ROMANTICISM AND REALISM IN CANADA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Allan Gotlieb

Canada projects a bipolar personality, of romanticism on one side and realism on the other. For decades, the realists held the upper hand. Even as Canada followed the path of multilateralism, it pursued unilateral goals in expanding its coastline, and promoted a bilateral trade agenda with the US. In the last decade, the romanticists have gained the upper hand, promoting a human security agenda, distancing Canada from the US, and articulating a foreign policy based on Canadian values, which its proponents say it is our duty to export. In a dazzling tour d’horizon of Canadian foreign policy over the last half-century, Allan Gotlieb, one of Canada’s leading foreign policy practitioners, appraises the records of prime ministers from St-Laurent to Chrétien, and proposes a reality-based agenda for Paul Martin.

Entre romantisme et réalisme, le Canada projette une image bipolaire en matière de relations étrangères. Le réalisme l’a d’abord emporté pendant quelques décennies : tout en s’engageant dans la voie du multilatéralisme, notre pays a également visé des objectifs unilatéraux, en étendant ses eaux territoriales et en appliquant un programme commercial bilatéral avec les États-Unis. Mais depuis dix ans, les romantiques ont repris la main en préconisant une politique de sécurité plus humaine, en se distançant des Américains et en élaborant une politique étrangère fondée sur les valeurs canadiennes — valeurs qu’il serait de notre devoir d’exporter à l’étranger, disent-ils. Dans un saisissant tour d’horizon de notre politique étrangère du dernier demi-siècle, Allan Gotlieb examine l’action de nos premiers ministres, de Louis Saint-Laurent à Jean Chrétien, et propose à Paul Martin une stratégie réaliste.

very nation needs a psychiatrist, Robertson Davies Canadians believe, as the slogan of a national book chain once observed, although I have never found the proclaims, “the world needs more Canada.” E quote. He must have said it because it is so true in These two destinations in our thinking have not always Canada’s case. In the five decades that I have been involved, pulled in opposite directions. On various occasions in our in one way or another, in Canadian foreign policy, I have history, one or the other served as a spur to action. often thought that Canadians have a split personality. We Sometimes they led to coherent strategies, but at times our seem constantly attracted to opposite poles in our thinking national interests and international aspirations seemed about our role in the world. irreconcilable. In describing these as the realist and the One pole ties us to hard reality, realpolitik if you will, romantic approaches to Canadian foreign policy, I must and makes us want our governments to protect the nation- emphasize that the actual goals have been far from static. al interest when it deals with other states. Canadians, when The continuing importance of the two visions lies in their they think this way, talk in terms of our sovereignty, securi- formative power to define and shape our national goals. ty, territory, trade, economic growth and prosperity. In con- These relatively new, value-oriented goals appear, on trast to the pole of realism, there is another pole that first inspection, consistent with a deeply rooted, traditional attracts Canadians to an idealistic vocation. Its advocates theme in our national psyche, that of Canada as the world’s tend to have a visionary, at times almost romantic, foremost peacekeeper, peacemaker and peace builder. But as approach to our position in the world. The vision changes the decline of our capability to play such a role became from time to time, but at its most expansive, it is based on more evident in recent years, due largely to lack of resources a mission to create a more just world, promote democracy, — and perhaps even as a result of the decline — a new reduce inequities among nations, protect victims of injus- vision of Canada’s mission emerged, more ambitious but tice and alleviate the conditions of the poor and oppressed. less expensive. In official circles, it is increasingly expressed

16 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy in terms of our attempts to create new nationalism, transforming the tone relevance to their personal lives. norms of international behaviour and character of Canadian foreign pol- Canadians are also coming to recognize, which, in turn, reflect our values. The icy.” But the visionary school of although we have been slow in doing authors of the Canadian foreign policy Canadian foreign policy, even at its so, that the is not the same review of 1995 — Canada in the World most crusading level, is seen by some nation that it was before the events of — committed Canadians to the goal, distinguished historians, such as John September 11, 2001. Now one issue — and only one — dominates In place of sovereignty and independence, natural security US relations with other and economic growth, the leading advocates of Canada’s countries: national security. international vocation seem to be establishing a new trinity In these circumstances, some Canadians advocate a in the goals of Canadian foreign policy — value-projection, hard-nosed role for Canada peace-building and norm-creation. The national interest is in the world. Canada must barely visible on their horizon. adopt a reality-based foreign policy by responding to the as Jennifer Welsh writes, of “an inter- English, and by Robert Bothwell, imperatives of geography, history and national system…ruled by law not Canada’s leading authority on the his- economics. The supreme challenge for power.” No small task. tory of Canadian foreign policy, as Canada, in their view, is to improve the In place of sovereignty and inde- firmly planted in the longstanding relationship with the colossus to the pendence, natural security and eco- Canadian liberal tradition. south and make Canada more secure, nomic growth, the leading advocates without reducing our independence and of Canada’s international vocation hat Canadians leave largely sovereignty. seem to be establishing a new trinity in W unexamined is whether the But others have a contrary vision: the goals of Canadian foreign policy — broad, visionary approach, focused on The mission of Canada, they argue, is value-projection, peace-building and transforming state behaviour rather to support countervailing forces norm-creation. The national interest is than on specific conflict resolution, can against the colossus and try to create barely visible on their horizon. accomplish very much, aside from mak- new norms, or rules, to constrain its The most activist of Canadian for- ing its advocates feel good. In recent power. Of course, one can advocate eign ministers in recent history, Lloyd times, arguments between advocates of either approach or a blend of the two Axworthy, conceived of Canada as an the two competing themes have and maintain that the ensuing policies “agent of change,” an avatar of the become louder and sharper. Perhaps are in our true national interest. These “responsibility to protect” the victims this increasing national irritability aris- are not simply different ways of in the world, rallying global networks es from the growing appreciation of our describing similar challenges: Major to break the monopoly power of elites declining influence and the sense of differences of style and substance flow and resist “the way of the warrior” impotence that comes from the lack of from the way one thinks about (read the US), which uses its military hard resources that can help Canada Canadian foreign policy. power “to seduce, shape and when make a difference in the world. What follows is an account of the necessary coerce” compliance with its But I believe the reasons lie deeper effects of these two poles — the realistic owns goals. He saw Canada as the and are to be found in the almost revo- and the romantic — in Canadian for- leader of the “third way,” positioned lutionary changes that have occurred in eign policy over nearly half a century. between the victims and the elites, the the international order in recent years. country with “the right stuff to be Canadians are now far more conscious et me state at the outset my conclu- agents of change.”Although the rheto- than ever before of the encroachment of L sions about Canadian foreign policy, ric of his successors is not as dramatic, the international environment on our as it has emerged through the decades: the foreign policy thrust of a successor, daily lives. When terrorist threats are Realism and romanticism, or Bill Graham, remained heavily value- regular occurrences, when acts of geno- realpolitik and the missionary spir- oriented. He saw Canada’s mission to cide are visible in our living rooms, it, have done battle to occupy cen- be the champion of equality, diversity when crossing international borders tre stage in our foreign policy. and humanitarian concerns. becomes an anxiety-ridden challenge, These competing themes have Some scholars find such goals ill when frightening diseases and environ- often failed to be reconciled and defined, overreaching and divorced mental issues have no boundaries, when have created confusion and from the national interest. “Lloyd our economic survival depends so stark- incoherence. Axworthy,” as Norman Hillmer and ly on access to the market of a single for- The theme of realism, or the Allan Chapnick put it, “unleashed an eign power, Canadians begin to realize national interest, has remained a ambitious doctrine of intrusive inter- that foreign policies actually have some constant and has been dedicated to

