A BRIDGE NOT TOO FAR? - Canada and European Security, 1989-2001
UN PONT PAS TROP LOIN? Securite du Canada et de l'Europe, 1989-2001
A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada
by
Benjamin Zyla, MA
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in War Studies
December 2007
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project benefited from the help and support of many people. Particularly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky who always gave me unwavering support during researching and writing the dissertation and opened new intellectual doors. For his guidance, wisdom, and extraordinary generosity, he has my deepest gratitude.
I am also greatly in dept to Dr. Jane Boulden and Dr. Charles Pentland for their invaluable assistance and kind support at various stages of the dissertation. Both have greatly inspired me and shaped my thinking. I cannot thank all three of them enough for their confidence, encouragement and support. Thank you!
At PvMC, I am grateful to the following faculty members at RMC who have supported me throughout the last four years in one way or another: Dr. Peter Bradley, Dr. Ugurhan Berkok, Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari, Dr. Lawrence McDonough, Dr. Brian McKercher, Dr. Kerim Ousman, and Giselle St.-Jean.
In addition, I greatly benefited from the financial support of the Royal Military College of Canada, particularly the Department of Politics and Economics and the Department of War Studies. The International Council for Canadian Studies (ICCS) also supported my graduate studies at RMC and awarded me a doctoral scholarship for international students. The Department of Defence also supported my research through its Special Projects Fun, which allowed me to travel to NATO headquarters in Brussels and to interview some officials.
Of great help were also the librarians at RMC, Queen's University, Fort Frontenac, the Department of Foreign Affairs, NATO headquarters in Brussels, the European Commission in Brussels, and the European Parliament in Brussels.
Last, but certainly not the least, I am in debt to my family for the love and support they gave in the last four years. They supported me unconditionally while being away many thousand kilometers. Without them this project would not have been possible. iv
ABSTRACT
Zyla, Benjamin Ph.D. in War Studies Royal Military College of Canada 7 December 2007 A Bridge not too far? - Canada and European Security, 1989-2001- Supervisor: Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky
Accepted wisdom in the literature of Canadian foreign and defence policy is that
Canada's standing in world politics had declined in the 1990. It was a decade of darkness for Canadian foreign and defence policy that made Canada an irrelevant international actor.
This dissertation takes the hypothesis of the declinist literature as a starting point.
It agrees with the analysis that Canada cut its foreign and defence budgets. The aim of this dissertation is not to challenge the empirical findings of this earlier research of the nature and scope of the budgetary cuts in the 1990s, but to disagree with the implications thereof. It also challenges the indicators being used to assess Canadian contributions to
NATO. Overall, the purpose of this dissertation is to disprove the assertions of a reductionist Canada and, more importantly, to counter the public misperception that
Canada was in decline. However, the objective is not to measure Canada's power in the international system but rather to analyze its role in the Atlantic Alliance.
The dissertation makes the following arguments: first, despite the cutbacks in the
1990s, Canada punched above its weight in NATO. Second, Canada advanced its role and standing in NATO as an intra alliance bridge builder by shaping the post-Cold War pan-European security community and helping states from CEE to institutionalize these norms. In doing so, the bridge helped secure Canadian interests in the transatlantic V alliance. Third, by revitalizing this bridge again after 1989, Canada significantly shaped the development of political and military institutions in CEE by promoting democratic values. As such, Canada was involved in pushing for a collective and normative security framework of allied representation and wanted to create a larger pan-European security community. Fourth, the thesis argues, that there is a need for alternative measurements of
Canada's standing in the NATO alliance. The traditional tool of reference for measuring a nations' contribution was its defence spending measured in relation to the level of its gross domestic product (GDP). However, the post Cold War order brought about alternative benchmarks such as measuring the contributions to NATO's rapid reaction capabilities, the percentile of national defence funds devoted to personnel and infrastructure expenditures, and others. Applied to Canada, those new measuring tools then place Canada's relative standing in the top tier of NATO countries.
Keywords: Canada, Canadian foreign policy, Canadian defence policy, NATO, EU, security, Cohen, Granatstein. vi
RESUME
Zyla, Benjamin Ph.D. in War Studies Royal Military College of Canada 7 December 2007 UN PONT PAS TROP LOIN? - Securite du Canada et de l'Europe, 1989-2001 - Supervisor: Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky
L'avis repandu dans les ouvrages sur la politique etrangere et de defense du Canada est
que le statut du Canada dans l'arene politique mondiale a decline dans les annees 1990.
La decennie en question aurait ete une periode de noirceur pour la politique etrangere et
de defense du Canada au cours de laquelle notre pays serait devenu un intervenant
international sans importance.
Cette dissertation prend comme point de depart l'hypothese avancee par ces
ouvrages « declinistes ». Elle accepte le constat que le Canada a reduit ses budgets des
affaires etrangeres et de la defense. Elle ne veut pas contester les resultats empiriques des
recherches anterieures sur la nature et l'etendue des reductions budgetaires dans les
annees 1990, mais n'accepte pas les implications proposees de ces coupures. Elle
conteste aussi les indicateurs utilises pour evaluer les contributions canadiennes a
l'OTAN. Globalement, cette dissertation veut refuter les accusations de « reductionniste »
portees contre le Canada et, surtout, corriger les fausses impressions du public selon
lesquelles le Canada etait en declin.
Cette dissertation avance les arguments suivants : premierement, malgre les
reductions des annees 1990, le Canada tirait plus que sa charge au sein de l'OTAN.
Deuxiemement, le Canada a elargi son role et son statut de mediateur intra-alliance au vii sein de l'OTAN en faconnant la communaute de la securite paneuropeenne de l'apres- guerre froide et en aidant les etats-membres de la CEE a institutionnaliser les nouvelles normes. Ce faisant, le lien etabli a aide a proteger les interets du Canada dans l'alliance transatlantique. Troisiemement, en revitalisant ce lien apres 1989, le Canada a exerce une grande influence sur le developpement des institutions politiques et militaires de la CEE par la promotion de valeurs democratiques. Dans ce contexte, le Canada a ete un des promoteurs d'un cadre de securite collective et normative pour la representation des allies et etait favorable a 1'elargissement de la communaute de la securite paneuropeenne.
Quatriemement, ma these avance que de nouveaux criteres sont requis pour evaluer la place du Canada au sein de l'OTAN. L'outil de reference traditionnel pour mesurer la contribution d'une nation etait le rapport entre ses depenses de defense et le niveau de son produit national brut (PNB). Cependant, l'ordre mondial de l'apres-guerre froide a donne' naissance a de nouveaux criteres comme par exemple la contribution aux capacites d'intervention rapide de l'OTAN, le pourcentage du budget national de defense consacre au personnel et aux infrastructures, etc. Lorsqu'on les utilise pour evaluer le statut du
Canada au sein de l'OTAN, ces nouveaux outils placent notre pays dans le groupe des dix premiers.
Mots cle: Canada, Canadian foreign policy, Canadian defence policy, NATO, EU, security, Cohen, Granatstein. viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT IV RESUME VI TABLE OF CONTENTS VIII LIST OF TABLES XI LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS XII INTRODUCTION 1
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 34 THEORETICAL-METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 35 INNOVATIVE CONTENT AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 38 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 39 DEFINITIONS AND OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 40 CHAPTER 1 IMAGES OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY 44
INTRODUCTION 44 THE ORIGINS OF THE IMAGE OF CANADA AS A MIDDLE POWER 48 VARIANTS OF THE MIDDLE POWER IMAGE 53 Functionalism 53 Middlepowermanship 55 Niche diplomacy 57 CANADA ASA PRINCIPAL POWER 58 CANADA ASA SATELLITE OR DEPENDENT POWER 64 CONCLUSION 71 CHAPTER 2 CANADA AND THE TRANSFORMATION INTO A NEW WORLD ORDER 73
INTRODUCTION 73 THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 73 CHANGING NATURE OF DIPLOMACY 80 CHANGING NATURE OF POWER AND THE RESOURCES OF THE NEW POWER 85 CHANGING NATURE OF THREAT 88 CHAPTER 3 CANADA AND NATO SINCE 1945 96
INTRODUCTION 96 CANADA AND NATO UNDER DIEFENBAKER (1957-63) 96 THE PEARSON GOVERNMENT (1963-68) 101 Collective defence vs. collective security 106 The Functionalist Principle in Canadian Foreign Policy 109 CANADA AND NATO UNDER TRUDEAU( 1968-84) 115 MULRONEY AND CANADA'S NATO COMMITMENTS (1984-93) 130 SUMMARY: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CANADA'S COMMITMENTS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY 135 CHAPTER 4 CANADA AND NATO 1989-1993 141
INTRODUCTION: TROOPS ARE COMING HOME 141 NATO LONDON SUMMIT 1990 154 NEW IMPORTANCE FOR CSCE IN EUROPE 160 NATO OF CANADA'S DREAMS 174 THE RUSSIAN FACTOR 178 THE REQUEST FOR A TRANSFORMATION OF NATO's ARMED FORCES 180 NATO, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CANADA IN THE EARLY 1990S 181 ix
ROME SUMMIT 1991 189 CANADA AND NATO's NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 194 NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS ECONOMIC SECURITY 197 REALITY CHECK FOR CANADA; ODD MAN OUT? - A CONCLUSION 199 CHAPTER 5 CANADA IN SHARING THE POLITICAL BURDEN 202
INTRODUCTION 202 CANADA AND THE CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION IN 1990s 202 CANADA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CEE 214 NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL (NACC) 217 PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM (PFP) 219 EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC) 227 FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE 231 THE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 233 The anti-NATO enlargement group 233 The pro-NATO enlargement school 238 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 242 WHO GETS IN? WHO STAYS OUT? 246 CANADIAN POSITION ON ENLARGEMENT 248 The White Papers 250 The Foreign Policy White Paper 257 CANADA: A EUROPEAN COUNTRY? 262 THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH RUSSIA 264 NATO ENLARGEMENT MATERIALIZES: THE FIRST ROUND 267 CONCLUSION 271 CHAPTER 6 CANADA AND THE MILITARY BURDEN OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 272
INTRODUCTION 272 GULF WAR 1 272 THE BALKANS 276 THE BALKANS AND ECMM 288 UNPROFOR 294 Canada and UNPROFOR - the initial phase 295 Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 298 The humanitarian situation deteriorates 302 The battle of the Medak Pocket 308 International Community becomes more forceful 309 OTHER CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS 312 IFOR 317 SFOR 319 CANADA AND NATO IN Kosovo (KFOR) 322 PUBLIC OPINION ON CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS 333 CANADIAN COSTS AND NATO BURDEN SHARING 335 Contribution to Rapid Reaction Forces 341 Commitments to NATO's Infrastructure 346 NATO's Civilian Indicators 348 Military Budget 349 Security & Investment Program 349 Aid for CEE 351 Canadian civilian commitments to regional stabilization in Europe, 353 CONCLUSION 354 CONCLUSION 357 APPENDICES 367 BIBLIOGRAPHY , 373 X
CURRICULUM VITAE 394 XI
LIST OF TABLES
Table Table I: Defence Spending as a Percent of GDP 92 Table II: List of NATO Countries with Mandatory Conscription 94 Table III: List of allied contributions to UNPROFOR 301 Table IV: Canadian participation in the Balkans until 2001 311 Table V: UN Peace Trust Funds 316 Table VI: NATO Troop Contribution to SFOR 320 Table VII: Total Expenditures in NATO's Kosovo campaign 327 Table VIII: Expenses of NATO Countries for OP Allied Force, OP Allied Harbor, and OP Joint Guardian 329 Table IX: NATO Troop Contributions to KFOR 330 Table X: Total Cost of CF Deployments 1991-2001 336 Table XI: Defence Expenditures as % of gross domestic product 340 Table XII: Member's contributions to NATO's Reaction Forces and to Gross Domestic Product in 1998 (in %) 343 Table XIII: UN Peace Support Personnel Share Relative to Labor Force Share 1999...345 Table XIV: % devoted to personnel expenditures 346 Table XV: % of total defence expenditure devoted to infrastructure expenditures 347 Table XVI: NATO Common Budgets Contributions and Cost Shares, 2004 350 Table XVII: Allied Contributions to NATO's Common Budgets in 1999 (in million of US$) 351 Table XVIII: NATO Member's Economic Aid to Central and Eastern European Countries per million $ of their GDP in selected years, 1991-97 353
Appendix Appendix 1: NATO Regional Nuclear Strike Planning, 1964 367 Appendix 2: Total Cost of CF Deployments 1991-2005 368 Appendix 3: Deployment of Canadian Foreign Service Officers, 1987- 1992 371 Appendix 4: List of NATO member states and their year of accession 372 Xll
LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS
Figures Figure I: NATO contributions to Kosovo Air campaign 323
Maps Map I: Croatian and UN Protected Zones, and the Medak Pocket 291 Map II: United Nations Protection Force, March-August 1992 297 Map III: The UN in Bosnia 1994 300 1
I do not know how we are going to run this country. We have two options: we can rely on Communists, who do have some useful experience but are not politically reliable; or we can entrust key positions to former dissidents, who are reliable but lack the knowledge necessary in order to lead the country. If we opt for the second solution, we are going to need a lot of help and advice from Western experts.'
You can't just sit at the G-8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G-8, there's a cost to doing that.2
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an assessment of Canada's external relations with NATO between
1989-2001. More precisely, it is a comprehensive study of Canada's role in and commitment to European security, and uses NATO as a case study. It also revisits an old debate about Canada's share of burden in the Atlantic Alliance and suggests new indicators of how to measure this burden in the context of a new security environment post-1989.
The twelve years in question mark an interesting era in the history of international relations. Many important historical events took place in that time. They also unfolded at a rapid pace and with far-reaching implications for people, states, regions, and international organizations. One might, for example, think of the peaceful revolutions in
Central and Eastern European societies (CEE) against totalitarian regimes that brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. From there on, history did not repeat itself, and
1 Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia in a conversation with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner shortly after Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution in 1989, quoted in Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in The "New Europe" - The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005), 13. 2 Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, John Manley in an interview with the National Post. See Paul Wells, "We Don't Pull Our Weight: Manley: Canada Shows 'Glaring Inadequacy' in Time of Crisis," National Post, 5 October 2001. 2 the former Cold War adversaries in the West and East made peace with one another. This rapprochement changed the European security landscape forever, including the role of states and international organizations that operate in this new security environment.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a landmark of
European defence since 1949. It was developed as a defence alliance of like-minded states in response to an evolving Communist threat. In a sense, NATO was the personification of a Western community of states that shared common norms, values, and objectives on a variety of issues, most chiefly foreign and defence policy. Canada is one of those countries that founded NATO in 1949 and thus has a deep historical understanding of the organization and a perception of its role in it.
Canada's long-term membership also shows that Canada has a rich historical experience with NATO and that it was deeply affected by the transformations in CEE.
The transformations in CEE not only affected NATO as an international organization but also the role and function of its member states. The government of Canada was forced to adjust its foreign and defence policies in order to reflect NATO's new function in international affairs and to define Canada's new role therein. This dissertation attempts to assess Canada's new role and standing in the new NATO.
One way of approaching this evaluation is to turn to the domestic literature and survey Canadian scholarship on Canada's role in NATO. The accepted wisdom in the
Canadian foreign policy literature is that Canada's performance and commitment to the
Atlantic Alliance in the 1990s was dire. The consensus among acclaimed academics was that Canada's contribution to world politics had declined. Two of those well-respected
Canadian academics are Andrew Cohen and Jack Granatstein who founded the so-called 3 declinist school of Canadian foreign policy, which holds that Canadian engagement in world politics was in decay in the 1990s.3 They argued that domestic political conditions pushed Canada into an isolationist foreign policy. More specifically, as Cohen argues,
Canada's lack of investment in its diplomatic and military services is the main reasons for
Canada's reluctant and insufficient engagements in world politics.
Cohen suggests that Canada once was a significant player in world politics and that because of the lack of federal funding for its foreign and defence services, Canada increasingly became invisible and fell behind on the list of the most influential countries in the world. According to the declinist school, the Canadian decay started in the so- called Golden Age of Canadian foreign policy under then Minister of External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson. At the time, Canada was perceived internationally as an emerging middle power4 with a reputation of a helpful fixer, honest broker, and mediator. Indeed, back then the world wanted more Canada, and Canada did not shy away from this responsibility.6 Canadians fought a war alongside its NATO allies in Korea, sent thousands of its soldiers to be part of NATO's conventional deterrence force in Germany, as well as to multilateral United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, and
3 See Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept; How We Lost Our Place in the World, Trade paperback ed. (Toronto: M&S., 2004), J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History?, 1st ed. (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military?, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Harper Perennial Canada, 2004). 4 See for example Adam Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle," SITREP: A Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute 66, no. 4 (July-August 2006), Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power," Canadian Foreign Policy 7, no. 2 (Winter 1999), Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 5 See for example Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle." or Chapnick, "The Middle Power." See for example Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945- 1970 (St. Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Pub., 2002). 4
Cyprus.7 Indeed, Canada became obsessed with international peacekeeping, which gave
Canada international visibility and the reputation of an impartial international actor. In turn, the international community recognized Canada's commitments to world peace by awarding Lester B. Pearson, Canada's Minister of External Affairs, the Nobel Peace Price in 1956.8 Despite all these early accomplishments of Canadian internationalism, according to the declinist school, 1956 also marked the starting point for Canadian irrelevance in international affairs, which lasts until today. According to Cohen, Canada did things in the past, but "[w]e are no longer as strong a soldier, as generous a donor, and as effective a diplomat, and it has diminished us as people."9 This decline, according to the proponents of the declinist notion, continued in the post-Cold War era: Canada is no longer "as strong a soldier, as generous a donor, and as effective a diplomat, and it has diminished us as people."10 In short, Cohen mapped out a dark period for Canadian foreign and defence policy in the 1990s and one in which Canada's international reputation has vanished.
Canada's armed forces, no doubt, did more with less: more missions but with less money and thus less capability. To be fair, Cohen did not suggest that Canada was in despair or had started to disintegrate. Hence, the issue was not whether or not Canada as a country would survive but rather how relevant Canada was in a post-Cold War world order, particularly in Europe and what role it played in the new NATO. Cohen's reference point for Canada's international engagements was the golden age of Canadian
7 For a detailed account of Canada and UN peacekeeping see for example Ibid. 8 See for example J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military?, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Harper Perennial Canada, 2004), J. L. Granatstein, Whose War Is It?: How Canada Can Survive in the Post 9/11 World (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007). Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, Trade paperback ed. (Toronto: M&S., 2004), 2. 5 foreign policy under the leadership of then Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson as well as H. Hume Wrong11 and Norman Robertson, both career civil servants in the
Department of External Affairs at the time. All three of them worked behind the diplomatic scenes trying to establish Canada as an emerging middle power.12 Cohen contended that Pearson, Robertson, and Wrong had a "vision of Canada in the world and struggled to bring it to life."13 This golden age, according to Cohen, has been over for over fifty years now: "The truth is that Canada is in decline in the world today. It is not doing what it once did, or as much as it once did, or enjoying the success it once did."14
Cohen operationalizes his hypothesis by examining the power of Canada's military, the generosity of its foreign aid, and the quality of its diplomatic services. His findings indicated that Canada performed poorly in all three categories and he therefore suggests that Canada was less effective than a generation ago in military terms.15 Canada emerged from the Second World War as the fourth largest military power in the world, but became one of the weakest in the 21st century.16 By 2003, Canada's armed forces were "undermanned, underfunded, overextended, and ill-equipped."17 Once, Cohen suggests, Canada was the world's leading peacekeeper, but it slipped to rank thirty-first in
11 Hume Wrong was educated at Oxford University before he joined the Canadian civil service. He was first secretary, councillor, minister councillor, and ambassador to the United States in Washington D.C. He also served as a permanent Canadian delegate to the League of Nations in Geneva as well as assistant undersecretary and then undersecretary of state for external affairs. Norman Robertson, on the other hand, after a teaching career in university became high commissioner of Canada to the United Kingdom (a post he held twice), undersecretary of state (also appointed twice), ambassador to Washington, and Clerk of the Privy Council. 12 For the latest research on this notion see for example Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle." or Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations. 13 Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, 12. 14 Ibid., 22. However, to be fair to Cohen, he asserts that no particular government, party or organization could be blamed for this decline. Indeed, as Cohen suggests, this "has been going on for decades - slowly, often imperceptibly, sometimes accelerated, sometimes arrested, under both the Liberals and Conservatives." See Ibid, 23. "Ibid. 16 Ibid., 27. 17 Ibid. 6
2003. The reason for that was that "Canada has no peacekeepers to send."18 This points to
a lack of resources and personnel to train, equip, and send soldiers on missions abroad in
assistance of UN peacekeeping operations.
Canada's diplomatic service was faced with a similar fate as Canada's armed
forces. Once called one of the "finest" diplomatic services in the world, it "has lost its
cachet."19 The effect of these cutbacks was a declining reputation of Canada's diplomatic
services. Again, Cohen suggests that budget cuts, internal reorganizations, patronage
appointments and an overall neglect are the main reasons for this declining relevance.20
In short, Cohen argues, Ottawa's diplomatic and defence services were under-staffed,
over-tasked and under-funded, and, as a result of this, the government found itself unable
to send its best soldiers, diplomats and bureaucrats to serve Canada abroad.
Consequently, because Canada was weak, the world turned away from Canada.
However, Andrew Cohen was not the only analyst of Canada's external relations
to suggest that Canada had become irrelevant in world politics. Another critic of
Canada's role in world affairs was Canadian historian Jack Granatstein who offers a
similar argument to the one Cohen presented. Most of Granatstein's analysis, however,
focuses on Canadian decline in one particular policy area, namely Canada's defence policy. In his book Granatstein asks the provocative question: "Who killed the Canadian military?"21 He attempts to answer this question by suggesting that Canadian politicians, regardless of which political party in power in Ottawa,22 contributed to the demise.23
"ibid., 29. 19 Ibid., 30. 20 Ibid., 30-31. 2 Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military? 22 Ibid., 201. 23 Ibid., 8. 7
Contrary to Cohen, however, Granatstein blames former Prime Minister Lester B.
Pearson for having started the neglect of Canada's armed forces while being obsessed with UN peacekeeping missions and his diplomatic role in the UN peacekeeping force during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Granatstein noted:
What no one remembers any longer is that, when Pearson cobbled the force together, few in Canada cheered. [...] But Canadians never really understood what their peacekeepers were doing, why they were good at their jobs, and why they were needed. And because they fell in love with peacekeeping, Canadians began to fall out of love with the true purpose of a military - to be ready to fight wars.
According to Granatstein, the trend of neglect of the Canadian military remained a consistency in Canadian foreign policy. Since the end of World War II consecutive liberal as well as conservative governments showed no real interest in Canada's armed forces.26 The blame for this neglect falls on the Canadian electorate. Canadian voters killed Canada's armed forces by re-electing the same politicians that continued to disregard Canada's foreign policy institutions:
The military scarcely interested us, and we [the electorate] paid it no attention. We assumed that we were safe, our territory inviolable, and we believed ultimately that the Americans would protect us. So you and I elected our politicians, and we told them in opinion polls that we wanted health care, culture, better pensions, and a thousand other programs from the government. These were all good things, and we need them. But Canada is a rich country, and we could have had both a strong military and the social services we want. Who killed the Canadian military? Ultimately, the Canadian people did.
1UJU., IJ, Ibid., 13 and 14-15. Ibid., 201. 8
Granatstein's analysis of the causes of Canadian decline was harsh. He largely agrees with Cohen's analysis: "Canada has reached a level of irrelevancy in foreign and military affairs. The country might still belong to the G-8, the United Nations, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and many more world organizations, but Canada has ceased to matter internationally."27
As noted earlier, Cohen and Granatstein's work are only two examples of a growing declinist literature. Another monograph dedicated to an examination of Canada's increasing international irrelevance in world politics is the 2002 edition of Canada
Among Nations29, This edited volume focuses on Canada's future in world politics after
9/11. The main working assumption of the book is similar to the one Cohen and
Granatstein present. It agrees with the hypothesis of a reduced role for Canada in international affairs and says:
Resources and bureaucrats had shrunk; the military was on life support; the United States was all too close; and the only real business of external relations was business. Canada seemed to matter so much less in the world, particularly when measured against the glories of the past, real and 29 apparent.
Mel Hurtig is another critic of Canada's foreign and defence policy. Considering the number of books he has published about this particular topic, he has almost made it his career to complain about Canada's increasing dependence on the United States. In The
Vanishing Country he examines Canada's foreign policy and looks at specific policy
27 Ibid., 2. 28 Norman Hillmer and Maureen A. Molot, eds., A Fading Power, Canada among Nations 2002 (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2002), xi. 9 areas such as the country's economic performance, its social policy, health care, education, and the labour market.30 Yet, the majority of the book is dedicated to the
Canada-US relationship. The central argument of the book is that Canada is being sold out to the United States. This notion is a consistency in Hurtig's work and speaks to his long history of complaint. In 1991, he argued in The Betrayal of Canada that the country is on the verge of being destroyed by a powerful corporate elite, most chiefly represented by the Prime Minister himself, Brian Mulroney.31 This most recent book could be seen as a continuation of his earlier work.
Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney, two defence analysts from Queen's University and the Royal Military College respectively have pointed out that at the beginning of the
1990s Canada's armed forces were faced with a dilemma: the operational tempo of the forces had increased while the total defence spending had decreased. This left the military with less capabilities, and Canadian soldiers had to do more with less. This policy, according to Bland and Maloney, caused frustration among the troops who interpreted the government's policy as "spending our lives to save taxpayer's money."32
The Conference Board of Canada, a non-profit think tank came to similar conclusions of Canada's relative standing in the world. The researchers argued that
Canadians had once seen themselves as being influential beyond our size, but this influence has vanished.33 The report argued that
Mel Hurtig, The Vanishing Country: Is It Too Late to Save Canada? (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2003). 31 Mel Hurtig, The Betrayal of Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991). 32 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 131. 33 Conference Board of Canada, Performance and Potential 2002-03 - Canada 2010: Challenges and Choices at Home and Abroad (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2000), 2. 10
this is due to the declining relative size of our economy among those of the nations of the world, compounded by our cuts in development assistance and defence spending.34
The report concentrated mostly on one particular policy area - Canada's economic policy
- and argued that other countries have strengthened their economic outputs since 1989 and became competitors for Canadian export markets. The reports anticipated that "by
2010, with military spending plateaued at 1.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), our capacity will be further reduced, along with our international reputation as peacekeepers."35
The Conference of Defence Association Institute (CDAI), a pro-defence lobby group who claims to represent some 600,000 defence supporters, also published a report in 2002 entitled A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces36 The central aim of the report was to lobby the government to increase the amount of Canadian defence spending. The report warned that the capabilities of the Canadian Forces were in a significant decline and had reached a level that threatened to make Canada irrelevant.37
The minimum level of Canadian defence spending, according to the report, also had an impact on the level of risks.
It can safely be said that national risks will increase in inverse proportion to the degree to which national armed forces are starved of the resources they need to counter threats to national security.38
lUiU, 35 Ibid., 3. 36 Conference of Defence Associations Institute, A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2002). 37 Ibid., viii. 38 Ibid., ix. 11
A Nation at Risk also examined the shortfalls of all three services - the army, navy, and air force and blamed the lack of funding as the main source that contributed to the declining relevance of Canada's armed forces.
In another publication, the CDAI offered a solution to the government by recommending to investment in "combat capable, flexible & adaptable, deployable & sustainable; and self sufficient & interoperable" forces.39 The argument the CDAI makes here was similar to the one it puts forward in A Nation at Risk. It argues that the more the world demands
Canada for its role and contribution to international peace and security, the more Canada requires credible armed forces. In short, the lack of funding is seen as the main reason for the low operational readiness of Canada's armed forces in the 1990s.40
To summarize the declinist school is to say that Canadians once punched above their weight, but they now pull their punches.
Alternative framework
To be sure, there is no doubt that in the early 1990s Canada was faced with a fiscal crisis at home that forced the government to cut its operating budgets. Two of the government's key departments with a foreign policy portfolio, chiefly the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence
(DND), had to cope with the majority of those cuts. In turn, this limited their ability to represent Canadians and Canada's interests abroad. For example, DND was forced by the government to close several base across the country, including the two bases in Baden-
Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Canada's National Security and Defence Policy in the 21st Century (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, April 2004), 5. 40 Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2001). 12
Soellingen and Lahr in Germany in 1994. Likewise, DFAIT closed a number of embassies and consulates around the world.42 This unilateral withdrawal from world politics affected Canada's relations with its NATO allies. Canadian representatives abroad, for example, particularly at NATO headquarters in Brussels, felt the brunt of their
NATO colleagues.43
However, despite these fiscal cuts, Canada remained committed to European security politically and militarily. In order to explain this phenomenon, one needs to employ an alternative conceptual framework for thinking about Canada's role in NATO in the
1990s. I will show that the problem with using the declinist argument to explain Canada's behaviour in a post-Cold War security environment in Europe is that it is based on rationalist assumptions, which do not hold in the post-Cold War pan-European security order. During the Cold War, the size of a state's armed forces, the number and types of weapons and equipment, and its level of defence spending measured with reference to a country's gross domestic product (GDP), were perceived as a benchmark to measure allied burden sharing during the Cold War. These yardsticks have become obsolete in a post-Cold War order due to the changing nature of the security environment in Europe.
The declinist literature uses the traditional Cold War benchmarks as the foundation of their assessment. More specifically, the declinist argument is based on an understanding of the international system as being dominated by balance of power politics and security
Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 165. 42 Ibid. 43 Confidential interview with Canadian military official, Royal Military College of Canada, 30 November, 2007. For a historical account of this notion see for example Sean M. Maloney, Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War, IRPP Working Paper Series; No. 2003-02 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2003). 13
alliances, where large conventional armed forces are a tool for containing the enemy, and the pre-eminence of nuclear forces is a tool for deterring the enemy.44 In short, one can call this the realist theory of Canadian foreign policy, which disregards the new meaning of security and military forces.
This dissertation challenges this rationalist assumption and shows that the logic that low levels of defence spending directly lead to a vanishing role of Canada internationally does not hold in the post-Cold War era. The basis for this contestation is the acknowledgement in the larger body of international relations literature that the conduct of international affairs has changed the behaviour and role of states and has given the armed forces have new roles and responsibilities as a result.45 These types of external factors affected the nature and conduct of Canadian external relations with
Europe, and are largely neglected in the declinist literature. Therefore, the post-Cold War environment in Europe, in which NATO operated and in which Canada was an active participant, demands a more detailed examination and analysis in order to reach a comprehensive assessment of Canada's role in NATO during the 1990s.
The alternative framework proposed here suggests that in order to understand
Canadian actions in the 1990s, one needs to examine the evolution of the notion of security. It is apparent from the literature that the concept of security, including national security and international security, evolved in the post-Cold War era. It now encompasses many other issues beyond traditional military concerns, such as the security of
44 The literature on the realist school of international relations is extensive. For a good introduction into this thought see Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism," in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 45 See for example Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), Mary Kaldor, Basker Vashee, and World Institute for Development Economics Research, Restructuring the Global Military Sector, 2 vols. (London, New York: Pinter, 1997). 14 individuals, the environment etc.46 In turn, this new definition of security requires a new understanding of threat perceptions of states and the new role that governments assigned to their diplomatic services and armed forces, as they responded to this new security environment. These theoretical discussions will be further explained in chapter two and provide the basis for the analysis that follows it.
Second, in order to properly understand Canadian actions in the NATO framework during the 1990s, they must be analyzed in the larger historical context. This approach not only allows a reconsideration of the underlying causes, factors, and interests that led to
Canada's membership in NATO but also provides an indication as to why Canada acted the way it did in the post-Cold War security environment. Indeed, Canadian actions in the
1990s did not take place in a vacuum, nor were they a surprise. As noted above, Canada is a founding member of the alliance and at the end of the Cold War in 1989 it had a relationship with the organization for fourty years. Canada has a certain reputation of its performance and role in the alliance that is based on Canada's historical contributions to the Alliance. Even though the declinist school examines Canada's historic role in NATO, it does so without placing Canada's relationship with NATO at the centre of its analysis.
It is this aspect of the analysis that the historical chapter intends to fill in order to determine the nature of Canada's role has been in NATO since 1949. I suggest that
Canadian external relations with Europe have been consistent since NATO's inauguration. More specifically, in 1949, Canada supported an inside and an outside mode of NATO. The inside mode referred to Canada's understanding of NATO being
For the latest research on this notion see for example Roland Dannreuther, International Security: The Contemporary Agenda (Oxford: Polity Press, 2007). 15 more than a military alliance. Canada wanted NATO to be an embracing security community, and one that included multilateral transatlantic cooperation beyond the defence dimension. Indeed, Canada envisioned a political and economic Atlantic community.47 In 1948, the St. Laurent government lobbied Canada's allies to include a passage in the Washington Treaty that extended the defence alliance beyond military cooperation, and embraced the notion of political cooperation among the allies and a transatlantic trade regime.48 Although Canada was confronted with opposition to its plans, the demands eventually became part of Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, and were later known as the Canadian article. Canadian idealism about NATO, however, was short lived and was overshadowed by NATO's external mode and the balance of power regime in Europe. With the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, NATO became preoccupied with the external geostrategic considerations of the Cold War rather than pursuing the objective of building a security community.49 As a consequence of this,
NATO members adjusted their national security policies and postured large conventional forces for the defence of Western Europe. Canada was one of those allied countries that made its troops available to NATO's defence forces, and like its allies, paid less attention to building a security community.
The end of the Cold War, however, changed this paradigm and the geopolitical context in which the alliance operates. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany worked as a switch in Canada's external relations, and allowed
Ottawa to re-focus on NATO's internal security dimensions of nourishing a security
47 See for example James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964). 48 Ibid. 49 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Nato 1948: The Birth of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004). 16 community. Canada finally had its political NATO. As David Haglund noted, it was the
"NATO of Canada's dreams."50 When the Cold War ended, the natural political move for
Canada, as it was for its NATO allies, was to revisit its policy of forwardly deploying its armed forces to Germany, and to shift its allied contributions to foster a new political role for NATO. More to the point, as events unfolded, Canadian efforts concentrated on two pillars: first, to bring peace and security to the Balkans, and second, to nourish NATO's new political functions of shaping the transition processes of countries from Central and
Eastern Europe. By doing so, Canada helped exporting NATO's values of liberal democratic governance, multilateralism, transparency, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Canada also helped to shape legal and institutional arrangements, established systematic interactions with political elites, assisted in drafting defence legislation and norms for the conduct of civil-military relations, and guided the young democratic governments in restructuring their defense and interior ministries. In short,
Canada helped in this transition process by socializing the political, military, and functional elites of CEE. In retrospect, this socialization of former adversaries was the single most important commitment to giving NATO a new role in European security as a crisis manager.
Politically and diplomatically, Canada promoted the enlargement of the alliance as well as its outreach program, such as the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). Furthermore,
Canadian diplomats worked through the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) [which in 1994 became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)] and later NATO to foster peace, order and stability on the European
50 David G. Haglund, "The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and the Co-Operative Security Alliance," International Journal 52 (Summer 1997). 17
continent. The fall of the Berlin Wall fundamentally changed the security environment in
Europe and in the world. This change gave the Alliance a new opportunity to develop a
new purpose for its existence. Canada actively helped to shape the new security
environment and NATO's new raison d'etre.
Bridge building
In this dissertation Canada's political role in the Alliance in the 1990s, is understood in
terms of Canada playing the role of an intra-alliance bridge builder and an actor that perceives NATO as a security community. Role-playing has been an important part of
conceptualizing Canadian foreign policy. Even before the Second World War, Canada's
role in international affairs was portrayed by the United States and Great Britain as that of
a bridge builder 51 between Canada's two closest partners, the United States and Great
Britain.52 As this thesis will explain, Canadian leaders put significant efforts into building
this bridge for two reasons. First, Canada did so in order to not get caught in between the
two allies Britain and the United States, and second, Canada built this bridge in order to
have access to its allies, but not necessarily to have influence. This was the mindset that
Canadians brought to NATO. Canada's High Commissioner to London, Norman
Robertson explains:
Ever since we have been in a position to shape our own policy abroad, we had had to wrestle with the antinomies created by our position as a North American country and as a member of the Commonwealth, by our special relationship with the United Kingdom and at the same time, although in less degree with other countries in western Europe as well. A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified with our special relationship with other countries in western Europe and in
51 Annette Baker Fox and Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Canada in World Affairs, The ACS US Papers (Michigan State University Press, 1996), 32. Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, Canadian Controversies Series (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979), 11. 18
which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably militarily, for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to me such a providential solution for so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership.53
Canada received recognition and respect for those efforts by its NATO allies. Again, to be sure, Canada built this bridge not to have influence in the alliance, but to play a role.
Pre-World War II bridge building
For example, Canadian diplomats were credited with helping to prevent a transatlantic rift between the two countries during the Washington naval negotiations in 1921.54 This was
an international conference called for by the United States to limit the naval arms race
and to work out security agreements in the Pacific area. Held in Washington, D.C., the conference resulted in the signing of several agreements. The relevance of this historical event for the analysis here is that Canada was asked by the United States to put pressure on the United Kingdom to abandon their Japanese alliance in form of a naval treaty.55 At another occasion during the Second World War, according to Lyon and Tomlin,
Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie was asked by US President Roosevelt to deliver a
secret memo to London at a time when the United States was not yet engaged in the war.
Thus Canada took up the role of a transatlantic bridge between the two English-speaking countries. This was a rather unique instance, considering the fact that at the time Canada
Norman Robertson, High Commissioner in London in 1948, quoted in Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope; The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 132. 54 This conference became formally known as the International Conference in Naval Limitations (1921-22). For Canadian role playing at the conference see for example J. Bartlett Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo- Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," Political Science Quarterly 50, no. 1 (March 1935), Stephen Wentworth Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, the Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929, The History of the United States, 1876-1976 (New York: Garland Pub., 1979). 19 was still a dependent dominion of the British Empire and without the privilege of conducting an autonomous foreign policy.
The notion of bridge building in the literature is used interchangeably with the notion of Canada being the linchpin. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is quoted to first having described Canada as the linchpin between Britain and the United States.56
The international community accepted Canada's new role as an "indispensable element in the worldwide quest for peace."57 The linchpin metaphor, as David Haglund argued, was
a description of an idealistic worldview based on moral values and ideas.58 It was
associated with the idea that Canada would be able to maintain peace and solidarity within the North Atlantic triangle.59 US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Churchill indirectly acknowledged this new status and invited Canadian Prime Minister
Mackenzie King to take part in some of their war deliberations.60
Others, such as historians Brian McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, have argued that the metaphor of Canada as the linchpin was first used in the aftermath of the Imperial
Conference in 1926.61 The conference was an important event in Canadian foreign policy because it accepted the Balfour declaration, which acknowledged that dominions such as
Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 11. 57 David G. Haglund and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End, Contemporary Affairs Series No. 4 (Toronto: Irwin Pub., 2000), 33. 58 Ibid, 34. 59 For a detailed examination of the North Atlantic triangle see for example John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle; the Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain (New York: Russell & Russell, 1970), David G. Haglund, "Brebner's North Atlantic Triangle at Sixty: A Retrospective Look at a Retrospective Book," London Journal of Canadian Studies 20 (2004/2005), B. J. C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956 (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 6 Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 11. Even though it is not historically proven yet if the British Prime Minister and his American counterpart were really committed to let Mackenzie King take part of the deliberations as an ally. Thus, it is more likely that they invited the Canadian Prime Minister as a gesture of politeness and encouragement for Canada's behaviour in international affairs. 61 McKercher and Aronsen, The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956,4-5. 20
Canada would be treated and ranked equally to the United Kingdom. Again, Canada did not build this bridge for other countries but for itself. Thus, only Canada was able to make use of this bridge. One of the first functions of a bridge, as Arthur Lower points out, is to be walked upon,62 and Canadians used this bridge as a diplomatic mechanism to pursue its interests.
Canada continued to pursue this bridge building policy in the post-World War II environment. During the negotiations for the Washington Treaty in 1948-49, for example,
Canada, according to a scholar practitioner who was familiar with the file, was active during the negotiations for the Washington Treaty.63 Dean Acheson, then US Secretary of
State, confirmed this view:
When the sessions resumed in February, I found myself working with a group of ambassadors whom I had known well for so long that we were truly - and not spuriously - on a first-name basis. The original group was small - Oliver Franks of Britain, Hume Wrong of Canada, Henri Bonnet of France, Eelco van Kleffens of the Netherlands, Robert Silvercruys of Belgium, and Minister Hugues Le Gallais of Luxembourg. [...] The Wrong-Acheson friendship went back over two generations. His father had been at the University of Toronto with mine, and Mrs. Wrong's father, Professor Hutton, had taught them both. [...] all the others had been colleagues of mine for many years. We talked easily and frankly.64
In short, Canada was active in the negotiations. It used the bridge to convince the United
States to sign on to this arrangement. After the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949,
Canada's bridge did not disappear and continued to exist. Canadian diplomats also helped
J. Arthur Lower, Ocean of Destiny: A Concise History of the North Pacific, 1500-1978 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978). See also Lower quoted in Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 12. 63 See for a detailed account of this time in Escort Reid, Time of Fear and Hope; The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). 64 Dean Acheson, Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969, 276-77. 21 to ease the tense relationship over the Suez Canal crisis in the 1950s. Moreover, Ottawa assisted the British government as it adjusted from the head of an empire to a normal member of the Commonwealth.66 As chapter two examines in greater detail, the concept of bridge building is closely linked to the image of Canada as a middle power. However, as this thesis will show, in the context of NATO, Canada's role was more that of an intra-
NATO Alliance bridge builder than it was an inter-alliance bridge builder. Canadian bridge building was always more important to Canadians than it was to other countries.67
Chapter two will also explore the external meaning of Canadian internationalism in greater detail. It suggests that idea of Canada being a middle, principal, or satellite power was developed by Canadians for Canadians in the sense that their intentions was to tell
Canadians who they are and what they should do internationally rather than having the international community tells them how they perceive Canada and its role in world politics.
Canadians are perceived by the United States as their closest friend, which gives unprecedented access to decision makers in Washington and provides a level of trust.68
As part of intra-Alliance bridge building, Canada exercised a moderating influence on
Washington. Canadian policy makers assumed that it was easier to influence their
Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 58. Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 18. 67 Here, most analysts agree that it is difficult to measure Canada's effectiveness and success. It is, however, recognized in the literature that two ideologically similar governments in Ottawa and Washington are more likely to establish a friendly relationship. This, however, is not to say that the Canada-US relationship is not protected against political tides of domestic politics. For example, Prime Minister Trudeau showed a relative lack of interest in a healthy Canada-US relationship. For one of the latest comprehensive assessments of this argument see Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State (Toronto; Washington: University of Toronto Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002). Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 20. This is also confirmed in the literature by Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). 22 neighbour, the United States, because Canadian officials were familiar with the political system and culture of their neighbour to the south. Thus, chances for influencing the decision-making process in the US machinery of government appeared to be promising.69
In addition, Canadians are perceived by the United States as their closest friends, which gives unprecedented access to decision makers in Washington and provides a level of
The international community respected this ability and used Canada's unique position in situations where their relationship with the United States became difficult.
Canada took up this role as an international mediator. One example is Canada's role in the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, in which the Canadian government successfully mediated
71 between two of its closes allies, the United States, and the United Kingdom. In short, as
Robert Greenhill argued, Canada's "international personality is clear, at least to others.
We are seen as an internationally engaged, economically and socially successful, increasingly multi-ethnic country."72 The international confidence that other countries had in Canadian diplomacy was a reflection of Canada's quiet diplomacy style, which, in turn, was the result of Canadian bridge building. It allowed Ottawa to use it as a tool of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States.73 This policy of quietness espouses Canada-
For the latest reiteration of this point see Allan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries, 1981-89 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007). 70 See for example Robert Greenhill, Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2005). This notion was also confirmed by confidential interview with NATO official at NATO Headquarters, 18 May 2007. 71 For a detailed historical account of Canada's role in the Suez Canal Crisis see for example Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970 (St. Catherines, Ont.: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002, 61-78. 7 Ibid., 19. Nils Orvik has elaborated on this notion by seeing the role of middle powers as mediators in arms control and disarmament negotiations. See his "NATO: The Role of the Small Members," International Journal vol. 21, no.2 (Spring 1966), 177-179. See for example Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), 18-22; 85-86. 23
US institutional collaboration to isolate North American issues from international ones.
This was Canadian functionalism at work, and allowed experts to solve the more technical issues of the relationship. Furthermore, early stages of Canadian foreign policy after 1945 showed, as we will see in the following chapters, that Canada tended to see the world through the prism of US foreign policy. International issues and Canadian reactions to it were defined by looking at the importance of this issue to the United
States.75 Thus, seeing events in international affairs through the prism of the United
States was one of the reasons why Canada engaged in to bridge building.
Post-Cold War bridge building
In the post-1989 security environment in Europe, Canada continued to play the role of an intra Alliance bridge builder by shaping the post-Cold War pan-European security community and helping states from CEE to institutionalize these norms. Again, it is important to recognize that only Canada was able to walk across this bridge. It was in
Canada's national interest to only allow Canadians to walk across that bridge as a way of securing Canadian interests in the transatlantic Alliance. By revitalizing this bridge in
1989 after it had fainted during the Cold War years, Canada helped to shape the development of political and military institutions in CEE by promoting democratic values such as the rule of law, peaceful settlement of conflicts, multilateralism, and human rights. As such, Canada was an actor of pushing for a collective and normative security
74 See Charles F. Doran, Forgotten Partnership: US-Canada Relations Today (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 139. 75 There is large agreement in the literature that Canada's role perception is not static; it changes over time. Don Monton, for example has researched Canada's role perceptions between 1957-72 extensively. His work is based on earlier works of Karl Holsti in the United States. See Kal J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly XIV, no. 3 (September 1970), Don Munton, "Much Ado About the Dependent Variable: Goals, Roles, and Actions as Foreign Policy," in Workshop on Approaches to the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy (Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University: 1974). 24
framework of allied representation and wanted to create a larger pan-European security
community.
NATO as a security community
A second way in which Canadian political actions in NATO in the 1990s can be
understood is in the context of pursuing a security community. This concept refers to the
idea that actors share values, norms and symbols that provide a social identity of that
particular community.76 Hence, a security community defines itself differently from other
communities. It carefully determines its own characteristics to allow for a clear
distinction. A security community goes beyond state interdependence in the domain of
security. Indeed, a security community refers to an integration of accepted values, norms,
and customs.77 The essence of security cooperation is that a nation state relies on the
resources and commitments of other states for its national security and thus its survival.
In turn, a closer integration in the security area demands from states to give up some of
their national sovereignty and thus some freedom of action and the power to accumulate
military power. This loss of sovereignty requires greater transparency of the state in terms
of allowing other states of the community to get access to vital national security
information, such as the level of defence spending, the structure of the armed forces, and
others. The integration in the security field then provides a sense of community that
creates the assurance that states that are members of such security community would
settle their differences peacefully. The commitment to more openness and transparency
76 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3. 77 As we will see below, Karl Deutsch was one of the first researchers to apply the concept of security communities to the NATO Alliance. See Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 25 marks one of the cornerstones of the NATO Alliance. Thus, it is not surprising that during the accession negotiations of the aspirant states the allies insisted to push for greater openness and transparency.
As noted earlier, the concept of a security community has been in existence for quite some time.78 The NATO Alliance is probably one of the most pertinent examples of such cooperation, but arms control agreements, land mine conventions and peacekeeping operations also come to mind. Generally speaking, security regimes are a more institutionalized form of security cooperation. Karl Deutsch is the first scholar who described the phenomenon of security communities.79 His work is rooted in the behavioural tradition of international relations and sprinkled with empirical analysis. It is also based on the work of Richard Van Wagenen.80 The idea that international actors can share values, norms, and symbols, which then could lead to a social identity of a state or international organization, is at the heart of the concept of a security community. The purpose of seeking security communities is a reduction of transaction costs of parties within such a community. They also provide a forum for communication and exchange: parties were told what others expect them to do and what they could expect from their peers.81 The conclusion, however, that all states are equally seeking such security
Theoretically, one could argue that security communities evolved with the birth of the Westphalian nation state system in 1648. However, it was not until 1957 when Karl Deutsch first conceptualized security communities. See Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, chapter 1-2. Indeed, the concept of a security community was a popular theoretical construct in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, the preoccupation of the Cold War with hard-power issues such as nuclear technology and military capabilities blinded the field of international relations theory. However, the end of the Cold War and the renewed interest of international relations scholars in the development of international norms, identities, and values have reinstated the interest for the concept of a security community. 7 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. 80 Donald J. Puchala, International Politics Today (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971), 165. 81 Harald Mueller, "Security Community," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Beth A. Simmons, and Thomas Risse-Kappen (London: SAGE, 2002), 376. See also Ronald B. Mitchell, 26
cooperation did not stand up to the evidence. Indeed there are differences among the
members of a security community, and some, as Harald Mueller noted, seek deeper
integration than others: "If we compare the present inclination of democratic states to
expand the realm of security cooperation in ways that imply further constraints on
national sovereignty, we find countries like Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands or
Germany in the forefront, the United Kingdom somewhere in the middle, and France, and
even more the United States, towards the end."82
Karl Deutsch published his work in the late 1950s based on observations of two
types of security communities in the international system: an amalgamated and a
pluralistic security community. He first describes a community in which the units are
formally integrated83 to the point of "a formal merger of two or more previously
independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after
amalgamation."84 A pluralist community is seen as a group of states that have become
integrated to the point where they have a sense of a coherent group or small community
while retaining heir national sovereignty: "These states within a pluralistic security
community possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and
mutual responsiveness - a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of we-ness, and
are integrated to the point that they entertain "dependable expectations of peaceful
change." A pluralistic security community could be defined as a "transnational region
"Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes," International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 1 (1998). 82 Mueller, "Security Community," 378. 3 An example would be the European Union of today. Deutsch himself uses the United States as an example. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, 5. 5 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 7. 27
comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change."86 For the purposes of this dissertation, NATO is considered a pluralistic security community.
Deutsch then assumes that this security community would settle its differences
peacefully. In that sense, a security community not only enhances international order, but
also contributes to a stable peace. Again, NATO is such a pluralistic security community.
Early on, NATO allies agreed to cooperate in policy areas other than security and
defence. Article 2, for example, talks about the political cooperation and the hope for an
enhanced transatlantic economic relationship. However, the pre-eminence of the threat of
Communism in the early stages of the Cold War overshadowed this dimension of the
relationship. The concept of security communities revived after the end of the Cold War
when NATO decided to reach out to states from Central and Eastern Europe. NATO no
longer was preoccupied with preparations for a mobilization against a hostile Soviet
Union. In part, such a decision was also made possible because of the strong support of
the US administration that showed considerable interest in CEE and the idea of a
87
community of states.
The resurgence of the concept of security communities could be explained by the
end of the Cold War and an evolution of international relations theory, both of which
challenged the traditional realist paradigm. It asked questions about identities, values, and
86 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30. 87 The sources for this are numerous. For a good overview, even though a critical one, see Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2001). However, this point was also made my some American legislators. Senator Richard Lugar is probably the most prominent proponent for an enlarged NATO. See for example his remarks in the Senate: Richard Lugar, "Getting Back to Basics: NATO's Double Enlargement," Congressional Record (Senate), June 10, 1996, p. S6001. 28 norms. After 1989, the new NATO could be characterized by "shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows to encourage community building - to conceptualize the possibility of peace."89 Thus, the literature of security communities was entrenched with liberal ideals. Indeed, the security community literature required an analysis of transnational forces that helped explain the interaction of the various actors in the system. In 1990, analysts argued that NATO had lost the glue that held the Alliance together when the Russian threat had disappeared.90 This, however, was a realist interpretation of history. Contrary to this position, liberal IR scholars would argue that despite the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the lack of threat that was projected against the West, the NATO Alliance still was relevant to solve international problems and reduce transaction costs of states.9' The fact that each state had (and continues to do so until this day) an equal voting opportunity in NATO, demonstrates that the Alliance indeed shares normative values such as equal representation, democracy, respect for minorities, the rule of law, and market economies. Also, communication on a regular basis inside NATO committees and in informal meetings make regular meetings possible and have contributed to a shared identification of what this organization is and what wants to do. Regular communication and the exchange of words, gestures, and symbols allow for mutual trust, understanding, sympathy, and loyalty and thus contribute to a greater community feeling. All those principles, including shared knowledge, normative
88 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 9. 89 Ibid. 90 See for example Sean Kay, NA TO and the Future of European Security (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter, 1994-95). 91 See for example Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, 2nd ed. (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), Stanley R. Sloan and Foreign Policy Association, NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Crisis, Continuity or Change?, Headline Series No. 324 (New York, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 2002). 29 principles, and ideational forces such as mutual transparency in all decisions related to security and defence, are significant elements of NATO's outreach programs and its process of enlargement. In other words, the level of trust and institutionalization is an essential factor for categorizing pluralistic security communities - whether it be a loose type of a security community or a tight one.92 Thus, the concept of community includes sociological and psychological aspects.93
In turn, a loose security community refers to a transnational region in which sovereign states are amply connected with one another and share similar identities.
Members of this community could be sure that other members of the community would not challenge the status quo. A more integrated or tight security community, however, refers to a much closer process of integration in which states adhere not only to the principle of mutual aid but also a pledge to come to the defence of other members of the community if one member of the community were attacked. Consequently, tighter security communities often share a commitment to collective defence. This is a system that is located somewhere in between a sovereign state and a regional, and centralized government: "It is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system."94 In this system, national sovereignty is pooled and networks and international interactions are the dominant features of security communities. Security communities, however, are not necessarily confined to a geographical space or region.
See John G. Ruggie, Winning the Peace (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 81-82, quoted in Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," 30. Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 5. 94 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," 30. 30
Scholars have also pointed out that the close proximity correlate to common interests and
beliefs, culture, and security concerns.95
Indeed, NATO made the adherence to these values a cornerstone of its
enlargement process in the sense that the accession states had to live up to NATO's
principles and values before they could join the Alliance. The underlying assumption of
NATO officials is that a close cooperation in various policy areas would deepen the
shared values and transnational linkage. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states were
enticed by two benefits that NATO had to offer: its collective defence posture preserved
in Article 5, and the shared values, norms, and principles the Alliance stands for.96
A side effect of each community is that it excludes those members that were not
likely to be allowed to join. The danger, of course, is that exactly those members that are
not allowed or prepared to join the desired community might react in a way that then
poses a security risk to the original group. Adler and Barnett called this the Tier One
security community by which they refer to an entity that is created by external factors
such as security threats and others.97 Those states then coordinate their relations and
actions in response to the perceived threat. Thus, by cooperating in their security
concerns they reduce the mutual fear of hostile invasion. In the case of NATO it was
Russia that made clear that it would not support NATO's enlargement plans and threatened to join the Commonwealth of Independent States98 - a group of non-aligned
95 The debate about NATO enlargement is an interesting point of reference here, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. It is interesting in the sense that the question of enlarging a security organization that was created to bring peace and order to the European continent, caused a debate of what defines a European country - be it its geographical location on the European continent or shared values and beliefs. 96 Annex to M-1(94)2, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. 97 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," 37. 98 Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations; The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 175. 31 states - to counterbalance NATO expansion. A Tier Two community is determined when a more integrated form of community is reached where not only governments and the political elite have become involved in but also its citizens."
Third, this dissertation examines Canadian military contributions to NATO in the 1990s in a new way. The new meaning of the concept of security, as noted above, provides the framework for this understanding and gives new meaning to military deployments post-
1989 and levels of defence spending. The end of the Cold War has brought about a busy schedule for the Atlantic alliance in addition to its political engagements in CEE. While former Cold War adversaries have become friends with the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, other parts of the world became more troubled. One might think of Kuwait and the first Gulf War in 1990, or the evolving crisis in the Balkans that followed in 1992. The
Atlantic Alliance was forced to respond to these events, most chiefly the crisis in the
Balkans. Canada was one of the NATO members that sent armed forces in response to these crises. More specifically, militarily speaking Canada was one of the first countries to send troops to the Balkans as part of a larger United Nations force in 1992
(UNPROFOR). Later, in 1994 when UNPROFOR was terminated, Canada remained in
Europe and committed its armed forces to the UN-authorized NATO-run Implementation
Force (IFOR), then the Stabilization Force (SFOR), and finally the Kosovo force
(KFOR). Indeed, Canadian Forces have been on duty continuously in the Balkans since
1991. While it is true that the Canadian government could have spent more on defence during this time period, these deployments occurred without extra tax-dollars for the CF
99 Ibid., 39. 32 from the federal treasury. Indeed, Canada did more with less, and the level of Canada's international activity increased while having fewer resources. Thus, the lack of Canadian defence spending in itself cannot be counted as an indicator of a Canadian decline on the international stage. An examination of military contributions is meaningless if it is not placed into a larger situational context. This larger context includes a comparison of
Canada's military activity at the international level in comparison to that of Canada's allies. Thus, the empirical analysis of how many troops and military equipment Canada made available to NATO for military operations in the 1990s is measured against the contributions of other NATO allies. This allows for a better understanding of Canadian burden sharing.
The new NATO also required a new understanding of the level of defence spending of its member states. While the share of the allied burden during the Cold War was measured in terms of the numbers of troops and equipment an ally was able to commit to the defence of Europe, this indicator became outdated in the post-Cold War era. As this dissertation shows in chapter five and six, the political and military commitments of allies post-1989 take on a new meaning in a changed security context.
This affected Canada as much as other NATO allies and renewed the debate about
Canada's share of burden in the Alliance. What mattered to NATO in the post-Cold War era were contributions to allied response capabilities, aid to CEE, and the level of commitment to NATO's civilian budgets. Again, it can be argued that by taking these transformations into consideration, Canada spent proportionately more on defence in absolute terms than other states. 33
Taken together then, it is suggested that these indicators can indeed be interpreted not as a sign of a declining or isolationist Canada, as the declinist school suggested, but one of a continuous commitment that was consistent with Canada's traditional foreign policy styles of liberal internationalism.
Aim and purpose of dissertation
The aim of this dissertation is neither to challenge the empirical findings of the declinist literature nor to challenge the heart of their argument that Canada's key foreign policy departments (DFAIT, DND) had to operate with fewer funds. Indeed, this dissertation assumes that cut backs of Canada's foreign and defence policy took place. Where this dissertation challenges the accepted wisdom of the declinist literature and the deductive nature of their argument is the idea that such a decline automatically leads to less influence in world politics. It is important to note that the aim of this dissertation is not to measure Canada's international power or influence abroad. As chapter 2 in this dissertation shows, measuring the level of a state's power is complex and nearly impossible to do. It is based on too many unknown variables. Instead, the aim here is to examine and measure Canada's role and relative standing in the alliance by offering a different theoretical framework for thinking about Canada's role in NATO in the 1990s, and by developing a new set of benchmarks that measure this new involvement.
To summarize, the purpose of this dissertation is threefold: first, to disprove the assertions of a reductionist Canada that were developed most chiefly by Andrew Cohen and Jack Granatstein; second, to show that Canada functioned as an intra-alliance bridge- builder; and third, to offer new indices of measuring allied burden sharing in a post-Cold 34
War environment, which, in turn, allows an examination of Canada's political and
military role in NATO, not its influence.
Research Questions
The following questions are addressed in this study: Is the declinist argument correct in
asserting that Canada was in decline in the 1990s? If the school is wrong in its assertions,
how can we then describe Canadian contributions to European security in the 1990s in
the context of a new security environment and the evolving conflicts on the Balkans?
And finally, did the new security environment in Europe change the parameters of
analyzing Canada's role not influence in the transatlantic Alliance?
Hypothesis
The dissertation takes the pessimistic view of a declining Canada as its starting point and
hypothesizes that this argument does not withstand the facts of Canadian engagement in
European security issues, nor its allied commitments in Europe. In short, the assertions of
the declinist school in the Canadian foreign policy literature cannot be verified when
using Canada's relationship with NATO in the post-Cold War European security
environment as a case study. One might, for example, consider Canada's role in the 1990
London Summit and the notion of the "hand of friendship," or its role in setting up new
institutions for NATO, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), or the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, or its continuous military commitments in the
Balkans, all of which give an indication that Canada did not vanish from the politics of
European security. Hence, the argument of the decade of darkness of Canadian foreign policy is juxtaposed to a somewhat more nuanced analysis and interpretation of Canadian performances in Europe between 1989-2001. Again, Canadian actions in Europe cannot 35 be examined in isolation and need to be placed into the larger historical context. As noted earlier, the end of the Cold War brought about new roles and responsibilities for NATO and its member states. The central argument of this dissertation is that Canada was not in decline but was a dedicated and committed NATO ally that played a role in shaping the new pan-European security order. This is not to say that the declinist hypothesis is refuted in its entirety. Indeed, this might still hold in other regions of the world.
Theoretical-methodological approaches
After examining the three predominant images of Canadian foreign policy - liberal internationalism, principal power, and satellite power image - the liberal internationalist approach of Canadian foreign policy is chosen to constitute the main theoretical focus of this study. In addition, the dissertation makes use of the body of literature of liberal security communities. Theoretically speaking, the concept of security communities is based on liberal assumptions. Thus, it provides a more specific framework to understand
Canadian actions in the 1990s. As noted earlier, NATO will be the case study in examining Canada's external relations. The liberal internationalist theory of Canadian foreign policy stems from the larger body of literature of liberal international relations theories and provides the basis for seeing NATO as a security community. This examination of key theories and concepts then provides the theoretical background for this comparative foreign policy analysis of Canada. As Danford Middlemiss and Joel
Sokolsky have argued, "after all, Canadian foreign policy is in itself a subfield of
International politics."100
Danford William Middlemiss and Joel J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada, 1989), 3. 36
Measuring Canadian political and diplomatic contributions to allied security is not an easy task. Often times, contributions are non-materialistic and take place in the form of negotiations, bargaining, and other tacit support. Besides examining primary documents of key actors, such as those of the Canadian government, NATO, and their bureaucrats, uninstructed interviews were conducted in the capital of Canada, Ottawa, and at NATO headquarters in Brussels to better understand the role and actions of key actors and their decisions. The rationale for choosing this approach has largely to do with the nature of primary documents, which largely remain inaccessible. This is then followed by a content analysis of the material and allows an examination of the communication between the key actors.101 More specifically, it allows tracing the line of thought of Canadian government officials and government departments. In short, this approach allows for an interpretative and deconstructive reading of the issues while the focus of analysis is on Canada. Again, the task of this dissertation is not to measure
Canada's power in the NATO alliance but to examine its role in the Alliance.
