchest ally, it cannot work with its EU allies. This is ridiculous. If Blair is involved in Europe it means the Transatlantic relationship is protected.” Quoted in: Dempsey Judy, "U.S. Calls NATO Meeting on EU Defense," The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 17 October 2003, p. 6. 530 Washington’s invitation to Poland to assume command of a mixed international force with peace-keeping responsibilities in Iraq (on the eve of the EU ministerial meeting convened in May 2003 to reaffirm commitment to the CSFP and address the challenge of a renewed Transatlantic relationship) was a tactical ploy which conforms to a policy of undercutting efforts to build solidarity among EU governments. See: Brenner Michael, "The CFSP Factor: A Comparison of United States and French Strategies " Cooperation And Conflict, vol. 38, no. 3, (September 2003), p. 191.
UNIGE / SES - 205 - Olivier Brighenti Part II an independent pole of power.”531 But if a “genuine” ESDP is to emerge, then a EU caucus within
NATO, something that all post-Cold War Administrations have explicitly opposed, is inescapable. In order to summarize the debate, my theory predicts that a hegemon in a unipolar world is never a status quo power nor an offshore balancer. It will oppose any security agreement that would lead to an autonomous and independent military power in the hegemon’s zones of strategic interest. It will try to avoid by all means the resurgence of any would-be competitor and above all the emergence of a new pole. The highest danger for the hegemon is the shift from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar configuration. As the evidence on the ESDP case showed us, the hegemon behaves accordingly to predictions of the theories. It strives to accumulate the greatest amount of power in order to secure its interests in far reaching regions of the world and preserve the current imbalance of power.
Let us now turn to the alternative theories I tested against the historical record. First of all, evidence lends little support for the offensive claim. According to the theories’ logic, the regional hegemon will not try to maximize its power in far-off regions of the world because global domination is virtually impossible.
The hegemon will stay on the sidelines and pass the buck to the regional powers in order to preserve the balance of power. It is the strategy of buck passing, in other words of shifting the burden to others. It is only if the local powers cannot restore the balance of power that the regional hegemon will intervene to restore the balance. In other words, in a unipolar world configuration, the offensive state pursues a status quo strategy and ceases to maximize power. In the case of post-Cold War European security that
I have developed throughout this chapter, there is a significant amount of evidence that contradicts the offensive argument that the hegemon in a unipolar world would act as an offshore balancer. First of all, as evidenced by the case of post World War II, offshore balancing as a strategy of “burden shifting” is a grand strategy of bipolarity/multipolarity, not of unipolarity. Second, an offshore balancing strategy in a unipolar world would mean that the hegemon would withdraw its presence (military troops and facilities) from Europe and encourage an autonomous militarily integrated Europe. It would sponsor a strong
531 I disagree with him when he says: “The United States today is pursuing the same European grand strategy that it pursued during the Cold War and the foundations of which were laid during World War II.” Layne Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University press), 2006, see. pp. 116-117. The evidence of the ESDP case proves that this was not the case in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Eisenhower’s dream was a united and integrated Europe that would gradually evolve as an independent pole of power. The failure to politically and militarily unite Europe after the failure of the EDC, set the grassroots of American preponderance during the Cold War.
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ESDP as an “independent power bloc” in world affairs. Hence it would push for a structural shift from unipolarity to multipolarity. Condoleeza Rice, who served both under the Bush I and II administration acknowledged that the: “administration believed strongly that, even if the immediate military threat from the Soviet Union diminished, the United States should maintain significant military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future. The American troops presence […] served as an ante to ensure a central place for the United States as a player in European politics. The Bush administration placed a high value on retaining such influence, underscored by Bush’s flat statement that the United States was and would remain a European power”532 The evidence throughout the 1990’s have proven the contrary. The
United States did everything it could to prevent the emergence of an autonomous ESDP. According to that logic, NATO as the security institution designed during the Cold War, should have disappeared at the same time as bipolarity collapsed. The evidence showed that, on the contrary, NATO was reinforced as the hegemon’s primary tool of power maximization on the European continent. As Brent Scowcroft bluntly wrote: “Whatever developed with respect to the Cold War the United States had to continue to play a significant role in European security.” He further stated “the vehicle for that role must be
NATO”533 Furthermore, while there is no hegemonic threat on the continent (except the hypothetic militarily strong united EU), U.S. troops are still stationed in Europe sixteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is absolutely no sign that the United States will withdraw its troop in the foreseeable future. Thus, although offensive realism does a good job at explaining the immediate post-
World War II period, it fails to explain how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world.
Secondly, there is insufficient evidence to support the defensive realist claim. The answer is quite clear.
Power maximization strategies is first of all counterproductive and renders states less secure. Since security is plentiful, there is no need to pursue “expensive expansionist” policies in far-reaching regions of the world that will reveal costly and negative for the hegemon. The hegemon will also act as an offshore balancer and pursue expansionist policies only when threatened. Quite surprisingly defensive and offensive realism concur when confronted to a unipolar world configuration.
532 Zelikow Philip D & Rice Condoleezza, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed- A Study in Statecraft, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1995, pp. 169-170 533 Bush George H W & Scowcroft Brent, A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, (New York: Knopf Publishing), 1998, pp. 230-231.
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Thirdly, the structural liberal approach is largely unable to explain the hegemon’s constant strive to block an autonomous European security policy. It fails short in explaining how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. The overall logic of this theory claims that power is based on restraint rather than on maximization. The hegemon puts restraints on its power in order to make it acceptable to other states and ensure there will be no balancing coalitions. Like after every major structural shift, the unipolar world configuration is characterized by a high level of asymmetries. In order to “reduce” the consequences of these asymmetries, the United States should have driven its policy along the lines of structural liberalism’s grand bargain. In short, the United States should have obtained commitments from European states to participate within the post Cold War NATO architecture (which was the case), and in return the hegemon places limits on the exercise of its power (which did not occur). As a consequence, the Europeans would not fear domination, reducing incentives to resist the hegemon’s claims and the United States would not need to use its power to enforce order and compliance.534 The
European post Cold War security bargain provides very little support for this theory. The United States did exactly the contrary: constraining the Europeans in the post Cold War NATO while maximizing its power over the Alliance. The asymmetries in power are such that the United States has no need to rely on such a strategy to preserve the primacy of NATO and prevent the creation of an autonomous
European security policy.
534 For the Structural liberal approach bargain see : Ikenberry John G, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, vol. 23, no. 3, (Winter 1998/1999), pp. 45-47.
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Case Study II: The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and the War in Iraq
Part III
8. The U.S. National Security Strategy and The War in Iraq: Power Maximization Strategies and the Unipolar International Structure
On 19 March 2003 after months of fighting, inside and outside the Security Council, the United States invaded Iraq without having obtained a resolution authorizing the use of force. The “official” U.S. rationale for war was, in the words of President Bush: “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”535 Unlike the first Gulf War, the United States went to war without the consent of its traditional allies and a mandate from the United
Nations Security Council. Thus, the invasion of Iraq is best characterized by its lack of international legitimacy and above all by its unilateral character. Furthermore, as it is now widely acknowledged,
Washington’s invasion of Iraq was based on flawed intelligence. Indeed, the United States knew from the beginning that Saddam Hussein’s regime did not possess weapons of mass destruction. Therefore,
Iraq did not represent a threat for U.S. security. The war was one of choice and not one of necessity.
How are we to explain these events? What is the rationale behind the U.S. decision to invade Iraq? Why did the United States go to war without the consent of the United Nations? Why did Washington base its entire strategy on two flawed assumptions, i.e., the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the links of the Iraqi regime with terrorism?
My central claim in this chapter is that the war in Iraq is best understood as a consequence of the unipolar international distribution of power resulting from the end of the Cold War.536 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States stands as the sole superpower. No other power or coalition of states can preclude the hegemon from pursuing its agenda. The unipolar international distribution of power provides the hegemon with incentives to exert more control and maximize its position on the international system. One of the most significant implications of unipolarity lies in the hegemon’s
535 Bush George W, "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom", 22 March 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html, (Accessed: 20/03/2007). 536 I do not occult the fact that the peculiar vision of the Bush Administration towards international politics is important to understand the war in Iraq. My central claim is that the unipolar world structure enabled to implement the neoconservative agenda. My argument is that without such a distribution of power, we would probably have been confronted with another scenario drawing along the Cold War American logic of containment and deterrence. Paraphrasing Stephen Walt: It is tempting to blame the war in Iraq and the resulting international clashes and the follies of particular leaders and to assume that more enlightened statecraft would quickly set things right. Unfortunately, this explanation overlooks the deep structural forces of unipolarity that are pulling the United States and the rest of the world apart. Walt Stephen M, "The Imbalance of Power," Harvard Magazine, Cambridge, March/April 2004, p. 33.
UNIGE / SES - 209 - Olivier Brighenti Part III willingness and, above all, its ability to project power unilaterally. Striving for global hegemony in a unipolar system means that the hegemon tends to acquire an enormous stake in world order, as does the scope of what constitutes its “national interest”.537 I will argue that the unipolar distribution of power is a powerful explanation to understand the rationale behind the war in Iraq. Secondly, I will argue that the invasion was a means to project U.S. power into the Middle East. Despite substantive protests from a large number of powers, including Russia, France, Germany, and China, the United States went to war with Iraq. It seems very unlikely that if the international structure were still bipolar, the United States would have opted for the same strategy. Four years after the invasion, it seems pretty obvious that the decision to go to war had nothing to do with 9/11 nor with the war on terror, and even less with the
“urgent need for democracy” in Iraq. The war can best be explained as a power maximizing enterprise, intended to establish an enduring U.S. hegemonic position in the Middle East. Washington’s strategy for
Iraq can be summarized in four points. First of all, the Iraqi campaign was a way to “test” the logic of preemption established by the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS). It was a way to tell the world (Allies and foes alike) that the United States meant serious business, and that its preponderance on the international system should not be challenged.538 Secondly, the United States sought to establish an American protectorate in Iraq, supported by permanent American military facilities. It is what the Pentagon has called “enduring bases”. Just one month after the invasion, the
United States was planning a long term military relationship with the emerging government of Iraq.
According to senior Bush officials: “this would grant the Pentagon access to military bases and project
American influence into the heart of the unsettled region.” A military foothold in Iraq would be felt across the border in Syria and, in combination with the continuing American presence in Afghanistan, it would virtually surround Iran with a new web of American influence. Colonel John Dobbins, Commander of
Tallil Forward Air Base, said the Air Force plan envisioned: “probably two bases that will stay in Iraq for
537 Jones Seth G, The Rise of Europe: Great Power Politics and Security Cooperation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2006, pp. 267-268. 538 Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board from 2001 to 2003 and David Frum, former speechwriter for President Bush and author of the “Axis of Evil” formula argue in their provocative book that the invasion of Iraq: “Gave other potential enemies a vivid and compelling demonstration of America’s ability to win swift and total victory over significant enemy forces with minimal U.S. casualties. The overwhelming American victory in the battle of Baghdad surely stomped a powerful impression upon the minds of the rulers in Teheran and Pyongyang.” Perle Richard & Frum David, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, (New York: Random House), 2003, p. 33.
UNIGE / SES - 210 - Olivier Brighenti Part III an amount of time, that amount of time is an unknown.”539 Thirdly, the base arrangements as well as the enduring American presence in Iraq depend on the nature of the political system that will take control of
Baghdad. Thus, the United States wants to leave behind a regime that would be favorable to U.S. interests and further Washington’s aims towards regional powers like Syria and Iran. Consequently, if the ties are close enough, the United States could have a military stronghold in one of the world’s most strategic regions. Fourthly, by dominating the future privatized economy of Iraq, the United States would benefit from a direct and cheap access to its resources. This would enable America’s oil-based economy to guarantee a direct access to the world’s second largest proven oil reserves.
In order to understand how events unfolded, I will draw on my hard-line approach. Indeed, the risks of the Iraqi invasion seemed fairly low and the benefits were potentially huge. Thus, the United States invaded Iraq for a very simple reason: it had the power to overthrow Saddam Hussein and impose itself as the hegemonic power in the region. The war in Iraq was a way for the United States to extend its strategic reach in the Middle East. This policy was made possible for three main reasons. First of all, unipolarity ensured the United States that no state or coalition of states could prevent U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Secondly, the United States had the military means and the unprecedented power to implement the Bush doctrine of preventive war.540 Thirdly, in the aftermath of 9/11 the timing appeared perfect. In effect, 9/11 provided the Bush Administration with a providential rationale to implement its hegemonic policy in the Middle East and enabled a massive defense budget buildup. As a consequence, this unprecedented military buildup, requested by U.S. “hegemonists” for aq long time, deepened the power asymmetries and strengthened American primacy in the international system. It is frequently claimed that on September 11, everything changed. Some argue that in a single day we
539 Quoted in: Shanker Thom & Schmitt Eric, "A Nation at War: Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Key Iraq Bases," The New York Times, New York, Sunday 20 April 2003, p. 1. 540 The so-called Bush doctrine was set out in numerous speeches and summarized in the September 2002 “National Security Strategy of the United States”. Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. 36. p. According to Robert Jervis: “The doctrine has four elements: a strong belief in the importance of a state’s domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war: a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics. Jervis Robert, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, (Fall 2003), p. 365. I will extensively discuss this doctrine in subsequent sections.
UNIGE / SES - 211 - Olivier Brighenti Part III passed, from a post-Cold War era to the post-9/11 era. Six years and two wars later nothing has really changed. The September 1 1attacks of have not altered the balance of power. Instead, they only aggravated differences in the imbalance that already existed. As outlined by William Dobson: “Perhaps the truest thing that changed because of 9/11 was the way in which the Pentagon’s budget soared. The
American military’s budgeted defense spending grew 39 percent between 2001 and 2006. Put another way, in 2001, the United State’s military expenditure of $325 billion was the same as the next 14 biggest militaries combined. By 2005, the Pentagon was outspending the next 14 militaries by $116 billion.”541
Thus, the only significant change is that the attacks temporarily removed every single constraints on
U.S. political elites, if there were any, allowing them to purse their policies more aggressively.
My argument unfolds as follows: unipolarity provides the hegemon with incentives to pursue power maximizing strategies. Simply put, Iraq was the ideal target to extend U.S. strategic reach in the Middle
East and strive for hegemony in that region of the world. Washington had the occasion to overthrow
Saddam Hussein’s regime and “reshape” the Middle Eastern security architecture at a relatively low cost, while establishing an American protectorate over postwar Iraq. As outlined by my theory, in a unipolar world, when the risks are relatively low and the rewards relatively large, the hegemon will pursue strategies of power maximization. The ideal situation for the hegemon is to maximize its power in every corner of the world with global hegemony as its final goal. The structural constraints of unipolarity provide the hegemon with the incentives to pursue such a strategy.
What about the offensive and defensive argument over the Iraqi case? Both strands of realism predict that Iraq can be deterred and contained in the classical sense. The evidence appears to contradict this claim. It is the logic of preemption that prevailed and the United States did not act with restraint and did not pursue a strategy of containment and deterrence. What about the liberal claim that the hegemon will act with restraint within the international order it created? According to this logic: “Western order has a structure of institutions and open polities that bind major states together, thereby mitigating the implications of power asymmetries and reducing the opportunities of the United States to abandon or dominate other states […] A cooperative order is built around a basic bargain: the hegemonic state gets
541 Dobson William J, "The Day Nothing Much Changed," Foreign Policy, vol. 156, no. 1, (September/October 2006), pp. 22-25.
UNIGE / SES - 212 - Olivier Brighenti Part III commitments by secondary states to participate within the postwar order, and in return the hegemon places limits on the exercise of its power.”542 The United States should not have invaded Iraq, since the use of force was not granted by the Security Council. This approach is, thus, unconvincing since the
United States invaded Iraq without the approval of the Security Council. As outlined by Stephen Walt:
“No matter what one thinks of this particular policy, it illustrates America’s deep reluctance to be bound by institutions, especially when doing so would require to forego actions it believes to be in its own short-term interest. International institutions may be good for many things, but controlling the United
States in its current condition of primacy is not one of them.”543
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I will analyze the so-called
Bush doctrine under the lens of my theory. This will enable me to highlight that it is a strategy of unipolarity. In other words, it is the unipolar distribution of power that favors such a strategy. It is a radical departure from the Cold War doctrine of containment and deterrence. Preventive war is possible because of the unchallenged preponderance of U.S. military capabilities. In the second section, I will focus on the buildup to the war, emphasizing on the political process within the United Nations. I will argue that the United States had the means and the will to implement its policies alone. As my theory predicts, international institutions are one of the alternatives in the hand of the hegemon. Institutions are good for the hegemon as long as they do not undermine its autonomy and serve its national interest.
Consequently, as long as the hegemon can advance its interests it will choose to cooperate. Unipolarity strongly enhances this fact. Indeed the disparities of power and the absence of traditional balancing engender radically divergent interests. Thus, whenever the multilateral framework is not considered relevant, the hegemon will choose not to cooperate and pursue its own agenda. In the third section, I will test the four competing theories. This case produces a particularly rewarding test for my hard-line approach, since the evidence lends strong support for power maximization, while the three alternative theories predict strategies of restraint. The final section discusses my findings and evaluates the relevance of my theory for the understanding of contemporary unipolar politics.
542 Ikenberry John G, "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint," In. America Unrivaled; The Future of the Balance of Power, edited by Ikenberry John G, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, pp. 214-215. 543 Walt Stephen M, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (New York: Norton), 2005, p. 147.
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8.1. The Bush Doctrine: A Unipolar Strategy?
The so-called Bush doctrine released on 20September, 2002 marked one of the most dramatic shifts in
American foreign and military policy since the end of World War II. The entire Cold War strategy, that proved highly effective, was based on the dual logic of containment and deterrence. The new American policy relies on the logic of power maximization, unilateralism and preventive war. This overview of
America’s current national security strategy has a sense of déjà vu. It highlights most of the aspects developed previously by Khalilzad, Libby and Wolfowitz in the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance (DPG).
Drafted by Rice’s National Security Council, the 2002 NSS blends together all the aspects of power maximization in a unipolar world. Similarly to the 1992 DPG, this document adopts the strategic notion of an unchallenged United States: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States”.544
Going far beyond the DPG, the National Security Strategy asserts the right to act unilaterally and clearly advocates the right and obligation for preemptive action: “We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.”545 The document, which at first reading seems rather moderate, is in fact highly provocative and asserts a well thought strategy of global domination. We can read all through the documents Americas’ commitment to its allies and international institutions. In its introduction, it states: “Today the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantages. We seek instead to create a balance of power (Realist Idea) that favors human freedom (Wilsonian Idea): conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty”.546
Cooperation and balance of power seem to be at odds with the notion of unchallenged power and unilateral preemptive action. The strategy of primacy that the Bush Administration advocates is not at all in favor of a balance of power but, on the contrary, looks towards a massive imbalance of power in favor
544 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002.p. 30. 545 Ibidem, p. 6. 546 Ibidem, Introduction. (Emphasis added)
UNIGE / SES - 214 - Olivier Brighenti Part III of the United States.547 The Bush National Security Strategy states that few lessons from the Cold War are relevant in the new post Cold War international security architecture. Thus, the logic of deterrence has become obsolete and new threats require new strategies. It reads: “The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States, with our allies and friends, to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation
[…]. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.”548 How are we to explain this shift from deterrence to preventive war? Why did the United States abandon the idea of deterrence that proved so compelling for more than fifty years and adopt a “hazardous” strategy of preemption? My central argument in this section is that this radical shift in U.S. political and military doctrine is best explained by the unipolar distribution of power. Many analysts argue that this new assertive use of U.S. military power is a consequence of September 11 and the War on Terror as well as the peculiar political beliefs of the neoconservative elements of the Bush Administration. Although the Bush Administration is probably one of the most “hawkish” in American history, it is not a satisfying explanation for the current unilateral and forceful use of power. The Bush doctrine of preventive war and democracy promotion is the logical outcome of the current U.S. position in the international unipolar distribution of power. Hard-line realism provides a convincing explanation for the Bush doctrine because it sees the hegemon as always wanting more power. This will lead the hegemon to expand its interests in every region of the world, in the case at hand the Middle East, more specifically when there are no checks. Hard-line realism states that the unipolar world configuration provides the incentives to adopt power maximizing strategies. The hegemon is prepared to prevent other countries, including its allies, from challenging its hegemonic
547 For a good account on the Bush Doctrine see: Jervis Robert, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, (Fall 2003), pp. 365-388, Jervis Robert, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no. 3, (Fall 2005), pp. 351-378, Monten Jonathan, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," International Security, vol. 29, no. 4, (Spring 2005), pp. 112-156, Cox Michael, "Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine," Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 4, (October 2004), pp. 585-608, Hendrickson David C, "Preserving the Imbalance of Power," Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, (2003), pp. 157-163, Wheeler Nicholas J, "The Bush Doctrine: the Dangers of American Exceptionalism in a Revolutionary Age," Asian Perspective, vol. 27, no. 4, (Winter 2003), pp. 183-216. 548 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. pp. 13-16.
UNIGE / SES - 215 - Olivier Brighenti Part III position. Behind this power maximizing logic lies a very clear foreign policy strategy. The United States was one of the two great powers throughout the Cold War. Following the gradual logic of the end of the
Cold War and the advent of a unipolar world, the United States cannot go backwards and be primus inter pares, it has to be primus solus. As Alexander Hamilton brilliantly understood two hundred years ago: “The spirit of moderation in a state of overbearing power is a phenomenon which has not yet appeared, and which no wise man will expect ever to see.”549 The objective of power maximization, as a strategy in world politics, is not to preserve the balance of power or to build a world based on multilateralism and cooperation, but to maintain and increase the power asymmetries so as to deepen the hegemon’s pre-eminence. To do so, the hegemon has to outdistance its potential competitors using all its advantages in the political, economical, military realm. Preventive war is a compelling tool to fulfill this goal. Preventive war is possible, not because Iraq hypothetically possesses weapons of mass destruction that threaten the world, and not because the neoconservatives think it is good, but because there are no checks to American military power. No state or coalition of states, as the Iraqi case makes it clear, is able to prevent the United States from invading Iraq. Being the sole superpower in the international system implies that the hegemon will strive for more power in order to attain global hegemony. As outlined by Robert Jervis: “A hegemon tends to acquire an enormous stake in world order. As power expands, so does a state’s definition of its own interests. Most countries are concerned mainly with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods; but for a hegemon, the world is its neighborhood, and it is not only hubris that leads lone superpowers to be concerned with anything that happens anywhere. However secure states are, they can never feel secure enough. If they are powerful, governments will have compelling reasons to act early and thus prevent others from harming them in the future.”550 Hereafter I will focus on the Bush doctrine.
549 Quoted in: Wolfers Arnold & Martin Lawrence W, ed. The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1956. p. 145. 550 Jervis Robert, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy, vol. 137, no. 1, (July/August 2003), p. 84.
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8.1.1. Inside the Bush Doctrine: Structural Incentives and the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States In the subsequent sections I will try to highlight the link between the strategy and the distribution of power. I will show that the Bush doctrine was rendered possible by the unipolar world configuration. In other words, the doctrine is one of unipolarity. Like the 1992 Defense Planning Guide, its core premises are rooted in the unipolar distribution of power.551 I will briefly analyze the “Democracy promotion component” of the doctrine. I will highlight that spreading democracy and liberalism has always been a
U.S. goal. The only difference with the past is that unipolarity provides the United States with the means to impose its will. I will focus more in depth on the concept of preventive war. I argue that unipolarity and the absence of checks and balances have rendered preventive war possible. I claim that preventive war on a global scale, as advocated by the Bush Doctrine, is impossible in a bipolar world where the rival great power ensures that the balance of power is preserved. The awareness of vulnerability was real since there was the threat of a nuclear holocaust and mutual assured destruction. Preventive action against the Soviet Union may have been possible as long as the United States had the monopoly of the nuclear weapon. From 1949 and the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, preventive war became impossible and containment and deterrence became the official American political and military doctrine.
I will compare the logic of preemption and the structural conditions for its implementation to the logic of deterrence that prevailed throughout the Cold War. I will show how the contemporary distribution of power enabled the preventive use of force and why that would not have been possible in a bipolar world. Put differently, I will emphasize that the Bush doctrine is a “genuine” strategy of unipolarity.