POLICY OPTIONS 17 FEBRUARY 2005 Allan Gotlieb

three broad goals over time: con- and a tendency to moralize and In being assigned to territorial trol over territory and resources, proclaim superior values. waters, I was, however, about to national unity, and more secure plunge (no pun intended) into an area economic access to foreign mar- s I warned, there is a personal ele- of exceptional importance to Canada kets, in particular the United States. A ment in this story. I joined the where, though unglamorous, our The idealistic theme, a do-good Department of External Affairs at the national interest was directly at stake. impulse, while also a constant, has time of the Suez Crisis in the era of We were not saving the world; we evolved in recent years, from help- High Pearsonianism. The Canadian were trying to appropriate a larger part ful fixer and honest broker to diplomatic service had an astonishing of it. The operative principle was: if it’s norm entrepreneur, change agent reputation in those days. In Oxford, water, grab it. and protector of victims. Arguably, where I was recruited, the eminent Concern over maritime borders it has metastasized from a do-good philosopher Stuart Hampshire told me was not all that surprising for a coun- to a feel-good foreign policy. it was the best in the world. I did not try with by far the longest coastline in Whether motivated by protecting need to be convinced. But I was not the world. What is more surprising is our sovereignty, or achieving a happy when I was assigned to be the that, in the inter-war years, Canada better world, our foreign policy desk officer on the Law of the Sea. I did did not draw any distinction between has often been characterized by a not leave the high tables of Oxford in imperial interests and Canadian ones. reluctance to commit resources, order to deal with fish. Or so I thought. It was the British who defined our

The Gazette, Montreal President and Prime Minister at the ramparts of the Citadel in Quebec City at the Shamrock Summit in March 1985. “Under Mulroney,” writes Allan Gotlieb, “Canada followed a reality-based foreign policy” focused on Canada-US relations. Results included the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA and the acid rain accord.