Generally speaking, a methodology is particularly useful in the context of a research program where hypotheses lend themselves to falsification. This dissertation uses a positivist approach in the epistemological tradition proposed by the German philosopher Karl Popper. He developed the logic of validation by which he meant that in order to further develop theory not confirmation but falsification of those theories is required in order to explain an observable phenomenon.102 Popper postulates that various hypothesis can be deducted or rejected by using empirical case studies or, as he calls it, quantitative research: "In the field of empirical sciences, more particularly, he [a
1 For a greater discussion of this see Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 618-22. 102 Karl Raimund Sir Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 27. 37 scientist] constructs hypotheses, or systems of theories, and tests them against experience by observation and experiment."103 His understanding is that the world is an objective reality and thus empirical analysis can help to explain this reality by testing existing theories. He also argued that facts of observation need to be interpreted before they can be counted on.104 It is in this behaviouralist tradition of the 1950s and 1960s, which was most chiefly developed by the Chicago school, which uses a scientific approach of analysis that was rooted in logical realism. This approach stresses observation and testing as the only ways of justifying claims to knowledge in the world.105 When positivism is constructed this way, it is opposed to the realist IR theory. The assumption is that only behaviour could be observed and thus it is the objective of the researcher to collect sufficient scientific data to test the theories.
More specifically, according to Popper the aim of a deductive research strategy is to test theories and to eliminate the false ones that are unable to explain reality.106 He argues that the researcher should follow six steps for testing: first, the researcher has to put forward a tentative idea or a hypothesis. Logically speaking, this is a deductive method in the sense that it formulates a singular statement and not a universal one. For example, in this dissertation, the notion that Canada is in decline is the single hypothesis that is being tested. In a second step, with the help of other previously accepted hypothesis, the researcher deducts a conclusion or a number of conclusions. This approach of logical comparison examines the internal consistencies of the system that is
For a detailed account of Popper's philosophy of science see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chapter 3. 105 See for example Ibid., 8-15. See for example Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 32-33. 38 being tested.107 In a third step, the researcher carefully examines those conclusions and the logic of the argument that produced them. The objective there is to compare this argument with the existing theories in order to see if it produces any scientific advances.
Fourth, if satisfied by the results, the researcher should test the conclusions by gathering appropriate data or make additional observations. In the words of Popper, "the purpose of this last kind of test is to find out how far the new consequences of the theory - whatever may be new in what it asserts - stand up to the demands of practice, whether raised by purely scientific experiments, or by practical technological applications."108 Fifth, if the test fails and the collected data is not consistent with the conclusions, the logical reasoning, according to Popper, could only be that the theory must be false too. In turn, if the data verifies the hypothesis, then the theory has passed the test.109 Six, if, however, the conclusions pass the test in the sense that the data, for example, is consistent with it, the theory is temporarily supported.
Innovative content and contribution to the literature
This project will challenge the accepted wisdom in the literature of Canadian foreign policy that Canada's role in the transatlantic alliance was fading in the 1990s. It will establish the argument that Canada was not pursuing an isolationist or reductionist foreign policy and was an active NATO ally. Furthermore, the research will show that
Canada's foreign and defence policy has been consistent with NATO's policies since
1949. The dissertation also reintroduces the notion of Canadian bridge building into the literature.
1UIU.) JA-. Ibid., 33. 39
Limitations of the Research
Because of the limited scope of this study, the dissertation concentrates only on one particular aspect of Canadian external relations, namely Canada's role in NATO and the political, diplomatic, and military role Canada played in the Alliance in the 1990s, This study is focused on an international organization, and in part, on Canada's role in this organization. This includes an examination of Canada's role in the Balkans. As a result and because of the limitations of the dissertation format, this study excludes a comprehensive analysis of Canadian foreign development aid, its economic relationships with other countries (particularly the United States), or Canada's external relations with other countries or international organizations. These studies, however, would have been relevant in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of Canadian external relations and the role that Canada played in the Alliance and to fully refute the declinist school's argument.
This point leads to another limitation of this research: the narrow focus of this analysis on the Canada-NATO relationship. This particular case study automatically excludes a comprehensive analysis of Canada's relationship, role, and standing in other pan-European security organizations such as the CSCE (later OSCE), the Western
European Union (WEU), and the European Union (EU). Yet, it is accepted wisdom in the larger body of literature on NATO, that the Atlantic Alliance was the most pertinent security institution in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance was capable to effectively manage 40
the new security environment while, at the same time, providing security for its member
states and assuring former adversaries.110
A third limitation of this research is the timeline of the period under investigation.
The difficulty this timeline poses is chiefly the limited access to classified documentation
of both the Canadian government and the NATO alliance. Many official documents
remain classified as top-secret and thus inaccessible to the researcher. This forced the
researcher to conduct interviews in order to gain access to background information.
This leads to a fourth limitation of the research and that is the absence of a top-
secret security clearance of the researcher. Because the topic of this dissertation had a
large international (NATO) content, certain material, such as top secret memoranda of
then Secretary General Manfred Woerner, were inaccessible, and are likely to remain so
in the near future.
Definitions and Outline of the dissertation
A thesis of this size and with the objectives as outlined above demands a definition of
some of its key terminology. The term Europe, for example, appears to be imprecise and
often times confusing in the larger body of the international relations literature. Often
times, the term makes reference to different things. Sometimes, people associate Europe
with a group of Western nation states that are geographically located on the European
continent. In this sense, Russia and Turkey are automatically excluded from this
111 definition. Others associate Europe with the European Union (EU) as a political-
Ronald D. Asmus and Council on Foreign Relations, Opening Nato 's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Larrabee Stephen F., "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993). 111 Charles Jones, "Europe" In The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Queen's 41 geographical entity that had started to become a global political actor in 1993. Before that, the European Union was known as the European Community (EC). In this dissertation, we use the term European Union or abbreviated, the EU, without making the distinction.
Second, it is well understood that the term European security is wide-ranging and can be the subject of confusion and debate. Thus, they term requires a much more narrow definition. In this dissertation, the term European security is used in the context of
Canada's role in NATO, because this organization has been the primary security actor in
Europe since 1949. However, at various other occasions and, when necessary, reference is also made to other European security organizations and security actors such as the EU, the pan-CSCE, the OSCE, and the WEU. All of those organizations were or have become important security actors in Europe. In addition, over time Canada developed a relationship with each one of them on a bilateral basis. However, because of the limitations of this dissertation, the primary focus will be on the Canada-NATO relationship with references being made to those other organizations only when necessary and to allow for a contextual understanding of the issue.
In addition, the term security requires a definition. This tasks, however, is not as simple as one might assume, because the scope and object of analysis in the larger field of security studies has changed with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it is the task of chapter one to provide an extensive discussion of how the term security evolved after the end of the Cold War, and how it is now defined in a post-Cold War era. This discussion then allows us to establish a reference point for comparing the changing nature of
University. 24 August 2007
Canadian foreign policy before and after the Cold War. In addition, the notion of security also hints at some larger geopolitical changes that affected the conduct of international affairs of nation states. For example, the nature of power politics equally changed with the end of the Cold War and had implications for the conduct of foreign policy of nation states. Likewise, these changes will also be discussed in the first chapter.
Once we have examined the changes of the nature of the international environment, the discussion then turns to the role of Canada in this environment and
European security in particular. In contrast to historians and other disciplines, political scientists seek the help of theoretical constructs in order to help explain states' behaviour or a certain phenomenon. In our case, we turn to a discussion of the three most common theories of Canadian foreign policy in order to seek help in explaining Canada's role in
NATO since 1989. However, as this discussion reveals, theorizing about Canadian foreign policy does not sufficiently explain Canada's actions in the NATO alliance in the
1990s. Therefore, the conclusion of this chapter could only be that Canadian foreign policies work in theory but not in practice.
The third chapter discusses Canada's role in NATO and the relationship it enjoyed with its major allies since the birth of NATO in 1949. This historical examination provides a contextual understanding of the relationship. This is pertinent in the sense that it allows and understanding of how decisions in Canadian foreign policy are made. The chapter also reveals the consistencies of Canada's external relations and its role in European security since 1949.
Part two of the thesis then dives into a discussion of Canada's role in NATO after
1989. The end of the Cold War brought about a stressful time for NATO. In 1949 the 43 organization was designed as a Cold War tool in response to a Communist threat and an expansionist Soviet foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War conflict, of course, this threat did not vanish completely but only diminished. This can be exemplified by the fact that after 1989 both the West and the East retained their nuclear arsenal and both used it as a tool of deterring the other. As a result, some analysts such as John Mearsheimer and others predicted that the NATO alliance would loose its purpose of existence and thus would cease to exist."2 However, NATO proved its critics wrong and under the leadership of then NATO Secretary General, Manfred Woerner, started a transformation process of the alliance and decided to lend a hand of friendship to its former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's transformation process included an organizational transformation as well as a structural one. The transformation touched upon the political, the military, and the economic nature of the alliance and its member states. However, the chapter's central focus is on Canada's role in this transformation process.
The next chapter then builds on the previous one and provides an examination of
Canada's role and standing in the military and economic transformation of the NATO alliance. In particular, the chapter analyses Canada's contributions to allied operations in the Balkans and Kosovo and discusses Canada's relative standing among its allies and offers new benchmarks to measure Canada's relative standing in NATO.
' '2 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990). 44
CHAPTER 1
IMAGES OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Introduction
The foreign policy of a country is difficult to comprehend. Various outside factors
influence it: historical ties between countries, cultural affinity, economic interests, or
simply a good relationship between statesmen. An even more complex task is to explain
the role, behaviour or decisions of a particular country in an international organization
such as NATO, the UN or others. This is so because of the multiplicity of factors that
have an influence on a particular set of decisions made in such a highly international
environment. One way of trying to understand and explain foreign policy decisions is to
seek the help of theoretical models or constructs.
In the case of Canada, the academic literature on Canadian foreign policy offers
three theories of Canadian foreign policy that might help explain Canada's role and
function in NATO. By examining them closer, however, these theories provide less of a
theoretical construct in the classical sense. Contrary to the nature of theoretical models,
they do not operate with dependent or independent variables in order to offer a parsimonious explanation for state actions and are rather descriptive. Thus, their value to
the literature is less to provide a theoretical construct for Canadian foreign policy
analysis but rather to provide an explanation for Canadian foreign policy and the role the
country played in the NATO Alliance. It is this explanatory value that we will try to seek
in the following sections.
However, before we do so, a short historical review of Canada's foreign relations is required. Historically, Canada's foreign relations were complicated because of its 45 status of a dominion in the British Empire. Between 1867 and the early 1930s, any decision with regards to Canada's external relations was made by Westminster. It was not until 1931 that Canada gained some autonomy in its foreign policy from the British
Empire.1 This was demonstrated in September 1939 when Canada declared war on
Germany one week after the British did. After 1945, Canadians were searching for their role and identity in a post Second World War environment and were striving to get recognition for their actions from other powers. After all, Canada came out of the Second
World War with the third largest navy and as the fourth largest air force. The accepted wisdom in international affairs was that the two great powers - the Soviet Union and the
United States - would dominate the countries in their spheres of influence, particularly small powers that had weaker power resources and influence to carry out policies on their own were the targets of the superpowers. In the case of Canada, the age of superpowers with the United Stats south to its border made it difficult to define its role in world politics. Politicians in Ottawa understood that their country did not hold superpower status. At the same time they were convinced that Canada was not a small power either.
It was, however, clear that Canadian identity was bound up with what it did internationally. Canadians participated in the two world wars as part of the British
1 Constitutional historians and lawyers have debated the official date of Canadian independence from the British Empire for a long time. In 1931 with the passage of the Statute of Westminster in the British Parliament, Canada obtained full jurisdiction over the conduct of its foreign affairs. It remained part of the Commonwealth. However, Canada took a seat at the table at the League of Nations in 1919 as a sovereign country. Nonetheless, even after 1931 Canada was not given independence in amending its constitution, which in a sense leaves the impression that Canada was only a partly sovereign country. This right, however, was given to Canadians in 1982 when the British Parliament passed the Constitution Act, which, among other things, gave Canada the power to amend its Constitution, including the Constitution Act, 1867 and all other acts of the British Parliament that had amended it over the years. Now Canada became fully independent from Great Britain. 46
Empire.2 This shaped Canadian identity abroad and her international reputation. The
struggle for recognition in international affairs was coupled with Ottawa's push for
greater independence in the British Commonwealth. Much of the influence Canada had
enjoyed in international affairs immediately after the end of World War II rested on its
diplomatic skills. How others - countries, statesmen, diplomats, and military officers -
saw Canadians was important for the nation in order to locate itself in a superpower
world as much as it was important for Canadians domestically to ensure national unity.
Meanwhile, Canadian officials worked hard in international forums to remind the world
about Canadian accomplishments and contributions in the two world wars. Government
officials had to explain to the world what Canadians had achieved and that Canada was
not like the United States, despite the fact that the two countries shared the same
continent in North America.
International politics, like all politics, was the struggle for power.3 Hence, the
concept of state power plays a central role in international relations. Political power, as
Hans Morgenthau defined it, was "a man's control over the minds and actions of other
men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large. Political power was a psychological relation between those who exercised it and those over whom it is
2 This was certainly less so during and after the Second World War. However, it needs to be recognized that this is a rather simplistic view of history; the relationship was a bit more complex than that. On Sept. 10, 1939, a special session of Parliament approved Prime Minister Mackenzie King's request that Canada join the war in Europe. The decision came exactly one week after Great Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany. It was the first time that Canadians made their own declaration of war as a sovereign nation. However, Canadians fought in World War II as part of British units. The tactical control of Canadian troops on the battlefields of Europe remained with Great Britain. However, Canadians selected their own senior officers leading the troops into the battle. 3 Harold Lasswell defined politics as "who gets what, when, and how." See Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York, London: McGraw-Hill, 1936). 47
exercised." Power politics was also an important concept for Canada after 1945. Indeed,
Ottawa quickly realized the truth in Morgenthau's psychological dimension of the
concept of power. As much as power was about the capabilities of the state it was also
about how other states perceived the influence of that particular state. In the case of
Canada, it was perceived by its allies, especially Britain and the United States, as a
"regional power without a region."5
Over time, three dominant images of Canadian power have evolved in the
academic literature of Canadian foreign policy - the middle power image, the foremost or principal power image and the dependency image. All three images have helped
describing Canada's role in the world. They did not evolve simultaneously but over time,
and had an impact on Canada's engagement in international organizations such as NATO,
the United Nations and others. They were not static and evolved over time. They will be
examined in sequence below. The first image describing Canada's role in the world was
that of Canada as a middle power, the second was the image of Canada as a foremost or principal power; and the third was Canada as a satellite or dependency power. In the
following, we will examine all three images in closer detail. The aim of this review is to
get a sense of Canada's position in the system of international relations and what its position was in relation to that of other states. These three images helped Canadian
foreign policy makers in many ways: domestically, they helped Canadians to understand their power capabilities and how to use this influence in international forums and
4 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Briefed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 30. 5 This term was coined by Hermann Kahn while giving a lecture in Ottawa in 1968. Quoted in Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 4. See also David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto, New York: Wiley, 1983). 48 councils. Internationally, they helped other powers to establish a power hierarchy of international actors and to locate Canada in it.
The origins of the image of Canada as a middle power
In the immediate post-World War II period, scholar-practitioners who served in the
Department of External Affairs shaped the image of Canada as a middle power. While they were public servants they also felt a desire to engage in academic discourse and published about Canadian foreign policy in academic journals.6 John W. Holmes, Hume
Wrong, and A.F.W. Plumptre were three of those practitioner-scholars who shaped the idea of Canada as a middle power.7 By examining the Canadian involvement in the previous two world wars, there was a sense that Canada could make a difference in the immediate post-1945 world order as long as Ottawa's actions were consistent and skilled.8 It was visible from the early writings in the field that the perspectives offered in the literature were a reflection of the personal experiences and ideas of the representatives writing about them.9 As we will see below, because of the lack of academic rigor and a comprehensive set of methodological tools to conduct a foreign policy analysis, there was
6 This point has been emphasized by many analysts including Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 17; Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Toronto: York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984), 4; John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour; Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, Carleton Library, No. 49 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 14. 7 See especially John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943- 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, vol. 1 (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972). With respect to creating new international institutions see A. F. Wynne Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944-75 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949. Andrew Fenton Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions, The Prentice Hall Canada Foreign Policy Series (Scarborough, Ont: Prentice-Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997). See also Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? 9 John J. Kirton David B. Dewitt, Canada as a Principal Power - a Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), 17. 49
no accepted definition of the term middle power. Different authors offered different
definitions based on geographical, functional or behavioural principles.
The literature appears to be undecided as to when the term middle power was first
associated with Canada. Adam Chapnik argued that the origins of the term middle power
could be found in the Mackenzie-King government in the 1940s when Canada was
striving for representation in the UN Security Council.10 Minister of External Affairs,
Louis St. Laurent, delivered the Gray Lecture in Toronto on 13 January 1947 in which he outlined five principles of Canadian foreign policy: (1) ensuring national unity; (2) promotion of political liberty; (3) respect and promotion for the rule of law in
international affairs; (4) promotion of Christian values; and (5) active involvement in
international affairs through participation in multilateral organizations.11 Yet, as St.
Laurent's first principle showed, Canada would also look at its domestic situation and its national interests first before becoming engaged in international affairs. The speech can be seen as recognition of Canada's middle power status in international affairs, because it was an assurance to the international community that Canada would remain committed and engaged in world politics.12 At the time, Canadian officials perceived Canada as a major international player. This perception, however, did not match the opinions of other members of the international community who saw Canada as a small power with unique functions and capabilities. Erika Simpson, for example, argued that the international
10 Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle," 3. " Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at the University of Toronto," cited in R. A. MacKay, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 390-93. 12 There were signs that isolation was a possibility. During the war Prime Minister Mackenzie-King urged for a collective security system to prevent another war. However, soon after the fighting had stopped, he began to retreat to his pre-war isolationism. 50
community perceived Canada as a "secondary power serving as a bridge or linchpin between Britain and the United States."13
In addition, power politics and how much influence states might have in a post
war environment were also important. The St. Laurent government realized that even though Canada was one of the victors of the Second World War, it did not hold enough
weight in international affairs to be considered a great power. Ottawa also did not
consider itself a small power either and lobbied the international community to award
Canada a special status on the UN Security Council.14 It had envisioned a model for the
Security Council in which the great powers would hold a permanent seat and a veto
power whereas the middle powers, like Canada, Australia and others, would receive preferential treatment in the selection of non-permanent members. "Countries such as
Canada, not important enough to be considered great powers, but far too important to be
relegated to the category of small powers, sought to create a distinct position for themselves in the international community, one that would be recognized through special
status on the Security Council."15 Even though this special status never materialized, the
image of Canada as a middle power found acceptance in the Canadian public. In a sense,
it was based on a functionalist assumption that middle powers would contribute their expertise and resources to international issues based on their capacity and expertise in the
field.
13 Erika Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson," Journal of Canadian Studies- 34, no. 1 (1999): 77. The first one to describe Canada as the linchpin of the English- speaking world was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. For a greater discussion of the bridge- building and linchpin metaphor see Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: the Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain; Haglund, "Brebner's North Atlantic Triangle at Sixty: A Retrospective Look at a Retrospective Book."; Haglund and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End. 14 For a very comprehensive analysis of Canada's role in the set up of the United Nations see Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations. 15 Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle," 3. 51
The unclear definition of what constitutes a middle power continued to exist after
a more stable international system was created with international organizations such as of
the United Nations, NATO and others to ensure lasting world peace and security,
Thinking about middle powers continued to be vague and middle powers were seen as
states with medium military capabilities. In the case of Canada, it was also located
geographically in the middle, squeezed in between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Lastly, middle powers were described by superpowers as states with their own
national ambitions of trying to prevent the superpowers from dominating international
relations.16 Inherent in these descriptions was the assumption that the international system
was of a hierarchical nature and one in which "objective capability, asserted position, and
recognized status"17 create three classes of states - great powers18, middle powers19 and
small powers. Canada learned through its colonial experience with Britain that one way
of dealing with a more powerful United States south of the Canada-US border was by
finding a counterweight to it. Europe filled that position of a counterbalancer after 1945,
as did the United States earlier to the British Empire.20 One reason why Canada joined
NATO was because in this way it was able to balance off the United States as its more
powerful partner in North America. To use John Holmes's words, "Canadians also saw
NATO as a counterweight. Along with the Commonwealth and the United Nations, it would give Canada a multilateral forum in which, by combining with other lesser powers,
See for example Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 17 Ibid, 22. The authors counted the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan as great powers. 19 Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Yugoslavia were seen as middle powers. 20 For a greater discussion of Canada's role in world affairs see Fox and Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Canada in World Affairs. 52
it could make its weight felt and so be relieved ... of the inhibitions of life on a continent with one gigantic neighbour."21
However, Canada in many ways was unique among its middle power peers, such as Australia and some Scandinavian countries. First, Canada was in close geographical proximity to the United States and shared the North American continent with this
superpower. Thus, Canada was exposed to American great power resources and interests.
It had the effect of putting the Canada-US relationship at the centre of attention of the government's foreign policy. As Charles Doran argued, both countries value different issues in their foreign policy. According to Doran, the United States put more emphasis on the political-strategic dimension whereas Canada was mostly concerned with the good health of the bilateral economic relationship. Thus, from an American perspective the relevance of the Canada-US relationship was perceived as part of global politics whereas
"Canada tends to look at global politics through the lens of its relations with the United
States. In consequence, the United States sometimes looks at Canada in smaller than real terms and Canada often looks at the United States in larger than real terms."22
Secondly, the conduct of Canadian foreign policy was influenced more than other middle powers by the nature of its domestic politics23. First, there was the unique federal system and the bickering of provincial premiers for more influence in foreign policy decisions, particularly when it came to foreign economic policies. This was partly the result of the British North America Act (BNA Act). The BNA Act did not assign specific competencies in the field of foreign affairs to either the federal or provincial
21 John W. Holmes, Canada; A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto, Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 127-28. Doran, Forgotten Partnership: US-Canada Relations Today, 139. 23 See for example Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997). 53
government. In 1867, a section on these competencies was not required because at the time Canada was a dominion of the British Empire and thus had no autonomy in its foreign policy decision-making.
There was also the "Quebec factor"25 in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. Like any other province in the federation, Quebec was concerned about foreign economic markets, foreign direct investments, and the relationship to the United States particularly for those reasons. The province of Quebec reserves the right for autonomous representation at selected international organizations and capitals. For example, the province of Quebec had its own embassy in Paris. The aim of such an institution was to export the province's cultural and linguistic attributes abroad.
Variants of the middle power image
As noted above, the period immediately after the Second World War was less shaped by contending theories and theoretical frameworks of Canadian foreign policy but more by political descriptions of international affairs. Liberal internationalism at that time was the unchallenged theoretical approach for an examination of Canada's external relations.
There were four major variants of the middle power image, including functionalism, middlepowermanship, internationalism and niche diplomacy/"
Functionalism
According to Jack Granatstein, Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong demanded in 1942 that
Canada's involvement in world affairs should be based on functional principles: the extent of Ottawa's involvement, Canadian interests, and the country's ability to
Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 295. 25 For a more elaborate discussion see for example Ibid., chapter 11. 26 Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?, 3. See also John J. Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Australia, Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 9. 54 contribute to the situation in question (the notion of functional representation).
According to Chapnik, Mackenzie-King believed that "states with functional interests in international affairs were of greater interest than those without"28 and thus deserved formal recognition in international affairs. King argued that adequate representation should be given to those countries that have the "greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question."29 According to Kirton, functionalism had three
in imperatives: first, it focused on Canada's role in the system of the United Nations.
Second, the functionalist imperative created a new class in the international relations hierarchy between superpowers and small powers. Third, the functionalist imperative called for active participation of Canada in world politics. Canada "claimed a management or leadership role where its specialized capabilities and interests allowed."31
This did not, however, mean that Canada sought leadership aspirations in all policy fields but only in selected areas where its capabilities were significant.
Nonetheless, as the literature argues, Canada's functionalist approach appeared to be disconnected from the middle power concept in the sense that the influence of functional middle power states changed depending on the issue in question, because the contribution middle powers could make was limited to their relative power capabilities.32
J. L. Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? (Toronto: Copp Clark Pub. Co., 1969), 3. 28 Chapnick, "The Middle Power," 74. J. L. Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings, New Canadian Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 24-27. Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 40. 31 Ibid. Great powers are powerhouses whose relative capabilities never change. Small powers do not possess any significant power resources at all, and middle powers are listed on the hierarchy of international affairs in between great and small powers depending on their relative power. However, their contribution changes depending on the issue in question. Hence, one might argue that middle powers are only small powers that were temporary escalated on the international power hierarchy. See Chapnick, "The Middle Power," 74- 75. 55
Middlepowermanship
The second thematic variant of the middle power concept was the so-called middlepowermanship, which categorized powers according to their activities and actions.33 In this sense, Canada's internationalism was based on norms and values of how to conduct international relations. The government believed that spreading those norms and values was one of the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy. It marked a departure from the definition of a middle power - from states that contribute to international affairs more than small powers but less than great powers to "states that mediated, conciliated, participated in international peacekeeping missions, and were generally good global citizens."34 Canada served as the "helpful fixer," "bridge builder," and "mediator".
Playing the role of a middle power, Canadian diplomats tried to be the mediators or conciliators in international bodies such as the UN and NATO. They worked hard to convince other powers the virtues of compromise, negotiation and conflict resolution, "to lobby so as to avoid dangerous confrontation and to ...reduce tension among nations."35
Canada's mediation efforts were mostly associated with Lester B. Pearson and his various initiatives - his bridge building efforts and pursuit of greater world peace while trying to convince the United States to leave the question of using nuclear weapons in the Korea conflict off the table, Pearson's work on the three-man Korean ceasefire commission in
December 1950, and his collaboration with India and Poland on the International
Supervisory Commission in Indochina, and his mediation role during the 1956 Suez
See Ibid., 75. Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle," 3. Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson," 78. 56
Canal crisis. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue that middle powers could be
characterized by "their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international
problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes."37
Keating agreed with this multilateralism in Canadian foreign policy and argued that
"policy makers also enjoyed considerable access to the major power centres in London
and Washington. Canada's enhanced status, when combined with the country's historical
experiences, encouraged a more enthusiastic response on the part of policy makers to
proposals for post-war organizations. A more activist strategy of international
TO
involvement emerged as the favoured policy option in Ottawa." Dewitt and Kirton
defined middle powers as "helpful-fixers" in their work.39 Lyon and Tomlin put another
twist to it and argued that middle powers were located in the middle of the ideological
spectrum and their role involved special responsibility for functional duties such as
peacekeeping.40
Ibid., 80. However, the literature is unclear about the origins and causes of Pearson's beliefs. Pearson himself references the battle experiences he witnessed during the First World War; See in particular chapter two in Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Other analysts argue that Pearson's visions stem from others such as John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and others. For more about this debate see Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson," 81. From an American perspective see Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 484-89. 37 Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 19. 38 Thomas F. Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9. What Keating meant by strategy of international involvement is Canadian multilateralism, that is the "practice of multilateral diplomacy and the policies supporting the establishment and maintenance of institutions and associations that facilitate and support the practice of multilateral diplomacy," p.4. Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 403. Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor. 57
Niche diplomacy
The last variant of the middle power image was niche diplomacy and this is the
"youngest" of the four variants.41 It was developed in the early 1990s in light of the fiscal constraints of the federal government that demanded that choices be made in the foreign policy field. Other fields, such as Canada's defence and development expenditures, were affected also. This reintroduced the notion of specialization of Canadians in selected policy issues and thus reducing Canada's international presence.
In sum, after examining the middle power concept as the first image of Canadian foreign policy, one comes to the conclusion that it was a Canadian-oriented image. It rationalized rather than objectively explained Canada's role and standing in the world. It was highly dominated by Canadian academics who wrote for other Canadian academics.
What was left out, however, was a comprehensive non-Canadian perspective on Canada's role as a middle power in world politics. The only two non-Canadian authors who have done work on Canada as a middle power are Charles Doran from John Hopkins
University and Joseph Jockel from St. Lawrence University. Ernest for these two authors, there is no comprehensive analysis written on images of Canadian foreign policy in
Europe or other parts of the world. Thus, the image of Canada as a middle power was a very Canada specific image developed and written by Canadians for Canadians.
Secondly, as Adam Chapnik has shown, quasi-academics and political practitioners who published their work in academic journals developed the middle power concept. Their work was largely meant for domestic consumption in Canada as much as it
41 Andrew F. Cooper, "In Search of Niches: Saying 'Yes' and Saying 'No' in Canada's International Relations," Canadian Foreign Policy 3, no. 3 (1995), Andrew F. Cooper and Geoffrey Hayes, Worthwhile Initiatives? Canadian Mission-Oriented Diplomacy (Toronto: Irwin, 2000), Heather A. Smith, "Caution Warranted: Niche Diplomacy Assessed," Canadian Foreign Policy 6 (Spring 1999). 58
was to achieve certain political objectives. The middle power image was intended to
ensure national unity in Canada and helped Canadians to find their role in the world
community. It successfully bridged the predominant rift among "imperialists,
internationalists, and continentalists."42
Canada as a Principal Power
The second major image, one that challenges the middle power paradigm, is that of
Canada as a principal power. James Eayres was the first scholar who argued that Canada had climbed into the league of major or great powers. In 1975, Eayres published an article in International Perspectives arguing that Canadian foreign policy had become more autonomous than in earlier times and thus Ottawa possesses greater capabilities to act independently in the world.43 He also argued that the international power structure had undergone revision. The new power structure had become more diffuse and opened
greater opportunities for Canada. The foremost concerns in international affairs for
Canada were the rising demand for natural resources as well as the decline of the United
States as the global hegemon. He argued that Canada was neither a small power nor a middle power.
The technology is there, or waiting. [...] The manpower is there, or waiting...The resources are there, or waiting too- animal, vegetable and mineral. [...] We need only decide how fast to develop them, how much to charge for them.44
Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, 128. 43 James Eayres, "Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power," International Perspectives (May/June 1975). 59
Eayres's arguments were consistent with the neorealist school of international relations
and were influenced by the large interdependency theory literature in the 1970s.45 Some
leading politicians in Ottawa also endorsed it. For example, Prime Minister Trudeau's
Minister of External Affairs, Mark MazGuigan, argued in an interview with the news
magazine Maclean's on 7 July 1980 that Canada certainly is an "upper-middle power."
Economically, we are a big power. We belong in this league [of great powers]."46
However, only a few international scholars and analysts have referred to Canada as a principal power. The most prominent and outspoken one was Henry Kissinger. He said that
Canada's somewhat aloof position combined with the high quality of its leadership gave it an influence out of proportion to its military contribution. [...] It conducted a global foreign policy; it participated in international peacekeeping efforts; it made a constructive contribution to the dialogue between developed and developing nations. At the same time Canada had its own special relationship with the United States.47
Another characteristic of this school, as Kirton and Dewitt remind us, is that the Canadian
government focused on pursuing its national interests in the conduct of international
affairs that offered the image of a "new" Canada.48 According to this school, Canada perceived itself as an exceptional country based on democratic institutions, federalism, bilingualism, income re-distribution, respect for the environment, and skilled workers and
See in particular Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 1989), Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1971). 46 Quoted in Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 11. 47 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 484-89. See also quoted in Falls, Admiral R.H., "NATO: The Contending Challenge," in The Empire Club of Canada Speeches 1980-1981 (Toronto, Canada: The Empire Club Foundation, 1981), 88-101. Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 39. 60 natural resources.49 All these factors placed Canada within the top tier of international affairs and consequently, Canada was seen as a principal power.
Later, Tomlin and Lyon used empirical methods to support Eayres's image of
Canada as a principal power by applying a relative power assessment method for trying to determine how Canada relates to other countries in terms of military, diplomatic, and economic powers.50 They used quantifiable attributes such as population, geographic location, economic strength, natural resources, and the nature of the military to locate
Canada on the international hierarchy scale. After examining like-minded powers such as
Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan, the two academics concluded that Canada could be ranked sixth internationally. It was, therefore, positioned in the upper part of international hierarchy. Tomlin and Lyon concluded that Canada enjoyed a first-tier status in international affairs and could be called a major power.
David Dewitt and John Kirton took Tomlin and Lyon's analysis to the next theoretical level and re-visited previous assumptions as well as conclusions. In principle
Kirton and Dewitt attempted to verify this and other previous studies. However, they used a different terminology. They argued that Canada was not a major power as much as it was a "principal power", because Ottawa had the capabilities and resources to act as a principal actor on its own without the help and support of other governments. It was not an agent of other countries or regions, or a mediator between conflicting parties, but a sovereign principal actor in international affairs with its own authority. In short, they argued that Canada was a pre-eminent player in international relations with the competence and capability to promote international peace, order, and security. The
49 Ibid., 40. Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor. 61
changing nature of the international system and the decline of American power after the
end of the Vietnam War opened a power vacuum which small or middle powers were
encouraged to fill.
Collectively substituting for states exercising individual hegemony, such "principal powers" are not merely the familiar great powers of realist theory. Rather they are principal states in three senses. First, they are the states in the international hierarchy, which stand at the top of international status ranking, collectively possessing decisive capability and differentiated from lower ranking powers by both objective and subjective criteria. Secondly, they act as principals on their international activities and associations, rather than as agents for other states or groupings or as mediators between principals. And, thirdly, they have a principal role in establishing, specifying, and enforcing international order.51
At the same time, the diversification of international trade and political relations Canada
undertook, especially with the European Communities (EC), could also be interpreted as
an aim to seek new partners to balance (or counterbalance) and thus reduce the
dependency on the United States and Britain.52 This was better known as the "third
option" that was introduced by the Trudeau government in 1972:53 "Within Canada itself,
the corresponding value of autonomous society prompts a reliance on strategies that
prohibit outright further American penetration and actively reduce the existing American
presence."54 As Allan Gotlieb argues, the third option was not only an economic strategy
of diversification but also a political one.55 Kim Nossal pointed out that much of the
intellectual foundation of the Canada as a principal power image was owed to him as a
51 David Dewitt and John Kirton. Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 38. See also Normal Hillmer and Garth Stevenson. Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). 52 Britain joined the European Communities on 1 January 1973. 53 The third option was introduced in 1972 and set aside the first option (ad hoc adjustment), and the second option (deeper integration with the United States). Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 43. 55 Allan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries, 1981-1989 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2006), 128. 62 senior diplomat in the Department of External Affairs. While Gotlieb was undersecretary for external affairs in 1979 he challenged the middle power paradigm in Canadian foreign policy. He continued to press for a new image for Canada in the international system while he was the Canadian Ambassador to the United States.56 His thoughts coincided with the free trade debate under the Mulroney government in the late 1980s. He argued that Canada should not be afraid of the free trade negotiations with the United States, because Canadians should recognize their sources of power in the international system in the way other countries recognize Canadian capabilities and influence.57 In short, Gotlieb saw Canada as a major power. Internationally, however, no major author viewed Canada in this way. Although Charles Doran wrote about Canada and its bilateral relationship with the United States, he was the only American to use the image of Canada as a principal actor in international affairs.58
The metaphor of Canada as a principal power, however, was not without contention. Kim Nossal, for example, pointed out that "the relative infungibility of power resources" was an explanation for why Tomlin and Peyton's statistical measures of
Canada's strength (or the lack of thereof) in international affairs cannot necessarily explain its influences in the world. In fact, it weakened the principal power paradigm in
Canadian foreign policy because large Canadian resources do not necessarily convert into influence in the world. Others, such as David Baldwin, reminded us that alleged potential power does not necessarily translate into real capabilities; he called it the "paradox of
Allan Gotlieb, Canadian Diplomacy in the 1980s: Leadership and Service (Toronto: Centre for International Studies University of Toronto, 1979). 57 For a detailed account see part II in Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries, 1981-1989. 5 Charles F. Doran, Economic Interdependence, Autonomy and Canadian/American Relations, Essays in International Economics, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983). 63 unrealized power." If one state possessed large military capabilities, the logical conclusion was not necessarily that its soldiers knew how to operate the equipment.
Conversely, the absence of power capabilities did not necessarily result into being powerless in international affairs: "So called 'weak powers' influenced 'strong powers' because of the power analyst's failure to account for the possibility that a country may be weak in one situation but strong in another."60 Baldwin was suggesting that power resources were issue specific. In some situations certain capabilities were more effective then in others and it depended more on the commitments of states to get involved than pointing out their actual capabilities.61
In sum, the image of Canada as a principal power rested on two main features: first, principal countries were top tier countries in the international power hierarchy and thus played a significant role in world affairs. They were also represented in the big leagues of world politics. Their status was ranked empirically according to their contributions and relative capabilities. Secondly, principal powers respond to their national interests and values and act accordingly internationally. Because of their power status they also enjoyed a relative autonomy in foreign policy decision-making and most often did not act as bridge builders. However, there were also shortfalls with this image.
Like the middle power image, the principal power metaphor largely lacked external
David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Trends," World Politics 31, no. 2 (Jan. 1979): 163. 60 Ibid., 164 and 70. 61 To better understand Baldwin's complicated hypothetical approach to power politics, it might be helpful to think about a power-currency-converter. On the one side, for example, you submit in power resources such as military capabilities into the exchange system expecting real capabilities coming out the other end. However, as Baldwin argues, there is no linear connection between submitting military assets and real capabilities coming out at the other end. His argument is that the outcome depends on the situation, and thus any situation is different and thus every power capability is different. One example is the experience of the United States in Vietnam or the Soviet Union's in Afghanistan. In both instances, the two superpowers had enormous military capabilities, which did not result into capabilities that would be applicable to solve the conflict and bring peace. 64
recognition from scholars outside of Canada. Only a selected few, such as Canadianist
Charles Doran as well as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye62 used the metaphor of Canada
as a principal power. Thus, only Canadian authors who wrote about Canada as a principal
power for Canadian audiences only.
Canada as a Satellite or Dependent Power
The third image of Canadian foreign policy saw Canada as a satellite or dependency
power vis-a-vis the United States. This image is linked to the literature of Canadian
strategic affairs and argued that Canada has a dependent relationship with the United
States in military and security terms through joint military institutions such as the
Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) and the North American Aerospace Defence
Command (NORAD).63 This bilateral security relationship, according to the satellite or
dependency power image, was not symmetrical. Canada was seen as the junior partner in
the bilateral partnership. These close institutional ties with the US were seen as too
confining to leave room for manoeuvre for autonomous Canadian foreign policy
decisions.
In more general terms, the satellite or dependency metaphor spoke to Canadian
domestic nationalism and the notion that Canada was retreating from world politics (or in
decline in terms of its relevance). The image was preoccupied with Canada's
vulnerability in the international economic system and pointed out that Canada's
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 63 Others have argued that throughout Canadian history this country was subordinate to the British. When the nexus of global hegemony at the end of the 20th century shifted from the British Empire towards a US hegemony, Canadian entanglement made the same shift; Canada became dependent on the United States because of its economic, ideological and cultural linkages. See Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 60. See also John Hutcheson, Dominance and Dependency: Liberalism and National Policies in the North Atlantic Triangle (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), quoted in Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 60. 65
economic fate was determined by its structural dependence on the US market. The
relocation of headquarters of Canadian businesses was used as an indicator to show the
decline and dependency on the US economic market. Stephen Clarkson was one of the
leading Canadian political economists examining the impact of the US economy on
Canada.6 Clarkson and others analyzed American foreign direct investment in Canada as well as American ownership of Canadian companies and levels of research and
development (R&D). The working hypothesis was that American dominance was reaching into the Canadian economy and was slowly taking possession of Canadian businesses.65 In Clarkson's mind, these developments also had an enormous impact on
Canadian sovereignty in the sense that because of this dependent relationship with the
United States, policy makers in Ottawa were less able to make autonomous decisions.
This, in turn, also had an impact on how the international community saw Canada. If the dependency theory holds true, other nations might view Canada only as an extension of the American empire. These arguments, however, were not completely new. Already in
Stephen Clarkson began his writings on Canadian dependency on the US market in the late 1960s. See Stephen Clarkson, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968). His latest book looks more specifically at the dependency relationship Canada has with the US and the impact of the free trade deals signed between Ottawa and Washington in the late 1980s/early 1990s. He argues that NAFTA has a supranational legislative function to the Canadian constitution and thus makes it superior to Canadian law. See Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State. However, this nationalistic foreign policy perspective was not new at the time and has its roots in the pre-World War II period. The main proponents of this perspective were Harold Innis & A.F.W. Plumptre. The Canadian economy and its problems: papers and proceedings of study groups of members of the Canadian institute of international affairs, 1933-1934 (Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1934); and Hugh Keenleyside, "The American Economic Penetration of Canada," Canadian Historical Review 8 (March 1927). 5 For greater details see Clarkson, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? According to Hawes, American FDI in Canada grew so rapidly that in the mid-1970s more than twenty 5% of all capital employed in Canada came directly from the US See Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?, 20. For a more recent analysis of the dependent relationship between Canada and the United States see Clarkson: "Under free trade, by contrast, the ratio of FDI to GNP grew from 19% to 24.5%. When measured in assets, the proportion of the Canadian economy under foreign control rose under free trade from 21 per cent in 1988 to 22.4 per cent in 1997. See Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State, 211. 66
1958, the Report of the Royal Commission of Canada's Economic Prospects concluded that despite the Canadian continuous economic growth that was perpetuated by foreign direct investment in Canada, the Canadian nation state was increasingly vulnerable to external factors and influences, in particular from the US Consequently, as the authors of the report argue, this challenged Canadian sovereignty over its economy.66
A second theme that influenced this school of thought can be seen in James
Minifie's book, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, published in 196567 in which he analyzed Canada's vulnerability during the Cuban Missile Crisis of the early 1960s and
Ottawa's decision to acquire nuclear weapons in 1963. In Minifie's mind, Canada was faced with a strategic choice to either distance itself from the United States or face integration with its southern neighbour: "Canada must make up its mind whether to part company with its beguiling, star-sprangled Devil, or resign itself to increasing subservience leading ultimately to absorption. This is the basic choice which is vital for the defence of Canada as a unit, and decisive for the defence of the continent as a whole."68 In geopolitical terms, what Minifie was referring to was that Canada had to make a choice to either closely cooperate with the United States, especially in security and defence terms, or thus risk being called the protagonist of a nuclear warfare powder monkey, or enjoy its reputation as a peacemaker. This was the option that Minifie espoused for Canada:
Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report (Ottawa; The Commission, 1958). See also Tom Kent, Inside the Gordon Report, Winnipeg Free Press Pamphlet; No. 57 (Winnipeg: Winnipeg Free Press, 1958). See also Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power; A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 29. James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965). 67
This book is written in the belief that Canada can contribute more to the defence of democracy, the West, the North American continent and to its own defence as a neutral than as a member of a lop-sided alliance in NORAD, or the straddling military consortium into which NATO has been debased. I believe that Canada can speak to the world in the language of freedom and peace to inspire mankind, much as the United States did before the cares of paramountcy, the need to placate dictators, the burden of arming and subsidizing half the world, and the objective and subjective handicaps of wealth muffled the accents of Jefferson, Lincoln and Wilson.69
The debate over dependency reached its apex during the Vietnam War. George Grant and others argued that Canada was not only embraced by the United States politically and militarily, but the US also carried influence in Canada's culture.70 Grant's concern was that the United States was pursuing policies that would ultimately lead to a cultural homogenization on the North American continent. This would have implications for
Canadian ownership of industries as much as it would have for the film, music and scholarly communities. American dominance over Canadian industries would lead to a linear decline of Canadian presence in world affairs and thus would restrain Canadian foreign policy making. The fear was that American cultural hegemony would undermine
Canada's social institutions and programs and would undermine Canadian sovereignty and security. The dependence image clearly showed what role the dependency theorists assigned to the Canadian nation state. In their view, the state was dependent on large industries and multilateral corporations. As such, the state simply was seen as an organ that created opportunities for big multinational corporations by reducing tax levels and other duties. As a result, the state was not able to formulate a coherent national interest.
Further, some Canadians were worried that American values, such as economic
"" Ibid, 172-3. 70 George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965). 68
liberalism, capitalism and consumption, would inadvertently affect the Canadian way of
life. Supporters of this school of thought saw Canada as a small power in the international
system.
The solution to this problem of dependence vis-a-vis the United States was to
adopt a more nationalist economic foreign policy and to diversify Canadian foreign
economic policy by looking at markets in Europe and Asia. The European markets in
particular were enticing because of an evolving EC, which meant reduced import tariffs
and duties for Canadian businesses, because they would be standardized. Thus, if Canada
would export goods to the EC, it would pay duties only once - at the first point of entry.
After that, the goods could be shipped freely within the borders of the EC without being
exposed to tax duties at inter-EC border crossings. Prime Minister Trudeau put these
ideas into policies - the "third-option" of Canadian foreign policy.71 The third option was
also developed as a counterweight to the United States and to diversify Canada's
interdependent relationship with the United States.72 Also, the Trudeau government
introduced measures to re-gain federal control over the economy and implemented
measures to discriminate against American capital and favoured investments of
Canadians. This, indeed, was a policy that was started under the previous Pearson
government. In 1963, Finance Minister Gordon, an economic nationalist who was not in
favour of letting American dollars into the country unchecked,73 had introduced a federal
71 The term third option implies that there are a first option and a second option as well. The so-called first option was maintaining the status quo, and the second option was deeper economic integration with the United States. The third option was formally outlined in a policy paper published by the Department of External Affairs. Canada-US Relations: Options for the Future (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972). 72 See for example Holmes, Canada; A Middle-Aged Power, Part III. 7 Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State, 127. 69 tax that targeted foreign ownership of Canadian companies with a 25% take-over tax rate.74
The Foreign Investment Review Agency, a federal institution, was established to monitor foreign direct investment in Canada and to promote domestic ownership of the
Canadian economy. Additional legislation was passed in 1973 restricting ownership in key sectors of the economy and requiring a quota of Canadians on the board of directors.
In 1976 the government signed a Framework Agreement on Economic and Commercial
Cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC). Later, in the 1980s, the
Trudeau government introduced the National Energy Program (NEP) to achieve three objectives: (1) to reduce foreign ownership of the Canadian energy industry; (2) to reduce
Canadian dependency on foreign oil markets; and (3) to increase revenue from the
Canadian oil sector. The political aims of all these policies of the Trudeau government were evident - to reduce the dependency on the United States and to slow down the integration of the North American continent by reasserting authority of the Canadian state over its economy. This was economic nationalism in its purest sense. However, justification for the NEP vanished in the early 1980s when the price for Canadian crude oil fell and matched international market standards.
In addition, as we will see in the next chapter, in 1969 the Trudeau government decided to reduce Canadian Forces in Germany. On 3 April 1969, the government cut the
7 Stephen Clarkson, Trudeau and Our Times, Trade pbk. ed., vol. 1 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997), 83-85. Gordon's ideas, however, did not evolve out of the blue. In 1955 he was appointed Chairman of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, which submitted its report in 1957. For more details see Clarkson, Trudeau and Our Times. Another source detailing this time period are also Larratt Higgins, "The Alienation of Canadian Resources: The Case of the Columbia River Treaty," in Close the 49th Parallel Etc.: The Americanization of Canada, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); or Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957. A good source also is J. L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1997). 70 forces in Europe by half. Trudeau also phased out their nuclear role. This decision was made without the consultation of Canada's NATO allies75 and not only questioned the importance Canada paid to NATO but also the benefits Canada had enjoyed until then as being a member of the big league. By 1978, however, the government had made a 180- degree turn (some historians called it a "pirouette"76) and, in conjunction with other
NATO allies, Canada boosted its national defence spending by 3% annually. This new policy also included the purchase of new battle tanks for the army in Europe and new CF-
18 fighter aircraft. In short, Trudeau tried to ignore NATO in the 1960s, but he was committed to the Alliance in the 1970s. All of a sudden, Canada was attracted again by the big league because of the benefits it had to offer. In addition, Canada also joined another big league, the Group of Seven (G7), which was enlarged from the Group of Five in 1975 to include Canada.77
In sum, the central argument of this third image of the Canadian foreign policy literature was that Canada had become dependent on the United States. One can summarize78 this school by highlighting its four variants: economic dependence, political dependence, cultural dependence, and institutionalized dependence. While Canada remained engaged in NATO and NORAD, its trade relationship with the United States increased. Thus, the dependency school cannot be seen as a useful theoretical construct to explain Canada's role in NATO in the 1990s.
John Gellner, Canada in NATO (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970). 76 J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). 77 The G7 meeting is a group of finance ministers from the group of the seven most industrialized nations of the world. Canada joined the Group of Six - France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US) in 1976. Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 66-67. 71
Conclusion
One problem in Canadian foreign policy, as Nossal pointed out, is the inadequacy of measuring the power of states in international affairs and thus locating Canada on the international power hierarchy. He stated that "it is impossible to demonstrate a country's power objectively or scientifically."79 While Tomlin and Lyon engaged in an empirical analysis of Canada's power capabilities and standing in the international power hierarchy,
Nossal argued that these measurements were inherently subjective, because "for how one views a state's power has inexorable political implications."80 The notion of power was a difficult concept to comprehend.
Despite all the difficulties of theorizing about Canada's external relations, after
1945 the middle power image was a useful tool for Canadian policy makers as much as it was for the Canadian public of the time. The middle power image and its resulting policies provided the government with international recognition and status. Indeed, the international community recognized the status of Canada as a middle power, but denied it the recognition of a major power.81
This chapter, however, went a step further and argued that a combination of the middle and principal power images would provide a better basis for understanding
Canada's role in the world. The point of the discussions of this chapter was that there was no single image that could sufficiently explain Canadian activity in the 1990s. In short, the images worked in theory but not in practice. The major power metaphor was a useful tool to help explain Canada's membership and role in one of the big international leagues with other big players sitting around the table. Indeed, Canada advanced to become a
7 Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 64. 80 Ibid. Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 9. 72 major player in the NATO Alliance after 1989 and showed a high level activity, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. This was a point that the middle power image had a hard time explaining. The middle power image, however, enhanced Canada's understanding of its own national identity and helped them to find their role in the hierarchy of world politics. It also helped to convince Canadians at home of the necessity of such international engagements. Canadians retained a certain attachment to activism in international relations, but much of what goes on was self-congratulatory rhetoric.
Indeed, it could be called foreign policy by platitudes."82 While this was good politics at home there appeared to be a disconnect between Canadian public policy and international realities.
Thus, one can come to the conclusion that Canadian foreign policy works in practice but not in theory. This means that theories of Canadian foreign policy are less able to explain Canadian foreign policy actions. Taken together, the middle power and principal power images provide a useful tool for explaining Canada's high activity in
NATO in the 1990s. Whether the combination of the two metaphors was also applicable to other middle powers is not the objective of this dissertation and remains to be pursued in future research projects. However, what can be assumed is that the more Canada is involved in the NATO Alliance the more its relative standing will increase in NATO and the more weight its voice will carry at the North Atlantic table. The next two chapters will examine Canada's role in NATO's evolution from a defensive Alliance towards a cooperative security or crisis management organization.
2 This notion is taken from a presentation by Kim Richard Nossal entitled "Implications for Canada - from Middle Power to What?" given to Annual Conference, Queen's Centre for International Relations Kingston, June 14-16, 2005. 73
Chapter 2
Canada and the transformation into a New World Order
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the changes that took place in the international system after the end of the Cold War with respect to the conduct of international affairs and ensuring European peace and security. Theoretically speaking, this is important to understand because it constitutes the external framework in which
Canadian foreign policy decisions with respect to European security took place. Any attempt to disregard an understanding of this external environment would result in an incomplete understanding of Canadian foreign policy during that time period. As such, this section provides the background for some of the changes of the international system and the new meaning of international security and diplomacy.
The analysis below does not claim to be comprehensive or inclusive; indeed, it is highly selective. The themes were chosen to explain the changing nature of the international system and the conduct of foreign policy within such a system at a time of transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War European order. In doing so, the sections also describe the changing mind sets of analysts of international security studies from one in which nation states were the primary level of analysis (during the Cold War) to one in which other dimensions of the state also become relevant.
The changing security environment
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the international community found itself faced with a new security environment. The dramatic events in Eastern Europe generated a serious debate in the academic community about the nature of a post-Cold War era and 74 the implications for continental European security.' After decades of fighting a Cold War, a dramatic shift took place in Europe: a highly defended continent, in which the armies of the West had trained for a nuclear exchange of force and a massive conventional war transformed to a region of without threat. Indeed, events moved very quickly in the early
1990s, so quickly that nobody really knew how to characterize the new world.2 During the Cold War, some scholars predicted that in a post-Cold War environment the great powers of the future would concentrate solely on maximizing their wealth within a system of states rather than compete for military power.3 As one analyst predicted,
"conflicts between the great powers will still be common, but they will be played out in boardrooms and courtrooms, not on battlefields or in command and control centers."4
Even though the West was surprised by the dramatic changes taking place in
Eastern Europe, almost all Western countries supported the peaceful revolution. Initially, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States were opposed to a unified Germany.
However, Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl was able to convince the US administration to support the unification of Germany and thus enabled a larger transformation process in Europe.5 The political support of the United States also made it
1 See for example Jessica T. Matthews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68 (1989); Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); J. Ann Tickner, "Re-Visioning Security," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge, Eng.: Polity Press, 1995); Richard H. Ullmann, "Redefining Security," International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983). 2 For a more detailed discussion of this revisionist view see James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). See for example John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Michael J. Hogan, The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard H. Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, Security Studies for the 1990s (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1993). 4 Goldgeier and McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," 468. 5 For a greater discussion see for example Barry Buzan et al., The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London, New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990). A more historical work 75 possible to convince Britain and France. Before such acceptance was sealed on paper,
Helmut Kohl acknowledged that the German government was committed to accept the status quo in Europe and to affirm existing borderlines in Europe. In light of these changes in Central Europe, US President George H.W. Bush prepared the international community for what he called a "new world order."
This new world order had implications for the concept and meaning of national security. There appear to be two contending academic views of the future of international security studies. Jessica Matthews, for example, argues in 1989 that global developments require a "broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues."6 A quote form an US officials shows that at the time the changing nature of security had already found its way into the policy world. In 1995 an official from the US State Department stated that "during the Cold War, most security threats stemmed from state-to-state aggression....Now we're focusing more on internal factors that can stabilize governments. Now we're paying much more attention to early warning factors, like famine and the environment."7
Other scholars assert that states would remain the primary actors of international affairs. In this case states would continue to worry about their national survival as much as they did during the Cold War.8 They also continue to be aware of the security dilemma in which an increase of one state's power resources would pose security risks to other includes Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). 6 Matthews, "Redefining Security," 162. 7 "The Greening of American Diplomacy," New York Times, October 9 1995, A4. quoted in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17. 8 Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118 (Fall 2003), John J. Maersheimer, Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, ed. Graham T. Allison, American Assembly, and Gregory F. Treverton, Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: Norton, 1992). 76 states. The assumption of this theory is that an anarchic structure of the international system continued to exist and thus causes of war and conflict, such as the pursuit of national prestige, economic competition, nationalism, and religious animosities, had not changed either. Their main argument is that the end of the Cold War generated no fundamental changes in international affairs. David Baldwin, for example, argues that with the end of the East-West conflict "the dimensions of security have not changed
...but the substantive specifications of these dimensions that were appropriate during the
Cold War are likely to differ from those appropriate for the 1990s."9 He argues that economic security,10 environmental security," social and military security and others could be seen as different forms of security, but not fundamentally different concepts.
Further, Baldwin shows that three themes emerged from the post-Cold War debate of the future of international relations.12 Robert Jervis and others who argue that the importance of military power in international relations had declined support the first one.13 Even though most international analysts agree that the reliance on military power
David A. Baldwin "The Concept of Security," Review of International Studies 32 (1997): 23. 10 For a discussion of economic security see for example Michael Borrus et al., The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Beverly Crawford, Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: The Case of East-West Trade, Investment, and Finance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Ethan B. Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992). " There are countless resources on this subject. A good overview provides Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security 23, no. 3 (1994), Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?," International Security 20, no. 2 (1995). 12 Baldwin "The Concept of Security." 13 See especially Raymond Garthoff, "Why Did the Cold War Arise, and Why Did It End?," in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge [England], New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert Jervis, "A Usable Past for the Future," in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge [England], New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Ernest May, "US Government, a Legacy of the Cold War," in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge [England], New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Barbara A. Bickster and Gregory F. Treverton, Conclusion: Getting from Here to Where?, ed. Graham T. Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, 1st ed ed., Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: Norton, 1992). 77 had declined, there continued to be disagreement in the literature about the relevance of military forces for a post-Cold War world order and their importance as a tool for foreign policy makers. Secondly, there seems to be agreement that researchers had to revisit the way they think about international security and the importance they place on the national interest of states.14 Third, scholars largely agreed that the definition of national security was too narrow and needed to be re-visited. Issues such as environmental pollution, the law of the sea, health epidemics and other issues became politically relevant. Baldwin says: "Recognizing that threats to national security or well being are not confined to the military realm, these proposals expand the notion of security threats to include such matters as human rights, the environment, economics, epidemics, crime, and social injustice."15
Generally speaking, the concept of national security is quite old. It has its origins in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. After 30 years of war in Europe, nation states became pre-occupied with questions of national survival and the protection of their people. This is the earliest form of national security and assumes that all other policies were subordinate to it. As a result, the national interest becomes synonymous with national security. Hence, as Arnold Wolfers points out, a policy of national security is primarily normative.16 Moreover, the international system of states is seen as being anarchic in the sense that there was no world government that is able to govern nation states. As a result, a competition between states occurs as to who would be the leader of the community of states. Nation states are seen as the primary actors in international
14 See especially Jervis, "A Usable Past for the Future." 15 Baldwin "The Concept of Security," 126. 16 Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1952): 483. 78
affairs. They are concerned about great power politics and the need to ensure sufficient
military capabilities for defensive purposes.
In the early 1960s it was Wolfers who first tried to approach the concept of
national security by using scientific methods. He argued that the notion of national
security is an "ambiguous symbol" that can have many meanings.17 In his mind, security
means protection of previously acquired norms and values. In this sense, security is a
value that nation states can decide to have more or less of: "Security, in an objective
sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the
absence of fear that such values will be attacked."19 The military definition of security
draws away attention from non-military threats that might have affected the stability of
states and the international system.20 Richard Ullman, on the other hand, argues that
defining national security exclusively in military terms portrays a false image. Instead, he
suggests a wider definition of security:
A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.21
17 Ibid.: 147. 18 Ibid.: 484. 19 Ibid.: 485. 20 However, this predisposition with military technology and strategy is somewhat understandable. The beginning of the Cold War and the (anticipated) imminent threat from a Soviet invasion in Western Europe left policy-makers as well as academics with little room for conceptualizations - they were simply too busy trying to develop adequate strategies for the defence of the West. As a consequence, the lens of research was put on the military quite automatically deferred other aspects of security. Military policy was considered high politics and thus was placed on the top of the agenda list whereas all other aspects were considered low politics. As David A Baldwin argues "security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists." See Baldwin "The Concept of Security." Later, Buzan points out that the use of military force rather than security has been the central concern of security studies. Yet, he rejects any intention to provide a clear definition of security, which, as Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 317. 21 Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 133. 79
David Baldwin agrees with this wider definition of security and expands it slightly. He argues that the term security is closely related to threats, which he defines as a "low probability of damage to acquired values."22 This definition allows the inclusion of natural disasters and other security risks as being threats to a state's national security. The term also ranks the preservation of values higher than the presence of threats. Harald
Mueller agrees with Baldwin and argues that security could be defined as "the absence of external threats to the state emerging from another state."23
However, as Helga Haftendorn points out, this definition has some difficulties and problems. The concept was designed for a Western understanding of security: "Most developing countries emphasize the economic and social as well as the domestic dimensions of security."24 Yet, non-developed countries are likely to have a different concept and understanding of security.25 It also shows that the development of the security paradigm and the shift from national security to international, and finally global security depends on which theoretical assumptions one makes. Nevertheless, Baldwin's definition allows for a definition of a security object (security for whom) as much as the values and norms such social actors might carry. Meanwhile, both Baldwin's and
Baldwin "The Concept of Security," 13. 23 Mueller, "Security Community," 369. 24 Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline Building in International Security," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (March 1991): 5. 25 Yet, this is not to suggest that the concept of security has not evolved since Wolfer's findings. Smoke reassured students of international security that the concept had not been developed much since Wolfers.25 In 1973 Klaus Knorr conducted a literature review of the field and argued that the semantics of the concept of security pre-occupy the field of study more than actual academic analysis. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, Barry Buzan devoted time to the field again and argued that the concept of security has been neglected for five reasons. First, the concept is difficult and complex to understand. Second, there is a dichotomy between the concept of power and the concept of security. Third, opponents of the realist school of thought of international relations are less interested in security studies. Fourth, the rapid developments of military technology pre-occupy academics and researchers and distract them from conceptual thinking. Fifth, the ambiguous concept of security is been exploited by politicians. See Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991). 80
Wolfer's definitions of security points to the fact that security is a value of which nation states can have more or less, depending on their political objects and ambitions of society.
Changing nature of diplomacy
The new world order described by US President George H.W. Bush is based on a new understanding of diplomacy as a tool of statecraft. It certainly is not a new tool that suddenly became available to diplomats and policy makers in 1989, but one that simply regained importance in a post-Cold War environment. This was made possible by the systemic changes of the international system and the new meaning these transformation processes gave the notion of security. Traditional, old-style diplomacy refers to the formal practices and methods of governments conducting foreign relations with other nation states. This could include the exchange of diplomatic personnel such as ambassadors or high commissioners and other officials, dispatches of messages between government officials, as well as negotiations in international forums. The conduct of negotiations and dialogue are the main characteristics of the old Cold War diplomacy.
Both states - the Soviet Union and the United States - had spun a network of supporting nation states - or allies - who sought to undermine the other side by all means necessary.