551 Stanley Hoffman brilliantly captured the essence of the Bush Doctrine. He says: “Alterations could already be read between the lines of the Defense Planning Guide of 1992, nicknamed “the masterpiece of Dick Cheney.” It introduced explicitly the possible necessity of unilateral action, it stressed the preventive use of force, and highlighted the usefulness of nuclear programs in other countries. The point was clearly to impose constraints on the allies of the United States, while proposing a strategy of deterring all rivals and of allowing interventions anywhere. Although at the time this didn’t lead to a rupture, one could already feel the tension between a will to liberate American forces from constraints and the existence of alliances and agreements that had been working for forty years and more. Today it is no longer the assertion of a doctrine of national interest pure and simple, it is something profoundly new which takes us very far away from the Wilsonian syndrome. Instead of expressing ideals or proposing a mission, instead of calling on the U.S. to cultivate its own garden or, inversely, to build with other countries a multilateral system at the service of common objectives, exceptionalism from now on means only seeing oneself as the only superpower and acting as such. In other words, exceptionalism (in fact if not in rhetoric) is reduced only to the question of means.” Hoffmann Stanley, Gulliver Unbound: America Goes Backwards, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), 2004, pp. 22-23.
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8.1.1.1 American Exceptionalism, Hegemony and Democracy Promotion The U.S. political system rests on a set of universal claims of liberal political ideals based on the strong belief in human rights and liberty. The United States always pictured itself as having a manifest destiny and a different course than the imperial powers of the old continent. The US has traditionally perceived itself as being an agent of historical transformation and progress in the international system. In her famous 2002 “Campaign article”, Condoleezza Rice wrote: “There is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect. America’s pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace. Its pursuit of national interests after World War II led to a more prosperous and democratic world. This can happen again.”552 It is a widespread belief among powerful states that their values are universal, and as a consequence that they must be spread if not imposed to others for the greater benefits of humanity.553
Throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, the United States seldom admitted anything else than a moral vision of the world in which Americans sought perfection. The first form of this American exceptionalism is isolationism, which is a direct consequence of the legacy of the
Founding Fathers. The United States should not be entangled in alliances and in “traditional” European power politics. In 1821, Secretary of state John Quincy Adams cautioned the United States not to go abroad: “in search of monsters to destroy,” but to be “the well-wishers to the freedom and independence of all […] the champion and vindicator only of our own.” He warned America not to enlist under other banners than its own, “were they even the banners of foreign independence”. Should America do so he warned: “the fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force […] she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own destiny.”554
Although this moral aspect of American exceptionalism is still very present in the American perception of its manifest destiny, John Quincy Adams was writing at a time when America was a fairly weak and
552 Rice Condoleezza, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 1, (January-February 2000), p. 47. 553 As defined by Kenneth Waltz: “Crusades are frightening because crusaders go to war for righteous causes, which they define for themselves and try to impose on others. One might have hoped that Americans would have learned that they are not very good at causing democracy abroad. But, alas, if the world can be made safe for democracy only by making it democratic, then all means are permitted and to use them becomes a duty.” Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), p. 12. 554 Quoted in : Chace James, "Imperial America and Common Interest," World Policy Journal, vol. 19, no. 1, (Spring 2002), p. 5.
UNIGE / SES - 218 - Olivier Brighenti Part III isolated country threatened by the European powers. Its survival as an independent country was far from certain. The second pattern in American exceptionalism is Wilsonism that can be considered as a more militant and crusader form of guaranteeing democracy and American values. By the time of the
First World War, Woodrow Wilson became the very personification of this crusadingstrand in American exceptionalism. He believed that only in interfering in the affairs of other nations could the United States wage its campaign of self determination for all people.555 As a consequence of America’s increase in power after World War I, the magnitude and ambitions of American democracy promotion increased. As stated by Stephen Walt: “American leaders have long seen the United States as a model for the rest of the world, and their ambitions have grown as U.S. power has increased. Upon joining the ranks of other
Great powers, the United States sought to combine the pursuit of power with the loftier goal of recasting the world in America’s image.”556 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States militarily intervened abroad about 25 times from 1901 to present. Most of those interventions were in its own backyard or resulted from the end of World War II and the need to create new institutions in the defeated states.557 During most of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine set forth a strategy to contain the
Soviet Union and other communist governments, not overthrowing and replacing them. It pledged the
United States to support free people resisting armed minorities or external pressures, not people who had already lost their freedom. Drawing on what has been said above, the Bush Doctrine privileging
555 Woodrow Wilson proclaimed to the U.S. Senate in January 1917, that American principles and policies were those of all mankind. He went on to propose that the nations of the world should: “with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as a doctrine of the world. No nation should seek to extend its polity over any nation or people. […] Every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.” This is mere rhetoric and Andrew Bacevich very well captured the essence behind the words. “Outside the Senate chamber” he writes “at least in some quarters, a different perspective prevailed. According to that perspective, even within the Western Hemisphere, the impact of the Monroe Doctrine was other than benign. Even during Wilson’s own presidency, it served not as a guarantee that all nations would be permitted to determine their destiny unhindered, unthreatened and unafraid, but as a mechanism for ordering relations between the strong and the weak according to the terms dictated by the strong. By the time of Wilson’s presidency, the Monroe Doctrine had evolved into a rationale for U.S. military intervention and the expansion of American power.” Bacevich Andrew J, American Empire: The Realities And Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, (Harvard: Harvard University Press), 2002, p. 115. 556 Walt Stephen M, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (New York: Norton), 2005, p. 80. 557 Except for interventions in West Germany, Italy, Austria and Japan after World War II, most U.S. forcible democracy interventions were in America’s Western Hemisphere zone of influence. See: Owen John M, "The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions," International Organization, vol. 56, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 388-289. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union spent huge amounts of blood and treasure in order to defend client states in the Third World. Vietnam and Afghanistan are the best examples of those interventions. See: Taliaferro Jefferey WC, "Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery," Political Psychology, vol. 25, no. 2, (August 2004), pp. 177-211.
UNIGE / SES - 219 - Olivier Brighenti Part III liberalism and democracy seems to fall within the mainstream of American foreign policy tradition. At first sight, it does not look so different from what has been done throughout American history. The
National Security Strategy of the United States begins with: “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom, and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” It goes on by asserting that: “The United States will use this moment of opportunity (high asymmetries in power) to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”558
I argue that far from falling within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy patterns, it represents a big departure from what has been done previously. So, how can we explain the magnitude of the Bush
Doctrine revolution? Since the promotion of democracy has always been at the center of American political core beliefs, what makes the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq different from previous eras? In short, it is the first time in American history that democracy enforcement on a global scale (to every corner of the world) is elevated at the rank of a Doctrine.559 I argue that democracy promotion as stated in the Bush Doctrine is a power maximizing strategy in order to extend American hegemony in all the corners of the world.560 As observed by Robert Tucker: “Once a great power goes beyond traditional
558 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. Introduction. (emphasis added) 559 As outlined by John Lewis Gaddis: “What appears at first glance to be a lack of clarity about who’s deterrable and who’s not turns out, upon closer examination, to be a plan for transforming the entire Muslim Middle East: for bringing it, once and for all, into the modern world. There’s been nothing like this in boldness, sweep, and vision since Americans took it upon themselves, more than half a century ago, to democratize Germany and Japan, thus setting in motion processes that stopped short of only few places on earth, one of which was the Muslim Middle East.” Gaddis John Lewis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," Foreign Policy, vol. 133, no. 1, (November/December 2002), pp. 55-56. 560 The Bush doctrine is often said to be the direct legacy of Woodrow Wilson’s democratic ideals. It is far from sure that Woodrow Wilson would recognize the Bush doctrine as the successor of his perception of democracy. Hendrickson and Tucker captured very well what drives apart traditional Wilsonianism and the Bush doctrine. “The League of Nations he championed” they say, “was based squarely on the need for the society of nations to devise defenses against aggression, rather than the need to transcend the society altogether. The League contained no democratic entitlement, and Wilson’s concept of a world made safe for democracy did not mean that the world should be made wholly democratic. For Wilson the preponderance of power the democratic coalition might achieve was to afford the basis for a progressive disarmament, not eternal U.S. military hegemony. His skepticism regarding military power and his affinity with Jefferson’s pacific system were reflected in his belief that economic sanctions and the power of public opinion would do the heavy lifting in prevention of aggression, an idea a world apart from Bush’s readiness to make force the first rather than the last resort of American statecraft. Hendrickson David C & Tucker Robert W, "The Freedom Crusade," The National Interest, vol. 81, no. 1, (Fall 2005), p. 15.
UNIGE / SES - 220 - Olivier Brighenti Part III balance of power considerations and makes other’s domestic political systems the litmus test of its own security, its interests cease to be national interests and instead become imperial ones.”561
My central claim is that enforcing democracy on a global scale, as the Iraqi case has proven, is a direct consequence of the asymmetrical distribution of power resulting from unipolarity. When the United
States was weak and threatened in its own survival, promoting American values and liberalism was simply not possible given the international structure and U.S. limited military capabilities.562 Kenneth
Waltz rightly observed: “Before World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developped ideologies that could easily propel them to unilateral action in the name of international duty: interventionist liberalism in one country, international communism in the other. Neither, however, widely exported its ideology earlier. The post-war foreign policies of neither country can be understood aside from the changed structure of international politics, exercising its pressures and providing its opportunities.563 During the Cold War, the U.S. strategy to guarantee a world made safe for democracy was based on building international institutions, good both for the promotion of American interests and for the accomplishment of its missions. The containment strategy after 1947 allowed the U.S. in the context of the Cold War to achieve a remarkable synthesis between power politics and American exceptionalism. The U.S. sought superiority, especially military, to fight communism, in the framework of international democratic institutions.564 Hence, the structural constraints of the Cold War checked
America’s global democratic reach. So long as the world was bipolar, the United States and the Soviet
Union held each other in check. Thus, the degree and the means by which the United States promotes
561 Quoted in: Layne Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University press), 2006, p. 124. 562 I fully endorse Robert Art’s statement that: “Historically, all great powers have sought to externalize their form of governance. None has ever been content merely to stand as a shining example of a particular form of governance; all have, instead, been vigorous political proselytizers and active missionaries. When they have chosen not to proselytize, it has been only because they were too weak: two examples are Stalin’s “socialism in one country” announced in the 1920’s, and what might be called America’s “republicanism in one country” enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.” Art Robert J, A Grand Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2003, p. 29. 563 Waltz Kenneth N, "America as a Model To The World," Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, (December 1991), p. 668. 564 Hoffmann Stanley, Gulliver Unbound: America Goes Backwards, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), 2004, p. 21. “During the Cold War, the U.S. lapsed into unilateral sponsorship of violence in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America; but in the main contest with the USSR it showed itself aware of the advantages that regional and global cooperation provide to the dominant power. International cooperation had the benefits of lightening the military and financial burdens of the U.S. as well as giving it more influence and providing ways of monitoring and shaping the behaviour of others.” Hoffmann Stanley, America Goes Backwards, (New York: New York Review of Books), 2004, p. 19.
UNIGE / SES - 221 - Olivier Brighenti Part III democracy is best explained by the degree of power at its disposal.565 The unipolar international structure means that the United States is not subject to severe external pressures and it feels few restrains to implement its democratic transformation policy. In fact, the Bush Doctrine as a direct application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy, correlates with a massive U.S. increase in relative power. The United States has now the capacity to use intervention as a mean to promote democracy on a global scale and, as the Iraqi case shows us, it clearly uses it. The fact that the
United States perceives itself as a benign and virtuous exception that defies the traditional logic of great powers does not change the result of the equation: a benevolent hegemon does not exist in international politics.566 As Paul Sharp writes: “No great power has the monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised.”567 Thus, hard line realism best explains the active and coercive promotion of democracy as a means to maximize U.S. power in the Middle East. In other words, hard line realism states that a massive increase in relative power and an unbalanced unipolar world provides the incentives for the hegemon to implement its coercive democracy promotion grand strategy. As the
565 I do not agree with Christopher Layne’s Open Door argument. He argues that the liberal ideological component of the United States ideology is the force driving the United States’ quest for extraterritorial hegemony. On the contrary, I argue that it is the pressures from the international system that are the motor of the United States’ so- called Open Door Policy. This has been made clear in Chapter III and the overall Eisenhower strategy. He states: “Today, U.S. policymakers believe, as they have since the early twentieth century, that the United States can be safe only in an Open Door world, a world shaped by America’s liberal ideology: and it is the Open Door, not the pressures from the international system, that is the motor of America’s quest for extraterritorial hegemony.” Layne Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University press), 2006, p. 118, Chapters 1 & 6. See also: Layne Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, (Fall 2006), p. 40, fn 130. 566 Political elites like to think that the United States is a benevolent hegemon operating in full harmony with the rest of the world. Other nations will accept American hegemony because it is different from previous ones. Illustrations are multiple. Sandy Berger said in 1999: “We are accused of dominating others, of seeing the world in zero sum terms in which any other country’s gain must be our loss. But that is a utterly mistaken view. It’s not just because we are the first global power in history that is not an imperial one. It’s because for 50 years, we have consciously tried to define and pursue our interests in a way that is consistent with the common good, rising prosperity, expanding freedom, collective security.” Berger Samuel R, "Remarks by Samuel R. Berger: American Power, Hegemony, Isolationism or Engagement ", 21 October 1999, (White House: Office of the Press Secretary), http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/19991021.html, (Accessed: 14/04/2007). President Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address echoed this view: “We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire.” Bush George W, "2004 State of the Union Address ", 20 January 2004, (White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040120-7.html, (Accessed: 13/04/2007). 567 Sharp Paul, "Virtue Unrestrained: Herbert Butterfield and the Problem of American Power," International Studies Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 3, (August 2004), p. 314.
UNIGE / SES - 222 - Olivier Brighenti Part III hegemon has acquired the capability to use intervention as a mechanism for democratic change, and imbalanced power creates the possibility for aggressive behavior, the hegemon will exercise it. Some analysts could argue that a structural approach such as my hard-line theory cannot account for forcible promotion of democratic institutions since hard-line realism does not go down to the “unit level”, i.e. inside the “black box” of state decision-making. James Owen for example states that: “because it ignores domestic institutions, structural realism is inadequate to explain foreign institutional imposition.
Even a realism that takes account of the consequences of internal institutions for state power cannot account for the phenomenon.”568 If hard-line realism cannot account for everything in a unipolar world, it can account for the most important one. Forcible imposition of democratic institutions cannot be done without a certain degree of power. For example, Lesotho is going to have a very hard time imposing its political system on its surrounding neighbor South Africa, although it might have specific interests and policy choices to do so. On the other hand, the contrary is far more realistic. Given South Africa’s relative power advantage and its dominant position in the region, imposing its political system on
Lesotho would be relatively easy. Thus, the ability to project political and military power is a precondition to promote and impose democracy in far-off regions of the world. As for every structural approach, hard- line’s behavioral expectations are general. Opponents to my approach would argue that I discard the intentions and ideological orientations of the Bush Administration and more specifically its neoconservative component. They would argue that hard-line realism fails to capture within the terms of the factors it privileges variation in the specific content of interests and policy choices. It is absolutely not the case. I do acknowledge that the ideological bias in the way the Bush Administrations and
Neoconservatives see the world has a dramatic effect on how the United States conducts its foreign policy. This does not mean that hard-line realism cannot account for these specific policies. The
“Neoconservative ideological crusade”, as I will show later on, is rendered possible only by the asymmetrical distribution of power of unipolarity. The so-called Neoconservative movement is nothing new. It has existed since the mid-thirties.569 It has always proposed a foreign policy agenda involving
568 Owen John M, "The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions," International Organization, vol. 56, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 398-399. 569 For a good overview on the Neoconservative movement see: Halper Stefan & Clarke Jonathan, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, ( New York: Cambridge University Press), 2004, 369 p. and
UNIGE / SES - 223 - Olivier Brighenti Part III concepts such as regime change, global hegemony, unipolarity, preemption and American exceptionalism. On the other hand, except for some aspects of the Reagan administration, it has never found the structural conditions enabling it to be implemented as a Doctrine for American security policy.570 It is not a surprise that the “neoconservative agenda” as defined by Kagan and Kristol became the cornerstone of the Bush Administration. Hence, the goals proposed by this strand of Neo- conservatism are possible solely under conditions of unipolarity. The unipolar international structure has made the Bush Doctrine of global forcible democracy imposition possible, since there are no severe external pressures on the hegemon and the world has become its backyard. Robert Kagan very well understood that it is the logic of the unipolar international structure that creates opportunities for the type of foreign policy he advocates. “The unipolar moment” he writes “had an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It made the United States more willing to use force abroad. With the check of Soviet power removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it chose, a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the humanitarian intervention in 1992, continuing during the Clinton years with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.”
“When the United States was weak,” he continues “it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is so powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do.”571
Without the huge asymmetries of power resulting from the end of the Cold War, we would always be talking about Neo-conservatism as a marginal political group on the right wing of the Republican party.
Hard-line realism best explains why forcible democracy promotion has become one of the cornerstones of the Bush Doctrine, since it is the international unipolar structure that renders that type of policy possible. Robert Jervis captured very well this aspect when he asserts: “To some extent, then, the new
Fukuyama Francis, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2006, 226 p. 570 Many Neoconservatives claim the legacy of the Reagan administration and more specifically his policy towards the Soviet Union. Although it is far from certain that Reagan was a Neoconservative, he was permeable to a certain approach towards communism. Neoconservative advocates such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan, explicitly claimed the mantel of Reaganism and derived their foreign policy position from his. On that aspect see: Kagan Robert & Kristol William, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 4, (July/August 1996), pp. 18-32. See also: Kagan Robert & Kristol William, "The Present Danger," The National Interest, vol., no. 59, (Spring 2000), pp. 1-5. For an interesting review and critic of their argument see: Lowry Richard, "Reaganism vs Neo-Reaganism," The National Interest, vol., no. 79, (Spring 2005), pp. 35-43. 571 Kagan Robert, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, vol. 113, no. 1, (June/July 2002), pp. 6 & 9.
UNIGE / SES - 224 - Olivier Brighenti Part III assertiveness of U.S. hegemony is accidental, the product of a reaction of personalities and events. Yet deeper factors reveal that if this shift in policy was an accident, it was also and accident waiting to happen. The forceful and unilateral exercise of U.S. power is not simply the by-product of September
11, the Bush administration, or some shadowy neoconservative cabal, it is the logical outcome of the current unrivaled U.S. position in the international system.”572
8.1.1.2 The Unipolar Distribution of Power and Forcible Democratic Imposition in Iraq The Bush Administration resorted to three sets of arguments to publicly justify the invasion of Iraq in
2003. The first one was that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction that directly threatened its neighbors and the United States itself. Months after the invasion, there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq although more than a thousand U.S. experts ran around the country to find the proofs that would have justified the war.573 The second rationale for invading Iraq was that Saddam
Hussein had links with Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks. The United States had to remove him from power in order to prevent him from launching new terrorist attacks on the United States. This hazardous and somewhat ridiculous justification was very quickly abandoned and President Bush publicly acknowledged in September 2003 that the United States: “had no evidence that Saddam
Hussein was involved with September the 11th.”574 The third justification was that even if there were no weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had no links with Al Qaeda, he was a ruthless dictator that oppressed his people. Consequently he had to be removed from power in order to install democracy in Iraq for the benefit of all. Under-Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that, regardless of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the United States had to invade
Iraq because: “We have an important job to do in Iraq, an absolutely critical job to do, and that is to help
572 Jervis Robert, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy, vol. 137, no. 1, (July/August 2003), p. 84. 573 In a secret memo that was leaked to the press, President Bush and his British counterpart Tony Blair acknowledged on 30January 2003, that there were no unconventional weapons in Iraq and that there was a possibility that none would be found before the start of the war. They both acknowledged that this was not a reason not to invade Iraq. They had planned the date of the invasion and failing to find WMD was not going to change anything. See: Van Natta Don, "Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says," The New York Times, New York, 27 March 2006, p. A 1. 574 Bush George W, "Remarks by the President After Meeting with Members of the Congressional Conference Committee on Energy Legislation ", 17 September 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030917-7.html, (Accessed: 12/04/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 225 - Olivier Brighenti Part III the Iraqi people to build a free and democratic country”575 In his address at the 20th Anniversary of the
National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush said: “The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed, and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran, that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free
Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”576 In his 2004 State of the Union Speech, Bush said: “America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace, a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom.”577
The invasion of Iraq is hard to understand if the only objective was to disarm Saddam Hussein and remove him from power in order to impose a democratic government for the sake of the Iraqi people.
The long history of American dealing with authoritative regimes, makes it clear that when it is in its national interest, the type of regime is not the major source of concern.578 If forcible democracy imposition in the Middle East was the dominant force driving the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then “illiberal” regimes such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, should also be on the list alongside Iran and North
Korea. Thus, if the three rationales for the invasion don’t hold up to serious scrutiny, how are we to explain the real underlying logic of the forcible imposition of democracy in Iraq? Why was Iraq the main target although it is not the only authoritarian regime in the Middle East?
575 Quoted in : Shanker Thom, "Wolfowitz Defends War, Illicit Iraqi Arms or Not," The New York Times, New York, 1 February 2004, p. A 8. 576 Bush George W, "Remarks By The President At The 20th Anniversary Of The National Endowment For Democracy", 6 November 2003, (White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/print/20031106-3.html, (Accessed: 13/04/2007). 577 Bush George W, "2004 State of the Union Address ", 20 January 2004, (White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040120-7.html, (Accessed: 13/04/2007). 578 Almost from the beginning, a central theme of U.S. foreign policy has been the support for democracy against dictatorship. For practical reasons, nevertheless, the U.S. government has tolerated, aided, and even allied itself with dictators. In the World War II contest with Nazi Germany and the other Axis powers, the United States allied with the Soviet Union. In the Cold War, when the Soviet dictatorship was the chief adversary, the United States had as allies a dictator in Spain, previously on the side of the Axis, and a dictator in Yugoslavia who had been an ally of the Soviet Union, had broken with Moscow, but remained a dedicated Communist. See : May Ernest R & Zelikow Philip D, ed. Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of US Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990, (Cambridge: MIT Press), 2006. 400 p.
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My argument is that the Bush administration used the “democracy promotion argument” in Iraq in order to advance its hegemonic reach in the Middle East, maximize its power in that strategic region of the world and as a consequence deepen its strive for global hegemony. Using democracy promotion as a rationale for invasion, the Iraqi case was the perfect way to establish the new world order outlined in the
Bush doctrine. The Iraqi case was the ultimate test for the four points I developed in the introduction to this part. The Iraqi campaign was a way to “test” the logic of preemption established by the 2002
National Security Strategy of the United States. It was a way to tell the world (Allies and foes alike) that the United States meant serious business and that its preponderance on the international system should not be challenged. It asserts that the United States is the only global power and that no other country should even think about reverting the course of American primacy. Secondly, the United States sought to establish an American protectorate in Iraq, supported by permanent American military facilities. The war in Afghanistan and Iraq has enabled the United States to establish U.S. bases in Central Asia, one of the last geographic area without them. This is an important goal of the NSS. The document states:
“To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”579 Thirdly, and this is where the democracy aspect has all its importance, the enduring American presence in Iraq depends on the nature of the political system that will take control of Baghdad. The United States wants to leave behind a regime that would be favorable to U.S. interests and further Washington’s aims towards regional powers like Syria and Iran. Consequently, if the ties are close enough, the United States could have a military stronghold in one of the world’s most strategic regions.
Thus, structural factors more than internal ones predisposed the United States to invade Iraq. In short, unipolarity has made the Bush doctrine possible since it provides the United States with disproportionate freedom of action. Consequently, the Bush doctrine went from theory to practice with the Iraqi case. As outlined by Robert Jervis: “Part of the Bush doctrine are unique to the circumstances, but it is the exception rather than the rule for states to stay on the path of moderation when others do
579 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. p. 29.
UNIGE / SES - 227 - Olivier Brighenti Part III not force them to do so.”580 As highlighted earlier, promoting democracy has always been an American goal. But democracy promotion is never altruistic, even for the United States.581 As outlined by
McCartney: “Americans seek to implant and strengthen democratic governance in other states not only to make other people feel ‘free’ (and however culturally insensitive Americans may be in this desire, articulations of this goal are generally sincere), but also and primarily because doing so expands
American power.”582 The absence of a peer competitor makes this part of the Bush doctrine feasible.
Thus, the: “Moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe”583 has less to do with a sudden predisposition in the Middle East for democracy, liberalism, and freedom than with the structural constraints of unipolarity and the enormous power asymmetries it confers to the United
States. Hence, a strategy of power maximization in a unipolar world will decide what type of weapons other states will be allowed to possess and it will make clear that liberal democracy is the only acceptable and tolerated form of government the United States will tolerate. As the invasion of Iraq has shed to light, the overwhelming U.S. power will be used to spread democracy, to deny weapons of mass destruction to any “potential” enemy of the United States and to make sure that no possible peer competitor will challenge the U.S. hegemonic position.
I will now answer to my second question. Why was Iraq the main target although it is not the only authoritarian regime in the Middle East? Iraq became the number one target for a host of reasons. I will highlight on some of them in order to explain why the United States focused on Iraq while tolerating authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and the list is fairly long.