18 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy national interests. For the champion of George Drew, Canadian high commis- the Sea initiative was more of a side- the freedom of the high seas, the sioner to London, whom the newly show than a mainstream pursuit. In three-mile rule was an article of faith. elected prime minister, John time however, there was to be a migra- This principle of international law Diefenbaker, made head of the tion of the national-interest theme to was under heavy challenge during the Canadian delegation to the Law of the the broad goals of our foreign policy. League of Nations era by a number of Sea conferences, providing him with a But this had to await the arrival on the states including the , which free hand. The campaign was greeted scene of some years later. wanted recognition of the legitimacy of with skepticism in the higher regions a 12-mile limit. At the Codification of the department, directed, as it was, he two decades following the Conference that the League convened at against the position of our allies. T Second World War have been The Hague in 1930, Canada exercised its Under the Pearson government, called, by Andrew Cohen among oth- newly acquired right to representation Canada began a lengthy negotiation ers, the “golden age” of Canadian separate from that of the mother coun- with the United States, led by then sec- diplomacy. Canada’s standing was so try. My first job in the Legal Division was retary of state for external affairs Paul high that it was called on to make con- to ascertain what position Canada took Martin (father of the current prime tributions to keeping the peace in a at the conference. No easy task. I could minister), to obtain US recognition of number of troubled areas including find only one statement in all the records made by What Canadians leave largely unexamined is whether the broad, the Canadian representa- visionary approach, focused on transforming state behaviour tive, a very junior officer named Lester Pearson, and rather than on specific conflict resolution, can accomplish very it consisted of one sen- much, aside from making its advocates feel good. tence: Canada supports the position of Great Britain in favour of our claims. Because the US would Pakistan, Korea, Palestine, Lebanon the three-mile limit. Canadian interests agree to nothing, the negotiations and Indochina. The awarding of the and imperial interests were one. came to a complete impasse. In the Nobel Peace Prize to Lester Pearson for early days of the Trudeau government, his leadership in the creation of the wo decades later, the Interdepart- Canadian officials devised an innova- first Emergency Force T mental Committee on Territorial tive approach that distinguished (UNEF), the crowning achievement of Waters established by the Privy Council, between territorial and functional the period, brought Canada unprece- determined our national interests to be jurisdiction: Canada would claim 200- dented recognition, but it also created otherwise: Canada should seek interna- mile zones for fisheries conservation in Canada a belief that we Canadians tional agreement on a 12-mile territorial purposes and pollution control. But had a special calling to bring peace to sea. Realism-based diplomacy was about because we feared that even these the world and would as a matter of to emerge in full flower. claims could be successfully chal- course, be the leader of middle powers After the first UN Conference on lenged in international law, Canada showing the way. the Law of the Sea failed, the General withdrew its acceptance from the com- The Department of External Affairs Assembly in 1958 debated whether to pulsory jurisdiction of the court at the time contained a large number call a second one to address the unre- regarding all matters relating to our of creative individuals, men of strong solved issue of the breadth of the terri- adjacent coastal waters. egos and self-confidence. It is true that torial sea. Canada decided to strongly many of those men were motivated, at advocate convening such a confer- anada’s only other choice was to least in part, by a sort of missionary ence. As the delegate to the UN C drop at least some of our most zeal or impulse. There was an idealistic, Committee where the issue was to be bloated claims. In the face of strident romantic, almost crusading spirit that debated, the government sent a politi- political support on both coasts, the unleashed great energies in pursuit of a cal appointee from the Senate assisted government was not prepared to do better world order. They were part of a by a young foreign service officer just this. In renouncing recourse to law, generation that had made enormous off probation — myself. Canada determined that its national sacrifices during the recent war and Shortly afterwards, Canada began interest, as it was conceived, took they formed the view that collective to organize an aggressive diplomatic precedence over its commitment to security, based on Anglo-American and global campaign in favour of a broader international goals. There was European solidarity was vital to pre- Canadian proposal for a six-mile terri- no idealism involved in renouncing vent yet another tragic descent into torial sea and further six-mile exclu- the court’s jurisdiction. chaos and destruction. Our interna- sive fishing zone. This was because the In the broad context of Canadian tional security policies, as Denis Stairs initiative was driven from the top by foreign policy at the time, the Law of has pointed out, were unabashedly

POLICY OPTIONS 19 FEBRUARY 2005 Allan Gotlieb

linked to the national interest. As a magnetic pole of Canada’s internation- internationally its character as a feder- result, it is probably true to say there al vocation pulled more strongly than al and bilingual country and reflect the never was a greater correspondence ever. The new secretary of state for priorities that flowed from these con- between our idealistic goals and our external affairs, a strong international- stitutional realities. Tellingly, the first basic national interest than at this time ist, thought he heard the drumbeat of paragraph of the statement was enti- in our history. public opinion. Canada, the message tled, “Foreign Policy as an Expression It follows that in no sense were went, should be a player, a broker, a of the National Interest.” our diplomats during the “golden age” mediator. Paul Martin Sr. was vigorous The new approach to Canadian trying to differentiate Canada from the in trying to turn a Nobel trick. He had foreign policy, as expressed in Foreign United States on the international enjoyed a foreign policy success a Policy for Canadians, the six-booklet plane. In helping to create NATO or decade earlier in negotiating an end to document published in 1970, migrated resolve the Suez crisis — the defining the impasse that blocked the entry of from the constitutional statement in event of the era for Canadian diploma- new UN members. As foreign minister, Federalism and to cy — they were doing precisely the he was successful in helping establish a the foreign policy review. Foreign Policy opposite. Working with the US for a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. But for Canadians defined Canada’s foreign better world was the bedrock principle. with both eyes on succeeding Pearson policy as “the product of the govern- But it was already the case that our as prime minister, he wanted further ment’s progressive definition and pur- talent exceeded our influence. achievements to his credit. suit of national aims and interests in The problem was that expectations the international environment.” Was ohn Diefenbaker, taking up office in of Canadians about their role in the anything new or useful being said? The J the midst of post-Suez fever, fact is that the Trudeau review believed he had to demonstrate Concern over maritime borders was did reflect a significant change that not just Pearson, but he not all that surprising for a country of emphasis in our foreign pol- and his government, too, could with by far the longest coastline in icy toward realism and away cut a swath on the internation- the world. What is more surprising is from the honest-broker or save- al stage. They immediately the-world role. Not surprising- solicited suggestions from every that, in the inter-war years, Canada ly, Lester Pearson was unhappy foreign service officer for “ini- did not draw any distinction about the review in that it tiatives” that Canada could take between imperial interests and failed to make the pursuit of on the international scene. Canadian ones. It was the British peace and security Canada’s Even at the bottom rung of the highest priority. department, this struck us as a who defined our national interests. The call in the White Paper perversion of our true calling. For the champion of the freedom of for developing “countervailing Diefenbaker’s foreign initiatives the high seas, the three-mile rule factors” in our relations with did much to weaken Canada’s was an article of faith. the United States found full international reputation — expression two years later, whether in the economic sphere, with world had become gravely exaggerated when External Affairs Minister his ill-considered suggestion for a 15 and could not be realized. “The case for Mitchell Sharp published the Third percent diversion of trade to Britain, or realism in our foreign policy,” I con- Option, which proposed diversifica- at the UN, where his personal initiative cluded in a private 1967 memorandum tion of Canada’s economic relations to condemn the Soviet Union for colo- to Pierre Trudeau, co-authored with Max with Europe and Japan as a way of nizing its East European neighbours Yalden, “derives much of its urgency reducing our dependence on the US. aborted, or in East-West relations, and strength from an appreciation of The Third Option was primarily an when he questioned US evidence of the consequences of national policies expression of domestic policy in that it Soviet missiles in Cuba and called for based upon immature or unreal con- called for strengthening the public an international inspection team to cepts of internationalism. False interna- instruments that would enable Canada determine the facts. tionalism leads to disillusionment and to gain greater control over its econo- The failures of the Diefenbaker era the consequences of disillusionment are my. It was a remarkable policy for deal- simply added to the pressures when isolationism and withdrawal.” ing with the US because it was a policy Lester Pearson became prime minister In Federalism and International for not dealing with the US. in 1963 for Canada to bolster its Relations, a document prepared under As an exercise in economic romantic vocation as a leader of mid- the aegis of Pierre Trudeau in the con- nationalism designed to strengthen dle powers and international peace text of the constitutional discussions Canada’s sovereignty and control broker par excellence. During the acri- of the time, the government stated over its economic destiny, the Third monious years of the Vietnam War, the Canada’s foreign policy should project Option reflected the realist school’s