The foremost diplomatic activity during the Cold War was to advance the national interest of the state and to limit the influence of the other side while avoiding a nuclear confrontation of the two superpowers. Indeed, Cold War diplomacy was characterized by summit diplomacy, where heads of state and government met directly to resolve major problems. 81
However, this classical characterization of diplomacy evolved in the post-Cold
War era. In the new world order there was no ideological struggle between the two
superpowers any more. After the fall of the Berlin Wall there was a demand that diplomacy should be formulated in a process that was open to the public. This not only
included a demand for greater participation in the formulation of foreign policy but also
for greater public control of foreign policy decision-making processes. In other words,
dialogue between states and non-state actors have widened the traditional definition of
diplomacy.26 Scholars now refer to it as a process "whereby states seek to communicate, to influence each other, and to resolve conflicts through bargaining - either formal or
informal - short of the use of armed force." In other words, what changed after 1989 was that states gave diplomacy more room and time to solve international problems. With the
fall of the Berlin Wall, diplomacy became global in scope and now has to deal with states that were excluded from diplomatic relations during the Cold War. In addition, small powers such as Canada, Norway, Sweden and others increased their international activities and thus their international visibility. Differently from the superpowers, they were able to adapt to the new international system much faster than the superpowers.27
This adaptation process has also given them new roles in the international community.
In addition, diplomacy of the new age more than ever takes place in a public forum where foreign ministers or diplomatic officials are seen on television cameras or are questioned by reporters about political issues. Thus, one of the trends of modern
In the following chapter we will examine this phenomenon closer with regards to the Canadian case. See for example Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration (London, New York: Routledge, 1995). See for example Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 82 diplomacy is that it evolved from a secret tool of statecraft and influence to a more publicly controlled one in which citizens and non-state actors are increasingly involved and able to exert control and influence.28
This was a phenomenon that Canadians in particular experienced in 1994. The negotiations process of the landmine treaty is a prime example of this modern diplomacy.
Officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) reached out to the public in order to gather information, ideas, and the opinions of
Canadians about certain foreign policy issues. The Liberal foreign affairs critic, Lloyd
Axworthy, complained publicly that Prime Minister Mulroney's Progressive
Conservative government seemed to be "unwilling to carry on a serious dialogue with the
Canadian people on foreign policy issues."29 The complaint made by Axworthy was that the government consulted rarely with the public, or parliament, on important foreign policy decisions. This, according to the Liberals led to an accumulation of a democratic deficit that distanced Canadians from the highest level of foreign policy making process.
During the 1993 election campaign, the Liberal Party of Canada called for changes in this procedure and for engagements of the public through roundtables and public meetings:30
"The Red Book promised that as part of the commitment to democratization, a Liberal government would establish a National Forum on Canada's International Relations to
For an extensive discussion see for example Joseph Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York, San Francisco: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), chapter 8. See also R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy (London and New York: Longman, 1988. 29 Lloyd Axoworthy, "Canadian Foreign Policy: A Liberal Party Perspective," Canadian Foreign Policy 1 (Winter 1992): 14. 30 Liberal Party of Canada. "Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada, Ottawa, 1993 83 discuss foreign policy issues."31 After being elected into office, the Liberals kept their election promise and held public hearings on foreign policy issues.32
Kim Nossal refers to two distinct phenomena of the democratization process - an external as well as an internal one.33 Externally, the Canadian government encouraged other states to follow the Canadian example and to adopt democratic ideals and practices.
Internally, democratization referred to the "degree to which Canadian foreign policy itself is democratic."34 Indicators of democracy, according to Nossal, are
popular sovereignty, the political equality of all adult citizens, governance by the consent of the governed, which usually involved elections that must be free and fair; the existence of a set of political and civil rights and liberties, including the right of assembly, of free speech, of political organization, and of opposition to the regime; the rule of law, including a fair and independent judiciary and a range of judicial rights, among which the most important is equality before the law. We also seek evidence of equitable participation of all citizens, regardless of class, ethnicity, gender or other attributes, in the political life of the community.35
In sum, what this trend of the new world order underlines was an increasing overlap between foreign and domestic politics.
The new emphasis on diplomacy was also felt as the United Nations, which emerged from its Cold War paralysis to become a more viable international organization of collective action in which the five permanent member states of the Security Council committed themselves to overcome their ideological differences. This new geopolitical setting generated a general pledge to multilateralism and greater international cooperation
Kim Richard Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Elusive Ideal," in Canada among Nations - Democracy and Foreign Policy, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen A. Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995). 32 Tim Dramin and Betty Plewes, "Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy," in Canada among Nations, 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen A Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 75. 33Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Elusive Ideal," 29. 34 Ibid. 35 Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Elusive Ideal," 30. 84
rather than competition. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, for example, can be
seen as a test case. An international coalition of the willing composed of Western
countries and CEE countries joined forces for the liberation of Kuwait. In general, there
was a sense in the international community that existing problems were multiple and too
complex for one country to solve unilaterally. It was assumed that international problems
would have a spill over effect and thus might affect more than one or two states.36 Thus
cooperation among states was seen as the route to take for managing international crisis.37
Moreover, the United Nations began to address issues such as drug trafficking,
regional instabilities, nationalist conflicts, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction
as well as terrorism. The new international security agenda was filled with non-traditional
security issues such as instability in the global trading and financial systems, the rise of
TO
nationalist tensions and environmental pollution. There was also a recognizable change
in the tone in international diplomacy in the sense that it was less ideologically laden. The
US and Russia agreed to negotiate before important votes were brought before the
Security Council in order to prevent a stalemate and promote consensus decision-making.
Indeed, the United States was committed to a more proactive and multilateral foreign policy. Then US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright summarized this new
cooperative arrangement as "assertive multilateralist."39
Michael Cox, Ken Booth, and Timothy Dunne, The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989- 1999 (Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). "Ibid. 38 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Printer, 1993), 7. 39 See for example Madeleine Korbel Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: 2003); Alan P. Dobson, "The Dangers of Us Interventionism," Review of International Studies 28 (2002). 85
Changing nature of power and the resources of the new power
The power of a nation-state can be understood in terms of its capacity to control the behaviour of other states. In other words, power is relational and could be understood in the context of the relationship between one or more states. Power understood in this sense
relates to the notion that the power of a state is most difficult to measure, but by
examining the role of a state within an organization one could deduct conclusions as to
how it relates to that of other states. Robert Dahl sees power as "the ability to shift the
probability of outcomes."40 He also points out that power is the ability to change the
behaviour of other states. David Baldwin asserts, "what functions as a power resource in
one policy contingency framework may be irrelevant in another."41 This is the
characteristic of the new power nation states uses in the post-Cold War era. It requires a
classification of the scope in which power is defined: "Power resources (or assets) in one policy contingency framework may not only lose their effectiveness in another context; they may actually become liabilities rather than assets."42 This means that it is difficult to
characterize a nation state's power if the object of its power is unclear. The traditional components of nation-state power, according to Ray Cline and his conceptual formula, are the critical mass (the size, and location), the population and natural resources of a country, its economic capabilities, its military capabilities, the strategic purpose, and the will to pursue a national strategy.43
40 Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioural Science 2 (July 1957). See also Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research, ed. Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison (New York: Free Press, 1969). 41 Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Trends," 165. 42 Ibid.: 166. See for example Ray S. Cline, The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assessment (Lanham, MD, Washington, DC: University Press of America; United States Global Strategy Council, 1994); Ray S. Cline and Georgetown University. Center for Strategic and International Studies, World Power Trends and US Foreign Policy for the 1980's (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980). 86
Joseph Nye and others distinguished between "soft power" and "hard power" resources.44 Nye argues that the traditional definition of power where powerful states are those that inhibited large populations, territory, natural resources, economies, military forces, and political stability does not apply in the post-Cold war security environment.45
Instead, Nye argues that the new sources of state power are soft power resources. While for example, in the agrarian economy of the eighteenth century the size of the population was considered a critical power resource because of the potential for infantry recruits, the size of the military matters less in a post-Cold War environment. Even though Nye's work was mostly concerned about US power resources in the world, it provided new insight into the discussion of the nature of power post-1989. He argues that a nation state possesses power when it has the ability to alter the behaviour of other states.
Governments have both hard power and soft power capabilities. Military or hard power capabilities allowed them to use coercive measures that they then employed in order to achieve political objectives. Thus, many nation states use their military power as an expression of their national power: "Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength in war."47 Not surprisingly, most of the literature of power is associated with the
United States. The US enjoyed what Barry Posen called the "command of the commons"48 - it is the most powerful nation at sea, space, and air. America, Posen and
Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford University Press, 2003). 45 See for the traditional definition see Cline, The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assessment, Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and US Foreign Policy for the 1980's (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980). Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. 47 Joseph S.Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Fall 1990): 154. 48 Barry R. Posen, "Commandos of the Commons: Military Foundation of US Hegemony," International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003). 87
others argue, is not contested militarily and thus appears as the global military hegemon:
"Command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea,
space and air than others do; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and
that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them
to the United States."49 This unprecedented military capability allows the United States to
wage war against any country whenever it decides to do so. Washington is capable of
restricting its adversary's abilities in order to access other military and economic
assistance. Consequently, economic sanctions that enforce foreign policy decisions are
considered a source of hard power because of their coercive nature.
However, as Nye argues, unprecedented military capabilities are not sufficient to
retain influence in international affairs: "Although force may sometimes play a role,
traditional instruments of power are rarely sufficient to deal with the new dilemmas of
world politics."50 In the post-1989 world order, soft power capabilities have become
equally important.
This also speaks to the recognition that the actors in international affairs changed with the end of the East-West conflict.51 In today's world, multinational corporations are
large players with considerable influence in international affairs. In other words, the
growth of transnational economic interests diminishes the freedom of leaders to conduct
foreign policy while transborder economic investments and international shareholders
J.LSIU.. U. 50 Nye, "Soft Power," 164. 51 The development of Liberalism and Constructivism in international relations theory have largely contributed to a better understanding of non-state actors in international relations. 52 See for example Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited," in Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Michael Doyle, "On the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 4 (1995). 88
have a significant influence in domestic politics. As a result, it has become increasingly
difficult for nation states to control their economies. In fact, as Goldgeier and McFaul
argue, "leaders are under increasing pressure to adopt international norms about
economic liberalism and political democracy."54
In a post-Cold War world order, other instruments of power such as modern
communication technologies force a greater interdependence on nation states and thus
increase the costs of warfare. In that sense, soft power can be understood as the power of
attraction. It is the ability of states to entice other countries to follow its course of action.
According to Nye, there are three sources of US soft power: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.55 Pop music and its culture, for example, are one of the
sources of soft power capabilities that attracted millions of young people around the globe every day. Entrenched in this global industry are ideas of the Western culture and values. According to Nye, this is a very significant source of US power. The United
States is also the largest exporter of English-speaking T.V. shows and movies.
Hollywood is the personification of the American entertainment industry.
Changing nature of threat
Inherent in the change of the international system after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is an absence of a single great power or a coalition of powers that pose an imminent threat to the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, this new threat environment does not require continuous support for global military spending and resulted in savings for taxpayers.
53 For the latest discussion about economic liberalism and the forces of globalization see Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 54 Goldgeier and McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," 476. 55 Joseph S. Nye, Think Again: Soft Power ([cited 31. March 2006]), available from www.foreignpolicy.com. 89
This affected all NATO countries equally. According to the United Nations, global
military spending, for example, declined by 3.6% annually between the 1987 and 1991
from $995 billion to $767 billion.56
In 1989, NATO's armed forces were taken by surprise of the end of the East-West
conflict and were forced to reposition and transform themselves in order to meet the new threats. The clear demarcation line that existed during the Cold War, in the words of the
UN, between "forces of democracy and those of totalitarianism"57 helped the militaries of
the West to face an aggressor and threat. The strategies of containment and deterrence
were developed in the early 1950s in response to an expansionist Soviet foreign policy in
which the Soviet Union threatened to launch a massive invasion into Western Europe.58
These strategic calculations changed after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. The end
of the Cold War, however, did not eliminate the threat posed by non-state actors such as
terrorists and nationalist groups or transborder conflicts. Even though, as Gaddis shows,59
nationalist forces are not a new phenomenon in international relations, they simply resurfaced with the end of the Cold War refreshing old animosities. One might think, for example, of the old acrimony between Hungary and Romania resurfaced; nationalist
sentiments also manifested themselves in South Eastern Europe. As Gaddis argues, these were forces of fragmentation in Europe that compete against forces of integration. In fact, it is these integrated forces that brought about a large geopolitical realignment process in
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Ruth Leger Sivard, "World Military and Social Expenditures," (Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Publications, 1996). 57 John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 2 (1991), 102-03. See for example John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 59 Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World" 105. 90
Western Europe: "It has come about largely as a result of those integrative forces that ended the Cold War: the much celebrated triumph of democratic politics and market economics."60 However, it is not safe to conclude that the success of the integrationist forces brought an end to the threats. At best, they diffuse a clear depiction of them: "One can no longer plausibly point to a single source of danger, as one could throughout most of that conflict, but dangers there still will be."61
While the nature of the threat changed significantly with the end of the Cold War, so did the forms of military organization. Some analysts suggest that after the end of the
Cold War the armed forces transforms from a modern to a postmodern military whose objectives and missions are fundamentally different.62 Others detect a change from old wars to "new wars" or "postmodern wars."64 Historically, the modern military fully emerged in the 19th century and is closely associated with the rise of the nation state.
Back then, states mostly employed conscripted army with a professional officer corps.
Throughout the Cold War all Western militaries relied on conscription, except for Britain, which returned to a voluntary army after 1963; the United States followed on 1 July 1973 and adopted an all-volunteer army.65 The point is that these Cold War militaries were
Ibid. p. 109. For a greater discussion of the liberal internationalist view see also Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," The National Interest (Summer 1989). See also Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society; Militarism, Demilitarization, and War at the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge [England]: Polity Press, 1991). 61 Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 113. 62 See Moskos, Williams, and Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. However, it is important to note that the concept of a modern and post-modern military is a theoretical construct with the intention to analyze the shift in military professionalism and organization after the end of the Cold War. 63 Mary Kaldor, The Disintegrating West, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978). Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998). See also Mark Duffield, "Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection," Journal of Civil Wars (April 1998), Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict (New York: Guilford Press, 1997). 63 See for example Deborah E. Cowen, "Fighting For Freedom: The End of Conscription in the United States and the Neoliberal Project of Citizenship," Citizenship Studies 10, no. 2 (May 2006). 91 equipped and trained to quickly mobilize their forces in case of a military conflict. Their primary missions and goals were determined to fight large-scale conventional wars, which in turn determined the size of the forces: "The power to destroy civilizations was the defining quality of the Cold War."66 Thus, the perceived threat of modern militaries was large-scale conventional invasions by other states and nuclear conflicts among great powers.
In the postmodern era of military organization, the active duty force of the United
States is reduced to 1.4 million soldiers in 1999 from 2.6 million during the Cold War.67
The reduction of the size of the force as well as the so-called peace dividend reduced the demands for new recruits to join the armed forces. In the case of the United States the defence budget measured in relation to the gross domestic product shrunk from 6% on average between 1985-1989 to 4% on average between 1990-1994 and subsequently to
3.3% on average between 1994-1999.68 In actual dollar signs, the US defence budget was reduced from US $ 306170 million (more than US $306 billion) in the fiscal year 1990 to
$278856 million (more than SU $ 278 billion) in 1995.69
Moskos, Williams, and Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, 2. 67 Ibid., 18., See also Wesley K. Clark, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire, 1 st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), where he says: "In World War I, General John J. Pershing had created, with help from the French and British, the modern, European-style US Army with 1 million soldiers deployed in France. These were the big, square divisions-two brigades each composed of two regiments, mostly infantrymen and machine-gunners, plus the division artillery-altogether some 10,000 infantrymen per division....In World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and afterwards, the US armed forces sought an enemy, focussed on him, trained to beat him These were the forces of the twentieth-century warfare, of mass armies and the battles of state against state. They targeted enemy forces- and after the fighting was done, they wanted to go home." 68 Official NATO Data on Defence Spending, 2002. 92
Table I: Defence Spending as a Percent of GDP Chart III-4 Defense Spending as a Perc ent 0 fGD p
• •— - -- I % Change % Change 1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 95-96 90-96 ——-— ______, United States 5.33 4.74 4.54 4.16i 3.83 -33%
MAIO Allies" ..... „^„ Belgium 2.42 2.35 1.87 ....L7* ,_1.73 i' ."65 '"._ ,;2% Canada 2.01 ...... ^ 1.73 "l"44 " -10% -28% F'onmark i 2~05 i.oe 2.00 " 1.9S "l.8*6 1 80 1.76 -3% -14% France j 3.561 3.41 ___3-41 3.34 3.T1 3.02 2.82 2.3C 2.13 I.9; '"" 1.78 1.70 1.67 " -2% -41% Greece i 4.66 _A2,t 4 46 4.42 4 43 4.42 4 61 _4% ..-.1!/o, 2.13 i'Ti '"""Y.05 " 2.0S """2.OC ~l.~7l "T95 ""'" 10% ^ixembourg 1.08 1.15 1.17 1.05 1.13 1.05 1.01 1 ~~~4% -6% Netherlands ' 2.62 ... .^.^ . "X"2« " ~~.2"H '. ~3-92 2.02 0% -23% Norway 2.94 2.7S 3.01 2.74 2.76 '2.45 2 1 '.„ 7:Pa/l>. Portugal 2.79 "2.73 2.67 '2.5S 2^49 """"'2.68 ..Z....-... . ^ -4% IT Y:$i ~ "l'4°/o y^ain 1.84 1.72 1.57 ""1.73 "T.54 1.55 """"" 1.49 "-19% "4% 'I'Lirkey \ 3.53 3.76 "3.88 4.05 4~25 4.25 20% 0% iTnited Kingdom ! 4.04 4.24 3.83 3.6C 3.37 3.03 2.93 -3% -28% Subtotal ! 2.88 2.74 2.58 2.52 2.38 2.23 2.20 -1% -24%
Pacific Allies Japan 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.9£ 0.98 0.98 0.99 2% ... „...._. Z »i Republic of Korea 3.82 "~3.6C 3.63 "3.47 "3.31 3". 19 -2% -18% Subtotal MS 1.16 1.16 '1 1.15 1.15 1.20 4% 1% Gulf Cooperation Council ___ Bahrain 5.01 4.60 5.44 5.37 5.03 4.73 -6% -5%- ?L'iwait * * 14.91 12 34 12.75 10.85 11.31 4% NA ^••rnan 1832 "' 14 6C 15 3€ 16 0* 16 3i 16.7S ' " 14 22 -22%' '"iutar 2.71 13.57 4.78 4.44 4.04 4.26 4.07 -4% 50% tif.udi Arabia 30.44 30'0£ 11.64 13.9C 10 8C "l"0.3€ 13 58 31% '-55% ... ._„_ T1 rated Arab Emirates ', 7.70 14.45 5.0'C 5.27 4.91 9.37 91% 22%'
Subtotal 28.22" 31 94* 10.82 11.72 9.99 9.48 12,04 27% -57%+, K_ __j ——j" ;
Giand Total 3.69* 3.41* 3.15 2.9S 2.77 2.57 2.56: 0% -31%*
* Reliable Kuwaiti defense spending and GDP figures for 1990-1991 arejiotjayailable due to the impact oi the :>.ilfWar. ' --i - - — -• >- •-« -- -> - - -• -
Source: United States. Dept. of Defense. Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the US Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2000). 93
The postmodern military also enjoys much-loosened ties with the state. In most of
70 the literature, the new wars are describes as internal or civil wars. In the post-Cold War, most Western countries replaced their conscript armies with volunteer armies (see chart below). Prior to NATO's enlargement process in 1999, nine of the sixteen NATO member states adopted a volunteer military, and only seven of the sixteen still operate military forces with conscripts.71 The picture, however, changes with the first and the subsequent second round of enlargement. In 2004, sixteen of the twenty-six NATO member states still have conscription armies, and only ten switched to volunteer armies.
This trend can be explained by the proportionally large number of post-Warsaw Pact countries who neither had the financial resources to comprehensively restructure their militaries and adopt a Western military structures72 nor the political commitment to do so, because of domestic constraints.
70 Kaldor, The Disintegrating West, 2. 71 See for example Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, "Armed Forces after the Cold War," in The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Moskos, Williams, and Segal, The Postmodern Military; Armed Forces after the Cold War. 72 At the moment CEE countries have adopted comprehensive military reforms in order to make their military structures and operations more interoperable with those of Western states. This process is taking a long time due to constraint fiscal budgets. 94
Table II:
List of NATO Countries with Mandatory Conscription*
Country Conscription ycs/no Duration
Belgium no Bulgaria yes 9 months Canada no Czech Republic yes 9-12 months Denmark yes 10 months (to be 4 months) Estonia yes 8 months France no Germany yes 9 months Greece yes 16-19 months** Hungary yes 6 months Iceland no Italy yes 10 months Latvia yes 12 months Lithuania yes 12 months Luxembourg no Netherlands no Norway yes 12 months Poland yes 9 months Portugal yes 4 months Romania yes 12 months Slovakia yes 4 months Slovenia no Spain no Turkey yes 15 months United Kingdom no United States no
* Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance - 2004/05 (London; Institute for Strategic ** Army: up to 16 months, Navy: up to 19 months, Air Force up to 19 months
In contrast to Cold War armies, the objectives and scope of post-Cold War militaries widen, and troops are trained for multipurpose missions, such as humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations.73 It is anticipated that the new force structure of
Western militaries would be adequate to face the new threats of the post-Cold War era,
Martha Finnemore analyzes the changing normative context of international interventions into sovereign states. She describes the role of humanitarian norms in shaping patterns of humanitarian interventions over two hundred years. See Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 95 particularly the nationalist tensions of sub national state actors, ethnic conflicts, and asymmetrical threats such as terrorism. One distinguishing feature of a post-Cold War military environment is not a decline of inter-state wars, but a rise in intra-state wars that sometimes lead to a complete collapse of states, so they became failed states.74 As a result, Western militaries updated their vocabularies and included terminology such as operations other than war, stability operations and so on. The role of postmodern militaries now includes separating belligerents, re-building war-torn societies, delivering food and medical supplies to refugees, and providing security for humanitarian and other non-governmental organizations. The new missions of postmodern forces are also a reflection of concerns for humans and less for states.
This new post-Cold War world order had implications for Canada. It allowed
Canadian officials to re-examine the nature of international threats that face Canada in the sense that old enemies in CEE now are partners of NATO. Likewise, this transition also had implications for Canada's role in NATO. While the new international environment called for new roles of the militaries, it allowed the government to reduce the role of
Canadian Forces that were forwardly deployed to Germany. Canadian Forces members are now expected to act more like diplomats and less as war fighters.
For the latest literature on failing and failed states (especially the experience of the United States) see Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Forum on Constructive Capitalism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 96
CHAPTER 3
CANADA AND NATO SINCE 1945
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical abstract of Canada's external relations with regards to NATO and issues of European security. This chapter examines the time period between 1945 until 1989. The next chapter then examines in closer detail
Canada's involvement in European security after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the
aim of this chapter is to provide the historical background for the next chapter to give the
reader a better understanding of Canadian actions in the 1990s. Thus, the purpose below
is not to provide a comprehensive historiography or a detailed historical description of
what happened in the first fourty-four years of Canada's membership in NATO. Rather,
the aim is to demonstrate an evolution of Canadian foreign policy thinking and to
elaborate on the notion raised in chapter one that Canadian foreign policy works in practice but not in theory. The structure of the chapter follows the sequence of Canadian governments. We will begin with the Pearson government, because the predecessor government under Louis St. Laurent (1948-57), and the notion of liberal internationalism that is attached to St. Laurent as well as his Minister of External Affairs, Lester B.
Pearson, has already been covered at length in chapter one.
Canada and NATO under Diefenbaker (1957-63)
John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative government defeated Louis St. Laurent's
Liberals in the 1957 general election. In terms of Canada's national security policy, however, he did not depart from the Liberals and continued to uphold the Pearsonian legacy of 1956. Liberal internationalism also became the reigning foreign policy doctrine 97 in Ottawa under Diefenbaker. For a minority government it was not surprising that the
Prime Minister's foreign policy built on liberal internationalism and reaffirmed Canada's support of NATO as an optimal mechanism for pursuing Canadian security interests. The second priority of the new government was a strong commitment to international organizations such as the UN and the Commonwealth.1 One of the first decisions of the new Progressive Conservatives in power was to approve the North American Air Defence
Agreement (NORAD), which was negotiated with the United States under the previous
Liberal government in 1956. It was also during Diefenbaker's tenure that a bilateral
Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) was signed with the United States.2 This new activism preceded an announcement of the Soviet Union on 26 August 1957 it they had successfully tested an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). A few months later, the Soviets demonstrated to the international community that they were capable of reaching orbit by sending the Sputnik satellite into space. It was in this international threat environment that the Canadian government formalized the NORAD agreement with the United States to enhance the monitoring of the North American airspace.3 Some analysts have argued that a sequence of events led to the signing of the bilateral agreement. David Cox, for example, argued that the decision to join NORAD was made in the fall of 1953 jointly by the Canadians and Americans.4 However, the United States
Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 191. 2 John Kirton, "The Consequences of Integration: The Case of the Defence Production Sharing Agreements," in Continental Community? - Independence and Integration in North America, ed. Andrew Axline, et al. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). 3 For a good review of the history of the NORAD agreement see Joseph T. Jockel, The United States and Canadian Efforts at Continental Air Defense, 1945-1957 (1978). For a discussion of the threat perception at the time see Thomas F. Keating, Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1988), 63-70. 4 David Cox, Canada and NORAD, 1958-1978; A Cautionary Retrospective, Aurora Papers 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985). 98 lobbied the Canadian government to co-operate with it on continental defence issues.
NORAD was seen as an institutionalization of the Canada-US defence collaboration and
"Canada's participation in the defence of the North American continent was part and parcel of American first-strike options for attacking the Soviet Union."5 The threat perception of the foreign and defence policy elite in Ottawa was similar to that of the
United States in that a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on the North American continent could take place without any strategic warning.7 Once the NORAD treaty was signed, Canadian airspace became an integral component of the defence of North
America.8 Even though NORAD was technically not part of NATO, it nonetheless underlined Canada's military and political commitments to the security of the West and the North American homeland, which was within the NATO perimeter. It also gave
Canada a seat at the table in decisions about continental air defence.
In 1957, the Diefenbaker government was also confronted with the question of equipping the Canadian Forces with nuclear weapons. The issue was put on Canada's agenda during a NATO meeting in December 1957, when the Alliance adopted NATO document MC 14/2 entitled "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO
Area." MC 14/2 is often characterized as NATO's strategy of massive retaliation and called upon NATO member states to contribute to the defence of the NATO territory.
NATO forces would function as a trip-wire for launching NATO's nuclear retaliatory forces:
5 Ibid., 9. Keating, Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis, 61. 7 For the latest comprehensive examination of the origins of NORAD see Joseph T. Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History (Kingston, Montreal: Queen's/McGill University Press, 2007). See for example Keating, Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis, 60. 99
Our chief objective is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all the forces at our disposal, including nuclear weapons, which the defence of NATO would require. In preparation for a general war, should one be forced upon us: a. We must first ensure the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counteroffensive by all available means and develop the capability to absorb and survive the enemy's onslaught. b. Concurrently and closely related to the attainment of this aim, we must develop our ability to use our land, sea, and air forces for defense of their territories and sea areas of NATO as far forward as possible to maintain the integrity of the NATO area, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset.9
MC 48/2 entitled "Measures to implement the Strategic Concept," which outlines, in
detail, military measures needed to implement this new strategy, accompanied MC 14/2.
Erika Simpson asserts that Diefenbaker might not have fully understood the implications
for Canada to agreeing to MC 14/2 and MC 48/2. She concludes that the bilateral
NORAD agreement preoccupied the young Diefenbaker government, and that the Prime
Minister himself might have been "perhaps unprepared for his first NATO meeting, [and]
he seems to have little understanding of what he was committing Canada to."10
On 23 September 1958, the government announced the acquisition of two nuclear
capable squadrons of Bomarc missiles and nuclear-armed interceptor aircraft to be based
on Canadian soil for the defence of North America. The decision was made public as a
larger package of the government's expanded NATO commitments."
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on Overall Strategic Concept For the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area, MC 14/2 (Revised), 21 February 1957, p. 13. Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 103. " Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 25-88, Chapter I: Relations with the United States, Part 4: Defence and Security Issues, Section A: Continental Air Defence, Privy Council Office. 100
However, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Diefenbaker government
initially refused to put Canadian Forces on high alert as it was requested to do by
NORAD and American officials.12 It was only after intensive pressure from the Canadian
military and the State Department in Washington that Diefenbaker agreed to alert the
military. In fact, Canada's Minister of National Defence, Douglas Harkness, had put the
Canadian military on alert without the approval or knowledge of Prime Minister
Diefenbaker.13 The Canadian public was left in the state of confusion and with the
impression that the government did not have a coherent defence policy. The confusion
was partly caused by the call for a general election in 1963 and the election campaigns,
which were dominated by nuclear weapons issues. As a result, the public debated the
necessity of arming the military with nuclear weapons. The Leader of the Opposition,
Lester B. Pearson, exploited this debate to his political advantage and advocated the
acceptance of nuclear forces for Canada.14
Diefenbaker himself approved acquiring nuclear weapons for the Canadian
military and lost the general election in 1963 because of his refusal to accept US nuclear
weapons on Canadian soil. Lester B. Pearson had publicly endorsed nuclear weapons for
Canada. The subsequent new government under Pearson strongly supported Canada's
commitments to European security by deploying both nuclear missiles as well as nuclear-
armed strike reconnaissance aircraft on European soil.
12 See for example Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, 28, 119. For the latest historical analysis of Canada-US relations at the time see Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History. 13 Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, 119. Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 118. 101
The Pearson Government (1963-68)
When Lester B. Pearson was elected Prime Minister on 2 April 1963, he argued that
Alliance commitments had to be fulfilled and nuclear weapons be accepted for the military.15 At the end of Pearson's tenure as Prime Minister did he request a review of
Canada's nuclear commitments as a means to enhance European security. Norman
Robertson, then undersecretary of state in the Department of External Affairs, issued a report for the government recommending the status quo and to "keep the allies allied" with Canada by retaining nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.16 The image of Canada as a middle power started to gain traction.
Lester Pearson is better known for his middlepowermanship during the 1956 Suez
Canal crisis, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Price in 1957. He was one of the key individuals in the foreign policy establishment in Ottawa, and served as the Minister of External Affairs (1948-1957).17 The so-called golden age lasted from the mid-1940s to the 1960s. The middle power image is characterized by Canadian internationalism and
1 8 persists until today, albeit subject to various challenges. Pearson not only asked what role Canada might play in a post-war international order but also what policies were conducive for establishing a global community of states. Canada believed in the collective security system in which international organizations were an integral component to ensure peace and security.19 The middle power concept was associated with
15 Marilyn D. Eustace, Canada's European Force, 1964-1971: Canada's Commitment to Europe (Kingston, Canada: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 1982), 16. 16 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, 11. 17 He later also served as Canada's fourteenth Prime Minister between 1963-1968. 18 Here, the literature appears to be in disagreement. As Kim R. Nossal shows, the term middle power was not adopted by the Government of Canada until early 1945. See Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 54. 19 John Holms clearly shows that the primary objective of Canadian foreign policy immediately following WWII was to create a collective security system. As Holmes argues, "there was, however, no particularly 102 a set of practical experiences Canada had and the evolution of a distinct international order after the end of the war.20 Over time, the status of a middle power gave Canadians a feeling of moral superiority - they were the ones that constrained the great powers "and acted as the world's conscience when things got out of hand."21
However, as argued above, Canada was always conscious of its national interest while joining entangling Alliances. It is clear from the literature that Canada became a signatory of the NATO treaty not primarily because of its global ambitions and good will but because it wanted to become member of a forum that would counterbalance the US, a great power and Canada's continental neighbour.22 It was also clear to the foreign policy establishment in Ottawa that the collective security system of the UN would not suffice in fulfilling Canadian national security interests during a time when the Soviet Union engaged in expansionist foreign policies that could threaten the fragile situation in Europe once again.23 Shortly after the end of combat in Europe, Winston Churchill warned the international community in a speech given in Fulton, Missouri on 12 May 1945 that an iron curtain had come down over Europe - "from Stettin to the Baltic to Trieste" and separating Western and Eastern Germany.24 The Soviet Union had gained control and influence over regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. It also gave support to a communist insurrection in Greece. The
Canadian territorial or economic interest at stake. Canadians were more concerned with general questions of collective security." See Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943- 1957, 106. 20 See for example Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions. 21 Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle," 4. 22 See for example Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. The negotiations for the creation of a North Atlantic Alliance took place in light of George F. Kennan's long telegram sent from the American Embassy in Moscow on 22 February 1946. For an excellent discussion about the time period see John W. Young and John Kent, International Relations since 1945: A Global History (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 68-93. 24 See for example Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 809-13. 103 gravity of the situation in Greece and Turkey, where communist ideology threatened to take control of the state institutions, pushed President Truman on 12 March 1947 in a
Joint Session of Congress to announce the Truman Doctrine. Truman's statement was attached to a request for $400 million for the assistance of Greece and Turkey to remain democratic states. On 24 June 1948, the Soviet Union retaliated and launched a full blockade of surface routes to West Berlin and threatened to starve the population of food supplies and other goods.25 The Western allies reacted with an airlift on 26 June to feed the population of West Berlin. Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, reiterated Churchill's fears to Canadians in a speech in the House of Commons on 29
April 1948:
Communists will pretend to co-operate with non-Communists just as long as it is in their interest to do so. But once they are in a position to seize power, they will seize it and will then discard or destroy their non-Communist allies. People in Canada, the United States, France, Italy, and other countries have been long in learning their lesson. Let us hope that they have now learned it well.26
One thing we must constantly keep in mind as we approach this fateful decision in that the western European democracies are not beggars asking for our charity. They are allies whose assistance we need in order to be able to defend ourselves successfully and our beliefs. Canada and the United States need the assistance of the western European democracies just as they need ours. The spread of aggressive communist despotism over Western Europe would ultimately almost certainly mean for us war, and war on most unfavourable terms. It is on our national interest to see to it that the flood of communist expansion is held back.27
There still is debate in the literature if the blockade was an overreaction of the Soviet Union trying to gain a hegemonic position in Central Europe of it is was a reaction to the London Agreement of June 1948 in which the allies decided to create a West German state, which was opposed by the Soviet Union. At the end of the month the allies had also introduced a new currency into Germany, which threatened to undermine economic policies in Eastern Germany. For the latest research on this period see the excellent volume of Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 145-46. 26 Speech by External Affairs Minister Louis St. Laurent to the House of Commons, 19 April 1948, reprinted in part in John Gellner, Canada in NATO (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970), 10. 27 Ibid., 11. 104
This geopolitical situation clearly showed that the UN could not "provide its members
with the security which would enable them to put it to full force for the peaceful
settlement of international disputes."28 Thus, Canada had to consider alternatives to
ensure its national security and found one in NATO. Canada's allies such as France,
Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg thought along the same limes.
In 1948, they negotiated amongst themselves a collective defence system, the Brussels
Treaty, which later became the Western European Union (WEU).29 The WEU was a
precursor to NATO and included a collective Article 5 defence clause that would ensure
mutual defence. Canada had been invited to send military observers to the assembly of
the Brussels Treaty countries, which it accepted. In the meantime, Canada was also a part
of a delegation that negotiated the Washington Treaty. It was apparent that Canadian pragmatism not functionalism drove Ottawa's foreign policy and secured Canada a seat at the table of one of the most exclusive defence pacts.30 Meanwhile, bureaucrats in the
Department of External Affairs were divided about the nature of the treaty itself. Escott
Reid, for example, was in favour of a more idealist treaty that would provide the "basis for the building of a federation of North Atlantic countries, a real North Atlantic
Community."31 Such a community would be comprised of states sharing the norms and values of liberal western democracies that would serve - besides mutual defence in the time of war - additional purposes during peacetime. Reid was in favour of an
28 Government of Canada. Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations 1948, Report of the United Nations (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1949), 23. 29 According to Reid, Canada's Prime Minister Mackenzie-King was informed about such developments by a top-secret telegram from the British Prime Minister in mid January 1948, in which the British PM spoke about an urgent necessity of a Western Alliance against the evolving Soviet threat. See Escott Reid, "The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance," International Journal 22, no. 3 (1967): 427. 30 This point is also reinforced in Ibid.: 436. 31 Ibid.: 430. 105 international constitution, because it would increase the influence of middle and small powers and could possibly make Canada a major player in the NATO Alliance. His idealist intention was that "the people of the Western world might consider creating a regional security organization, open to any Western country, in which each member state would pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of other members if any power should be found to have committed aggression against any one of the members."32
Lester Pearson became a strong supporter of the "second best alternative" to collective security after he saw the deadlock of the permanent members in the Security
Council and supported a regional Atlantic organization: "As Secretary of State for
External Affairs and with the strong and unwavering support of Mr. St. Laurent, I wanted to do what I could to make NATO a strong and effective organization for collective defence. But I was equally anxious to make it more than that; to include in the treaty provisions for political co-operation out of which might develop a genuine Atlantic
Community."33 In a speech to the House of Commons, Pearson argued that
in the past, alliances and leagues have been formed to meet emergencies and have been dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create conditions for a kind of cooperation which goes beyond the immediate emergency. Threats to peace may bring our Atlantic pact into existence. Its contribution to welfare and progress may determine how long it will survive.34
In the end, Canada managed to negotiate for Article 2 of the NATO treaty, which became known as the "Canadian article" promoting Western norms and values: "Canada's early
"Ibid.: 426. 33 Lester B. Pearson, "Forty Years On: Reflections on Our Foreign Policy," International Journal 22 (Summer 1967): 361. 34 Speech by External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson in the House of Commons, 4 February 1949 reprinted in part in Gellner, Canada in NATO, 14. 106 advocacy of NATO, and attempts to make it much more than a military alliance, are seen as being in the same community-building tradition."35 This Article, however, was given less significance by Canada's allies. It was clear to Canada's allies as much as to the
Canadian government at the time, that Article 2 of the NATO treaty would be seen as subordinate to Article 5, NATO's collective defence clause.36
Collective defence vs. collective security
The Canadian liberal internationalist foreign policy tradition consisted of two subsets: the concept of collective security manifested in the UN system and the concept of collective defence institutionalized in NATO. Ottawa saw the old balance of power concept of international relations, where two or more states compete for influence in international affairs by relying on their military power resources, as unsuccessful. As part of a necessity to prevent another world war, the idea of a new collective security arrangement was developed. Canada, according to Canadian historian James Eayres, played an active role in developing this new international organization.37 Employed during the evolution of the League of Nations, the concept of collective security went beyond the pure idea of defence and included, according to Inis Claude, arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes. It assumed that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under armed attack would "supplement and reinforce each other."38 The philosophy behind a new collective security concept was to create a system for maintenance of international peace like the League of Nations where a collectivity of states functioned as
35 Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 3. 36 See for example Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947- 1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. 38 Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 245. 107 a deterrent to potential aggressors that were trying to offset the existing balance of power.
Then Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his Minister of External Affairs, Louis St.
Laurent, as well as the Canadian public saw an opportunity for Canada to play a prominent role at the centre stage of international affairs.39 This liberal international commitment included the international institutions such the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, and the Bretton Woods system of international monetary stability, as well as the United Nations.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Canada realized that it could not rely on the collective security system of the UN to guarantee Canadian security.40 When the fathers of the UN Charter developed Article 2(4), which described the general prohibition of the use of force in that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations," they had not anticipated the possibility of two superpowers as rivals to one another for influence in world politics. Indeed, the idealism of the system of collective security was quickly overshadowed by the veto power of the permanent five members of the Security Council. At times, pursuing national interests might be contradictory to collective ideas of the organization and thus weaken the organization in its decision-making processes. In the early 1950s the Canadian government was very much in favour of a multilateralist foreign policy conducted chiefly through the UN and its organizations. When it came to questions of national security and national defence, however, the government did not trust the UN's collective security system. Instead,
3 See Chapnick, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle," 3. 4 Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 108
Ottawa concentrated its efforts and resources on the NATO Alliance, which became a firm pillar in Canada's foreign and defence policy.41
The Korean War in the early 1950s expedited the fear of Canadians of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe.42 At home, the government committed nearly 40% of the federal budget to the modernization and mobilization of Canadian troops in Europe.43 The war started when Kim IL Sung gained support from Stalin for an armed attack on South
Korea. The West assumed that Stalin had ordered the invasion of South Korea and that he might use this proxy war to distract the West from a larger invasion into Western
Europe.44 Canadians accepted this threat assessment of its allies and sent troops to Korea as part of a UN authorized mission.45 The Korean War altered the relationship between the East and the West and deepened the hostilities between the two, making reconciliation nearly impossible. The war in Korea also sped up the institutionalization of the Western defence system and transformed NATO from a political organization to a genuine military organization. Before Korea, there was no significant coordination and cooperation taking place among the allies. Evidence for the institutionalization of this relationship can be found in the creation of a Supreme Allied Command Europe
(SACEUR). SACEUR gave NATO its first unified and coherent military command. The first SACEUR was General Dwight Eisenhower, who had dual responsibilities: he was the Alliance's chief military commander and also the highest military authority for
41 For a similar train of thought see for example Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada, the United States and NATO: A Tale of Two Pillars," in North American Perspectives on European Security, ed. Michael K. Hawes and Joel J. Sokolsky (Lewiston N.Y., USA: E. Mellen Press, 1990), 210. 42 See for example Allen G. Sens and Peter J. Stoett, Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions (Toronto: ITP Nelson, 1998), 88-91, Young and Kent, International Relations since 1945: A Global History, 149-52. Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 101. 4 See for example John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005). 5 Sens and Stoett, Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions, 90. 109
American Forces in Europe.46 In 1952, the naval equivalent of the SACEUR, Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) was created and headquartered in Norfolk,
Virginia. This organization, however, was different from that of the SACEUR in the sense that no standing forces were attached to this command unit. Nonetheless, its troops were earmarked for an emergency. Canada had marked virtually all the operational forces of the Royal Canadian Navy to it.47
Canada also contributed proportionately more financially to NATO's common infrastructure, such as buildings, airfields, fuel pipelines and the like. By the end of 1957
Canada had shouldered 7.13 % of the total expenditures for infrastructure compared to
42.68% for the US, 13.75% for France, 11.45% for the U.K., and 6.5% for Italy.48
The Functionalist Principle in Canadian Foreign Policy
The first central theme of Canada's internationalism was its functional approach to international affairs. As noted, in 1942 Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong first outlined a philosophy of Canadian foreign policy and called it the "functional principle."49
Representation in international institutions was thought not be limited to great and middle powers nor extended to all states, but, accorded to those states that had the "greatest contribution to make to their particular object in question."50 This ordering principle of functionalism in Canadian foreign policy advocated that those countries with the greatest expertise and experience in the particular field should be included in the decision making
46 See for example David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 63. 47 Gellner, Canada in NATO, 30. 4«Ibid. 49 Wrong to Under-Secretary of State Norman Robertson, 20 January 1942, in Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 9, 107. The evolution of functionalism is traced in A.J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," InternationalJournal35.2 (1980), 309-28. 50 House of Commons, Debates, 9 July 1943: 4558, quoted in Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 17. 110 process despite their power status in international affairs: "It called for the creation of an even broader international infrastructure which would separate technical problems from political ones."51
This paradigm shaped Canadian foreign policy for many years to come. Canada was actively involved in international councils and took an active leadership role when it believed that it could make a difference by bringing special expertise to the issues being discussed. Functionalism was based on multilateralism as a tool of foreign policy making and committed Canada to the belief that increased interdependence among states would lead to an international community of states. This included Canada's engagement to stabilize regional conflicts. In the everyday life of Canadian foreign policy making, the government looked out for feasible compromises in international committees, sent its best diplomats to international panels and conferences, respected the autonomy of international decision making bodies such as the UN and NATO, and was willing to commit resources to its military and diplomatic missions. The foreign policy elite in
Ottawa anticipated that proxy wars or conflicts would cause confrontation and would be uncontrollable in the long run. Ottawa was more than eager to solve these conflicts through international institutions. As part of this commitment, Canada became a foremost nation supporting peacekeeping operations and found itself called a middle power.
International collaboration rather than balancing was seen as the new norm of international affairs. This was the second theme in Canadian foreign policy during the early 1950s. It was called Canadian "middlepowermanship." In short, the middle power concept was shaped by a particular style of foreign policy rather than power measured in
51 Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? , 4. Ill terms of level of population, development, and military capabilities. "The Canadian theory of functionalism was more than an argument for a larger Canadian role. It was a philosophy for world self-government."52
In part the notion of Canada being a functionalist middle power evolved out of
Canada's external behaviour of sending military observers to Asia, the Middle East, and
Indochina. In those cases, Canada was recognized by other states as a country that tried to keep the peace between super- and small powers.53 One of the tools of middlepowermanship politics was peacekeeping while the responsibility for providing security was left to the major powers who were much more capable militarily. Canadian servicemen earned the reputation as successful peacekeepers during many UN peacekeeping operations, most chiefly during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 for which
Lester B. Pearson's crisis management capabilities were honoured with the Nobel Peace
Prize. Furthermore, the "middle power" concept was shaped by the fear of states with non-superpower status in international organizations. They were anxious that the newly created United Nations would be dominated by the permanent five members, France, the
United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain and would exclude smaller powers from the highest decision making processes.54 In 1964, then Minister of External
Affairs Paul Martin Sr. took Pearson's concept of peacekeeping to the next level during the dispute about Cyprus.55 This time period (1952-1967) has been called in the literature
Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, 236. 5 However, this is not to say that Canada was a neutral country during the Cold War. As Sean M. Maloney argues convincingly, Canada was part of the Western Alliance during the Cold War and thus was not a neutral combatant in the bipolar conflict. See Maloney, Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War. See also Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970. Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 55. 55 See for example Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970. 112 the "aggressive period" and introduced the idea of "peacemaking." The same year, in
1964, the government published a new defence white paper that placed peacekeeping as
to the number one priority of the government.
The new Pearson government had pledged that Canadian troops would only be sent on UN peacekeeping tours if those missions were in Canada's national interest.59
Cyprus marked the largest Canadian peacekeeping deployment at the time and went to the heart of Canadian interests in NATO. Canada's commitment lasted for nearly thirty years (1964-1993) and included 800-1,000 Canadian troops on average at any given time.60 Canadian interests were the following: first, there was a great danger that the two
NATO members, Turkey and Greece, would start a war over Cyprus and thus Canada, as a NATO ally, would be forced to take sides in the conflict and required to send armed forces to enforce NATO decisions. Paul Martin, Minister of External Affairs, told the
Greek Ambassador in Ottawa that Canada's interests are twofold: the "crisis threatened the viability of [NATO] which means so much to Canada...it is obvious that Russia is enjoying the embarrassment of the West over Cyprus and is prepared to exploit any opening. Second, if the UN is not permitted to keep the peace in Cyprus, then we must admit a strategic failure for the organization; nevertheless, this would be better than a massacre which UN troops as peacemakers must avoid even at the price of humiliation
After the successful Suez peacekeeping force was put into place, the UN also sent a more robust peacekeeping force into the Congo in 1960 as well as into Cyprus in 1964. Particularly the Cyprus mission was composed of forces from virtually all NATO allies in order to reduce the risks that the two NATO allies Greece and Turkey start a war over the Island. See for example Ramesh Chandra Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 51. 7 Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, 21. 59 Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970, 164. 60 Ibid., 188. 113 despite their recognized ability as fighters, especially the Canadians." ' Second, Canada's aim in deploying military forces to Cyprus was to help stabilize and bring peace to a former British colony and thus deny the Soviet Union for gaining influence in
Southeastern Europe.62 Third, Cyprus was strategically important for NATO and for
Canada because of its geographic location in Southeastern Europe (see Map 1 in appendix). The NATO bases in Cyprus provided the Alliance with strategic reach to a considerable area of Soviet landmass. As Maloney argues, British nuclear bombers stationed in Cyprus were able to deliver their deadly payloads on Warsaw Pact countries in case of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.63 In addition, Cyprus was in near geographical reach to the Middle East and thus NATO bases on Cyprus could be used as a stepping-stone for deployments into the oil-rich Gulf region.
The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state on 16 August 1960 and shortly thereafter joined the United Nations. The constitution of the country was negotiated between the governments in Turkey and Greece. About 18% of the population of Cyprus was Turkish whereas more than 80% was Greek.64 The formal agreement recognized the distinction between the two communities while both communities shared government offices and enjoyed partial autonomy in their communities. However, when the President of the republic, Archbishop Makarios, publicly demanded to amend the
61 NAC RG 25 acc80-81/22 vol. 64, file 21-14-4 CYPR-1, Pt.2, (7Jul 64), Message from External Affairs in Ottawa to PERMISNY, "Minister's Discussion with Greek Ambassador," quoted in Ibid., 213. 62 Ibid., 188. 63 Ibid. 191. See also Chris Ashworth, Military Airfields of the Central South and South-East, Action Stations, 9 (Wellingborough [Northamptonshire]: P. Stephens, 1985), Chris Ashworth, RAF Bomber Command, 1936-1968 (Newbury Park, CA: Haynes Pub., 1995). 64 At the same time the three countries Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey signed the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee on 16 August 1960. 114
constitution, violent demonstrations broke out on 21 December 1963. The Turkish
minority feared that their rights were to be diminished. The Turkish military, which was
stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of the Alliance left their camp on 24 December 1963
and deployed to the area where the violence was taking place. A ceasefire was finally
arranged on 19 December and enforced by mostly British forces.66 On 4 March 1964 the
UN Security Council authorized a UN peacekeeping mission to Cyprus, which was to last
for more than 30 years.67 Canada played a leading role in that mission and was at the
forefront of pushing its allies to accept a more forceful UN operation with a far reaching mandate to solve the crisis.
Cyprus was important for NATO and for Canada because of its strategic location.
After it became apparent that Communist parties had influenced Greek Cypriots in the mid-1960s, the threat of a Russian infiltration was growing. Canada also was concerned that the conflict in Cyprus was to bring violent conflict to two NATO allies.68 Thus, the
Pearson government's interest was to keep the peace in Cyprus in order to allow NATO access to those bases.
65 He demanded that the constitution should be demanded on 13 items. One of his demands was thatborht the President and the Vice-President were to be elected by the entire House of Representatives and not, as under the Constitution, separately by its Greek and Turkish members. These proposals were then wired to the Turkish government in Istambul who rejected them promptly. 66 United Nations and Dept. of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace- Keeping, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1996), 284. 67 See for eexampl; e Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945- 1970,9 192. 68 It should be noted that both countries - Greece and Turkey - had possession of American nuclear forces on their soil. See Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping, 192. 115
Canada and NATO under Trudeau (1968-84)
Even though the middle power concept showed considerable durability as a guide to
Canadian foreign policy thinking and making,69 it lost ground to competing theories of
Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s and then had a renewal in the 1980s and 1990s.
The year 1968 was a turning point for conceptualizing about Canadian foreign policy.
Until then, international affairs were preoccupied with military and security issues,
However, changes in the international system, the policies of detente that followed the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the growing rift between China and the Soviet Union reduced the perception of immediate military threats to North America and Europe.
NATO also adopted "flexible response" as its new strategy at the 13-14 December
1967 ministerial meeting:70 "Flexible response assumed that there would be a lead-up period of tension and even escalation prior to the onset of major conventional and nuclear war."71 With the French withdrawing from NATO's integrated command structure in
1966, the main opponent of a more flexible NATO strategy was no longer present.72 As a result, the process of drafting a new strategy went ahead quickly. On 7 October 1966, an informal meeting of the NATO Military Committee revisited the threats facing NATO
The concept of Canada as a middle power was revisited in 1977 in a study conducted by R.B. Byers, David Leyton-Brown, and Peyton Lyon, "The Canadian International Image Study," International Journal 32 (Summer 1977). In their three article series the authors look at Canadian images and elite views on Canadian foreign policy. 70 Following the Harmel Report on NATO doctrine, the North Atlantic Council formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. The flexible response strategy allows the Alliance to engage in some degree of conventional warfare before and escalation into nuclear exchange is being pursued. Flexible response, before it became an official NATO strategy, was a new doctrine developed by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1961 in a report for the Kennedy administration entitled "A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future". Sean M. Maloney, The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-Natoization, and Denuclearization, 1967-1970, Martello Papers 27 (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 2005), 17. 72 For an excellent discussion about the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated command structure see Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 116 and re-examined allied responses to it. The Committee concluded its deliberations by calling for flexible responses to meet various contingencies. Those recommendations were then taken to the meetings of the Defence Ministerial Meetings on 11 May 1967 in which the Ministers agreed that "the overall strategic concept for NATO should be revised to allow NATO greater flexibility and to provide for the employment as appropriate of one or more of direct defence, deliberate escalation and general nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to an aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack."73 Hence, not only the element of flexibility was reiterated in NATO's strategy, but also the idea of escalation, a thought that was more developed in MC 14/3.74 This document then spelled out three types of military responses to aggression in case NATO was attacked by external forces: first, the idea of direct defence would escalate the response to the level the enemy chose to fight on. Second, the concept of deliberate escalation added various steps "to defeat aggression by raising but where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat."75 This included retaining a first strike nuclear capability or selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets. Finally, the ultimate military response was the general massive use of nuclear weapons against military and urban-industrial targets. This was also seen as the ultimate deterrent. However, MC 14/3 was supplemented and specified by MC 48/3, which listed "measures to implement the strategic concept for the defence of the NATO area."76 It described the military requirements for defending NATO including improved
73 Defence Planning Committee DPD/D(67)23, "Decisions of the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session 11 May 1967. Military Committee 14/3, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area." "Ibid. 76 Ibid. 117 intelligence capabilities and early warning, increased readiness and flexibility, improved air defence, reinforcement forces, mobilization and better logistics. It is not clear at this point in history, as Maloney shows, what role Canadians played in drafting both documents.77 However, since Canada was a full member of NATO at the time and decisions inside NATO are made in secret and excluded from public scrutiny, it can be reasonably argued that at minimum Ottawa was not only present when informal discussions about the new doctrine took place but also when it was time to convince other
NATO allies to give their consent.
Flexible Response was tested shortly after it was adopted as NATO's new strategy. On 20 August 1968 Warsaw Pact forces from East Germany and Poland overthrew a moderate Czech government. Soviet tanks moved through the streets of
Prague. NATO closely monitored the events in Czechoslovakia, but did not put its forces on high alert. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) had asked for additional conventional forces in Europe in case the crisis threatened NATO territory.78
Canada's response to the Prague Spring was a condemnation of the violence taking place, but Canada was in no position to reinforce its forces stationed in Germany. In addition, even if Canada would have had additional troops to send, it lacked the strategic airlift capabilities to move them into theatre. In short, Canada was not able to assist its closest allies in case of an emergency. As Maloney put it quite succinctly: "Canada could participate in deterring a nuclear war, could fight a short-term conventional or nuclear ground war in Europe, could rebuild in the aftermath of a nuclear war, and could conduct
Maloney, The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-Natoization, and Denuclearization, 1967-1970, 17. See for example Tony Judt, Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 441-47. 118 small-scale Cold War conventional peripheral operations in extremely low intensity environments to reduce tension. Canada could not, however, respond to a potential protracted conventional war or respond to a crisis in which large-scale conventional forces could contribute to deterrence."79 Nonetheless, despite Maloney's point, the fact remained that there was no NATO military response to the Prague Spring events. It was not Canada's inability to react but the changed security environment of detente that had shifted the importance of military forces. In this sense, Canadian responses were consistent with NATO policies.
When the Pierre E. Trudeau government came to power in the spring of 1968, it ordered both a review of Canada's foreign and defence policies, including Canada's commitments to NATO: "The spirits of both reviews reflected changing sentiments toward East-West relations, relations with the United States, and Canada's external relations."80 During Trudeau's time in office, Canada's commitments to Europe passed through three distinct phases. The first one was characterized by the announcement of a defence policy review and the third option policy. The government deemphasized
Canada's military commitments to NATO in favour of greater emphasis on Canadian sovereignty and surveillance of the Canadian homeland. In the second phase, loosely defined as between 1973-75, the Trudeau government's dislike for increased Canadian commitments to European security took a 180-degree turn. The government showed renewed interest in the NATO defence Alliance, mostly for domestic reasons. In 1975, the government announced a major procurement plan to modernize Canada's forces in
Europe and thus placed concerns about and commitments to NATO at the forefront of
79 Ibid,, 23. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 31. 119
Canada's defence policy. Finally, after 1978 the government sensed an indifference to
Canada's role in NATO and decided to procure new equipment for its forces in Europe. It bought new battle tanks and CF-18 fighter aircraft as well as new naval vessels.
The White Paper of 1970 called for a review of the middlepowermanship concept
o i and advocated a refocus on Canadian national interests and priorities. The foreign policy review was initiated in May 1968 and took two years to be completed. Prime
Minister Trudeau questioned fundamental aspects of Canadian foreign policy and personally discredited the style of "middlepowermanship"83 of the Trudeau years that
"defined Canadian interests in terms of the search for global, economic, political, and military stability."84 These were the key elements of Canada's support for international institutions such as NATO, NORAD,85 and the UN as the best available means of ensuring stability in a Cold War. He argued that Canadian foreign policy should be the extension of domestic priorities abroad.86 Trudeau sought to create a linear connection between domestic needs of Canadians and Canada's activities abroad by determining
Canada's national interests and not vice versa, that the international system would determine Canadian policies. Trudeau's rational foreign policy approach was supported
The full title is Canada, Department of External Affairs. Foreign policy for Canadians - Europe, International Development, Latin America, Pacific, United Nations (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970). The paper outlined the six new priorities of the Government: (1) to foster economic growth; (2) to safeguard sovereignty and independence; (3) to work for peace and security; (4) to promote social justice; (5) to enhance the quality of life; and (6) to ensure a harmonious environment. 82 Denis Stairs, "Reviewing Foreign Policy, 1968-70," in Canadian Foreign Policy - Selected Cases, ed. John J. Kirton and Don Munton (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 189. In this chapter Stairs analyzes the internal and external factors that led to the foreign policy review. Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 180. 84 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 31. 5 Middlemiss and Sokolsky argue that Canada always viewed the NORAD agreement as an extension of Canada's commitments to NATO. Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 35. 120 by a report of the House of Commons that recommended to the government to look more
87
"inwards" and to concentrate on national domestic and local problems.
Another significant challenge to the government was the quiet revolution in
Quebec and Quebec nationalism, which resulted in an intense conflict between the federal government and the province. While faced with the threat of separation of Quebec from op
Canada and the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) crisis at home, the government argued that Pearsonian internationalism should no longer shape Canadian foreign policy; the new government saw it as neglecting vital Canadian interests. Thus, Canada's domestic interests had priority over Canada's international commitments to NATO or
NORAD.89 Canada's defence policy, according to Prime Minister Trudeau, had been dominating Canada's foreign policy since 1945. The pursuit of international roles such as being the helpful fixer was explicitly rejected in this document.90 The Prime Minister was also dissatisfied with the Canadian foreign policy making process, which mostly took place in the Department of External Affairs and the Minister's office. Canada's new national interest was thought to be international economic growth, fighting global pollution, defending Canadian sovereignty, and diversifying Canadian relationships with
"Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence," in House of Commons Special Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (February 6, 1969). 88 The FLQ group was the militant wing of the independence movement for Quebec. During the October crisis in (October) 1970, the FLQ kidnapped the British diplomat James Cross and Quebec Cabinet Minister Pierre Laporte. The federal government in Ottawa responded to the crisis by invoking the War Measures Act, which empowered the police and armed forces to hunt and arrest FLQ activists. For a succinct overview see for example J. F. Bosher, The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 155-59. 89 Or, put differently, domestic security trumped international security engagements. Larry R. Stewart, Canada's European Force 1971-1980: A Defence Policy in Transition (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 1980), 2. In the short term, history had proven Trudeau right. In 1970, the Le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) abducted a British diplomat to Canada and later killed Pierre Laporte. The government used in unprecedented measured in response. See footnote 93. 90 Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 6. 121 other states away from the close bilateral relationship with the United States. In short,
Canada's foreign and defence priorities were replaced with a push for greater Canadian sovereignty, a greater focus on continental defence, regional security, and contributions to global peacekeeping.92 Trudeau made his objectives known in a speech before the
Alberta Liberal Association in Calgary on 12 April 1969:
I am afraid, in the situation which we had reached, that NATO had in reality determined all of our defence policy. We had no defence policy, so to speak, except that of NATO. And our defence policy had determined all of our foreign policy. And we had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO. And this is a false perspective for any country to have a military alliance determine your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy, which determines your military policy.93
Trudeau's aim was to address the imbalance by rejecting the status quo of Canadian foreign and defence policy. His government rejected the notion that NATO was Canada's first line of defence. Questions such as Northern sovereignty in the Arctic, native land claims, and the relationship with the United States surpassed issues and problems in
Europe on the government's agenda. Ottawa's new foreign policy under Trudeau was to be made by closely examining Canada's national interests. Trudeau left it to Mitchell
Sharp (Minister of External Affairs) and Marcel Cadieux (Minister of National Defence) to explain Canada's decision to its major NATO allies. During a NATO ministerial meeting in Washington, Mitchell Sharp announced that Canada would reduce its
European forces by 50%, forces that had represented Canada's support for European
Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 180. See also Stewart, Canada's European Force 1971-1980: A Defence Policy in Transition. 92 Canada. Dept. of National Defence, Defence in the 70s - White Paper on Defence, ed. (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 16. For an good interpretation of the White paper see Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 31-45. 93 Canada, Department of External Affairs, "The Relations of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy," Excerpts from an Address by Prime Minister Trudeau to a dinner of the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, April 12, 1969, Statements and Speeches, No. 69/8, p.4. 122
security and the collective defence system since the early 1950s. The reaction of
Canada's allies was harsh: they did not appreciate the lack of prior consultation nor was
the Alliance convinced of Canada's commitment to NATO overall.95
Moreover, the Trudeau government not only changed the shape of the Canadian
Forces but also their roles. Canada's nuclear strike capabilities were discontinued by
1972 and Canada's brigade group was made more flexible and mobile. The nearly three
thousand strong mechanized ground force was to become a light air-mobile force. At
home, 16,000 military and 5,000 civilian positions were cut. The only service that
remained almost untouched was the Navy with its commitments to NATO's maritime
defence, the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT). The decisions of restructuring and re-prioritizing Canadian commitments to European security were
largely driven by fiscal constraints, a measure that was implemented for all federal
departments.96 All these changes were announced in the 1971 defence White Paper,
entitled Defence in the 70s, that called for reprioritizing Canada's defence commitments:
(1) increase domestic surveillance and sovereignty; (2) increase defence efforts in North
American with US; (3) fulfill existing NATO commitments; (4) continue international
Sharp, "NATO: Reviewed, Revised and Renewed", Bout de papier (vol. 6, no. 1), pp. 28-9. However, there is an argument to be made that consistent support for social programs while cutting the defence budgets served the security of Canadians by "buying off the more moderate separatists or uncommitted Quebecois, strengthening the links between that province and the central government, and preventing a slide into revolution. See Maloney, The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-Natoization, and Denuclearization, 1967-1970, 21 or Major General Dan Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1984). 95 Mary Halloran, "A Planned and Phased Reduction": The Trudeau Government and the NATO Compromise, 1968-1969," in Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO, 1956-1972, ed. Christian Niinlist and Anna Locher (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2006), 140. Stewart, Canada's European Force 1971-1980: A Defence Policy in Transition, 5. 123
peacekeeping missions. 7 Also, the government made clear that it would only send
Canadian peacekeepers when Canadian interests were touched or at stake.
