MRP Proposal 09-24-11
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TITLE: “Gambit Diplomacy” and Canada to the n-th Power: A modernized foreign policy for a new century of multipolarity SUPERVISOR: Dr Ian Roberge, MPIA Assistant Professor RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION IN PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Scholars hierarchize power according to political systems, to economic vibrancy, to commercial values of natural resources, to territorial or industrial size, to military or nuclear capabilities, and to other similar criterion. A three-tiered system emerges as defined by great, middle, and small powers, each contributing to global governance based on limitations, if any. “Middlepowerhood” generally describes Canada and its diplomacy. Holbraad presents middle-powers as balancers, mediators, bridges, and promoters of international understanding.1 Woods’ description includes characteristics as regional leaders, functional leaders, conflict stabilizers, status seekers, and multilateral moral powers.2 Finally, Cox who, adding to the list of features of middle-powers, describes them as having the ability to keep a distance from major conflict, a degree of autonomy from the major powers, a dedication to international stability, and a commitment to gradual world change.3 Canada receives other designations such as Dewitt and Kirton’s “principal power,” Eayr’s “foremost power,” and Wong’s “functional power” which, appropriated most often, describes Canada as an ad hoc power whose status increases when active, and decreases when inactive. “Exponential power” is a classification that, unlike others where power is relational and based on points of reference, instead measures power based on territorial, civilian and military resources, and multiplies its effect by the use of foreign policy. Such a power amplifies its “soft” and “hard” power to achieve a desired result. Other models are reductionist and classify states based on their relationships to more or lesser powerful states.4 For example, the U.S. traditionally remains a hegemon, or great power, because no nation eQuals it. The researcher’s model characterizes power based on global ambition, humanitarianism, interventionism, and citizenship in relation to domestic inputs, not on multilateral relationships. Canada disadvantaged by a lack of human resources, by its dependency on the U.S., and by an underserviced and underfunded military, still manages to project considerable power abroad as a result of its foreign policy, despite a deficit of inputs. The state multiplies the efficacy of its resources, “punches above [its] weight” according to Heinbecker and Segal,5 promotes national interests internationally, intervenes globally, and achieves a higher status as an adherent of exponential power, a neologism advanced in our research paper. Five schools of thought define foreign policymaking in Canada which are 1) independence diplomacy, 2) quiet diplomacy, 3) pinchpenny or nickel diplomacy, 4) pulpit diplomacy, and 5) niche diplomacy. Independence diplomacy entails a split from U.S. influence in favour of prioritizing national interests and sovereignty, independence from “continentalism,” and the practice of unilateralism without fear of U.S. retaliation. Quiet diplomacy entails leveraging influence in Washington, in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and NATO, and in international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.6 Pinchpenny or nickel diplomacy reflects the decline of internationalism in Canada as a concomitant of cutbacks to foreign policy.7 Pulpit diplomacy heavily appropriates “soft power,” marginalizes militarism, devalues statism, and downloads international participation from state to non-state actors.8 Finally, niche diplomacy forecasts retrenchment, parsimony of internationalism, selectivity based on fiscal austerity, and a withdrawal from global issues as Canada competes for global influence with fewer resources. Historically, Canada’s status as junior-partner, first with Britain, today with the U.S., results in a continued inferiority complex, though unwarranted. Canada was among the few which founded the U.N., the Bretton Woods System, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, invented international policing, established the International Criminal Court, and ratified a treaty proscribing landmines.9 This middle power veritably transformed international relations, increased the importance of multilateral action, and universalized ideals of peace. However, “to [remain] a middle power,” writes Welsh, “is to settle for mediocrity.”10 With a changing dynamic of world order resulting from economics, with the advent of multipolarity, and with the conclusion of war in Afghanistan, Canada stands at a watershed. Either the nation may continue to