My first argument is that Washington does not seek to impose a democratic system on authoritarian regimes that are friendly or allied to the United States and that do not threaten or flout U.S. hegemonic reach in the Middle East. The United States and Saudi Arabia share interests in the strategic defense of
580 Jervis Robert, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, (Fall 2003), p. 380. 581 Kenneth Waltz rightly outlined : “The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being of the world. But these terms will be defined to the liking of the powerful which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others. Waltz Kenneth N, "America as a Model To The World," Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, (December 1991), p. 669. 582 McCartney Paul T, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy From September 11 to the Iraq War," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 3, (Fall 2004), p. 406. 583 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. p. 2.
UNIGE / SES - 228 - Olivier Brighenti Part III the region and Riyadh is the key ally of the United States in stabilizing the oil prices. Pressing if not imposing democracy in that state would possibly jeopardize Washington’s position in the Gulf. There are competing interests that can explain why the United States is not pushing hard for the democratization of Saudi Arabia.584 Thus, concerns about governance and human rights have been subordinated to other competing strategic interests such as loyalty, the “war on terrorism” and cheap oil supplies. It is interesting to note that when the Saudi government arrested reformers that wanted to promote a constitutional monarchy, Colin Powell said: “Each nation has to find its own path and follow that path at its own speed.”585
Egypt has been ruled since 1981 by President Mubarak and is far from a model of democracy. On the other hand, Egypt is at peace with Israel and the United States. Pushing too hard for democracy in that region could destabilize this “friendly regime” and bring to power a much more radical government that would endanger Washington’s position in that strategic region. As the Egyptian political scientist Amr
Hamzawy said : “No single country, especially a superpower, can act simply out of democracy promotion. It has to be combined with strategic considerations. One of those is certainly to push forward and to press Mubarak to introduce substantial reforms. […] The second position you clearly see is a more hesitant approach. Because if you press hard for substantial political reforms, you don't know what kind of alternatives you might have.”586 The same pattern applies to Pakistan. Islamabad is a key element in Washington’s global War on Terror. Although much of the terrorist turmoil comes from the tribal areas of the Northern Frontier, and although the Pakistani military intelligence services (ISI) has trained and backed the Taliban regime, Washington has a stake in having an authoritarian “pro-
Western” Pakistan as an ally in its global War on Terror.587 Thus, promoting or enforcing democracy in that country would probably lead to a radicalization of the fundamentalist movements and pave the way
584 Wittes Tamara, "The Promise of Arab Liberalism: America's role in Middle East Reform," Policy Review, vol. 125, no. 1, (June/July 2004), pp. 61-76 585 Quoted in : Jervis Robert, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no. 3, (Fall 2005), p. 371. 586 Quoted in: Bumiller Elizabeth, "The First Lady's Mideast Sandstorm," The New York Times, New York Monday 6 June 2005, p. A. 1. The Bush Administration’s push for democracy among Palestinians brought the Radical Islamist group Hamas into power. Thus, the United States has to be very careful with its democracy promotion rhetoric towards Egypt if it wants to avoid having the Muslim Brotherhood replacing Mubarak’s “friendly” regime. 587 For a very good discussion see : Abbas Hassan, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror, (New York: M.E. Sharp), 2004, 275. p.
UNIGE / SES - 229 - Olivier Brighenti Part III for an unacceptable hostile Islamist regime. On the other hand, Pakistan has a nuclear deterrence capability that would render an “Iraqi type” invasion impossible.588 Thus, it is not in Washington’s strategic interest to push too hard for democracy in friendly regimes, even if those are authoritative. The case of North Korea is interesting. Far from being a U.S. “friendly dictatorship,” it seems very unlikely it will ever have the “special treatment” inflicted to Saddam Hussein. If North Korea was attacked, it would probably heavily strike the South with unconventional weapons. It would ultimately be defeated, but the price of the conquest would be unacceptable. Thus: “North Korea is too tough an adversary to tackle” says Robert Jervis “unless the need to do so is overwhelming. Iraq on the other side is the right size enemy, troublesome enough to merit attention, but not so strong that it has a powerful deterrent.”589
Thus as highlighted by hard-line realism, the costs are too high and the risks are too uncertain to try and invade North Korea. Pressing for democratic transformation in so-called rogue states such as Iran, Iraq or Syria is far less dangerous. Unlike the countries ruled by “friendly dictators” or those with powerful deterrence, there is little to lose by trying to impose democracy in unfriendly and weak ones.
My second argument is that Iraq fulfills all the criterias that usually justified an invasion throughout history. In Owen’s study, across time, many target states stood out as having geopolitical as well as strategic importance due to their natural resources.590 Iraq holds an important strategic position in the
Middle East. It has the second proven oil reserves in the world. Furthermore, it is, alongside Iran and
Syria, the only regime that is hostile to the U.S. hegemonic reach in the Gulf region. Thus, eliminating
Saddam Hussein is crucial in order to deepen American primacy in the Middle East. As outlined by John
Agnew: “Saddam Hussein has long flouted U.S. designs in the Middle East and Iraq had the potential
588 According to Waltz, the spread of nuclear weapons has a stabilizing effect. His fundamental claim is that nuclear forces have a very powerful deterrent effect, and that nuclear states would therefore be extremely reluctant to tangle with each other. If such a state does take aggressive action-if a nuclear Iraq invaded Kuwait, for example- other powers would find it too dangerous to use military force against the aggressor state, and would only be able to take non-military measures. If the United States at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 "had thought that Iraq might have had a few bombs, it would have had to manage the Iraq-Kuwait crisis differently, say by employing only an embargo.” A nuclear state will be capable of deterring the United States from threatening its vital interests. For a very good account on Waltz’s claim and his opponents, see: Trachtenberg Marc, "Waltzing to Armageddon?," The National Interest, vol. 69, no. 1, (Fall 2002), pp. 144-155. See also updated reference book on that aspect: Waltz Kenneth N & Sagan Scott D, ed. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, (New York: Norton Publishing), 2003. 224. p. 589 Jervis Robert, "The Confrontation Between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence," European Journal Of International Relations, vol. 9, no. 2, (June 2003), p. 328. 590 Owen John M, "The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions," International Organization, vol. 56, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 395-396.
UNIGE / SES - 230 - Olivier Brighenti Part III resources (in the form of oil) to subsidize its own liberation by U.S. forces. In other words, it was
Saddam’s lack of acceptance of American hegemony, his resistance to U.S. norms of political and economic conduct, along with the other “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea in what President G.W.
Bush called the “axis of evil” in world politics, that singled him out for special treatment.”591
My third argument follows from the two previous ones. Iraq was the perfect case to test the Bush
Doctrine of preventive war. The United States success in toppling down the Taliban regime in 2001 provided the Bush Administration with a “taste of success.” This victory probably contributed to expand
America’s strategic reach in the Middle East. If Washington was able to overthrow Saddam Hussein and consolidate its position in Iraq, it would gain an important instrument of influence in the Gulf. After the quick and successful Afghan campaign where the United States was greeted as liberators, Iraq seemed the most feasible place were to strike the next blow. Suddenly it seemed that American values were transportable, even in the most remote and hostile region of the world that had historically been the graveyard of empires.592 It became clear to the Bush Administration that if the United States could repeat in Iraq what had been done in Afghanistan the Bush doctrine of forcible democracy promotion would reveal successful. As outlined by John Lewis Gaddis: “If we can topple this tyrant, if we can repeat the Afghan Agincourt on the banks of the Euphrates, then we can accomplish a great deal. We can complete the task the Gulf War left unfinished. We can destroy whatever weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein may have accumulated since. We can end whatever support he’s providing for terrorists elsewhere, notably those who act against Israel. We can liberate the Iraqi people.
We can ensure ample supply of inexpensive oil. We can set in motion a process that could undermine and ultimately remove reactionary regimes elsewhere in the Middle East.”593 So according to the logic of the Bush Administration, the invasion of Iraq would prove ex post that the Bush doctrine of preventive war was the right way to deal with dictators, although it triggered harsh opposition worldwide. Expecting to replay the Afghan success, military resistance would be quickly eliminated, and Iraqis would welcome the United States as liberators. The winners would be able to install a friendly “democratic regime,”
591 Agnew John A, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 2005, p. 19. 592 See : Bearden Milton, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 6, (November/December 2001), pp. 17-30. 593 Gaddis John Lewis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," Foreign Policy, vol. 133, no. 1, (November/December 2002), p. 54.
UNIGE / SES - 231 - Olivier Brighenti Part III favorable to U.S. interests in the region. The overall success of the occupation would demonstrate that the long diplomatic efforts since 1991 were useless to deal with authoritarian regimes and that the world would acknowledge and support America’s efforts to transform the Middle East. The recent concessions by Libya were an apparent example of the positive feedback that follows the application of brute force.
In the 2004 State of the Union, Bush advanced what was essentially a causal inference, relating the effects of newfound US military credibility on proliferation and democratic behavior: “Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great Britain succeeded with Libya” he said, “While
12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America.”594
8.1.2. Preventive War and the Unipolar International Structure: A Power Maximization Strategy? As I have outlined throughout the previous section, the Bush doctrine inaugurated a dramatic shift in
U.S. grand strategy. Probably the most striking and controversial element of this doctrine concerns the notion of preemption that was first laid out in Bush’s June 2002 West Point Speech. It can be seen as an answer to the terrorist threats, but it constitutes above all a broader view of how the United States is going to use its overwhelming power in order to advance America’s interests and manage international politics in a unipolar world. If 9/11 changed anything in American foreign policy, it is the way the United
States perceives the threats to its national security. September 11 changed U.S. perception of threat because it brought together two elements that were much more deadly in combination than they were separately: radical Islamism and weapons of mass destruction. As outlined by Fukuyama: “Both had existed for a long time as issues in U.S. foreign policy, the former since at least the Iranian revolution in
1978 and the latter since the dawn of the nuclear age. Each by itself constituted a serious problem for
U.S. foreign policy, but put together in a single package, the two raised for the first time the imminent possibility of a direct, undeterrabe nuclear or biological threat to the United States.”595 Thus, the perception of these new threats required, according to the Bush administration, a very different set of
594 Bush George W, "2004 State of the Union Address ", 20 January 2004, (White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040120-7.html, (Accessed: 13/04/2007). 595 Fukuyama Francis, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2006, p. 67.
UNIGE / SES - 232 - Olivier Brighenti Part III policy responses than the ones used during the Cold War. According to the NSS: “The gravest dangers our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.”596 The Administration justifies this new doctrine as a necessary adjustment to more uncertain threats of the “post-9/11 era”. As the
National Security Strategy states: “Today our enemies see weapons if mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states, these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the U.S.”597 As a consequence of this new “threat perception,” the Cold War grand strategy of deterrence and containment is becoming more and more irrelevant given the nature of the terrorist threat. Thus the dual policy of deterrence and containment as well as the balance of power logic has been “discarded” since the new threats cannot be deterred. In his West Point speech, Bush clearly made the case for pre- emptive action, citing the unique character of rogue states and terrorist groups whose threat defied traditional deterrence and containment strategies. He said: “For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”598 Even without a clear threat, the NSS logic claims the right to use preemption action at any moment. Bush stated at the
West Point Speech: “Our security will require transforming the military you will lead, a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all
Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to
596 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. Cover Letter. 597 Ibidem, p. 15. (emphasis added) 598 Bush George W, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point ", 1 June 2002, (White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, (Accessed: 16/04/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 233 - Olivier Brighenti Part III defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”599 After West Point, the preemption logic was officially codified as the U.S. grand strategy in the 2002 NSS. The document declares: “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction, and more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively […] We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions.”600
Many scholars have argued that preemption is nothing new in international politics.601 John Lewis
Gaddis argues that preemption has been used by several American Administrations throughout the nineteenth century.602 Preemption was also considered at several moments during the Cold War. Colin
Powell declared to the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee: “If you would go to the new national security strategy that the President issued not too long ago and look at the specific section which talks about our strategy and doctrine, you will find that we have not abandoned containment, we have not abandoned deterrence. […] A doctrine of preemption, or an element of preemption in our strategy is appropriate. It's not a new doctrine. It's been around for as long as warfare has been around. […] So see it as elevation of one of the many tools that we've always had, but don't see it as a new doctrine that excludes or eliminates all the other tools of national security and military power.”603 I do not agree with this claim. If we adopt an accurate definition of preemption, rather than a floppy one as the one used in
599 Ibidem 600 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. pp. 15-16. 601 Although preemption has been used in the past, there are strikingly few prior cases. The most popular case is Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor as well as the 1996 Sinai Campaign. On that aspect see : Litwak Robert S, "The New Calculus of Pre-emption," Survival, vol. 44, no. 4, (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 60-66 and also Levy jack S & Gochal Joseph, "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1996 Sinai Campaign," Security Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 1-49 See also : Copeland Dale C, The Origins Of Major War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2000, pp. 1-17. 602 Gaddis John Lewis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2004, 150 p. According to Gaddis, The Bush Administration has, therefore, devised a new grand strategy whose foundations lie in the nineteenth-century tradition of unilateralism; preemption, and hegemony, projected this time on a global scale. See also: Art Robert J, A Grand Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2003, pp. 181-197. 603 Powell Colin L, "The Administration's Position With Regard to Iraq", 26 September 2002, (The Senate Foreign Relations Committee), http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/13765.htm, (Accessed: 19/04/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 234 - Olivier Brighenti Part III the NSS to justify preventive war against Iraq, preemption according to my standards, means: the use of military force against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack or use of force by that nation, which represents the start of the war.604 Thus, if preemption has been a political and military tool at America’s disposal as long as warfare has been around, why is the Bush doctrine of preemption such a dramatic shift in American grand strategy? The answer is quite simple. With the publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush Administration has elevated military preemption against every potential adversary as the official U.S. doctrine. Putting preventive war at the heart of U.S. national security strategy makes it clear that the sole superpower is going to use its overwhelming military power whenever and wherever it feels the need to.
8.1.2.1 Preemption and Preventive War: The NSS and the Rationale for Invading Iraq In order to understand the underlying logic of the American invasion of Iraq, we need to discuss the idea of preemption as defined in the NSS. Preemption is the cornerstone of the new Bush doctrine. But there is a problem of definition that has dramatic consequences in “the real world.” My definition of preemption is taking military action against a state that is about to launch an attack. In short, preemption assumes detection of the enemy’s mobilization of its forces in order to attack, which represents the start of the war. Dan Reiter defines a war as preemptive: “If it breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will itself be the target of a military attack in the short term. The essence of preemption, then, is that it is motivated by fear, not by greed.”605 Cases of preemption are very rare throughout history. Reiter’s study of preemptive wars since 1816 counts only three possible cases: World War I, the Chinese intervention in Korea and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Preventive wars, on the other hand, are far more common.
Preventive war means starting a war against a state that might, at some point, pose a threat. Jack Levy defines preventive war as: “A state strategy driven primarily by the preventive motivation, or, more
604 The historical record indicates that the United States has never, to date, engaged in a "preemptive" military attack against another nation. Nor has the United States ever attacked another nation militarily prior to its first having been attacked or prior to U.S. citizens or interests first having been attacked, with the singular exception of the Spanish-American War. For a good overview see: Grimmett Richard F, "U.S. Use of Military Preemtive Force: The Historical Record", December 2002, (U.S. Congressional Research Service), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4grimmett.htm#fn2r, (Accessed: 19/04/2007). 605 Reiter Dan, "Exploding the Power Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, vol. 20, no. 2, (Fall 1995), p. 6.
UNIGE / SES - 235 - Olivier Brighenti Part III accurately, to a war arising from such a strategy.”606 The rationale for preventive war is that conflict with the adversary is so deep and unremitting that war is ultimately inevitable.607 Preventive wars are more common since most countries that launch an attack without an immediate provocation believe their actions are preventive.608
In the case of Iraq, are we talking of a preemptive or a preventive war? This is not a mere semantic distinction. The issue of preemption and prevention in the case of Iraq is of the utmost importance, since it is at the heart of the question whether the United States was defending itself or committing aggression. The distinction is between legality and illegality. A preemptive war would have been justified, only if there had been significant evidence that Iraq was mobilizing its military forces to attack the United States. Preemption would have been unobjectionable in principle, if it had been an act of anticipatory self-defense in a war effectively initiated by Saddam Hussein. Preemption cannot be used to justify a war of aggression. This whole ambiguity lies at the heart of the 2002 NSS. Its justification for preemption has drawn heavily on often conflated discourses of self-defense, preemption, terrorism, rough states and weapons of mass destruction. Soon after 9/11, members of the Bush Administration began equating self-defense with preemption. Secretary of Defense Rumsfled said: “There is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every country does, of self defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against the terrorists at every place and every time against every conceivable technique. Therefore, the only way to deal with terrorist network is to take the battle to them. That is in fact what we’re doing. That is in effect self-defense of a preemptive nature.”609 In order to make the case for invading Iraq, the Bush administration argued that in an age of nuclear-armed terrorists, the very distinction between preemption and prevention was outmoded; the restrictive definition of the former needed to be broadened. Thus, the NSS blured the distinction
606 Levy jack S & Gochal Joseph, "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1996 Sinai Campaign," Security Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, (Winter 2001/2002), p. 10. 607 Betts Richard K, "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities," Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, (2003), pp. 17-25. 608 Dale Copeland typically uses a broad typology and argues that decline and prevention account for most major wars during the past two centuries. For example, Copeland interprets the Cold War, and containment doctrine in particular, as a preventive war by the United States to avert the relative decline against an increasingly powerful Soviet Union. See: Copeland Dale C, The Origins Of Major War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2000, 322 p. According to the definition I will use, preventive war occurs only when there is an accurate use of military power. 609 Quoted in: Crawford Neta C, "The Slippery Slope to Preventive War," Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, (2003), p. 30.
UNIGE / SES - 236 - Olivier Brighenti Part III between rough states and terrorists. The document states: “We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”610 But these differences do make a difference.
The Administration’s worry was that a few so-called rough states, in particular Iraq, Iran and North
Korea would develop capabilities to acquire weapons of mass destruction and hand over these weapons to terrorist groups. According to the NSS logic, the regimes themselves could be deterred, but the terrorist groups couldn’t. Thus, states that are not technically in violation of any existing international laws could nevertheless be the target of American force, if Washington determined that they had a prospective capacity to do harm. In August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney applied the new preventive doctrine to the case of Iraq. “What we must not do in the face of the mortal threat” he said, “is ti give in to wishful thinking or wishful blindness […] Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network or murderous dictators, or the two working together constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action.”611 As a consequence, the United States would periodically find it necessary to reach inside states and create the political conditions that would prevent terrorism. Thus, the NSS made it clear that it questioned the old Westphalian notion of state sovereignty. When asked whether there was a new doctrine emerging that is as broad as Kennan's containment, Richard Haass, then Director of Policy Planning for the State
Department declared: “I think there is. What you're seeing from this Administration is the emergence of a new principle or body of ideas I'm not sure it constitutes a doctrine-about what you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked."612 These
610 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. p. 5. 611 Quoted in: Borger Julian, "Cheney Waves White House War Banner: Vice-president Gives Support to Pre-emptive Strike on Iraq," The Guardian, London, 27 August 2002, p. 12. 612 Quoted in: Lemann Nicholas, "The Next World Order: The Bush Administration May Have a Brand-New Doctrine of Power," The New Yorker, New York, 1 April 2002, p. 42.
UNIGE / SES - 237 - Olivier Brighenti Part III discourses, however, have distinct heritage and rationales. Combining these different kinds of arguments was intended to make the case for preemption.613 As outlined by John Lewis Gaddis: “In mounting its post-September 11 offensive, the Bush Administration conflated these terms, using the word preemption to justify what turned out to be a preventive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”614
Thus, the case of the invasion of Iraq is the hallmark for preventive war defined as preemption. Saddam
Hussein’s regime didn’t pursue any actions that could justify a preemptive attack as defined above. Iraq posed no direct threat to the United States. It gave no aggressive signs, and there was no serious evidence that it developed weapons of mass destruction. George Kennan, the architect of containment, very well outlined the absurdity of the Bush doctrine of preventive war. "I could see justification (for preventive war) only if the absence of it would involve a major and imminent danger to our own country, or, at worst, to our most intimate and traditional allies. Of this I see no evidence." If Iraq has cultivated weapons of mass destruction, Kennan argued, the greatest threat would probably be to its neighbors, particularly Israel, rather than to the United States, and so "it would be up to the government of that country to estimate the extent of the danger and to find the most fitting answer to it." He went on, "The apparently imminent use of American armed forces to drive Saddam Hussein from power, from what I know of our government's state of preparedness for such an involvement, seems to me well out of proportion to the dangers involved.”615 Even more absurd, why would a secular regime such as Saddam
Hussein’s deliver weapons of mass destruction to fundamentalist terrorist networks?616 The whole rational for war was based on pure speculation and power considerations. In other words, the war in
613 See: Lang Anthony F, "Evaluating the Preemptive Use of Force," Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, (2003), p. 1. Nuclear proliferation and terrorism, are not twin horrors and do not result in a single set of policy guidelines. The problem of when states proliferate and when terrorist groups attack are often quite distinct from the problem of when terrorist groups might gain access to nuclear weapons. On that aspect see: Byman Daniel, "Do Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism go Together?," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 122, no. 1, (Spring 2007), pp. 25-46. 614 Gaddis John Lewis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, (January-February 2005), p. 4. 615 Mayer Jane, "A Doctrine Passes," The New Yorker, New York, 14 October 2002, p. 70. 616 Stephen Walt argues: “The danger that rogue regimes will give away WMD is extremely remote. After incurring all the costs and risks of obtaining these weapons, would any leader either give or sell them to terrorists, when he could not control how the terrorists might use them and could not be sure that the transfer would not be detected? Indeed, rogue states that obtained WMD could not be sure that the United States would not retaliate if it merely suspected that they had transferred weapons to a terrorist group. For this reason, among others, new WMD states will go to great lengths to make sure that their arsenals do not find their way into terrorists’ hands. No foreign government is going to give up weapons they need for deterrence and allow them to be used in ways that would place their own survival at risk.” Walt Stephen M, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (New York: Norton), 2005, p. 224.
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Iraq was an old-fashioned attack on a sovereign state. It was not a war: “Initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that the enemy an attack is imminent. Far from that: CIA analysts, according to
George Tenet, the CIA director, never said there was an imminent threat.”617 The United States sought to overthrow his regime using preventive war “disguised” in preemptive war. Iraq was the best case to test the new logic of preventive war as a power maximizing strategy in the Middle East. Thus, preventive war, as stated in the Bush doctrine, is a war fought to forestall a shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East. The United States had the power to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime and there was no reason it wouldn’t do it. Unipolarity provided the United States with incentives to increase its global reach in the Middle East and preventive war over Iraq was the best tool to fulfill that goal. Striving for global hegemony, implies extending America’s national interest and security concerns at the global level. Thus, the broadening of the national interest as well as the desire to control the international environment combined with unchecked military power in a unipolar world makes a preventive war doctrine of eliminating potential threats and rivals possible. As Richard Betts rightly argues: “When security is defined in terms broader than protecting the near-term integrity of national sovereignty and borders, the distinction between offense and defense blurs hopelessly […] Security can be as insatiable an appetite as acquisitiveness, there may never be enough buffers.”618
8.1.2.2 Preventive War: A Strategy of Unipolarity? Having these elements in mind, is preventive war a genuine power maximizing strategy in a unipolar world? My answer is straightforward: yes. The use of military force has become the centerpiece of
America’s strategy to manage world order. In his June 2001 West Point graduation speech, Bush made it very clear that the United States was going to maximize its relative power in the international system and prevent any other power from matching its unprecedented position. “America has, and intends to keep” he said “military strengths beyond challenge thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”619 Preventive war in the logic
617 Schlesinger Arthur M, War and the American Presidency, (New York: Norton Publishing), 2004, p. 25. 618 Betts Richard, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 1982, p. 14. 619 Bush George W, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point ", 1 June 2002, (White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, (Accessed: 16/04/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 239 - Olivier Brighenti Part III of the NSS is a tool to ensure that America’s primacy will not be challenged and to guarantee that the international distribution of power will remain unipolar. It is striking that although there is a continuous reference to the allies and friends, nothing in the NSS suggests that preventive war is a tool that will be used only against so called rogue states and terrorist networks. The logic of preventive war, as a mean to guarantee American uncontested primacy, applies to every power (friend or foe) that might challenge the United States in a close or far future. The NSS boldly states: “The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat and attempt by any enemy, whether a state or non-state actor, to impose its will on the United States […] our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
United States.” Rising powers are not immune to America’s power maximizing strategy. The NSS makes it clear that it is concerned by rising centers of powers that might on the long run challenge the
United States and restore some form of multipolarity. “We are attentive” the document reads “to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition. Several great powers are now in the midst of internal transition, most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking place.”