Yet, despite the announcements of the cutback of force and the defence budget,
Canada did not abandon any of its commitments.98 Indeed, as Joel Sokolsky and Danford
Middlemiss argued Canada had actually increased its commitments to NATO by creating
the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable Combat Group (CAST) of approximately the size of
a battalion group." The White Paper, Defence in the 70s, revealed that to squadrons of
CF-5 Freedom fighter aircraft were to be made available for duty in Northern Europe.100
The CAST battalion could either go to Norway or Denmark and was not touched by the
defence cuts. Thus, CAST can be seen as Canadian reinforcement commitments to
NATO's Northern Defence.
Shortly after publishing the White Papers on foreign and defence policy, the
Trudeau government's isolationist foreign policy took a turn. In 1975, the United States had joined its European NATO partners who had called upon the Canadians to increase
their defence budget and upgrade their forces.101 The urge of the US to upgrade the forces
was consistent with the view held by the United States that Canadian commitments to the defence of the North American continent does not alleviate it from its obligations in
Europe.102 In addition, domestic impediments to consolidating the defence resources for the war in Vietnam pressured the administration to ask some of its closest allies to
shoulder a bit more of the defence burden in Europe. These external factors, as well as
97 Canada. Dept. of National Defence., Defence in the 70s - White Paper on Defence, 16. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 36. 99 For an extensive discussion of the evolution of CAST see Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and Nato's Northern Flank (North York, Ont: York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1986). 100 Canada. Dept. of National Defence, Defence in the 70s - White Paper on Defence, 35-36. 101 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 38. 102 Ibid., 39. 124 homemade defence problems such as aging equipment, compelled the Trudeau government in 1974 to commission a Defence Structure Review (DSR). J The DSR basically reviewed the commitments of the CF as well as its structural organization and recommended to put NATO again as the top defence priority. As a result of the DSR process, the government also made decisions about weapons acquisitions such as the
German-made Leopard 1 tank, new fighter jets and frigates.104 This meant that Canada's forces in Europe would retain its armoured capability and not become lightly armed as previously envisioned by the government. In addition, CF-18 fighter aircraft as well as
Aurora reconnaissance planes were purchased also.
Despite early questions, Prime Minister Trudeau was committed to Canadian middle power policy throughout the rest of his tenure. He continued to deploy Canadian troops around the world for peacekeeping operations, which were seriously questioned by the earlier White Paper.105 The government also retained its commitment to collective defence. Contrary to accepted wisdom in the public, the role and importance of NATO in
Canadian foreign policy had never diminished under Trudeau. Even though when entering office, the Prime Minister Trudeau lowered the importance of NATO for Canada and withdrew forces from Germany, the government never left the Alliance. In short, it did "not do a France," which had decided to leave NATO's integrated military structure in 1966; Canada remained committed and an active ally in the Alliance as a participant in
NATO exercises and a contributor to a functioning political and military Alliance.
Indeed, Canada's NATO commitment at the time (between 1968-72) was consistent with
103 Ibid. 104 Canada bought 128 tanks in total for its ground forces in Europe. 105 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 36. Jockel argued that the White Paper entailed "downgrading" of Canadian peacekeeping operations. See Jockel, Canada and Nato's Northern Flank, 22. 125 the changing geopolitical environment of detente, the beginning of arms control agreements, and the war in Vietnam. Inside NATO, the Harmel Report brought about changes for the Alliance. Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who felt very strongly that the Alliance would have to adjust to the new international conditions of detente, wrote the report.106 It was officially titled, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance," gave the
Alliance new life, and combined the two competing views about the future of the
Alliance: first, it called for a "maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression,"107 and second, for a more political Alliance "in which the underlying political issues can be solved."108 In short, the Harmel report called for
"defence and detente" and policies that would bridge the two different views of how best to reduce East-West tensions.
Meanwhile, NATO's political, military as well as economic benefits were still appreciated by Canadian foreign policy makers and none of the foreign policy elite was determined to quit NATO membership. Canada gained politically from NATO because it retained a seat at a table where the most important decisions about war and peace were made. Furthermore, Canada benefited economically from the relationship because Ottawa had a close interest in the well being of Western Europe and access to their markets. At the same time, the trade relationship with the United States increased also. Finally,
Canada's military benefited from a membership in NATO. For the defence community, it was a guaranteed access to the newest weapons technology and doctrine and would allow
Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, 47'-5:1. ' 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance - Report of the Council," Brussels, 13-14 December 1967. 126
Canada to remain interoperable with its allies. As such, one might argue, NATO
continued to be a consistent element in Canadian foreign policy.
Evidence for this can be seen in the early plans to replace the Centurion battle
tank in Europe with the lightweight British Scorpion, a fire support vehicle. This deal,
however, did not materialize, even though the government had announced that it would.
Instead, Canada bought 128 Leopard CI tanks from the Germans for its ground forces in
Europe. Thus, the Trudeau government maintained a heavy armoured capability for the
first line of defence in Europe. A geopolitical environment of detente and NATO's
strategy of flexible response also induced those decisions. Furthermore, Cabinet decided
on 21 July 1972 that the Canadian air force would be re-equipped with a fleet of long-
range patrol aircraft for $600 million. The views expressed in the White Paper, Canada
continued to send troops on peacekeeping missions to Cyprus, the Middle East, and to
Vietnam. In 1975, Canada was still the country that sent the largest national component
to UN peacekeeping forces.109
Canadian internationalism and middlepowermanship under Trudeau also played
out in arms control negotiations.110 Prime Minister Trudeau seized the opportunity to play
a greater role on the international stage by pushing Canada's NATO partners to place
greater emphasis on arms control and disarmament with the Soviet Union. At a meeting
of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of NATO, Canada proposed to NATO Secretary General
Manlio Brosio to explore ways of starting negotiations with the Soviet Union about arms reductions. The Russians replied favourably to Canada's request during a bilateral
Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 36. See also Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes. 127 meeting in Ottawa on 17 October. Canadian diplomats were also represented on
NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.
One of the areas that the 1972 Foreign Policy White Paper did not talk about was the Canada/US relationship. This was a difficult topic for Ottawa because the overall geopolitical situation was difficult. On the one hand, the United States was bogged down in a war far away from home that also caused considerable domestic outcry. Second, the international community put pressure on the United States for pursuing its policies in
Indochina. Indeed, it was a chain of events that contributed to a weakened America.
Because of the continuous war efforts in Vietnam, the US spent more money than it earned at home. Even though its economy had quintupled between 1950s and 1970s to
$107 billion, these funds were not nearly enough to pay for America's global defence
1 I 7 commitments. As a result, the prices within the US rose and American products became less competitive on international markets. Likewise, the confidence of international investors in the US dollar diminished. International corporations and countries turned away from using the dollar as a safe currency. They doubted that
America would be able to stabilize its currency with the gold reserves it possessed.113 The oil crisis in 1979 also forced the issues of energy shortages, currency crisis, as well as a decline of US power as a result of its involvements in the Vietnam War to the top of the international agenda.
Facing these economic pressures, the Nixon administration decided to unilaterally change the rules of the international monetary system and announced that it would no Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 20, and 40-42. Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750,2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Norton, 1994), 644. 113 For a brief overview see for example Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 149. 128 longer convert American dollars to gold for $35 per ounce and imposed a surcharge of
10% on import duties with the intention to containing the outflow of US dollars.114
Foreign investors began to doubt the stability of the currency that "the dollars they held were truly as good as gold."115 In 1971 it came close to a financial panic when it was revealed that the US had imported more products than it had exported. Because of this, investors began to trade their US dollar notes into the more stable gold. This led to the downfall of the Bretton Woods system and resulted in high inflation rates; a slow US economy did its share as well. Economists referred to this time period as stagflation,"6 a combination of economic stagnation and high inflation. The result was that all international currencies floated freely in the international market, causing international instability. The implications for Canada were daunting as much as they were for the
United States. The Trudeau government was reminded of its dependent economic relationship with the United States and responded by introducing the third option policy.
In light of the unilateral decision of President Nixon in 1971 to abandon the gold standard system of currency exchanges,117 the Canadian government was faced with three options: (1) to maintain its present relationship with the United States; (2) move towards
"4Ngaire Woods, "International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization," in The Globalization of World Politics; An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 280. See also Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, 149. LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, 644. 116 Woods, "International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization," 260. For another good analysis of the history of international political economy see Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). 'n The Bretton Woods system was put in place at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. It was agreed that all countries' currencies would be fixed at a certain value; the leading currency they became fixed to was the US dollar. In return, the US administration promised to pay $35 for each ounce of Gold. However, this system of fixed exchange rates came under significant pressure in the late 1960s and early 1970s, because of an overheat of the US economy. In August 1971, the US government announced that it would suspend the fixed dollar convertibility and remove the price of gold from the dollar. The consequence was that the currencies would now freely float as opposed to being fixed. 129 a closer integration with the US; or (3) pursuing a strategy of diversifying Canada's relationships."8 Canada decided to follow the third strategy and to develop a counterweight to US domination. The ally Canada sought a closer relationship with was
West Germany."9 Nonetheless, a third-option policy was not necessarily a novelty in
Canadian foreign policy; the idea of a counterweight had been around for many years before and been applied by almost every Canadian government since Confederation.
In sum, Trudeau's foreign and defence policy has been called in the literature the
"voluntarist tradition" of Canadian foreign policy.120 This tradition sees Canada's moral international engagement as a reflection of its domestic commitments to peace, order and good government. This notion was consistent with Canada's multilateralism and international legalism. If not during his time in office, Trudeau admitted in his memoirs after he had left office to be a supporter of Canadian middlepowermanship.121
Meanwhile, Canadian commitments to European security were significantly reduced under the Trudeau government: "Going the extra distance in an attempt to secure peace had been one of the hallmarks of the Pearsonian liberal internationalist tradition. De- emphasizing peacekeeping together with collective defence signaled turning away from this tradition in favour of more Canadian-centred foreign and defence policy that was focused on Canada's national interest.122 Canada's foreign and defence policy under
Trudeau, as Sokolsky and Middlemiss argued, were also at odds with NATO's new flexible response strategy that shifted the balance of defence in Europe from one relying
See for example Ivan L. Head, Pierre E. Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy 1968-1984 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart), 1995. Stewart, Canada's European Force 1971-1980: A Defence Policy in Transition, 27. 120 See for example Lewis Hertzman, Alliances and Illusions Canada and the NA TO-NORAD Question (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig, 1969). 121 Pierre E. Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 329-41. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 35. 130 on nuclear weapons towards using more conventional forces as a deterrent. Only later on did the Trudeau government realize this imbalance and increased Canada's commitments to Germany by procuring new capabilities. This explains the turn of the defence policy under Trudeau and the fact the defence commitments increased.
Mulroney and Canada's NATO commitments (1984-93)
When the Mulroney government came to power in the summer of 1984, it kept one of its election promises and abolished Trudeau's national energy program (NEP). Furthermore, it charged the previous Liberal government with "running down the armed forces"124 and promised Canadians to correct this situation by increasing the defence budget. However, throughout its tenure the new government never increased Canadian defence spending.125
After receiving the largest majority in Canadian history, the new government told its allies that it would increase Canada's investments in European security issues. It intended to demonstrate that Canada was back on the international stage and more committed to live up to its global responsibilities. The Mulroney government pledged to reform the armed forces in the first speech from the throne: "Canada will once again play its full part in the defence systems of NATO. Only in this way we do earn the right to full consultation and participation in the policies of the alliance."126 In short, Canada wanted to pull its weight again in international organizations and to boost its commitments therein.127 One of the first official acts of the new government was to initiate a review of
m Ibid., 37. 124 Ibid., 45. 125 See for example John M. Treddenick, "The Defence Budget," In: David B. Dewitt, David Leyton- Brown, Canada's International Security Policy (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), 413-454. 126 Canada, House of Commons Debates, lsl Session, 33rd Parliament (5 November 1984), 7. 7 See for example Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 70; M.J. Tucker, "Canadian Security Policy," in Canada among Nations 1985: The Conservative Agenda, ed. Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen A. Molot (Toronto: J. Lorimer and Co., 1985). At the same time, the government 131
Canada's foreign and defence policy. The review process was supported by a Joint
Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate and held hearings with Canadians across the country.128 This distinguished the review from previous review processes in the sense that it allowed parliamentary scrutiny. The Committee issued its report, entitled
Independence and Internationalism, in June 1986 and recommended more than one hundred proposals for how to improve Canada's foreign and defence policy. The
Mulroney government decided not to publish a formal White Paper on foreign policy.
Instead, the Department of External Affairs issued a response to the Joint Committee report, which then functioned as a formal statement on foreign policy.
A new defence White Paper entitled Challenges and Commitments^® followed in
1987 in which the government promised Canadians to increase Canada's commitments to
NATO and increasing Canada's defence spending while rejecting the Liberal spirit of detente. The defence paper argued that "the great hopes of the early seventies [had] not been realized... The realities of the present call for a more sober approach to international relations and the needs of security."131 It pledged $183 billion over fifteen years towards modernizing Canada's forces in Germany, acquiring a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear
reached an agreement with the United States to modernize the radar stations in Canada's north. Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 157. 128 The government deliberately chose to ask for a joint committee rather than the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in order to be able to handpick the parliamentarians reviewing Canada's foreign policy, which is only possible under a joint committee. For a greater discussion see Denis Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," Canadian Foreign Policy 3, no. 1 (Spring 1995). 129 Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism: Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1986). 130 Canada. Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada - a Synopsis of the Defence White Paper (1987). 131 Ibid. 132 submarines, and re-equipping the army and air force. The government intended to
"double our troop strength in Europe and modernize our equipment on NATO's central front for high intensity warfare."133 In sum, this signaled a significant commitment by
Canada and was meant to strengthen its role in NATO.
There appears to be consistency in the literature arguing that both White Papers were entrenched in the tradition of Lester B. Pearson in the sense that they called for an increased involvement of Canada in international affairs and supported US President
Reagan's Cold War military buildups. Thus, the literature largely agrees that the White
Papers were consistent with foreign policy traditions of earlier Liberal governments.134
The Department of External Affairs also reassured Canadians that Canada's military capabilities would be appropriate for the tasks required of them, particularly in Europe.
As such, NATO's role and importance as well as Ottawa's commitment to the collective defence of Europe, was seen by the new government as an opportunity for Canadians to maximize their security and national interests. Allied commitments re-gained importance in Canada's national security policy to ensure sovereignty of the Canadian homeland. The
1987 defence White Paper stated:
Like each of its predecessors, this Government believes wholeheartedly that there is no acceptable alternative and rejects as naive or self-serving the arguments of those who promote neutrality or unilateral disarmament. Canada has never been neutral. We have always sought our security in a larger family of like-minded nations. In light of our position in the world, the values and traditions, which have been defended steadfastly by previous generations of Canadians, and our political and economic interests, neutrality would be hypocrisy. Our security would continue to depend on the deterrence provided by our former allies, but we would have opted out of any contribution to and, equally significant, any say in
Erika Simpson, "Canada's NATO Commitment: Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues," Behind the Headlines 57, no. 2/3 (Winter/Spring 2000): 23. 133 Ibid. See for example Tucker, "Canadian Security Policy," 69. 133
the management of that deterrent. We would turn our backs on the obligation to work for a stable world order; technology and geography would not, however, allow us to escape the consequences should that order collapse.
The White Paper, for example, proposed sending an additional 1,200 Canadian troops to
Europe in support of the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group at Lahr. Also,
Canada's Allied Mobile Force, Land (AMF-4) was to be separated from the 4,800-strong
Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade designated to deploy to Norway in the event of war.136 At the same time, Mulroney continued with the procurement process of the Liberal government, including the low-level air defence system for the forces in
Europe,137 and showed commitments to replace three submarines, the Sea King (ASW) helicopters, and to increase the overall personnel level of the CF. The White Paper recommended buying six additional frigates, up to twelve nuclear submarines, new naval helicopters, maritime long range patrol aircraft, and equipping existing ships with sonar technology.
In 1989, however, all these processes of reforming the forces stalled because of a lack of funds and a lack of public support. The government was faced with a large federal deficit and an economic downturn. High inflation rates put strains on expenses for social programs and diminished the support for military programs in the public. In light of these domestic constraints, the government had to announce the cancellations of some of the procurement programs and moved towards cutting defence spending, including reducing the overall number of troops. For instance, the plans to purchase nuclear submarines were
135 Government of Canada, Department of Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada - a Synopsis of the Defence White Paper, 3. 136 Norway did not allow the deployment of foreign troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime. That was the reason why the Canadian Forces were only designated. 137 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 47. 134 cancelled, so was the purchase of new battle tanks and plans to deploy a division in
Europe: "We no longer had to, or could, devote so much money and resources toward improving our collective defence, particularly our NATO commitments."138 Also, in
1987, the Mulroney government discontinued its commitment to deploy the CAST brigade to reinforce Norway in case of an attack on NATO allied territory.139
With regards to peacekeeping, the Mulroney government continued to follow a liberal internationalist tradition by deploying Canadian peacekeepers around the world and Canada continued to deploy peacekeepers to, for example, Cyprus, the Sinai and others.140
It was not only the fiscal constraints that limited the room of manoeuvre of the
Mulroney government. The government was also affected by changes in the international system that demanded immediate responses and left virtually no time for long-term foreign policy planning. Thus, some of the Mulroney government's reactions to changes in the international system were ad-hoc decisions. Meanwhile, Canada remained engaged on the world stage as a committed and capable international actor and NATO partner.
When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union, he introduced his policies of glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (economic opening). This put the
Soviet Union on a less confrontational course with the West. This was noticed among
Western allies but they were reluctant to show triumphialism over their former enemy. In the late 1980s, it was visible that Soviet imperialism had slowly come to an end: the
Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, 6. 139 See for example Sean M. Maloney, "Force Structure or Forced Structure? - The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s," Choices 10, no. 5 (May 2004): 9. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, 47. 135
Soviet Union had withdrawn from Afghanistan by 1989, and the cohesion of the USSR and its satellite states in Eastern Europe was crumbling.
Of particular importance for Canada at the time was the question of what to do with the large arsenal of Soviet nuclear forces.141 Canada became one of the leading
NATO countries not only to help in the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe but also to develop significant programs and policies for nuclear disarmament.
International disarmament agreements were an important milestone in achieving those ends. In 1987, Gorbachev had responded favourably to an arms reduction treaty proposed by the United States142 and offered to reduce Soviet short range SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. In June of the same year, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries approved the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated all intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and thus contributed to the reduction on tensions in Europe.143
In total, the Soviet Union destroyed 1,750 nuclear missiles while the United States destroyed 850 missiles.144
Summary: Trends and issues in Canada's commitments to European security
Canada's influence and power in the world was based on the diplomatic skills it showed in the immediate post-1945 international system. The experiences then, as this and the previous chapter have tried to demonstrate, shaped the nature of Canadian foreign policy until the end of the Cold War in 1989. This and Ottawa's global diplomatic commitments
141 Interview with senior NATO official, NATO headquarters, 18 May 2007. 142 It needs to be noted that the INF issue has been around since the NATO 1979 'dual-track' decision to deploy Cruise Missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe. After they arrived in Europe in 1983, the Soviets left the INF talks. They were finally revived in March 1985 almost simultaneously with Gorbachev taking power in the Kremlin. The INF treaty was officially signed on 8 December 1987 in Washington by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. The treaty eliminated all INF systems of missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. The agreement also provided verification mechanisms. 1 4 Young and Kent, International Relations since 1945: A Global History, 585. 136 were particularly visible in helping to set up international institutions in order to bring about international stability and global order. This global engagement included the diplomatic successes of creating a collective security based international system such as the United Nations and collective defence Alliances in Europe. As a result of this global commitment, Canada earned the respect of other states for its achievements in international affairs. At home, these successes served as a source of pride. Canadian diplomatic skills reached the apex of international diplomacy during what was called the golden era of Pearsonian foreign policy from the 1940s to the 1960s. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, Canada showed creativity as a mediator of internal conflicts within the western Alliance rather than a mediator between the two. Evidence for this can be found in Canada's role in negotiating the Washington Treaty or its role during the Cyprus conflict. Canada was committed to a realistic foreign policy, knowing that it was not a heavyweight in international affairs. Canadian officials also realized that their country did not possess the power capabilities in international bodies to launch solo initiatives. The distribution of international power and influence made Canada realize that it needed to lobby major powers for their support for changes to happen in international affairs.
Canada was not powerful enough itself to bring those changes about it. During the course of Canadian foreign policy and its relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a result-based foreign policy with a specific set of targets was always more important than pursuing an idealist foreign policy with no outcomes. The key objective was to deliver the required results, especially in crisis situations, when it mattered. Canadian officials were singled out as skilful and, as a result of that, Canada earned the reputation of a compromise organizer and problem solver. The concept of functionalism was the 137
overarching organizing principle and Canada took only responsibility in areas in which it was confident to make a difference. The concept of functionalism assumed that problems of the international community could best be solved by referring them to international
institutions and its sub- bodies, where policy experts would be able discuss them in
greater detail. This functionalist approach to foreign policy, as well as the acceptance of
Canada's power status in the international system, had the benefit of legitimizing
Canada's foreign policy. It forced Canadian policy makers to set priorities and choices.
As a result, Canadian foreign policy makers were required to collaborate and consult with
Canada's allies as well as to remain engaged in coalition building and maintenance of
international organizations. Canadian diplomacy was quiet, but not irresolute. Canada
organized international meetings and roundtables, engaged in liaison and shuttle
diplomacy and also enjoyed the reputation as a country working the telephones and corridors of international institutions.
However, let there be no doubt that Canada's international engagements were driven by its national interests, the first and foremost of which was to maintain the allied relationship and to keep allies allied. In general, Canada followed its national interest and unilaterally spent or cut its defence budget whenever the government felt it was required to do so. The Diefenbaker government cut defence spending, the Pearson government unified the armed forces and cut Canada's defence spending even more, the Trudeau government first cut the defence budget and then recommitted Canadian troops. His successor, Brian Mulroney cut Canada's defence budget while being faced with a domestic economic downturn. The cuts mostly took place in Europe with the withdrawal of Canadian 4 Mechanized Brigade from Germany and the air force. 138
The litmus test for this foreign policy style was first applied during the Korea and
Suez Canal crisis, when Canada concentrated "on being a helpful fixer in the intra-Cold
War block attempting to diffuse tensions or urging restraint on Western leaders."145
Later, the Diefenbaker and Trudeau governments revised the quiet diplomacy paradigm and advocated a more diverse foreign policy.
Another theme that evolved in the early years of post-1945 Canadian foreign policy was the notion that foreign policy was made by an elite in Ottawa and disconnected from Canadians at large. During the Cold War, Canadian external relations were largely made in secret with only the Prime Minister's Office, the Minister of
External Affairs and his department, and some key senior bureaucrats being involved.
Parliament and other governmental institutions were virtually excluded from the foreign policy making process as much as the Canadian public, domestic think tanks, or academia. Prime Minister Pearson played the central role in Canadian foreign policy making during the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and dominated the decision making process as probably none of his predecessors or successors. When Pierre
E. Trudeau came to power he neither appreciated nor accepted the valued strengths of
Canadian foreign policy. His main concern with the Department of External Affairs was that of its poor management, its under-representation of Canadian society, and being out of touch with realities of the changing nature of the Cold War. In addition, as Cooper argued, during the Trudeau government Canadian diplomats acted less like helpful fixers or mediators in world politics, especially in areas such as the protection of the environment or the promotion of social justice, human rights issues and Arctic
Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy; Old Habits and New Directions, chapter 2. 139 sovereignty. These issues were out on the international agenda and he demanded a foreign policy that was less influenced by the middlepowermanship tradition of the
Pearson years. This new course did not always find the acceptance of the Department of
External Affairs and its diplomats.147 In addition, the department itself was faced with competition from other federal departments that discovered competencies of international policy issues in their fields. This resulted in a struggle about competencies between the
Department of External Affairs and other departments about who should be the leading department in charge of Canada's external relations. The product of this reorganization of the Department of External Affairs was an extensive period of relearning and rethinking.
During the Mulroney government, the trade commissioner service was merged into the
Department of External Affairs, forcing the department to include more foreign economic policy.
Also, during Prime Minister Trudeau's tenure in office domestic politics increasingly influenced Canadian foreign policy making. The domestic factor of the
Quiet Revolution in Quebec, as much as the struggle between the provincial and federal governments, changed the nature and dynamics of Canadian foreign policy making.
In sum, one could argue that Ottawa was proactive and engaged internationally and realized that it did not have the power nor felt the need to reform the international system. Instead, it spent its efforts trying to find solutions within the existing system of states and cooperated and allied itself with its closest partners in Europe and North
America. Canada was engaged internationally during the Cold War despite various cuts in its foreign and defence budgets. This continuous engagement in European security is a
146 ibid. 147 ibid. 140 consistency of Canadian foreign policy and one that, as we will see in the next chapter, also continued in the 1990s. 141
Chapter 4
Canada and NATO 1989-1993
The East is turning to the West. Our political approach of co-operation instead of confrontation, as set out in the Harmel Report, is gaining increasing acceptance. Our ideas are on the advance. Democracy, human rights, pluralism. You need to read Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations to see how far concepts which we have fostered for two decades have penetrated the Soviet vocabulary. Our initiatives are determining the course of political events.1
To answer the question I posed at the outset, this is an Alliance for a vision of peace, security and prosperity.2
Introduction: Troops are coming home
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Canadians continued to debate their role and commitments to NATO, especially Canada's reasons for keeping troops in
Germany. It was estimated that this commitment cost Canadian taxpayers nearly $1.3 billion a year excluding the costs for training.3 Canadians, as much as anybody else, were surprised by the speed with which the international strategic situation changed:
"Canadians watched with wonder as what we thought would take decades, came to pass in weeks."4 Indeed, with the end of the East-West conflict, governments, including
Canada's, supported by the majority of their citizens, believed that it was time to cash in
1 "Stability in Europe - NATO's way forward," Address given by the NATO Secretary General, Manfred Woerner to the Annual Meeting of the World Economics Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 1 February 1989. 2 "NATO and a new European Order," Address given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to the Italian Senate, Rome, 19 April 1990. 3 See for example Roy Rempel, "Canada's Troop Deployments in Germany: Twilight of a Fourty-Year Presence?," in Homeward Bound? Allied Forces in the New Germany, ed. David G. Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 232. 4 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 1. See also Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, "Canada's Stake in European Security," NATO Review 38, no. 5 (October 1990). 142 the peace dividend. Canada was not different and was also affected by these views.
Canadians were very much aware of the changes in the international system and the responsibilities it placed on Canada.5 Now that the Cold War was over, the majority of
Canadians were convinced that their troops should come home. The government came to similar conclusions. In 1990, shortly after the end of the Cold War, an internal government task force argued that
The diminution of the Soviet threat, projected conventional arms reductions and the emergence of independent Central and East European states both mandate and permit a reduction and restructuring of Canadian Forces committed to European defence. Europe as a fulcrum of East-West conflict (and hence a source of strategic threats to Canada) is in the process of disappearing. The structure of all Canadian efforts predicated on this threat, including our forces committed to Europe, must change.6
Another government document stated that the new role of NATO also required a readjustment of the importance of military forces forwardly deployed to NATO partner countries. The report stated:
Pursuing a cooperative security policy abroad will require adjustments in our mix of policy objectives and instruments. Military instruments will be relatively less important; diplomatic instruments - both analytic and institution-building - are more important.7
In April 1989, while the government was faced with a growing fiscal deficit, it announced a cut back of the defence budget by $2.7 billion over five years. This resulted in the closure of Canadian Forces bases and cuts to procurement programs.8 Between
5 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 1. Task Force on Canadian Security Policy, Europe and Canadian Security, p. 1. 7 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 12. 8 Government of Canada, Budget 1989 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1989), 28. See also Government of Canada, Defence and the 1989 Budget, Budget in Brief: Booklet issued by the Department of Finance, Ottawa, April 27, 1989. Note that a government document lists total cuts of $2.2 billion over five years. However, it does not specify in detail which cuts are subsumed under this amount. Working then with the internal DND numbers (2.2 billion), the government of Canada cut nearly $ 6 billion between 143
1989 and 1993, nationwide, fifteen bases and stations were closed. This included the closure of the two Canadian bases in Germany9 and the return of 1,200 troops home to
Canada by 1992.10 At the time, Canada still had more than 6,600 troops on its two bases in Germany." Internal government estimates suggested that some $1.2 billion was to be saved by the Canadian taxpayers over the next five years.12
In early 1992, Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson, announced that all Canadian
Forces personnel were to return home. Upon this surprising announcement, the Minister of National Defence quickly reassured the Canadian public that the government's commitment to NATO was as strong as ever. The Minister stressed that "the pull-out decision is based on budgetary and fiscal reasons and we have absolutely no philosophical differences with NATO."13 According to one defence analyst, the news was conveyed to Canada's delegation to NATO only a few hours before the Minister made the announcement.14 The Canadian delegation in Brussels was not given any direction as to how to justify the government's decision inside NATO itself, especially since
Mulroney had reassured the German chancellor Kohl a few weeks earlier of Canada's continuous commitment to the defence of Europe.15
1989-1992 including the cuts of $3.4 billion in the federal budget of 1989-90. See Canada. Deptartment of National Defence, Canadian Defence Policy (Ottawa: National Defence, 1992), 14. Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 165. 10CFB Baden-Soellingen closed in 1994 and CFB Lahr in 1995. 1' According to the IISS Canada's mechanized brigade consisted of 4,400 troops in addition to a 2,600 men strong air division. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance -1991/92 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1992), 53. 12 Simpson, "Canada's NATO Commitment: Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues," 7. 13 Department of National Defence (DND), Statement by the Honourable Marcel Masse, September 17, 1991. 14 Simpson NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, 10. 15 Ibid. 144
The decision to close Canadian bases in Germany created the impression in the
Canadian public that the government's defence policy was made in the Department of
Finance rather than the Department of Defence and thus that strategic choices were determined by bureaucrats rather than threat assessments.16 As noted, the Mulroney government quickly noticed the shortfalls and was quick to respond to those misperceptions. It published a Statement on Defence Policy in September 1991 in which it reaffirmed Canada's four traditional defence commitments: the defence of Canada, active membership in NATO, commitment to the defence of the North American homeland, and participation in UN peacekeeping missions.1; Even though the statement confirmed the reduction of CF personnel in Germany, it assured Canadians that the government planned to retain a task force of 1,100 troops in Europe.18 It tried to sell the reductions to Canadians as a product of the long-sought reductions in East-West tensions.19 In addition, the policy statement introduced acquisition plans for the next fifteen years. Despite the cutbacks, it was the Department of National Defence that had the largest interest in keeping the troops in Germany because it feared that Canada would be marginalized in NATO if all CF personnel would leave Germany. However, by reducing Canada's European commitment, Canada shifted to a more continentalist foreign policy in the early 1990s. This was consistent with earlier white papers.20
Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 158. See for example Michel Rossignol, "Defence Policy Review," (Library of Parliament, Political and Social Affairs Division, 1993). Since 1849 these were Canada's defence priorities. However, they were given different significance by governments ever since. fs Ibid. 19 See for example Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9; Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 3. 20 For a greater discussion see Michael K. Hawes and Joel J. Sokolsky, North American Perspectives on European Security (Lewiston N.Y., E. Mellen Press, 1990), 225. 145
Indications for this evolution can be seen in various bilateral trade agreements that were reached between the Mulroney government and the Reagan administration (and later, the first Clinton administration).
The decision of the Mulroney government was not a surprise. It was consistent with the views of Canada's elected representatives. The majority of MPs on Parliament
Hill were in favour of reducing Canada's defence commitments to Europe when social programs were under considerable financial stress.22 The NDP released its own vision of the future of Canadian defence policy and published their own White Paper entitled
Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence, which explained the NDP's long-standing intention to pull Canada out of NATO.23 This was a policy the party had advocated since
1969. The NDP proposed to invest the savings made by cutting the commitment in
Germany in increasing the defence of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. This proposed expansion included the acquisition of six Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, 12 non- nuclear submarines, 18 frigates, and a fleet of helicopters. The NDP draft paper attracted wide attention in the media. This was not a surprise. Public opinion polls showed that if an election were held at the time, the NDP would form the government. In July 1987, and a few days before the release of its defence paper, the party won three federal by- elections in ridings where NDP candidates had never won before.
In 1992, the government issued a new defence policy statement, entitled
Canadian Defence Policy?A The document was made public in April 1992 at about the
21 The Mulroney government signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the Unite States. 22 Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions, 94-95, and 110-16. Derek Blackburn, Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the Defence White Paper (Ottawa: New Democrats, 1987). 24 Canada. Deptartment of National Defence, Canadian Defence Policy. 146 same time as the new 1992 federal budget, which announced further expenditure cuts across the entire federal budget. While making a fuller presentation of Canada's place in the new geopolitical situation, the 1992 statement basically reflected the impact of the additional cuts in planned defence spending in the 1992 federal budget. The statement accelerated the closure of the two bases in Germany by a year and cancelled the initial plans to retain a small force of 1,100 personnel in Europe.
However, there was not only agreement with the government's policy. Opposition for withdrawing Canadian troops came from the Atlanticist side of the debate and scholars who were in favour of keeping a strong commitment to NATO and European security. They argued that Canada's commitments to NATO had shaped Canada's defence policy during the Cold War. Threat of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe had provided the strategic rationale for keeping Canadian Forces in Germany. This threat required continuous Canadian investment into its army, navy, and air force. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, however, the conventional threat perception of Soviet imperialism vanished and so did the nature of the military threat. Ergo, the diminished threat had an effect on the nature of Western defence spending and thus reduced the levels of NATO defence commitment. During the Cold War, NATO functioned as a justification for keeping a somewhat updated and modern Canadian military. These investments were the natural benchmarks for measuring Canada's commitment to
European security.25
Atlanticist Canadians also saw membership in NATO in a functionalist way that opened Ottawa doors to the most prestigious military and political decision-making body
25 See for example Kenneth J. Calder, "Doing the Things That Matter: Canada and Euro-Atlantic Security," International Journal 50 (2005): 701; Joel J. Sokolsky, "A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances," Armed Forces and Society 16, no. 1 (1989): 20. 147 in the world. Through its membership, Canada could be assured that no far-reaching geopolitical decision would be made without consulting Canada. Membership in NATO was also seen as an instrumental tool of counterbalancing Canada's powerful neighbour to the south, the United States.27 Thus, for Canada NATO was also seen as a way of managing the US hegemon."28
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Germany, Canada remained active in NATO. As the Minister of External Affairs argued in 1990, Canada was in a unique position to help shape the evolving societies in CEE because of the composition of this country as a multicultural entity. Many Canadians had personal ties and family relatives in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other CEE states and thus not only shared cultural ties with them but most often also spoke the language. Thus,
Canada had a special interest in CEE and a comparative advantage to offer. As Joe Clark said:
The remarkable events in Central and Eastern Europe are intensely personal for millions of Canadians whose roots are there. Many have ties of language and family. Some were forced to flee by the very regimes which have now collapsed. Most have family or friends whose hopes were thwarted, or lives diminished, by those old regimes, but who have the prospect now of building new lives and new societies in old homelands. Virtually no other nation possesses the web of intense personal connections to Eastern and Central Europe which we have in Canada. That gives us a special interest, and a special capacity, in helping those societies become prosperous and free.29
26 Gustav Schmidt, "Historical Traditions and the Inevitability of European Ties," in Being and Becoming Canada, ed. Charles F. Doran (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1995), 86. 27 See for example Ibid., 84. 28 Ibid., 88. 29 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 1. 148
In short, a large group of Canadians was personally touched and affected by those dramatic changes in CEE. The government pointed out that Canada's stake in a new
Europe is not a given and it should not be mistaken that because Canada had sent thousands of Canadian soldiers to Germany during the Cold War its relevance would endure after the Cold War. The Minister of External Affairs argued:
Nostalgia is not a basis for policy. Our interests in Europe are real, contemporary and compelling. [...] Powerful new economic and political forces are at work, forces over which Canada has limited influence. A European role will not be bestowed upon us because we decide it is on our interest. It must be earned. That requires imagination and realism and hard work.30
The changes in CEE did not affect only Canada. The US administration itself highlighted the importance of the changes in CEE. Meanwhile, it reiterated the importance and continuity of containment and deterrence as allied strategies.
This strategy [of containment] provided an enduring pillar for the growth of Western democracy and free enterprise. While the most important goal of containment has been met - the development of free and prosperous societies in Western Europe and in other parts of the world - the Soviet military threat has not diminished. Rather, in the last two decades, the Soviet Union has increased its military power across the spectrum of capabilities, drawing on that power to exacerbate local conflicts and to conduct a global foreign policy opposed to Western interests. The Soviet Union has stood apart from the international order and often worked to undermine it.31
Canada completely agreed with the United States on this issue. An internal government report concluded that "the Soviet Union will remain, despite unilateral and negotiated force reductions, a major continental military power. As well, Soviet nuclear capabilities
30 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 2. 31 The White House, National Security Directive 23, September 22, 1989, The Bush Library, F 89-191. This position was also reiterated in The White House, National Security Directive 23, 22 September 1989. The Bush Library, F 89-191. 149
will continue to be a match for USA strategic forces and, retargeted, could threaten all
Europe."32
Prior to the government's announcement, the Canadian ambassador to NATO
played an important role in lobbying Canada's NATO colleagues for establishing a North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a political forum for aspirant NATO member
candidates. After Britain and France had rejected an associate membership in NATO for
states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) for security reasons, Canada's chief
diplomat in Brussels worked the telephones and used his negotiation skills to bargain for
some kind of NATO membership for these countries under the auspices of NACC.33
Indeed, Canada wanted NATO to become more political and less military: "It is only natural in these circumstance for NATO to assume a more political role, a role which
would reflect both the new European reality and a declining military mission."34
Formally, CEE states were not covered by NATO's Article 5 protectorate, but it was
accepted wisdom in the NATO community that in the event of an external aggression,
NATO would feel obliged to assist.35 Furthermore, the Canadian public and its diplomats
in Brussels were equally surprised about the government's decision to bring the troops home, particularly since Canada's Foreign Minister, Barbara McDougall, had praised
Canada's contribution to peacekeeping and European security by sending troops to
Yugoslavia. Indeed, "high-level representatives from allied countries" saw this as
32 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Europe and Canadian Security, p. 4. 33 Confidential interview with Senior Canadian official at NATO headquarters, 20 May 2007. 34 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 3. 35 See for example Philip H. Gordon, Nato 's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). 150
"Canada's most valuable contribution to European security."36 Thus, Canadian contributions to international peacekeeping were recognized by Canada's closest NATO allies and it was accepted wisdom that Canadian peacekeeping had brightened Canada's image and reputation at NATO headquarters. Part of Canada's positive reputation stemmed from the high profile of the Commander of the UN forces, Canadian Major
General Lewis Mackenzie.37
Nonetheless, as much as the government's announcement might have hurt
Canada's reputation in NATO, it was clear that Canada would remain in NATO and would stay active politically in its various councils, committees, and working groups. It was thus an announcement that only had implications for Canada's military deployments
- Canada's political commitments, however, remained unchanged. NATO's Secretary
General Manfred Woerner explicitly endorsed this reduced Canadian commitment. In a speech given in Brussels in 1990 and at a time when Canada debated whether or not to pull out completely from Germany, he said that "there is a clear desire to see the United
States and Canada remain in Europe, of course with reduced forces, but remain nonetheless."38 On another occasion, Woerner acknowledged Canada's long-term commitment to European security. He argued that without North American's participation in European security Europe would have been unable to balance the Soviet
Union militarily. He said:
What has kept the peace in Europe for nearly half a century and helped to bring about change is as much the physical presence of US and Canadian
Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, 10. 37 Ibid., 10-11. See also Carol Off, The Ghosts ofMedak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2004). 38 "Address given to a Conference sponsored by the United States Mission to NATO on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance," Speech given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Brussels, 19-21 September 1990. 151
Forces in Europe, as the political commitment of these two nations. [...] A purely European security organisation could neither balance the Soviet Union militarily nor provide the same kind of political stability.39
With the end of the Cold War, NATO itself as an international organization was faced with the question of its own existence and taken by complete surprise by the changes in
Eastern Europe. The paramount question in the debate about the future of the transatlantic
Alliance then was how could the West justify the existence of a military defence Alliance in a security environment without a Communist threat?40 Related to the question of existence was the political, military, economic, and cultural transformation taking place in the former Warsaw Pact countries. NATO bureaucrats were concerned that the changes in CEE would leave a security vacuum in Europe that would further destabilize not only the region east of the Oder-Neisse line but also Western Europe. Thus, NATO decided to respond rapidly to the changes taking place in CEE and, according to Ryan Hendrickson and others, it was largely due to the leadership and personality of then NATO Secretary
General Manfred Woerner that NATO's outreach process was pushed ahead.41 On top of
"Address given at the 36l Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly," Speech given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, London, 29 November 1990. 40 Many books have been written about the question of the existence of NATO after the end of the Cold War. See for example Ted Galen Carpenter, The Future of NATO (London, Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1995); Carpenter and Conry, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality; Jonathan Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," International Affairs 13, no. 4 (1997); Philip H. Gordon, Nato 's Transformation; David G. Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," in Will NATO Go East? - the Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996); Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen Gregory Sens, NA TO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003); Alan Sens and Albert Legault, "Canada and NATO Enlargement: Interests and Options," Canadian Foreign Policy 4, no. 2 (Fall 1996); Allen G. Sens, Canada's Transatlantic Interests and the Enlargement of NATO (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations University of British Columbia, 1997). 41 Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NA TO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006). Also confidential interview by author with Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, 9 May 2007. See also Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, 1, and 60-74. By far the best and most comprehensive account of NATO transformation, even though written from an American perspective, is Asmus and Council on Foreign Relations, Opening Nato 's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era. 152 that, during this time period, NATO was also involved militarily in the Gulf War.42
Indeed, the years between 1989 and 1991 marking the end of the Cold War were not easy for NATO.
Despite the larger turmoil in the NATO bureaucracy in Brussels, it soon became clear that Canadian actions of cutting back their NATO commitments were consistent with the actions of its NATO allies. According to John Lis and Zachary Selden, after the end of the Cold War, NATO countries significantly cut their defence spending. For example, the level of defence spending measured against the GDP in the United Kingdom fell to 3.0% in 1995, that in France to 3.1%, in Germany to 1.7%, and in the United States to 3.8%.43 The cuts were also consistent with the evolution of the notion of security. The meaning of security changed considerably after 1989 from one of which numbers of military hard power were the deciding instruments for the conduct of a nation state's foreign policy to one in which economic, political, environmental security issues played a role.44 The major difference, however, was that Canada was the first country to announce such steps when other NATO countries were waiting for an opportunity to publicize theirs. As it turned out a few months later at NATO's London summit, Canadian decisions to reduce forward deployments to Germany were consistent with the defence policies of other countries and those of NATO. Shortly after Canada withdrew its forces from Europe, the United States government also announced a major reduction of its troop
This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 43 Lis, John J., and Zachary Selden. NATO Burdensharing after Enlargement (New York: Novinka Books, 2003), 3. 44 This change of the notion of security has been affirmed by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana. See Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 18th December, 1996. 153 size. For example, the America's troops that were sent to fight in Operation Desert
Storm during the Gulf War in 1991 did not return to Europe and headed back to the
United States.46 As such, Canadian actions were mirrored by the decisions of other
NATO allies to reduce their forces.
As mentioned earlier, while the Canadian government decided to pull all of its troops from Germany, the government continued its political commitment to NATO and its bureaucracy. One should not underestimate the role and importance of the delegations at NATO headquarters as well as the bureaucrats working inside the headquarters, which functions as the international civil service for NATO.47 In this sense, the NATO Alliance is also an important source of human resources and human capital that Canada continued to invest in. Canada, for example, continued to send Canadians to work on the
International Staff. It did not withdraw its diplomats and officers from the Canadian delegation to NATO. Quite the opposite: Canada increased the numbers of its diplomatic staff at Canadian embassies and consulates throughout the region. Canada's foreign minister Joe Clark proudly announced: "As a complementary step, my Department is increasing the number of diplomatic staff at our embassies throughout the region.
Assistance to Eastern Europe is not a question of charity. It is a matter of hard common sense and self-interest."48 And indeed, Canada did not reduce the number of its diplomatic staff in Europe and slightly increased it (for a detailed chart see Appendix). In
45 Kim Richard Nossal, ed., Succumbing to the Dumbbell: Canadian Perspectives on NATO in the 1990s, Canada andNato: The Forgotten Ally? (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992), 26. 46 The literature on the Gulf war and the composition of Operation Desert Storm is vast. However, a succinct overview provides John M. Collins, "Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Implications for Future US Future Requirements," in CRS Report for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, April 19, 1991). For US forces not returning to Germany but to the United States see Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, "New Battle Stations?," Foreign Affairs (September/October 2003). 47 The international civil service at NATO headquarters is called the International Staff. 48 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 154
the fiscal year 1987/88, two hundred and eighty two Canadians civil servants served in
Europe. That number increased to two hundred and eighty nine in the fiscal year 1989/90
and by 1991/92 it rose to two hundred and ninety four Canadians in total.49
Canada's self-interest in the new Europe was to maintain a stable and prosperous
European continent, which would help bring economic prosperity to Canadians.50 Also,
Canada's interest was to ensure that Europe did not become again what it once was in the
First World War and the Second World War. In addition, of course, Canada continued to
participate in all allied committees, council meetings and so on. Therefore, the
withdrawal of CF personnel was consistent with the new security environment in which
diplomacy, negotiation and outreach have gained precedence over forwardly deployed
military capabilities.
NATO London Summit 1990
The dissolution of the Soviet empire also meant the end of a threat to NATO. The
Alliance was created as a community of states with the common objective to stand
together in order to defend the West against the ideology of Communism. Lord Ismay,
NATO's first Secretary General, then used a now famous phrase to explain the relevance
of NATO. He said that NATO was given birth "to keep the Russians out, the Germans
See Appendix for a more detailed list. Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Annual Report. The following reports were consulted: FY 1987-88, 1988/89,1989/90, 1990/91, and 1991/92. It is true, as the figures in the appendix indicate, that the percentage of Canadian civil servants serving in Europe went down (from 26.68% in FY 1987/88 to 23.69% in FY 1989/90 and back up to 24.47% in FY 1991/92). This evolution, however, cannot be explained by the decreasing numbers of civil servants being sent to serve in Europe - the number, as shown in the text actually increased - but by the increased number of Canadian bureaucrats being sent to Africa and Asia. In FY 1987 250 government officials worked in Africa, by the FY 1991/92 that number had risen to 290 (see Appendix). A similar trend occurred in Africa: in the FY 1987/88 174 government officials served in Africa, by the FY 1991/92 that number had increased to 261 in total. These increases then reduced the percentage of officials serving in Europe. 50 See for example Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 2. 155 down and the Americans in."51 Some analysts, mostly associated with the realist school of international relations, have argued in 1990 that because NATO did not face a threat from Communist subversion any more there would be no reason for the Alliance. John
Mearsheimer, for example, summarized the argument quite succinctly:
[...] NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent. NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, [...] NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe. NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War.52
Robert Kaplan argued similarly: "Without the Soviet menace to serve as a unifying glue, there seemed to be ample reason to recommend its dissolution."53 NATO's Secretary
General Manfred Woerner who was probably one of the most visionary Secretary
General NATO ever had, had a different view. He said:
I am experiencing the fortieth anniversary of NATO rather like the manager of a successful football team which has just won the league title. His initial instinct is to celebrate the season's glories. But instead his mind is inevitably on the team's promotion to the higher division. How will the team cope with the new, more demanding environment where not only the rewards, but also the challenges, are so much greater? Such is life. The more successful we are, the more new tasks we find ourselves taking on.54
NATO allies were very well aware of the debate. This was also one of the central themes at the ministerial meeting at Turnberry in June 1990. Manfred Woerner had no doubt that
51 One might also add the French happy. Lord Ismay was the first Secretary General of NATO between 1949-1957. 52 Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 13-14. 53 Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. 54 "The future Tasks of the Alliance," Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to the Quadrangular Forum, Brussels, 1 April 1989. 156 the Alliance would play a significant role of shaping the future of CEE. In 1990, the
Alliance, however, was not ready to face such significant challenges and thus the
Secretary General demanded an internal Alliance transformation: "If we want to be able to meet the challenge of change, we have to change ourselves. We are equipping the
Alliance for its role as a partner in stability and progress."55 It was also at the Turnberry
Ministerial Meeting that the NATO Alliance first discussed cooperation as a new dimension of NATO policy in addition to defence and dialogue.56
The Canadian government was convinced that the end of the Cold War marked a milestone in the history of international relations and understood that it had to respond to the changing international environment, especially the one in Central and Eastern Europe.
Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, argued in 1990: "The revolution of
1989 requires a new Canadian approach not only to Central and Eastern Europe, but towards the entire region."57 Yet, because of the rapid changes taking place in Europe,
Canada had not formulated its new interests in the new and evolving Europe. It was again
Joe Clark who vaguely outlined them in rather general terms: He said
Canadian interests in Europe are real, contemporary and compelling. Our primary interest is peace. Two world wars this century have left thousands of Canadians graves in Europe, teaching us that security at home has no meaning without security in Europe. Politically, the values that have triumphed in Europe are our values too.58
A more detailed account of Canada's foreign policy objectives was summarized in an internal government report - however, the list is rather unspecific and includes the following as Canada's foreign policy interests: "respect for and defence of sovereignty;
55 Opening Remarks at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Turnberry, 7-8 June 1990. 56 Ibid. 57 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 157 military defence; peaceful resolution of conflicts; arms control and disarmament; effective international institutions; stability in the international trade and financial systems; economic competitiveness; growth of free market principles; economic growth in developing countries; expansion of Canada's international trade; orderly procedures for the international movement of persons (immigrants, refugees); democratic development and respect for human rights; environmental protection; detection and prevention of crime, including narcotic trafficking; prevention of terrorist activities; respect for international law; protection of marine resources."59 However, this broad definition of Canadian security interests also occurred during the Cold War years and thus it can be seen as a consistency in Canadian national security policy.60 This comprehensive list of Canadian foreign policy interests lead to the conclusion that in
1991, the government of Canada was rather unsure about its real foreign policy goals and saw Canada as the natural promoter of cooperative security. This, one might argue, was because Canada realized that it was unable to accomplish this extensive list on its own and thus engaged in these cooperative arrangements with its allies and friends to achieve them. Nonetheless, besides all the uncertainties in those foreign policy goals and priorities, the government was firmly committed to make NATO (or remain to have
NATO) as the most important transatlantic link that Canada had. In short, NATO remained an integral part of Canada's foreign policy and it was still the only institution with a military capability and an inbuilt consultative mechanism on leading political and
Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 11. 60 Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada's Defence Policy in an Unstable World," International Journal 48 (Spring 1993): 383. 158 strategic issues. The government concluded that "NATO will be especially critical in seeing us through the instabilities - including particularly those in Eastern Europe - inherent in a transition from an era of East/West hostility to a cooperative system of security embracing all the countries of Europe."62 Ottawa wanted NATO to become more political and less military and thus for Canada the policy of cooperation became the logical extension of NATO's Harmel Doctrine. On the eve of the London Summit,
Canada's Minister of External Affairs gave a speech at Humber College in Toronto in which he outlined Canada's strong support for a more political NATO and "turn outwards to embrace its old adversaries and new friends."63 He proposed that NATO should provide the venue for regular Soviet Foreign Ministers meetings in Brussels to foster the dialogue and reduce NATO's nuclear deterrence.
In addition, the new Europe also held some economic prospects for Canadian businesses. The Soviet Union alone was faced with a huge economic downturn. A report of NATO's Political Committee concluded that Russia's economic growth was dwindling at 1.5% per year.64 The overall budget deficit reached some $160 billion, or 9% of its
GNP.65 Russia's share of world trade accounted only for 4% and the supply of the nation's basic foodstuff articles was at a minimum level. The Canadian government was very well aware of the fact that helping to rebuild a society would most likely generate
61 See for example Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 3. Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 27. 63 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990,4. "Address given at the 35lh Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly," Speech given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Rome, 9 October 1989. 159 contracts for Canadian companies and open new export markets. Thus, one of Canada's interests in CEE was of economic nature.
The Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was seen as the successor institution for the construction of a new Europe and one institution through which Canada was able to pursue those interests. This policy found Canada's endorsement and support inside the government for shaping a post-Cold War security environment for Europe.66 At home, in 1994, the Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate charged with reviewing Canada's foreign and defence policy recommended to the Government that Canada should retain its NATO membership and
"encourage NATO to continue moving to a collective security role for the whole of
Europe."67 The committee recommended that
Canada remain an active member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supporting NATO's continued evolution as a forum for promoting multilateral peace and security through Partnership for Peace and other mechanisms. As NATO develops, Canada should remain in the integrated military structure. The Canadian Forces should be committed to meaningful military roles within NATO in accordance with their capabilities and the Alliance's needs.68
The Government in Ottawa responded to the recommendation and made proposals for a structural transformation of the organization to include, for example, a parliamentary assembly of the CSCE and summit meetings of the Heads of State and Government.
66 See for example Joseph T. Jockel, "Canada in a Twin-Pillared Alliance: The 'Dumbbell' May Just Have to Do," International Journal 46, no. 1 (1990-91): 20. 7 Parliament Canada, Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (Ottawa: Publications Service Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994), 35-36. 68 Ibid. 160
Canada had a vision for the Alliance, a role it anticipated for it, and one in which would be an active player.69
The North Atlantic Council subsequently endorsed Canada's position unanimously. The final communique stated that "our common security can best be safeguarded through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements."70
New Importance for CSCE in Europe
It appeared that the CSCE seemed to be the natural fit for dealing with European security issues - especially in the area of arms control - given its membership of more than 34
European, North American, and Asian countries.71 The internal security task force concluded that "[...] NATO may gradually become less central to European security. The new type of conflict may increasingly be managed within the CSCE or a strictly
European context. NATO may become the locus for management of whatever strategic threats remain."72 Initially Canada saw the CSCE as a complementary institution to
NATO and a "true instrument of cooperative security, one that would supplement
The response of the Government to the Recommendations of the foreign policy committee were made in Canada, Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Govt, of Canada, 1995). The government's response to the recommendations of the joint defence committee was Department of National Defence Canada, "1994 Defence White Paper," (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994). 70 "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council, Meeting in Ministerial Session, Copenhagen, 6-7 June, 1991. A good counterexample where the concept of interlocking institutions failed was in Yugoslavia where 'interlocking' became institutional bickering. 71 The CSCE was established in 1973 and became the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 January 1995. The OSCE now had a formal Secretariat, Senior Council, Parliamentary Assembly, Conflict Prevention Centre, and Office for Free Elections. Ever since the Lisbon Declaration was published in 1996 entitled "The Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century," the OSCE affirmed the universal and indivisible nature of security on the European continent. 72 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Europe and Canadian Security, p. 3. 161 deterrence with assurance." This was also the opinion of the North Atlantic Council, which stated:
We also see the potential for the CSCE and arms control processes to serve as important and complementary means of developing measures to strengthen co-operative security. Our objective is to maintain a stable framework for change enabling the establishment of a lasting peace with freedom in Europe.74
The CSCE also had an extended scope beyond NATO's limited focus on security and defence matters in the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition, NATO's heads of state and government decided to encourage the "positive developments in Central and Eastern
Europe"75 and to reach out to NATO's former adversaries and to start a political process of dialogue and cooperation. However, as NATO's Secretary General pointed out,
NATO's readiness to co-operate depended on progress on human rights issues, responsible behaviour in Soviet foreign policy, and reduction of military capabilities.76
He was convinced that Soviet President Gorbachev was serious about reforming Russian society and adopting a more Western style of governance and business. Woerner argued that "we can be relatively optimistic about this current bout of Communist soul- searching. In its quest for growth, the East will need to import our values as much as our technology. It must also find ways to integrate its economies into the international trading system through participation in our Western economic and financial institutions. We will
Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 74 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Defence Planning Committee, Final Communique, Brussels 22-23 May 1990. 75 NATO Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Final Communique, Brussels 28-29 May, 1991. 76 "Stability in Europe - NATO's way forward," Address given by the NATO Secretary General, Manfred Woerner to the Annual Meeting of the World Economics Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 1 February 1989. 162 therefore have more influence over the domestic evolution of these societies than we have enjoyed over the past."77
In 1991, the government of Canada concluded that the Western model of society and economy was attractive to former Warsaw Pact countries. As a government report concluded, "as a result of this change there has been an extraordinary realignment of political and economic interests. Countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are looking to the European Community, North America and Japan as the locomotives to pull them toward a new era of democratic polity and economic prosperity,"78 The government continued to give NATO a primary role for shaping the transformation processes in CEE. Yet Ottawa was aware of the evolving role of other security institutions in Europe such as the CSCE and the EC but it was hesitant to give up its support for NATO's new role in a new Europe. It argued that
Until new security architectures are in place, current institutions such as NATO, in which we have an assured voice, must be supported, but in ways that make clear Canadian readiness to see them evolve or be subsumed as necessary in new organizations. To appear reluctant to envisage a new security order will increase the temptation of Europeans to exclude us.79
Canada took this outreach process very seriously. The government concluded that a new security order in Europe must
reciprocally provide assurance to all nations. It must address the potential for inter-state or intra-state conflict triggered by socio-economic discontent and/or the nationalistic mobilization of ethnic hatreds. Of particular concern will be the emergence of any non-democratic governments and of threats to the new democracies. In this situation, priority security objectives in Europe ought to include the careful and deliberate creation of a set of interlocking
77,. 'The future Tasks of the Alliance," Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to the Quadrangular Forum, Brussels, 1 April 1989. 78 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 1. 79 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Europe and Canadian Security, 3. 163
institutional arrangements which would constitute a new security architecture for Europe.80
Thus, Canada developed three different programs worth $30 million to assist Poland and
Hungary, in particular, in their efforts to reform their countries.81 In addition to $12 million in emergency food aid,82 the first program actively supported the International
Management Centre in Budapest of which the inaugural dean was a Canadian citizen.
Another project supported a training scheme for Polish farmers to teach them livestock and farm management.83 In addition, Canada became a founding member of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1991, which has the objective of providing capital to fund private sector initiatives and infrastructure in CEE. The bank fosters regional programs that are directly aimed at specific regions and thus are better able to address regional needs and concerns.84 The North Atlantic Council outlined NATO's goals in more abstract terms: "The process of dialogue with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, including political and military contacts at all levels, has now been established and should continue to be expanded."85 These measures were seen as steps towards overcoming the past of isolating regions and their developments.
The concept of cooperative security is based on the assumption that mutual regulative mechanisms in place are able to minimize the uncertainties that states might feel about each other or external threats.86 As such, the cooperative security is a
80 Ibid.,5. 81 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 82 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9; Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 9. 83 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 4 Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of r,Globalibid- Governance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 398, and 401-02. ' Paul B. Stares and John D. Steinbruner, "Cooperative Security in the New Europe," in The New Germany and the New Europe, ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 222-25. 164 preventative concept to confront international tensions and aggressions. Canada defined cooperative security as follows:
In the absence of true common security, a comprehensive, flexible and evolutionary 'cooperative security' concept and approaches appear more realistic. Such a 'cooperative security' concept would envisage countries (including, as in the European instance, former adversaries) joining voluntarily in a variety of institutions, organizations and agreements which, taken together, cover a variety of issues that impinge on security, such as arms control, trade, the environment and human rights.87
In short, cooperative security is about managing risks and thereby preventing them from becoming renewed military threats. Thereby "flexibility, adaptability, and realism"88 are the key factors for success. In addition, it operates under the principle that the use of military force can only be applied in order to protect the geographical and political integrity of a country. Secondly, a cooperative security regime ought to be inclusive in the sense that it cannot exclude other important states of the region. At the same time, the concept should not be mistaken for a blind support of the Canadian government for international institutions and agreements.
However, it is now clear, more than seventeen years after the fact, that the concept of co-operative security was highly debated and challenged by various branches of the government before it was sold to Canada's NATO allies. In light of the evolving security changes in Europe and the uncertainty about Canadian interests in this new future, the
Mulroney government formed the so called "Canadian Security Task Force,"90 which had the objective of examining Canada's security policy at the time. It did so by drafting various reports on issues of Canada's security policies. It consisted of bureaucrats from
Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 8. 88 Ibid, 10. Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 10. 9 Members of the Task Group were M. Dawson, R.J. Lysyshn, I. Mundell, K.G. Nesbit (DND), G.A. Pringle, E. Puxley, G. Soroka, E. Whitcomb. 165 various federal departments, most chiefly the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the Department of National Defence (DND). On 10 July 1990 Captain (N) Nesbit wrote to the director of IFBS thanking him for a "most enjoyable (although frustrating at times)" period. Further he complained about the bureaucratic rivalries between DND and
DEA:
I believe we absolutely must do something about the mind-set difference between the Foreign Service and Canadian military people. There is a real gulf. As a group, we servicemen don't really appreciate diplomacy, international politics and arms control. Your people don't seem to have a very good handle on how a sovereign nation can and should use defence forces to further its national aims.91
Nesbit and his department were strong supporters of the view that the security of
Canadians had to come first before the government should undertake endeavours in arms control and co-operative security measures as espoused by DEA.
In light of the evolving geopolitical changes in Europe, Canada advanced to espouse interlocking institutions92 that would be working towards a peaceful European continent. The tone in the US administration was similarly responsive. At the time, nobody thought of a NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe. The Alliance was too occupied with coping with the geopolitical shift and re-considering its reason d'etre.