20 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy view of what the purpose of foreign he new Progressive Conservative tions. To conclude that a continental policy should be. It proved to be a T prime minister’s principal priority arrangement with the US was the best flawed policy, inspired by misguided in foreign affairs was refurbishing rela- way to obtain increased access to views about the national interest. Its tions with the United States, which he American markets marked a major principal associated domestic policies made part of his campaign platform. breach with Canada’s traditional pref- which, in time, were the Foreign Trudeau’s nationalist policies, in par- erence for multilateral solutions. Investment Review Agency (FIRA) ticular the NEP and FIRA, were viewed Assisted by the support of the Mac- and the National Energy Program as helpful neither to the Canadian donald Commission for a Canada- US (NEP), did not survive the Trudeau economy nor to Canada-US relations. free trade agreement, and by the positive effects of the Auto Pact, the The legacy of the Trudeau years was a foreign policy that swung Mulroney government pur- sued continental free-trade to erratically between the poles of aggressive nationalism and a successful conclusion. Con- unrealistic internationalism. The compass jerks from pole to pole. ducting high level personal For Trudeau, one day it was brass-knuckles realism, the next, diplomacy, Mulroney was feel-good idealism. The contradictions in the style, substance able to achieve his other two objectives as well, an acid- and expression of his foreign policy cannot be resolved. rain accord with President George Bush Sr. and an agreement with era; and trade, far from becoming Trudeau’s tendency to find moral Reagan on the passage of US vessels more diversified under Trudeau’s gov- equivalence between the two super- through Arctic waters, providing ernment, grew even more dependent powers, particularly at a time when increased recognition of Canada’s claim on the US market. Ronald Reagan was declaring the to sovereignty. Soviet Union to be an evil , was s the years passed, Canada’s for- deeply resented in the White House. otwithstanding the prime minis- A eign policy under Trudeau increas- The goals of Mulroney’s foreign policy N ter’s determination that a conti- ingly took on the crusading, moralistic, were thus grounded in a clear view of nentalist approach was necessary to save-the-world overtones that belied the national interest from which he advance our national interest, it was the explicit focus on the national inter- never wavered in his two terms as inevitable that his new Progressive est of his White Paper. Trudeau became prime minister. Conservative government would want in time the leading tier-mondist and The bedrock reality principle was to conduct its own general foreign pol- proponent of the north-south dialogue that the US was friend and ally and not icy review, which it did under the aegis among the industrialized countries and a power against which one sought coun- of Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Commonwealth. His swan song, terweights. It was a foreign policy that Joe Clark. the peace initiative of 1983, supported he would direct himself, rather than It can be argued that Canada pur- by a cheer-leading Canadian media, through his foreign minister, Joe Clark. sued a two-track foreign policy in the was overreaching and led nowhere. Within weeks of taking office, Mulroney years — the prime minister’s The legacy of the Trudeau years Mulroney went to Washington to meet continental, national-interest track was a foreign policy that swung errat- Reagan, against the unanimous coun- and Joe Clark’s internationalist track. ically between the poles of aggressive sel of his advisers in . This set Outside the new hemispheric nationalism and unrealistic interna- the stage for the reality-based style and interest, including joining the tionalism. The compass jerks from substance of his leadership. He Organization of American States in pole to pole. For Trudeau, one day it immersed himself not only in design- 1989, Mulroney’s foreign policy main- was brass-knuckles realism, the next, ing the grand strategies, but in most tained a strong focus on international feel-good idealism. The contradic- specific tactical considerations, espe- issues. As was to be expected, Canada tions in the style, substance and cially as they related to Congress. His remained committed to its role as expression of his foreign policy can- shift from multilateralism to bilateral- peacekeeper par excellence, devoting not be resolved. The symptoms of ism in relations with the United States resources to conflict resolution in bipolarism grew more prominent was a departure of historic propor- Bosnia and Somalia and to the US-led than ever. But the focus of the nation- tions. From the outset of its postwar campaign in the first Gulf War. al interest, especially as it affected role, Canada had been a vigorous An idealistic — and most would Canada’s relationship with the United advocate of lowering tariffs and other say commendable — streak was visible States, was to demonstrate growing barriers to trade through the General in Mulroney’s vigorous, though unsuc- resonance in the incoming govern- Agreement on Tariffs and Trade cessful, attempt to persuade Ronald ment of Brian Mulroney. (GATT) and multilateral trade negotia- Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to sup-