In order to implement this power maximization strategy the document states: “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defense beyond challenge.
Our military highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must dissuade future military buildup.”620 The logic behind Bush’s comment is that unipolarity confers the
United States with a huge margin of power to operate in the international system. Military power beyond challenge, means that there is only one superpower and that there is no point for anyone to try to compete with the United States in the military realm. Preventive war is at the heart of the strategy, and as the Iraqi case signaled to the world: there is no hope of becoming a rival power or challenging the
United States.” Thus international conflict shifts from traditional military rivalries, to trade competition and other minor quarrels that are not worth fighting for. The Bush doctrine abandons the traditional
620 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. pp. 29-30. (emphasis added)
UNIGE / SES - 240 - Olivier Brighenti Part III notion of balance of power for a strategy of global domination that puts American unchallenged military capabilities at the heart of international politics.
What makes the 2002 NSS logic of preventive war different from the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance?
The preventive war logic as well as the massive military buildup was already suggested in the
“Pentagon paper”. The document states: “We must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant position in the world.”621 In order to accomplish this aim, a strong emphasis was made on the use of military force, if necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in such countries as North Korea, Iraq etc… Although the 1992 distribution of power was highly asymmetrical the immediate end of the Cold War made this strategy doubtful. It is true that the United States grew faster than other countries, it reduced its military spending at a slower rate than all other powers, but all the conditions to effectively implement the DPG strategy were not met. It is a whole different story with the
2002 NSS. Otto von Bismarck is reputed to have said that preventive wars were “Suicide for fear of death”.622 He was probably right. The nineteenth century multipolar distribution of power made this strategy risky, given that the disparities of power between the great powers were not that striking. Many scholars have defined preventive war as a means for a declining hegemon to preserve its preponderant position in the system. This idea can be traced back to Thucydides’ argument that what made the
Peloponnesian War inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in
Sparta. Thus Sparta initiated the War to crush the Athenian challenger while it was still at the top.
Robert Gilpin claims: “The first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem. By launching a preventive war the declining power destroys or weakens the rising challenger while the military advantage is still with the declining power.”623 In the same vein, Jack
Levy argues: “The preventive motivation for war arises from the perception that one’s military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising adversary, and from the fear of the consequences of
621 Quoted in : Tyler Patrick E, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World," New York Times, New York, 8 March 1992, p. 1 622 Quoted in : Betts Richard, "Suicide from Fear of Death?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1, (January/February 2003), p. 35. 623 Gilpin Robert G, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981, p. 191.
UNIGE / SES - 241 - Olivier Brighenti Part III that decline.”624 In a unipolar world, the disparities of powers between the hegemon and its adversaries are so overwhelming that Bismarck’s warning seems irrelevant. Preventive war in a unipolar world ensures that potential rivals never come strong enough to threaten the hegemon’s preponderance.
Thus, in such a distribution of power, preventive war is not driven by the fear of the hegemon’s declining power but by power maximizing strategies. Preventive war ensures that the potential challengers (allies or foes alike) never became strong enough to threaten the hegemon’s dominance. Hard-line realism states that the unipolar international structure provides the hegemon with incentives to maximize its power through preventive war. As outlined by Jack Snyder: “Such a strategy presents a great temptation to a country as strong as the United States, which can project overwhelming power to any spot on the globe […] Consequently, it faces many of the same dilemmas as did the great powers that have gone before it.”625 The massive military buildup that occurred from 2001 to 2006 (+ 34 %), deepened the imbalance of power and removed the structural constraints on U.S. political elites, allowing them to pursue their policies more aggressively. Thus as a result, the strategy of preventive war on a global scale became possible and viable.626 In order to conclude this section, according to my hard-line approach, global preventive wa,r as outlined in the 2002 NSS, is a genuine strategy of unipolarity. The hegemon in a unipolar world cannot be a status quo power. Positioned at the top, the hegemon cannot rest and watch others develop their capabilities. The Bush doctrine of global preventive war makes this aspect very clear. Having established order within its large sphere of influence, a hegemon will find itself threatened by whatever is beyond its reach.627 As outlined by Kenneth Waltz: “The interest of the country in security came to be identified with the maintenance of a certain world order. For countries at the top, this is predictable behavior. […] Once a state’s interests reach a certain extent, they become
624 Levy Jack S, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motive of War," World Politics, vol. 40, no. 3, (October 1987), p. 87. Randall Schweller also analyses declining states and the preventive use of force. He argues that only non- democratic states wage preventive wars against rising challengers. Declining democratic states will not use that option. Schweller Randall L, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies more Pacific?," World Politics, vol. 44, no. 2, (January 1992), pp. 235-269. 625 Snyder Jack L, "Imperial Temptations," The National Interest, vol., no. 71, (Spring 2003), p. 29. 626 I do not argue that preventive war is a good strategy or not, I argue that the unipolar distribution of power makes preventive war as a means to maximize power on a global scale possible. As the Iraqi invasion has shown us, the outcomes might be different from the ones initially expected. 627 Thomas Mowle and David Sacko argue that the hegemon in a unipolar world is a status quo power. Systemic constraints help us understand that this is not the case and that the hegemon is a revisionist state seeking a new international system, rather than resting on its power. See: Mowle Thomas S & Sacko David H, The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future, (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan), 2007, 228. p.
UNIGE / SES - 242 - Olivier Brighenti Part III self reinforcing.”628 Preventive war is thus a means to discard these threats and strive for global domination. Paul Schroeder’s logic is interesting in order to explain the “global preventive war” rational in a unipolar world. In effect, he claims: “Preventive wars, even risky preventive wars, are not extreme anomalies in politics, the sign of bankruptcy of policy. They are normal, even common tools of statecraft right down to our own day, British history, for example, is full of them; the British Empire was founded and sustained in great part by a series of preventive and preemptive wars and conquest.”629
8.1.3. Deterrence, Containment and the Bipolar International Order: Is a Global Strategy of Preventive War Possible? Having shown that a strategy of “global preventive war” is rendered possible by the asymmetries in power and the absence of checks, I will now make a historical comparison with a bipolar distribution of power. Is such a strategy of global preventive war possible in a bipolar international distribution of power? Does the bipolar world configuration provide the incentives to pursue such a strategy? As history has shown us, the structural constraints of the Cold War did not allow, American nor Soviet policy planners to adopt a global strategy of preventive wars in order to defeat the adversary. In this section, I will briefly concentrate on the Cold War double policy of containment and deterrence and explain what led such a strategy. I will highlight that the bipolar international order resulting from the peculiar distribution of power after World War II had its own logic. I will stress the fact that a roughly equal distribution of power and the checks imposed on both superpowers rendered containment and deterrence the only viable policies.630 I will show that a global preventive war “doctrine” is impossible when the distribution of power is roughly equal and when global nuclear deterrence can imply mutual destruction. I will emphasize on the fact that the preventive war as a strategy to maximize state power in
628 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 200. 629 Schroeder Paul W, "World War I as Galloping Gerties: A Reply to Joachim Remak," Journal of Modern History, vol. 44, no. 3, (September 1972), p. 323. 630 I draw on the logic that the distribution of power during the Cold War was roughly equal and as a consequence the system was stable. As defined by Mearsheimer: “Power can be more or less equally distributed among the major powers of both bipolar and multipolar systems. Both systems are more peaceful when equality is greatest among the poles […] Under bipolarity, the overall equality of the system is simply a function of the balance of power between the two poles, and equal balance creates an equal system, a skewed balance produces an unequal system.” Mearsheimer John J, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, vol. 15, no. 2, (Fall 1990), p. 18.
UNIGE / SES - 243 - Olivier Brighenti Part III the international system is far less likely, if not impossible, in the “Bush Doctrine Type” when there are powerful checks.
8.1.3.1 Bipolarity: A Clear-Cut Definition It is now commonsense to assert that the Cold War was characterized by bipolarity. But what do we really mean by bipolarity? A clear-cut definition is important because bipolarity must not be used as a description of state’s behavior but as an explanation for this behavior.631 I will use a structural definition of bipolarity in order to understand the pressures it exerted on the two superpowers during the Cold
War. Kenneth Waltz argued that the world after World War II was bipolar because it implied such a distribution of power among individual states that two have been much more powerful than the others.
Thus, bipolarity according to that logic is a description of the distribution of power among individual states and not, as many have argued, a shorthand for the polarization of the world into two hostile camps as a result of the Cold War.632 The Cold War was the result of bipolarity since the position of the
United States and the Soviet Union in the international system meant that each one saw the other as its principal adversary.633 As outlined by Wagner: “Because the United States and the Soviet Union were so much more powerful than other states, allies were of little importance to them. The two could therefore avoid the dangers associated with a confrontation between blocs (the policies of which tended to be dominated by their most vulnerable members) and instead deal freely and directly with one another. At the same time, their relations were not characterized by the uncertainty that was associated with a system of changing alliances, i.e., one in which it was never entirely sure who was opposed to them.”634 With this clear cut definition, we can account for the pressures and incentives that bipolarity had on the two protagonists and how this created the “Cold War order”.635 Within a few years after
631 On that aspect see : Wagner Harrisson R, "What Was Bipolarity?," International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, (Winter 1993), pp. 72-106. Harrison claims that despite its widespread use, the term bipolarity has no clear meaning, thus making the analysis of different distributions of power difficult to define. 632 See : Waltz Kenneth N, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, vol. 93, no. 2, (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909. 633 Some scholars have adopted the definition that bipolarity was the expression of the polarization of two hostile camps as a result of the Cold War. According to this idea, bipolarity was the result of the Cold War. I totally disagree with that claim and adopt the theory that the Cold War was the result of the bipolar distribution of power. 634 Wagner Harrison R, "What Was Bipolarity?," International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, (Winter 1993), p. 81. 635 Ikenberry claims that World War II produced two postwar settlements. One is realist and the other is liberal. The first one (realist) was a reaction to deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and it culminated in the containment order that I will discuss later on in this section. The other settlement (liberal) was a reaction to the economic rivalry and political turmoil of the 1930’s and the resulting world war. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will discuss
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World War II, each of the major winners had come to regard each other and not their former enemies
(the defeated Axis Forces), as the principle threat to their survival. Each sought to ensure their survival by developing weapons capable of destroying one another. It is important to bear in mind that the bipolar distribution of power is independent from nuclear weapons. In my view, Waltz rightly stressed that bipolarity and all its effects would have existed anyway without nuclear weapons. He wrote:
“Nuclear weapons did not cause the condition of bipolarity; other states by acquiring them cannot change the condition. Nuclear weapons do not equalize the power of nations, because they do not change the economic bases of a nation’s power […] Even without nuclear technology the United States and the Soviet Union would have developed weapons of immense destructive power. They are set apart from the others not by a particular weapons system but by their ability to exploit military technology on a large scale.”636 Thus, we can define bipolarity as a condition in which military capability, whether conventional or nuclear, is distributed in such a way that two states are much more powerful than all the others. Where nuclear weapons make a difference is in the strategy that the two superpowers adopted to deal with one another. The fear of nuclear war is a unit-level phenomenon. Not only did it reinforce bipolarity, but it acted as an independent causal factor to discourage the great powers from going to war. As Waltz rightly stated: “Nuclear worlds call for and encourage a different kind of reasoning. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. Of course, it may also not be. But that is not the kind of uncertainty that encourages anyone to use force. In a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear worlds, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated.”637 The two superpowers sought to pursue what Burns called a “strategy of global deterrence.”638
only the first “order”. See: Ikenberry John G, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3, (May/June 1996), pp. 81-83. 636 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, pp. 180-181. In the same vein, John Lewis Gaddis says: “It is interesting to speculate as to whether Soviet-American bipolarity would have developed if nuclear weapons had never been invented. My own view-obviously unverifiable-is that it would have, because bipolarity resulted from the way in which World War I1 had been fought; the condition was already evident at the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Whether bipolarity would have lasted as long as it has in the absence of nuclear weapons is another matter.” Gaddis John Lewis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, vol. 10, no. 4, (Spring 1986), p. 121-122, fn. 67. 637 Waltz Kenneth N, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better," Adelphi Papers, vol. 171, no. 1, (1981), pp. 6-7. 638 Burns wrote : “Let us assume, first, a state of total deterrence, and one in which, moreover, ballistic missiles have been so developed that any city-sized tract could probably be hit from anywhere else on the earth's surface. The military significance of geographic location will be felt only in regard to the business of deterring conventional
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8.1.3.2 Bipolarity: Structural Constraints and Superpower Rivalry Bipolarity combined with the major military nuclear buildup that occurred during the Cold War gave birth to the only viable doctrine in such a power configuration: deterrence and containment.639 Former
Secretary of State Alexander Haig made this very clear in his statement: “The catastrophic consequences of another world war, with or without nuclear weapons, make deterrence our highest objective and our only rational military strategy.” Classical theories of deterrence assume that: “The strategy of deterrence, and the related principle of limiting to tolerable proportions whatever conflicts become inevitable, tend to spring from the premise that the favorable results of a total war can never be sufficient to justify its cost. Such a war according to that conception, would be too big, too all- consuming, to permit the survival even of those final values, like personal freedom, for which alone one could think of waging it. It need not be certain that it would turn out so badly; it is enough that there is a large chance that it would.”640 Containment is a policy which seeks to protect the sphere of influence as well as prevent further expansion of the adversary. The Cold War strategists insisted that there was an irreducitble element of power involved in international politics and that it was measured by the ability to prevent Soviet military and political expansion.641 George Kennan, the architect of containment saw very clearly that: “Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that
Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable
forces; tactical nuclear weapons will guard frontiers and seaboards from attack by army, navy, or airforce, but will be themselves "deterred" from attacking by the great batteries of intercontinental rockets, which thereby will be exercising what we shall call "global deterrence." Burns Arthur L, "From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis," World Politics, vol. 9, no. 4, (July 1957), p. 518. 639 Containment and deterrence are always seen as a dual strategy. Although deterrence theory implicitly endorses the containment doctrine's claim that if the Soviet Union is prevented from expanding, it will eventually become peaceful, this position lacks grounding in the rest of the theory and must remain an ad hoc addition. Jervis Robert, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, (January 1979), p. 292. 640 Brodie Bernard, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," World Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, (January 1959), p. 173. For classical theories of deterrence see also: Wohlstetter Arnold, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, no. 2, (January 1959), pp. 211-234. As states by Jack Levy: “Although there are several different variations of rationale deterrence theory, there is a consensus regarding some minimum conditions required for deterrence to work. A state must clearly define its commitment to defend a particular interest, communicate that commitment to the potential aggressor, possess a sufficiently potent military capability to impose costs on the adversary which exceed his expected gains, and demonstrate its resolve to implement the threat even though there may be short-term costs to itself.” Levy jack S, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work?," British Journal of Political Science, vol. 18, no. 4, (October 1988), p. 486. 641 Kissinger Henri, Does America need a Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2001, p. 28.
UNIGE / SES - 246 - Olivier Brighenti Part III counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.” “In these circumstances” he continued “it is clear that the main element of any United
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”642 Thus both superpowers become status-quo states determined to keep what it has, including existing in a world of which half or more is friendly or at least not sharply and perennially hostile. The superpowers are “constrained” to be status quo powers, for one simple reason: neither side can prevent the other from destroying it, but each side can deter an attack by threatening retaliation.643 Thus by the early 1950’s, the United States and its allies around the globe had a formidable containment policy firmly in place, and there was little opportunity for further Soviet expansion in Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Persian Gulf.644 Unlike the situation after World War I, the only powers capable of creating a Third World war are the United States and the Soviet Union, each of which dominates “half of the world”. While many disputes and crisis occurred during the Cold War, neither power had a grievance so essential for its security and survival as to risk disrupting the balance to overcome that grievance. Kenneth Waltz observed: “The United States, and the Soviet Union as well, have more reason to be satisfied with the status quo than most earlier great powers […] force is more useful than ever for upholding the status quo, though not for changing it, and maintaining the status quo is the minimum goal of every great power”645 In other words, if the “aggressor” does not comply peacefully, the other will physically defend itself by trying to “annihilate” the adversary. Thus, deterrence is a strategy of coercion. Coercion, which includes deterrence and compellence, works on the adversary’s will and intentions by inflicting pain and holding at risk what other values, i.e. threatening or carrying out punishment. The conventional wisdom holds that deterrence restrained the Soviet Union by convincing its leaders that any military action against the United States or its allies would meet certain
642 Kennan George, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4, (July 1947 ), pp. 575 & 581. 643 As noted by Van Evera : “State with developed nuclear arsenals can annihilate each other even after absorbing an all-out attack, giving rise to a world of mutual assured destruction (MAD). In a MAD world, conquest is far harder than before, because international conflicts shift from tests of will and capability to purer tests of will, to be won by the side willing to run greater risks and pay greater costs […] For these reasons the nuclear revolution makes conquest among great powers virtually impossible.” Van Evera Stephen, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 15, no. 3, (Winter 1990-1991), p. 13. 644 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, p. 201. Stalin’s decision to back North Korea’s invasion of the South in late June 1950 was the last case of Soviet-sponsored aggression in any of those critically important areas for the remainder of the Cold War. 645 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, pp. 190-191.
UNIGE / SES - 247 - Olivier Brighenti Part III and effective opposition. It sought to prevent Soviet aggression by denying its leaders opportunities to exploit. According to deterrence theory, Soviet aggression would wane as a function of Soviet perceptions of American military capabilities and resolve.646 Preventive war, as defined in the 2002 NSS has nothing to do with coercion. On the contrary, it is a strategy of brute force, that implies taking hold of what one wants and defeating the other’s army.647
8.1.3.3 Bipolarity and Superpower Rivalry: An Assessment of Deterrence and Containment One of the most striking aspect of the Cold War is the quasi absence of conflict between the two superpowers for more than fifty years. Statesmen in both camps have been extremely cautious in risking war against one another. There has been a huge number of crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union and none of them led to a direct confrontation. Gaddis runs down an impressive list that talks for itself. Crisis in Soviet-American relations include: “Iran, 1946; Greece, 1947; Berlin and
Czechoslovakia, 1948; Korea, 1950; the East Berlin riots, 1953; the Hungarian uprising, 1956; Berlin again, 1958-59; the U-2 incident, 1960; Berlin again, 1961; the Cuban missile crisis, 1962;
Czechoslovakia again, 1968; the Yom Kippur war, 1973; Afghanistan, 1979; Poland, 1981; the Korean airliner incident, 1983.”648 In previous eras and power distributions, these crisis would have, without any doubt, escalated in major wars. How can this be explained? Why were political leaders and statement on both sides so cautious in managing Soviet-American relations when war would have occurred in numerous cases in previous eras? Once again, the answer lies in the peculiar distribution of power resulting from the end of World War II. The bipolar international structure combined with global nuclear
646 Lebow Richard N & Stein Janice G, "Deterrence and the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 110, no. 2, (Summer 1995), p. 166. 647 Thomas Schelling makes a remarkable and useful distinction between coercion and brute force that helps us understand both the deterrence strategy and the global preventive war strategy. He wrote: “There is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between fending off assault and making someone afraid to assault you, between holding what people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it, between losing what someone can forcibly take and giving it up to avoid risk or damage. It is the difference between defense and deterrence, between brute force and intimidation, between conquest and blackmail, between action and threats. It is the difference between the unilateral, “undiplomatic” recourse to strength, and coercive diplomacy based on the power to hurt.” Schelling Thomas C, "The Diplomacy of Violence," In. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, edited by Art Robert J & Jervis Robert, (New York: Longman), 2004, pp. 149-150. Robert Jervis as well as John Mearsheimer argue that brute force was dominant in the pre-nuclear age. Thus one can think that in conditions of bipolarity, direct brute force is very unlikely and both adversaries need to rely on coercion in order to ensure their security and not provoke a massive and mutual-destructive war. See: Jervis Robert, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, (New York: Routledge), 2005, p. 62 & fn. 10, p. 157. 648 Gaddis John Lewis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1989, p. 230.
UNIGE / SES - 248 - Olivier Brighenti Part III deterrence had a dramatic stabilizing effect on superpower crisis management and behavior. The possibility of mutual destruction provided the political elites with incentives to be cautious and wage the consequences when contemplating war. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz concluded: “The probability of war between America and Russia or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is practically nil precisely because the military planning and deployments of each, together with the fear of escalation to general nuclear war, keep it that way.”649 Thus, it is not the virtuous character of political leaders, their particular skills or aversion for war that best explains the absence of direct conflict between the two superpowers.
It is the bipolar international structure and the high stakes involved for the two superpowers that provided incentives for political leaders to act with restraint and caution.650 As outlined by Kenneth
Waltz: “It is not that one entertains the utopian hope that all future American and Russian rulers will combine in their persons […] nearly perfect virtues, but rather that the pressures of a bipolar world strongly encourage them to act internationally in ways better than their characters may lead one to expect.”651 The same structural constraints provided both blocs with powerful incentives to control and manage crisis that resulted from third parties in the “periphery”. Nuclear deterrence provided mechanisms to prevent escalation of conflicts. As a result, the United States and the Soviet Union successfully managed a whole series of crises around the world, notably in the Middle East. I fully endorse Gaddis’s claim that: “the development of nuclear weapons has had, on balance, a stabilizing effect on the postwar international system. They have served to discourage the process of escalation that has in other eras, casually led to war. They have had a sobering effect upon a whole range of statement of varying degrees of capabilities and responsibilities.”652
649 Art Robert J & Waltz Kenneth N, "Technology, Strategy, and the Use of Force," In. The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, edited by Art Robert J & Waltz Kenneth N, (New York: Lanham), 1983, p. 28. 650 Some scholars argue that nuclear weapons had very little if no impact in preventing conflict between the two superpowers. John Mueller argues that: “it is not at all clear that they have had a significant impact on the history of world affairs since World War II. They do not seem to have been necessary to deter World War III, to determine alliance patterns, or to cause the United States and the Soviet Union to behave cautiously.” According to his logic, war among western, modernized nations, has become unthinkable. See: Mueller John, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," International Security, vol. 13, no. 2, (Fal 1988), pp. 55-79, and Mueller John, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, (New York: Basic Books), 1989, 336 p. For a good critic of his argument see: Kaysen Carl, "Is War Obsolete?: A Review Essay," International Security, vol. 14, no. 4, (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64. 651 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 176. 652 Gaddis John Lewis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, vol. 10, no. 4, (Spring 1986), p. 123.
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Having briefly outlined how the pressures of the bipolar distribution of power affects state behavior when confronted with powerful checks, can we claim that a global preventive war strategy, as the one stated in the 2002 NSS, is a genuine strategy of unipolarity? Would such a strategy have been possible in a bipolar world? The answer to the first question is obviously yes, while the latter is clearly no. Although the structural argument cannot account for everything, it lays out the basic conditions for a strategy to be feasible or not. A global strategy of preventive war would not have been possible under conditions of bipolarity and general nuclear deterrence, because direct brute force (preventive war) against the adversary would have meant huge casualties if not total destruction. The pressures from the system gave political leaders clear inducement not to pursue such a strategy. Bipolarity coupled with nuclear deterrence made hegemonic wars or “system-changing wars” very unlikely. Fifty years of Cold War showed us that although crisis often occurred, both powers were satisfied with the status quo and would never have pursued strategies such as preventive war in order to transform the system. The grand strategy presupposed a loose framework of consultation and agreements to resolve differences: the great powers extend to each other the respect of equals and they accommodated with each other until vital interests come into play. The great powers compete with each other, and although war is not unthinkable, sober statecraft and the balance of power offered the best hope for stability and peace.653
This is precisely what the Bush Doctrine is not about. It is all about transforming the system along
America’s strategic logic, ideology and interests. The logic of the Bush Doctrine is one of infinite expansion in order to attain global hegemony and absolute military security. It is thus clear that the roughly equal distribution of power in a bipolar system impeaches such a strategy. On the other hand, the unipolar distribution of power and the absence of checks renders this strategy feasible or at least
“theoretically” practical.
653 Ikenberry John G, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5, (September/October 2002), p. 46.
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8.1.3.4 Implementing the Hegemonist agendas and the bipolar/unipolar international distribution of power: Recurring Patterns, Different Outcomes? In order to illustrate this aspect, I would like to address two aspects that seem to provide a rewarding test for my argument. I will first analyze what I have called the “hegemonists agenda” throughout the
Cold War and its aftermath.654 I will stress that strategies for global hegemony, absolute security, and global preventive war are a powerful temptation for a hegemon. In analyzing four different cases, I will show that for this strategy to succeed, huge asymmetries in the international distribution of power have to be met. The second aspect I wish to highlight, regards deterrence vs. preventive war in a bipolar and unipolar world. I will draw on the case of the People’s Republic of China during the mid 1960’s and the
2003 invasion of Iraq.