NATO had to market itself and develop new objectives and principles in the new security environment. Also, the issue of enlargement was overshadowed by NATO's preoccupation with the conflicts in the Balkans. The NATO Alliance knew that any decision of enlargement would not be made without its biggest ally, the United States.
Only the US was able to push its allies towards extending the invitation to selected
91 Written letter from Captain (N) K.G. Nesbit, National Defence Headquarters to Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Director, Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Lester B. Pearson Building, 10 July 1990. 92 This notion is further explained in Barbara McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992). 166
countries from CEE. The issue of enlargement did not gain momentum in the US until
Richard Holbrooke, then US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs, took office in 1994:93
In addition to NATO, a variety of organizations and institutions must contribute to the new structure of peace. The new architecture should involve both such institutions as NATO and the EU, which strive for true integration among members, and others such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which provide a wide, inclusive framework for looser forms of cooperation. Although the EU is primarily a political and economic entity, it also makes an important contribution to European security.94
It was in this atmosphere that the NATO Summit meeting in London in 1990 recognized
the substantial decrease in the military threat and the requirement of the Alliance to adapt
to this new environment. The Summit recognized that Europe had entered a new era in
which the states of Central and Eastern Europe were gaining more independence from
Soviet influence.
The Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe.[...] We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.95
The initiation of change inside NATO and extending the "hand of friendship" to CEE
was a German-Canadian initiative brought forward by German Foreign Minister Hans
Dietrich Genscher and Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark.96 Shortly after that the Berlin Wall came down, divided Germany re-unified itself and democracy was
He held this position until 1996. 94 Richard Holbrooke, "America: European Power," Foreign Ajfairs 74 (March/April 1995): 46. 95 London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5-6 July 1990. McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? , 4. 167 extended eastwards. Both Canada's and Germany's Ostpolitik were united in the interest not only to stabilize Russia but also to link Germany's immediate central and Eastern
European neighbours to Western institutional structures. Their association with NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council offers them membership in a North
American community of values. In short, one could say that Bonn and Ottawa wanted to create a zone of stability to the east. Manfred Woerner, NATO's Secretary General traveled extensively to CEE to deliver NATO's message. In a speech delivered to the
Czech and Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Woerner said:
I have come to Prague today with the same, very simple message that I took to Moscow in July and which I will take to Warsaw next week; for it is a message that is addressed with equal conviction to all our former adversaries who are now our friends and partners. We extend the hand of friendship to you. We wish to cooperate with you. The time of confrontation is over. The hostility and mistrust of the past must be buried. We need to work together. Only in this way we can build the Common European Home or the European Confederation or the new European Order, call it what you will. We all know what we mean: a Europe of democracy, human rights and partnership in which the whole sustains the parts and the parts sustain the whole.97
The London Summit took place on 5-6 July 1990 and was NATO's first summit after the end of the Cold War and took the Clark-Genscher initiative a step further. At the summit, the heads of state and government formally recognized that the political division of
Europe and the threats associated with it had come to an end. As a result, it was a not surprising that the Soviet Union and its satellite states were not explicitly mentioned as threats to the Alliance as in earlier strategic concepts. However, NATO leaders showed considerable concern about the security vacuum the USSR left behind. "Many NATO members regard the region to their east as a security nightmare - fraught with complex
"Building a new Europe," Speech given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Republic, Prague, 6 September 1990. 168
religious, political, economic, and ethnic rivalries - for which they would prefer not to
assume responsibility."98 NATO's answer was a new force posture that moved away from
the concept of forward defence towards a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. About
80% of NATO's stockpile of sub-strategic nuclear weapons would be destroyed. Also,
NATO planned to reduce the overall size of its forces as well as their level of readiness. It
decided to increase the flexibility, adaptability and mobility of its forces. The Summit
called for a type of a multinational rapid reaction force able to respond to crisis rapidly
and on short notice. Based on these guidelines, NATO politicians decided to start a
reform process of their domestic NATO forces, doctrine, and thinking in order to make
NATO ready for the 21st century. As one NATO official put it, the overall transformation
of NATO goes beyond reforming NATO's military capabilities and also includes political
and structural elements." The political transformation was associated with NATO's
decision-making reforms in an enlarged Alliance. Also, NATO decided to reform its
organizational command and control structures for operations and commitments. The
military aspect of transformation was dedicated to increasing interoperability among the
NATO allies and to increase the reaction times of NATO forces in case of an emergency.
In short, the London Summit laid the groundwork for this transformation process
while assuring its partners100 that NATO was to remain a defensive Alliance only, and
Jeffrey Simon, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?" Orbis (Winter 1993): 21. 99 Presentation by Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, Head, Planning Section, Operations Division, NATO International Staff, NATO Headquarters and Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to the conference of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the University of Calgary entitled "NATO Transformation: Realignment for the Future, November 2-4, 2006 Delta Bow Valley Hotel, Calgary. Presentations are available online at httpi//wjvw.,^ accessed 7 January 2007. 100 In 1989 the NATO Alliance consisted of 16 countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Other states from CEE who showed an interest in either working with NATO or showing 169 indicating that it would only use military force in case of a hostile attack on one of its member states. Thus, NATO did not decide to abolish its doctrines of deterrence and defence and continued to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. At the same time, the Alliance's security policy was augmented by an additional element. The new
NATO now consisted of three mutually reinforcing pillars: dialogue, cooperation, and collective defence. States from CEE, however, did not perceive NATO's cautious approach as threatening nor as an intent of Western imperialism. Instead, there was a sense of their strong ambition to join the Alliance.101
In the early 1990s, these developments were somewhat contrary to the internal estimates by Canadian foreign and defence policy makers in Ottawa, who had assumed that indeed CEE states would wish to avoid closer ties and links with Western states because of their fear of Russia, which despite the geopolitical turmoil in Eastern Europe remained an influential actor in Central and Eastern Europe and might make use of this influence in case they were seen as being too close to the West. "Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is continuing to modernize and which have implications for our defence."102
Ottawa as well as its allies saw an increased role and function of the CSCE to quickly fill the security vacuum left by the USSR.103 However, it was clear by the fall of 1990 that
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic made their ambitions heard very clearly that
intentions of applying for membership were considered partners. Today countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and others are among the NATO partner countries. 101 McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally?, 5. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Study on NATO Enlargement," (Brussels: September 1995), Chapter 2, Section B, Article 12. North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Final Ministerial Communique," (Turnberry, United Kingdom: 7-8 June, 1990), Article 10. 103 Ibid., Article 13. 170 their intentions were establishing closer ties with NATO. To achieve this goal they formed an informal Alliance. They met in Visegrad, Hungary, in September 1990 to evaluate the forms of cooperation amongst themselves and with the Western Alliance.104
One year later this cooperative relationship resulted in a liberalization agreements called
"Pro Memoria" that liberalized trade between the three countries and reformed their trilateral military relations by allowing for greater transparency and openness. The agreement was signed on 30 November 1990. One month later the Visegrad countries coordinated their recognition of Croatian and Slovenia.105 Ideally, the intentions of those three states to join NATO must have appeared logical to the Canadian government because the institutional deficiencies of the OSCE were very well known in Canada before. Thus, one might argue, Canada's predictions were off. Indeed, the intentions of
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, especially, were very clear early on. In short, one might come to the conclusion that the government in Ottawa misinterpreted the developments in CEE.
One of the deficiencies of the CSCE was the lack of enforcement capabilities that would give the organization the power and tools to act effectively in order to solve a crisis. The CSCE remained a talking shop. The Canadian government put it more diplomatically saying that
The CSCE has lacked the institutional framework now required for effective and ongoing cooperation and confidence-building. It must therefore develop the tools to perform those tasks. Canada believes that continuing political direction from the highest level is required on a regular basis.106
As a result, these three countries are often referred to as the Visegrad countries. ,os Joshua Spero, "The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw Triangle: Central European Security after the Visegrad Summit," European Security (Spring 1992). 106 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 171
Moreover, meetings of the CSCE Council required unanimous voting for decisions to be adopted and actions to be taken. In many instances, this ended in long negotiations and debates and thus delayed actions.107 Finally, the CSCE and its member states did not share a common value and belief system that would allow them to act collectively to preserve European security in the event of a significant crisis. Overall, it had to be recognized that the passing of the Cold War had not eliminated uncertainty. Canada, also a member of the CSCE, recognized these particular weaknesses and inefficiency of the
CSCE, especially in times when nation states in Europe were under significant time pressure to shape the transformation process in CEE. Thus, the government in Ottawa put more emphasis on strengthening NATO and strengthened its evolving outreach process.
"[...]NATO provides the framework for discussion with the new states from the East on how to achieve the objective of a Europe whole and free."108 In the post-1989 world,
NATO became an instrument of stability and security for Canada: "Apart from the United
States, Europe remains the only part of the world in which we have the full scope of interests and relations - political, economic, social, cultural, ethnic and historical, in addition to a security relationship which predates confederation."109 NATO managed to transform itself and left the CSCE not only with an unclear mandate but also with an uncertain future.
NATO also put emphasis on improving its of crisis management capabilities to rapidly deploy to locations of crisis. This required a military transformation of forces into highly mobile, capable, and flexible units that are deployable on a short notice and can
107 See for example Paul Letourneau and Philippe Hebert, "NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design," in The Future of NATO; Enlargement, Russia, and European Security, ed. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal: 1999), 114. 108 Canada. Deptartment of National Defence, Canadian Defence Policy, 3-4. 172 sustain in the field for a short period of time.110 This was also realized by Canada, which understood that more flexible, more mobile and more adaptable force capabilities are able to perform a greater variety of tasks and issues and thus provides the government with more options in crisis situations.111 As the government noted:
Over the past few years, multilateral organizations have begun to employ impartial outside military forces in innovative ways to deal with regional instability. Such forces have provided disaster relief, helped in postwar reconstruction, ensured the protection of refugees, supervised fair elections, assisted nations to manage the transition to independence, and even protected ethnic minorities.
[...] The defence of Canada's sovereignty, our continued participation in collective security arrangements, and our aspiration to help resolve regional conflict, all call for the maintenance of flexible, capable armed forces. These forces will have to adapt to new domestic realities and new geostrategic conditions...'12
Two years earlier, an internal report concluded that "new European security arrangements are likely to involve an increased attention to peacekeeping, peace monitoring and verification functions. Canada should be ready to reconfigure some Canadian Forces for such duties."113 The requirement for flexibility was also understood in the military establishment. Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, noted, the ambition of the government and the CF is to develop "general-purpose combat capable armed forces, stationed in Canada for the most part, ready to deploy anywhere in
1,0 This fact is highlighted in many NATO declarations. See for example Final Communique of the Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, Article 8 or London Summit Declaration. See also Christopher Donnelly, "Shaping Soldiers for the 21st Century," NATO Review 48, no. 2, Moskos, Williams, and Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. This fact was reiterated in the 1994 defence policy review. See Canada, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, 22. 1 Canada. Deptartment of National Defence, Canadian Defence Policy, 11. 113 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Europe and Canadian Security, p. 10. 173 the world in defence of Canada's interests."114 Indeed, flexibility was not only required for military personnel, but also for all other departments. In 1990, the task force on
Canadian security policy published a report, entitled Canadian Security In The 1990s, in which it was argued that
Just as the security equation today is vastly different from that obtaining only a year ago, the list of security concerns and contributing factors will undoubtedly evolve over time. Any security policy should be fixable enough to respond to changes in the international environment which may alter the calculation of Canadian security interests or the means to their attainment.115
Like any other NATO member, Canada's participation in NATO rested with its ability to be interoperable with its major allies in NATO. If their governments decided to put their troops through a process of transforming their militaries, so too would Canada. The government realized the direction its NATO allies were taking and responded by ordering its forces through a transformation process also. It was recognized by the foreign and defence establishment in Ottawa that "high-intensity combat capability is clearly essential if future Canadian governments are going to be able to act in concert with American or
West European allies over serious military threats to the allies' common security interests."116 The government used different terminology and argued that Canada needed to retain multi-purpose and combat capable forces.117 Indeed, as Moskos, Williams, and
Segal argued, among the NATO family, Canada was one of the first countries that
114 General A.J.G.D. de Chaste lain, "Wing-walking revisited: Canada's defence policy after the Cold War," Canadian Defence Quarterly 12 (June 1992), 8, quoted in Jockel and Sokolsky, "Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada's Defence Policy in an Unstable World," 391. '15 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Canadian Security In The 1990s, 4. 116 Douglas Alan Ross, "Canada and the Future or European Security: From a Cheap Ride to a Free Ride to No Ride at All?," International Journal 50 (Autumn 1995): 724-25. 117 Canada, "1994 Defence White Paper," 14. 174 successfully transformed its armed forces from a traditional model military into a postmodern military:
Among the Anglo-American nations [...] Canada has probably moved earliest and farthest from a traditional military model. The armed forces themselves have been increasingly democratized, liberalized, and civilianized. Canada's military posture is increasingly driven by internal rather than external considerations. A high value is placed on military integration with the larger society and transparency of the civil-military interface.118
NATO of Canada's dreams
The summit in London recognized that military capabilities were only one dimension of this transformation process and that it needed to be supplemented by other softer capabilities as well, based on the values of Article 2. In 1949, this article was called the
Canadian article because it was the Canadian government that pushed for an inclusion of economic cooperation as one additional dimension of the Alliance. Article 2 says:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.119
In 1949, with Article 2 the NATO member states pledged themselves to further reduce tensions among themselves and actively foster their economic relationship. In other words, the article was designed to increase the political and economic interdependence of the NATO member states and also create something like a transatlantic economic
Alliance where countries from both continents would be subject to fewer tariffs and trade
Moskos, Williams, and Segal, "Armed Forces after the Cold War," 9. 119 The North Atlantic Treaty, (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Office, 1949). 175 barriers. However, the symbolic importance of Article 2 was overshadowed by the dramatic events in Korea in the 1950s, which also marked a significant watershed for
NATO and caused the rearmament of its member states. As a result, the NATO Alliance never materialized into a community that also fostered a transatlantic economic relationship. The Canadian article and its importance for the transatlantic relationship in
1949 were revisited after 1989 as an idea for shaping the transatlantic relationship in the new security environment and in order to bring greater security, cooperation, and friendship to Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, it gave NATO a new objective to pursue in the post-Cold War era and Canada helped to achieve building this new bridge. NATO
Secretary General Manfred Woerner argued that "the East is turning to the West for help, inspiration and expertise. We cannot sit passively on the sidelines and watch a human tragedy unfold. It is our humanitarian duty to help all peoples who aspire to our values."120
It was not a new bridge that Canada helped to build, but one it helped to maintain.
Canada's Minister for External Affairs said:
The primary Canadian bridge to Europe has long been our contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. That contribution has involved thousands of Canadian troops on the ground in Germany, troops whose lives have been out on the line daily in the defence of freedom. In a real sense, that contribution of Canadian lives can have no substitute and no parallel. That military contribution is however bound to change over time, as a product of the long-sought reduction of East-West tensions [...].
Thus, it was rather not surprising "that President Bush, at the news conference following his June 1990 summit in Washington with President Gorbachev, referred explicitly to the
"The Future of the Alliance," Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner at Istambul University, Istambul, 18 September 1989. 121 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 176
Canadian article and Lester Pearson's role in securing its adoption."122 The final communique of the London Summit in 1990 then spoke in similar terms and pointing out the importance of the transatlantic Alliance beyond its military dimension. The heads of state and government outlined their vision of a new NATO in the sense that "NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of
Europe."123 According to Ross, this was a call for Canadians to get involved and to help building a transatlantic security community through redistributive assistance.124 Canada's
Secretary of External Affairs, Barbara McDougall specified Canada's commitments in a speech given to the Universal Speaker's Group:
Many Canadians probably do not recognize the innovative nature and magnitude of our assistance efforts to date, nor the leadership we have shown to other Western countries in the rationale and mechanisms for our assistance. Canada has provided and is providing assistance to Eastern European worth about $4,5 billion through a creative mix of debt relief, balance of payments support, currency stabilization, commercial credits, technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and business incentives.125
In short, Canada answered that call and helped bring NATO on course to get actively involved in spreading its values of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law as opposed to focusing primarily on a passive defensive role. Thus, Canada actively helped to make
NATO a more political Alliance. Manfred Woerner praised the Alliance by saying: "The political role and function of NATO is increasing in importance. Something that was
122 Jockel, "Canada in a Twin-Pillared Alliance: The 'Dumbbell' May Just Have to Do," 18. 123 London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5-6 July 1990, Article 4. 124 Douglas Alan Ross, "Canada's Functional Isolationism," International Journal 54 (Winter 1998-99): 120. 125 Canada, NATO, and Eastern Europe: the challenge, Speech by the Secretary of External Affairs, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, to the Universal Speaker's Group, Toronto, April 16, 1992. 177 occasionally lost sight of during the Cold War is acknowledged again: NATO is a political Alliance, a community of the destines and values of the free world."126
However, let there be no doubt: Canada pursued these policies because it was in its national interest to do so and not because of altruistic values. In 1991, the government made very clear what those interests for Canada in a new Europe are: "the survival of the nation state as a distinct entity; the maintenance of democracy and freedom; economic prosperity; and the physical safety of Canadians."127 Helping CEE states to transform their governments, economies, and societies was not only good for peace and security in
CEE but also lucrative for Canadian businesses. As McDougall outlined: "Commercial credits...are a key element in our assistance because they induce and reward economic change, foster private sector relationships and have a number of multiplier effects - including the stimulation of direct trade with Canada..."128
These were interests that Canada had pursued in NATO since 1949, namely the desire for peace, prosperity, and democracy in Europe.129 This was a consistency of
Canadian foreign policy that was carried forward also by the Chretien government and its foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. For example, in 1997, he told his NATO colleagues:
As we review the lessons of history, I would like to recall the contributions of the former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, who 50 years ago asked for Article 2 to be incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty. The development of a broader identity for NATO is being reflected in our discussions on enlargement and in the enhanced
"Address to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung," Speech by NATO Secretary General, Manfred Woerner, Brussels, 7 July 1989. 127 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5 1991,4. 128 Canada, NATO, and Eastern Europe: the challenge, Speech but the Secretary of External Affairs, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, to the Universal Speaker's Group, Toronto, April 16 1992. 129 Calder, "Doing the Things That Matter: Canada and Euro-Atlantic Security," 702. 178
relationship we are forging with Russia and Ukraine, as well as with the Baltic states.130
The Russian Factor
The NATO Heads of State and Government also sought to reassure Russia and the evolving independent states of Central and Eastern Europe that NATO would not transform into an offensive Alliance and remain reactive. NATO could not become a concern to Russia: "We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force."131
NATO reached out to its former adversaries and showed an act of friendship by inviting those countries to establish permanent liaison offices at the NATO headquarters in
Brussels.132 Canada strongly supported this act of friendship. Joe Clark said:
It is also important that NATO become even more actively engaged in the dynamic security dialogue now emerging between East and West, a dialogue that involves NATO's members and NATO's interests, old adversaries and new friends. Here again, we welcome the decision of the London Summit to propose a joint declaration between the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), extending the hand of friendship. We also support the invitation to President Gorbachev to address the North Atlantic Council, and welcome the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison between NATO and the embassies of WTO member states in Brussels, including the briefing of these embassies after major NATO meetings (a Canadian initiative).133
In diplomatic circles this was seen as a remarkable gesture by the Alliance considering that it was the natural victor of the Cold War and could have fostered a military expansionist policy deep into CEE.134 In this way the two former adversaries were able to
Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February 1997. 131 London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5-6 July 1990, Article 5. 132 London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5-6 July 1990, Article 7. 133 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 13 Also confidential interview by author with Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, 9 May 2007. 179 establish a political relationship with one another and to get to know each other better by
sharing thoughts and deliberations about certain issues. NATO's collective action was consistent with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner's scheduled trip to Moscow on 13-17 July 1990, following the publication of the London declaration.135 This was a significant symbolic gesture that one of the most visible exponents of the Western
Alliance traveled to the capital of the former enemy and offered a hand of friendship. The symbolic meaning of this in international diplomacy cannot be underestimated.
Moreover, there appears to be no doubt that Woerner himself was a particularly dynamic secretary general who played a significant role in transforming the organization.136 He advanced to become one of the most successful Secretary Generals NATO ever had137 and brought significant political experience to the job. Woerner was a Cold War warrior and had served as Germany's defence minister (1982-88), and had been a member of the
German Bundestag from 1965 until he became NATO Secretary General in 1988.
Because of these experiences, he was a well-connected politician who had acquired respect in capitals in Europe as well as on the other side of the Atlantic. This close relationship with the United States helped Woerner in his tenure as Secretary General, because it would reduce tensions and suspicions among allies. He was a bridge builder among the allies.138
The Secretary general visited Moscow at the invitation of Russia's Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. 136 Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," 24. 137 Confidential Interview with NATO Official at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, 24 May 2007. For an excellent comparison of NATO Secretary Generals see Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War. 138 Confidential Interview with NATO Official at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, 24 May 2007. 180
The request for a transformation of NATO's armed forces
As indicated above, the London summit put NATO on a new course of action and demanded a comprehensive transformation of the Alliance, politically and militarily.
Special emphasis was put on the notion of creating rapid response capabilities for NATO.
The call was directed towards a force structure that would be much smaller, its soldiers highly flexible and mobile, and deployed in a multinational environment.139 This plan was refined in 1991 at a meeting of NATO's defence ministers in Brussels. Envisioned were a multinational corps composed of five divisions from NATO members and stationed in Germany. They would serve under British command while the United States would provide the tactical airlift capabilities for the troops. It was planned to have 5,000 troops to be able to respond to a crisis situation within 72 hours. As part of NATO's rapid reaction forces, a Rapid Reaction Corp for Allied Command Europe was established under the leadership of the United Kingdom supported by a multinational headquarter.
Thus, the new force structures reflected the characteristics of more flexible, mobile, and multinational forces while maintaining a lower collective defence posture.140 This concept of NATO's new force structure was institutionalized in the Combined Joint Task
Force Concept (CJTF).141
London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5-6 July 1990, Article 14. 140 This included a lower readiness of NATO's forces as well as a reduction of up to 80% of NATO's nuclear forces. The CJTF concept will be explained in greater detail in the next chapter. 181
NATO, the evolution of the European Union and Canada in the early 1990s
NATO's move in 1990 to go beyond the traditional collective defence guarantees was consistent with developments of the European Union.'42 Until the end of the Cold War there was a division of labour on the European continent: the European Community (EC) would foster their economic and cultural integration process whereas NATO would provide security for the European continent. As such, NATO reduced the burden for
European nation states of investing in their territorial defence capabilities. This division of labour ended with the end of the Cold War and encouraged proposals for much greater internal European cooperation in the area of security affairs inside the EC. Title V of the
1991 Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty on the European Union, established a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the Union. The CFSP became the second pillar of the European Union.143 By signing the Maastricht Treaty, European member states not only fostered the economic integration process of the EC,144 it also gave them the tools to act politically and be represented in international councils and committees such as the
OSCE, the UN, and others.145 This was made possible through CFSP. In a sense, CFSP
When speaking of the European Union reference is made to the political-institutional setting as opposed to a geographical union. 143 The first pillar creates an internal EU market, a joint agricultural policy, environmental policy, economic and monetary union, and a customs union. The third pillar includes cooperation in the field of home and justice affairs. 144 The European Community (EC) was originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signatories of the Treaty of Rome. The EC changed its name with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 145 It is being recognized that the EU does not formally possess a seat at the United Nations as an international organization. Common diplomatic practice, however, is that most EU member states try to find a common position on a specific policy issue before it is being brought before the committees. See for example Heliskorski, J., The "Duty of Cooperation' Between the European Community and Its Member States Within the World Trade Organization," Finnish Yearbook if International Law 1 (1996), 59; Kuijper, P.J., "The European Communities and Arbitration," in: A.H.A. Soons (ed.), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects, 1989, 181; Marchiso, S., "EU's Membership in International Organizations," in: E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, 2002, 231; Rosas, A., "The European Union and International Dispute Settlement," in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano, Ruth Mackenzie (eds.), International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects, 2002, 49; Sack, J., "The European Community's Membership of International 182 was meant to provide the answer to Henry Kissinger's famous question of "Whom should
I call when I want to talk to Europe?" It was, however, a schizophrenic landscape because despite the political commitments to CFSP, the EU lacked real military capabilities to carry out any significant operations. The objective of the CFSP was that member states were to "inform and consult with one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively.. ,"146
The Maastricht Treaty also incorporated the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU The treaty also included sections about the conduct of the EU's external relations, particularly all questions related to European security and defence. These developments of more autonomous147 European capabilities strengthened the evolving role of the EU as an international security actor. Canada was aware of these evolutions and Europe's new ambitions in the world as well as the implications for Canada.148 In 1990, the internal government security task force concluded that "relaxation of tensions in Europe and the emergence of viable and exclusive European institutions will tend to marginalize the influence of non-Europeans in Europe. This occurs at a time when Canada must cope with an impression in Europe subsequent to the FTA [the Free Trade Agreement reached with the United States] that we are concentrating primarily on a North American
Organizations," Common Market Law Review 32 (1995), 1227; Schermers, H.G., "International Organizations as Members of Other International Organizations," in: R. Bernhardt et al. (eds.), Volkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift fur Hermann Mosler, 1983,823. 146 Title V, Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht 7 February 1992. 147 Autonomous understood here in the sense that they are more independent from NATO. 148 For an extensive review and analysis of the Canada-EU relationship see Evan H. Potter, Transatlantic Partners: Canadian Approaches to the European Union (Montreal: Published for Carleton University Press by McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999). 183 agenda." Ottawa realized that it needed to remain committed to NATO in order to retain an influential voice in European security matters and that it needed to develop a more proactive with an evolving European Union.150 Internal government documents show that Canada had quite a realistic view of its role in the transatlantic Alliance and its relationship vis-a-vis the evolving European Union:
We cannot expect to build our future security relations with Europe on "credits" earned by our participation in NATO over the last forty years. Nor can we assume a significant role for Canada on the basis of a sentiment that Canada is a "European" nation. We are a North American nation and therein lies our specific value to European security.151
But for Canada, the access gate to Europe was through NATO and not bilaterally with the
EU for at least three reasons: first, Canada was and never was a European country in the sense that it is not located geographically on the European continent. Second, Canada had enjoyed a long-term relationship with NATO and thus it was premature to exchange this relationship for a new one. Third, Canada was not asked, nor was it hinted at by EU policy makers, that Canada should apply for EU membership. Taken together, there was no option for Canadians to join the evolving European Union152 and therefore the government was committed to foster an institutionalization of the Canada-EU relationship.153 The issue of NATO transformation was seen by Canada as a way to achieve those ends and, as a side product, the government gained international
149 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Europe and Canadian Security, 2. 150 Paul Buteux, "Canada and Europe: The Implications of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union," in Between Actor and Presence: The European Union and the Future for the Transatlantic Relationship, ed. George A. MacLean (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2001), 115-16. 15 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 26. 152 Having said this, there are voices being heard that Canada should indeed join the EU See for example Timothy Garton Ash, "Why Canada should join the EU", Globe and Mail, Toronto 29 June 2006. 153 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 26. 184
recognition for helping to transform the Alliance and as such to have contributed to the
effectiveness of it.154
In June of 1992, the WEU was tasked by the EU to develop a new concept for
future European forces, stressing that the sole responsibility for defence would remain
with NATO. The transformation process of European military forces should focus on
force projection and the management of far-off crises. The WEU developed the so-called
Petersberg Tasks that marked the first recognition of a new strategic environment in
Europe after the end of the Cold War and became the core of European Security and
Defence Policy.155 The Petersberg Tasks include conflict prevention mechanisms, humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management missions, peacekeeping tasks as well
as active combat tasks such as peacemaking.156 In short, the Petersberg Tasks were an
attempt to define what, when, and how Europe's forces should be used for. In some
countries, this step towards more autonomous European forces was not very well received, especially in the United States.157 Washington very much objected to more
autonomous European capabilities, but laid out some general principles under which the
United States was willing to allow greater EU autonomy. In 1998 then Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, defined the conditions for European autonomy inside NATO more
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991, Article 2. 155 Currently, the European Union receives its authority to deploy forces abroad from the Treaty of the European Union, Article 17.2, which says: "Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." The terms peacemaking and humanitarian are taken from the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. See Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union, Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992. 156 However, the Europeans misleadingly use the term peacemaking instead of peace-enforcement, a term that the UN, NATO, and other countries commonly use. See for example Martin Ortega, Petersberg Tasks, and missions for the EU military forces (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2005), available at llllp :/Mw wjsji, ejt TO ^ 157 Madeleine Korbel Albright, "The Right Balance Will Secure Nato's Future," Financial Times 07.12.1998. For a greater discussion of the '3D's' see for example Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, 191. 185 closely by demanding three things: (1) no duplication of already existing NATO forces;
(2) no discrimination against non-EU but NATO members; (3) no decoupling from
NATO.158 The US proposed a solution that was centered on a compromise creating separable but not separate forces. This compromise allowed the WEU to act independently while using NATO military assets and was later formalized in the Berlin
Plus agreement. However, support for greater autonomy inside NATO came from former
NATO Secretary General Lloyd Robertson. Robertson responded to Albright's "3Ds" by outlining his own principles under which NATO should co-operate with the EU He called them the three "I's" - indivisibility, inclusiveness, and improvement.159 He argued that transatlantic security is paramount for both continents (indivisibility) while all those
NATO states that are not members of the EU should be included in future EU military operations (inclusiveness). Also, additional capabilities were to be provided by the EU member states for such operations (improvement). Robertson argued that if these three principles were lived up to NATO would have no reason to fear ESDP; indeed, it should encourage it.160
Analysts from across the Atlantic in North America voiced their uneasiness about these new developments in Europe. They feared that it could force Europe into isolation and thus would make it more protectionist.161 Canada and the United States made clear
Albright, "The Right Balance Will Secure Nato's Future." 159 George Robertson, "Die NATO Und Die EU: Partner Oder Rivalen?" in Europaeische Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitik. Der Weg Zu Integrierten Europaeischen Streitkraeften, " ed. Werner Hoyer and Gerd F. L.Kaldrack (Badan-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002). 160 Ibid., 189. 161 Jockel, "Canada in a Twin-Pillared Alliance: The 'Dumbbell' May Just Have to Do," 12. For the side advocating less European autonomy see for example Graham T. Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, 1 st ed ed. (New York: Norton, 1992); Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War; Gordon, Nato 's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70 (1990/1991); Michael Mastanduno, 186 that their governments would not support a protectionist European Union and insisted on openness, transparency of EU security affairs. Their joint geopolitical interest in Europe was to keep an open international trading system that would allow opportunities for North
American businesses. Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, put it succinctly:
The new Europe must be an open Europe, open to the West and open to the East. Canada has particular interest in the evolution of an open, united Europe. Of course, we are not members of the European Community, but we are traders and we have a profound interest in the questions of foreign policy that are increasingly the subject of European Political Cooperation. It is for this reason that Canada has recently proposed a new phase in the institutionalization of Canada-EC political relations at all levels.162
Canada was aware that it would be left out of any agreement that the United States might sign unilaterally with the new European Union, in which case Canadian interests would be locked out of the transatlantic economic Alliance. "At the same time, the USA is apparently hedging its bets with regard to the future politico-security structure of Europe
"Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realis Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997); Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." For a selection of scholars arguing positively about the developments in Europe see for example Ronald D Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003); Asmus and Council on Foreign Relations, Opening Nato 's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era; Asmus, et al, "Building a New NATO."; Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1999); Joschka Fischer, "From Confederacy to Federation," in Speech given at the Humbolt University (Berlin, Germany: May 12, 2000); Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What Is NATO For?," Survival 43, no. 4 (2001-2002); G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Henry Kissinger, Charles Kupchan, and Council on Foreign Relations, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Task Force Report (New York, NY., Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2004); Charles Kupchan, Atlantic Security: Contending Visions (New York, NY..Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998); Charles Kupchan, "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective Survival," Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000); Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century, 1st ed. (New York: A. Knopf, 2002); Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged; William Wallace, "Europe: The Necessary Partner," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (2001). See also Phillip Borinski, "Europe and America: Between Drift and New Order," in Europe and America: Between Drift and New Order, ed. alton Frye and Werner Weidenfeld (Guetersloh: Bertelsman Foundation, 1993); Werner Weidenfeld, "The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship," in Europe and America: Between Drift and New Order, ed. alton Frye and Werner Weidenfeld (Guetersloh: Bertelsman Foundation, 1993). 162 Clark, "Canada's Stake in European Security." 187 by seeking a closer bilateral relationship with the EC, perhaps in treaty form."1 3 As a result, Canada had to be careful of not becoming the forgotten transatlantic ally and left out of a new transatlantic partnership. Canada responded by carefully making use of its own transatlantic bridge it had built in 1949 and walked over it again. Back then, the bridge was build to connect Canada with the European continent. This established and well-developed bridge became useful again and, to use in the metaphor, Canada walked over the bridge to reach Europe once again. It was much easier to do this time, because the bridge or, to use conventional terminology, the relationship between Canada and the
EU was already established. Joe Clark voiced Canada's alertness in a speech at Humber
College in Toronto: "It is not their prosperity which is at stake, it is ours. It is not their security, it is ours."164 This can be interpreted as Canada's response or counterpart to
James Baker's speech given in Berlin a few weeks earlier. Baker then said "we propose that the United States and the European Community work together to achieve a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links. [...] We will create a new Europe on the basis of a New Atlanticism."165 Clark proposed a new relationship between Canada and the European Union that would include regular bilateral meetings between the Secretary of External Affairs and the foreign minister of the country holding the Presidency of the European Union. His arguments were based on an internal government report, which stated that "Canada should also work on enhancing and institutionalizing bilateral ties with the EC (both the European Commission and the EPC
163 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy (IFBS), Europe and Canadian Security, p. 8. 164 Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 2-3. 165 See James A. Baker, "A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era," Address to the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, in US Department of State, Current Polity, no. 1233 (December 1989). 188
[the European Political Community] as well as with key Community member states
(FRG, France, Netherlands)."166 The danger was not so much that Canada would be excluded from the transatlantic trade regime altogether. In reality, however, there was never a serious threat that Canadian ambitions for a renewed relationship with the EU would be rejected. The danger, however, was that Canada might be overlooked in light of the United States who is not only the more powerful country of the two but also guarantees the physical security for the European continent: "Like the United States,
Canada wanted to strike a deal with the new Europe."167 In this sense, Canadian and
American responses to the developments in Europe in 1991 were somewhat similar.
CEE states were also aware of and attracted by the developments in the European
Union. They perceived the transformation of the European Union parallel to those transformation processes in NATO. In other words, they did not perceive the division of labour between the EU and NATO as much as Western countries did and saw a possible
EU membership as a ticket for future NATO membership and vice versa. In fact, by studying and comparing the enlargement procedures of the EU and NATO it becomes apparent that the criteria for accession to the EU are much more comprehensive than are those of NATO. The EU requires more comprehensive domestic reforms of more than one policy area. Accordingly, the obstacles for membership for the EU are much higher and much more far-reaching than those of NATO. Thus, the logical conclusion for applicants in both organizations was that if accepted in one of the institutions, either
NATO or the EU, it would increase their chances of becoming a member of the other one. As one Polish analyst puts it:
166 Task Force on Canadian Security Policy, Europe and Canadian Security, p. 10. 167 Jockel, "Canada in a Twin-Pillared Alliance: The 'Dumbbell' May Just Have to Do," 13. 189
In our view, NATO goes together with the European Union. It is not directly linked, but it is very much connected. It helps to broaden social, cultural, economic and societal development and there is a link to the West through the military institutions. It is a complete set. It will help us to bring more investment to Poland, and will permit us more technological cooperation, openness of society, and competitiveness of people of different professions and walks of life, and that will help us to accelerate our economic and social progress.168
This statement clearly indicated two things: first, it is indirectly acknowledged that the
Western allies were the victors of the Cold War and acted accordingly with their new partners to the East. Second, the Alliance, as an entity and in its efforts to reach out to
CEE, worked under the assumption that Central and Eastern Europe was impoverished and underdeveloped in comparison to the West,169 It marked the end of the old Europe.
As one analyst put it, "both old Europe and old NATO are now dead."170
Rome Summit 1991
The Rome Summit in 1991 was the natural successor of the London summit of 1990 where the heads of state and government had decided to overcome the political division of Europe and to start an outreach process. As part of this vision for new NATO was the decision to adopt a new strategic concept. The Rome Summit then formalized such a transformation and adopted a new strategic concept for the Alliance. Its aim was to
1 71
"transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in Europe." It was formally recognized that the Soviet Union does not pose a threat to the NATO
168 Andrej Karkoszka, "Canada, Poland, and NATO Enlargement," in Canada, Poland and NATO Enlargement, ed. Jim Hanson and Susan McNish (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), 5. 169 For a greater discussion of these assumptions see Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision." 170 Ibid.: 695. 171 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8l Nov. 1991, Preface. 190
Alliance any more than it did during the Cold War; indeed the threat has become a risk - multifaceted and multidirectional actually.172
The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been reduced substantially, and minimum allied warning time has increased accordingly.
Instead, new threats are facing the NATO allies, including Canada. Among those new threats are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of ethnic conflicts, failed and failing states, terrorist movements, and political extremism. Old and former adversaries themselves have started a process of transforming their societies into democracies and "rejected ideological hostility to the West."173 These ideological conflicts were the main causes that led to the birth of NATO.
As it has been argued in Chapter 2 that this change in the international environment required a broader approach to security:174 "It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension."175 The
NATO Alliance paid tribute to these changes by increasing its dialogue and co-operation with former Warsaw Pact countries through various programs and institutions.176 In addition and as part of the outreach posture, the Alliance invited those countries that were
Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," 25. !73 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991, Article 1 and 21. 174 See for example Barry Buzan and Ole Wsever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998). 175 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991, Article 24. 176 For the most detailed account of this period see Asmus and Council on Foreign Relations, Opening Nato 's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, Book II. 191 seeking membership in the organization to send liaison officers to NATO headquarters in order to start a rapprochement process between the former adversaries. The objective of these functional initiatives, which later provided the basis for the enlargement process, was to familiarize one another with mutual habits and procedures. The process of reaching out did not mean that NATO and the aspirant CEE necessarily agreed on every issue or policy. Indeed, the process of harmonization was difficult and spiked with many roadblocks on the way. The chief objective, however, was to achieve mutual understanding of respective security concerns to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs. Militarily, NATO states sought to increase their arms control agreements with CEE states in order to bring more peace and security to the region and to provide the West with guarantees of process on the demilitarization issue. As part of this process of increasing transparency, the military helped to overcome the divisions of the
West and East by intensifying military contacts in each other's institutions and thus achieve greater military transparency and mutual trust.
However, the security of NATO allies remained indivisible: The Heads of State and Government were firm in their commitment to NATO's collective defense clause.
The main objective of the Alliance continued to be to ensure the territorial integrity of its member states. At the same time, while strongly committed to Article 5 and the use of nuclear forces as a deterrent, the Alliance was committed to help transform the former
Warsaw Pact countries. Nonetheless, the immediacy of nuclear weapons was reduced as well as the level of conventional forces deployed in Europe. However, according to the
George H. W. Bush administration, this transformation was only achievable if the West remained strong, by which Bush meant to remain capable of invoking Article 5 missions. 192
President Bush said that it "can only be pursued from a position of American strength and with patience and creativity."177 For example, in 1989, the Soviet Union still committed
15-17% of its GNP to weapons that were largely fielded against NATO countries.178 This
American policy was endorsed by the NATO Alliance. This, in return, however, required capable forces to defend all member states of the Alliance by using political as well as military means. There was an awareness, particularly in the US defence community, that the United States now was the sole global hegemon. As Charles Krauthammer put it succinctly with his unipolar moment thesis:
Our rebuilding of American military strength has served as an essential underpinning to our past success. We must preserve that strength as the underpinning for our future efforts. [...] It would be reckless to dismantle our military strength and the policies that we have helped make the world less dangerous, and foolish to assume that all dangers have disappeared or that any apparent diminution is irreversible.179
NATO's new strategic thinking corresponded well with the changes taking place in Canada's foreign and defence policies. Canada perceived instability in the world as one of the main threats of the new security environment. The government was also aware of the inherent risks of opening up NATO and reaching out to NATO's, and thus
Canada's, former adversaries. As a government report noted on 5 April 1991:
Ethnic clashes, independence movements, and a wretched economy are testing Soviet reforms and providing a measure of legitimacy to reactionary forces that have supported, on one hand, a return to Communist Party orthodoxy, and on the other, xenophobic chauvinism. The situation is fluid and worrying. Such unrest always threatens to spill over outside the borders of the Soviet Union. In Central Europe, old antagonisms based on nationalism and authoritarian traditions again threaten the peace.
177 The White House, National Security Directive 23, September 22, 1989. 178 "Address given at the 35th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly", Speech given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Rome, 9 October 1989. 179 The White House, National Security Review 12, Washington, March 3, 1989 (declassified 7-16-1998). 193
The prevention of similar events in the future has to be a basic priority of the Government [the Canadian government].180
This is consistent with what the allies had agreed upon at the London Summit, to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence. This included a modification of the strategy of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. It also demonstrated the defensive nature of the
Alliance to CEE and Russia in particular. The assumption was not only that instability was a great source of future conflict but also that the end of the Cold War has not eradicated the need for security organizations in general, as the conflicts in the Balkans demonstrated.
The London and Rome summit also reaffirmed the second characteristic nature of the Alliance. Even after the end of the Cold War, NATO continued to embody a transatlantic link by which the security of Europe is permanently linked and tied to North
America. This means that the new NATO continued to emphasize transatlantic solidarity also as a prerequisite for the safeguard of NATO's values and principles. As noted above, throughout its history, NATO has provided a collective defence mechanism by which it defends any member state against external aggression on the principal that an attack on one is considered an attack on all. However, in order to do so, the Alliance required standing military forces. On the strategic level, in order to ensure its collective defence capabilities, the Alliance created an integrated military structure and standardized its equipment, doctrines, and other military procedures.181 The long-term objective of these agreements was to increase interoperability among NATO member states. Key features
180 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5 1991, 1. 181 NATO's Standardization Agreements (STANAG) or Allied Joint Publications (AJP), and Allied Tactical Publications (ATP) are probably the most important allied publications to name. 194 include collective force planning, common operational planning, multinational formations, the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis, crisis management and reinforcement arrangements, and joint and combined exercises. These were some of the principles that characterized NATO during the Cold
War and NATO continued to rely on those principles in the post-Cold War and particularly applied them in its outreach programs
Canada and NATO's new strategic concept
NATO's transformation and new role in issues of European security posed significant challenges for Canada. The disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union coupled with the emergence of a strengthened E.C. (with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 it became the
European Union) forced Canadian foreign policy makers and Canadians at large to face the fundamental question of what priority and importance NATO should be given in the future. In other words, how many resources should the government devote to the defence of Europe in times of diminished threat levels and the demand of the Canadian public to cash in the peace dividend? The non-military aspects of the NATO Alliance were always of concern for Canadian foreign and policy makers. Since the birth of NATO, Canada has always seen the political dimension of the Alliance as important as its military commitments. In 1949 Canada urged its allies to expand the NATO's military commitments to include political and well as economic provisions.182
As a result of this history, Canada was able to champion the transformation in
Central and Eastern Europe as much as it favoured and fostered NATO's outreach programs. Canada advocated that NATO's Western values and principles be exported to
182 As explained in the previous section, Canada was able to secure references being made to this in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, which is also known as the Canadian article. 195
Central and Eastern Europe. In this sense, Canada sold NATO at home as an Alliance for democracy and freedom in Europe. Prime Minister Mulroney showed strong Canadian support for this notion while speaking at a Convocation ceremony at Stanford University on 29 September 1991:
The burden of building a new world order is too great to be borne by any one country, even a country as powerful and principled as the United States of America; it's a burden that must be shared by all industrialized nations, and I tell you today, Canada will fulfill every single one of its obligations.183
This approach responded to Canada's domestic demands. Canadians were reluctant to accept high military commitments to a unified and peaceful continent. In this sense, Article 2 was the means to achieve peaceful ends in Central and Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, the Canadian government used the North Atlantic Council to push its allies for the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the first step towards an institutionalized relationship with CEE states without officially offering them protection under NATO's Article 5 defence posture. They were considered as being "friends of
NATO," not allies and thus a defence guarantee did not apply. The German Foreign
Minister Genscher and its American counterpart, James Baker, answered this call. Indeed, the United States appeared to be the keenest NATO member supporting the enlargement process.184 In a speech made in Berlin, US Secretary of State James A. Baker argued that
as Europe changes, the instruments for Western cooperation must adapt. Working together, we must design and gradually put into place a new architecture for a new era [...] the architecture should reflect that
Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation, Stanford University, California, USA, September 29, 1991. 184 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance -1995/96 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1995), 33. 196
America's security - politically, militarily, and economically - remains linked to Europe's security.185
In short, Baker suggested that the US and the EC form a new institutional relationship.
Baker was one of the first thinkers of interlocking institutions in Europe and the speech took place at a time when European security institutions were faced with transformation processes in the context of political and military adjustments. In addition, the institutions had to find ways to accommodate the new states from CEE.
Canada's decision to cut its defence budget and its subsequent troop withdrawal from Germany was consistent with NATO's new strategic concept that the Alliance ratified during the NATO summit in London between 5-6th July 1990. The Summit set a new course for the Alliance and recognized that the political division of Europe and military confrontations of the Cold War were overcome and new answers to be found. As one official NATO document clearly states: "We agree that a continued improvement in the security environment should permit reductions in the defence burden for most countries."186 The new security environment required interlocking institutions - a broad cooperation of all security organizations in Europe - rather than one single institution.
Canada was very much in support of NATO's new course of action and worked actively in NATO to this end.187
See James A. Baker, "A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era," Address to the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, in US Department of State, Current Polity, no. 1233 (December 1989). 186 Final Communique of the Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, Article 10. 187 McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally?, 2. 197
National security versus economic security
By the late 1980s, realists argued that the communist ideology in CEE had failed and that the USSR was burdened financially and politically by the inefficiencies of communism and excessive military spending.188 Indeed, Russia's economic power and technology declined to the point where competition with the West was unfeasible. Hence, Western principles of democracy and liberal market economies prevailed over a communist planned economy.
Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev who became the youngest serving
General Secretary of the Communist Party on 11 March 1985,189 the USSR determined that in order to overcome internal stagnation, it had to reform its political institutions, the military, and its economy. With the visions of perestroika and glasnost Gorbachev introduced a liberalization of Russia's political and economic system and a restructuring of Russian society. Also, in contrast to his predecessors, his policies were less confrontational towards the West. At the same time, his aim was not to end communism but to make it work better. The government also cut back its military defence spending and stopped its expansionist foreign and defence policy of attempting to increase Russia's territorial spheres of influence:
There was a strong correlation between economic development and stable democracy. This relationship continues to be true today: most of those countries that experienced democratic upheavals evolved in the past couple of generations from primarily agricultural societies to modern industrial ones with high levels of urbanization, labour mobility, education, and the like.190
See for example Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War." 189 By the time Gorbachev too up this position he was 54 years of age. He was also twenty years younger than the American President Ronald Reagan. 190 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, Toronto, New York: Free Press, Maxwell Macmillan Canada 1992), 83-84. 198
Francis Fukuyama argued in 1989 that what the world was seeing was the "end of history."191 Fukuyama's thesis was that the end of the bipolar confrontation brought and end to the ideological struggle of the two superpowers and left liberal democratic values and economic liberalism as the accepted principles of governance.
It was in this liberal democratic environment that the NATO summits took place in 1991 and 1992. This new liberal atmosphere was also in the interest of Canada: it enhanced the possibility for Canadian businesses to gain access to new markets and reduced security risks in CEE. Indeed, Canada unilaterally decided to reduce its military commitments and deployments to Europe and allowed the troops to come back home.
Liberal internationalism was consistent with Canada's domestic priority list and the changes of Canadian foreign and defence policy, which were transformed into an international economic policy. Canada's first and foremost national interest was to get its economic house back in order again and to pursue that national interest as the top foreign policy priority. As such, the decision to withdraw the troops from Germany was a consistent policy aimed at trying to defend Canada's economic interests in light of fiscal constraints at home. This, however, did not imply that the government withdrew from
Canada's international responsibilities. Indeed, Ottawa was aware of its responsibility to continue to exercise influence on multilateral security issues as well as to operate in multilateral security operations. As such, Canada continued to contribute to such operations through the UN and the NATO framework. This assured policy makers in
Brussels that NATO's integrated command structures, its common procedures, and doctrine would be available in case of a crisis.
191 Ibid. 199
Reality check for Canada: Odd man out? -A conclusion
Shortly after Canada's defence cuts were made public it became apparent that this decision was more a political statement than reality. NATO remained the primary transatlantic institution for consultation and military readiness. As the government stated in 1991:
The military role for NATO will remain but is being adapted. NATO will move to leaner and much lower, less threatening, force levels. It will have to gear its military readiness, its equipment and forces, and its strategy to different responsibilities that are still not clearly defined. If NATO is to maintain public support, policies like forward defence will have to be replaced by more unambiguous non-threatening defence doctrines.192
In 1991, Canada cut its forces in Germany but remained committed to NATO. The CF retained its expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18 fighter jets, and an air defence battery to Europe.193 Canadians also continued to serve as part of the NATO
Airborne Early Warning force (AEW), which was based in Geilenkirchen, Germany.194
The NATO Airborne Early Warning Force Command was created in January 1980 with a headquarters co-located with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
Belgium. Integrated multinational crews flew the NATO E-3A aircraft from 13 NATO member nations.195 Canada was one of the countries that sent officers from all three services. Canadian naval units, such as its destroyers and frigates, remained ready to be dispatched to NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic. At the same time, eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three submarines as well as fourteen long-range
Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5, 1991, 28. Simpson, NA TO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, 11. 194 In 1999, the Force officially changed its name to the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force to better reflect the evolving capabilities and roles of the NATO E-3A fleet. 195 These countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United States. 200 patrol aircraft, and twenty- five Sea Kings were committed to patrol the North Atlantic as part of NATO's augmentation force.
In addition to sending troops, the government was also diplomatically engaged and lobbied its NATO allies to work towards a change of NATO's strategies and doctrines that would reflect the changes of the post-Cold War environment and demonstrate that NATO had become more of a political organization.196 The point here is that maintaining a Canadian military was useful to NATO. Ottawa sent its forces when it could and engaged diplomatically and continued to support and pay for NATO's infrastructure budget. This can be considered a significant contribution and will be examined in closer detail in the last chapter.
Finally, the government renewed a ten-year contract between Canada and the
Federal Republic of Germany that allowed about 6.000 German troops to train on
Canadian bases at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Shilo (Manitoba) and CFB Goose Bay
(Newfoundland).197 CFB Goose Bay continued to function as a training site for NATO's tactical flight training. It is home of permanent detachments of the German Luftwaffe, the
Italian Aeronautica Militare, and occasionally from the Royal British Air Force, as well as the Royal Netherlands Air Force. In addition to its NATO function, the base also remained a forward operating base for Canada's CF-18 fighter jets.
Despite Canada's sudden pull back from Europe and the diplomatic mishandling of informing its allies about the decision to bring the troops home, the decision to do so was consistent with NATO's policy. Other NATO member countries also cashed in the
196 Government of Canada, Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy For Canada, April 5 1991, 26. 197 See for example Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy., Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future - the Position Papers (Ottawa: The Committee, 1994), 21. See also Alex Morrison, A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992), 49. 201 peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, and reduced the size of their troops in
Europe and cut their domestic defence expenditures. The reduction of the troops went hand-in-hand with a restructuring program for their armed forces. The Cold War militaries were structured and trained for the defence of national territories while anticipating a high-intensity European land war. These strategic missions for the military required large scale and conscript-based force structures in order to have sufficient numbers of troops ready in case of a conventional attack from the East. It simply became highly unlikely in a post-Cold War environment where crisis management and peace support operations were becoming high in demand. Thus, it was the natural decision of
Canada and its allies to reduce their militaries. According to a NATO Parliamentary
Report, by 1999 the United States had reduced its forwardly deployed forces in Europe from 325,000 to about 100,000 troops while European members of the Alliance reduced them by more than 500,000 in total.198 This accounted for 30-40% reductions of troops of all three services in the NATO Alliance. Indeed, what the United States experienced was the "Canadianization of American policy."199 However, in light of the new realities in
Europe, Canada retained a level of defence spending in Europe that was at necessary levels to keep a seat at the table and to remain a committed and capable ally.
See for example NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001, Article 4. 199 This argument that America's European policy has become much like that of Canada has first been made by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, in an address to the CD. Howe Institute in September 1990. See Carol Goar, "Making Sense of Tory Foreign Policy," Toronto Star, 20 September 1990. 202
CHAPTER 5
CANADA IN SHARING THE POLITICAL BURDEN
Introduction
After having examined Canada's role in European security in the immediate post-Cold
War environment in the previous chapter, this chapter will examine the political and diplomatic burden of the NATO Alliance that Canada shouldered during the 1990s as well as the resources that allowed Ottawa to do so. More specifically, this chapter will examine the Canadian role in NATO's outreach programs such as the Partnership for
Peace Program (PfP) as well as its ambitions for NATO's first round of enlargement in
1999.
Canada and the Central Eastern European region in 1990s
In 1989, Canada was as much surprised about the changes in international affairs, as were other countries. The Mulroney government, however, quickly realized the conflict potential of those historic events. It was concerned about the future and instability of
Russia and its large military arsenal, including its large stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Canada's foreign and defence policy elite was also concerned about countries from the former Warsaw Pact that gained new independence. Strategically, they were located in between the old Soviet Union and Western Europe. With the turmoil in CEE, however, the former Warsaw Pact countries functioned as the new buffer against the Soviet Union.
The greatest danger to Canada was a re-nationalization of European societies, which then had the potential of renewing tensions and conflicts in Europe.1 This geopolitical setting
1 Karkoszka, "Canada, Poland, and NATO Enlargement," 2. 203 would very much look alike the one before the First World War when no common sets of rules, norms, and consultative mechanisms were in place to ensure international order.
Two options lay on the table for states from CEE: on the one hand, they could form a new buffer zone between the West and Russia, or they could become an integral member of the Western Alliance. When the United States made the political decision to expand the Western Alliance,2 Canada did not oppose and joined in the decision. Indeed,
Canada was pushing for a far larger first round of enlargement and wanted to include
Slovenia and Macedonia in the first round also.3 Prime Minister Chretien voiced this call for a wider enlargement at the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997 and thus put Canada at the top of the enlargement debate.4 Canadian officials also believed that the Alliance must make it very clear in Madrid that the first wave of enlargement was not the last one.5 Meanwhile, Ottawa pushed its allies to consult with Russia on the question of enlargement and that Moscow should be included in this process through, for example, the Partnership for Peace agreement.
It was clear that the end of the Cold War shifted the meaning of Central Europe.
During the Cold War, Germany was been seen as a Central European country. Now, after the end of the Cold War this perception changed and now Poland and the Czech Republic
2 Brent Scowcroft, "Whither the Atlantic Community" Issue Brief, (01-02), (Washington, DC: The Forum for International Policy, March 21, 2001). 3 Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997. 4 During the summit, Jean Chretien accused the United States for pursuing NATO enlargement for domestic purposes. An open microphone caught the Prime Minister saying: "It's not reasons of state. It's all done for short-term political reasons, to win elections. Take the quarrel over whether to admit the Baltic states. That has nothing to do with world security. It's because in Chicago, Mayor Daley controls lots of votes for the nomination." In reality, however, Chretien acted like Clinton and was equally concerned of domestic politics. See Moises Nairn, "Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Victim of Globalization," Foreign Policy (Winter 1997-98): 37. 5 Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997. 204 were considered Central European states. They are not only perceived by other countries as Central European states but, indeed, saw themselves as being in the middle of Europe and located in between Russia and Western Europe. In this sense, they functioned as a bridge between East and West. Canada realized this strategic perspective early on and helped building the NATO bridge. The Canadian government actively promoted the export of Western values such as democracy, the rule of law, transparency and so forth and thus actively prevented those countries from backsliding into greater instability.6
Ottawa was concerned that the region would become a security nightmare. By promoting the bridge building notion, Canada continued to have access to the defence planning of not only its old European allies but also those of its new allies in CEE. Thus, Canada continued to have a seat at the table, which allowed for privileged access to pivotal information related to a comprehensive list of security and defence issues of Central and
Eastern Europe. Ottawa was able to do so because it had considerable experience with building and maintaining bridges. Canada realized the importance of a bridge building capability for Central and Eastern European countries and was probably one of the few countries in the NATO Alliance to understand and appreciate the importance of such a function. As such, Canada helped to give NATO a new raison d'etat. This bridge building approach was also consistent with official NATO policy of reducing the importance of military forces and raised the awareness of the importance of soft power capabilities.7
NATO's new reason for being also had positive implications for the transatlantic relationship. It meant that the United States remained committed to NATO. As noted
6 This is also why Canada favoured a NATO enlargement before an EU expansion because a EU expansion was most likely to take a decade or longer due to the extensive requirements of the aqui communitaire, the large regulation framework of the European Union. 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Final Ministerial Communique." 205 above, one of functions of the Alliance was to "keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in." Transferring this raison d'etre to the post-Cold War then, it was noticed that the Russians were weak, Germany had become a key member of NATO, and so the only remaining objective, going back to Lord Ismay's strategic posture, was to keep the Americans in. This was applicable and true in the early years of the Cold War as much as it was true in the mid-1990s. Canada helped bridge this objective in NATO at times when there was great potential for the Alliance to fall into irrelevance.
Alternatively, Canada could have neglected or avoided the debate about NATO enlargement politically and probably would have risked complete marginalization amongst its allies on top of ruining its bilateral relationship with CEE.
As an integral element of the bridge building efforts, Canada lobbied its friends in other international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the
World Bank, to help set up support programs for the development of a democratic society in Russia and other states in Central and Eastern Europe.8 In other words, Canada helped export democracy, a free market economy, and the rule of law by using a functionalist approach of involving international organizations. Thus, it helped slowly surround Russia with democratic states with the hope in mind that they would then have a positive influence in the transformation of Russia. The policy elite in Ottawa assumed that Canada had an exceptional record of democratic modes of governance. It found encouragement in a report of the House of Commons, which said: "Our democratic society demonstrates daily that economic success is compatible with social justices."9 In this sense, Canada's promotion of democratic values to Central and Eastern Europe can be seen as a means to
8 Confidential Interview with Senior NATO Official, NATO headquarters, Brussels, 18 May 2007. Canada, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, 17. 206
an end, the end being a stable and less aggressive Russia. Simultaneously, Canada was in
favour of fostering the economic development of CEE states and Russia and helping to
integrate their economy into the globalized economic community. The strategy behind
those policies were engagement and enlargement: to foster economic engagement in the
hope that this would ultimately lead to an increased economic interdependence, which in
turn, would make conflicts between countries more costly.10 This strategy was in
Canada's national interests. Canada was searching for new opportunities abroad, which
could also function as a counterweight to the United States. Meanwhile, the level of
bilateral trade relationship with the US increased. It was made possible in part by the bilateral free trade agreements. Again, this protection of Canada's economic interests were consistent with fostering Canada's national economic interests while knowing that if not Canada nobody else would protect Ottawa's interests. Indeed, engagement and
enlargement were the predominant paradigms in international affairs and Canada's
foreign policy approach was consistent with those of its allies. In the United States, for
example, the Clinton administration pursued a foreign policy of enlargement in the first term and during the second term coupled it with the policy of engagement.11 It was
consistent with Canada's strategic thinking. This neoliberal theoretical framework
assumed that a network of economic relations would reduce nationalistic sentiments because its constituents were assumed to be better off. Thereby Canada contributed to a
See for example Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," Foreign Affairs 76 (September/ October 1997). 11 For a greater discussion of the US policy of engagement and enlargement see "From Containment to Enlargement: Current Foreign Policy Debates in Perspective," National Security Affairs Presidential Assistant Anthony Lake's speech at John Hopkins University, September 21, 1993 or Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Building Peace in the Middle East," address at Columbia University, September 20, 1993. US Department of State Dispatch, September 1993. A comprehensive account of President Clinton's foreign policy is provided in James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005). 207 diminution of Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe by not only supporting the admittance of those countries into the Western Alliance but also by reducing Russia's economic power and forward presence in the region.
It was in Canada's national interest to have a more stable European continent, prosperous and free from aggression and hostility. This objective was also easy to sell at home in Canada in times when Canadians wanted the government to cash in the peace dividend and reduce defence spending. Hence, the policy of enlargement was one of the cheaper options for Canadian foreign policy makers. Domestic polls indicated in 1995 that spending on the military was supported by 16% of Canadians whereas increased transfers of moneys to the provinces was supported by 73% of Canadians, followed by a strong support for youth employment measures (66%) and healthcare (64%).'" These statistics showed that for many Canadians the debate about NATO enlargement was largely irrelevant in their daily lives. What mattered to Canadians were the conflicts on the Balkans because that is where Canada's real commitments took place. The Balkans was far away from Canada, indeed, too far for most Canadians. They were not of their concern because the issues did not pose a direct threat to the Canadian homeland and the well being of Canadians This was the reason why the general population was uninterested in the issue of enlargement.
Instead, on the foreign policy side of things, the conflicts in the Balkans mandated primary attention of the public and the government. However, it can be argued that
Canada, indeed, did not only have a vital stake in the debate of NATO enlargement but also in the process of enlargement. The NATO Alliance was the only functioning and
12 Edward Greenspon, "How We'd Spend Our Federal Surplus," The Globe and Mail 14 February 1998. 208 effective multilateral Alliance of which Canada is a member.13 An enlarged NATO, in other words, was in Canada's national interest and answered well to its strategic position in the West.
First, many of Canada's major international allies such as Britain, France, and
Germany were European countries and geographically located in Europe. Canada had realized its European heritage that linked the North American country to the European continent. Canada's first settlers came from Europe and ever since then Canada was linked to Europe, and especially to Britain, historically, culturally and demographically.
Europe shaped Canada's self-determination as a political entity. Her mind was psychologically directed towards Europe.14 Europe was part of Canada's strategic perimeter and an economic interest area.
Canada was also a member of the Group of Eight (G8), a group of the eight largest economies in the world and whose Heads of State and Government meet annually.
This group of states had significant leverage in the global economy and accounted for more than 65% of its activity. Four of the eight countries are either European countries or permanent members of the UN Security Council. Hence, Canada had an interest in the stability and well being of Europe.15 In this sense, the NATO's allied councils provided
Canada with access to the world's most influential countries as well as a forum to express its views and opinions.