POLICY OPTIONS 21 FEBRUARY 2005 Allan Gotlieb

port sanctions against South Africa. Unlike Trudeau, he was outspoken on human rights violations (in , Kenya, Indonesia) and could thus be said to have placed new emphasis on humanitarian values in Canadian for- eign policy, even claiming that human rights and good governance was a “cornerstone of our foreign policy.” It is fair to conclude that, under Mulroney, Canada followed a reality- based foreign policy. There were few strains between the polar attractions of the national interest and an activist global role. In rooting national interest in North American soil, in Canada-US friendship, and in enthusiastically engaging with the US on international issues, Canada’s global role was enhanced; there was no sense of Canada’s seeking internationally to offset US power. That coherence was in marked contrast to the role of Canada in the world that was to emerge under the government of Jean Chrétien.

n a habit of Canadian political life I that had become addictive, the Chrétien government did not long delay in conducting its own, de rigueur foreign policy review. Predictably, the review of 1994/1995, Canada in the The Gazette, Montreal World, reflected both faces of Canadian foreign policy: security and Lester B. Pearson and Louis St-Laurent at the end of their decade-long partnership as external affairs minister and prime minister, the zenith of Canada’s influence in the prosperity on the one hand, and world. At the time, Canada committed 7.3 percent of GDP to defence spending, com- Canadian values, such as good gover- pared with only 1.1 percent today. Canada’s influence as a culminated nance, the rule of law and democracy with Pearson being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. and the need to project them abroad, on the other. As it turns out, the government of Canadian diplomacy. As well, there approach could be seen as grounded in Jean Chrétien did strike out in new emerged an excessive preoccupation the national interest. Almost immedi- directions and we did get on with seek- with the projection of Canadian values ately after the Liberals won the 1993 ing a “larger role.” But far from liberat- as a goal of foreign policy. election and Chrétien became prime ing ourselves and our foreign policy minister, he threw to the winds his from overwhelming US preoccupation, uring most of the Chrétien era, commitment as leader of the opposi- the demon of anti-Americanism cast a D our foreign policy could have tion to renegotiate NAFTA. Under his large shadow over our international been mistaken for that of two coun- leadership, the government entered ventures in the Chrétien years. tries. On the one hand, there was the into free-trade agreements with Chile The Chrétien government’s prime minister’s single-minded devo- and Israel and became a leading propo- approach to foreign policy was to be tion to pursuing trade promotion nent of free trade throughout the characterized first by a profound lack around the globe; on the other, his for- Americas. of coherence, then by an increased eign minister’s crusade for human anti-American inflection which led us security. The poles of Canadian foreign uring this time, Chrétien’s longest to adopt a quixotic international role, policy were never further apart. On D serving foreign minister, Lloyd notably different from the heyday of economic matters, the prime minister’s Axworthy, soon after his appointment

22 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy in 1996, began to carve out what Robin the 1970s and 1980s, Canada declined Canada’s role, or more accurately, a Jeffrey Hay described as “arguably the to 32nd in the world by the end of quixotic one, distinguished from most ambitious agenda of any foreign 2001. By 2003, Canada had only 250 Canada’s traditional approach to its minister in history.” “In putting people military and civilian personnel in UN international vocation by abandoning at the heart of security policy, peacekeeping operations. In Jack the concerns of the realist school. In Axworthy’s vision,” in the words of Granatstein’s assessment: “By the seeking to transform the behaviour of Canada’s former ambassador to the beginning of the current century, other states, its aims were ill-defined, United Nations, Paul Heinbecker, “was shortages of equipment and person- overreaching and by and large impos- virtually Copernican in its significance.” nel all but eliminated Canada’s mili- sible of fulfillment. Never in the histo- Notwithstanding its roots in the tary capacity.” ry of Canada’s foreign relations had idealism of Canada’s diplomat-mis- Yet as Foreign Minister Bill Graham differentiation from the United States sionaries of an earlier era, it differed in put it in 2002: “For many Canadians, become a greater imperative than significant ways from past Canadian and in the eyes of the world, peacekeep- under Axworthy’s stewardship. It was foreign policy. Unlike earlier Canadian ing is fundamental to who we are as a no less than a prerequisite for navigat- diplomats born in the manse, who nation. I am proud to affirm that the ing the third way. Fortunately, the tended to be practical in their outlook, maintenance of peace remains our high- emphasis on soft power, “human secu- Axworthy articulated his vision in the est aspiration.” Yet it was on the watch of rity networks” and the third way broadest possible terms, often engaging the government of which he was a mem- found no resonance with his successor, in what his critics have called full ber that the resources behind Canada’s down-to-earth, practical-minded John blown “pulpit diplomacy.” Manley, whose objective was Until 1990, Canada had par- restoring good relations with ticipated in every UN peacekeep- With declining influence in the US. During the all-too- ing activity and under Chrétien, Washington, neglect of the military, short term of his stewardship, it strained itself to maintain that the needle of the foreign policy role in the last decade of the cen- and emphasis on projecting our compass swung dramatically tury. In the NATO-authorized virtues and values, Canadians, at the from feel-good vision to do- operation in Kosovo and in the end of the Chrétien decade, had good practicalities like manag- UN operation in Bosnia and the little reason to believe their country ing the Canada-US border. former Yugoslavia, Canadian But declarations about forces were active participants. any longer influenced the major how quickly the Axworthy There was no diminution in our issues of the time. legacy seemed to be fading self-identification as the world’s proved to be premature, to say foremost peacekeeper. the least. Under Manley’s suc- This identification, however, was soft power declined precipitously. How cessor, Bill Graham, there was yet grounded ever more in the romantic could this be our highest aspiration, if another foreign policy review in 2003 vision of ourselves and ever less in there was no willingness to increase the — A Dialogue on Foreign Policy — and reality. The story is now well told, resources necessary to achieve it? This the government again placed great though still insufficiently appreciated, was another contradiction in Canada’s stress on projecting Canadian values, of the decline in our defense spend- foreign policy of the era. There were oth- humanitarian goals and peacekeeping. ing, our aid programs and the capaci- ers. Axworthy’s human security agenda, The needle shifted back yet again to ty of our armed forces to conduct which he sought to implement through the visionary, feel-good side of a for- various roles. Compared to a level of soft power, led to great emphasis on the eign policy conducted, if not in oppo- defense spending of some 7.3 percent projection abroad of Canadian values. sition to Washington, at least at some of GDP in the 1950s and some 0.53 This translated into advocacy of the rule distance from it. percent of GDP in official aid in the of law and international rule-making, a Thus in the later years of his gov- 1970s, expenditures declined to a frac- main object being to constrain the ernment, Chrétien, at the helm of tion of that by century’s end — 1.1 United States in its international behav- Canadian foreign policy, distanced percent of GDP on defense and some iour. Yet there was no evidence that new Canada from the US on Iraq. The 0.22 percent on aid. Canadian spend- regimes of law would influence US con- rationale for his decision, the ing on defense ranked Canada among duct. The US, through refusing to ratify “Chrétien Doctrine” as I called it, was the lowest three members of NATO, several new treaties, made it perfectly that Canada would never engage in along with Luxembourg and the clear they would not. enforcement action unless the UN Netherlands, and 17th in the world in authorized it. terms of official aid. From being the xworthy’s third way represented, The Chrétien doctrine broke new largest contributor to peacekeeping in A in essence, a Utopian vision of ground in Canadian foreign policy. Half