First of all, as I have outlined previously, the so-called “neoconservative ideology” is an important factor in understanding how the Bush Administration sees the world. But as I have abundantly stressed, the necessary conditions for turning this “political agenda” into a National Security Strategy for the United
States are best explained by the unipolar distribution of power.655 On four occasions since the outset of the Cold War, the “hegemonist agenda” has appeared in the American foreign policy debate. On all four occasions, it advocated a strategy of global primacy, preventive use of force and massive American military buildup to expand the global reach of U.S. hegemony. As outlined by my theory, it failed to materialize during the Cold War but its core ideas where adopted as America’s national security strategy, when the international distribution of power was genuinely unipolar. In the early years of the
Cold War, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) urged for a more aggressive stance against the
Soviet Union. This was commonly called “rollback” during the Cold War. Rollback rejects the dual logic of containment and deterrence and calls for aggressive actions in order to precipitate the demise of the
Soviet Union. According to this group, if the United States had conducted preventive war against the
654 I use the generic term of hegemonists to describe all the political and ideological movements that have advocated American global hegemony since the outset of the Cold War. These comprise the Committee on the Present Danger of 1950, 1975 and 2004, as well as the neoconservative think tanks as the Project for the New American Century founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. For a good historical and ideological background of these groups see: Barry Tom, "U.S: Danger, Danger Everywhere," Asian Times, Hong Kong, 23 June 2006, p. 1. 655 Schlesinger writes: Looking back over forty years of the Cold War, we can be everlastingly grateful that the loonies (advocates of preventive war during the Cold War were regarded as loonies) on both sides were powerless.” Schlesinger Arthur M, War and the American Presidency, (New York: Norton Publishing), 2004, p. 23. My argument states that this has nothing to do with “luck” or gratefulness, but with the structural conditions of the Cold War that prevented this type of agenda to be implemented.
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Soviet Union when it had the chance to, the United States would have prevailed and the Soviet Union would have been defeated. In other words, if the United States had sought a policy of preventive war instead of the dual strategy of containment and deterrence, the Cold War would probably never had happened. The means to implement rollback was according to its proponents: “all-sided political warfare; auxiliary military and paramilitary actions; adequate preparation for whatever military action may be required in the future.”656 During the Truman Administration, Francis P. Matthews, a secretary of the Navy, called publicly for war on the Soviet Union as a way to compel cooperation for peace. He was immediately rebuked by the President. “I have always been opposed, even to the thought of such a war”
Truman wrote in his Memoirs. “There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be stopped by war. You don’t prevent anything by war except peace.”657 Eisenhower had investigated the possibility of rollback. By the time he took office in 1953, he had a clear vision of international politics and Soviet-
American rivalries. He reined in his anti-containment rhetoric. It was clear in his mind that the bipolar international distribution of power coupled with nuclear weapons, dramatically limited America’s strategic options. The structural constraints pushed the Eisenhower Administration to adopt a national security strategy adapted to the international structure. For Eisenhower, the Cold War was a zero-sum game: whenever the West gave in, the Soviet Union gained an advantage. In order to prevent this, the goal was to make the risks for the Soviets always higher than the potential gains, i.e. conquering
Germany would result in the destruction of all Soviet cities. With total destruction of one's own country looming on the horizon, no potential gain would justify the risks.658 The United States abandoned rollback as a means to demise the Soviet Union with the adoption of the NSC/162/2 in October 1953. A classified and undated Statement of Policy by the National Security Council recognized the dramatic
656 Quoted in : Art Robert J, A Grand Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2003, p. 87. 657 Quoted in: Schlesinger Arthur M, War and the American Presidency, (New York: Norton Publishing), 2004, p. 22. Secretary of States Dean Acheson made it very clear already in 1950 that preventive war was not an option for American policy planners given the international power configuration. In a speech he made in Dallas in order to promote the NSC-68, (NSC-68 was an important part of an overall shift in American foreign policy to a comprehensive containment strategy that was confirmed by successive administrations. It shaped American policy towards the Soviet Union for more than twenty years.) Dean Acheson addressed the issues that the NSC-68 did not recommend. “A third course” he said “euphemistically called preventive war, adopted with disastrous results in other times by other types of people and governments than ours, would take the form of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. It would not solve problems; it would multiply them. Then as now nothing seemed to me more depressing in the history of our country than the speeches of the 1850’s about “the irrepressible conflict”. War is not inevitable. But talk of war’s inevitability had, in the past, helped to make it occur.” Acheson Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton Publishing), 1969, pp. 376-377. 658 Poirier Lucien, Des Stratégies Nucléaires, (Bruxelles: Ed. Complexes), 1988, p. 73.
UNIGE / SES - 252 - Olivier Brighenti Part III changes in the Soviet/American relations. The document states: “With the growth both in Soviet nuclear capabilities and in the power of nuclear weapons themselves, in the period 1956-59, a total war involving the strategic use by both sides of nuclear weapons would bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of Western civilization and the Soviet regime. Under these circumstances, the freedom of either side to initiate the use of strategic nuclear bombing against the other may be circumscribed by: a) The fear of the effects of retaliatory use of such strategic bombing; and B) The possibility, that neither side would gain a decisive military advantage from such an exchange of nuclear blows. This situation could create a condition of mutual deterrence, in which each side would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general war.”659 Thus, the constraints of bipolarity rendered rollback and preventive war as a general strategy for the United States irrelevant.660 Answering to James Reston of the New York Times in 1954, Eisenhower made it very clear that he fully embraced containment and deterrence and rejected the very idea of rollback and preventive war advocated by the Committee on the Present Danger and right wing members of the Republican Party. “A preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility” he answered “I don’t believe there is such a thing, and frankly I wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing.”661 On 19 October 1954, Eisenhower said that since the addition of atomic weapons to the arsenal of both the Western nations and the
Communists: “It seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace, if there is to be a happy and well world.”662
659 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, "Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956", Washington D.C., Undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 716-717. 660 The NSC Guidelines states : “Although the time for a significant rollback of Soviet power may appear to be in the future, the U.S. should be prepared, by feasible current actions or further planning, to take advantage of any earlier opportunity to contract Communist-controlled areas and power.” Ibidem, p. 720. 661 Quoted in: Schlesinger Arthur M, War and the American Presidency, (New York: Norton Publishing), 2004, p. 22. Susan Eisenhower made it also very clear that Eisenhower rejected preventive war and that containment and deterrence became the official doctrine of the Republican Party. “There were many, many policy discussions” she said “But in the end both the Truman and the Eisenhower administration stepped back from this [preemption]. Instead the kind of internationalism that revolved around the establishment and maintenance of healthy and multilateral alliances, became the bedrock of the Republican Party.” Quoted in: Hirsh Michael, At War With Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World, ( Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2003, p. 46. 662 Eisenhower was pressured by the advocates of an aggressive policy (preventive war) to change the course of his policy. Majority leader (republican), Senator William Knowland told the Senate: “that the responsible committee of the Congress should promptly summon the State and Defense officials and the Joint Chief of staff to fully find out where in their judgement it will take us, and whether this clear and present danger which appears to me to exist, is such that a basic change in the direction of our policy is warranted.” The clear and present danger Knowland saw
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The idea of rollback resurfaced in the early 1980’s. Not surprisingly this idea was influenced by the second Committee on the Present Danger formed in 1976. The CPD sought to alert the population on the “growing Soviet threat” and the dangers of the Nixon-Carter Detent policy. The CPD II included to its strong anti-Soviet rhetoric a new set of ideas promoting growth and expansion. It advanced a unilateral philosophy of power retention through military strength. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1981, the advocates of “rollback and preventive war” saw, for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, a man who gave every sign of sharing their views.663 The “reincarnation” of the rollback doctrine was very theoretical and based more on rhetoric and disinformation than on actual facts. During the 1984 campaign, Reagan adopted a harsh rhetoric towards the Soviet Union. Hegemonists from the CPD saw in his speech a strategy of rollback of Soviet Power and the liberation of its East European satellites.
“The United States,” declared Reagan in August 1984 “rejects any interpretation of the Yalta agreement that suggests American consent for the division of Europe into spheres of influence.”664 Such statements coupled with Reagan’s “evil empire” formulation gave the impression to the hegemonists as well as the Soviet Union that the United States was reviving the “republican strategy” of rollback. Strobe
Talbott wrote: “All this sounded to Soviet ears very much like the revival of […] rollback and contributed to the impression that the USSR was dealing with a new phenomenon, an administration that seemed truly and unprecedentedly committed to the goal of doing the Soviet Union in, or at least of rolling back the Soviet system, right to the gates of the Kremlin.”665 Neoconservative’s most influential figure in the
80’s quickly understood that this was mere rhetoric and that no actions in the Reagan foreign policy towards the Soviet Union implied that the United States was willing to pursue strategies of prevention.
He declared: “Perhaps the Soviets had some grounds for apprehension when Mr. Reagan first assumed office, but by 1984, after watching his performances as president for three years, they had no reason
was a possibility of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. Quoted in : Reston James, "Knowland Warns of Policy Danger: Calls for Review," The New York Times, New York, 16 November 1954, p. 1. 663 Within four years of the founding of CPD II, 46 of its members had joined Reagan’s foreign policy advisory task force. Reagan himself was a member of CPD II. By the end of Reagan’s first term, 32 members had joined the administration, and by 1988 more than 50 committee members had served in high ranks of the national security apparatus. 664 Quoted in: Podhoretz Norman, "The Reagan Road to Detente," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 3, (Special Issue 1984), p. 450. 665 Talbott Strobe, The Russian and Reagan, (New York: Vintage Books), 1984, pp. 73-74.
UNIGE / SES - 254 - Olivier Brighenti Part III whatever to believe that he was trying to resurrect the dream of rollback.”666 It is true that the Reagan
Administration adopted a very aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union in the hope or expectation of weakening it. The Reagan Administration like its predecessors, was constrained by the bipolar international distribution of power and global nuclear deterrence. In this type of configuration, his margin of activity was limited and constrained by structural factors. Reagan probably did more to “shudder” the status quo than any other administration during the Cold War, but his legacy must not be overestimated.
Reagan and his advisers genuinely believed that the détente policy initiated by the Nixon/Kissinger tandem and followed by Ford and Carter had enabled the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority over the United States. Thus his “aggressive” policy was aimed at preventing the balance of military power from tilting irreversibly in favor of the Soviet Union.
The third and fourth “revival” of the hegemonists strategies took place in the aftermath of the Cold War.
The third attempt is the 1992 DPG. I will not comment this document since I did it at length in various other sections. The fourth appearance of the hegemonists doctrine is far more interesting for the purpose of this dissertation, since after three unsuccessful attempts, the “hegemonists agenda” and the idea of global preventive war is elevated to the rank of official American national security strategy The ideological weight of influential “hegemonist agendas” is at the heart of the Bush doctrine of global preventive war. The second wave of neo-conservatives led by William Kristol and Robert Kagan followed the steps of their predecessors. Kristol and Kagan founded the Project for the New American
Century (PNAC) in 1997. Largely inspired by the CPD, the PNAC also stressed on the need to develop and promote America’s global reach. Just like the CPD did throughout the Reagan Administration, the
PNAC played a large role in defining the Bush Doctrine of preventive war. The difference lies in the fact that it succeeded to impose its vision of American National Security Strategy. In 2000, a blueprint for the creation of a “global Pax Americana and U.S domination of the world” was drawn up by the PNAC for
Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush and Lewis “Scooter” Libby. The document is an updated version of the 1992 DPG drafted by the same people with the exception of Jeb Bush.667 The report states: “In broad terms, we saw the project as building upon the defense strategy outlined by the
666 Podhoretz Norman, "The Reagan Road to Detente," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 3, (Special Issue 1984), p. 450. 667 MacKay Neil, "Bush Planned Iraq 'Regime Change' Before Becoming President," The Sunday Herald, London, 15 September 2002, p. 1.
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Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of the Bush Administration. The Defense Policy
Guidance […] provided a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.”668 Like the 1992, the PNAC document develops a plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime and use America’s overwhelming military power to extend its reach in the Middle East. The document states: “the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in the Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam
Hussein.”669 Two years prior to the 2002 NSS, the PNAC report states: “America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the pre-eminence of U.S. military forces.” It goes on advocating that U.S. armed forces would serve as the “cavalry on the new American frontier” and that the United States must be ready to “fight and decisively win multiple simultaneous major theatre wars.”670 It singles out Iran, Iraq, North Korea and China as potential threats to America’s hegemonic reach. “It is now commonly understood” the document states “that information and other new technologies, as well as widespread technological and weapons proliferation, are creating a dynamic that may threaten America’s ability to exercise its dominant military power. Potential rivals such as
China are anxious to exploit these transformational technologies broadly, while adversaries like Iran,
Iraq and North Korea are rushing to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons as a deterrent to
American intervention in regions they seek to dominate.”671 The policy prescriptions and the overall global strategy of the 2002 NSS is so strikingly resembling that one could think: if the hands were those of the PNAC project authors, the voice was the voice of President Bush.
Why did the “hegemonists” agenda succeed in setting the core premises of the 2002 NSS when it had failed in the 1950’s, 1980’s and early 1990’s? My central claim is that the unipolar distribution of power provided the preconditions for this type of agenda to be implemented. The fact that President Bush
668 The Project for the New American Century, "Rebuilding America's Defense: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century", September 2000, (The Project for the New American Century), http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf, (Accessed: 18/02/2006). p. ii. 669 Ibidem, p. 14. 670 Ibidem, pp. iv & 15. 671 Ibidem, p. 4.
UNIGE / SES - 256 - Olivier Brighenti Part III embraced these ideals is an important explanatory factor and must not be neglected. Nonetheless my argument states that without a unipolar distribution of power the “2002 strategy of global preventive war” is virtually impossible and would have been mere rhetoric like the previous three attempts. The PNAC ideas would never have been elevated to the rank of National Security Strategy of the United States without this peculiar distribution of power. The grand strategy entertained by the second-wave of neoconservatives demanded the United States to shatter the status quo. Unlike their predecessors, they understood that the new conditions (unipolarity) absolved Americans from any further requirement to adhere to the norms that had defined the postwar international order. The events of 9/11 provided a tailor-made opportunity to break free from the fetters restricting the exercise of American power and to justify a new military doctrine of preventive war, regime change and U.S. military supremacy.672
The second aspect I wish to analyze is the case of China’s nuclear program in the mid 1960’s. This case is interesting since it has many similarities with the 2003 invasion of Iraq to prevent Saddam
Hussein’s regime from developing weapons of mass destruction. I will briefly outline the rationale behind the Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Administration to pursue a strategy of preventive strikes against the
People’s Republic of China in order to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. I will analyze the different options they faced and emphasize on the final decision not to pursue a strategy of preventive strikes and avoid direct confrontation with Communist China. I will then compare those options to the one’s the Bush Administration faced while planning the invasion. I will highlight a possible rationale to understand why the Bush Administration chose brute force over deterrence. My main argument always draws along the logic of hard-line realism. The international distribution of power provides the hegemon with the incentives to favor one strategy over another. Different distributions of power often imply/favor different strategies.
Between 1960 and 1964, the Kennedy Administration seriously explored the feasibility of preventive military strikes673 on China’s nascent nuclear capabilities in order to coerce the People’s Republic of
672 For a good account see : Bacevich Andrew J, The New American Militarism: Why Americans are Seduced by War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005, pp. 91-95. 673 In 1962, when the Kennedy Administration was wrestling with the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Joint Chief of Staff recommended removing the missiles by preventive attack. Robert Kennedy, U.S. Attorney General and President Kennedy’s closest advisor called the Joint Chief’s idea: “Pear Harbor in reverse” He added,
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China into complying with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.674 The Kennedy Administration viewed
China’s prospective acquisition of nuclear weapons as a major threat to U.S. national security. The evidence at the administration’s disposal were limited. Despite some U-2 high-altitude and satellite imagery, there were important gaps in U.S. intelligence on Chinese nuclear capabilities. A December
1960 intelligence estimate (NIE) reflected these limitations. Its authors noted: “our evidence with respect to Communist China’s nuclear program is fragmentary as is our information about the nature and extend of Soviet aid.” The CIA thus guessed that a first Chinese production reactor could go critical in late 1961 with the first plutonium becoming available in 1962. The NIE report states: “On the basis of all available evidence, we now believe that the most probable date at which the Chinese Communists could detonate a first nuclear device is sometime in 1963, though it might be as late as 1964, or as early as 1962, depending on the actual degree of Soviet assistance.”675 This assessment, although very vague, precipitated the Kennedy Administration to explore the feasibility of preventive military strikes against the Chinese nuclear facilities. In an Interview, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William
Foster, said that the President would: “Think out loud” saying, “You know, it wouldn’t be too hard if we could somehow get kind of an anonymous airplane to go over there, take out the Chinese facilities, they’ve only got a couple, and maybe we could do it, or maybe the Soviet Union could do it, rather than face the threat of a China with nuclear weapons.”676 The rational behind Kennedy’s fear of China’s nuclear program was the perception that Mao’s China was fundamentally more dangerous and irresponsible than the Soviet Union. The second aspect was that Kennedys Administration believed that
China would be U.S. major antagonists of the late 60’s and beyond and that a nuclear China would jeopardize the U.S position in Asia. Bundy described Kennedy’s fear that a nuclear China: “would so upset the world political scene [that] it would be intolerable.” Thus, Kennedy believed that: “We should
“For 75 years we had not been that kind of country.” Quoted in: Schlesinger Arthur M, War and the American Presidency, (New York: Norton Publishing), 2004, pp. 22-23. The historical evidence of the Chinese nuclear program seems to contradict this claim. 674 The Evidence used in this section is from: “Burr William & Richelson Jeffery T, "Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964," International Security, vol. 25, no. 3, (Winter 200/2001), pp. 54-99, which is based upon oral history, interviews and declassified U.S. documents. Although I heavily rely on this seminal work my conclusions are in certain respects different. 675 National Intelligence Estimate, "The Communist Chinese Atomic Energy Program: Summary and Conclusions", Washington D.C., 13 December 1960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 vol. 19, p. 747. 676 Quoted in: Burr William & Richelson Jeffery T, "Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964," International Security, vol. 25, no. 3, (Winter 200/2001), p. 54.
UNIGE / SES - 258 - Olivier Brighenti Part III be prepared to take some form of action unless they agree to desist from further efforts in this field.”677
The third aspect was related to nuclear proliferation. According to a CIA Report: “Other nations might enter the field if only to counter the power and prestige which their rivals or their enemies might gain through the acquisition of a nuclear capability. Even a small increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons will add to the dangers inherent in critical situations as they arise.” For the administration, nuclear proliferation could ”increase the chances for irrational and desperate action and
[…] stir up additional political turmoil by encouraging intransigence in their possessors and by encouraging fear and counteraction among those who might consider themselves threatened.”678
Kennedy was so obsessed by the Chinese nuclear program that he was even willing to enlist the Soviet
Union in order to prevent the People’s Republic of China from pursuing its nuclear program.679 He hoped that with the Sino-Soviet hostility increasing, he could solicit Khrushchev’s support through a test ban treaty including China. “Our primary purpose” Kennedy said during a NSC meeting, “in trying to get a treaty with Russia is to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese
Communists. […] We will have a difficult time protecting the free areas of Asia if the Chinese get nuclear weapons. A test ban including only the USSR, the British, and the U.S. would not be very meaningful except in regard to the Chinese problem which the Russians are believed to be as concerned about as we are.”680 Soviet officials rebuffed the Kennedy Administration’s attempts to coordinate Soviet-
American approach to the Chinese problem. As a consequence, with Kennedy’s encouragements, U.S. officials started to explore the possibilities for preventive strikes and/or covert action against the Chinese facilities. Two approaches prevailed. The first one, led by Kennedy and National Security Assistant
William Bundy, pushed for preventive strikes against Chinese facilities. The second, led by the State
677 Quoted in : Ibidem, p. 67. 678 Central Intelligence Agency, "Estimate of the World Situation", Washington D.C., 17 January 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 8, p. 8. 679 It is not striking that Kennedy sought to enrol the Soviet Union in his adventure. The dangers of going it alone were too high. The greatest challenge to peaceful bipolar arrangement is a major showdown between regional powers allied to one or the other superpower. China was not allied to the Soviet Union, on the contrary, but it is not clear whether Moscow was helping Beijing in its nuclear program. Thus, nuclear armed states would be much less likely to go to war, and perhaps they would try to cooperate to prevent escalation in the “periphery”. See: Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebhur, Morgenthau and Waltz, (New York: Columbia University Press), 2003, p. 163. 680 National Security Council Meeting, "Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council Meeting", Washington D.C., 22 January 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 vol. 8, p. 462.
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Department, questioned the underlying premise that China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would have an “intolerable impact” on U.S. security. By October 1963, the States Department expert Robert
Johnson issued a non-alarmist report on China’s nuclear program. According to Johnson, the Chinese nuclear capabilities: “Will not, for the indefinite future, alter the real relations of power among the major states or the balance of military power in Asia. […] The great asymmetry in Chinese Communist and
U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities” minimize the Chinese nuclear threat. A nuclear China would be within range of American striking power but not vice versa, forcing it to “take account of the danger of a
U.S. nuclear or non-nuclear counterforce as a possible response to major aggression.” This made it
“exceedingly unlikely” that the Chinese would use nuclear weapons first, unless the mainland was under
”serious attack.” According to Johnson, China wanted a nuclear force to deter an attack on their territory and was unlikely to change its essential prudence risk-adverse military policy. Johnson’s superior Walt
Rostow told Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Averell Harimann that not only would:
“U.S. overwhelming nuclear superiority” deter Beijing, “its desire to preserve its nuclear force as a credible deterrent might tend to make China even more cautious than it is today in its encounters with
American power”681 While Robert Johnson was preparing his report, President Kennedy was assassinated and replaced by Lyndon Johnson. President Johnson was far more skeptical than
Kennedy on the political feasibility of preventive strikes. Nevertheless, Bundy wanted to see more work on preventive actions. Bundy believed that the Johnson paper minimized the Chinese nuclear threat because the Chinese nuclear capabilities would: “have far greater political consequences.”682 In final, the State Department won the “battle of ideas” and President Johnson endorsed its conclusions against preventive strikes. Robert Johnson’s report was implicitly contrary to Kennedy’s thinking. He argued that preventive action against China’s nuclear program was dangerous and likely to fail and that it could hurt the United States’ image and weaken its prestige, the intangible assets of world power. Secondly and more importantly, he thought that Beijing or Moscow could readily misinterpret what was supposed to be a limited war action as the beginning of a major attack on the mainland. The possibility of “retaliatory
681 Quoted in : Burr William & Richelson Jeffery T, "Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964," International Security, vol. 25, no. 3, (Winter 200/2001), pp. 76-77. Twenty years before Waltz’s claim that nuclear proliferation would bring stability to the system, the State Department had already endorsed this claim. 682 Ibidem, pp. 82-83.
UNIGE / SES - 260 - Olivier Brighenti Part III action […] could not be ruled out.683 Lyndon Johnson made a strong case against “Bundy’s proposal” for preventive military action unless Washington had world opinion on its side or Bejing was menacing its neighbors. He thought that a case that could win international acceptance would be based on worldwide arms control agreements, such as treaties on nonproliferation and inspected suspension of nuclear material production. The Soviet’s refusal to back or help the United States in its preventive actions against the Chinese nuclear program finally settled the argument over direct preventive action.
President Johnson’s disapproval of “unprovoked” unilateral action suggests that he had a less alarmist vision of the Chinese motivations and that it could be deterred in the “classical sense.” Furthermore, the bipolar international configuration and the massive retaliation capabilities of the Soviet Union provided the incentives to act with caution. President Johnson and the State Department, calculated very well the costs that the United States would suffer if Washington acted preventively without the consent (if not participation) of Moscow. Preventive attacks seemed to be a very “hazardous” option in a bipolar world configuration, given the undoubted adverse international reaction. In 1964, the United States definitively chose to abandon the idea of preventive action and concentrate on a “traditional strategy of deterrence” that had proven compelling with a much more powerful and aggressive Soviet Union.684 According to
Johnson’s report: “To neutralize any political benefits that a small nuclear capability would provide
Beijing, the United States need not do much more than it was already doing. On the political-military front, once Beijing had tested a weapon, the United States had to be ready to provide reassurance to friendly countries that it would help them in a confrontation with China.”685 This meant that he expected that the United States could adequately and easily deter China. Burr and Richelson’s conclusion is appealing since it provides us with striking similarities with the rationale for the invasion of Iraq, although the policy outcomes are dramatically different. It reads: “The account represents a case where, despite a leader’s (specifically Mao Zedong’s) cavalier rhetoric about nuclear war, acquisition of a nuclear capability did not produce an onslaught against his neighbors. Here the estimate from CIA and State
683 Ibidem, p. 81 684 Here is the account of when CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms raised the question of action against Chinese nuclear facilities. “Dick said he had raised this question several times at the White House and had been told to "keep his mouth shut." Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington D.C., 18 September 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. 30, p. 99. 685 Quoted in: Burr William & Richelson Jeffery T, p. 78.