Second, an enlarged NATO would provide greater stability and security in
Europe. This was not a new political objective of the Alliance and indeed one that
13 Paul Buteux, "Sutherland Revisited: Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," Canadian Defence Quarterly 24 (September 1994). 14 Joseph Frankel, National Interest, Key Concepts in Political Science (New York: Praeger, 1970), 76-84. 15 The membership of the G8 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 209
Canada had supported throughout the Cold War. This strategic thinking did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and Canada continued to be aware of its dialectic security situation: on the one hand, Canada shares historical baggage with Europe and was a member in many international organizations headquartered in Europe (such as the OSCE,
NATO and others). At the same time, it also shared the North American continent with the United States and resulted in close cooperation in many policy areas, including security. This close relationship with the US had been institutionalized in many bilateral agreements. Thus, Canada's security was tied both to the United States and Europe, including NATO.16
During the Cold War the Alliance had assumed that politically weak and instable countries were vulnerable to the Soviet Union's political, military, and psychological influence.17 The Marshall Plan, the Truman doctrine, and NATO were designed to provide security, stability, and order in Europe. The principle of collective defence went hand in hand with the internal stability of the Alliance. NATO's Article 2 referred to cooperation in policy areas other than security. Canada had pushed its allies to include this article into the Washington Treaty because it saw the NATO Alliance not only as a military pact but one that would foster economic cooperation. After the Cold War,
NATO's values of political stability and security were as prominent in Europe and as they were in Canada. Hence, it was in Canada's national interest to contribute to them. In the post-1990 environment, NATO continued to provide security insurance for its allies with its collective defence Article 5. The Alliance has done so since 1949 and thus
NATO has prevented another global war that demanded large sacrifices of Canadians, as
16 Schmidt, "Historical Traditions and the Inevitability of European Ties," 84. 17 Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," InternationalJournal 50 (Autumn 1994-1995): 679. 210 did the previous two world wars. NATO has also provided Canada with a multilateral political forum where it had a seat at the table of one of the most prestigious decision making bodies. Canada has always seen NATO much more as a political organization than a military one. It wanted to see it as a community of states in the sense that Karl
Deutsch described in the late 1950s.18 This community shared similar values and principles of national security. Canada became a champion of Article 2 and an international actor. Canadian governments knew that its national security policy depended on a stable international environment. Hence, the priority of its foreign policy was to shape that environment. That was why Canada became a founding member of
NATO, was the third largest power of the Bretton Woods system, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Department of National Defence put it succinctly in 1967:
International Influence is not an end in itself, but a means of furthering Canada's national interests, both general and specific. The reasons for Canada's participation in NATO and North American defence are in this respect analogous to the reasons for Canada's participation in bodies such as the IMF, the GATT, and the International Agency for Atomic Energy.19
More generally speaking, Canada's membership in international institutions allowed
Canadians greater political flexibility and a degree of independence from the United
States that no other institution was able to provide. In turn, the membership also provided pivotal access to the United States. "Access to American leaders has always been an important by-product of paying one's dues in NATO. Such access was critical if and
Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. 19 Department of Defence Canada, "Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces," (Ottawa: July 1967). 211 when the world was moving towards major conventional warfare or possible nuclear exchange."20
Third, an enlarged NATO had geopolitical implications for the Alliance and thus
Canada. Enlargement not only strengthened NATO's overall military position in Europe by incorporating the militaries of its former adversaries. Thus, it pushed NATO's eastern border closer to Russia. As a result of these strategic moves, Russian influence was contained. This had several implications and advantages for Canadian policy makers. A deterred Russia would reduce the likelihood of Canadian military deployments to Europe.
It also reduced the levels of threat to the Canadian Forces and thus reduced the costs for keeping the troops on high alert. Hence, after 1989 the pledge made at NATO's birth to keep the Russian's out, was still applicable and continued to find support in Canada.
Fourth, an enlarged NATO supported the normative dimension of the Alliance by providing stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe. The new states of
NATO functioned as a buffer zone against intrastate conflict and social unrest. This was a principle that Canada had supported throughout NATO's history by emphasizing
NATO's Article 2. For Canada, NATO was a military organization as much as it was an allied political forum. Alan Sens argued: "Canada's post-Cold War position is that
NATO should be an instrument of stability and peacekeeping and should be adapted to suit the new prominence of these functions, while not forsaking the collective defence mission."21 The Canadian government recognized that the Cold War NATO Alliance had to evolve and pushed its allies for an enlarged NATO. Canada's Department of Foreign
20 Ross, "Canada and the Future or European Security: From a Cheap Ride to a Free Ride to No Ride at All?," 725. 21 Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," 697. 212
Affairs and International Trade argued: "To meet those challenges, Canada will press for an evolution in NATO's vocation and membership, while seeking to allay current
Russian concerns over NATO expansion."22 Thus, Canada was in favour of NATO enlargement also because it saw it as an opportunity to establish a more firm political relationship with Central and Eastern European countries while retaining access to
NATO's multilateral security discussions that may have relevance for Canada. It also gave Ottawa the opportunity to press hard for living up to NATO's article 2 and engage in the softer issues that the Alliance was faced with, such as monitoring human rights, and training peacekeepers.
Canada saw the difficulties and problems particularly with NATO's inability of predicting how Russia might perceive an enlarged NATO. At the same time, Canada made clear that "enlargement cannot be held hostage to negotiations with Russia."23
Canada was much in favour of approaching and negotiating with Russia, but at the same time, also to critically reflect their proposals for a new order in Europe.
Canada also had vital economic interests in Europe. These interests did not vanish with the end of the Cold War and remained vital for Canada. Canada sought an enhanced economic relationship with Europe, because it could instrumentalize it to counterbalance
American hegemony in North America. Thus, the issue of NATO enlargement was not solely a strategic issue but also an economic one. The United States was the most dominant actor in this process and thus NATO enlargement advanced to become an
American show. For example, in the wake of the NATO Washington Summit in 1999
22 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Government of Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement (Ottawa: Govt, of Canada, 1995). 23 Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997. 213
when the NATO allies vigorously debated about which states should accede to NATO
without finding a consensus, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright unilaterally
decided to announce that the United States was only willing to accept Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic as new members of the Alliance. At that point the decision was
made and only those countries were invited to join NATO and the US acted like the
hegemon of NATO.
Also, Canada bought into the assumption that prosperous and economically
healthy countries were less likely to go to war with one another.24 Here, NATO could
play a role model and export its values of liberal democratic and market economies.
Germany's foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, had argued that in addition to exporting
security to Central and Eastern European states, NATO should also build an economic bridge to those countries.25 This was only in Canada's interest to gain access to an
enlarged European market that would provide new opportunities for Canadian businesses.
This Canadian view was consistent with the view of the United States. Its Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, Jeffrey E. Garten, has argued that "we
need a new economic architecture across the Atlantic."26
Canada was a strong supporter for EU enlargement because a larger EU would
guarantee some economic prosperity in Eastern Europe by making use of the EU's
In the international relations literature this is often referred to as the 'democratic peace theory'. See for example Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1985); Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs - Part 1," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1985); Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); John M Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (1994); Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001). 25 Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," 694. 26 Cited in Ibid. 214 economic programs. This prosperity then would reduce the financial burden that Canada would have to shoulder because it is not a member of the European Union. Another issue also had an influence on Canada's position on an evolving EU and NATO. The domestic lobby of ethnic minorities living in Canada wanted their relatives to be free and prosperous, no matter how distant and far away they were from Canada. It was this emotional attachment of Canadian ethnic minority's European heritage that had affected
Canadian public policy and it did not negatively affect the federal government to listen to those concerns.
Thus, it was no surprise that Canada also became a strong supporter of NATO's institutions and programs that were about to change the political and military landscape in
Europe.
Canada and the Transformation of CEE
NATO was taken by surprise of the end of the Cold War as much as the larger international community. Nobody had assumed in the mid-1980s that the bipolar conflict between the two superpowers would end. The fall of the Berlin Wall removed the ideological and structural conditions that were the integral part of the superpower rivalry for more than four decades. John Lewis Gaddis referred to the competition of the two superpowers as the "long peace" that stabilized international politics.27 However, when the Russian President Michael Gorbachev started his new policies of Glasnost and
Perestroika, he put his country on a more open path with the West. NATO immediately responded to the changes taking place in CEE in 1990. The Alliance realized that it had a unique opportunity to reach out to former Warsaw Pact countries and to show them a
27 See for example Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War; Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History. 215
"hand of friendship." Meanwhile NATO politicians were well aware of the political and economic instability of the former Warsaw Pact countries. They also realized that the window of opportunity to influence positive changes might be small.29 Helmut Kohl, the
German chancellor at the time, put it bluntly in a phone conversation with President
George H.W. Bush describing the situation in one Eastern European country: "I will do all I can to support the new [Polish] government, especially in the economic area. With the EC, I intend to give assistance in human resources. This seems to be the problem, if I may put it bluntly: there is a lot of good will and many good ideas, but the Poles do not know how to put them into practice."30 In a bilateral meeting between Germany and
Poland, Kohl made clear that Poland ought to introduce a market-oriented economy. Kohl also lobbied his colleagues to provide homogeneous assistance.31 It was important for
Bonn, Washington, and also Canada that NATO would respond in a coherent way to an evolving Europe as opposed to individual NATO member states acting on a bilateral basis. When initial help arrived slowly, Kohl complained about the reluctance of other
NATO allies to provide assistance to CEE: "My feeling is that our Western friends and partners should be dong more. There is a difference between words and deeds."32 In another conversation with the American president, Kohl acknowledged the difficult situation Eastern Europe and Russia in particular were facing: "...The problems he
28 McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? , 4. 29 Confidential Interview with NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 24 May, 2007. 30 The White House, Memorandum 8520 of Telephone Conversation from Helmut Kohl to President Bush, Washington, October 23, 1989, The Bush Library. 3 See for example Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Von Konrad Adenauer Bis GerhardSchroeder (Ulm, Germany: Ullstein, 2003), 364-67, Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, 145-80. The most explicit analysis is provided in James Addison Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995), 231. 32 The White House, "Memorandum 8520 of Telephone Conversation from Helmut Kohl to President Bush," Washington, October 23, 1989, The Bush Library. 216
[Gorbachev] faces are enormous - nationalities, the food supply situation - and I do not see a light at the end of the tunnel yet."33
The peaceful unification of Europe and the question of enlarging the Alliance came just about at the right time for Canada. Canada made it undoubtedly clear that it was a strong supporter of NATO enlargement. In the words of its Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada is entirely committed to the enlargement of the
Alliance" and the process should be sped up as soon as possible.34 Ottawa also supported the transformation of NATO because it knew that no other international organization - not the OSCE, or the EU, or the WEU and others - have made a difference in preventing or enforcing peace and order, particularly in the Balkans. As such, Canada became a strong supporter for NATO's future, which is also an integral part of the overall transformation process of NATO.35
The end of the Cold War posed a new opportunity for the Alliance to export its values of peace and stability eastwards. With the publication of the London Declaration, as examined in detail in the previous chapter, the Heads of State and Government not only ordered the North Atlantic Alliance to undergo a transformation process, but also outlined proposals for developing cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Indeed, NATO acted forcefully: it told the Soviet Union that it would not perceive it as threats any more. It also invited Moscow and the successor states of the
Soviet Union to establish diplomatic liaison offices at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
33 The White House, "Memorandum 1180 of Telephone Conversation from Helmut Kohl to President Bush," Washington, February 13, 1990, The Bush Library. 34 Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997. 35 See for example NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001. 217
Because the scope and geopolitical significance of the transformation in CEE absorbed all attention, there was no mention of enlarging NATO. In fact, the issue of enlargement was put on the back burner. While the Alliance was preoccupied with bringing peace to the Balkans, European nation states demanded more autonomy inside
NATO (a phenomenon subsumed under the term European Security and Defence Identity
- ESDI). Also, strategically speaking, NATO appeared to be comfortable and effective with employing its strategy of deterrence and containment.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
At the November 1991 Rome Summit, the Heads of State and Government agreed on establishing the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). The NACC's primary goal was to give its members a platform to cope with security risks through transparency and consultation on political-military security matters. The NACC provided a forum to discuss civil-military relations, advancing military reform and conversion of the defence industry. The NACC was also the first institutional acknowledgement of a transformed
NATO from one that had the primary function of defending hard security interests and a territory to one that exported security against new risks.36
The NACC was the institutionalization of the loose partnership that NATO started to create in 1990s in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initially, NATO had invited liaison officers to set up a permanent office at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
The NACC gave this previous rather loose relationship a more permanent structural framework. It was the "first bridge NATO constructed over Europe's old divide."37
36 Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," 678. 37 US Department of State, Statement to North Atlantic Cooperation Council: Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher (Brussels, 96/12/11). 218
Canada was a strong supporter of the NACC. Canada's NATO ambassador was actively involved in lobbying Canada's allies to set up this institution and to provide assistance to CEE countries. On the political level in the North Atlantic Council, Canada lobbied its allies to make NATO facilities and knowledge available to member states of the former USSR.38 On 7 December 1991, for example, a Canadian Forces transport aircraft flew humanitarian supplies from Cologne in Germany to Moscow. While the aircraft was in the air, NATO ambassadors were assembled to discuss NATO's future relationship with Central and Eastern Europe. Only two weeks later, this new relationship was institutionalized and the NACC formed. It was given birth at its inaugural meeting on 20 December 1991.39 Almost at the same time, the former Soviet republics became members of the new Commonwealth of Independent States and entered a period of political and economic stress.
The NACC was created to allow and assist in a peaceful process transforming previous communist governments into liberal democracies and teach them how to live up to the principles of free market economy, the rule of law, and democratic political institutions. The objective of the NACC was to promote stability and security in Europe by providing a political forum for mutual exchange and debate. The Alliance noted: "We are determined to work towards a new, lasting order of peace in Europe."40 The NACC was there to provide transparency among all of its members by meeting bimonthly with
38 McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? , 1. 39 At the time the following countries were members of the NACC: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States as members of the NATO Alliance and Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Slav Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and one representative of the Soviet Union as countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 40 M-NACC-1(91)111 North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, Article 2. 219 liaison officers and to allow for a forum of political consultation and for facilitating talks about issues related to military defence planning, arms control, crisis management, civil- military relations, force structure and so forth.41 The NACC, however, did not restrict its discussions to defence and security issues but also conferred about economic, political, and social problems. Besides those rather positive elements, some analysts saw the
NACC with rather critical eyes. The NACC was to meet at least once a year in ministerial session with NATO's highest political committee, the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
The NACC was also scheduled to hold bi-monthly meetings of the NAC with liaison partners on the Ambassadorial level. In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) replaced the NACC. The NACC broke new grounds in many ways. However, it lacked the opportunity for each partner country to develop a more individual relationship with NATO. For this reason, the allies were propelled to a Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. This led some critics such as Jonathan Eyal, for example, who argued that the
NACC was only a gigantic talking shop similar to the OSCE and produced no real results or significant decisions.
Partnership for Peace Program (PfP)
The PfP program was announced by US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin in
Travemuende, Germany, in October 1993 and was formally accepted on 10 January 1994 during the NATO Brussels Summit. It was seen as a program in which NATO would provide practical answers to changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In reality, however, analysts have seen PfP critical and as a means of putting off the real decisions of how to
41 See for example NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001, Article 3. 42 Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 701. It is, however, difficult to reach a full and comprehensive judgement at this point in time without having access to the primary documentation, particularly those of CEE states. The documents still remain classified. 220 structure the enlargement process and who to invite for membership. In short, the PfP program was highly debated.
Nonetheless, its aim was described as helping to transform the societies and institutions of the PfP countries and to politically engage them.44 This meant an expansion and intensification of political and military cooperation throughout Europe and along allies. It also allowed participating countries that are members of the OSCE or the
NACC to strengthen their relations with NATO. NATO political leadership concluded the following:
We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance...are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area...We have today launched an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace.45
The PfP program was a comprehensive cooperative security program in which NATO provided detailed advise of how to run an effective civil administration and how to organize and structure the armed forces. To this end, a Partnership Coordination Cell
(PCC)46 was established at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. Representatives of those countries met with NATO allies on a regular basis and fully participated in discussions and deliberations of the NAC and the military bodies in the NATO headquarter. The program
Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," 26. 44 The White House, National Security Directive 23, September 22 1989. The Bush Library, F 89-191. 45 Press Communique M-1(94)2, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. 46 For a greater discussion about the role of the PCC see G. Lange, "The Pec - a New Player in the Development of Relations between NATO and Partner Nations," NA TO Review 3 (May 1995). 221 stressed transparency as the highest objective, as a confidence building measure, and dialogue and cooperation for joint actions. On a more abstract level, the objective and intention of the program was to provide a framework beyond traditional ways of diplomatic consultation. It was designed as a reaching out program that sought cooperation, mutual understanding, and transparency in defence planning among all of its member states. It intended to create a real, personalized partnership between NATO allies and aspiring member states.47
The PfP program was based on an American initiative and had strong support not only in the US administration itself but also the Congress. The White House argued:
US policy will encourage fundamental political and economic reform, including freely contested elections, in East-Central Europe, so that states in that region may once again be productive members of a prosperous, peaceful, and democratic Europe, whole and free from fear of Soviet intervention. Our policy of differentiating among East European states based on their internal political and economic processes, and our support for the CSCE process, will help in the achievement of this goal.48
The PfP program operated under the authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and within the framework of the NACC. Nonetheless, some analysts complained that
NATO's outreach process was too soft and not forceful enough. Yet, this interpretation did not stand up to the facts. NATO's outreach process, indeed, was filled with forceful language. Jonathan Eyal, for example, argued that after more than four decades of division and separation, Europe embraced the East as the new partners. At the same time,
Member of the PfP program as of 2007 are the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 48 The White House, National Security Directive 23, September 22, 1989. The Bush Library, F 89-191. 222 it told its new partners to "tame their elan, go back to their capitals and acquire some knowledge of government."49
This cooperative security model was consistent with Canada's perception of
NATO's role and function in a post-Cold War environment. Canada's Minister of
External Affairs, Joe Clark, first introduced it in a speech to the United Nations in
September 1990. He stressed the political dimension and significance of it in international relations as well as the need to seek political solutions to questions of international conflict.
Canada played a role in the PfP program and supported its actions strongly because it provided four things for Canada: (1) transparency and democratic control of the armed forces of CEE states; (2) a network of military and defence related issues; (3) cooperation between CEE states and NATO; and (4) it offered confidence-building measures. Ottawa committed itself to help building institutions and tools for capacity building in support of conflict prevention mechanisms.50 For example, it invited some of the officers from CEE to Canada for language and peacekeeping training courses. The
Canadian Peacekeeping Centre in Cornwallis, a former Canadian Forces base, functioned as the host institution for those training courses. Ottawa also continued to make use of its
Military Training and Assistance Program (MTAP). MTAP provides language courses, professional development for officers (including command and staff courses), and peace support operations training.
The Military Training Assistance Program was a key instrument of Canada's defence diplomacy and advances Canada's contribution to international peace and
49 Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 697. 50 See for example Sarah Scott, "NATO Foreign Ministers Took Steps" Can West News, 10 June 1990. 223 security.51 One of the central aims of the program was to establish bilateral defence relationships with selected countries and to promote Canada's national profile. According to the Department of National Defence, the MTAP Program pursued the following interests: "promote Canadian foreign and defence policy interests, target assistance to achieve influence in areas of strategic interest to Canada, promote Canadian bilateral defence relations, raise Canada's independent national profile as a valuable player in the international arena, build peace support operations capacity among Canada's peacekeeping partners, contribute to the international campaign against terrorism through select assistance, promote democratic principles, the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and international stability."52 In other words, the primary objective of the MTAP program was to help building capacities for countries to democratically manage their militaries. Thereby Canada's experience in peacekeeping and peace building operations became useful. As part of the MTAP program, Canadian Forces language school at CFB
Borden trained officers in the English language proficiency in order to facilitate communication among international forces. This Canadian contribution was a functionalist approach of its national security policy.
Canada was also one of the first countries to enhance the size of its CEE diplomatic representation in CEE. It sent Ambassador James Bartleman as a special representative to the region and invited diplomats from CEE to visit its NATO delegation
51 For a detailed discussion of this argument see for example Andrew P. Rasiulis, "The Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP): An Instrument of Military Diplomacy," Canadian Military Journal 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001). 52 For comprehensive background information see Department of National Defence, DND Policy Group, "Directorate of the Military Training Assistance Programme (D MTAP) - Background & Strategic Relevance", available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id:={75991DE6-7D4D-4C4B-988C- 0EFE4AB4EE47K accesses Sept. 18, 2007. 224 in Brussels. The Minister of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, summarized
Canada's position and interests in the new NATO as follows:
A successful Euro-Atlantic security system will have to provide the following elements: military confidence; and atmosphere of respect for human rights; mechanisms for assisting in the development and entrenchment of democratic values and practices; a consultative mechanism in which differences, especially in security related areas, can be aired candidly and regularly; and the prospect of economic progress.53
The PfP program came at the right time for Canada. The government was able to support it so strongly because it required little resources. It was an effort that was made with new partners from CEE rather than without or against them like during the Cold War.
Canada's commitment was "just enough"54 to keep a seat at the NATO table in times of national turmoil and budgetary crisis. Douglas Alan Ross interprets this as a sign of
Canadian weakness. He argued that "even as Canadian teeth and claws were being allowed to decay, the intellectual superstructure of Canadian foreign and defence policies were extended and developed with foresight and intelligence."55 This, however, cannot be interpreted as an indication for a decline of Canada. The reality, as noted below, was that
Canada was able to shoulder all those additional tasks while undertaking a considerable effort to bring peace and security to an evolving conflict in the Balkans.56 It sent its peacekeepers - more than 4000 in total - to the Balkans because the government was able to maintain an expeditionary capability and re-deployed its soldiers leaving Germany to
UNPROFR. This was not a sign of weakness or international isolationism, it was consistent with Canadian foreign policy: Canada sought a functional engagement and not
53 McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? ,11. 54 This term was coined by Joel J. Sokolsky. See for example Sokolsky, "A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances." 55 Ross, "Canada's Functional Isolationism," 122. 56 The next chapter will more closely analyze Canada's role in the Balkans. 225 functional isolationism. It was ready to deliver when called upon and was there when its allies needed Canada. Again, this can hardly be interpreted as a sign of decline but as a sign of commitment and engagement.
The plan was to create interlocking institutions for the preservation of stability and peace in Europe accepting the danger of overlap over gap. Accordingly, the focus of cooperative security measures was on states that would seek membership in various regional organizations. The membership in these organizations might overlap and states might choose not to join all of the organizations but rather be selective. It was a functional principle to conducting international affairs: "Cooperative security is to be constructed by putting into place many different international instruments and institutions which, although they function separately, contribute to overall security."57
However, this liberal internationalist paradigm was married to realist assumptions
CD while being based on a narrow definition of Canada's national interest. The liberal internationalist, institution-building and law promoting approach to international security relations was not "an anachronism that has outlived its utility."59 The realist part of the cooperative security concept was the reassurance of NATO that military capabilities were not to be eradicated in the new post-Cold War era. Even after the end of bipolarity the
NATO Alliance remained confident militarily. Yes, it reduced its overall size of deployable forces and also ordered itself to become slimmer, faster, more mobile, and more interoperable, but nonetheless remained militarily strong and capable. This can be
Barbara McDougall, "Canada, NATO, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council," in Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally?, ed. Barbara McDougall, et al. (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992), 11 58 Ross, "Canada's Functional Isolationism," 122. 59 Ibid.: 123. 226 seen in NATO's military strategy that was readjusted to the post-Cold War security environment, but remained in place. NATO also retained expeditionary armed forces.60
The PfP program did not only intensify the political relationship but also the military partnership of its members. As a side effect it also diminished threats through transparent decision-making processes. The PfP program was designed for practical questions related to all issues of defence and security whereas the NACC only provided a political forum for consultation and exchange. Also, the NACC was a multinational forum while PfP created a partnership between individual NATO member countries and single applicant status. Further activities included joint military planning and exercises and an invitation to participate in NATO missions.
The PfP framework agreement required that states that were interested in becoming a partner of NATO had to affirm a variety of principles. For example, they had to fulfill in good faith the obligations set out in the Charter of the UN and the Principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another state.61 This commitment also required the acknowledgement of existing borders and a commitment to settle internal as well as external disputes peacefully.
NATO's political-military steering committee worked as the forum for all PfP countries. The Deputy Secretary General of NATO provided oversight and guidance.
Similar to the NACC settings, from time to time all NACC/PfP countries were scheduled to meet and exchange their views and experiences.
60 See for example North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Final Ministerial Communique." Turnberry Meeting. 61 Annex to M-l(94)2, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. 227
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was the political forum that managed the practical work of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) of the NATO Alliance. EAPC was launched in 1997 to bring an "institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues" to the satellite states of the former Warsaw Pact countries. It brought together 49 NATO partner countries.62 The initiative for creating an
EAPC was first presented by US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in a speech in
Stuttgart, Germany on 6 September 1996. The first issue on the agenda of the new EAPC was to develop an action plan outlining areas in which EAPC member states were able to increase their consultation and cooperation. The EAPC Council agreed upon this plan in
December 1997. Ever since, consultations and cooperation have increased over questions such as the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the crisis in Kosovo, problems of international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In practice, meetings of EAPC countries were held at the level of ambassador.63 An extended meeting of all EAPC foreign and defence ministers as well as their Chief of Defence Staffs augmented the consultation process.
The EAPC Council was designed as an extension of NATO's PfP program, which was seen as a true success for the Alliance and also well received among the applicant states. This success led almost inevitably to calls from allies and partners to enhance the scope and depth of the program. In May 1997, the NATO Foreign Ministers decided
As of January 2007 the following countries are member of the EAPC: all current NATO member states plus Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (*), Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 63 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, M-NACC-EAPC-1(97)66, 30 May 1997. 228 during their Ministerial meeting in Sintra, Portugal, to enhance the PfP program and to create the Euro-Atlantic partnership Council (EAPC). The Minister concluded:
We are determined to raise to a qualitatively new level our political and military cooperation with our Partners, building upon the success of the North Atlantic Cooperation council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We have therefore decided to propose to our Partners to launch together at tomorrow's NACC meeting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the framework of which we have developed with Partners over the last months. [...] The EAPC, in replacing the NACC, will unite the positive experience of NACC and PfP by providing the overarching framework for political and security-related consultations and for enhanced cooperation under PfP, whose basic elements will remain valid.64
Since its inauguration, the EAPC provided a political forum for consultation and cooperation on all issues related to security and defence. The aim of the EAPC was to provide a mechanism for long-term consultation, cooperation on a wide range of issues, and to make the PfP operational for future NATO missions. This required an increase in the partner's involvement in the PfP decision-making and planning process. The matters debated ranged from regional security issues to questions of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and all issues related to defence including defence planning, budgeting, strategy, oversight, and civil-military relations. The EAPC council also has initiated an ad-hoc working group on small arms, light weapons, and mines issues. The objective was to exchange information on how best to control those weapons. The EAPC through the PfP program also trained soldiers to effectively manage nuclear stockpiles and how to destruct surplus stockpiles. In 2000, a special trust fund was established to support the destruction of anti-personnel landmines, surplus
Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997, Article 2. 229 ammunition, and small anus and weapons. This initiative was a unique Canadian idea.
The Canadian joint delegation to NATO contributed more than $1 mio. to this fund.65
The EAPC institution also reached out beyond the NATO territory and fostered a friendly relationship with NATO's neighbouring countries. Some countries of the
Caucasus region, for example, who will most likely never become members of NATO, were reassured that the EAPC would help them to address their security concerns while following two important EAPC principles. The first one was that the partnership between
NATO and the aspirant states was inclusive, meaning that all states would be provided with the same opportunities and nobody was to be discriminated. Secondly, NATO states and their partners were free to decide themselves of the level of their involvement in
NATO activities.
The EAPC could be seen as the political framework for all programs of outreach and cooperation. The institution replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), which was NATO's first institution to structure the transformation process in
Europe. However, after five years of operation, the need was felt among its members to reform it to expand its scope, and flexibility. The EAPC dealt with questions of civil emergencies, defence planning, disaster preparedness, and peace support operations. The action plan also had practical implications. In February 1998 a crisis management simulation was successfully conducted between the Alliance and its EAPC partners. In
June of 1998, the NATO Secretary General launched the Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) based at NATO headquarters. It was the responsibility of this centre to coordinate with the UN Office for the Coordination of
Interview with Susan Pond, Head of Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. 230
Humanitarian Affairs to synchronize the response of EAPC countries in the event of a crisis. EAPC countries also played a role during the conflicts in the Balkans where they augmented the deployments of NATO allies by sending some of their own armed forces.
This showed willingness and commitment to support the Alliance.
One of the problems of the EAPC, however, was its lack of decision-making powers like those of the NACC. Initially, the EAPC had no role in the decision-making process of the PfP programs with which it shared almost the same membership. In addition, the ministerial meetings that took place twice a year produced relatively little outcomes and substance. Currently, they were held once a month on the ambassadorial level and the council met twice a year at both Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers level. The Secretary General of the NATO Alliance or one of his Deputies chaired the
Council's meetings. In addition, the political as well as the Military Committee supported the work of the EAPC.
History has shown that the EAPC has played a role in South-Eastern Europe, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. The NATO Alliance launched its South East
Europe Initiative at the 1999 Washington Summit and ad hoc working groups worked under the auspices of the EAPC to promote regional cooperation. The EAPC remained open for accession and by signing the PfP Framework Document states are automatically given membership in the EAPC.
However, the successful experience of the PfP and EAPC program66 have contributed to the debate about enlarging the NATO Alliance and thus institutionalize the evolving partnership with CEE.
66 Confidential Interview with NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 23 May 2007. 231
Foundations of the NATO enlargement debate
There were various possible reasons why NATO decided to enlarge and to reach out to countries from Central and Eastern Europe. First, some analysts argued that an enlarged
NATO would benefit all existing allies and would increase their own security. Germany, for example, was very much in favour of an eastern enlargement of NATO because reduced tensions would create partnerships and trust. Hence, it was not surprising that
Germany lobbied its allies very hard to enlarge NATO eastwards. While addressing the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in March 1993, Germany's
Minister of Defence, Volker Ruehe, argued strongly for NATO's Eastern enlargement.67
The strategic advantage for Germany was obvious: the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) would be relieved of guarding and defending its eastern borders and thus be able to cut costs for defending its territory.
Second, it was clear that NATO's first round of enlargement after the Cold War took place for security reasons. Those countries that showed an interest in becoming a member wanted to join NATO for its collective defence clause in Article 5.
Third, they were seeking the security protection of the NATO allies in part also because they were in fear of Russia. They argued that after 1990 Russia's foreign and defence policy and its diminished status in international affairs made the country unpredictable.68 Those countries that shared a common border with Russia - Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania - had no buffer country between them and Russia and thus were very eager to seek external security protection. An enlarged NATO would guarantee the
67 See Volker Ruehe, "Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," Survival 35 (Summer 1993). 68 Howard J. Wiarda, "The Politics of European Enlargement: NATO, the EU and the New US-European Relationship, Occasional Paper No. 67," (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre, February 2002), 7. 232 security of candidate countries and thus functioned as a preventative measure against a resurgent Russia. While doing so, however, as Alan Sens and Albert Legault argued,
NATO needed to maintain a cohesive and effective Alliance.69
Fourth, the process of enlargement required significant domestic reforms of aspirant countries. The demand for reform measures ranged from, to name only a few, restructuring the armed forces, establishing democratic institutions that oversee the conduct of the armed forces, and a new thinking in civil-military relations. It was anticipated by NATO that those reforms would translate into other policy areas also and that the aspirant states would use this as an opportunity for a more comprehensive reform process.
Meanwhile, NATO reiterated the importance of remaining militarily strong and capable. A meeting of NATO's defence ministers in 1991 stated clearly the military objective of the Alliance that it "must preserve the strategic balance and maintain credible deterrence and an effective common defence to counter any threat to the territory of the
Allies."70 The western Alliance was convinced that only a strong NATO made the changes in Central and Eastern Europe possible.71 While retaining strong and capable forces, the Alliance also considered it necessary to set up institutional bodies that would allow for a coherent approach and that would guide aspirant states with their application and channel NATO's partnership endeavours. The Western allies thereby acknowledged that those countries themselves were unable to manage the transition. This was certainly the view of Helmut Kohl and George Bush. In a telephone conversation the two leaders
69 Sens and Legault, "Canada and NATO Enlargement: Interests and Options," 88. 7 Final Communique of the Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, Article 4. 7 The White House, Telephone Conversation from Helmut Kohl to President Bush, Memorandum 8520 Washington, October 23, 1989, The Bush Library. 233 talked about the situation in Eastern Europe and said: "They [the Polish government] are too idealistic with too little professionalism. Many of their professionals have spent the last couple of years in prison, not a place where one can learn how to govern. They are committed to democracy and market economics; we must help them."72 So, it was not surprising that leading Western allies like Germany, the US, and the U.K. pushed NATO to create more formal institutions that would assist in NATO's transformation. This decision of creating innovative bodies was not surprising. It was a bureaucratic answer to
NATO's inexperience with enlargement, especially when no bodies or internal working groups were available that provided comprehensive guidance.73
The two schools of thought of NATO enlargement
The issue and significance of NATO's enlargement in the post-Cold War era went to the heart of its values and objectives of what the organization was and where it wanted to be.74 It raised the fundamental question of what the new NATO of the post-Cold War would look like?
The debate about the nature and scope of NATO enlargement took place for many years and lasted from the end of the Cold War until three countries - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic -joined the Alliance in 1999. There were two schools of thought of enlargement.
The anti-NA TO enlargement group
On the one hand were the skeptics of enlargement who did not see the strategic rationale for an enlarged Alliance. They argued that by expanding NATO, the Alliance would
72 The White House, "Telephone Conversation from Helmut Kohl to President Bush," Memorandum 9335 Washington, November 10, 1989, The Bush Library. 73 In fact, NATO enlarged only three times during the Cold War: it invited Greece and Turkey to join the Alliance in 1952, included Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. 74 Timothy Edmunds, "NATO and Its New Members," Survival AS, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 145. 234 invade the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union. This potentially could raise tensions and pose a great danger for the security and order in Europe.75 Walter Clemens, for example, argued: "For NATO to set up camp closer to Russia's borders is a recipe for strengthening Russian nationalism, militarism, and imperialism."76 Furthermore, just the thought of an enlarged NATO defence Alliance made the Russians feel uncomfortable. In response to NATO plans they showed emotions of betrayal and disappointment, especially by Germany and the 2+4 negotiations on the reunification of Germany. Russia asserted that during the unification negotiations, Germany had given assurance to Russia that it would not support an enlargement of NATO to include former members of the
Warsaw Pact under any circumstances.77 Germany denied such guarantees.7
Other critics argued that countries like Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and others were not required to become members of NATO's outreach programs such as the Partnership for Peace in order allow them to participate and contribute to NATO operations. They also doubted that the Alliance would be able to carry out more of a political function of exporting liberal democratic values such as freedom, the rule of law and so forth to
Central and Eastern Europe. Clemens was one of such critics and pointed out that a flourishing democracy was dependent on internal factors that could only be influenced
79 marginally by external actors.
One of the voices against enlargement is Walter C. Clemens, "An Alternative to NATO Expansion," International Journal 52, no. 2 (Spring 1997). 76 Ibid.: 342. Letter to NATO Secretary General Solana from the German Ambassador to NATO, "German Position on Alleged Implications on NATO Enlargement by the 2+4 Treaty", March 26, 1996. National Archive of Canada. Sloan, NA TO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, 157-66. 79 Clemens, "An Alternative to NATO Expansion," 343. 235
Another argument against NATO enlargement were that large numbers of
Russians were living in the Baltic states would be dissatisfied with the political transformation process taking place in CEE. The fear of NATO was not only that they would oppose the radical reform processes under way but also mobilize their Russian companions in a rally against a Westernization of Central and Eastern Europe. In this sense, NATO was faced with a delicate dilemma: Its ambitions of trying to fill the power vacuum that was left behind by the Russians after their withdrawal from CEE was dangerous, but a too strong approach by NATO was equally dangerous. This led prominent academics, such as John Gerard Ruggie, to doubt the validity of NATO as an institution for facilitating the process of transforming the European security architecture.
Instead of NATO handling the reaching out and stabilization process, he argued, the
European Union should have been the leading organization shaping the eastward expansion and the integration of European communities. Letting the EU taking the lead on enlargement would have posed fewer risks to the EU80 The Alliance could have also placed the financial burden of enlargement to the EU and thus reduce the sum payable by the US and Canada would have had to pay.81 However, for countries like Canada and the
US, such a move could have meant and end of their membership in NATO. Peter
Roberts, for example, who was a Canadian diplomat at the time, argued in the Globe and
Mail that "we should get out. We should say to our allies in NATO...that we are friends and trading partners of the Russians, that we have links with them going back nearly 200 years, that we have no interest in putting what they will regard as hostile forces on their
John Gerard Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to Nato's Future," The Washington Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1996). 81 Ibid.: 117-19. 236 borders and frightening them out of their wits. And, therefore, we are withdrawing from the Alliance."82
Others pointed out that even though Russia was weakened politically and militarily in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War era, it nonetheless continued to have a large military establishment and possessed significant numbers of conventional and nuclear weapons. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, by
1996, more than 1.5 million men and women in total still served in the Russian Army.83
The numbers for 1990-1991 are even higher. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had deployed thirty divisions (-600,000 troops) into CEE; twenty-one of those divisions remained forwardly deployed in CEE in 1993.84 The Soviet Union also continued to rely on its nuclear arsenal and threatened the West that it would establish a formal military
Alliance with the Commonwealth of Independent States in case NATO would proceed with its unilateral enlargement process without seeking formal approval of Russia.85
Moscow threatened NATO to form a counterbalance that would offset NATO's expansionist policies. Russia disapproved of NATO's enlargement from the beginning despite its silent acceptance of the Partnership for Peace program and other outreach programs.
The high costs of enlargement were also seen as a reason for not enlarging the
Alliance. It was argued that the costs of NATO enlargement would not equal its benefits.
82 Peter Roberts, "Let's Go Even Further Than De Gaulle Did and Bid Adieu to NATO Entirely," The Globe and Mail, 19 July 1997, D9. 83 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance - 1995/96, 113. 84 See Simon, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?," 22. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an alliance of states that was formed simultaneously with the end of the Cold War. It included the following countries: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. For a greater discussion see Karns and Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, 175. 237
However, there appeared to be no consensus among analysts about the total costs to the
Alliance for enlargement. Estimated figures varied considerably. This might be explained by the fact that the level of defence spending stood in direct correlation to the threat perception, which, to a certain extend, was not objectively measurable. Some figures, however, showed that enlargement would cost NATO countries US $20 billion over ten years. If NATO were to station troops in all new member countries, as Clemens argued, it would raise the bill up to US $100 billion.86 The variance in the numbers was to be explained by the different methodologies being used in each study.87 Erika Simpson, who was a Canadian analyst of NATO, came to different conclusions. In 1999, she estimated that NATO enlargement would cost somewhere between US $27-billion to US $35 billion over the next 13 years (1997- 2010), and half of that would be paid by the new member states.88 Canada, she argued, would be left with a bill of US $6-7.5 billion.89
NATO's own estimates, however, were much lower and estimated at only US $1.5 billion. According to Simpson these numbers were to be explained by the fact that NATO only included the direct costs associated with the enlargement and excluded indirect costs such as the upgrading of military infrastructure and the modernization of weapons systems, which were to be covered by the member states. In general, however, there were three factors that drove the cost of enlargement: expenses for NATO's regional capabilities; the costs related to the transformation of the new member states; and the
Clemens, "An Alternative to NATO Expansion," 355. 7 For a comprehensive explanation of the different methodologies used to estimate the costs for NATO enlargement see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F.S. Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?," Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996). Erika Simpson, "The Looming Costs of NATO Expansion in the Twenty-First Century: What Alternatives Does Canada Have?" International Journal 54, no. 2 (1999). 89 Ibid.: 325. 238 costs for direct accession. Estimates of how much NATO enlargement cost the
Canadian taxpayers remain classified at this point. Simpson showed in her analysis in
1999 that Canada contributed CAN $157 million to NATO's Security Investment
Program, its infrastructure budget, the AWACS system, and the civil budget.91 In terms of NATO's infrastructure program, Canada benefited from it least. In terms of net return,
Canada received the least benefit from the program. However, other costs occurred to
Canadians: it made, for example, a significant contribution to NATO by opening training facilities like the one at CFB Goose Bay to its NATO allies. Simpson's estimates, however, also came with flaws. For example, she excluded the cost for training and equipping Canadian soldiers for overseas operations.
The pro-NATO enlargement school
On the other side of the enlargement debate were those who argued that the process of opening to the East was not intended against Russia. Quite to the contrary, the objective of the enlargement process was to provide the Alliance with tools for crisis management, to promote democracy and the rule of law.
NATO enlargement was most prominently supported and promoted by former policy makers.93 The supporters in general saw the Alliance as an organization with a global-reaching mandate and capabilities. This new Alliance required the generation of additional capabilities in order to make NATO a true global expeditionary organization
90 Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 712. One of the main costs for NATO would be setting up new intelligence-sharing facilities. 91 Simpson, "The Looming Costs of NATO Expansion in the Twenty-First Century: What Alternatives Does Canada Have?," 327. 92 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Defence Planning Committee, Enhancing Alliance Collective Security-Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibility in the Alliance, Brussels, December 1988. 93 See for supporters of NATO enlargement Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74 (January/February 1995), Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995). 239 with the capability and political will to deploy military forces out-of-area. Initially, this was the vision of the United States; it was shared only by a few European states.
Although most of them have contributed to NATO's out-of-area missions in one way or another, such as the one in Kosovo in 1999, the nature and composition of the missions was a significant point of contention in the transatlantic relationship. One reason for the divergence in part might have been the diverging security strategies of the United States and the European Union presented. Europe's strategy of dealing with international conflict was much more defensive and inward looking whereas the United States claimed to have global ambitions.95
The second school of the pro-enlargement camp argued that the primary objective of enlargement was to transform NATO into a more regional military organization.
France, Belgium and others wanted to see NATO as a regional security organization with the objective of providing continental defence for Europe and its immediate neighbourhood. This camp also sought not only a greater role for more autonomous
European military capabilities in NATO but also a strengthened role for Europe's common security and defence policy (ESDP). The point of contention with this argument was the role of NATO's Article 5. The division of labour was that ESDP shouldered
"4 Andrew A. Michta, "What Next for NATO?," Orbis (Winter 2007): 156-57. 95 The differences of the two security strategies have become most visible after the terrorist attacks on September 1 ll . For a greater debate and comparison of the two strategies see for example Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy; A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, vol. (Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005); Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security," (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2004); Simon Duke, "The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does It Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?," European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2004), European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," (Brussels: European Council, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, Joanna Jackson Goldman Memorial Lecture on American Civilization and Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions of US Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97); White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006); White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2002). 240 responsibility for non-Article 5 missions and the NATO treaty would be invoked for
Article 5 operations.
Understandably, strong support for NATO enlargement also came from CEE countries. In particular, the Baltic states were very keen on becoming a member of the
Alliance, or at least acquire some form of associated membership status with NATO, because Russia's sign of weakness made it unpredictable and fearful. Those countries still remembered the lessons learned from the early Cold War history and Russian imperialism. In 1968, the Brezhnev Doctrine imposed a limited sovereignty for members of the Warsaw Pact following the intervention in Czechoslovakia. He defined the concept of limited sovereignty by saying that "Whenever internal and external forces hostile to
Socialism try to reverse the development of a Socialist country towards the restauration of capitalism...this becomes...the concern of all Socialist countries." Indeed, some analysts have argued that CEE states were closer to the West culturally and historically than they were with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the Soviet empire put a dark, dividing curtain over Eastern Europe. The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, on a state visit to Canada in 1997, reiterated this pint by saying to the press that "for a post-communist country, being in NATO is the final, final gesture, the final symbolic event that the past is definitely over, that there is no connection with the former Russian empire of the past."96 In addition, there was a fear that because of Russia's domestic instability, Moscow could be inclined to turn to countries like Iran and help them to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, which, in return could threaten Western interests around the world.
96 Juliet O'Neill, "Czech PM Wins Canadian Support for NATO Membership Quest," The Ottawa Citizen 21 February 1997, A7. 241
Another argument being presented in support of the enlargement was that NATO should only enlarge if a strategic rationale mandates it to do so, for example in case of a significant security risk in Eastern Europe.97 Others pointed out that NATO enlargement had to be a carefully planned process and only to be executed once NATO allies were to be assured that indeed democratic institutions and principles as well as liberal market democracies were freely implemented in CEE in order to prevent NATO from inheriting a strategic risk. However, the reasoning for CEE states to join the NATO Alliance might not overall be related to security interests. CEE states were eager to introduce a Western style economic structure. As Allan Sens and Albert Legault point out, they "also wish to join NATO for other reasons, such as to encourage foreign investment; to strengthen appeals for economic assistance; to enhance their prospects for admission into the
European Union; to gain personal political dividends for political leaders; and to improve relations with neighbours."98
Surprisingly, there were also some realists who have supported NATO enlargement by pointing out that one reason for enlarging NATO was to fill the security vacuum that was left behind by the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger, for example, called
Eastern Europe a no-man's land after Soviet's withdrawal.99 Russia not only left a military vacuum but also a political one. The end of the Cold War, he argued, took away the buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West. This gave NATO a direct external border with Russia. Even though the nature of the conventional threat had diminished, threats to NATO did not disappear altogether. New threats had evolved, such as terrorism and failed states. Moreover, there was fear that refugees from Russia and
97 See Gaddis, The Cold War; A New History. 98 Sens and Legault, "Canada and NATO Enlargement: Interests and Options," 91. 99 Henry Kissinger, "Not This Partnership," Washington Post, 24 November 1993. 242
CEE could start moving towards the West.100 So, an enlarged NATO was seen as a tool to reduce the immigration flow from Eastern Europe to Western Europe by exporting its values of security and democracy. It thereby pushed off any Russian ambitions (if any) of regaining Central and Eastern Europe and kept the region politically stable. As such,
NATO's decision to go eastwards can be seen as avoiding the spectre of chaos and anarchy. Its new definition of security now included economic, environmental and other dimensions.
The more liberal or ideal camp of NATO enlargement argued that the export of
NATO's values and principles was driving the enlargement process. Timothy Edmunds, for example, argued in a quite comprehensive study that NATO's enlargement had a huge impact in Eastern Europe.101 It not only forced countries to reform their institutional arrangements and transformed their civil-military relationship where the democratic control of armed forces was now the chief objective of a defence administration. This was not the case before 1989. During the Cold War, the militaries of the former communist countries pushed the Russian agenda as opposed to the interests of the country.
Basic principles of NATO Enlargement
It was clear that with the NACC body and the PfP program in place, NATO was almost automatically on the enlargement track. However, the Alliance essentially had no agreed criteria on which it was able to base its decisions for enlargement. NATO allies realized that and commissioned a study on the principles of NATO enlargement in 1993/94.
NATO's political authorities accepted the report of the study during a NATO ministerial meeting in December 1994.
100 Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 697. 1 See for example Gheciu, NATO in The "New Europe: " The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War. 243
The study on enlargement laid down some of the most basic principles of
enlargement. Aspirant member states had asked NATO prior to 1994 to set up rules and
guidelines for the process of enlargement that would allow them to demonstrate to the
NATO Alliance that they were responsible and committed to become members. The
study on enlargement was also a benefit for NATO in the sense that it gave the
organization a framework of rules to work with and that made the decision-making process more transparent. Hence, some analysts have called it the "why and how" study of enlargement.102
The principles were subsequently published as the Study on NA TO Enlargement
in 1995 and entailed the following: first, applicant countries should be accepted into the
Alliance based on their democratic credentials and merits rather than geographical position in Europe.103 Democratic control of the armed forces was the key component of any state's wider process of democratization. However, it was important to distinguish between the democratic control of armed forces and the civilian control thereof. For example, one could argue that the Soviet Union most certainly had a civilian oversight mechanism for the governance of its armed forces; however, these mechanisms of political governance were not necessarily democratically defined and understood in
Western societies.104 A democratic and civilian control of the armed forces also required an institutional framework that guaranteed democratic accountability and transparency.105
According to various analysts, NATO was successful in promoting democratic
Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," 18. 103 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Study on NATO Enlargement," Chapter 2, Section D, Article 29. 104 Edmunds, "NATO and Its New Members," 148. 05 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces and Society 29, no. 1 (2002). 244 principles as well as providing accountable defence administrations and transparency.
To be sure, NATO allies did not initiate democratization in those countries; it was their own sovereign decision to do so and NATO only helped to achieve the ends in this process. In the countries that joined NATO in 1999, their armed forces were not a significant political actor any more in domestic politics and have overcome their ideological pasts.
Also, parliamentary oversight of the armed forces and the defence policy of the country were important benchmarks in transforming Cold War militaries. Ideally, a parliamentary oversight mechanism would include the institution of a functioning legislative branch, which was equipped with the powers to autonomously investigate the conduct of the armed forces. Those two institutions then report back to Parliament.
Furthermore, Parliament was an important actor for debating and developing a nation's security policy. It also appropriates funds for the armed forces and the procurement military capabilities. Thus, parliamentarians had a significant role to play as a democratic oversight organ of the armed forces and the government at large. The objective was to guarantee that the state was the only actor with the legitimacy to use force while parliament was the sovereign body that held the executive accountable for their actions and decisions.107
NATO has contributed to the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe by allowing for three things: first, an associate partnership and the possibility of full membership of NATO through the PfP program and others; second, the allowance for
106 See for example Edmunds, "NATO and Its New Members." 107 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces has done some far-reaching work in this area. See for example Hans Born and Alexey Arbatov, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms, and Practices, Geneva (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2003). 245 technical assistance to aspirant states; third the reinforcement of democratic rules and norms.108 These three issues demonstrated the evolution of thinking inside NATO from a collective defence organization to one that also provided collective security functions. As a pre-condition for associate membership status in NATO, the states were required to show a strong commitment to democracy, principles of liberal market economies, and civilian control of the military.109 It was assumed in general that the spirit of consensus would guide the new relationship. Indeed, as studies of NATO enlargement have shown, applicant countries have pursued membership in NATO not only for security reasons but also to use the moment of change for reform processes in other domestic policy areas, such as reforming their economies, governments, and armed forces.110 Also, countries seeking membership in NATO needed to provide significant evidence that they have adopted a functioning democratic political system, a transparent civil bureaucracy, which they peacefully seek to end territorial or ethnic conflicts, and respect for human rights according to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. NATO officials also pointed out that aspirant countries were also assessed against their ability to contribute to NATO's collective security commitments and to enhancing security and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area.
Applicants had to accept the fact that they would be joining a community of like-minded states and work together on the premise of consultation and consensus rather than competition. They were also required to contribute to NATO's eight new functions,
'm Edmunds, "NATO and Its New Members," 151. 109 Simon, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?," 32. 110 Raymond Millen, Pax NATO: The Opportunities of Enlargement (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), August 2002), 5. 246 as outlined in NATO's Study on Enlargement}11 first, they were expected to contribute militarily to NATO's collective defence posture by allowing their forces to be assigned for NATO missions. Second, they were expected to bring their national command structures to NATO standard in order to make themselves more interoperable with the
Alliance. In turn, the Alliance had to determine whether or not these new structures would require new command posts to be located in Eastern Europe. Third, NATO officials made clear that CEE states were supposed actively to participate in NATO's training and exercises to familiarize themselves and NATO forces with one another.
Fourth, in terms of NATO's nuclear force structure, the CEE states were benefactors of the overall nuclear posture and it was anticipated by NATO that they would actively subscribe to the strategic concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons played in this strategy. Fifth, it was a prerequisite for the success of NATO's collective defence structure that NATO forces are allowed to be deployed on the soil of CEE countries. Six, the aspirant countries were obliged to share intelligence information with other NATO allies. Seven, all new members were expected to contribute to the enlargement process financially. And finally, the new states were required to undertake all measures possible to speed up the process of becoming interoperable with the NATO
Alliance. In sum, the new states were expected to subscribe to NATO's basic principles: democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.112
Who gets in? Who stays out?
The debate about when to enlarge NATO and who to invite was made possible because of the successes of the PfP program as well as the willingness of some CEE states to reform.
111 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Study on NATO Enlargement," Chapter 5, Section A, Article 70. 1,2 Ibid. 247
Thus, PfP was the basis for enlargement. On the question of which countries would be admitted to the Alliance first, the Allies were aware of the fact that some of those countries that did not make the cut in the first round were most likely to be deeply disappointed. The firmest support for NATO enlargement came from Germany. Between
1991 and 1993 the idea of expanding Western institutions into CEE figured prominently among German politicians and Germany was one of the only countries that actively supported this expansion at a time when its allies did not even consider the issue until
1993.113 In 1993, Germany's Defence Minister, Volker Ruehe, delivered the Alastair
Buchan Memorial Lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in which he called for Western support to export political and economic stability to CEE. He further argued that the Alliance could not be a "closed shop".114 Germany's own national interests of NATO enlargement were that it wanted to see at least the Visegard nations as new members of NATO in order to avoid the historical trap for German politicians to have to choose between East and West. An integrated Poland, for example, would alleviate the Germans from enforcing their eastern border since the eastern border of
Europe would then lie in Poland. Meanwhile it was apparent that the German government did not speak with a unified voice. Ruehe belonged to a younger generation of Christian democrats, whereas Chancellor Kohl was ambiguous, at least publicly, of pushing NATO towards enlargement. He was trying to avoid upsetting the Western Alliance as well as raising fears of Germany's eastern neighbours of an expansionist German foreign
See for example Paul Letourneau and Marie-Elisabeth Raekel, "Germany: To Be or Not to Be Normal?," in Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition ed. Philippe G. LePestre (Montreal: McGill/Queen's University Press, 1997). 114 Ruehe, "Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," 135. 248 policy. The toughest opposition against NATO enlargement, however, came from the
United Kingdom. The Defence Committee of the House of Commons release a report on
1 August 1995 in which it warned against a hastened enlargement. Instead, the process was meant to place in a gradual and cautious manner. The US government argued similarly and was not supportive of a rapid enlargement of NATO into CEE.116 Also,
Ruehe's own colleagues in Cabinet disagreed with the plans for rapid expansion.
Particular resistance came from the Chancellor's office and the Foreign Ministry.117
In 1995, the NATO Alliance published a yearlong study of the issue of enlargement. It concluded that no firm decision ought be made about which countries would become members of NATO. Instead, a general policy statement was released that reaffirmed NATO's open door policy on enlargement. The statement was in the spirit of
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which says that any European country that was in the position to further the principles of NATO and contribute to security in the Euro-
Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance.
Canadian position on enlargement
Canada was pushing for a wider enlargement to include Romania and Slovenia into the
Alliance as well.118 It was clear, however, that Canada was not entirely convinced about
Romania's case and its readiness for NATO membership. Nonetheless, Ottawa actively supported Romania's candidacy based on their shared cultural and linguistic ties. It also
115 For two good discussion of this issue see for example Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalisation of German Foreign Policy," Orbis 38, no. 2 (Spring 1994); Gregor Schoellgen, Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Riickkehr AufDie Weltbiihne (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004). 116 Letourneau and Hebert, "NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design," 112. 117 Reinhard Wolf, "The Doubtful Mover: Germany and NATO Expansion," in Will NATO Go East? - the Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), 203. 118 Eyal, "Nato's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 708. 249 made sense strategically to invite Romania as one of the first countries. In Canada's view, the domestic tensions between ethnic Hungarians residing in Romania would be more manageable if both Romania and Hungary were admitted concurrently. From a military point of view, Romania had the greatest military potential of the region to make a contribution to the Alliance and thus was one of the few countries that had military capabilities to bring to the table. However, after speculation and debate inside NATO of who to invite to the Alliance first, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright announced in the wake of the NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain, that the United States was only able to support three countries for NATO membership. The offer for membership was to be made formally at the 50th anniversary Summit in Washington in 1999. Originally, US policy was not to advance the preferences for individual countries in public unless the entire NATO Alliance had reached an agreement. However, when some European countries broke that rule, the United States was forced to make a decision.119 Hesitations in Washington were caused by the fear that the Madrid NATO summit would end up in disarray and leave the Alliance disunited and the United States possibly isolated from its
European allies. Thus, the administration in Washington took the lead on the issue and forced the allies to decide.
In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO. It argued that it was unable to push for a wider round of enlargement because of domestic opinion and the pressure of US Congress.120 However, the US administration could be sure about
See for example Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, 2nd ed. (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 120 For a greater discussion of US domestic opinions about NATO enlargement see for example Stephen Kull, "The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement," NATO Review 45, no. 1 (January 1997). 250 partisan support to include those three countries.
Canada's role and contribution to NATO's enlargement process cannot be understood without considering the domestic preconditions of Canada's international engagements. During the course of the debate about enlargement, Canada went through three election campaigns - in 1993, 1997, and 2001. They absorbed the government's attention with domestic policy issues such as Canada's economic situation, high inflation, and national unity.
The White Papers
The federal election in 1993 also gave Canada's defence policy a new direction through a new Defence White Paper. It was published in 1994 and based on an earlier parliamentary report.122 During the election campaign the Liberals had accused the
Tory's defence policy of being too closely aligned with the Clinton administration. The
White Paper outlined concepts and policies for the Department of Defence and the
Canadian Forces of how to face the realities of the new international security environment, and in particular Canada's role in Europe.123 One of the first acts of the new government was fulfilling an election promise and to cancel the acquisition of the EH 101 helicopter, which was seen as unsuitable for operations in a post-Cold War setting.124 The
White Paper drew a very uncertain picture of the future of European security but recommended remaining in NATO. It anticipated that the long war would translate into a long peace in which states would act in the spirit of cooperation and diplomacy and
121 Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to Nato's Future," 116. 122 Canada, "1994 Defence White Paper." 123 For a close examination of the 1994 White Paper see Joel J. Sokolsky, Canada, Getting It Right This Time: The 1994 Defence White Paper ([Carlisle Barracks, Pa.]: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995). See for example Michel Rossignol, Political and Social Affairs Division, Replacement of shipborne and rescue helicopters, Ref.# 94-3E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 19 October 1998). 251 refrain from plotting over militaristic strategies. Despite the new world, order significant threats such as regional and ethnic conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, mass migration and environmental hazards, continued to pose threats to Canada.
The debate took place by inviting the public for consultations and asking the
House of Commons for parliamentary hearings. Accordingly, the House of Commons formed a Special Joint Committee of the House and the Senate. The committee consisted of representatives from both legislative branches and began hearings on Canada's defence policy. At the earliest stage, the Government was divided about the following questions: should Canada's foreign and defence policy be reviewed jointly or separately? Then
Minister of Defence, David Collenette, and his department insisted that two separate reviews should be undertaken.125 Meanwhile, the House also conducted a foreign policy review and examined priorities and roles of the Canadian Forces for the future and the new security environment.
During the hearing it became clear that the witnesses themselves were divided about which route to take for Canada's future defence policy. The one camp argued that in spite of the changing nature of the international security environment, a significant change of Canada's defence policy was required in the sense that Canada should further reduce its military capabilities and develop niche capabilities.126
A second cluster of people argued to the contrary and agreed that the world had changed; yet the degree of the changes was largely unknown. The implications for the
CF, therefore, were to set its priorities straight and to retain its present capabilities. A third school of thought subscribed to the view that Canada should rethink the nature and
125 Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," 103. 126 See for example Cooper and Hayes, Worthwhile Initiatives? Canadian Mission-Oriented Diplomacy. 252 objectives of its military. Instead of continuing to fund military capabilities, Canada should invest its resources into development assistance, institution-building, weapons reductions and arms control regimes and other soft power issues.
These diverging views of the future of Canada's defence policy were also reflected in the Committee's conflicting recommendations. First, the initial idea of the
Canada 21 Council was to develop an independent defence White Paper, which would then be presented to the Government. The group recommended that Canada should solely concentrate its defence policy on Canada's collective security interests and to pursue those interests in a post-Cold war world order.127 Accordingly, Canada's forces required a restructuring process to be ready to defend common security interests through the United
Nations and NATO. In doing so, Canadian peacekeeping missions would be given a priority role in Canada's defence policy. Implied in the specialization into peacekeeping operations was the assertion that peacekeepers would not require hard power capabilities such as heavy tanks, artillery and so forth. In turn, this would allow the government to reduce capital investments into the forces. In short, the Council did not favour the idea of a general, multi-purpose military. It advocated a specialized Canadian military, in which large units of Canada's air force and navy were no longer needed.
The second view was presented by the report of the Special Joint Committee on
Defence itself, which recommended that despite the changes in the international security environment, the Canadian Forces should retain combat-capable forces that were not only able to carry out peacekeeping missions but also high intensity combat.128 The thrust of
127 Canada 21 Council, "Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century," (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994). 12 The report was published after the committee had received over 300 written submissions, heard 275 witnesses at 47 meetings across the country and had travelled to Brussels, Colorado Springs, and New 253
the report was that despite the troubled situation at home, Canadians shared the
conviction that Canada had an important role to play of contributing to world peace and
security. It reaffirmed Canada's interests as a trading nation of open access to world
economic markets and international economic stability. The committee shared the belief that the post-Cold War environment had brought about a multipolar world order with as
much uncertainty and instability as before. The threat to Canada had changed but it did
not vanish completely. New threats to Canadian national security included failing or
failed states, particularly in South Eastern Europe, growing regional and ethnic conflicts,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic rivalries, and issues of
environmental degradation.129 The globalization of economic markets, for example, had
implications for the Canadian nation state in the sense that national capitals had lost a
degree of control of international capital markets. Similar things were said about issues of
international migration or environmental hazards. This also pointed to another phenomenon that became visible in the post-Cold War world order. The "interregunum period"130 could be characterized by a dichotomy of foreign and domestic politics -
domestic politics had implications for a country's foreign policy, which in return had
implications for domestic issues.131 The committee recommended a re-prioritization of
Canada's national security policy, in which the primary objective of the CF was to defend the Canadian homeland, followed by contributions to the defence of North America
York. See Parliament of Canada. Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy: Security in a Changing World," (Ottawa: 1994). Canada, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, 5. 130 This term has been coined by Michael Cox and colleagues. See for example Cox, Booth, and Dunne, The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989-1999. 31 Fareed Zakaria has superbly described the debate between Aussenpolitik and Innenpolitik in Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17 (Summer 1992). 254 through NORAD and other bilateral defence agreements with the United States, and the
1 ^7 maintenance of collective security in Europe. Those recommendations found acceptance in the forces and among the lobby groups supporting a more capable
Canadian military, such as the Conference of Defence Associations.133
Besides inviting studies from special interest groups, academics, and Canadian civil society at large, the Committee also visited various Canadian Forces bases across the country and some CF units deployed on peacekeeping mission to Bosnia, Croatia and the Adriatic, to name only a few. According to Stairs, these visits had an enormous impact on the committee members.134 They demonstrated to its members that the
Canadian public at large was in great support of Canadian peacekeeping operations and that the soldiers deployed in harm's way should receive the equipment they required to carry out their missions and to protect themselves.