POLICY OPTIONS 23 FEBRUARY 2005 Allan Gotlieb

a decade earlier, Canada had joined a and emphasis on projecting our virtues state that has the power to do so. NATO-sponsored armed intervention and values, Canadians, at the end of China and India, in the pursuit of their in Kosovo without the authority of the the Chrétien decade, had little reason national interest, may at some later UN Security Council. It is possible that to believe their country any longer point in the twenty-first century come Chrétien used lack of UN authorization influenced the major issues of the time. to exercise much greater power than for the Iraq invasion as a fig leaf to dis- The Martin government has they do today. The European Union guise his true but unarticulated reasons announced yet another foreign policy might also come to pursue a global for Canada’s non-participation. review. It should have avoided that. strategic vision, something it does not However, in ceding, or appearing to These time-consuming exercises, at do now. It may even, in time, aspire to cede, to the UN the deter- mination of our national The worst prescription for a realistic foreign policy for Canada is to security interests, the seek differentiation from the US for the sake of being different. For prime minister went some distance toward reasons of history, language, culture, geography, demography, positioning the Axworthy security and shared values, Canada has a unique relationship with vision of the third way in the US, which should rightly be regarded as special. the mainstream of Canadian foreign policy. best, accomplish little or nothing; at play the role of , which will Paradoxically, he was also articulat- worst, they blow stale air into old require it to make investments in its ing a foreign policy for turning inward. clichés and encourage self-congratula- military capacity well beyond what its Because Security Council agreement to tion and self-deception about our members have been prepared to do. authorize armed intervention in areas place in the world. But it is not a superpower today, nor of conflict and human rights violations does it wish to be. will remain a rare occurrence, the hen asked to define Canadian Chrétien doctrine enables Canada to W foreign policy, Lester Pearson, he worst prescription for a realistic justify non-involvement regardless of was reported to have replied, “Ask me T foreign policy for Canada is to moral principles that may call for inter- at the end of the year and when I look seek differentiation from the US for vention. It thus can serve as a cover for back at what Canada has done, I’ll tell the sake of being different. For reasons a policy of isolationism. you what our foreign policy is.” Our of history, language, culture, geogra- new government would be well- phy, demography, security and shared hrétien’s reluctance to criticize advised to follow Pearson’s example. values, Canada has a unique relation- C offensive comments about the Whatever we do, we should not try to ship with the US, which should rightly United States made by his colleagues conceptualize or package our foreign be regarded as special. Far from close- and other insiders helped distance policy in value-wrapped formulations ness posing a threat to our existence, it Canada further from Washington than about Canada’s place in the world. is a necessary condition for our eco- at any time since the John Diefenbaker New directions are increasingly self- nomic well-being and our internation- era. There was arguably more coher- evident because they are based on al effectiveness. Our potential for ence, less polarity and fewer contradic- unavoidable realities. The challenge is influencing the world’s greatest power tions in Canadian foreign policy at the to open our eyes to these realities, is our comparative advantage in the end of the Chrétien era than during base our foreign policies unambigu- world. It gives us credibility in other most of the years of his leadership. The ously on them and get on with imple- capitals. As US power grows, so does romantic view held unchallenged menting them. Canada’s opportunity. ascendancy. Although Lloyd Axworthy A reality-based foreign policy has a was no longer his foreign minister, number of requirements. t is to Paul Martin’s credit that he has Chrétien became at one with him in The first is to recognize that transcen- I established a permanent cabinet positioning Canada outside the orbit dent US power is the dominant feature of committee on Canada-US relations of Washington and in downgrading the contemporary international order. This under his personal chairmanship. This concerns about the impact of our poli- is unlikely to change, in our lifetime, in allows him and his government to cies on Canada-US relations. favour of some restoration of nine- assess all policy initiatives, domestic In two decades, Canada went from teenth-century concepts of the balance and foreign, within the context of the honest broker to norm-entrepreneur, of power. Call it a hyper-power, imperi- Canada-US relationship. It speaks vol- from doing good to feeling good in al power or colossus, the United States umes about the significance of that rela- foreign policy. is the only state that articulates and tionship in realizing our policy goals. With declining influence in acts on a global strategic vision. At least A second requirement for a realistic Washington, neglect of the military, for the foreseeable future, it is the only policy is the recognition that Canada’s