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Department officials that a nuclear China would not behave aggressively proved far more accurate than the worst-case fears of President Kennedy and National Security Assistant Bundy. There would probably be little dispute that restraint (on both sides) was wise or that an attack on China’s nuclear facilities would undoubtedly have done far more harm than good.”686
For the purpose of this comparative analysis with the case of Iraq, I will highlight the rationale behind the
2003 invasion and emphasize their similarities. I will use the same three rationales that drove Kennedy’s fear of China’s nuclear program, i.e. irrationality of the aggressor, competitor in a strategic region, and danger of nuclear proliferation. In a second stage I will compare how the Bush Administration dealt with these same issues, and provide a power based hypothesis in order to understand why brute force, rather than coercion prevailed.
First of all, the case of Iraq and China have a striking similarity in the sense that both were based on poor intelligence. If in the Chinese case, the evidence at the Administration’s disposal was limited mainly due to technological problems inherent to that period, the Iraqi evidence was deliberately deceptive. In 2002, the Bush Administration released photos and a report dating from 1998 of what was presented as new evidence of an Iraqi nuclear facility. Bush claimed that the Iraqi regime would have nuclear weapons within six months. Secondly, just like the advocates of preventive strikes against the
People’s Republic of China nuclear program had portrayed Mao Tse-tung as an irresponsible mad man, advocates of preventive war in Iraq described Saddam Hussein as a unpredictable sociopath. Saddam was said to be a suicidal serial aggressor bent on dominating the Persian Gulf. He was often compared to Hitler as the quintessential assailant with an unstoppable appetite for conquest. The war party contended that Saddam Hussein was either irrational or prone to serious miscalculations, which meant that he may not have been deterred by even credible threats to retaliate.687 Asked in 2002 whether anyone besides Blair supported his position that Iraq’s threat will remain as long as Hussein is in power,
Bush said: “yes, a lot of people understand he is unstable. So we’ve got a lot of support.”688 The second
686 Ibidem, p. 98. 687 For a very good analysis that shows that Saddam Hussein’s past behaviour does not fit these assessments, see: Mearsheimer John J & Walt Stephen M, "An Unnecessary War," Foreign Policy, vol. 134, no., (January/February 2003), pp. 51-59. 688 Quoted in: DeYoung Karen, "Bush, Blair Decry Hussein: Iraqi Threat is Real they Say," The Washington Post, Washington D.C., Sunday 8 September 2002, p. A 1.
UNIGE / SES - 262 - Olivier Brighenti Part III argument is that a nuclear Iraq is a major threat to American Security and to the world in general. Just as a nuclear China “Would so upset the world political scene […] that it would be intolerable,” a nuclear
Iraq would upset the regional balance of power, threaten its neighbors and the United States. A nuclear
Iraq could weaken the will of U.S.-allied neighbors and induce them to accommodate Saddam Hussein, thereby eroding the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. Dick Cheney said a nuclear-armed Saddam
Hussein: “Would seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.”689 Thus as for the Chinese case, a nuclear Iraq could only weaken Washington’s influence in the region and its capabilities to intervene on behalf of allies there.
The third argument refers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 2002 NSS makes this point very clear: “At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states’ pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.”690
The 1961 CIA report made exactly the same assumption that: “an increase in the number of states with nuclear-threat capabilities would increase the chances for irrational and desperate action.” Faced with the same dilemma as the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the process that led to the decision to go to war is also very similar. Two camps within the Administration had different approaches. Just like in the 1960’s, the hard-liners from the Pentagon and the White House including Bush, Cheney and
Rumsfled pushed for preventive war, while more cautious people like Colin Powel and Armitage at the
State Department thought to use all the alternatives at hand before resorting to war. Thus two solutions
689 Quoted in: Bumiller Elizabeth & Dao James, "Eyes on Iraq: Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack," The New York Times, New York, Tuesday 27 August 2002, p. A 1. 690 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. p. 14.
UNIGE / SES - 263 - Olivier Brighenti Part III were clashing. The first one was preventive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq even if the United
States had to act unilaterally, the second was to embrace the existing international institutions and win international acceptance (see next section). Unlike the Chinese case, the Bush Administration decided that preventive war against Iraq was the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein’s supposed nuclear program. Unlike President Johnson’s disapproval for “unprovoked” unilateral action,691 the Bush
Administration decided that the threat was sufficient to justify a preventive war and that although world opinion was desirable, it was in no ways a precondition.692 The rationale behind this decision was that a nuclear Iraq could not be deterred by the United States. This is in stark contrast with the 1960’s Chinese case and Johnson’s analysis that: “The great asymmetry in Chinese Communist and U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities” minimize the Chinese nuclear threat. A nuclear China would be within range of
American striking power but not vice versa, forcing it to “take account of the danger of a U.S. nuclear or non-nuclear counterforce as a possible response to major aggression.” Thus China which possessed even in the mid 1960’s far more military capabilities and power than Saddam Hussein could be deterred while Iraq cannot. The Bush Administration argues that Iraq’s nuclear weapons are such a threat for its neighbors and allies that it will deter the United States from protecting them. The Administration’s logic implies that preventive war is inevitable because it is not Iraq but the United States that will be deterred from protecting its allies and its homeland when Saddam Hussein obtains nuclear capabilities.
Johnson’s 1963 report outlined that a nuclear China would not fundamentally alter the way that the
United States had to deal with China’s neighbors. It said that in the political-military realm, once China had tested its first weapon, the United States only had to reassure its neighbors and allies that the
United States would help them in a confrontation with China. Apparently, according to the war-mongers, the same logic does not apply to Iraq although U.S. deterrence capabilities (conventional and non- conventional) are far more effective than in the mid 1960’s. As outlined by Robert Jervis: “the
691 It is interesting to note that where President Johnson was adamant on the “unprovoked” aspect, Bush thought of strategies in order to provoke Saddam Hussein to make his case for the war. The famous Downing Street Memo, attributes the discussion of provocation to President Bush: “The U.S. was thinking of Flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colors. If Saddam fired at them, he would be in breach.” Quoted in: Van Natta Don, "Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says," The New York Times, New York, 27 March 2006, p. A 1. 692 The 2002 NSS argued that the United States would like to work with traditional alliances and international institutions wherever possible, but that if it could not get international agreement over defending itself from potential catastrophic terrorism, it would need to resort to coalition of the willing.
UNIGE / SES - 264 - Olivier Brighenti Part III administration’s policy implies that the U.S. is easy to deter. Bush and his colleagues have then implicitly accepted Waltz’s argument that nuclear proliferation will spread deterrence and bring about nuclear stability, while rejecting his claim that these weapons will moderate behavior.”693
In my opinion, the administration’s logic is highly unconvincing.694 The historical evidence from the
Chinese case provides some interesting findings that can help shed light on the “real” rationale behind the 2003 Iraqi invasion of Iraq. As I have outlined previously, one of the most important variables against the preventive attacks on the Chinese nuclear capabilities was the undoubted adverse international reaction. Pursuing preventive strikes required tacit if not explicit Soviet support. In other words, when Johnson sought to enlist world opinion, he meant the Soviet Union. Moscow rebuffed
Washington’s overtures in 1963 and again in 1964. The Soviet negative response effectively settled the argument over direct action against nuclear China. Depending on Moscow’s reaction, the risks entailed in provoking a war with China were huge. Political elites could not rule out the possibility that the Soviet
Union could misinterpret the U.S. action. Retaliation actions by the Soviet Union could not be dismissed.
In a bipolar nuclear era, a “hazardous adventure” could have led to a world war. Thus the international distribution of power provided incentives for restraint given the dear “possible” consequences of an unprovoked unilateral preventive action. Where a bipolar distribution of power provides little, if no incentives for preventive war (deterrence is the basic pattern to deal with major threats when powerful checks exist), a unipolar world provides the hegemon with other incentives. Indeed, the United States could very well have deterred Saddam Hussein, even if he had acquired weapons of mass destruction.695 As stated by Walt and Mearsheimer: “Both logic and historical evidence suggest that a
693 Jervis Robert, "The Confrontation Between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence," European Journal Of International Relations, vol. 9, no. 2, (June 2003), p. 321. 694 Today, the United States is capable of deterring a nuclear China from actions against Taiwan. China possesses approximately twenty CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the West coast of the United States. This force is sufficient to pose a risk for the United States of unacceptable destruction from unintended escalation. See: Ross Robert S, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation and the U.S. China Relations," International Security, vol. 27, no. 2, (Fall 2002), pp. 48-85. and Christensen Thomas J, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challengers for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, vol. 25, no. 4, (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Apparently this pattern does not apply to Iraq that has no proven nuclear weapons program, that has not used any unconventional weapons during the 1991 Gulf War and that has not threatened its neighbors since the invasion of Kuwait. 695 War advocates within the Bush administration would claim that my argument ignores that we are dealing with a man that is reckless and that is not impressed by America’s threats. If the threats don’t work, logically deterrence and containment will not work either. This is a false reading of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In thirty years, he has started two wars. He invaded Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. The first one was supported by the United States. It was not a reckless decision but an attempt by the weaker state (Irak) to balance the hegemonist views of the
UNIGE / SES - 265 - Olivier Brighenti Part III policy of vigilant containment would work, both now and in the event that Iraq acquired a nuclear arsenal. Why? Because the United States and its regional allies are far stronger than Iraq, and because it does not take a genius to figure out what would happen if Iraq tried to use its arsenal to blackmail its neighbors, to expand its territory, or to attack another state directly. It only takes a leader who wants to remain alive, and who wants to remain in power. Throughout his lengthy and brutal career, Saddam
Hussein has repeatedly shown that these two goals are absolutely paramount. That is why deterrence and containment would work, and that is why preventive war is unnecessary.”696 Thus in fine why reject containment? As hard-line realism predicts, the Bush Administration chose not to contain Saddam
Hussein’s regime because it had the means to overthrow the Iraqi regime and extend its reach in the
Middle East. Being the sole superpower in a unipolar world provides the hegemon with a wide margin of scenarios. When no pressures are exercised on the hegemon, why would it choose to contain a regime it despises, when it can easily topple it with no risks of international adverse reaction. Saddam Hussein always rejected America’s hegemony, he resisted the U.S. norms of political and economic conduct.
Furthermore, Iraq was an easy target. This singled out Saddam Hussein for special treatment. Thus preventive war was the best “tool” to eliminate his regime and forestall a shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East.
8.2. The Invasion of Iraq and the United Nations Security Council: International Cooperation and Power Maximization in a Unipolar World
In an address to the nation on 18 March 2003, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to go to exile or face attack from the United States and a so-called “coalition of the willing.” This speech made it clear that diplomacy had failed and that the United States was going to invade Iraq. Washington was unsuccessful in its attempt to convince the Security Council that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the world and that he needed to be removed by force in order to enforce UNSC resolution 1441. Thus, the
stronger state (Iran) that wished to impose its political system in the Middle-East. Thus, it was not a war to gain territory from Iran, but a war to overthrow Khomeini. Before invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein approached the United States. He received clear signs that the United States would not intervene in Arab-Arab affairs and that Washington had no security treaties of commitments to Kuwait. 696 Walt Stephen M & Mearsheimer John J, "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes," BCSIA Occasional Papers, vol., no., (November 2002), p. 14.
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United States was going to pursue a unilateral preventive war against the Ba’athist regime. How did events unfold? How can we explain Bush’s decision to go to war without the “authorization” from the
United Nations? How can we explain that Washington tried to convince skeptical allies during six months and finally decided to intervene unilaterally? My argument is that the United States acted precisely as my theory predicts. Hard-line realism argues that cooperation is important and more specifically in a unipolar world. Indeed, cooperation is compelling because it is a strategic tool of power maximization. Multilateral institutions are the structural means by which potential winners pursue their own interest, often at the expense of the political losers. They are one of the alternatives in the hand of the hegemon. In a unipolar world, the hegemon feels less restraint and can “shop” in the institutions. It can rely on them when that is in its interest and will give it a higher leverage to pursue its goals. It can also withdraw from binding institutions and agreements with few risks of retaliation or counter hegemonic reactions. In a unipolar world, where hierarchy is constitutive of the system, the hegemon is less concerned about the balance of power and thus can cooperate more easily as long as it maximizes its relative gains. The 2002 NSS clearly stated that international institutions were important. The document reads: “We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The
United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.”697 The Iraqi case is rewarding for my theory, since it clearly shows that the
United States is committed to its “international obligations” as long as those meet their fundamental interest. Since they failed to “rally support” for their invasion of Iraq, they formed a “coalition of the willing” to fulfill their goals and ignore the Security Council.
In order to test the logic of my argument, I will briefly trace how events unfolded in the United Nations from 2002 to the invasion of Iraq. I will show that the decision to “topple” Saddam Hussein was totally
697 Bush George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Whitehouse, September 2002. Cover Letter.
UNIGE / SES - 267 - Olivier Brighenti Part III independent from a U.N. resolution and that the Bush Administration had decided to invade the country years before 19 March 2003. Going to the U.N. had three major returns for the Administration’s. First of all, it was a way for the United States to gain legitimacy for its preventive war plan and share the burden of the invasion with as many members as possible.698 Secondly, Afghanistan had shown that the United
States could achieve military success more or less alone, but the United States wanted the international community to assist its regime change policy. President Bush had made this clear at a NSC meeting about post-war Afghanistan: “I oppose using military for nation-building. Once the job is done, our forces are not peacekeepers. We ought to put in place a U.N. protection and leave.” He was notably sympathetic to Colin Powell’s notion of a: “UN mandate plus third country forces ruling Kabul.”699 In other words, the United States needed the United Nations because in practice, the U.S. simply could not walk away from Iraq the moment they had toppled down Saddam Hussein’s regime. It sounds very similar to Kagan’s vision of Transatlantic relations consisting of: “the United States ‘making the dinner’ and the Europeans ‘doing the dishes.’”700 Thirdly, the United States knew too well that if they wanted
Tony Blair to be able to enroll his country in Bush’s war, they would need to bring the matter to the
United Nations.701 When the United States failed to get what it wanted from the United Nations Security
Council, it decided to go it alone following the invasion plan it had crafted since mid 2002.
It is often said that the antepenultimate stage in the countdown to the looming Third Gulf War may be dated to 29 January 2002, when President Bush delivered his State of the Union address to the U.S.
Congress and the American people. In effect, it is the first official declaration on the need to remove
698 As a report from the U.S. General Accounting Office shows: “Under Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. and allied forces representing 31 countries engaged in combat and combat support missions during 1990 and 1991 to defend key regional allies against invasion from Iraq. The Office of Management and Budget estimated the incremental cost to be about $61 billion. However, the United States is still receiving contributions from its allies and expects these contributions to cover most of the incremental costs.” About 88% of the cost was paid by the allies, which means that the United States paid only $7 billion of the estimated incremental costs. United States General Accounting Office, "Report to the Honorable Bill Alexander, House of Representatives: Southwest Asia, Costs of Protecting U.S. Interests", August 1991, http://archive.gao.gov/d19t9/144832.pdf, (Accessed: 12/11/2006). p. 12. 699 Quoted in: Woodward Bob, Bush at War, (New York: Somon & Schuster), 2003, pp. 231 & 237. 700 Kagan Robert, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, vol. 113, no. 1, (June/July 2002), p. 8. 701 The United States took it for granted that they could count on the British. “Two years from now” Bush had decalred just a week after 9/11 “only the Brits may be with us”. Quoted in: Ferguson Nial, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire, (New York: Penguin Books), 2004, p. 161. Having Britain on board lends credibility to the American claim to be leading a coalition against Saddam and ensured that U.S. troops would be reinforced by substantial British contingent. This is one plausible explanation why Bush went so far as to meet Blair’s request for a U.N. mandate for war.
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Saddam Hussein from power and liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny, but the Administration’s obsession with Iraq began the very first day of the Bush Administration. On the afternoon of 30 January
2001, ten days after his inauguration as the forty-third president, Bush met the Principals of his National
Security Council (NSC) for the first time (Cheney, Rumsfled, Rice, Powell, O’Neil, etc). The designated topic was “Mideast Policy”. Shortly after the meeting started, Bush turned to Condolezza Rice and said:
“So, Condi, what are we going to talk about today? What’s on the agenda?” She answered: “How Iraq is destabilizing the region, Mr. President.” She noted that Iraq might be the key to reshaping the entire region. CIA Director George Tenet offered a briefing on the latest intelligence on Iraq. The CIA believed
(satellite photos of a building) the plant produced either chemical or biological materials for weapons manufacture. After the meeting, Paul O’Neill recalled: “Getting Hussein was now the administration’s focus, that was already clear.”702 The next NSC meeting two days later made things even clearer.
Powell began by discussing the new strategy for targeted sanctions. After a moment, Rumsfled interrupted. “Sanctions are fine” he said. “But what we really want to think about is going after Saddam
[…] Imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that’s aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about.” Most importantly, in order to understand the whole rationale for war that would prevail for the next two years or so, he added: “It’s not my specific objective to get rid of Saddam Hussein, I’m after the weapons of mass destruction. Regime change isn’t my prime concern.” According to Paul O’Neill:
“From the start, we were building the case against Hussein and looking at how we could take him out and change Iraq into a new country. And, if we did that, it would solve everything. It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The President saying, ‘Fine. Go find me a way to do this’”703 Thus on February 1st 2001, seven months prior to the September 11 attacks, it was decided that Saddam
Hussein had to be removed. How he was to be removed was the central question. The battle of will between Powell and his moderates (seeking an international U.N. solution) versus the hard-liners like
702 Quoted in : Suskind Ron, The Price of Loyalty: George W Bush, The White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2004, p. 72. This book is based on interviews of Secretary of Treasure Paul O’Neil, who attended all NSC meetings. After that meeting: “Bush had assignments for everyone. Powell and his team would look to draw up new sanctions regime. Rumsfeld and Shelton, he said should examine our military options […] Tenet would report on improving our current intelligence. O’Neill would investigate how to financially squeeze the regime.” p. 75. 703 Ibidem, pp. 85-86.
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Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz (unilateralists seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein with American power), who were already planning the next war in Iraq and the shape of a post-Saddam Iraq had just begun. In April 2001, the hard-liners logic of linking Saddam Hussein with terrorism was put forth by
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. In the first meeting of the Bush Administration on terrorism
(April 2001), counterterrorism Czar Richard Clark stated: “We need to put pressure on both the Taliban and al Qaeda by arming the Northern Alliance and other groups in Afghanisatn. Simultaenously, we need to target bin Laden and his leadership by reinitiating lights of the Predator.” Wolfowitz replied:
“Well I just don’t undersatnd why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden. […] There are others that do as well, at least as much. Iraqi terrorism for example. […] You give bin Laden too much credit. He could not do all these things like the 1993 attack on New York, not without a state sponsor. Just because FBI and CIA have failed to find the linkages does not mean they don’t exist.”704
Thus by April 2001, the Bush Administration had set the rationale for war that would prevail throughout
2002 and 2003. It was strikingly clear in the 2002 State of the Union Speech that Bush had endorsed the Rumsfled/Wolfowitz thesis that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction, sponsored terrorism and had played a role in September 11. He declared to the nation on January
2002: “Our goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. […] Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.” At this stage, it was pretty clear that the United States was going to remove
Saddam Hussein from power, the only question was to know if Bush could or would rely on the existing international institutions. Bush’s State of the Union Address had been clear: “that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake
704 Clarke Richard A, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, (New York: Free Press), 2004, pp. 231- 232.
UNIGE / SES - 270 - Olivier Brighenti Part III about it: If they do not act, America will.”705 Shortly after the State of the Union Address, Richard Perle, chairman of a US Defense Department advisory board, declared in an interview to the German Financial
Times: “I don’t think there’s anything Saddam Hussein could do that would convince us there’s no longer any danger coming from Iraq” U.S. President was now on: “a very clear path heading toward war with Iraq.”706 Richard Haas confirmed that he had realized in July 2002 that war was inevitable and that
Bush had made his decision. “There was a moment," he said. "The moment was the first week of July, when I had a meeting with Condi […] I raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put
Iraq front and center at this point, given the war on terrorism and other issues. And she said, essentially, that that decision's been made, don't waste your breath. For me, it was that meeting with Condi that made me realize it was farther along than I had realized.”707 Harsh debates were going on between the
Pentagon backed by Cheney and the State Department. Powell wanted to go to the United Nations and make the case for an international solution to the Iraqi problem. The hawks at the Pentagon were already drafting military plans to invade Iraq.708 On the 5th of August 2002, Powell could finally make his case to Bush. He warned President Bush that if he invaded Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein: “You will become the government until you get a new government. You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people, you will own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems. You'll own it all. […] So you need to understand that this is not going to be a walk in the woods. It’s nice to say we can do it unilaterally, except you can’t" After listening to Powell Bush asked: “What should I do? What else can I do?” Powell
705 Bush George W, "2002 State of the Union Address", 29 January 2002, (Whitehouse), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html, (Accessed: 22/03/2003). (Emphasis added) 706 Anonymous, "Pentagon-Berater: USA zum Krieg mit Irak bereit," The Financial Times Deutschland, Frankfurt, Monday February 2002, p. 5. 707 Quoted in : Lemann Nicholas, "How it Came to War: When Did Bush Decide that he Had to Fight Saddam," The New Yorker, New York, 31 March 2003, p. 37. The “Secret Downing Street Memo also says that Bush had decided to resort to war. It reads: “The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US congressional elections. The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet. Rycroft Matthew, "The Secret Downing Street Memo", 23 July 2002, (Full Text Available at: Downingstreetmemo.com), http://downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html, (Accessed: 19/12/2006). 708 The existence of the document that outlined significant aspects of a "concept" for a war against Iraq as it stood about two months ago indicates an advanced state of planning in the military even though President Bush continues to state in public and to his allies that he has no fine-grain war plan on his desk for the invasion of Iraq. Schmitt Eric, "U.S. Plan for Iraq is Said to Include Attack on Three Sides," The New York Times, New York, Friday 5 July 2002, p. 1. See also: Gordon Michael R & General Trainor Bernard E, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, (New York: Pantheon), 2006, especially pp. 3-54
UNIGE / SES - 271 - Olivier Brighenti Part III replied: “If you take it to the U.N., you’ve got to recognize that they might be able to solve it. In which case there’s no war. That could mean a solution that is not as clean as just going in and taking the guy out. The international cover could also result in a different outcome.”709 Powell had finally met some success to convince the President to take the question to the U.N.710 By the end of August 2002, Dick
Cheney, in an attempt to rule out any political mediation of the Iraqi situation at a time when the international community were furiously trying to get U.N. inspectors back to Baghdad, declared: “A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever. On the contrary there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somewhat back in box.”711 In early September
2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell supported the return of UN inspectors as a “first step” towards neutralizing Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. He declared: “Iraq has been in violation of these many UN resolutions for most of the last 11 or so years. So as a first step, let’s see what the inspectors find, send them back in, why are they being kept out.” In order to sell the rational for war to the world, he continued: “The world has to be presented with the information, with the intelligence that is available. A debate is needed within the international community so that everybody can make a judgment about this.”712 These tensions within the States Department and the Pentagone/Vice President made it clear from the outset that although Bush was going to seek a U.N. Security Council authorization for war, such authorization was not regarded as necessary. The American return to the
U.N. as outlined by Micheal Dunne: “Is only one stop, and a parallel one, on its chosen journey.”713 The
709 Quoted in : Woodward Bob, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2004, p. 150-151. 710 It is Tony Blair, in Camp David on September 8 2002, who finally managed to convince Bush of the need to go to the U.N. Mr Bush indicated to him that in a landmark speech to the United Nations on Thursday he will try to give the UN one last chance to get its weapons inspectors into Iraq before the US launches a military strike. See: Blitz James, "Blair Gains Respite over Iraq as Bush Gives UN Last Chance," The Financial Times, London, Monday 9 September 2002, p. 2. 711 Quoted in: Fineman Howard & Lipper Tamara, "Same as he Ever Was," Newsweek, New York, 9 September 2002, p. 33. It is said that this comment did not reflect the view of President Bush. A lot of evidence can be found in insider’s accounts that Bush fully backed the Invasion of Iraq from the beginning of his administration. For an insider’s view on that aspect see former U.S. Counterterrorism Czar’s book: Clarke Richard A, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, (New York: Free Press), 2004, 352 p. See also Bush’s former Secretary of Treasure account (with Ron Suskind): Suskind Ron, The Price of Loyalty: George W Bush, The White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2004, 347 p. For a non-insiders but very well documented (direct interviews with Bush) account see: Woodward Bob, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2004, 467 p. 712 Quoted in : Gumel Andrew & Woolf Marie, "U.S. in Disarray Over Iraq as Powell Backs Call for Weapons Inspectors," The Independent, London, Monday 2 September 2002, p. 1. 713 Dunne Michael, "The United States, the United Nations and Iraq: Multilateralism of a kind," International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 2, (March 2003), p. 271.