In the end, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy outlined the importance of conventional military capabilities, particularly those for peacekeeping or peacemaking operations abroad. It singled out the army as an instrument of the government, the committee also recognized the new face of threats in the post-Cold War environment.135 It argued that weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as the widespread deployment of land mines have become new threats to Canada. Landmines, in particular, pose a great threat to
Canadian soldiers being deployed in peacekeeping operations such as the one in Bosnia.
Canada, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, 9. The most active special interest group pushing for Canadian military capabilities is the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) based in Ottawa who mostly consists of retired senior military officers. 134 Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," 105. Canada, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, 15-16. 255
With regards to the overall budget, the Committee recommended a cut in
Canadian defence expenditures in order to avert further reductions in the future that could potentially paralyze the forces altogether. Affected by these cuts was the Canadian mission to NATO and it was recommended to cut the personnel by 50%. At the same time, however, the CF was to remain a unified and multi-purpose military "composed of sea, land, and air elements that are: properly equipped, able to operate together at home in defence of Canada's territorial sovereignty and security, and able to operate together at home in defence of Canada's multilateral peace and security interests and responsibilities."136 In terms of procurements, the Committee recommended an increase of the size of the army by 3,500, to maintain the size of its naval fleet of destroyers and frigates,137 to buy new search and rescue helicopters, and to purchase modern armoured personnel carriers. It was suggested to buy these capabilities off the shelf rather than going through a decade long and complex procurement process. Overall, however, the recommendation of the Committee was to scale back the air force, maintain the level of the navy, and increase the army. It was explicitly acknowledged that the changing security environment and the nature of new threats such as unstable states (such as in the former Yugoslavia) placed a greater importance on conventional military capabilities, particularly on the army.138
In more general terms, the 1994 Defence White Paper continued to show a commitment to a more continentalist approach of Canada's national security policy. This was already apparent with the publication of the previous White Paper in 1987 and was amplified by a closer Canada-US relationship in other policy areas such as the economic
136 Ibid., iii and 35. 137 Ibid., 36. 138 Ibid., 15. 256 relationship. In the later part of the Mulroney government, Canada signed a free trade agreement with the United States, which was later expanded into the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).139 The more continentalist approach to Canadian defence policy also included a reduced priority for NATO. By the time the White Paper was published, the CF had already closed its two bases in Germany as part of a
Government-wide fiscal restructuring process. Until 1997 the CF had to cope with an almost 15% budget reduction; the armed forces were reduced from a 75,000-strong force to about 60,000. This included a general reduction of the senior ranks in the CF. Also, capital investments in infrastructure and equipment were delayed or stretched out over the next 15 years. The only one of the three services that saw a boost in personnel was the army. The Government recognized the services the army had accomplished in the peacekeeping operations. It therefore pledged 3,000 additional troops for the army as well as the purchase of new armoured personal carriers (APCs). At the time the White Paper was published, the Canadian government had deployed Canadian Forces to the Balkans in order to ensure European security. In this sense, despite the fiscal constraints of the CF,
Canada had done more than its share in European security.140
The White Paper also reiterated Canada's commitments to the world and intended to expand its military links to the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.141 To this extent, as one Canadian defence analyst noted, "it would appear that in the post-Cold
War era, Ottawa intends to conduct a security policy more global in scope than it has for
13 For a sceptical view of this continentalist approach see Clarkson, Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State. For the latest work examining the more continentalist approach and Canada's defence relationship with the United States after September 11th see Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and North America (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005). 140 Sokolsky, Canada, Getting It Right This Time: The 1994 Defence White Paper, 24. 141 Canada, "1994 Defence White Paper," 37-38. 257 the last 50 years, one firmly anchored in North America but reaching out to new regions."142 In short, despite the budgetary cutbacks, Canada retained a general-purpose global combat capability.
The Foreign Policy White Paper
The new government promised Canadians to review Canada's foreign policy.143 It pledged to do so by setting up a "National Forum on Canada's International Relations" in which Canadians at large, including academics, policy makers and the non-governmental community in particular had the opportunity to contribute to a foreign policy review and important foreign policy issues as identified by the Minister of External Affairs.144 The forum was held in Ottawa for four days and debated about themes such as economic justice, foreign aid, human rights and others.145 The Government saw this as a step
""Sokolsky, Canada, Getting It Right This Time: The 1994 Defence White Paper, 10. 143 The Defence Committee published its report on 2 November 1994 followed by the Foreign Policy Committee's report on 15 November 1994. See Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future - Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: The Committee, 1994). The report was also accompanied by two other volumes: Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future - Dissenting Opinions and Appendices (Ottawa: The Committee, 1994); Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future - the Position Papers. 144 During the election campaign in 1993, Chretien's Liberals promised to Canadians to 'democratize' the Canadian foreign policy making process and reaching out to civil society for ideas and advise. For details see for example Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model," in To Walk without Fear - the Global Movement to Ban Landmines, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron, Brian W. Tomlin, and Robert J Lawson (Oxford, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); Tim Draimin and Betty Plewes, "Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy," in Canada among Nations - Democracy and Foreign Policy, ed. Maywell A.; Molot Cameron, Maureen A (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995); Stephen Lee, "Beyond Consultations: Public Contributions to Making Foreign Policy," in Canada among Nations - Leadership and Dialogue, ed. Fen O. Hampson and Maureen A. Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1998); Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Elusive Ideal"; Kim Richard Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?," Canadian Foreign Policy l,no. 3 (1993). 145 For a great and detailed discussion of the outreach process and the hearings of the various parliamentary committees see Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," 97. 258 towards democratizing Canadian foreign policy.1 Stephen Lee argues that "the Forum is designed to include a wide range of sectors of civil society: local community leaders, journalists, business, labour, and professional groups, as well as academics, experts, and foreign affairs NGO's."147 This was, as Denis Stairs argues, not a commonly known process of the Department of Foreign Affairs, which traditionally perceived issues of
148 international peace and security too vital to be debated by the public.
The White Paper was based on the recommendation of the report of the Foreign
Policy Committee.149 Its membership was somewhat larger than that of the Defence
Committee and researched a much larger agenda. Its two co-chairs, Janice Gross Stein and Pierre Pettigrew used roundtables as a tool for involving actors from the civil society involved and to sense from Canadians what priorities and roles they wanted the department to carry out. However, because the scope of the committee was so broad, it was decided to create subcommittees that allowed hearings for a wider community.
Overall, the committee held over 700 meetings, received 550 briefs and heard from 550 witnesses and put special emphasis in its report on Canadian prosperity and employment for Canadians.150 In the end, the tone of its final report was similar to that of the Defence
Committee in the sense that it recommended reductions of the foreign service and a geographical relocation of the officers.151 The central argument of the White Paper was that Canada's international success and involvement increasingly derived from a healthy
146 This notion was first introduced in the Liberal Red Book. See Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada (Ottawa: 1993). 147 Lee, "Beyond Consultations: Public Contributions to Making Foreign Policy," 60. 148 Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," 92. 149 Government of Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement. 150 Ibid. 151 This caused some frustration among the Foreign Service officers community. For a critical examination of the foreign policy white paper see for example David Malone, "Foreign Policy Reviews Reconsidered," International Journal 56, no. 3 (Autumn 2001). 259
economy at home. As a result, the first priority of Canadian foreign policy was to ensure
domestic economic security and to seek new international markets to explore in order to
sustain it. Gordon Smith, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as David Malone
argued, heavily influenced this notion and vision. He had a three pillar vision that was
based on (1) Canadian prosperity and global economic interdependence; (2) physical
security for Canadians; and (3) Canadian values.152 NATO's soft enlarging and reaching
out process, as discussed earlier, became vital for Canada because of the difficult
domestic situation. It was also recognized that economic inequalities between developed
and less developed countries could be one of the root causes for political, economic and
humanitarian crisis around the world. These two examples exemplified the importance of
the new dimension of security in the post-Cold War era and the tendency that foreign
policy ultimately was domestic policy and vice versa. Through the process of
globalization, for example, international labour laws and regulations, which were
conceived as the sole prerogative of the state during the Cold War, had entered the realm
of international affairs and have affected countries in many ways.153 This activism in the
foreign policy statement was consistent with the activist tone of the defence policy
statement, which was only published a few weeks earlier: "The first major message from
Canadians was that they wanted to remain actively involved in the world."154 The
economic dimension of this new liberal-internationalism was very apparent in the
government's actions and was based on Canada's national interest. The nation realized more than ever that its future was dependent on the competitiveness of its economy and
152 Ibid.: 565. 153 For a good example where international rules and norms have affected Canadian policy and jurisdiction see Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State. Ibid, and Government of Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement. 260
workforce. This also meant that Canada was not to fall into isolationism. It was not
surprising then that the Chretien government announced a Team-Canada, which operated
out of the Department of Foreign Affairs, to promote Canadian trade relations abroad.
Andre Oullet, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, outlined in
the House of Commons Canada's new economic priorities. While the overall budget of
DFAIT was cut by 7,5% (or $104,9 million) in the fiscal year 1995/6, its international
economic section was not touched by these reductions and a government wide Team-
Canada was created. Team Canada introduced new partnerships between the government
and the business community. Its objective was to provide technical assistance to
Canadians to get access to foreign markets and to help to position them in the globalized
economy. In a sense, the Team-Canada approach was an elaborate inter-departmental,
inter-governmental network founded on a partnership with the Canadian business
community.
Security issues such as the international migration of refugees, transnational
crimes, global diseases, the pollution of the environment and global disasters in general
also posed danger to Canadian and international borders. As David Malone said: "indeed,
human rights abuses in some countries compounded economic problems, as did
environmental degradation. Sustainable development remained an elusive objective."155
This notion was also a good reference point for understanding the more continentalist
view Canadian that foreign economic policy has taken in the early 1990s. Chretien's predecessor, Brian Mulroney, had singed free trade agreements with the United States
and concluded the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United
Malone, "Foreign Policy Reviews Reconsidered," 567. 261
States and Mexico. In this sense, the policy of Canada adjusting its foreign and defence
policy while paying closer attention to the North American continent it shared with the
United States was consistent with not only seeking its own security but also that of its
closest ally. Both Mulroney and Chretien understood this dimension and signed a
trilateral free trade agreement with the United States. In 1995 exports to the United States
counted for nearly 80% of Canada's exports and 65% foreign domestic investments came
from the United States. The FTA treaty also ensured Canadian access to American
markets. Thus, it was not surprising that the Chretien government's intention was to
promote this economic integration instead of investing into military capabilities.
Chretien's foreign policy was also consistent with the foreign policy of the Clinton
administration.
The White Paper also argued that Canada's international engagement was
grounded on Canadian values and principles - tolerance, democracy, equity, human
rights, social justice and the peaceful resolution of differences.156 This identification was
similar to the findings of the foreign policy committee and formed the basis of Canada's
actions abroad. Sending Canadian peacekeepers abroad could best defend those values,
according to the view of Canadians. Peacekeeping became very popular among
Canadians particularly in the 1960s because it showed the world that Canadian
international activism was different from that of its southern neighbour, the United
States.157
Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State, Government of Canada, Canada in the World; Government Statement. 157 Denis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," Policy Options (January - Februaray2001):46. 262
While the CF's operational tempo exceeded the capabilities of the forces, the government did not perceive itself as a small power but as a major international player.
The government told Canadians that "we are an influential nation, asserting our interests directly around the world, including at the highest tables reserved for the few, such as the
Quadrilateral Group of the world's leading traders and the G-7."158 Meanwhile, the notion of the necessity of selectiveness also appears among government officials and
Canadian society. The geopolitical power resources required it to be selective about the places it chose to get involved in based on the mantra: "more effective and less costly."159
Meanwhile, membership in international organizations ensured Canada a seat at the table where crucial information about troubled spots in the world were exchanged and debated about. It also ensured a rules based international order, one that Canada was so dependent on for its economic security.
Canada: A European country?
The government argued that Canada and Europe shared similar cultural values, close economic ties, and a common heritage that tied the two together. As Kim Nossal argued, this political-social-cultural affinity did not evolve after 1989 and has been ingrained into
Canada's self-perception and political practice since the 1770s.160 People living in the northern half of the North American continent shared transatlantic ties in terms of family, nationality, commercial interests, and political-cultural interdependence. These transatlantic ties have continued to play a significant role in Canada's foreign and defence
Government of Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement. 159 Rioux and Hay have labelled this policy "selective internationalism". See Jean-Francois Rioux and Robin Hay, "Canadian Foreign Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism?," International Journal 54 (Winter 1998-9). 160 Kim Richard Nossal, "A European Nation? The Life and Times of Atlanticism in Canada," in Making a Difference?: Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, ed. John English and Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Lester Pub., 1992). 263 policy after the Cold War. Paul Buteux, Michel Fortman, and Pierre Martin showed that despite Canada's aging population, the multicultural nature of Canadian society did not have a negative effect on Canadian foreign policy. In the 1970s, the composition of the
Canadian population consisted of 82 per cent of Western Europeans who had migrated to
Canada (mostly British, French, German, and Italian). This picture had changed somewhat in 1991 when only 41 per cent of Canadian immigrants came from Europe.161
In fact, Buteux's and his colleagues' study disproves the hypothesis that new immigrants to Canada have diluted Canada's image and perception as a "European nation." Paul
Buteux and Michel Fortman concluded that "the hypothesis that immigration affected the outlook of the Canadian public on Europe as a focus of foreign policy may also be intuitively attractive, but it does not seem to stand up under closer scrutiny."162
Particularly among the younger generation, the support for Canada's involvement in
European security was significant. Younger immigrants were more likely to support
Canada's military engagements in the Balkans than any other segment of Canadian society.163 The point is that in light of the pre-eminence of the domestic environment in the early 1990s, none of Canada's ethnic minorities opposed Canada's support for a
Eurocentric foreign policy and NATO enlargement. What Canadians at large were concerned about was the evolving crisis on the Balkans and NATO's military operations there.
161 Paul Buteux, Michel Fortmann, and Pierre Martin, "Canada and the Expansion of NATO: A Study in Elite Attitudes and Public Opinion," in Will NA TO Go East? - the Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), 155-56. 162 Ibid., 159. 264
In this sense, as the Canadian government noted, "the constancy of our commitment was firm, as attested to by our contributions to NATO, the OSCE, and to
UN peacekeeping within the European continent."164 The North Atlantic Alliance thereby played a pivotal role for maintaining stability during times of fundamental change in
Europe.
The difficult question of what to do with Russia
On 27 May 1997 the Heads of State and Government, NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Founding Act of mutual relations between NATO and the Russian Federation. Solana was given the exceptional authority of the North Atlantic Council to directly negotiate with Russia. The result was the agreement signed in 1997 in Paris. As part of this treaty, a permanent joint council was to be created as a forum of mutual political consultation and cooperation. The council was scheduled to meet once a month. During the first meeting of the Council, held in ministerial session, the politicians discussed the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and welcomed the participation of Russia. Debated also was Russia's individual membership in the PfP program while NATO welcomed a Russian military representative to its NATO's headquarter to establish a liaison cell. Manfred Woerner noted in an opening statement to the North Atlantic Council:
We will allow no-one and nothing to manoeuvre our Alliance into a false alternative: to have to choose between Russia and the other Cooperation Partners. Our message to Russia has been consistent and clear ever since after our Summit in London you sent me to Moscow to extend the hand of friendship: "yes" to an ever closer partnership with a democratic and reformist Russia - "no" to any revival of expansionism. Our vital objective
Government of Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement. 265
remains to build a new comprehensive Euro- Atlantic architecture of security with, and not without or against Russia.165
This institutionalized relationship was the result of a long rapprochement process. Russia had signed the PfP documents in May 1995 at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council meeting that started a broader and more intense dialogue with NATO. Subsequent meetings on the ambassadorial level took place between NATO and Russian officials who were working towards improving information, sharing security issues, military doctrines and strategies, conflict prevention and crisis management procedures.166
The NATO-Russia Partnership Council's objective was to work in the spirit of following the principles of democracy and cooperative security. NATO made clear in the founding act that NATO and Russia do not see each other as adversaries.167 The aim of this partnership was to make decisions more transparent for both actors as well as engaging the Soviet Union on a variety of policy issues in order to test their commitments to the partnership. In return, NATO committed itself not to build or store nuclear weapons on the soil of NATO's new member states. In fact, NATO committed itself to a policy of "three no's" - no intention, no need, and no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in a territory of a new member of the Alliance.168
Canada actively supported this proposal but also warned its NATO allies that they should not be taken hostage to negotiations with Russia. Canada's Foreign Minister
Opening Statement, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. 166 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance - 1995/96, 33. 167 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris, May 27, 1997. 168 See Secretary General responding to a reporter's question in Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 18th December, 1996. See also NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001, Part IV. 266
Lloyd Axworthy noted: "We should do our utmost to reach agreement if at all possible.
We should be prepared to review Russian proposals very carefully, in a pragmatic and flexible manner in order to address Russia's legitimate concerns. [...] But we need also to make clear to Russia that it is being offered a historic opportunity to move closer to the
Alliance and to a new relationship with all its European and North American neighbours."169
Besides this diplomatic language of fostering the bilateral relationship between
NATO and Russia, the Russian government had made clear that it deemed NATO's enlargement to include Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia as unacceptable for three main reason:170 First, an enlarged NATO would offset the military- strategic balance in Europe and would augment NATO's conventional forces by somewhere between 15-20%. Second, Russia feared that if new members were admitted to the Alliance, other steps might follow. Russia feared an enlargement of existing military infrastructure in Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the deployment of NATO troops to those countries. Furthermore, the deployment of forces might also mean a permanent stationing of NATO nuclear stockpiles and weapons on their territory. Third, the arms reduction negotiations that were taking place in the mid-
1990s were perceived by Russia as favouring NATO and as such they would offset the strategic balance in Europe. It became clear during the early negotiations for the
Partnership Council that Russia had envisioned a larger comprehensive security system
169 Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997. 170 See Russian Defence Minister Ronionov's statement while visiting NATO headquarters in 1996 in Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 18th December, 1996. 267
than NATO had in mind. Whereas the Alliance intended to create a joint European
security system in which Russia was envisioned to play a role, the government of Russia
made clear that it was looking forward to a worldwide comprehensive security
arrangement.
The NATO Alliance basically disregarded such claims and restated its objectives
of making the Permanent Joint Council a successful forum for cooperation and
consultation. The Ministerial Meeting in 1997 concluded that "this marks the beginning
of a new strong, stable and enduring partnership which will be of vital importance for
European security. [...] The activities of the Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity, transparency and full respect for the interests of other states."171
NATO Enlargement materializes: The first round
The NATO Alliance realized in the early 1990s that threats to European security and order were located on the continent's periphery, particularly in the Balkans and the
Baltics. And yet, one might argue, it was rather surprising that NATO started its enlargement process not in Southern Europe but in Central Europe. Form a strategic point of view, it might have made more sense for NATO to invite some of the Balkan states, such as Slovenia, into the Alliance first for two reasons: first, those countries were the first ones to drastically reform their domestic institutions, and secondly, they were the most fearful countries of Russia because of their close proximity to Russia as well as a large Russian diaspora. The first countries to join NATO were Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic. This meant that other countries, particularly from the Balkans and the
171 Final Communique. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997. 268
Balitcs were excluded in this round of enlargement, because NATO perceived security risks in the Balkans and the Baltics as too immediate for the Alliance.
It was also assumed that NATO enlargement was largely a technical problem rather than a political issue. Various bodies and committees such as the NACC, the PfP program, and the EAPC have helped to shape and steer the transformation process. They were all set up "to create a more direct and progressively deeper relationship between
NATO and its eastern neighbours."172 However, after the institutions and programs for promoting and guiding the enlargement process were put in place, NATO was faced with making a decision about aspiring membership countries.173
At the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997, Slovenia and Romania received special status in NATO and were seen as the first countries of the pool of applicant states to join
NATO. This notion received strong endorsement of Canada and Germany.174 France indicated that it strongly supported Romania's application for membership because of cultural and historical ties.175 However, this move did not find support by the United
States, which was not willing to go beyond the initial three candidates Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary. Ronald D. Asmus argued that this was for four reasons: first, inviting a small group of countries was consistent with US views of undertaking the process of enlargement with significant foresight and caution.176 Second, from a military perspective, it was much more practicable to add a small number of countries to NATO's
172 Edmunds, "NATO and Its New Members," 147. 173 Wiarda, "The Politics of European Enlargement: NATO, the EU and the New US-European Relationship, Occasional Paper No. 67." 174 Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Expanding NATO: The Case for Slovenia," Parameters (Winter 2002-03): 65. 175 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round," Survival 40, no. 3 (1998), 171. 176 Asmus and Council on Foreign Relations, Opening Nato 's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, 218. 269
military structures. Third, domestic politics in the United States played a role in
reducing the opposition against enlargement in Congress. Fourth, admitting a small group
of states would maximize support among the allies.178
Although Slovenia and Romania lost the diplomatic battle, the NATO Alliance
and Canada's foreign minister publicly stated that NATO's door would remain open for
future rounds of enlargement.179 This, however, was also a clear indication that despite
the political will to have further rounds of enlargement, there was no guarantee for those
countries to become full members. Thus, only Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the transatlantic defence Alliance at its historic 50th anniversary celebrations
during the Washington Summit in 1999. The Washington Summit reiterated its open-door
commitment and concluded:
The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability.
According to an October 2001 report of NATO parliamentarians, NATO's 1999 round of
enlargement can be seen as a success. It turned out that the skeptics of NATO
enlargement were proven wrong. The report, which was adopted unanimously, stated that
the Alliance remained an effective organization and showed political cohesion.180 Also,
by inviting new members into the Alliance, enlarging NATO had not inherited significant
178 ibid. 7 Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997. 180 The report was adopted only very shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11th. See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001, Part II. 270 risks, as some critics feared it would. Quite to the contrary. Some of the countries became security providers rather than security consumers. This might be explained by NATO's comprehensive guidelines that were put in place (the MAP for example), which reduced the risk for surprises for both NATO and the new member states at times when the former
Soviet Union was in political turmoil.
It was also apparent that the new members have undergone profound domestic changes and their militaries and administration are now guided by democratic principles.
Their forces are now under a democratic and civilian control. The governments have also developed long-term restructuring programs of their armed forces in terms of acquiring new hardware and training, and have adopted Western-style training programs.
This, however, was not to say that there were no problems with NATO's enlargement. Most Eastern European countries, for example, continued to have large armies, which were too big and too inflexible to carry out NATO's new military tasks.
Furthermore, their defence budgets remain constrained and acquisition or modernization plans were put on hold. In terms of reforming their civil-military relationship, their parliamentary oversight mechanisms are still not effective enough. This was due to the lack of resources, expertise and staff that was trained for issues related to defence and security. As a result, newly acquired powers of parliaments were limited. It turned out that the agenda of parliamentarians was filled more with questions of economic consolidation, institutional democratization and other political reforms rather than 271 military reforms. This busy agenda pushed back issues of national security policy making.181
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to examine Canada's role in NATO's enlargement process.
Although many primary government documents still remain classified and thus do not allow for a detailed picture behind the scenes, Canada was an active player in NATO and a helpful ally to make NATO's enlargement possible. Canada had expertise and offered it to NATO at various occasions. This functionalist principle became quite useful in molding the new NATO. It also showed that Canada was not in decline. Quite to the contrary, Canada was active in NATO in the 1990s, given its fiscal situation. Canadian foreign policy makers chose to ensure that Canada's domestic house was in order and that the country was prosperous. This policy of fiscal restraint and restructuring was popular among Canadians, which also explains the fact that there was no significant domestic resistance against an evolving new NATO. NATO's new role provided it with a new lease of life for a role in the post-Cold War international order. Meanwhile, Canada welcomed the strong US leadership in the debate about NATO enlargement. Although
Canada had little influence over the nature or direction of NATO's strategic issues, it was not a laggard; it was an active and committed ally and functionally quite useful to the
Alliance.
181 Other countries were faced with similar difficulties. The Czech Republic was confronted with weak institutions of communication between the Ministry of Defence and parliament and a lack of expertise of parliamentarians and their staff in security and defence issues. Lithuania, on the other hand, debated for a long time about the future of its defence policy and thus limited parliament's oversight roles. See for example Timothy Edwards, 150, 272
CHAPTER 6
CANADA AND THE MILITARY BURDEN OF EUROPEAN
SECURITY
Introduction
The central argument of Jack Granatstein and Andrew Cohen was that Canada was in decline in the 1990s. Both authors, as well as other reports, focus on the military as the unit of analysis to prove their hypothesis. This chapter will also examine Canada's role in the Gulf War, the Balkans, as well as compare Canada's relative defence spending with those of other NATO allies. However, contrary to Cohen, Granatstein and others, this chapter intends to show that the 1990s were not a "decade of darkness" but and era of
Canadian activity and contribution.
Gulf War I
On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. That same day, the UN Security
Council discussed the matter and passed Resolution 660 demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops.1 Four days later, the Council passed another, more forceful resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and imposed economic sanctions against
Iraq.2 The ground invasion to liberate Kuwait started on 16 January 1991 after Iraq had failed to comply with UN demands to withdraw its troops.
Even though the liberation of Kuwait was a UN mission, the Gulf War also had a significant impact on the NATO Alliance and Canada's foreign and defence policy in particular. It demonstrated to Ottawa that despite the absence of a threat from the Soviet
1 S/RES/660, 2 August 1990. 2S/RES/660, 6 August 1990. 273
Union, the world was still an unstable place where violent conflicts were likely to occur.
Indeed, there remained a demand for military capabilities and military commitments to
NATO. If it wasn't clear during the Cold War, it became visible in the immediate post-
Cold War order that Canada shared a common strategic interest with the United States -
peace, order, stability, and prosperity in Europe.3 In many ways, Canada was faced with
similar challenges to its national security, and, in the case of the Gulf War, also had
common interests.
Canada answered the call for coalition forces mandated by UN Security Council
Resolution 661 and sent what was requested,4 including three Canadian warships,5 a
supply vessel, a field hospital,6 a fighter jet squadron,7 and Special Forces personnel.
Canada successfully ran a blockade against Iraq. It also dispatched three hundred field
engineers to the United Nations Iraqi/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).9 Six
thousand and six hundred Canadian Forces personnel were deployed in the Gulf
operations before, during and after the hostilities.10 In support of the post-Gulf War
embargo of Iraq (Operation Barrier), Canada also dispatched one ship and 250 support
personnel to the Maritime Interception Force (MIF), which was deployed in the Red Sea
3 See for example Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the New Europe," Statements and Speeches 90/9, Humber College, Toronto, 26 May 1990, 2-3. 4 The operation was called Operation FR1CTION/SCIMITAR/SCALPEL/ACCORD/FLAG. 5 The estroyer Athabaskan, Terra Nova, and the Protecteur. 6 This was based in Saudi Arabia. 7 In total, Canada sent twenty-six CF-18s. At the time, Canada owned 127 in total. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance - 1991/92, 53. See for example Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces in the Gulf War (1990-1991)," BG-97.017 - April 3, 1997. See also Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 236-38. 9 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance - 1991/92, 53. Canada did not partake in Operation Desert Shield or Operation Desert Storm. Department of National Defence, Policy Group, Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations, available at http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/content.asp?id-=%7B4433D831- 9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4ClDA3D%7D, accessed on 1 June 2007. 274 in 1992. Even though Canada's commitment was a small one, and, as Sean Maloney argued, it was "not a traditional area of Canadian interest,"12 Canada was able to commit troops and resources when called upon.13 The war with Iraq in 1991 demonstrated that
Canada came up with "just enough"14 capabilities and troops to have a seat at the table in
NATO, the foremost international organization dealing with providing collective defence.
It was a small contribution, but nonetheless one that the United States and other coalition forces thankfully accepted for this collective security operation. At home, the Mulroney government sold this mission to Canadians as part of "a broader definition of peacekeeping."15
The Gulf War demonstrated what comparative advantages NATO possessed in international security. Even though NATO as an international defence Alliance was not formally involved in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi forces, NATO military assets and planning capabilities were used by the coalition of the willing (including Canada) to plan and execute the operation in the Gulf. NATO's long practiced integrated command and control structure facilitated interoperability amongst the various coalition military forces, and made a rapid build-up in and deployment to the Gulf possible. This would not have been achieved without making use of NATO's infrastructure in Europe.
Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 239-40. 12 Sean M. Maloney, War with Iraq: Canada's Strategy in the Persian Gulf, 1990-2002, Martello Papers, 24 (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 2002), 7. Canada's military involvements in the Gulf region are well documented. See for example Duncan Miller and Sharon Hobson, The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War (Toronto: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), Jean Morin and Richard Gimblett, Operation Friction, 1990-1991 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997). 14 This term has been coined by Joel Sokolsky. See Sokolsky, "A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances." Nicholas Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 69. 275
During the liberation of Kuwait, and particularly during the sea and air operations around Kuwait and Iraq, the allies depended heavily on NATO and its common operational procedures, habits, techniques, and practices of cooperation. In short, the interoperability among the Western allies facilitated a rather smooth conduct of the liberation of Kuwait. Even though NATO territory was not directly invaded, it was nonetheless threatened, because Turkey, as a NATO ally, shared a common border with
Iraq. The Turkish government officially requested military assistance from its NATO allies for the defence of its territory.16 Even though NATO did not participate in the liberation of Kuwait, forces from NATO members were part of the operation that was mandated by the UN Security Council and made use of NATO facilities such as bases and other infrastructure. Besides offering air defence capabilities to Turkey, the Alliance also made its Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) technology available to coalition forces and as such contributed to the air reconnaissance of the Gulf. This shows that the NATO Alliance was capable and willing to support one or more of its allies with military expertise and equipment even in situations where NATO as an organization per se was not formally involved. NATO's Defence Planning Committee concluded: "We warmly welcome the success of the international coalition forces in the recent Gulf War.
We note with satisfaction the effectiveness of the prompt action taken by the Alliance in deploying naval and air forces to its Southern region to deter any possible attacks on its members."17 This leaves the impression that there was an evolving collaboration between
Turkey shared a border with Irak and its government was anxious that the conflict would spread into Turkey. 17 Final Communique of the Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, Article 5. 276 the United Nations and NATO that sparked a debate inside the Alliance whether or not
NATO should go out of area.
The Visegrad countries, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, also participated in the war against Iraq. Although their contribution was small, relative to the total NATO contribution somewhat insignificant, it, nonetheless, was a symbolic contribution made to NATO. The political intention of these states was to show that they were serious about becoming a close partner of the Western Alliance and striving to become security exporters, as opposed to security consumers. Poland sent two hospital ships, the Czech Republic deployed its chemical decontamination unit, and Hungary made thirty-seven volunteers available.18
The Balkans
During the 1990s, Canadians sent some of their best-trained soldiers, diplomats and development workers to the Balkans in order to bring peace and stability to the region.
The government committed force through various multilateral efforts, initially through the European Community and the United Nations. Canadians also contributed to the implementation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), in the person of Louise Arbour who was appointed by the UN Security Council in 1996 as the Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. She held this appointment until 1999. Canadian soldiers also participated in two NATO-led missions who constituted, in the words of Nicholas
Gammer, the "largest military operations ever undertaken by the Alliance. Both
8 Simon, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?," 27. 277
[missions] represent the integrated use, on an unprecedented scale, of multilateral institutions committed to the cause of humanitarian intervention."19
Canada's contributions were not made without debate among Canadians about the necessity of such deployments, especially in times of an economic downturn and empty public chequing accounts, as discussed in the previous chapter. Of concern to the military establishment in particular was also Canada's already constrained and aging military capabilities and thus the increased risks this posed for its soldiers,20
In 1991, the Mulroney government, aware of the new post-Cold War order challenges, demanded more than a peacekeeping operation in the Yugoslav civil war and one in which a multinational UN force was to be interpositioned between the belligerents to monitor a cease-fire, or watch over the disarmament of some militant groups.21 The government was hoping for a more forceful mission under Chapter VII of the UN. In general, the post-Cold War era called for a more interventionist approach to conflict resolution as the conflicts to solve became more complex and diverse. Canada not only recognized this shift, but also endorsed it by making troops available. As then Foreign
Minister Barbara McDougall said: "In the era of human rights, Canada has rejected the doctrine of non-intervention and insisted on international oversight in the United Nations and the CSCE."22 In this sense, the Canadian government under Brian Mulroney was advocating a more forceful liberal internationalism, which meant that Canadian soldiers had to adjust their image of peacekeepers. Up until then, the peacekeeping missions in the
Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 3. See for example Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 131. Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 3. Barbara McDougall, "Meeting the Challenge of the New World Order," International Journal 47 (Summer 1992): 467. 278
Suez Canal crisis in 1956 and Cyprus (1959-1993) were seen as the peacekeeping prototype for the CF.
Geopolitically, the crisis in the Balkans had significance not only for Canada's foreign and defence policy. It also marked an important event in international affairs that affected a variety of major actors - international institutions, nation states and individuals. The media also played an important role in the conflict. Images of fighter jets dropping bombs or causing devastation to local infrastructure on the ground, mass- graves of ethnically cleansed people, and general human suffering were not seen in
Europe since the end of World War II. These images were transmitted by media outlets around the globe and put governments under significant pressure to either act or to alter their actions. The evolving crisis in the Balkans posed a significant threat: the nature of the crisis had the potential to seriously undermine European security and revive Cold-
War-like east-west tensions.23 The transatlantic relationship was also put under strain.24
Throughout the crisis, the United States demanded from its European allies to do more to contain and solve an ethno-nationalist conflict that was just on their doorstep.25 When the
EU failed to bring peace to its Southern region, once again, the transatlantic Alliance, represented by NATO, was called upon, this time to help in a crisis-management operation.
See for example Mearsheimer, "The False Promise oflnternational Institutions," or Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War." A good discussion can be found in Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Bush Administration (1989-1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001), 147-204. For a good analysis of the countries' policies towards the crisis in the Balkans see for example Lenard J. Cohen, Alexander Moens, and Allen G. Sens, NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003). 279
NATO's bold diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives in Yugoslavia heralded a more interventionist doctrine of international affairs. It set a precedent of a justification of intervening into the domestic affairs of a sovereign state based on humanitarian grounds.
Canada was a strong supporter of a more active and interventionist NATO in former
Yugoslavia. For example, during the UNPROFOR mission in the spring of 1993,
Canada's vigorous defense of the Eastern Bosnian town of Srebrenica could be seen as evidence of a more aggressive military operation that went beyond traditional peacekeeping.26 This incident did not remain unnoticed in the public debate back home in
Canada. The majority of the Canadian public supported a more robust Canadian peacekeeping mission.27 Some analysts have argued that this operation marked a significant change in Canada's foreign policy.28
Canada's more interventionist foreign policy was consistent with NATO policy. It was in Canada's national interests to keep a close tie with European security issues, especially after the EC decided to develop an autonomous European foreign and defence policy as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. Due to their unique geopolitical location and reputation as a trustworthy transatlantic ally, Canadians worked as the bridge builder between NATO and the UN. Ottawa was particularly frustrated with the way the UN
For a journalistic descriptions and quite detailed account of the evolutions around the massacre see for example Carol Off, The Ghosts ofMedak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2004). 27 According to a Gallup Report in 1992, Canadians strongly supported their troops in Yugoslavia and 64% believed that the CF should be authorized to use their weapons to bring peace and stability to the country. See Gallup Report, October 1992. See for example Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, No. 3 (Toronto, Washington, D.C.: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994). 280 handled the crisis in Yugoslavia and the slow responses of the international community to problems on the ground and became an advocate for a more proactive role of NATO.29
Canada acted as a bridge builder because it was in its own national interest to do so. The advantage of doing so was to guarantee that Canada and its interests would not be excluded from Europe. In addition, Canada had functional expertise to bring to the table: it was one of the most experienced countries in peacekeeping operations and member of both organizations, NATO and the UN. It also had a good situational awareness of the requirements on the ground and the respect of its allies.30 Thus, it was somewhat natural that Canada would carry out this function and make its expertise available to NATO in order to ensure that the Alliance would successfully carry out its mission under the mandate of the UN. Coincidentally, this was also the first ever mission that was
"contracted out" by the UN in the sense that the UN asked a regional organization to carry out a peacekeeping operation.31 This co-operation between NATO and the UN was explored in the UN Secretary General's report, "An Agenda For Peace," which proposed that regional organizations might be used for preventive diplomacy operations as well as post-conflict peacebuilding.32
The Prime Minister, for example, wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar asking for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to deal with the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yugoslavia. Mulroney's initiative failed because of a lack of support of Canada's closest allies, such as Britain. See Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 81- 83. 30 For a foreign military assessment of Canada's performance see for example Dawn M. Hewitt, From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans, Martello Papers; 18 (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 1998), 5. 31 See for example Jane Boulden, "NATO and the United Nations During UNPROFOR," NATO Fellowship Report 1999-2001. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping - Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992). 281
Prior to a more detailed analysis of Canada's contributions to peace and stability in the Balkans, Canada's bilateral relationship with Yugoslavia requires a historical explanation. It all started during the Second World War when four hundred and ninety seven Commonwealth airmen were shot down over Yugoslavian in an effort to liberate
Yugoslavia; twenty-five of those were Canadians serving in the Royal Canadian Air
Force (RCAF).33 This ultimate sacrifice (ca. 5% of the casualties) underscores Canada's investments in the region and helps to give us an indication as to what Ottawa's political interests were to take part in the intervention in the 1990s.
The government in Ottawa was informed by the embassy of Yugoslavia in Ottawa on 8 December 1945 that the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly in Belgrade had proclaimed the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The new country was immediately recognized by Canada, Great Britain, and the United States later that month.
This decision to recognize the new federal Yugoslavia caused mixed reactions among
Yugoslav Canadians at home. A census poll in 1941 showed that twenty one thousand people were of Yugoslav decent, six thousand of Serbian, and twelve thousand of Croat heritage.34 The ethnic groups were organized into activist groups - for example the
Council of Canadian South Slavs supported the Tito regime and the Soviet Union whereas the Serbian Shield Society considered Canada's recognition of Yugoslavia a terrible mistake.35
Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 17. 34 Ibid., 19. 35 Ibid., 20. 282
In the early phase of the post-Cold War era, the Tito regime held a close relationship with the Soviet dictator Stalin. Canada's Department of External Affairs was aware of this relationship and viewed the cbuntry as aggressive and dogmatic in serving the interests of the Soviet Union, which created mistrust and suspicion in the bilateral relationship.37 In 1948 the Secretary of State for External Relations, Louis St. Laurent, while addressing the House of Commons expounded a more global role for Canada in international affairs. This included the increased involvement of Canada in Eastern
Europe.38
There was an early recognition in Ottawa of Yugoslavia's unique position in the
East-West relationship and Canada intended to nourish its bilateral relationship with
Yugoslavia by accepting Tito as its leader. Consequently, the government in Ottawa started a policy of rapprochement to Yugoslavia. This revitalization of the bilateral relationship coincided with the split between Tito and Stalin in June 1948, which provided new opportunities for Canadian foreign policy. A memorandum for Canada's
Minister of External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, noted: "Following the Stalin-Tito split, the Canadian foreign policy community recognized that Yugoslavia was admirably situated in geo-strategic and political terms as an important back door to Eastern Europe and specifically the Soviet Union."39 The decision was made in Ottawa to support Tito's ambitions for independence from the Soviet Union and to use the country as a
36 Marshall Josip Broz Tito was the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He was also the founder of the non-aligned movement. 37 Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950. Quoted in Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 21. 38 Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at the University of Toronto," cited in R. A. MacKay, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 390-93. 283 counterbalance against Soviet hegemony, even though it was widely known that the Tito regime was in massive violation of human rights. As such, one could argue, Canada used
Yugoslavia as a bridge to Eastern Europe and also worked hard as a moderator to ease the tensions between Yugoslavia and its neighbours.
Economically, the relationship between Canada and Yugoslavia was weak in the
1940s. Canadian investors were deterred by the political situation in Yugoslavia and feared that their capital investments were subject to state intervention.40 This, however, started to change when J. Scott Macdonald presented his credentials as Canada's ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1951. In conjunction with the new embassy came a package of economic assistance that was given to Yugoslavia through the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF). Canada also pushed for greater technical assistance for
Yugoslavia through the UN Technical Assistance Program.41
Meanwhile, NATO recognized the strategic importance of Yugoslavia and the border conflicts it had with its neighbours. At a NATO deputies meeting, officials were aware of the fact that Yugoslavia was incapable of defending itself in case of a hostile attack from one of its neighbours. The meeting in 1951 concluded that Yugoslavia should be supplied with military equipment and technology for better self-defence. In return for its actions, Ottawa demanded the release of Canadian prisoners of war. This is not to say that Canada was not cognizant of Yugoslav's communist foreign policy.
Canada continued to give economic support for reforms in Yugoslavia in the
1960s. Ottawa used its diplomatic leverage with international institutions to secure
40 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179-81. 41 Draft Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet, "Contributions to extra- budgetary programmes," Ottawa, September 28th, 1955, DEA/54750-DU-1-40, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 21, 99. 284 economic assistance for Yugoslavia and urged the country to make economic reforms.
Domestic reforms had become necessary when the split inside the communist bloc in the
1950s forced Yugoslavia to go through a period of transforming its agrarian, centralized economy into an economy that was driven by market forces. It was also at this time that the bilateral trade relationship between Canada and Yugoslavia started to rejuvenate.
Canada's diplomatic engagements in Yugoslavia allowed Ottawa to get a closer insight into the conflict in Vietnam as well as about China and Russia's intentions therein. This information was important for policy makers in Ottawa in order to assess how the Soviet Union used its influence with the non-aligned states, a status of
Yugoslavia that Canada had supported strongly.42 The question of non-alignment and national sovereignty became important for issues of European security when the Soviet
Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. In response to the crisis, Tito argued that it was an issue of Czech domestic sovereignty and that the international community had no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia. The Canadian government, on the other hand, had hoped for a larger transition in Eastern Europe and assumed that
Czechoslovakia was able to rise to a non-aligned country similar to that of Yugoslavia.43
Canada showed concern about Russia's military invasion and violence even though it refused to strongly condemn of Soviet actions in November 1968, one of the few NATO allies to do so.44 Ottawa anticipated that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would draw the
NATO Alliance into direct confrontation with one or more member states of the Warsaw
Pact.
42 See for example Memorandum from Head, European Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Relations with the Soviet Satellites, DEA/50128-B-40, January 17l\ 1956, in: Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 23, 521. 43 Ibid., 46. Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 146, 285
Canadian diplomats were aware that their views were always well received in
Belgrade because of Canada's unique ties to Europe and the United States while being a member of what John Brebner called the "transatlantic triangle."45 In this sense, Canada played a bridge building function and became the gatekeeper for exchanges of information. This reduced the possibility of misinformation and misperception among the major powers. It was accepted wisdom in the international community that Ottawa was well versed to engage diplomatically with members from both sides of the Cold War.46
This position served Canadian policy makers very well, and because of Canada's bridge building function retained Ottawa's influence in South-Eastern Europe.
In the 1970s, the republics of the Yugoslav federation gained more influence in the policy-making process of the federal government. The issue of nationalism began to affect the government's machinery when the republics demanded a larger voice in decisions about foreign policy issues. The consequence of the demand for greater autonomy coincided with a demand for a decentralization of the government services and decision-making. In 1971, during the so-called "Croatian spring,"47 the Croatian ethnic group demanded two things: that Croatian becomes an official language in Yugoslavia and to get more sovereignty from the federal government. Tito reacted to those calls by brutally suppressing those voices with police forces, which resulted in mass arrests.48
Canada's response to these internal conflicts of Yugoslavia was relatively cautious, in part because Ottawa respected the territorial sovereignty of the country and also because
Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: the Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain. Keating, Canada and World Order; The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 146. 47 The term Croatian Spring refers to a political movement that took place in the early 1970s. The objective of the movement was to press for more autonomous rights for Croatia in the Yugoslav federation. In addition, they also voiced demands for a tax reform, in which, for example, revenues made in the tourism industry were not completely sent to the federal government. Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 49. 286
of the debate about Quebec's sovereignty. The government was also aware of the large
Croatian minority that lived in Canada. As a result, Ottawa tried to avert a domestic
confrontation between the two Slavic groups and continued to follow a policy of
cautiousness.
Three years later, in 1974, a new constitution allowed for greater decentralization
of the Yugoslav federation and gave the republics more autonomy. The republics seized
this opportunity to become quasi-sovereign international actors and created their own
ministries of foreign affairs. Until 1991, Yugoslavia consisted of a federation of six
republics - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia - and the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. As much as
other members of the international community, the Canadian government had the
difficulty of coordinating its bilateral relationship with each of the specific republics and provinces. By virtue of their geographical location in Europe, it was natural that those republics that shared an external border with another country pursued a more active
foreign policy as opposed to other republics that were surrounded by republics of the
federation. Slovenia, for example, promoted a strong relationship with the European
communities, whereas the federal government in Belgrade still believed in the non-
aligned movement.50
During 1981 Yugoslavia was faced again with an internal uprising of one its ethnic groups. Marshall Tito had died in 1980, causing an internal struggle inside the
Communist party between the more liberal wing and its conservative counterpart. Serbian
49 They were given autonomy under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. See for example Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000). See for example Slavoljub Djukic, Milosevic and Markovic; A Lust for Power (Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 2001), 32-33. 287
President Slobodan Milosevic led the Conservative wing; the Slovene leader Milan
Kucan, who was also supported by Croatia, represented the more liberal wing. The ideological controversy was largely about economic policies: Kucan and Croatia wanted to adopt a more Western economic model with privately owned companies whereas
Milosevic was in favour of a state controlled economy.51
In 1981, the Albanian minority in the province of Kosovo demanded full republic status. For the Serbian ethnic groups, however, Kosovo was seen as the heart of medieval
Serbia and they decided to protect the Serbian minority living in Kosovo. Federal security forces of the Tito regime moved into Kosovo and brutally separated the conflicting parties.52 This event resulted in a renewed debate about the future of the country of
Yugoslavia - was it to be a confederation of independent states, or a federal state with less autonomy for the provinces? Yet again, the dividing line was visible: Milosevic strongly supported a more centralized federation; Slovenia and Croatia wanted a more confederate political system.53
In the late 1980s, the economic relationship between Canada and Yugoslavia was placed at the top of the bilateral agenda list. Prime Minister Mikulic traveled to Canada in
February 1988 for an official state visit, and signed a memorandum of understanding that
Yugoslavia was interested to acquire modern telecommunications technology, aircraft, and nuclear reactors from Canada. The Mulroney government responded favourably to such a request, but pointed out that the bilateral economic relationship should be left to the market forces and without interference of the federal government. Nevertheless, it
51 See for example Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (New York, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1995), 122. 52 See for example Ibid., 106. 53 Elinor C. Sloan, Bosnia and the New Collective Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 11. 288 was apparent that the state of the Yugoslav economy had started to deteriorate at a significant pace: foreign direct investments, for example, had started to leave the country and that the political leadership in Belgrade became increasingly fragmented.54 Canada's ambassador to Yugoslavia summarized the tensions succinctly:
The situation in Yugoslavia is much worse than it was at the end of 1987. The problems of inflation and nationalism have placed a severe strain on unity. Regional disparities, economic, ethnic and ideological have become more acute. In economic, if not political terms Canada does not have much at stake. Is faith alone an adequate basis for strengthening economic ties with this country?55
In sum, it was quite apparent that the support for the Communist party within Yugoslavia was diminishing and that increasing economic, regional, and ethnic disparities affected the stability of the federation. Canada was concerned about the integrity of the country.
Tito, despite his questionable human rights record, had imposed a strict order on
Yugoslavia that held the ethnic factions together since 1945.56 This, however, had changed with his death and the end of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall worked as a catalyst for the resumption of ethnic tensions that soon became uncontrollable.
The Balkans and ECMM
The end of the Cold War brought about changes and Yugoslavia began to fall apart. In
1990, Slovenia and Croatia held secession referendums that were followed by
Carl Bildt noted that before the war Bosnia had been one of the poorest republics of Yugoslavia after Macedonia. See his Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 241. See also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences, 11. 55 Memo from Ambassador Terrance C. Bacon, 25 Nov. 1988, Canadian Embassy, Belgrade to department of External Affairs, Ottawa, quoted in Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 55. 56 Sean M. Maloney, "Operation Bolster: Canada and the European Community Monitor Mission in the Balkans, 1991-1994," in The McNaughton Papers, no. 10 (The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), 3. 289 declarations of independence only one year later, on 25 June 1991. In addition, the
Croatian leadership under Franco Tudjman adopted a new constitution on 22 December
1990, which did not politically recognize the large Serbian minority living in Croatia.
This caused concerns not only among the Serbian-Croatians but also in the central government, which was alerted about these events and responded by sending in troops to bring about order. There occurred a ten-day battle between Slovenian forces and the
Yugoslav National Army (JNA). Slovenian forces responded by surrounding JNA troops and cutting off their supply lines. The EC attempted to broker a ceasefire between the two parties, but the fighting did not stop. Austria, a member of the EC, called the matter in front of the CSCE, which had experience in confidence- and security building measures.
Notwithstanding its expertise and large membership, the CSCE delegated the responsibility of monitoring the withdrawal of JNA forces from Slovenia to the EC. The
EC in turn, showed considerable concern that the fighting would destabilize the entire
Balkan, and put together a peacekeeping force, the preceding force to the UN-led
UNPROFOR operation. The mission was called the European Community Monitoring
Mission (ECMM).
However, the conflicting parties would only agree to the ECMM on the condition that the United States or Canada or both were to become parties of the monitoring force.57
Canada volunteered its expertise in peacekeeping operations along with Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Sweden. This made sense, considering that Canada had participated in nearly
"ibid. 290
all UN peacekeeping operations since 1945. It also enjoyed respectable reputation
among its allies for the quality and proficiency of its troops.
The initial deployment phase was three months and soldiers were to be unarmed
and had to wear civilian dress. The operational headquarters of the ECMM was in Zagreb
with various regional outposts scattered throughout the region, which caused significant
problems for the mission in terms of communication and transportation.59 Altogether,
Canada sent nine observers to the ECMM and one senior Canadian officer in September
1991.60 All of the monitors were sent by the Department of National Defence; none were
sent from any other federal department.
The objective of the Canadians, in accordance with the mission statement of the
ECMM, was to monitor the ceasefire agreement that was reached between Slovene forces
and the JNA.61 Canadians, however, were restricted from enforcing the implementation
of the cease-fire agreement62 and it took them some time and effort to re-structure the
ECMM mission administratively so that it was able to address the diverse tasks it was
given. It was apparent, however, that the mission primarily was a political mission and
only later evolved to a quasi-military mission that carried out observing and monitoring
tasks. As the historian Sean Maloney pointed out, in 1992 the objective of the ECMM
For a detailed discussion of Canada and UN peacekeeping see for example Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping, Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping; Cold War by Other Means, 1945- 1970. 59 Maloney, "Operation Bolster: Canada and the European Community Monitor Mission in the Balkans, 1991-1994," 9. Ibid., 11. Even though the total numbers of troops to the ECMM fluctuated significantly, the Canadian commitment made up of 5-10% of the total. In 1992, the total numbers of ECMM personnel were close to 300 and Canada on average sent 15 observers every six months. See also Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 230. 61 Maloney, "Operation Bolster: Canada and the European Community Monitor Mission in the Balkans, 1991-1994," 13. 62 Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Operation Order, "OP BOLSTER- Canadian Contingent to the Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia," November 1991, quoted in Ibid. 291 was also to monitor the pink zones in the Karin (see map below), which was the border region between Croatia and Serbia.63 Without the monitoring of the ECMM, the Croats or
Serbs could attack those regions and ethnically cleanse them.
Map I: Croatian and UN Protected Zones, and the Medak Pocket
AUSTRIA Croatia, UN-Piocow.'rt^ont-. SfpttsfnDr-. 1993
CR0A1 SLOVENIA
/'""
ikfj aw
;v». BOSNIA AND 7 HCRCE60VINA
The Mecfak Pocket bf R8iA % v., i. » \
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Source: Carol Off, The ghosts of Medak Pocket: the story of Canada's secret war (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2004), p. 1.
Krajina translated means the frontier or the borderland of a country with established military defence positions. The Krajina has been the location of battles for centuries. 292
The interests and objectives of the Canadian contingent to the ECMM were twofold.
First, it used this mission to collect political, military, demographic, geographic, and other data and were sent it back to Ottawa.64 This information was then used to prepare for Canada's contingent to UNPROFOR. Secondly, after announcing the withdrawal of
Canadian troops from Germany, the government was able to show its commitment to
European security through the ECMM and to retain a certain degree of influence in
Europe.
The overall commitment of sending fifty Canadians to the ECMM cost the
Canadian taxpayers more than $1 million per year. According to reports from officers
serving in the field at the time, Canadian commitments were welcome despite the fact that Canadians were frustrated with the way the EC handled and organized the ECMM.
One of the factors that complicated the mission was a rotating European presidency, which changed every six months and complicated matters on the ground. As one operational report sent back home to Ottawa noted:
Canadians have a unique, high profile within the mission both as the only non-European member and through the appointments we hold. As we withdrew our forces from stationing in Europe, this mission provides continuing Canadian presence, and a degree of influence, in the European theatre within a European organization. As the mission expands its area of operation there have been other members of the CSCE who have discreetly attempted to join the ECMM for specific tasks. This approach has been discouraged both by the Mission and the host nations. Canada, therefore, has a foothold in an organization which [...] will be the 'flagship' for a continuing European mission to deal with the multitude of existing and future problems in the European area. The Yugoslav experience has demonstrated (rightly or wrongly) that the Europeans have little respect for Third World nations, under the structure of the UN, being involved in their
Maloney, "Operation Bolster: Canada and the European Community Monitor Mission in the Balkans, 1991-1994," 22. 293
problems...Through our small contribution to the ECMM, Canada can reap significant benefits in a very cost effective manner.65
The ECMM mission was also advantageous to Canadians because its area of operation was more comprehensive than that of UNPROFOR. Whereas the UN mission was restricted to the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) and cease-fire violations,
ECMM was able to operate in Croatia and Bosnia.66
The ECMM mission became increasingly occupied with humanitarian concerns during the course of 1992, which it dealt with through its Humanitarian Cell that was established the previous year. Under humanitarian auspices, the mission ensured the availability of medical supplies, the support of refugees with humanitarian necessities, as well as provided escorts for UNHCR convoys.
While the government of Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia was willing to let Slovenia become independent. However, it vetoed the secession of Croatia, partly because a large minority of Serbs lived in Croatia and thus this minority as to be disconnected from Serbia. In mid-August of 1991, the fighting between the JNA and
Croatian paramilitary groups intensified. Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom then brought the conflict to the attention of the UN Security Council.67
For Canada, as then Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, argued, this was the first test for the concept of interlocking institutions that Canada cherished so much. She noted:
The international response to the Yugoslav crisis is in fact a useful illustration of the central theme in Canadian policy of interlocking institutions: a OSCE sponsored monitoring mission, managed by the EC; NATO's repeated political pressure on all parties: NACC condemnation of
65 24 September 1992, "Op BOLSTER-Roto 2: Post Op Report," quoted in Ibid., 36-37. 66 Ibid., 23. 67 S/23060, 23 September 1991. 294
violence; and UN peacekeeping efforts. Canada has contributed its voice and its resources to these activities, demonstrating its commitment by such actions as contributing monitors to the CSCE mission and by making the largest single contribution to the peacekeeping efforts in Yugoslavia.6
UNPROFOR
With Security Council Resolution 713, the UN urged the belligerents to solve their disputes peacefully and abide by previously established cease-fire agreements. It also voiced concern that "the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security" and imposed an international weapons embargo on Yugoslavia in an attempt to contain the crisis. A few months later, the Yugoslav government officially requested from the Security Council the authorization of a peacekeeping force. The
Council agreed and passed Resolution 721, approving a small contingent of soldiers to be deployed to prepare for a larger peacekeeping force, called UNPROFOR. It had three main objectives: first, to facilitate and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian aid; second, contain the conflict through safe-zones and a no-fly zone; and third, to negotiate cease-fires with the belligerents.69
Preceding those events, Canada's Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, had sent a letter to UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to call upon the Security Council to act in response to the worsening humanitarian situation in Yugoslavia.70 The Mulroney government had become impatient with the slow response of the EC, as well as the international community at large, to recognize the seriousness of the situation in
McDougall, "Canada, NATO, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council," 12. See for example "Fighting escalates, UN role in question," United Nations Chronicle vol. 32, no. 3 (September 1995). Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 81, 98-101. 295
Yugoslavia.71 Canada's Minster of External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, voiced
Canada's frustration with the slow response of the international community in a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1992. She said that "recent events demonstrate that the use of force may be a necessary option, and we urge full consideration of the Secretary-
General's view in this regard."72 Mulroney, pressured by the Liberal opposition to do more, was in favour of a more interventionist and aggressive approach in the Balkans.
Canada also continued to embrace the Atlanticist tradition in Canadian foreign policy and saw the collapse of Yugoslavia as a vital threat to the overall stability and security of the
European continent.73
Ultimately, it was Canada's initiative that pushed the issue on the agenda of the
UN Security Council and74 led to resolution 713.75 The Canadian government understood that only a large ground force could solve the escalating humanitarian situation.76 Thus, it was no surprise that Mulroney offered Canadian peacekeepers to help stabilize the
Balkans.
Canada and UNPROFOR - the initial phase
The Canadian military's deployment to UNPROFOR was called Operation Harmony and lasted from 1992-1995. It had the objective to monitor the UNPA's in Croatia, which, the belligerents had agreed, were demilitarized and monitored by UN peacekeepers. Subsequently, the mission was expanded to include the monitoring of cease-fire agreements and troop withdrawals. UNPROFOR became also responsible for the
71 Ibid., 98-101. 72 The Right Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Address to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations Assembly," New York, 24 September 1992. 73 See for example Barbara McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992). This was also confirmed in confidential interview with senior Canadian official, Privy Council Office, 12 June 2007. 74 Ibid. 75 S/RES/713, 25 September 1991. 76 McDougall,"Address to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations Assembly." 296
Sarajevo airport and the city of Sarajevo, a largely Muslim dominated city.77 Its task was to secure the airport itself, a ten-kilometer zone around the airport, and a transit corridor from the airport into Sarajevo.78 In total, the Canadian operation went through six rotations. Initially, Canada deployed 1,139 personnel, which were taken mostly from 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade units in Germany.79 Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie worked as the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR and was responsible for securing the city and surroundings of Sarajevo. A Canadian battalion was chosen to carry out this job. Canadians were authorized to do so by UN Security Council Resolution 761 (29 June 1992).80
77 UN Doc. S/24075, 6 June 1992, paragraph 4 and 6. ™Ibid. Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 230. Sloan, Bosnia and the New Collective Security, 20. 297
Map II: United Nations Protection Force, March-August 1992 _,__—__
\
VftKWI 'x.. Belgrade
/Of,, \ CAHABA/FRAMCE - JULY 1W4 °\ rfWNC£/UKHAlN£/EGVPT - *UC,(KT S'W _ J
H t> I -\ f I /'•
ION FORC
Source; Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: the road to Sarajevo (Vancouver: Douglas & Mclntyre, 1993), 112.
In the setup of UNPROFOR, Canadian officials were briefed by UN officials about the logistics of the operation. Each nation was told by the UN to bring along fifteen
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).81 As commanding officer of the Canadian contingent, Gen. MacKenzie found these numbers inadequate for the operation and asked his own government to send eighty-three APCs instead.82 In addition, Canadians demanded more ammunition, vehicles, and weapons. The reaction of the UN was,
Hewitt, From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans, 29. ' Ibid. 298 according to Dawn Hewitt, to balk "at the Canadians' request, basically because it did not want to pay for it."83 In the end, the government in Ottawa agreed to shoulder the additional costs for shipping the extra equipment.84 The government also took the initiative and pushed it through the UN based upon recommendations of its forces in the field.
The job of the Canadian contingent was dangerous. In November 1994, fifty-five
Canadian troops were taken hostage near Sarajevo in response to NATO air strikes against Serbian forces, who used them as human shields to deter further air strikes.85 This alerted other UNROFOR allies. In the meantime, Canada continued to press the United
States to send ground troops in support of UNPROFOR. The US finally agreed to commit
25,000 troops to protect UN soldiers in the event a complete pullout of the UN troops became necessary. This, however, was not what Canada wanted.
Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
There was also movement on the international diplomatic front. In 1991, Germany's
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made public that the Federal Republic of
Germany considered recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent and sovereign nation states.86 This course of action, however, was quite controversial among NATO allies. Canada was among those countries that had misgivings about it and opposed such a move for various reasons. First, concern was expressed about the large ethnic minorities living in Croatia, and second, about the symbolic sign this recognition might send to other countries of the loose federation of Yugoslavia, such as Macedonia or Bosnia
83 Ibid., 29. 84 Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo (Vancouver: Douglas & Mclntyre, 1993), 203. 5 Hewitt, From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans, 38-41. 86 For greater details of this time, see Hans Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, 1. Aufl. ed. (Berlin: Siedler, 1995). 299
Herzegovina. Third, recognition of Croatia as a sovereign country would allow it to freely purchase weapons and military equipment, which was contrary to the will of the UN
Security Council.87 Despite all the controversy, Germany formally recognized the two
states on 15 January 1992.88 Canada was not listened to and had little influence over those decisions, because they were not decisions made by the Alliance but bilaterally between two sovereign nation states.89 Ottawa was diplomatically engaged, but not heard.
Thus, by the end of May, thirty-one countries had established diplomatic relations with
Croatia. Canada, however, did not officially recognize Croatia until 5 April 1993.