assert power, presence and peace internationally, or it may resign itself once more as a defeatist and subordinate of U.S. foreign policy. We are proposing a sixth model of diplomacy, “Gambit diplomacy,” centralized on national self-interest, business and political opportunism and consistency. The ebb and flow in the practice of Machtpolitik in Canada shows governments to be sporadically assertive. American retaliation for such discretion historically recurs as seen by 1) the Kennedy administration’s threat to reduce oil imports in reciprocation to Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s rejection of a continental nuclear missile program,11 2) the Nixon administration’s threat to reduce the same import quota over Prime Minister’s Trudeau claim of sovereignty in the Northwest Passage,12 or 3) the Reagan administration’s threat to revoke Canadian G8 membership in dissuading Trudeau’s implementation of the National Energy Plan.13 This tit-for-tat model of foreign policy enjoys a mutuality of benefits, however, and Canadian governments should not refrain from practicing such Realpolitik, as supported by 1) the lucrative Defence Production Sharing Agreement of 1958, 2) the privilege of which Canada profits over Mexico in trade,14 and 3) the capitalist integration in Latin America where, under an American umbrella, Canada invested over $117.2 billion in 2007.15 What we are suggesting is that Stairs’ “diplomacy of constraint,”16 furthering bilateral reconciliation, and Lennox’s “specialisation,”17 supporting American interests at home, should be coupled with a louder political voice for Canadian interests alone. Such a model of Gambit diplomacy enshrines Canada’s role as discrete from the U.S., but still acknowledges the importance of the latter whose imports of Canadian goods have increased to 85 per cent, and whose level of direct and indirect investment has risen to over 75 per cent.18 Independent diplomacy parochializes modern-day economics, quiet diplomacy no longer satisfies the Canadian conscience, pinchpenny diplomacy exaggerates the recession of internationalism, pulpit diplomacy romantically discards militarism, and niche diplomacy ignores Canada’s continued engagement on multiple fronts. A new century necessitates a new foreign policy in security, economics, and politics, cognizant of modern realities, of the modern balance of power and of emerging economies, and of a burgeoning identity for a growing nation. The Gambit model of diplomacy, in conclusion, contributes to knowledge a modernized approach to foreign policy in Canada. METHODOLOGY (three-pronged) First and foremost, the researcher’s paper will be theoretically-based as we perform an extensive and comprehensive literature review of 1) Canadian power, and 2) the models of Canadian diplomacy. The first part of our paper will look at the modern balance of power, and will locate Canada’s place within this spectrum by conceptualizing “exponential power.” The second part of our paper will look at, and compare the strengths and weaknesses of, each model of diplomacy in Canada. In the third part of our paper, we will propose our model and neologism of “Gambit diplomacy,” discussing the merits of such a model, how it reconciles Canada’s diplomacy with its active participation, externalization, and mediation abroad, and why Canadian foreign policy may be best understood and framed through its use. Adhering to the epistemological school of positivism, we will theorize and then validate the researcher’s model by analyzing secondary data from a single case study (embedded, analysis of multiple variables) where Canadian leaders positively framed (ie. Overton’s window, Putnam’s two-level game), asserted national interests, and projected power in their foreign policy of Gambit diplomacy. This selected policy may reflect convergence with, or divergence from American interests, and we will measure retaliation, if any, for the latter. In the analysis of our single case study, we will first dissect and answer how and why a foreign policy was chosen over its alternatives using models and theories of decision making, including 1) the Rational Actor model (ie. Opportunity costs, expected utility, trade-offs, game-theory, tit-for-tat, chicken game), 2) the Organization model (ie. Prime Minister Chretien’s dissent in the 2003 IraQi war based on U.N. admonishment), 3) the Bureaucratic model, 4) the Bounded Rationality and Cybernetic model (Decisions based on limited choices), 5) Prospect theory (Similar to Expected Utility Theory), and 6) Poliheuristic theory (Walter Lippmann’s emphasis of public opinion).19 Secondly, we will analyze biases which influenced the policy, such as groupthink, wishful thinking, overconfidence, polythink, the polarization effect, or post-hoc rationalization.20 This aspect of our research differs from any literature on