UNIGE / SES - 272 - Olivier Brighenti Part III insistence upon America’s free hand and the necessary virtues of unilateralism lay at the heart of Bush’s
Speech to the UN General Assembly. He said: “My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable.”714 The result of America’s return to the Security Council was UNSC 1441. This resolution was adopted unanimously and offered Iraq: “A final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.” It decides: “To set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687.” It demands to receive: “Not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.” It states that: “False statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment.”715 The period following the adoption of resolution 1441 is the last stage of the march to war. It is the most interesting one since it really shows that the United States was ready to go to war without a U.N. mandate. The Iraqi government agreed on the 1441 resolution, and on October 12 2002, General Amir al-Saadi, Saddam Hussein’s special advisor, sent a letter to U.N. Chief Inspector Hans Blix asserting: "our complete readiness once again to receive the advance team (of U.N. inspectors) on October 19 as per our preliminary agreement with you and our readiness to resolve all issues that may block the road to our joint cooperation.” On November
19 2002, the U.N. disarmament experts arrived in Baghdad after four years of absence. On December
7, according to the timetable of UNSC resolution 1441, the Iraqi government filed a twelve thousand
714 Bush George W, "President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly", 12 September 2002, (Whitehouse), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.html, (Accessed: 22/04/2007). Emphasis added. The October 2 Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States armed forces against Iraq, provides the Administration with a strong backing and free hand for its war in Iraq. 715 United Nations Security Council, "UNSC Resolution 1441(2002)", 8 October 2002, (United Nations Press Services), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement, (Accessed: 22/12/2004). Paragraphs 2, 3, & 4.
UNIGE / SES - 273 - Olivier Brighenti Part III page document to the United Nations.716 The United States dismissed the document arguing that Iraq had not complied to the requirements of the 1441 resolution. Thus, Iraq was in “material breach” with the UNSC resolution717 Secretary of State Colin Powel, speaking on behalf of the White House said the
United States would continue to work with the United Nations inspection team at least for a few more weeks. It would also give Iraq an opportunity, to correct the record about the missing documents and unanswered questions about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. "The world is still waiting for Iraq to comply with its obligations," he said. "The world will not wait forever. It is still up to Iraq to determine how its disarmament will happen. Unfortunately, this declaration fails totally to move us in the direction of a peaceful solution."718 Although the United States was giving a few more weeks for inspections, it seemed quite clear that Washington was on the path to war. Simultaneously, a big
Transatlantic clash between the United States/Great Britain and France, Germany, Russia and China began. France accused the United States of impatience on its confrontation with Baghdad and brandished a possible veto on any Security Council Resolution for military action against Iraq. French
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared: “We believe that nothing today justifies envisaging military action […] There’s no reason to go to war while we can still improve the path of cooperation. We don’t believe the world is ready.” German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said that: “Iraq has complied fully with all relevant resolutions” and that the inspectors should have “all the time which id needed.”
Colin Powell replied that the Council would have to: “make a judgment” on Iraq’s cooperation after Mr.
Blix’s report the following week. He made it pretty clear that Washington was going to use force when
716 According to the secret “Downing Street Memo”, Tony Blair said in July 2002, that if Iraq failed to let the weapons inspectors back, they had a case for war. The document states: “The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change. The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors.” Rycroft Matthew, "The Secret Downing Street Memo", 23 July 2002, (Full Text Available at: Downingstreetmemo.com), http://downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html, (Accessed: 19/12/2006). 717 Hans Blix had declared that the 12'000 page document submitted by the Iraqi Government was incomplete. Mr. Blix said that it contained "very little" evidence of previously known arms programs or past efforts to develop weapons. "The absence of that evidence means of course that we cannot have confidence that there do not remain weapons of mass destruction," he said. Quoted in: MacFarquhar Neil, "Iraq Insists U.S. Experts Are Rushing To Judgment," The New York Times, New York, Friday 20 December 2002, p. 16. It would be interesting to see how credible this document is today, knowing that there were no weapons of mass destruction. 718 Quoted in: Tyler Patrick E, "Showing 'Talons of the Dove,' Powell Presses for Compliance by Iraqis," The New York Times, New York, Friday 20 December 2002, p. 18.
UNIGE / SES - 274 - Olivier Brighenti Part III he summoned the Council not to "shrink from the responsibilities" or be "shocked into impotence."719 In an attempt to discredit France and Germany, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used a divide-and rule-strategy, that had proven so compelling with the expansion of NATO. At the foreign press center he declared: “If there's leadership and if you're right, and if your facts are persuasive, Europe responds.
And they always have. Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old
Europe. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem […] But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this, they're with the
United States.”720 On January 27, Hans Blix gave his 60-day interim report to the Security Council. A few hours later, Colin Powell briefed the press. He declared: “We listened carefully as the inspectors reported that Iraq has not provided the active, immediate and unconditional cooperation that the Council demanded in UN Resolution 1441. As Dr. Blix said, ’Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it.’” He went on: “The inspectors' findings came as no surprise. For 11 years before 1441, Saddam Hussein's regime refused to make the strategic decision, the political decision, to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction and to comply with the world's demands. To this day, the Iraq regime continues to defy the will of the United Nations.
The Iraqi regime has responded to 1441 with empty claims, empty declarations and empty gestures.”
Although Powell assured the press that “even at this late date the United States hopes for a peaceful resolution” it seemed pretty clear that they were resolved to invade Iraq. The only remaining question was when. “Iraq's time for choosing peaceful disarmament is fast coming to an end” Powell said.721 The following day, it became even clearer, in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address, that the
United States was going to invade Iraq with or without a U.N. mandate. He declared: “We have called on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm. […] In all these
719 Quoted in : Preston Julia, "An Attack on Iraq not yet Justified, France Warns U.S.," The New York Times, New York, Tuesday 21 January 2003, p. 1. 720 Rumsfeld Donald H, "Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center", 22 January 2002, (U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330, (Accessed: 04/03/2007). Although this remark may seem to be mere provocation, it had a huge impact in Europe and helped divide EU/NATO members. It helped to advocate the so called “coalition of the willing”. It is also important to see that the United States that traditionally advocated a united Europe, played on the divide-and-rule in order to secure its interests just like they had done with the expansion of NATO and the ESDP process. 721 Powell Colin L, "Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors' 60-Day Report: Iraqi Non-cooperation and Defiance of the UN", 27 January 2003, (U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/16921.htm, (Accessed: 23/03/2006).
UNIGE / SES - 275 - Olivier Brighenti Part III efforts, however, America's purpose is more than to follow a process, it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world. […] Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.”722 As the “drums of war” were beating louder and louder, Tony Blair was facing a very tough political pressures from his public opinion as well as from his own cabinet. On the last day of January 2003, British Premier flew to Camp David with the hopes of securing an explicit
U.S. commitments to a second U.N. Security Council resolution, authorizing military action against Iraq.
He hoped that this would provide him with the legitimacy he needed in his country as well as a way to mend the huge Transatlantic gap. President Bush was very reluctant about the idea of a second resolution. They believed they had all the authority they needed under resolution 1441 as well as the
October 2002 Congress Joint Resolution authorizing war. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, Richard Haass made this very clear when he declared: “In any event, we ended up going for the second resolution, quite honestly, not because we needed it. It was seen as nice to have, from our point of view. It was seen as desirable. But it was something that Tony Blair and others felt very strongly that they needed in order to manage their domestic polities.”723 Secondly the Bush
Administration feared that they would not get a second resolution and that would undermine the little remaining international support they had so far for their war. Despite misgivings, Bush had little choice than to accept Blair’s proposition for a second resolution. A confidential memo written by Tony Blair’s top foreign policy advisor David Manning summarizing the two-hour meeting between Bush and Blair, makes it very clear that the United States was going to invade Iraq with or without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional weapons.724 “Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around military planning” wrote David Manning. The start date for military campaign was now pencilled in for 10 March, this was when the bombing would begin” Manning wrote, paraphrasing the President. Bush agreed that the two countries should attempt to get a second
722 Bush George W, "2003 State of the Union Address", 28 January 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html, (Accessed: 05/04/2007). 723 Quoted in: Lemann Nicholas, "How it Came to War: When Did Bush Decide that he Had to Fight Saddam," The New Yorker, New York, 31 March 2003, p. 38. 724 The secret memo, stampeded “extremely sensitive” and revised by the New York Times, was authenticated by two top British officials. All further quotations from: Van Natta Don, "Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says," The New York Times, New York, 27 March 2006, p. A 1.
UNIGE / SES - 276 - Olivier Brighenti Part III resolution, but he added that time was running out. “The U.S. would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms and even threaten.” The document added: “But he had to say that if we ultimately failed, military action would follow anyway.” The two leaders agreed that three weeks remained to obtain a second UNSC resolution before military commanders would need to begin preparing for an invasion. The memo describes Blair as saying: “We had been very patient. Now we should be saying that the crisis must be resolved in weeks not months.” The memo also shows that
Bush and Blair acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found in Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned invasion, Bush said: “The U.S. might be able to bring out a defector who could give a public presentation about Saddam’s W.M.D.” The United States never sent a defector to give a public presentation of Saddam’s W.M.D, but five days later, Colin Powel was in charge of exposing to the world Saddam’s W.M.D. His speech clearly indicated that the Bush
Administration was ready for war. It was the ultimate attempt to convince the International community, backed with evidence that revealed a web of lies and deception to legitimate the U.S. “Iraq adventure.”
His February 5 2003 famous speech to the United Nations started with: “My colleagues, every statement
I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.” “Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September
11th world," he declared. He added that: “Iraq had unquestionably violated United Nations resolutions, including the latest one, demanding that it cooperate with inspectors and disarm.”725 His speech failed to convince the international community in what Washington saw as its last attempt to convince. Ten days later, U.N. Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix made his report to the Security Council. It was a scrupulously balanced list of pluses and minuses. Although he reported some problems, the report was far more favorable than the previous one. Furthermore, it was in sharp contrast with Powell’s presentation. Blix Declared: “Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in
725 Powell Colin L, "U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council ", 5 February 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030205-1.html, (Accessed: 22/03/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 277 - Olivier Brighenti Part III advance that the inspectors were coming. […] The results to date have been consistent with Iraqi declarations […] we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and private residences.”726 Blix said that the inspectors had: “So far not found any such weapons.” He said he needed more time in order to fulfill the requirements of resolution 1441 although the “period of disarmament through inspections could still be short.”727 As expected, the United States focused on all the negative aspects of the report and questioned the need for more time. Colin Powell in a television interview showed the impatience of the
Administration. He declared: “We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out, as Iraq is trying to do right now, ‘string it out long enough and the world will start looking in other directions; the Security
Council will move on; we'll get away with it again.’ My friends, they cannot be allowed to get away with it again.”728 White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer declared: “No, I think the report from Hans Blix this morning was very diplomatic with its bottom line being that the world has no confidence that Saddam
Hussein has disarmed. And that's what this is about. […] So when you listened to Mr. Blix this morning describe the very fact that the weapons that kill are, one, proven to be in the hands of Iraq in a proscribed manner, and the weapons of mass destruction that kill even more, the anthrax, the nerve agent, the VX, are unaccounted for. The world still has great cause for concern about Saddam Hussein possessing weapons. That's what came out of New York today.”729 Thus the United States was dead- set on war. They had clearly abandoned the idea of a U.N. solution, but as pledged to the British, they had to present a second resolution. On February 24, British Premier Tony Blair tabled a new resolution co-sponsored by the United States and Spain. The resolution is brief and states that Iraq has failed the final opportunity to comply with Security Council Resolution 1441 and requests that the Security Council
726 Blix Hans, "Briefing of the Security Council", 14 February 2003, (United Nation Press Services), http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm, (Accessed: 22/06/2006). 727 It is interesting to note that Blix questioned some of the evidence that Powell had presented in his speech at the U.N. Blix declared: “I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection” 728 Powell Colin L, "Secretary of State Colin Powell and foreign ministers from across the globe respond to Blix and ElBaradei's reports." 14 February 2003, (The News Hour 'PBS'), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan- june03/reaction_2-14.html, (Accessed: 22/04/2007). 729 Fleischer Ari, "Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer ", 14 February 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-9.html, (Accessed: 12/04/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 278 - Olivier Brighenti Part III enforces the resolution. Statements by Deputy Secretary of State Wolf and Holmes make it very clear that the President: “believes that we do not absolutely require another resolution in order to act. He believes, and we believe, that the authority for that actually resides in Resolution 1441.” Furthermore, it is obvious that the United States is ready to act alone but seeks international legitimacy, as well as the help of the U.N. once it has achieved its mission and toppled down Saddam Hussein. When asked if the
United States would go it alone, Assistant Secretary Holmes declared that a U.N. mandate: “would be very important in order to demonstrate to the world that the United States and other members, and other countries that are supporting this resolution, that we're going the extra mile to try to show that we take the international community seriously, we take the Security Council seriously.” Holmes confirms my claim that the United States wanted the U.N. to deal with the aftermath of the war: “If the President decides he wishes to go forward with coalition members on an intervention, there could be a very important role for the Security Council and the United Nations in what comes after that. There could be a role for humanitarian [assistance] and reconstruction.”730 In a television interview on March 10, French
President Chirac made no doubt that France would oppose a second resolution. He thought that the inspectors were doing their job, and that a peaceful solution was still possible. He declared: “The inspectors confirm that there is no danger, that we should continue along that line, and that the goal can be attained in following that line. Some of our partners, and they have their own reasons, consider that we should end the process quickly using another approach, that approach being war. […] Thus we are from as system that was the one of inspections in order to disarm Iraq to a system that says: ‘in X days, we go to war’. France will not accept that and thus will refuse this solution.”731 On March 16, Blair, Bush and Aznar met in the Azores and gave the international community a 24 hours ultimatum to back the co- sponsored resolution. If the resolution was not adopted, the so-called “coalition of the willing” would go it alone. Bush declared: “We concluded that tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world. Many nations have voiced a commitment to peace and security. And now they must demonstrate that commitment to
730 Wolf John & Holmes Kim, "Second UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq", 27 February 2003, (U.S. State Department), http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/18058.htm, (Accessed: 14/12/2006). 731 Chirac Jacques, "Interview télévisée du Président de la République sur TF1 et France 2", 10 March 2003, (Elysée Press Services), http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/interviews_articles_de_presse_et_interventions_televise es/2003/mars/mars_2003.12293.html, (Accessed: 05/05/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 279 - Olivier Brighenti Part III peace and security in the only effective way, by supporting the immediate and unconditional disarmament of Saddam Hussein.”732 The following day, France, Russia China and Germany stated their opposition to a military operation. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said: “France cannot accept the resolution that sets an ultimatum and envisages an automatic use of force” Russian
President Vladimir Putin, dismissed the ultimatum: “We are for solving the problem exclusively by peaceful means. Any other development would be a mistake, fraught with the toughest consequences, leading to victims and destabilization of the international situation as a whole.” As a consequence, the bitterly fought UNSC second resolution was abandoned. The United States and Great Britain knew that they would face a firm defeat in the U.N. security council. "The United Nations has failed to enforce its own demands. The diplomatic window is now closed," said White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer.733 On March 18, President Bush gave an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, while publicly blaming the United Nations for its failure to enforce its resolutions. He declared: “The world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. […] Our good faith has not been returned. […] The United Nations
Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours. […] The United States of
America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. […] Saddam
Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.”734 On Tuesday morning at the crack of dawn, the United
States launched its preventive war against Saddam Hussein.
Tracing the process and showing how events unfolded since the early days of the Bush presidency provides a rewarding test for my theory. Indeed, it seems pretty clear that the United States was on the path to war as early as beginning 2001. Washington seemed to have another agenda than finding a peaceful solution to the Iraqi question. By bringing the matter to the United Nations Security Council, the
United States sought to gain a “mantel of legitimacy” for its war. While still in the Bush Administration,
732 Bush George W. Blair Anthony & Aznar José-Maria, "President Bush: Monday "Moment of Truth" for World on Iraq", 16 March 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030316- 3.html, (Accessed: 22/04/2007). 733 Quoted in : Anonymous, "Attack on Iraq Imminent," The Guardian, London, Monday 17 March 2003, p. 1. 734 Bush George W, "President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours: Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation", 17 March 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html, (Accessed: 26/12/2006).
UNIGE / SES - 280 - Olivier Brighenti Part III
Richard Haass made it very clear that: “Resolution 1441 was an extraordinary achievement. It got inspectors back in under far more demanding terms. And it didn't tie our hands. We never committed ourselves to another resolution. So it was an extraordinary accomplishment. It gave tremendous legal and political and moral authority to anything that we would subsequently do.”735 Secondly, the whole
U.N. process, highlighted that the United Nations was a parallel track in Washington’s strategy. The
United States had to secure the British commitment and that meant bringing the case to the United
Nations. Thirdly, it is quite clear that the United States sought to have the United Nations in order to take over the reconstruction and peace-keeping/state-building operations. Bush made it clear that: “If military force is required, we'll quickly seek new Security Council resolutions to encourage broad participation in the process of helping the Iraqi people to build a free Iraq.”736 The various official and classified documents make it obvious that Washington was going to go to war with or without a UNSC resolution.
The United States is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Like all permanent members it has a veto right on all decisions and resolutions. The huge military asymmetries in military power and the resulting unipolar world structure confers the United States with the capacity of ignoring the Security Council when its decisions do not suit its interests. Thus as highlighted by hard-line realism, the hegemon’s approach to international institutions can combine multilateralism with unilateralism simultaneously or sequentially. Haass’s comment is a perfect illustration of what the hegemon’s patterns of cooperation are in a unipolar world where checks and balances are quasi nil. "In the case of the U.N.” he said “we've just once again learned the lesson that the U.N. can only function as an institution when there's consensus among the major powers. The U.N. was never meant to act with the independence of a nation-state. It was never meant to be the instrument of one great power against another. So, when the great powers can't agree, that's when they have to go outside the U.N. Otherwise they'll destroy the
735 Quoted in : Lemann Nicholas, "How it Came to War: When Did Bush Decide that he Had to Fight Saddam," The New Yorker, New York, 31 March 2003, p. 38. 736 Bush George W. Blair Anthony & Aznar José-Maria, "President Bush: Monday "Moment of Truth" for World on Iraq", 16 March 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030316- 3.html, (Accessed: 22/04/2007)., Bush was quoted to have said in the Azores : “We have to build an international consensus for Iraq, a new Iraq … and we’ll go back to the U.N. for another resolution after the War. The U.N. can help with many issues but should not run the country” He made it clear that the coalition would be in charge. Quoted in: Woodward Bob, Plan of Attack, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2004, p. 359.
UNIGE / SES - 281 - Olivier Brighenti Part III institution to make it relevant. You want to preserve it for those times when the differences between the powers are modest, or they actually agree."737
8.3. The Invasion of Iraq: A Hard Case for Hard-Line Realism?
Throughout this chapter I have sought to provide evidence for my systemic theory of unipolarity. My central task has been to seek to explain why the hegemon pressed for the invasion of Iraq and finally invaded the country on a unilateral basis. My theory predicts that the peculiar unipolar distribution of power provides the hegemon with incentives to pursue power maximizing strategies. More generally, I argue that power maximization is a “normal pattern” of behavior for the hegemon in a unipolar world.
Thus, the policy adopted towards Iraq since the first days of the Bush Administration do not represent an anomaly in international politics. François Fénélon argued, in the 18th century that a country disposing of greater power than others do, cannot be expected to behave with decency and moderation.
His theorem has been well illustrated by such powerful rulers as Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon and
Kaiser Wilhelm II. There was not necessarily something wrong with the character of these rulers or of their countries. At a minimum it was a surplus of power that tempted them to arbitrary and arrogant behavior.738 The evidence throughout this chapter lends strong support to my theory. Furthermore, there is a significant amount of evidence that contradicts the argument of the alternative theories I chose to test. Thus, my hard-line approach enables to account for evidence left unexplained by other theories.
Hard-line realism being a theory of international politics and not a theory of foreign policy, I have focused my research on the broad constraints of unipolarity on the hegemon’s behavior. The Iraqi case has highlighted that in a unipolar world, where the hegemon is subject to very few if no serious checks, it will adopt power maximizing strategies that will enable it to extend its reach in the Middle East and strive for global hegemony. Being the sole superpower in a unipolar world, the hegemon can use its overwhelming power in order to gain access to strategic regions outside of its hemisphere. Simply put,
Iraq was the ideal target to extend U.S. strategic reach in the Middle East and strive for hegemony in that region of the world. Washington had the occasion of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime and
737 Quoted in Lemann Nicholas, op cit. p. 38. 738 This is a quotation from : Waltz Kenneth N, "America as a Model To The World," Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, (December 1991), pp. 668-669.
UNIGE / SES - 282 - Olivier Brighenti Part III
“reshape” the Middle Eastern security architecture at a relatively low cost, while establishing an
American protectorate over postwar Iraq. Hard-line realism states that the power maximization logic of the hegemon does not require a specific threat. As the evidence from the Iraqi case has proven, there was no major threat from Iraq, nor for its immediate neighbors and even less for the United States.
Secondly, I have tried to emphasize that the Bush doctrine of global preventive war is a genuine strategy of unipolarity. The historical comparison with the Cold War dual doctrine of containment and deterrence gave strong elements in that sense. Indeed, a global strategy of preventive war is not possible in a bipolar international structure where the balance of power is roughly equal. Furthermore, the global nuclear deterrence constrains both parties to adopt moderate behaviors. The Chinese case study showed that one of the most important variables against U.S. preventive action was the undoubted adverse reaction from the Soviet Union. Political elites could not rule out the possibility that the Soviet Union could misinterpret the U.S. action. In a bipolar era, a “hazardous preventive action” could have led to a world war. Thus, the pressures from the structure provided incentives for restraint given the risks of an unprovoked unilateral preventive action. Superpower status in a unipolar world provides the hegemon with numerous possible scenarios. Indeed as I have shown, the structural incentives of a unipolar world pushed the United States to favor a strategy of preventive war as the best
“tool” to eliminate his regime once and for all and forestall a shift in the regional balance of power.
Thirdly, I have shown that the unipolar distribution of power helps to explain the advent of such a doctrine. Global hegemony and the use of preventive war has always been tempting for a powerful state. I have shown that this agenda has been present in the U.S. foreign policy debate since the outset of the Cold War. Throughout my analysis, I have shown that this agenda succeeded and was elevated to the rank of National Security Strategy not only because some “neoconservatives” held high positions within the Administration or because Bush shared those ideas, but because for the first time in nearly sixty years, the international distribution of powers rendered such a strategy possible. Hard-line realism helps to explain the necessary conditions for this type of agenda to emerge. Indeed, without huge asymmetries of power and unipolarity, neo-conservatism and their hegemonist agenda would still be a political minority at the right wing of the American political chessboard. Fourthly, tracing the process in the United Nations showed that unipolarity reinforced U.S. capacity to “shop” in the international
UNIGE / SES - 283 - Olivier Brighenti Part III institutions. The Iraqi case is a hard case to show that cooperation is compelling when it represents a tool to maximize the hegemon’s power. It showed that the United States was willing to rely on the United
Nations Security Council as long as that was in its strategic interest. The evidence showed that the
United States sought to use the United Nations to pursue its interests and when it didn’t turn out as planned, they chose to ignore the international community and go along the lines of the military preventive war crafted since mid- 2002. For example, it seems very unlikely that, in a bipolar international distribution of power, the United States would have turned down NATO’s invocation of article V (self-defense clause) after September 11. With the risk of a major nuclear confrontation with the other superpower, it seems very doubtful that DOD Donald Rumsfeld would even have thought of saying: “In this war, the mission will define the coalition, not the other way around.”739
Let us now turn to the alternative theories I tested against the historical record. First of all, evidence lends little support for both the offensive and defensive claim. According to the offensive logic, the regional hegemon will not try to maximize its power in far-off regions of the world because global hegemony is virtually impossible. Defensive realism states that power maximization is counterproductive and renders states insecure. Both theories argue that the hegemon acts as an offshore balancer, and that it will intervene in the Middle East only if Iraq threatens to dominate the region and strives for hegemony. Thus both theories state that the obvious strategy to adopt towards Iraq is deterrence and containment. Iraq is not threatening the vital interests of the United States and can be easily deterred.