24 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy role as a middle power can never be nder at least four prime ministers multilateral cooperation. The only regained. The reasons for this are many. U — St-Laurent, Pearson, Trudeau alternative to unilateralism is intelli- For one thing, Canada hardly qualifies and Mulroney — Canadians have gent and creative multilateralism. This as a middle power because of the size asserted unilateral claims to sovereign- will often mean coalitions of the will- of its economy — one of the world’s ty or jurisdiction over vast maritime ing, whether or not Canada wishes to largest. For another, the very concept zones. Probably the largest claim to join them. The proposal of Prime of middle power, a creature of Cold sovereignty anywhere on the globe Minister Martin for the Group of War geopolitics, is passé. As well, there was made by the government of Brian Twenty to work on “important issues is no longer any balance of power in Mulroney when it enthusiastically of global concern,” although not with- the world to tilt one way or another. drew straight baselines around the out problems, is creative in showing a While in other times, Lester islands of the Arctic Archipelago. All willingness to break out of the UN Pearson and Pierre Trudeau spoke these actions, including Canada’s framework. often of Canada as a middle power, questionable legal behaviour on the As a fourth prerequisite for a reality- Prime Minister Paul Martin should not high seas during the 1995 turbot war, based foreign policy, we must also abandon our fixation with international Canada and like-minded states must search out new forms of rule-making. Canada is no multilateral cooperation. The only alternative to unilateralism more qualified to be a leader in rule-making than most is intelligent and creative multilateralism. This will often mean other members of the UN. coalitions of the willing, whether or not Canada wishes to join Some may think that, as a them. “moral superpower” with a value-laden foreign policy, tether Canadian foreign policy to an and our renouncing of recourse to the we have a special calling to be a “norm obsolete concept. rule of law whenever we could be chal- entrepreneur,” but this would be a vain- A third requirement for a reality-based lenged, were greeted favourably by glorious enterprise. Canada’s reputation foreign policy is that Canadians liberate Canadian public opinion — some- in the world as a constructive peace- themselves from the belief that the UN is the times with wild acclaim. maker has never been based on a pas- sacred foundation of our foreign policy. Canadians, of course, have always sion for legalism and adjudication. Support for multilateralism and support accepted the obvious proposition that Other than with regard to international for the UN are not equivalent. international problems require interna- trade, we have avoided the rule of law Canadians have long espoused multilat- tional cooperation for their solution. We whenever we believed it could damage eralism as a principle of foreign policy. have never questioned that multilateral- our national interests. “Canadians” it has been said “are born ism is at the heart of economic and with a multilateralist chromosome in social cooperation and that internation- till, Canada’s new government their biological make-up.” We are, of al security requires solutions beyond the S seems to be making international course, right to be multilateralists, where capacity of individual states to achieve. law and rule-making a central theme circumstances warrant. But a practical or Unfortunately, the commitment to of its approach to international peace realistic perspective would make the multilateralism has tended to blind and security. Once again we seem to be choice of unilateralism, bilateralism or Canadians to the fact that the UN Char- trying to make ourselves feel good by multilateralism a question of appropriate ter is a flawed document. Yet the myth taking the high road to a better world. means to achieve particular ends. that the UN represents the disenfran- Our new prime minister has stated The UN is not the only begetter of chised of the world is so strong that the that what Canada seeks is the “evolu- multilateral action nor the only greatest champion of Canada’s vision- tion of international law and practice, authority that can confer legitimacy ary human-security agenda, Lloyd so that multilateral action may be on armed intervention. Axworthy, argued strenuously that the taken in situations of extreme human- We should also dispense with “responsibility to protect” the victims itarian emergency.” He envisages the hypocrisy and moral superiority about of the world should be the domain not Security Council establishing thresh- our commitment to multilateralism of the Security Council but of the Gen- olds that would define the circum- and be honest enough to recognize that eral Assembly — which, of course, stances that would allow for when it comes to pursuing our national includes among its some 190 members, intervention. interest, Canada has a long history of the very dictatorships that are perpetra- But the idea that agreement could unilateralism. Even if we have a multi- tors of violence against their citizens be reached in advance on specific norms lateralist chromosome, when our terri- that would distinguish between legiti- tory or sovereignty is at stake, there is a anada and like-minded states mate and illegitimate intervention is zest for unilateralism in our genes. C must search out new forms of romantic in the extreme. But what is