Iraq’s motivations to change the regional status quo is by far not strong enough to justify military intervention. Advocates of the war argue that Saddam Hussein is not deterrable, so the only way to secure the world is to act preventively against his dangerous regime. As I have outlined throughout this chapter, I totally agree with the argument that Saddam Hussein’s regime can be contained. There is no rational logic behind the Administration’s claim that Saddam Hussein cannot be contained and that preventive war is the only solution to deal with this brutal and unstable tyrant. Even if Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in great quantities, which revealed totally inaccurate, he would have been deterrable. I totally agree with Waltz’s claim that: “with nuclear weapons, any state will be deterred
739 Rumsfeld Donald H, "A New Kind Of War", 27 September 2001, (U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=440, (Accessed: 22/03/2006).
UNIGE / SES - 284 - Olivier Brighenti Part III by another state’s second-strike forces, one need not be preoccupied with the qualities of the state that is to be deterred or scrutinize its leaders. In a nuclear world, any state, whether ruled by a Stalin, a Mao
Zedong, a Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong Il, will be deterred by the knowledge that aggressive actions may lead to its own destruction.”740
The problem is that both strands of realism miss two crucial points. The hegemon in a unipolar world is not a status quo power, it is a power maximizer striving for global hegemony. Secondly, the hegemon does not seek to preserve the existing regional balance of power, it seeks to forestall a shift in the balance, in order to extend its global reach. Deterrence could have been a strategy, but the unipolar distribution of power provided the hegemon with incentives to disrupt the balance of power in the Middle
East. As hard line realism predicts, the Bush Administration chose not to contain Saddam Hussein’s regime because it had the means to overthrow the Iraqi regime and extend its reach in the Middle East.
When no pressures are exercised on the hegemon, why would it choose to contain a regime it despises, when it can easily topple it, with no risks of international adverse reaction. Thus preventive war, not containment or deterrence was the best “tool” to eliminate his regime and forestall a shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East. Secondly, the Iraqi case lends little support for the offshore balancing concept. Indeed, an offshore balancer would abandon the ideological aspects of the promotion of democracy. Thus, if the United States acted as an offshore balancer, it would not assertively export democracy, attempt to save failed states, or use military power for the purpose of humanitarian intervention.741 The Iraqi case is a landmark case against offshore balancing since the
United States sought to transform the Middle East through forcible democracy imposition, save a rough state from its brutal dictator, and help the Iraqi population.
The structural liberal approach is largely unable to explain the hegemon’s invasion of Iraq. The overall logic of this theory claims that power is based on restraint rather than maximizing strategies. The hegemon puts restraints on its power in order to make it acceptable to other states and ensure there will be no balancing coalitions. According to Ikenberry: “The rules and institutions that are created serve as
740 Waltz Kenneth N, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," In. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, edited by Art Robert J & Jervis Robert, (New York: Longman), 2004, p. 268. 741 Layne Christopher, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security,, vol. 22, no. 1, (Summer 1997), p. 112.
UNIGE / SES - 285 - Olivier Brighenti Part III an ‘investment’ in the longer-run preservation of its power advantages. Weaker states agree to the order’s rules and institutions. In return, they are assured that the worst excesses of the leading state, manifest as arbitrary and indiscriminate abuses of state power, will be avoided, and they gain institutional opportunities to work and help influence the leading state.” Thus “The existing multilateral order […] should reign in the Bush administration and the administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism.”742 The evidence of the Iraqi case seems to contradict this claim. According to the structural liberal order, “multilateralism becomes a mechanism by which a dominant state and weaker ones can reach a bargain over the character of the international order.”743 Thus, the United States should not have invaded Iraq without the consent of the
Security Council. It shows that under conditions of unipolarity, the hegemon is very reluctant to be binded by weaker states in international institutions. The hegemon has the means to implement its agenda alone. Therefore when it cannot pursue its interests through international institutions, it will choose to go it alone. France, Germany and Russia sought to use the United Nations Security Council in order to prevent the United States from invading Iraq. In a unipolar world, the weaker states may want to use International institutions to limit the power of the hegemon, but as the Iraqi case made clear, the hegemon will use the same institutions to maximize its power. Unipolarity provides the hegemon with such asymmetries in power that it will not let itself be binded by weaker states when its national interest is a stake. Bush’s answer to the press a fortnight before the invasion began makes it clear that the
United States was not going to let the Security Council limit the U.S. use power. He declared: “I'm confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act, and we really don't need United Nations approval to do so. I want to work, I want the United Nations to be effective. It's important for it to be a robust, capable body. It's important for it's words to mean what they say, and as we head into the 21st century, when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission.”744
742 Ikenberry John G, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?," Perspectives on Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, (September 2003), p. 541. 743 Ibidem 744 Bush George W, "President George Bush Discusses Iraq in National Press Conference ", 6 March 2003, (The White House), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html, (Accessed: 10/05/2007).
UNIGE / SES - 286 - Olivier Brighenti CONCLUSION
Assessing Hard-Line Realism as a General Theory of Unipolarity
Part IV
9. Conclusion
My central task in this dissertation has been to try and explain how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. The end of the Cold War, as all major war/changes in international politics, had the effect of rearranging the international distribution of power. Although the end of the Cold War was “peaceful,” it is nonetheless a revolution in international politics. A structural change gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varies according to changes in the structure.745 Thus, this new distribution of power implies new patterns and outcomes. To date, there has been no serious attempts to address this fundamental aspect of contemporary international politics. In this dissertation, I have posed a set of questions in order to overcome, what I have called the “unipolar theoretical puzzle.” How does the hegemon behave in a unipolar world? How does the unipolar international structure affect the hegemon and provide it with incentives to act in a way or another? Will the hegemon constantly strive to maximize its power or will it choose to restrain itself? What effects does the unipolar distribution of power have on the hegemon, particularly on its power-seeking strategies? In order to answer these questions, this dissertation has sought to provide a power-based theory of unipolarity and by examining the post Cold War security architecture, to demonstrate not only that unipolarity provides incentives for power maximization strategies, but also that my theory offers a more accurate explanation than the existing ones. The evidence of the empirical studies lends strong support for my theory and suggests that hard-line realism can account for evidence left unexplained by other theories.746 It is crucial to recall that hard-line realism is a theory of international politics and not a theory of foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz has made this distinction very clear thirty years ago, although many scholars still dispute his argument.747 Systemic theories explain continuities in outcomes within peculiar distributions of power. Hard-line realism as a
745 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 70. 746 In that sense, hard-line realism represents a Lakatosian progressive problem shift within the neorealist research program. Progressive research programs are those that offer additional content by predicting, and empirically corroborating, some hitherto unknown, unexpected or unusual fact. Hard-line realism predicts and empirically corroborates facts left unexplained by the alternative theories I chose to test. On that aspect see: Elman Colin & Elman Fendius Miriam, "Lessons from Lakatos," In. Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Elman Colin & Elman Fendius Miriam, (Cambridge: MIT Press), 2003, pp. 21-68. 747 Waltz Kenneth N, "International Politics is not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (Autumn 1996), pp. 52-55. For a counter-argument see: Elman Colin, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?," Security Studies, vol. 6, no., (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-51 and Rose Gideon, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, vol. 51, no. 1, (October 1998), pp. 144-172
UNIGE / SES - - 287 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV systemic theory of unipolarity explains what to expect and why to expect it when overwhelming asymmetries of power exist among the units. Hard-line realism deals with the forces that are at stake at the international level, and shows how the hegemon is pressed by the international structure to do things in a certain way. As outlined by Kenneth Waltz: “Such theories [systemic] tell us about the forces the units are subject to. From them we can infer some things about the expected behavior and fate of the units: namely how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish. To the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable.”748 Hard-line realism is not a theory of foreign policy since it is not a theory at the national level. It does not go inside the “black box” of state decision- making. Being a theory of international politics does not mean that it cannot account for how individual states will act with respect to systemic pressures. As outlined by Dale Copeland: “At any point in time, states face specific systemic constraints reflecting their unique trends and differentials of power. This fact allows us to make predictions about how individual states will act without necessary considerations of their unit-level characteristics.”749 Thus, hard-line realism can account in some respects, for both the foreign policy of individual states as well as the international outcomes. My argument is that the structure of the international system, and not the internal characteristics of the hegemon, causes it to maximize its power ad infinitum and strive for global hegemony. In other words, this dissertation is not about American foreign policy, but about international politics and how the structure affects the hegemon’s behavior. It is not the purpose of this work to provide American political elites with policy prescriptions, or the best grand strategy to adopt in order to perpetuate U.S. preponderance or handle allies with restraint. It is not a dissertation about American grand strategy since the end of the Cold War nor about U.S. hegemony. This dissertation is about the unipolar distribution of power and how this peculiar structure encourages certain behaviors.750 Hence as a systemic theory of international politics, hard-line realism has determined to what extent behavior and international outcomes can be explained
748 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 72. 749 Copeland Dale C, The Origins Of Major War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2000, p. 235. 750 My hard-line theory, contrary to Christopher Layne’s extraterritorial hegemony theory, is not a neoclassical realist theory of U.S. Grand strategy that incorporates systemic as well as domestic variables. As I have outlined throughout this dissertation, unit-level factors are important, but the purpose of hard-line realism is to explain that the unipolar structure will encourage the hegemon to do some things and refrain it from doing others.
UNIGE / SES - - 288 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV with reference to systemic constraints. Kenneth Waltz claimed that: “Success in explaining not in predicting is the ultimate criterion of good theory.”751 In other words, why things work the way they do.
As a result, what are the contributions of my theory to the understanding of the contemporary unipolar politics?
This chapter first examines the implications of my findings for the realist research program as well as the structural liberal approach. I will emphasize on the added value of my approach to the theoretical understanding of unipolarity. To fulfill this goal, it reassesses hard-line realism in the light of the historical evidence. The cases show that the hegemon in a unipolar world responds to the logic of the theoretical model. Thus, we can conclude that hard-line realism is an interesting and convincing explanatory theory to understand contemporary international politics. In the end, I will address some aspects and limitations of my theoretical model.
Realism and the Unipolar distribution of power
By creating a realist theory of unipolarity, this dissertation makes three main contributions to the realist research program. First, by providing a comprehensive framework of how unipolarity “works” hard-line realism goes beyond the question of the stability and durability of system. Furthermore, offensive as well as defensive realism, although having proven highly compelling in the understanding of bipolar and multipolar international systems, do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. Thus, I have derived predictions from their core assumptions in a unipolar world. I have shown that a unipolar distribution of power has its own logic that differs dramatically from that of a bipolar or a multipolar one.
Thus with a new configuration of powe,r we need a new theoretical framework in order to understand aspects left unexplained by the existing theories. Hard-line realism seeks to fill this theoretical gap. The evidence tends to show that the hegemon in a unipolar world responds to the logic of the theoretical model.
The second contribution of this dissertation to the realist research program is that the hegemon in a unipolar world maximizes its power ad infinitum in order to attain global hegemony. Thus, as the
751 Waltz Kenneth N, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, (December 1997), p. 916.
UNIGE / SES - - 289 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV evidence shows us, the hegemon in a unipolar world is never a status quo power. This is in complete contradiction with both defensive and offensive realism. Defensive realists claim that striving for global hegemony is counterproductive for three main reasons. First of all, there is no systemic pressures to expand, secondly, offensive and expansionist behavior triggers counterbalancing coalitions and thirdly, states that seek global hegemony end up being less secure.752 As a consequence, in a unipolar world, defensive realist states tend to be “defensive positionalists”. Offensive realists and mainly
Mearsheimer’s approach claim that global hegemony is virtually impossible because of the “stopping power of water.” Thus, a hegemon that has attained regional hegemony becomes a status quo power and does not strive for more power in order to attain global pre-eminence. As a result, in a unipolar world, the hegemon becomes a “defensive positionalists”. The evidence from the empirical record contradicts both offensive and defensive claims and lends strong support for my theory. The Iraqi case clearly shows that the hegemon in a unipolar world is not a status quo power. As predicted by hard-line realism, it is a power maximizer striving for global hegemony. The hegemon does not seek to preserve the existing regional balance of power, it seeks to forestall a shift in the balance in order to extend its global reach. Deterrence could have been a strategy to deal with Saddam Hussein, but the unipolar distribution of power provided the hegemon with incentives to disrupt the balance of power in the Middle
East. As hard-line realism predicts, the Bush Administration chose to invade Iraq because it had the means to overthrow the Iraqi regime and extend its reach in the Middle East. When no pressures are exercised on the hegemon, why would it choose to preserve the status quo, when it can easily extend its global reach? Thus, preventive war, not containment or deterrence was the best “tool” to eliminate
Saddam Hussein’s and forestall a shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East. Robert
Jervis wrote: “No state can have a greater stake in the prevailing order than the hegemon, nor can any state have greater power to maintain the system. The United States should then be a very conservative state in its foreign relations; with its power and dominance thus assured, it should be the quintessential status quo power. It makes a puzzle of Washington’s current behavior, which is anything but conservative. In the fierce debate over the merits of its post–September 11 foreign policy, insufficient
752 Glaser Charles L, "Realists As Optimists: Cooperation As Self-Help," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994-1995), pp. 70-72.
UNIGE / SES - - 290 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV attention has been paid to the odd fact that the United States, with all its power and stake in the system, is behaving more like a revolutionary state than one committed to preserving the arrangements that seem to have suited it well.”753 Hard-line realism provides theoretical elements to understand this puzzle.
The third contribution of this dissertation for the realist research program is that the hegemon in a unipolar world is not an offshore balancer. Hard-line realism claims that offshore balancing is a strategy of bipolarity/multipolarity and not of unipolarity. Both offensive and defensive realism predict that the hegemon will pursue strategies of offshore balancing in order to maintain the hegemon’s predominant position in its sphere of influence. Thus, as an offshore balancer, the hegemon pursues strategies of buck passing. In other words: “if a potential hegemon comes on the scene in another region, the distant hegemon’s first preference would be to stand aside and allow the local great powers to check the threat.
If the local great powers cannot contain the threat, however, the distant hegemon would move in and balance against it. In essence, regional hegemons act as offshore balancers in other areas of the world, although they prefer to be the balancer of last resort.”754 Hard-line realism states that the absence of checks and balances makes offshore balancing as a general strategy of “burden shifting” irrelevant in a unipolar world. The unipolar international distribution of power provides incentives to maximize power in order to attain global hegemony, not to create a potential buck catcher that could, on the long run challenge the hegemon and rise as a peer competitor. The evidence from the ESDP case lends strong support for my claim. Offshore balancing as a general strategy of “burden shifting” is irrelevant in a unipolar world for two main reasons. First of all, offshore balancing requires a “buck catcher”. By definition, under unipolarity there is no “buck catcher” since there is one single pole. In order to pursue an offshore balancing strategy in a unipolar world, the hegemon would have to create a buck catcher. In other words, the hegemon would have to favor a strong militarily integrated Europe that would take over the burden of European security. Voluntarily creating a peer competitor whilst enjoying an unprecedented power “differential” would be self-defeating. Secondly, evidence has shown that the
United States pursues a double strategy of power maximization in order to maintain, strengthen and
753 Jervis Robert, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, (Summer 2006), pp. 7-8. 754 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001, p. 141.
UNIGE / SES - - 291 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV deepen its hegemony in Europe while preventing it from any autonomous enticement. Thus, the U.S. maximizes its power through the logic of “NATO first” policy. The United States is willing to facilitate the creation of a European “defense arm” but only within NATO, since the Alliance remains Washington’s essential tool for its hegemonic strategy on the continent. Thirdly, the historical analysis of the immediate post World War II period also lends strong support for my theory. Indeed as I have shown the structural constraints of a bipolar world pushed the United States to favor a “third force” that would eventually evolve towards a fully independent European army with the ultimate goal of restoring a multipolar international balance of power. This strategy required that the Europeans integrate their military capabilities and ensure a high degree of unity. While the bipolar configuration pressed the hegemon to unreservedly push for European unity, unipolarity provides the United States with the incentives to pursue the exact opposite strategy. Since the end of the Cold Wa,r Washington has sought to maximize its power on the European continent through strategies of division. Fourthly, an offshore balancing strategy in a unipolar world would mean that the hegemon would withdraw its presence
(military troops and facilities) from Europe and encourage an autonomous militarily integrated Europe. It would sponsor a strong ESDP as an “independent power bloc” in world affairs. Hence it would push for a structural shift from unipolarity to multipolarity. There is absolutely no sign that the United States will withdraw its troop in the foreseeable future. Although offensive realism does a good job in explaining the immediate post-World War II period, it fails to explain how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world.
The evidence from the Iraqi case also provides strong support that the hegemon in a unipolar world does not act as an offshore balancer. Iraq represented no serious threat to the region and even less to the United States. It was not seeking to disrupt the regional balance of power and was not striving for hegemony. Thus, it could have been contained and deterred in the “traditional sense.” As predicted by hard-line realism, the United States invaded Iraq in order to improve its global reach in the Middle East.
Had it acted as an offshore balancer, it would have contained and deterred Iraq and left it up to the regional powers to deal with Saddam Hussein’s regime. If the hegemon had acted as an offshore balancer it would have abandoned the ideological aspects of democracy promotion. It would not assertively export democracy, attempt to save failed states, or use military power for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. The Iraqi case is a landmark case against offshore balancing, since the
UNIGE / SES - - 292 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV
United States sought to transform the Middle East through forcible democracy imposition, save a rough state from its brutal dictator and help the Iraqi population through “humanitarian intervention.”
Structural liberalism and the Unipolar Distribution of power
The argument developed throughout this dissertation also has implications for the liberal structural theories, particularly Ikenberr’y strand that emphasizes on the role of institutions and constitutional orders. The liberal structural approach is a sophisticated account of how the hegemon should behave. It falls short in explaining how the hegemon effectively behaves in a unipolar world. Although it highlights interesting aspects under conditions of bipolarity, American behavior since the end of the Cold War provides little evidence of self restraint in the absence of countervailing power. According to Ikenberry:
“Constitutional orders are political orders organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power. In a constitutional order, power is ‘tamed’ by making it less consequential.”755 According to the logic of constitutional orders, the hegemon: “gets commitments by secondary states to participate within the postwar order, and in return the hegemon places limits on the exercise of its power.”756 The collapse of the Soviet Union only partly destroyed the post World War II order. It ended the bipolar international distribution of power, but the institutional order created remained intact. According to the liberal logic, the circumstances that led the United States to engage in multilateral cooperation in the past are still present and, in some ways, have actually increased. Thus from this perspective, multilateralism, and the search for rule-based agreements, should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity.757 If this is correct, we should see the hegemon heavily relying on the liberal order. Contrary to hard-line realism, structural liberalism rejects the constant strive for power and the logic at stake is restraint and cooperation rather than power maximization, unilateralism and coercion. This logic may have been in some respects compelling in a bipolar world, but in a unipolar distribution of power, the evidence of the empirical chapters lend little
755 Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001, p. 29. 756 Ikenberry John G, "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint," In. America Unrivaled; The Future of the Balance of Power, edited by Ikenberry John G, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002, pp. 214-215. 757 Ikenberry John G, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?," Perspectives on Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, (September 2003), p. 541.
UNIGE / SES - - 293 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV support for this claim. In the case of the ESDP, the structural liberal approach is largely unable to explain the hegemon’s constant strive to block an autonomous European security policy. Like after every major structural shift, the unipolar world configuration is characterized by a high level of asymmetries. In order to “reduce” the consequences of these asymmetries, the United States should have driven its policy along the lines of structural liberalism’s grand bargain. In short, the United States should have obtained commitments from European states to participate within the post Cold War NATO architecture (which was the case) and in return the hegemon places limits on the exercise of its power
(which did not occur). As a consequence, the Europeans would not fear domination, reducing incentives to resist the hegemon’s claims, and the United States would not need to use its power to enforce order and compliance. The European post Cold War security bargain provides very little support for this theory. The United States did exactly the contrary: constrain the Europeans in the post Cold War NATO while maximizing its power over the Alliance. The asymmetries in power are such that the United States had no need to rely on such a strategy to preserve the primacy of NATO and prevent the creation of an autonomous European security policy. The case of Iraq is even more troublesome for the structural liberal theory. According to structural liberalism, by seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution, the
United States acted to place its anti-Saddam policy in a multilateral framework. As the evidence showed us, there was no doubt that the United States was going to invade Iraq with or without a U.N. mandate.
The United States had the power to invade Iraq alone. The Iraqi case clearly highlighted that international institutions may be good for many things (some form of legitimacy, sharing the costs of the war, having the international community help rebuild Iraq, helping Tony Blair with his public opinion, etc…), but restraining and binding the hegemon under conditions of unipolarity is not one of them. Thus, the United States should not have invaded Iraq without the consent of the Security Council. Under conditions of unipolarity, the hegemon is very reluctant to be binded by weaker states in international institutions. The hegemon has the means to implement its agenda alone. When it cannot pursue its interests through international institutions, it will choose to go it alone. France, Germany and Russia sought to use the United Nations Security Council in order to prevent the United States from invading
Iraq. In a unipolar world, the weaker states may want to use International institutions to limit the power of the hegemon, but as the Iraqi case made clear, the hegemon will use the same institutions to
UNIGE / SES - - 294 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV maximize its power. Unipolarity provides the hegemon with such asymmetries in power, that it will not let itself be binded by weaker states when its national interest is a stake. In the absence of countervailing power, the empirical evidence makes Randall Schweller’s claim very compelling. “Institutions” he writes
“are either instruments of strong states, and therefore capable of binding subordinate ones, or they are independent of strong states and thus unable to perform a binding function. In any case, leading states can never be bound by institutions. A hegemon may choose to exhibit restraint, and then again it may not. In these matters, however, institutions are guarantors of nothing.”758
Hard-Line Realism as a General Systemic Theory of Unipolarity: A Final Assessment
This dissertation has enabled to answer the initial questions I had addressed. According to the underlying logic of hard-line realism, a hegemon in a unipolar world will maximize its power ad infinitum as long as it is in its national interest. Hard-line realism seems to be a convincing framework for the understanding of contemporary international politics. It provides valuable elements in order to understand how the pressures of the system encourage the hegemon to do some things while refraining it from doing others. Bearing this in mind, I will address some aspects and limitations of my theory.
Richard Rosecrance wrote: “One of the difficulties of most international theory is that it has been analytical rather than historical in character: it has been deterministic rather than contingent. Models have been offered that described one historical age in theoretical terms but failed to account for others.
The dynamics of historical development has in this way defeated any purely monistic approach.”759
Hard-line realism does not break away from this harsh epistemological problem. First of all, there is little
“historical distance” to account for unipolarity and the pressures it has on states behavior. Indeed, the evidence provided throughout this dissertation dates back to the early 1990’s. Thus fifteen years is a short amount of time in international politics. This is mainly due to the fact that the post-Cold War distribution of power is the first unipolar era in world history. Christopher Layne claims that France in
1660 and Great Britain in 1860 were as dominant in the international system as the United States is
758 Schweller Randall L, "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay," International Security, vol. 26, no. 1, (Summer 2001), p. 182. 759 Rosecrance Richard, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books), 1986, p. 67.
UNIGE / SES - - 295 - - Olivier Brighenti Part IV today. Although they were hegemonic in their own region, the world was not unipolar.760 Thus, hard-line realism helps us understand one specific historical age in theoretical terms. This brings us to a second limitation in my argument. I was not able to make historical comparisons with previous unipolar distributions of power. As a consequence, hard-line realism has described how the hegemon behaves under conditions of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War. Although this might seem to be a major problem, I argue that it isn’t. The end of World War II settled the first bipolar era in world history.
Theories analyzed how bipolarity worked under the same restricted conditions I had to deal with. The major improvements in the field were made by comparing the structural constraints of bipolarity with the ones taking place under conditions of multipolarity. Comparing the two types of systems enabled scholars to draw some general patterns and outcomes that revealed useful for the understanding of the
Cold War. As more evidence became available, the theoretical frameworks produced more fine grained and compelling sets of predictions and outcomes. While constructing my theory of unipolarity, I used a similar pattern. My theory tries to explain regularities of behavior and leads one to expect that the outcomes will fall within specific ranges set by the theoretical framework. In order to fully understand the pressures of unipolarity, I relied on historical comparisons with previous cases under conditions of bipolarity. As a result, hard-line realism helps us to understand unipolarity and provides general explanations and predictions about state behavior. Hard-line realism has developed arguments for future testing. Like all theories in social science, it will be discussed, embraced, modified and improved, all for the purpose of a more accurate understanding of contemporary international politics. Mastanduno and Kapstein wrote in 1999: “For the past decade, policymakers and scholars who focus on international affairs have found themselves adrift without chart or compass. The end of the Cold War surely meant profound changes in the international system, but what form did the ‘new world order take’?”761 The scope of this dissertation was to provide some guidance in order to understand this profound change in international politics. Hard-line realism might not yet be the flawless compass and chart, but it sets the grassroots for a better understanding of contemporary international politics.
760 Layne Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, (Spring 1993), p. 17. 761 Kapstein Ethan & Mastanduno Michael, ed. Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1999. Preface.
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