POLICY OPTIONS 25 FEBRUARY 2005 Allan Gotlieb

not romantic is that the people of civil disorder and human rights viola- he Canada-US Free Trade Darfur are slaughtered while we seek UN tions to scale their ambitions to their T Agreement and NAFTA were consensus on the rules of intervention. capacity to act. Canada’s internation- major achievements based on the Utopianism, millenarianism and al aspirations, as well as its self-inter- North American reality, but did not go visionary crusades should have no place in est, call for us to commit the financial far enough in protecting our econom- Canadian foreign policy. resources that allow us to play a use- ic interest — an interest cogently sum- This is a fifth requirement for a ful role in these diversified and prolif- marized by the fact that bilateral trade reality-based foreign policy. erating situations. now accounts for as much as three- The extreme emphasis placed by Even when Canada acts unilaterally quarters of our annual income. our leaders in recent years on Canada’s in the name of the national interest or There is no example anywhere of a role as advocate for a world of human security, the commitment to the neces- major industrialized nation’s resting so security is a recipe for our continued sary resource allocations has been absent. much of its commerce on so slender an marginalization. If human security Some of our claims to Arctic channels international legal foundation. We throughout the world is the aim of remain contested, but Canada lacks the should regard our current arrange- Canada’s soft power, then Canadians capacity to monitor them to detect the ments as a stage on the way to deeper assuredly need to recognize that all the presence of foreign submarines. and wider integration. hard power in the world could not The most important requirement is Key areas of our trade were not achieve it. the recognition that our destiny as a sov- included in our free trade agreements: ereign nation is inescapably tied to our Procedures for objective bilateral dispute ut to acknowledge that our for- geography. We cannot sustain relations settlement remain primitive; the flow of B eign policy must reflect goods is riddled with protection- Canadian values is not at all to Even when Canada acts unilaterally ist harassment through say that the aim of Canadian in the name of the national interest antidumping and countervail foreign policy is to spread actions; border obstacles to the Canadian values. Canadian or security, the commitment to the movement of goods, services and political leaders are rightly necessary resource allocations has people have increased signifi- responding to Canadian values been absent. Some of our claims to cantly since the attacks of Sep- when they accept humanitari- Arctic channels remain contested, tember 11, 2001; rules of origin anism as a basic component of interrupt the flow of commerce; foreign policy. But to effectively but Canada lacks the capacity to and concerns about security protect human rights, in con- monitor them to detect the threats deepen the divide of the cert with like-minded states, presence of foreign submarines. 49th parallel. The Ontario our strategies must be based on Chamber of Commerce has esti- two fundamental realities: Little can be with our colossal neighbour by being mated the province’s annual costs of bor- achieved unless the US is willing to be the eternal supplicant. Nor can we der obstacles to be at least $8 billion. a leading player, and the UN, because retain our self-respect or sustain rela- A reality-based foreign policy for of its flaws, cannot, in many situa- tions by pretending that we can Canada must recognize that, in negoti- tions, be the instrument of protection. recruit friendly American constituen- ating with the US, its security concerns So far as the capacity to protect is con- cies to our side to defend us against are paramount. Greater economic inte- cerned, the UN is not an alternative to powerful US interests and lobbies. In gration should be accompanied by a the United States. Without US support the area of lobbying, US domestic common security perimeter surround- in most situations, the UN cannot act. interests can trump a foreign power ing the two countries to ensure the A sixth requirement for a realistic for- any day of the week. security of the continent and freedom eign policy is the willingness to commit We must try to build, as the of movement within. Without such a significant resources to achieving Canada’s Europeans have done, on a larger bold and innovative approach it is goals. Canada’s international aspira- sense of community, a North doubtful we will be able to achieve our tions will ring hollow and will be American community that substitutes trade objectives. Similarly, if Canada divorced from reality unless Canadians enforceable rights and obligations for declines to participate in US missile are willing to accord a significantly political arbitrariness and the muscle defense, we will be signalling to the higher financial priority to the achieve- of special interests. The reward of suc- Americans that we are not serious ment of our foreign policy goals. cess in such an endeavour is the about the defense of the continent. The large number of failed and securing of our political sovereignty; The implications for our long-term failing states in the world requires the price of failure is continuing economic interests are inescapable. those who wish to intervene to pro- dependency and a diminishing sense Would Congress be likely to tect the victims of famine, disease, of national self-confidence. agree to such a far-reaching and

26 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy comprehensive accord? If Canada King and the Second World War, regional conflicts, Canada would be has the vision, and provided security when the basis of Canadian foreign adopting a functional foreign policy. is a component, there is, in time, policy was functionalism. In using We could go even further. By some prospect for success. The that word, our diplomats meant that avoiding visionary pronouncements Canada-US Free Trade Agreement Canadians should look at the specific about our foreign policy and ceasing to was a Canadian initiative, yet it was issues and get involved in situations moralize and talk about our superior the most comprehensive bilateral where we had the specific interests, values, we could finally bring to an economic agreement ever entered skills and resources that would allow end our long spasms of bipolar behav- into by the US. It abridged US sover- us to make an effective contribution. iour, promote our national interest eignty in areas where this was said to A return to functionalism would lack and gain both self-esteem and the be impossible, and Congress passed glamour, but it would be a good respect of nations. We would, at last, it. Paradoxically it may be easier to recipe for Canada in the world of have a reality-based foreign policy. achieve a grand agreement with the today and tomorrow. In enhancing US than a modest one. The greater our economic and security relation- Allan Gotlieb is a former Canadian the number of interests in play, the ship with the United States through ambassador to the United States (1981- less fatal can be the opposition of strengthening its legal foundation, in 89) and served as under-secretary of state single or narrow interests. regaining our potential for influenc- for external affairs. He is chairman of ing the world’s foremost power, in the Donner Canadian Foundation and inally, then, we should recognize pursuing a more creative approach to senior adviser to Stikeman Elliott in F functionalism as a realistic under- multilateralism, in rebuilding the . Adapted from the C.D. Howe lying principle of our foreign policy. physical and human resources Benefactors Lecture, November 2004. A reality-based approach could take enabling us to increase our contribu- The full lecture may be viewed at us back to the time of Mackenzie tions to troubled societies and www.cdhowe.org

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