The leaders of Bosnia Herzegovina held a referendum of independence on 29
February 1992, which won a clear majority among the population (99.4% of the voters in favour of independence), and President Alija Itezbegovic declared Bosnia-Herzegovina independent on 2 March 1992.90 At the time, Bosnia was the most ethnically diverse republic in Yugoslavia, with a population of 43.7% Muslims, 17.3% Croats, 31.4%
Serbs, and 7.6% others.91
United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 787 of 16 November 1992. 88 It is highly debated in the literature until this day whether or not Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia contributed to the violence that occurred shortly thereafter or if it helped solving the conflict, Italy and Austria also supported Germany's move. 89 "European leaders abandon caution on Yugoslav crisis," Globe and Mail, 4 July 1991, A16. The Canadian government was subsequently confronted with large domestic criticism from the Croatian and Slovenian communities in Canada. Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, 77. See for example Shoup, Paul, The East European and Soviet Data Handbook, Table C-10, p. 156. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Steven L. Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 16-61. Tim Judah, however, cites a different ethnic breakdown of the Bosnian population. He stated that Bosnia consisted of 43.7% Muslims, 31.1% Serbs, 17.3% Croats, and 7.0% others. See Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 344. 300
Map III: The UN in Bosnia 1994
H U M k< A R'.y.
;." R O A
1, . IK..J.
\ i. t K fc ! A
A. !> A Ml A '
3 THI UN IN BOSNIA 1994
Source: Patrick K. O'Brien, Atlas of World History (London, U.K.: Philip's, 1999), 267.
The referendum was preceded by secret talks between Croatia and Serbia about essentially dividing up Bosnia between the two and with a small buffer state in between.
In January 1992, the Bosnian government had asked the international community to pre emptively deploy UN peacekeepers. The UN Security Council approved the request in
Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992, and deployed more than 13,000 UN troops to
Bosnia in the initial round, 1,200 of who came from Canada.92 The chart below lists the total contributions of all member states to UNPROFOR in total:
Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 96. 301
Table III: List of allied contributions to UNPROFOR
List of allied contributions to UNPROFOR
Argentina 23 854 5 882 2,23% 19 Bangladesh 40 1235 43 1318 3,33% 9 Belgium 0 1038 6 1044 2,64% 15 Brazil 6 0 34 40 0,10% 30 Canada 45 2091 15 2151 5,44% 5 Colombia 12 0 0 12 0,03% 34 Czech Republic 0 971 37 1008 2,55% 16 Denmark 45 1230 14 1289 3,26% 27 Egypt 0 427 27 454 1,15% 23 Finland 10 463 12 485 1,23% 22 France 41 4493 11 4545 11,50% 1 Ghana 0 0 32 32 0,08% 31 Indonesia 15 220 29 264 0,67% 24 Ireland 20 0 9 29 0,07% 33 Jordan 71 3367 48 3486 8,82% 2 Kenya 50 967 47 1064 2,69% 14 Lithuania 0 0 32 32 0,08% 32 Malaysia 26 1550 27 1603 4,05% 26 Nepal 49 899 5 953 2,41% 17 Netherlands 10 1803 48 1861 4,71% 6 New Zealand 0 249 9 258 0,65% 25 0,15% 28 Nigeria 48 0 10 58 2,27% 18 Norway 31 826 39 896 7,76% 4 Pakistan 19 3017 34 3070 2,95% 12 Poland 29 1109 30 1168 0,13% 29 Portugal 39 0 12 51 3,85% 7 Russian Federation 36 1464 22 1522 1,47% 21 Slovak Republic 0 0 582 582 3,25% 10 Spain 0 1267 19 1286 3,20% 11 Sweden 35 1212 19 1266 0,03% 35 Switzerland 6 0 6 12 0,03% 36 Tunisia 12 0 0 12 3,70% 8 Turkey 0 0 1.464 1464 2,95% 13 Ukraine 9 1147 10 1166 8,66% 3 United Kingdom 0 3405 19 3424 1,89% 20 United States 0 0 748 748 0,01% 37 Venezuela 0 0 2 2
TOTAL 727 35304 3506 39537 100% 37
Source: Congressional Research Service, Bosnia: US Military Operations, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Order Code IB93056, updated July 8, 2003; United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: UN Department of Publication, 1996); Personal Interview conducted with LCol Ross Fetterly, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Finance Section.
The chart above indicates that the Canadian contingents marked more than 5 per cent of the total mission, which can be interpreted as a significant contribution of a fiscally constrained country that Canada was in the early 1990s. UNPROFOR came into existence in March 1992 in three UN protected areas in Croatia, particularly in eastern and western Slavonia, and the Krajina. It was authorized to demilitarize the UNPAs and to provide protection for the population living within those zones. Canadians were 302 deployed into sector west. According to Carol Off, they were deliberately placed into this
sector because of their extensive experience with peacekeeping.93 Sector West was also one of the most dangerous sectors to operate in and one that had a hostile front line.94 The living conditions were also quite rudimentary for the soldiers who were usually billeted in damaged buildings, without access to heat or running water.
The United States and the Soviet Union reacted to the evolving crisis and recognized the independence of Bosnia on 7 April 1992 in the hope that the formal recognition would help stabilize the entire Balkan region. This hope, however, did not materialize and violence occurred in the border region between Croatia and Bosnia as well as in the capital city Sarajevo. The city was a strategically important location because it hosted the headquarter of UNPROFOR, notwithstanding the fact that the UN mission was in Croatia.95
The humanitarian situation deteriorates
When violence continued, the UN Security Council demanded an end to the violent confrontations and the withdrawal of the JNA and Croatian army units. Only two weeks later, another Security Council Resolution (Res. 757) attested that both conflicting parties had not complied with Resolution 752 and determined that this conflict now posed a threat to international peace and security. As a result, the UN imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions against Yugoslavia, and demanded that humanitarian aid was to be distributed to the suffering population. Canada implemented those sanctions into
Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War, 66. Ibid. The Canadians were actually place right in the contested territory between the Serbs and the Croats. 95 This turned out to be a problem to have a headquarter at a distance from the actual operation. The intention of the UN, however, was to send a stabilizing signal to the region. This, however, became problematic when the city of Sarajevo itself became subject to the violence. 303 domestic Canadian legislation at the end of May 1992 and froze all financial assets of
Yugoslavia in Canada.
On 10 June 1992, the Mulroney government decided to take the risk of a more forceful intervention that would authorize the use of force.96 It recognized that the EC was unable to contain the spread of violence and deployed the first 850 troops to open and secure the airport.97 The rules of engagement for the Canadian contingent, however, were restrictive: Canadian soldiers were only allowed to return fire in self-defense.98
After some heavy exchange of fire against the Bosnian Serbs, the Canadians successfully opened the Sarajevo airport. In the following weeks, the Canadian Chief of Defence
Staff, John de Chastelain, learned that the Commander of the Canadian contingent, Gen.
MacKenzie, had modified the rules of engagement for his troops. He had instructed them to pre-emptively engage hostile snipers.99 Thus, Canadian troops operated at the forefront of the conflict while risking the lives of their soldiers.
In the summer of the same year, violence intensified and the humanitarian situation of the population worsened. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made the situation known to the public in an address to the UN Security Council, where he said the advancement of the Serbs and Croats might leave only minimum territory for the
Muslim population.100 By that time, Bosnian Serbs supported by Serbia had already taken control of more than 60% of the entire country. There were also first reports that the
96 See for example Barbara McDougall et al., Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992). They were accompanied by 350 vehicles. 8 Army Lessons Learned Centre, "Operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia," Dispatches 4 (September 1996), p.22. Canada's more forceful engagement in liberating the Sarajevo airport took a toll on Canadian troops and wounded fifteen of them. 100 S/23900, 12 August 1992, parag. 5. 304
Bosnian Serbs engaged in activities of ethnic cleansing. The UN Security Council, in a
very unique move, decided to authorize the use of force in order to ensure the delivery of
humanitarian aid to the Bosnian population. It was unique, because, as Jane Boulden
argued, this was the first time in the history of the UN Security Council that the body
linked the delivery of humanitarian aid to the use of force.101
In addition, a no-fly zone was established under the authorization of Chapter VII
of the UN charter (Res. 781) after a missile shot down an Italian aircraft carrying
humanitarian aid. Because the UN was unable to monitor Bosnian airspace on its own, it
had asked NATO for help. The Alliance put together Operation Deny Flight. This was
authorized to intercept and shoot down violators of the no-fly zone. Canada participated
in this operation by sending thirteen soldiers to NATO's Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS), which controlled the air units policing the no fly zone.102 Operation
Deny Flight lasted from 1993-96.
Canadians also participated in UNPROFOR with Operation Cavalier, which
included the armed protection of humanitarian aid organizations in the region. There was
also a 113-man logistics battalion that supported both Operation Cavalier as well as
Operation Harmony}m Whereas operation Cavalier and Harmony were drawn from
regular force units, the logistical operation consisted mostly of members from the militia.
Most of the Canadian peacekeepers served in Western Slavonia, a region that was most heavily contested and that included a number of Serbian and Croatian villages. As such,
Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, 78. 102 Department of National Defence, Policy Group, Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations, available at httpj/l/www^ 9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4ClDA3D%7D, accessed on 1 June 2007. 103 This commitment was later increased to 271 personnel Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security; Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 231. 305
Canadians were deployed to one of the forefronts of the conflict and tasked to bring peace
to it. However, they were constrained in their actions by the tight rules of engagement
that prevented them from a more forceful intervention. A total of 860 Canadian
servicemen deployed to the Balkans with UNPROFOR during the spring of 1992 that
were followed by another 800 in September of 1992. For the next three years until 1995
there were approximately 1,600 Canadian troops in the Balkans at any given time
assigned to UNPROFOR, UNPF-HQ, and UNCRO.104 This made Canada the second
largest force contributor after France among the sixteen nations in total.105 Canada's
troops were also the second best equipped of all UNPROFOR troops106 (except for the
French), despite the significant cutbacks of the defence budget at home.107 For instance,
Canadians were the only ones who had APCs, which made them a fully mechanized brigade. The Nepalese contingent, for example, had no such vehicles and those of the
Argentineans, Jordanians and others continuously required maintenance and spare parts.
As Carol Off noted, "for all the weaknesses of the Canadian battalion, it was the best
equipped and best trained of all peacekeeping contingents in Croatia, with the exception
of the French," despite the cutbacks in the 1990s.108
Department of National Defence, Policy Group, Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations. On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR and divide it into three separate peacekeeping missions. First, it established the United Nations Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO); second, the Council decided to re-name UNPROFOR into the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) with a joint United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF-HQ) in Zagreb. Each of the three missions was headed by a civilian who functioned as the Chief of Mission and a military commander. The overall command and control of all three mission laid in the hands of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the theatre force commander. Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War, 65. 106 Hewitt, From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans, 54. 107 Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War, 102. 306
In early 1993, Bosnian Serb forces carried out violent assaults in eastern Bosnia and concentrated their efforts around the city of Srebrenica. They ethnically cleansed two-thirds of Bosnia's territory109 and managed to unite the Bosnian and Croatian enclaves of the Krajina and thus established a land corridor to Belgrade. The city of
Srebrenica was populated by more than 60.000 Muslim refugees who started to flee the city when Serbian forces advanced to the city to extinguish the ethnic minority. In 1991, the city of Srebrenica had a population of 37,000: 73% of them were Bosnians, 25% were
Serbs.110 Again, the UN responded by strongly condemning the violent attacks against
UNPROFOR and restricting the Bosnian Serb's freedom of movement in Resolution 819.
The city of Srebrenica and the area around it were also treated as safe-zones. The UN
Secretary General was also asked to immediately increase the number of UNPROFOR troops in the city. More than three hundred Canadian soldiers were deployed to
Srebrenica to guarantee the survival of the Muslim population there.111 In effect the CF acted as a trip-wire in the sense that if Serbian forces would attack the Canadian company, the international community would interpret this act as an aggression against
UNPROFOR. A little later, UN resolution 824 also made the Bosnian Muslim dominated towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac safe areas.112 The areas around the cities were supposed to be free of weapons, ammunition, and all forms of armed attacks of Bosnian
Serbs.113 The Milosevic regime in Belgrade was asked to stop supplying the Serbian
Report of the Secretary General - General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: Srebrenica Report (1998), Section F. The report also lists in detail the events that led to the massacre in Srebrenica as well as describes its aftermath. 1,1 Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (New York, N.Y., USA: Penguin Books, 1997), 91. 112 S/RES 824 (1993), 6 May 1993. 113 For a detailed account of the massacre in Srebrenica and the rule of the Dutch UN peacekeepers see for example Honig and Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. 307
fighters with weapons and ammunition. Notwithstanding the UN resolution, the
compliance was totally dependent on the belligerents.
Indeed, now that the mandate of the operation had been augmented from protecting humanitarian convoys to ensuring order in the safe-zones, Canada called upon
its NATO allies also to deploy their soldiers to the city of Srebrenica. Canada's Minister
of External Affairs lobbied Canada's allies, France and Britain, at a NATO meeting in
Athens to send troops to the city.114 The rationale of Canada, according to Nicholas
Gammer, was to "internationalize the consequences should Bosnian Serb forces resume
their attack on Srebrenica."115
Even though the leadership of Radovan Karadzic of the Bosnian Serbs was forced by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade to accept the Vance116-Owen peace plan,117 a
referendum held amongst the Bosnian Serb population rejected it. Milosevic put pressure
on Karadzic after the United States threatened to use air strikes and economic sanctions
that had shown an impact in Serbia.118 The Clinton administration adopted a lift and
strike strategy - lift the weapons embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and attacking
from the air Serbian forces that were surrounding Sarajevo and other towns.119 America's
European allies as well as Canada strongly disapproved of this strategy, fearing repercussions and attacks against their own troops that were deployed on the ground. As a result, the Security Council expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR beyond delivering
114 Ibid., 107. Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 158. 116 Cyrus Vance was appointed as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Yugoslavia. 117 The Vance-Owen Plan listed ten constitutional principles and a cease-fire agreement. It also called for a confederation often autonomous provinces equally controlled by the three ethnic communities and Sarajevo being shared by all three of them. The United States rejected the plan because it would give Serbia 40% of Bosnia's territory when only 30% of Bosnia's population was of Serbian decent. Sloan, Bosnia and the New Collective Security, 48. Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, 82. 308
humanitarian assistance to deter attacks against the safe areas by using military force if
necessary.
In 1993, the fighting had increased again and it became apparent that the Bosnian
Serb forces blocked a rotation of UN troops in Sarajevo. Serb forces also controlled the
airport in Tuzla that was vital to deliver humanitarian assistance. Canada supported the proposal of using air strikes to bring peace to the region. The UN Secretary General
authorized a massive use of air strikes after a mortar attack on the Sarajevo marketplace
on 5 February that killed sixty-eight people. Fighting in other areas of the region, such as
in the town of Gorazde, caused the Secretary General to ask NATO to expand the air
strikes to other five areas. NATO issued a deadline for Bosnian Serb troops to withdraw their heavy weapons, which they met and thus averted further NATO air strikes.
The battle of the Medak Pocket
The CF was also caught up in a fierce battle around the Medak Pocket in September 1993 where Croatian forces were in the process of ethnically cleansing Krajinan Serbs east of
Gospic. The Medak pocket was an enclave that the Serbs of Croatia had claimed to be theirs (see map on p. 314). They called it the Republic of the Serbian Krajina. Originally, the region was monitored by French peacekeepers. However, after two of their soldiers were shot, the French contingent withdrew and the UN commander asked the Canadian battle group in Sector West to split in half and take control of Sector South. The village of Medak was a strategic location for the Serbs because it allowed them to launch attacks on the Croatian headquarters in Gospic, a town only a few kilometers away. During the
Cold War, Gospic was the hometown of a large garrison of the Yugoslav National Army
(JNA). When the Serbs had advanced into the region earlier in 1991, the Croats 309
responded by murdering the Serbian elite of Gospic - doctors, lawyers, and teachers. The
Canadians essentially were caught in the crossfire between the Serbs and Croats.120
Initially, Charlie Company of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was ordered
not to engage in the violent conflict and observe the situation on the ground. Indeed, what
happened was that Croatian forces were advancing from the hills towards the village of
Medak, which was held by Serbian forces at the time.121 However, the intention of
Croatian forces, as Carol Off describes in great detail, was not only to re-take the Medak
pocket but also eliminate the local population. This marked a classical operation of ethnic
cleansing. The Canadians were caught right in between the frontlines and knew that once
the Croatian forces advanced, they would not halt for the Canadians. The Canadian
platoon was ill equipped to hold off such an attack; their ammunition was limited, so was
their overall logistical support.122 Moreover, their rules of engagement as peacekeepers
were unclear. Were they expected to defend themselves and the region around Medak or
were they expected to run? Back at UNPROFOR headquarters, the commanding officer
of all UN troops, French Lieutenant General Jean Cot, had singled out the Canadians as
the UN's "swat-team, the only contingent of peacekeepers he could rely on."123
International Community becomes more forceful
Franco Tudjman, the Croatian President was equally tired of the inability of the UN to
protect Croatians. As Carol Off describes the situation: "And they were even more fed up
with the pesky peacekeepers whose mission kept getting in the way of their national
For a detailed description of the battle see Hewitt, From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans, 62-66, Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War. 121 The Medak Pocket was not part of a UN protected zone. However, it was part of the pink-zone, which were areas where Serbian forces refused to withdraw and the UN had no control over. Hewitt, From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans, 64. Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War, 13. 310 aspirations."124 The attacks of Bosnian Serb forces on 12 July 1995 in Srebrenica functioned as a trip-wire that caused the United States to become an active player in the crisis. As Jane Boulden argued: "America's more forceful commitments and dual push for more air strikes and a diplomatic solution - brought the two streams of international response [...] firmly together into one overall strategy and decision-making process for the first time."125 The United States made clear to the conflicting parties that if a peaceful settlement of the conflict were not possible, the United States would not hesitate to become involved more forcefully. Again, the Bosnian Serbs were given a specific list of demands by NATO and a deadline by which they were expected to be met. None of those demands was met and thus NATO started an extensive air campaign called Operation
Deliberate Force. While more than 3,515 sorties were flown in total by the "coalition of the willing" and 1,026 bombs dropped on the country, a team led by US diplomat
Richard Holbrooke coordinated the diplomatic negotiations. The carrot-and-stick- approach appeared being successful: both parties agreed to recognize the existing borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a ceasefire agreement signed on 5 October 1995. The final peace accords were negotiated at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 October 1995.126 The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced
UNPROFORin 1996.
The table below summarizes in detail the Canadian participation in the Balkan peacekeeping operations until 2001. Canadians took part in UN missions (UNPROFOR)
IZ4 Ibid., 10. Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, 90. 126 Among other things the Dayton Agreement created the nation-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a War, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1998). 311
as well as missions carried out by NATO. A thorough examination reveals that Canada
was an active and committed ally:
Table IV: Canadian participation in the Balkans until 2001
Mission Duration Approx. max size Max. Canadian Description contribution UNPROFOR 1992-1996 44,870 2,400 UN Protection Force 750 civpol 45 civpol Bosnia, Croatia (UNCRO), Macedonia IFOR (NATO) 1996-97 60,000 1,035 NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina SFOR (NATO) 1997-2001 35,000 1,800 NATO-led Stabilization Force Bosnia-Herzeqovina UNPREDEP 1995-2001 1,100 2 UN Preventive deployment Force, Macedonia, UN Skopje UNMOP 1996-2001 27 1 UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Croatia UNMIBH 1996-2001 5 1 UN Mission in Bosnia- 2,057 civpol 30 civpol Herzegovina UNMACBH 1996-97 72 6 UN Mine Action Centre, Bosnia-Herzegovina KFOR (NATO) 1999-2001 50,000 1,450 NATO-led Kosovo Force
UNMIK Police 1999-2001 4,366 86 RCMP UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Source: Leanard J. Cohen, "Blue Helmets, Green Helmets. Red Tunics: Canada 's Adaptation to the Security Crisis in Southeastern Europe. " in: Alexander Moens, LenardJ Cohen. Alan G. Sens, NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2003, p. 127.
One shortfall of UNPROFOR was the lack of funding. It turned out to be one of
the UN's most expensive missions and Canada contributed more than $41 million per
year to it.127 Canada was the eighth largest financial contributor out of fourteen countries
altogether that contributed to UNPROFOR, in total $120 million in 1993.128 Mulroney justified Canada's contribution to UN peacekeeping by pointing out that "peacekeeping is
not cheap; the force in Yugoslavia will cost $650 million this year. But compared to even
the financial price of war - $ 1 billion a day in the Persian Gulf - let alone the carnage and
Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, 100. 128 Ibid., 181. This number, however, is not identical with the one provided by the Department of National Defence. According to DND, Canada spent $ 221.000 million during the fiscal year 1993/94 for this particular operation. Interview with LCol Ross Fetterly, Department of National Defence, Finance Section, 19 July 2007. 312 destruction that results, peacekeeping is very, very cost-effective." The government was supported in its view by more than 80% approval ratings regarding the role of the
CF.no
Other Canadian Contributions
Canadian contributions also extended to other areas. Between 1992 and 1995 Canada actively participated in a combined mission of NATO and the WEU Both organizations began to monitor the Mediterranean Sea enforcing the sanctions levied against Serbia and
Montenegro under Security Council Resolution 752. The NATO mission was called
Operation Maritime Monitor, its WEU counterpart was Operation Vigilance. On 8 June
1993 both operations were merged into Operation Sharp Guard, which consisted of twenty ships in total.131 This naval task force turned out to be quite effective and was supported by maritime patrol aircraft. It was authorized to control all suspicious ships and board them if necessary. Canada also sent two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft for the monitoring of the Macedonian coastline as well as a helicopter-carrying frigate of the
Halifax class with 210 seamen on board.132 In addition, Canadian naval officers were deployed to the operational headquarter overseeing the operation and took the lead of
NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL).
Under the naval blockade and backed by the UN Security Council, Serbia was prohibited from importing or transporting crude oil, other petroleum products, and coal
129 Andre Picard, "Mulroney implores UN member states to their dues," Globe and Mail, 25 May 1992, A4. 30 See Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinions on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance (Hull, Quebec: Minister of Supply and Services, 1995), 21. 131 For a detailed account of Canada's commitment to Sharp Guard see Sean M. Maloney, The Hindrance of Military Operations Ashore: Canadian Participation in Operation Sharp Guard, 1993-1996, Maritime Security Occasional Paper; No. 7 (Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 2000). 132 Later, the Canadian contingent was also augmented by the operational support ship HMCS Preserver. See Department of National Defence, Backgrounder: Operation Sharp Guard, 2 February, 1996. 313 into Serbia or Montenegro. NATO/WEU vessels were authorized to inspect all ships destined for Serbia and to deny them access if necessary. In total, NATO challenged
74,000 ships of which 6,000 were closely inspected at sea and 1,400 of them sent to a harbour for closer inspection.133
Canada was not part of the so-called Contact Group. The objective of the contact group, which consisted of the US, the U.K., Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, was to restore Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia. The Serb government, however, rejected this proposal, during various negotiations that led to the so-called Rambouillet
Agreement. Canada was not a member of this group despite contributing the third largest
UNPROFOR contingent as well as making a difference in UNCIVPOL, ECMM, SAM,
WEU/NATO naval and air operations. Thus, its diplomatic influence was limited.
However, it was not clear that more Canadian troops would have given Ottawa membership on the Contact Group. The question then remains whether or not this is an indication of a decline or and indication of how countries approached Canada. Canada has never been a major power in international affairs, and thus, it is surprising that all of a sudden was there a demand for Canada to be one. This is a misperception or a myth. In short, this argument does also not support the declinist school and Canada would have declined from a myth.
Canadians were, however, part of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), This panel was established at a Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 8-9
December 1995, after the successful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in
IFOR Final Factsheet, NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard, October 2, 1996. 314
November 1995. The objective of this conference was to mobilize international support
for the Dayton Accords - either through financial contributions, sending troop
contingents to IFOR or other means.135 Since the London Conference in 1995, the PIC
has met five more times at the ministerial level to review progress and define the goals of peace implementation for the coming period.136 The PIC also had an executive council, which functioned as the steering committee of the PIC and made all significant decisions.
The following countries were members of this council: Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union,
the European Commission, and Turkey (representing the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference). Hence, one might argue, even though Canada took a diplomatic rebuff when
it was not invited to become a partner of the "Contact Group," it became a member on the more influential executive board of the PIC where actual and far-reaching decisions about the distribution of aid and others were made. Thus, the actual impact Canada had on the
PIC was far more extensive than is commonly known and was an example of Canadian
functionalism.
United Nations and United Nations Dept. of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1996), 492. 5 Currently, the PIC is comprised of the following members: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China (resigned in May 2000), Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America; the UN High Representative for Bosnia, Council of Europe, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Commission, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Monetary Fund (IMF), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations (UN), UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Transitional Administration of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES; disbanded in January 1998) and the World Bank. 136 In June 1996 in Florence; in December 1996 again in London; in December 1997 in Bonn; in December 1998 in Madrid, and in May 2000 in Brussels. 315
The Canadian government also sent Canadians to be part of the United Nations
Committee of Experts (UNCOE). In fact, Canadians were the first to respond to the UN
Secretary General's request to set up an international war crimes tribunal. The Mulroney government also offered to make the War Crimes Investigative Team (WCIT) available.
This mission lasted from 1992 until 1994. At any given time, Canada provided up to seven legal and military police officers to UNCOE in Operation Justice, to report on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.137 In that sense, Canada played a leading role in developing international legal norms and laid an important groundwork for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal in
May 1993.138
Canada also hosted an international conference of legal experts in Vancouver from 22-27 May 1993. The theme of the conference was the human rights violations in
Yugoslavia. The delegates debated the establishment of a permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC).139 The conference also produced a final report in which it recommended a war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia. Judge Jules Deschenes, a Canadian, was elected by the UN General Assembly to become ©ne of eleven judges for the war crimes tribunal.
In addition to providing contributions to UNPROFOR, Canada also made a contribution to the UN Peace Forces trust fund. This was not very well known in the
137 Department of National Defence, Policy Group, Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations, available at http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831- 9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4ClDA3D%7D. accessed on 1 June 2007. 138 The International Criminal Tribunal was authorized by Security Council Resolution 808 and 827. Even though the idea of a world criminal court is certainly not a new one in international affairs - the idea was also considered after WWI and the Nuremburg Trials - it was, however, groundbreaking in the sense that the UN saw a window of opportunity in the 'new world order' to revive such an idea. 316 public, but Canada was the third largest donating nation altogether. The table below lists the total contributions of states. The trust fund system collected significant amounts of money for the region. Canada did not shy away from the additional costs. It was a committed ally and shouldered nearly 10% of the total costs (see below). This contribution is also consistent with Canadian functionalism.
Table V: UN Peace Trust Funds
Trust fund for the restauration of essential public Trust Fund United Nations Peace services in Sarajevo/ n US dollars Forces (UNPF) for the commoncost of Amount % Rank the Bosnia and Herzegovina command Austria 463.392 2,32% 12 Amount % Rank Belgium 1.000.000 5,00% 7 Austria 400.000 7,43% 8 Brunei Darussalam 30.000 0,15% 21 Belgium 153.000 2,84% 11 Canada 515,939.9,58%. 3 Denmark 184.075 0,92% 14 Denmark 449.414 8,34% 8 Dutch Transp.Council 59.043 0,30% 18 Indonesia 30.000 0,15% 20 Ireland 161.234 2,99% 10 Ireland 530.802 2,65% 10 Italy 1.363.278 25,31% 1 Italy 5.735.611 28,67% 1 Luxembourg 288.270 5,35% 9 Japan 1.020.000 5,10% 6 Netherlands 508.724 9,44% 6 Malaysia 1.050.000 5,25% 5 Norway 511.635 9,50% 4 Netherlands 2.327.864 11,64% 3 Spain 511.301 9,49% 5 Norway 467.978 2,34% 11 Tunisia 1.989 0,04% 12 Pakistan 50.000 0,25% 19 UK 521.972 9,69% 3 Portugal 125.627 0,63% 15 Quatar 690.424 3,45% 9 Total (in US d 5.386.756 100% 12 Republic of Korea 100.000 0,50% 16 Spain 75.000 0,37% 17 Source: The Blue Helmets: A rev ew of United Nations Peacekeeping Sweden 2.099.737 10,50% 4 UK 2.610.500 13,05% 2 US 1.000.000 5,00% 8
Total (in US dollar): 20.006.453 100% 21
Source: The Blue Helmets: A review of United Nations Peacekeeping
The chart on the right lists the contributions of states to the government services in the city of Sarajevo. As the list indicates, Canada only ranked 13th. This, again, can be explained by Canada's functionalist foreign policy approach: the government was faced with a deficit crisis at home and had to spend its money wisely. In sum, the Yugoslav crisis brought Canada back on the radar screen of the international community, and continued to live up to its reputation as an international peacekeeper. Canadians were 317 among the first to contribute to the UN operations militarily, diplomatically, and financially and, remained committed to the Balkans once UN forces left and NATO took over.
IFOR
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Accords, brought about a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. It also replaced the UN mission UNPROFOR with the more robust NATO force called the
Implementation Force (IFOR). The IFOR mission was authorized by the UN Security
Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995; it lasted from 1995 tol996. IFOR was heavily armed and authorized to use force under chapter VII of the UN charter. The official transfer of power from UNPROFOR to IFOR took place on 20 December 1995.
All NATO as well as some non-NATO countries contributed to the mission and by early
1996 some 50,000 troops from 15 NATO nations, as well as 10,000 troops from sixteen non-NATO, had deployed their forces to Bosnia to take part in Operation Joint
Endeavor.140
Canadians continued to shoulder a significant burden and sent 1,047 soldiers141 to the IFOR mission. The Canadian contingent consisted of a mechanized infantry company,
1W IFOR AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, 1 March 1996. The list of non-NATO countries participating in the IFOR mission include countries from the NATO PfP countries such as Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and the Ukraine. It was the first time that Russian forces served in a NATO operation and were under the tactical control of the United States led multinational division. NATO's Combined Joint Task Force concept allowed for a smooth integration of the forces. Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 233. Lenard Cohen counted a different number of Canadian troops and came to 1,035 in total. See Lenard J. Cohen, "Blue Helmets, Green Helmets, Red Tunics: Canada's Adaptation to the Security Crisis in Southeastern Europe," in NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Alan G. Sens (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 127. The official DND number is 1,029 collected from an interview with DND official, June 2007. 318 an engineer squadron, and national support and command elements. Its mandate, however, was limited to ensure the military provisions of the Dayton Accords. According to the Dayton Accords, IFOR was authorized to use force and take military actions, as it deemed necessary to ensure compliance with the case-fire agreement.142 More specifically, IFOR was tasked to monitor the border between Croatia and Bosnia and their four-kilometer wide zones of separation. IFOR troops literally interpositioned themselves between the belligerents and separated the conflicting parties physically. In short, NATO forces were tasked, as Douglas MacGregor noted, "to prevent a resumption of ethnic cleansing and fighting, and to formalize the creation of a Muslim-dominated multiethnic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."143
The IFOR mission sectioned Bosnia into three areas, which cut across the frontlines. A British General based out of Sarajevo had the overall operational control of the respective sectors and reported back to the Allies Forces Southern Europe based in
Italy.144 IFOR forces were also augmented by a 2,200-strong Russian contingent that was deployed under NATO control. IFOR forces also had the responsibility of collecting heavy weapons and for demobilizing the remaining forces. They also assisted
UNPROFOR with a safe and speedy withdrawal of UN forces. IFOR was augmented by a civil-military team (CIMIC), which consisted of experts, such as lawyers, judges, economists, health officials, and educators.
This explicit mandate was significantly different from UNPROFOR's mandate. Their soldiers were only allowed to use military force in self-defence. In addition, it has been said in the literature that IFOR only had one mandate as opposed to the many UNPROFOR was burdened with. 143 Douglas A. Macgregor, "The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle," Orbis 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 95. 144 The Commander in Chief at AFSOUTH was an American General. 319
Mandated by UN Security Council resolutions 981 and 1025, NATO also provided an airlift operation for humanitarian purposes into Sarajevo.145 Dubbed
"Operation Air Bridge," Canada contributed 48 aircrew and ground personnel in 1996.
Together, the six nations committed to the operation delivered more than 176,000 tons of food, medicine, and supplies to city of Sarajevo.146 While Italy provided the airports,
Canada flew 1,806 flights; France 2,133; Germany 1,279; the U.K. 1,902, and the US
4,597.147 According to American analyst Larry Wentz, the operation averaged 13.8 C-130 sorties per day. Thus, Canada was the fourth largest force contributor in this operation, and carried almost as much of a burden as the United Kingdom.
The strong presence of UN/NATO troops made a difference on the ground and forced both Serbs and Croats to comply with the peace agreement. They withdrew their heavy weapons and troops, and by 1996 IFOR had brought an end of hostilities to the country. The IFOR mission was funded by the member states contributing to the operation as well as NATO. Thus, the operation was financed by a complex matrix of national as well as communal NATO funding. The latter costs were taken from NATO's military budget and the NATO Security Investment Program (the former infrastructure program). NATO's member states including Canada shouldered all the expenses related to the deployment of their troops.
SFOR
In December 1996 IFOR was replaced with a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was also known as "Operation Joint Guard." Canada continued to contribute to this stabilization
145 The airlift started 3 July 1992 and ended 9 January 1996. See for example United Nations, and Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 500. 146 Besides Canada, those nations included France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Larry K. Wentz, Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (Vienna, VA: CCRP, 1997). 147 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 500. 320 mission through "Operation Palladium." The government sent 1,327 personnel to help stabilize the region. Authorization came from Security Council Resolution 1088 (12 Dec.
1996). The commitment consisted of an infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, engineer squadron, an administrative company, and National Support & Command
Elements.149 The government had also authorized the deployment of Special Forces units.
In addition, Canada supplied NATO with a multinational divisional headquarter that was rotated with the British and the Dutch.
Table VI:
NATO Troop Contributions To SFOR As of February 2000 6,000-)
Source: United States, Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (Washington, D.C: Department of Defense, 2000), p. II-9.
Canada's commitments to SFOR were significant. Evidence for this significant contribution cannot only be found in the size of the troops Canada made available, but
Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 234. The numbers provided in this monograph are, however, not identical with numbers available from other publications or official government documents. Lenard Cohen, for example, counted 1,800 troops as Canada's contribution to SFOR; see Cohen, "Blue Helmets, Green Helmets, Red Tunics: Canada's Adaptation to the Security Crisis in Southeastern Europe," 127. The Department of National Defence lists 1,641 as the official number. See Interview with Senior Officer of the Department of National Defence, Finance Section, 2007. Bland and Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 234. 321
also the fact that almost all of Canada's army units rotated through "Operation
Palladium."150 Canadian SFOR troops were authorized to implement all aspects of the peace agreement by using military force if necessary.
Canada also sent six CF-18 fighter aircraft including one hundred and twelve military personnel to be part of NATO's military operation Deliberate Guard, which lasted from August 1997 until the start of the air campaign against Kosovo in 1999.151
Operation Deliberate Guard provided tactical air support for NATO's SFOR contingents.
Canada also had an Air Component in MAMDRIM under Operation Bison
(February 1997 - February 1998). The CF deployed a 14-person Airlift Control Centre
(ALCC) to Rimini, Italy, to provide intra-theatre movement for personnel and equipment in support of SFOR in Bosnia. The tasks of the Canadian component were to provide pre- mission weather/intelligence briefings, flight planning, scheduling, passenger/freight handling and aircraft servicing.
Canadians and other SFOR troops have also worked towards ensure the civilian elements of the peace agreement, such as supporting the international police task force.
They have helped with providing humanitarian assistance and ensuring the safe returns of refugees and displaced people. SFOR soldiers were also tasked to help catch war criminals and provide protection for the conduct of elections.
151 Department of National Defence, Policy Group, Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations, available at http://www.dnd,ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831 - 9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4CI DA3 D%7D, accessed on 1 June 2007. 322
Canada and NATO in Kosovo (KFOR)
President Milosevic came to power in 1987 while campaigning on the promise to reintegrate the Albanian dominated province of Kosovo back into Serbia.153 Kosovo's
Serb minorities had raised concerns that they were discriminated against by the ethnically
Albanian government and thus sought the help of the Serbian leadership. Milosevic responded and introduced martial law in Kosovo while replacing ethnic-Albanian officials with Serbs. It was in this environment that the conflict in Kosovo was evolving.
In 1998, ethnic Albanians, grouped together in the militant Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) began attacks on Serbian police and Yugoslav army troops. The response of the
Milosevic government was harsh: it employed violence and repression. In total, the conflict between the KLA and Serb forces resulted in more than 400,000 refugees and killed more than 2,500 people.154
The Kosovo crisis posed significant challenges for NATO and the transatlantic
Alliance, given that the Alliance had failed to stop the genocide and mass murdering in
Bosnia in the early 1990s: First, if NATO was unable to stop the genocide in Kosovo in
1999 and defend one of its fundamental values, it most likely would have meant the end of the transatlantic Alliance and the slow death of NATO. No international actors would have taken the Alliance seriously any more and its reputation would have vanished. The objectives of the Alliance were to stop a humanitarian crisis in the Balkans that might spread into South Eastern Europe, such as Greece, Bulgaria, and other neighbouring
For an excellent overview and background of the Kosovo crisis see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Moment of Truth," Survival 47, no. 4 (Winter 2005-06). These numbers were taken from the early stages of the Kosovo crisis, the total number can only be estimated. 154 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, Kosovo and US Policy, 4 December 2001, RL31053.2. 323
states. Second, to defend the values Europe stood for; and third, the danger that this crisis might affect the cohesiveness of the Alliance itself. In short, the stakes of the Kosovo conflict were high for Canada as well as for NATO. Canada did not shy away from taking responsibility in the Kosovo operation. It became the seventh largest contributor to
NATO's Kosovo campaign (see chart below) of eighteen nations in total and also shouldered the costs for this campaign as well as for sustaining its forces in Kosovo
(logistical support).155
Figure I: NATO contributions to Kosovo Air campaign
• US • Canada • Other Allies
Source: Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, "Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allies Military Operations" July 8, 2003, p. 4-5.
Canadians participated in the 78-day Kosovo air campaign with eighteen CF-18 fighter- bombers operating out of Aviano in Italy and with additional support staff.156 While
Canada contributed only close to 2%t of the 912 NATO aircraft in total, it flew 10% of the total NATO sorties of 37,000 (see chart on the next page).157 This was a disproportionate contribution by Canada. It underlined two themes in Canadian foreign
Unfortunately, at this point the total costs for Canadian deployments in the Kosovo operation are not available yet. Interview with LCol Ross Fetterly, Department of National Defence, Finance Department, 19 July 2007. 156 In 1997, six fighter aircraft were deployed from 416 Tactical Fighter Squadron (4Wing) in Cold Lake, Alberta to Aviano in Italy for a period of three months. Later, the duration as well as the size of the squadron were increased and additional fighter aircraft was sent from CFB Bagotville. '"Numbers have to be treated with caution. Daalder and O'Hanlon, for example, counted 'nearly 40,000' sorties. See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: Nato's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 4. 324 policy in the 1990s: first, NATO was important for Canada, and second, Canada contributed more to its success relative to other NATO allies. It was, for example, one of the first countries that sent ground troops to KFOR. This demonstrated that Canada did not shy away from sending ground troops after the air campaign; it actually took the risk of casualties. Likewise, the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle that was deployed to the
KFOR force impressed Canada's NATO allies and provided a vital capability to
KFOR.158
Canadian participation in the Kosovo air campaign was not without risks: pilots were exposed to Serbian air defence systems while dropping their bombs over Serbia.
Canadian CF-18s were modified to be able to carry precision-guided munitions (PGMs), a vital air power capability that only a few NATO allies possessed.159 This air campaign marked the first air combat mission of the CF in Europe since World War II. Canadian pilots flew nearly 2,600 hours, 678 of them were in combat missions, dropped 532 bombs and 361 laser-guided bombs while mostly targeting Serbian artillery positions.160 They accomplished this task without losing any aircraft or pilots. The capability to carry day and night precision-guided ammunition was crucial for the mission and requested at the time by the Joint Force Component Commander (JFACC), an American Senior Officer.
US Colonel Davis noted:
He assembled all the senior national representatives and requested that we all tell our nations not to send or offer and more day, Visual Flight Rules, air defence fighters. He needed precision bombers, and particularly wanted multi-role aircraft that could be employed where and
158 Kim Richard Nossal and Stephane Roussel, "Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower," in Alliance Politics, Kosovo, andNato 's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?, ed. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave, 2001), 185. 159 David L. Bashow et al., "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign," Canadian Military Journal (Spring 2000): 55. 325
when needed. He then singled out the CF 18s (with their day/night PGM capability) from Canada as the exact capability for which he was looking.161
This recollection of a member of the Task Force Aviano spoke highly of the training and
capabilities of the Canadian air force, which was able to contribute to such a vital NATO mission, in which the credibility and reputation of the Alliance was on the line. And
indeed, Canada was one of only a few NATO allies that was capable of using NATO advanced technology such as precision-guided ammunitions.
Canada's long experience in combined and joint exercises with NATO allied forces, such as the United States Air Force, the Navy, or the Royal Air Force, made this smooth collaboration possible. Altogether, three hundred CF personnel participated in the
Kosovo air campaign. Canadian contributions stretched its armed forces and went to the nation's limits. Canadians flew sixteen sorties each day, which required thirty-two pilots to carry them out. This, in turn, represented half of all available CF-18 combat ready pilots.162 Despite having only a limited number of aircraft being deployed to Aviano,
Canadians flew 10% of NATO's total high-risk Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) missions, which refers to the number of Canadian pilots engaging hostile ground forces from the air. By examining the number of refugees that returned to Kosovo after the end of the air campaign, nearly 1 million in total,163 one might come to the conclusion that overall, the air campaign was rather successful.164 Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon
161 Colonel D.A. Davies, The Campaign for Kosovo's Canada's Fighter Force in Action, 03 Feb 2000, p. 2, quoted in Ibid.: 56. For a solid account of the role of the US in the air campaign see Air Force Association, "The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work," (September 1999). 162 Bashow et al., "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign," 60. 163 The literature on displaced people of Kosovo is vast and numbers of refugees remain inprecise. A good account of the refugee flows, however can be found in Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 240-54. 164 Nonetheless, the author is aware of the fact that NATO had missed its initial goal ofpreventing a humanitarian disaster or genocide. This debate of the effectiveness of the air campaign has not come to an end and no definitive answer has been commonly accepted in the literature yet. 326 argue that the Milosevic regime had removed 1,3 million people from their homes while pushing another 800,000 or so out of the province of Kosovo;165 up to 10,000 died during the conflict.166
One of NATO's objectives of the war was not to defeat the Serb-dominated
Yugoslav armed forces or cause a regime change in Belgrade. The simple objective was to force the Milosevic regime back to the negotiation table and to allow an international peacekeeping force into Kosovo to contain the crisis and violence.167 The NATO Alliance did not demand independence from the province of Kosovo but autonomy for its ethnic
Albanian majority. US President Bill Clinton best described the overall aim of the
Kosovo air campaign:
Our strikes have three objectives: First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And, third, if necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.168
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien argued in a similar way in a speech in the House of Commons on 12 April 1999, in which he justified Canada's engagement in the war:
It is these three elements - our values as Canadians, our national interests in a stable and secure Europe and our obligations as a founding member of NATO - that led Canada to take up arms with its NATO partners. It is because of our values, our national interest, and our obligations that we must see the job concluded.169
Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: Nato 's War to Save Kosovo, vii. 166 Ibid., 3. 167 Ibid., 2. 168 White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President on Kosovo" (24 March, 1999). 169 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 12 April 1999. See also http://www.pco- bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=archivechretien&Sub--speeches&Doc,=speeches 19990412969 e. htm, acccessed June 14, 2007. 327
The historical 50' anniversary NATO Summit in Washington was overshadowed by the air campaign against Serbia. It forced the Alliance to rethink its strategy and demanded a more systematic approach in their operations.
Canada sent approximately 1,450 personnel to the Kosovo mission,170 including an infantry battle group, a reconnaissance squadron, eight helicopters and an engineer contingent. The chart below lists the total burden sharing for NATO's Kosovo campaign:
Table VII: Total Expenditures in NATO's Kosovo campaign
Total Expenditures
• Canada Czech Republic Denmark 9% • France 8% >^?^- Germany j-piiii^^*^ 9% Iceland Italy 56% :-;. Netherlands ^m^: Norway "3%2% Portugal Spain UK US
Sources: United States, Congressional Research Service, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report, CRS Report for Congress RL30398, January 3, 2000. For the Canadian Data: Department of National Defence, Finance Department, June 2007.'" It was apparent that Canada was the third largest contributing country in the entire
The numbers are identical in Bland and Maloney, Cohen and from DND. 171 The intention of this chart is to provide an estimation of the total costs and the distribution thereof. It is by no means a fully accurate picture of the costs. There are various reasons for this: the different accounting practices of the member states, fluctuations of exchange rates, time periods of budgets, the allocation of incremental costs etc. Notwithstanding these shortfalls, the chart provides a rough estimation of the costs the NATO member states shouldered. 328
Kosovo campaign, taking the air and ground campaign combined. However, those
numbers need to be examined with caution. The reason for this is that NATO member
states lack unified accounting practices and thus provided costs in a variety of formats:
some countries have grouped their Kosovo-related costs according to the nature of the
operation (military or humanitarian), others only listed the costs for particular
operations.172 A similar divergence occurred in the time period for which those costs
were listed. Below is a detailed account for the expenses for NATO allies for the
following three operations: Operation Allied Force (air campaign in Serbia and Kosovo
between 25 March -10 June, 1999); Operation Allied Harbor (the Kosovo refugee
assistance in Albania and Macedonia, 14 April - 1 September 1999); and Operation Joint
Guardian (the Peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, 11 June - present).173
172 United States, Congressional Research Service, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report, CRS Report for Congress RL30398, January 3 2000. 173 The Canadian government only provided the total number of troops and did not list them according to each operation. 329
Table VIII: Expenses of NATO Countries for OP Allied Force, OP Allied Harbor, and OP Joint Guardian
Total Expenditures Allied Force OP Joint Guardian
Belgium n/a n/a n/a
. Canada * 4:w.ss -•.' . na. _. *!-_•. s..'_.""^ -&'&-'. -H=?.'- _-.:" Czech Republic 15,5 n/a 15,5 Denmark 18,4 7,4 6,2 France 395,2 203,2 192 Germany 454 26,2 192 Greece 40 n/a 40
Hungary 18,7 n/a 18,7
Iceland 0 0 0 Italy 222 n/a 222
Luxembourg 0 0 0
Netherlands 107,5 n/a n/a
Norway 114 19,1 94,9
Poland 11,6 9,6 2
Portugal 50,9 6 44,9 Spain 80,3 23 57,3 Turkey 56 26 30 UK 166 n/a n/a US 2825,9 1775,7 1050,2
Source: Sources: United States, Congressional Research Service, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report, CRS Report for Congress RL30398, January 3, 2000. For the Canadian Data: Department of National Defence, Finance Department, June 2007.
The accounts provided above allow an estimate of how much each contributing nation
spent during the crisis. The implications for Canada then is it was not a laggard in the
NATO Alliance, it pulled its weight and shouldered 9% of the total burden and was thus
equally ranked with Germany, which was a country with three times the population of
Canada.
Between 1998-99 Canadians also participated in the OSCE mission, the Kosovo
Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM),174 and
sent troops to NATO's KFOR mission ("Operation Kinetic")- They were deployed to monitor and control the compliance of Milosevic's regime with international agreements.
KDOM and KVM both are international names for the missions and not the Canadian one. 330
The KVM had 15 Canadian monitors; the KDOM had employed two Canadians. Whereas the latter one reported directly to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, the former worked under the sole authority of the OSCE. Both missions had determined that a massive violation of human rights and acts of genocide had taken place, which resulted in 78-day air campaign, "Operation Allied Force," against the Milosevic regime. Both missions were terminated shortly before that.
Table IX: NATO Troop Cowtribattens To KFOR As of FefcnMwv 2000 7,000 4000 5,000 \ 4,000 3,000 2,000- 1,000 0 nnnnnnnni -f.r ' -?? " #
Source: United States. Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000), p. II-11.
A small number of CF officers also served in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. In addition, CF personnel supported humanitarian efforts in Albania.
In November 1999, the Canadian government shifted its emphasis significantly by reducing its commitment to KFOR and increasing Canada's share in SFOR. The immediate concern of the Canadian contingent was to ensure that there would be no
One reason why Milosevic gave in after 78 days was the waning support of Russia for his government. In addition, the Serbian economy was not doing very well and thus put financial constraints on the government and its people. 331 security vacuum in the transition period. Canadians helped to demilitarize the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and transform it into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which was a civilian organization responsible for coordinating civil emergency responses and work under the authority of the UN interim administration.
Another objective of the Canadians was to help KFOR accomplish the task of de- mining the province of Kosovo and to ensure the safety of all ethnic minorities - Serbs,
Bosniac, Roma, Turks, and Albanians (nearly 90% of the total population of Kosovo)177.
A successful element of the KFOR contingent was a civil-military relations cell, which functioned as a nation-building cell that helped to establish a close working relationship between the military operation and the local population. In the words of a former commanding officer, Klaus Reinhardt, KFOR had accomplished the following:
As part of the reconstruction effort, KFOR soldiers have built or repaired 200 kilometers of roads, six bridges and several bypasses, helping relieve congestion and assist the flow of humanitarian aid. Military engineers have restored the railway network, repairing 200km of track and rebuilding two bridges. Damage to Pristina airport has been repaired and the airport reopened to commercial flights.17
Indeed, Canada saw the new NATO as a tool to promote softer security issues such as the human security agenda that one would expect the UN to shoulder. During the Balkan crisis and the massacres in Sarajevo and Srebrenica Canadian policy makers have had a bad experience with the United Nations in the sense that it was unable to ensure the safety of humans. The government put more confidence in NATO to prevent another
Lt. General Sir Mike Jackson, "KFOR: Providing security for building a better future for Kosovo," NATO Review (Autumn 1999), 16. 77 Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, "Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allied Military Operations," July 8, 2003, 1. 178 General Klaus Reinhardt, "Commanding KFOR," NATO Review (Summer/Autumn 2000), 17. 332 massacre and humanitarian crisis. Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Minister of Foreign
Affairs, justified Canadian involvements in Kosovo by saying:
NATO's actions are guided primarily by concern for the human rights and welfare of Kosovo's people. NATO's recourse to air strikes was precipitated by evidence that the regime of repression by the Serb government was on the rise and accelerating. [...] NATO did not provoke this tragedy - it responded to it. And the decision to act was not motivated by a military threat to Alliance territory, but by an affront to Alliance values and belief - perhaps more explicit in some capitals than n others - that human security matters. Alliance members could not turn away from the humanitarian crisis taking place on NATO's European doorstep. That is why Canadian pilots are part of the effort, why we are providing humanitarian relief and why we are offering sanctuary to 5,000 refugees.179
Diplomatically, Canada was at the forefront of events. Even though it was not part of the initial "Contact Group," it was, however, a member of the international economic elite by being represented at the G-8 Summit on 18-20 June 1999 in Cologne. There, the heads of government and state demanded an immediate end of the violence in Kosovo, the withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces, the acceptance of a UN peacekeeping force, an interim international administration governed by the UN, and the return of all refugees to their homes. Vital for negotiating these benchmarks was the consent of Russia, which in turn put more pressure on the regime of Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo.
With the strong support from the Canadian public, it was hardly surprising that the government volunteered ground troops to the Balkans and was pushing other NATO allies to do the same.180 The conflict in the Balkans and the response of the international community through the UN had reinforced a trend in Canadian foreign policy that when
Lloyd Axworthy, "Kosovo and the human security agenda," Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Statements and Speeches 99/28, April 7 1999, quoted in Nossal and Roussel, "Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower," 193. 180 Jeff Sallot, "Canada's Tone Turning Dovish," Globe and Mail, 20 May 1999. 333 it came to security interest, the Canadian government had less faith in the UN and put its resources and commitments towards NATO. Kim Richard Nossal and Stephane Roussel argue: "Indeed, it could be argued that the Canadian government would not have been unhappy had NATO embraced a more robust ground troops option earlier in the conflict, even though Ottawa did not follow the path of the British prime minister, Tony Blair, who openly campaigned for the use of ground troops."181 Thus, it was not surprising that some "90 percent of Canadian peace-related deployments took place under the auspices of NATO, albeit (in the case of Bosnia) with general UN blessing."182 The point of this analysis then is that indeed Canada had not turned away from Europe and NATO in the
1990s, but shouldered proportionally more than some of her NATO allies. Hence, Canada contributed significantly to the preservation of NATO and to the defence of its values.
Public Opinion on Canadian involvement in the Balkans
One reason of why the Canadian government was able to make significant contributions to European security was because it was assured in its actions by Canadian public opinion. This domestic support for Canadian engagement was consistent throughout the
1990s. NATO was popular among Canadians and Canadians demanded from the government to continue to invest its resources in the defence Alliance. They wanted
Canada to be a good ally and to remain in NATO. The general support for Canada's role in NATO was remarkably high: in 1999 32% believed that Canada should place a very high priority on its role in NATO; 41% believed it should be high.183
' Nossal and Roussel, "Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower," 183. 182 David G. Haglund, "Allied Force or Forced Allies? The Allies' Perspective," in Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and Nato's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?, ed. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York, N.Y.:Palgrave, 2001). 183 Department of National Defence News Release, "Les Canadiens et la defense: les Canadians appuient les FC au Kosovo, June 1999. 334
In 1995, in the height of the crisis on the Balkans, the Canadian International
Development Agency found that 75% of Canadians supported the notion of the government working towards enhancing international peace and security.184 The public pressured their politicians to do more to enforce humanitarian conditions on the ground in the Balkans185 and thus inadvertently accepted the new role of peacekeepers in a post-
Cold War environment. In addition, the public's attention moved away from nation states to one in which the "individual" became the centre of analysis.
Canadians had great faith in NATO: in 1998, 67% of Canadians believed that
NATO was very relevant in the new security environment; only 35% considered NATO to be an outdated organization that was not able to cope with new threats.186 Canadians believed that the world had become a more dangerous place.
In the wake of the Kosovo campaign in 1999, commentators in the media tried to sell this war as the "right thing to do."187 Nearly 80% of Canadians agreed with the
Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinions on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance, 12. 185 See Compass/Southam/IISS survey quoted in Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, "Support for International Involvement in Canadian Public Opinion after the Cold War," Canadian Military Journal (Autumn 2001): 45, footnote 11. 186 See Compass/Southam/IISS survey. This number is almost identical with the official numbers of the Government of Canada, which states that support for NATO membership among Canadians is somewhat between the 60 or 70% mark. See Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinions on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance, 12. This argument, by the way, is also consistent with public opinion polls and government actions in Europe at the time. The new German government, for example, exhaustingly argued in favour of the war against Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo based on humanitarian concerns. Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Joschka Fischer, publicly argued that 'we could never let this happen again'. He was alluding to the genocide taking place in Auschwitz. Because of the nature of the political system in Germany, any German military deployments require the consent of the Bundestag, the German parliament. The young government under Gerhard Schroeder, who came to power in the wake of the Kosovo crisis in 1998, combined the decision of participating in the air campaign with a confidence vote and thus forced the coalition parties to accept the government's view of sending armed troops into Kosovo. The procedure to authorize the deployment of troops, however, is different in Canada. In the Canadian political system, the House of Commons does not have to authorize the use of force; this is the sole prerogative of the government in session through Cabinet. Nonetheless, it is the good tradition of parliamentary procedure that the House is consulted before the government sends troops abroad. For a legal discussion see for example Michael Dewing and Corinne McDonald, "International Deployment of Canadian Forces: 335 government and believed that NATO air strikes were sufficiently justified; 57% were also in favour of sending ground troops. The Canadian public strongly supported the decision of the government to send Canadian soldiers into Kosovo: 57% of Canadians supported that idea. The total support among Canadians for NATO's actions in Kosovo was close to
80%.188 The air campaign, however, was not without its critics. Some argued that it was almost illusionary of the international community to believe that an air campaign would bring peace and stability to the country. The argument was that the most an air campaign would be able to achieve was to bring damage to a countryside or infrastructure but it
1 RQ could not stabilize a country or region. For that job, as NATO was aware, the Alliance needed ground troops.190 Canadians realized this and the decision was made to send
Canadian servicemen to participate in the Kosovo Force (KFOR; 1999-2000). In short, there was open support for the use of force based on humanitarian grounds among
Canadian policy-makers and the Canadian public.
Canadian Costs and NATO burden sharing
In total, Canada spent $3,073.9 million between 1991-2001 for United Nations and
NATO operations in the Balkans (see chart below). This number excludes Canada's Parliament's Role," (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch, 2004). See also Constitution Act 1867, sections 15 and 19. 188 Both numbers were taken from a poll for the National Post, 11 April 1999, p.l, quoted in: Martin and Fortmann, "Support for International Involvement in Canadian Public Opinion after the Cold War," 50. 189 There was also an argument in the NATO literature that the participation of American and Canadian warplanes in Operation Allied Force was a sign of a widening Atlantic. After the tragedies in Bosnia with a largely absent (or hesitant) American military, the commitment and interest of Washington in Europe during the Kosovo crisis was considerable. The same applies to Canada even though the country has shown considerable interest and commitment to Europe in both conflicts. Thus, both Canada and the US were very much linked to Europe in the 1990s and thus the notion of a 'strategic widening or drift' appears to be incorrect. For a detailed discussion see for example Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, Alliance Politics, Kosovo, andNato's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?, 1st ed. (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave, 2001). See for example Scott A. Cooper, "Air Power and the Coersive Use of Force," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 84. For a similar view comparing the air campaign during the Gulf War 1990/1991, Operation Deliberate Force (1995), and Operation Allied Force (1999) see Paul C. Forage, "Bombs for Peace: A Comparative Study of the Use of Air Power in the Balkans," Armed Forces and Society 28, no. 2 (Winter 2002). 336
contributions to the Kosovo crisis between 1999-2001.191 While looking at NATO and
including the costs for Canada's NATO operations in the Balkans as they are available, it becomes apparent that Canada spent $203.3 million for the IFOR operation, $3,041.2
million for SFOR, and $ 515.9 million for the Kosovo operation, or $3,760.4 million for
all operations in total (see chart below).
Table X:
TOTAL COST OF CF DEPLOYMENTS 1991-2001 1991-2001 IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FULL INCR. \ PERSONNEL COST COST
EUROPE i UNPROFOR - CAN8AT1 (Croatia) | 860 530,300 203,200 UNPROFOR - CANBATII (Bosnia) | 826 626,100 248,100 UNPROFOR - OTHERS (Croatia & Bosnia) 34 125,100 39,100 UNHCR AIRLIFT - OP AIRBRIDGE (Sarajevo Airlift) 1 4°8 75,200 1 5,200 ECMMY-OP Bolster 1 48 0,000 0,000 UNCOE - OP JUSTICE (Former Yugoslavia) I 7 2,000 0.020 OP DENY FLIGHT (Former Yugoslavia) 13 2,000 0.011 IFOR - OP ALLIANCE (Balkans) (NATO) ]1 1029 203,300 52,700 SFOR - OP PALLADIUM (Bosnia) (NATO) 1 1641 1 507,400 489,100 EUFOR - OP BRONZE/BOREAS I 83 0,000 0,000 UNMACBIH - OP NOBLE - (Bosnia) I 4 2,500 0,900 Total by FYj 4899 3073,900 1048,300
Source: Department of National Defence, finance Section, June 2007
Defence economists point out that the full cost is defined as the sum of all costs - variable
and fixed, direct and indirect, cash and non-cash - incurred by the government for a
specific period of time. Incremental costs are defined as the additional costs that incur as
a result of supplying a service. These costs result from additional resources or a reallocation of existing resources. Thus, incremental costs are only those additional costs
incurred by doing the deployment.192
The numbers suggest that Canada shouldered 21.46% of the total burden of the total United Nations bill for its operations in the Balkans. Thus, Canada shouldered more burden relative to its size that other NATO allies. This high number, however, has to be
The reasons for this, as mentioned earlier, is that the data is not yet available by the Department of National Defence. Interview with LCol Ross Fetterly, Department of National Defence, Finance Department, 19 July 2007. 192 Salaries for soldiers and civilian support personnel, for example, are covered under the full costs. 337 taken with caution. It is contested for the following reasons: The United Nations lists the amount of $4,616,725,556 as the total costs that incurred for UNPROFOR (I+II),
UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and the UNPF-HQ.193 Comparing this UN data with the total amount of Canadian funds spent for the same time period is somewhat difficult for the following reasons: first, Canadian accounting practices are different from those used by the UN. Moreover, the United Nations did not reveal its accounting practices when questioned.194 However, when calculating the total sum of Canadian burden sharing for
UNPROFOR (I+II), UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and the UNPF-HQ against the UN number,
Canada spent in total CAN $1,361.2 million.195
Another problem with those numbers is that the UN accounting practices are not publicly accessible and it is not clear, for example, whether or not the UN had included the monthly stipends for UN peacekeepers into their calculations or whether they would have to be added on top of the total amount of $4,616,725,556, in which case the
Canadian contribution would be smaller than 21.46%.
Third, it is not clear if the numbers provided by the United Nations on its website are raw numbers or if they were adjusted for inflation. Because of the lack of information by the United Nations, this dissertation assumes that the numbers provided by the UN were not inflated and that they reflect the total costs to the United Nations for UN peacekeeping for UNPROFOR (I+II), UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and the UNPF-HQ.
This number is the official number estimated by the UN for the entire operation. The estimation was conducted by the Department of Public Information in 1996. It can be accessed at http://www.un.org/Depis/dpko/dpko/co__mission/unprof_p.htm. accessed 20 June, 2007. 194 Phone Interview of the author with UN Official in the Peacekeeping Department at the UN headquarters in New York, 19 June 2007. 195 Department of National Defence, Finance Section. June 2007. The currency exchange rate in 1996 was 0,7280 thus the total amount in US dollars is $ 990,953.6 million. 338
Nonetheless, the numbers show that Canada shouldered a significant burden of the costs for the operations in the Balkans.
Canadians also paid a heavy human price for their commitments to the Balkans.
Twenty Canadian soldiers196 lost their lives in the former Yugoslavia and many other returning troops suffered from physical and emotional distress after they returned home to Canada.
There was a great debate about Canadian contributions to allied operations that dominated the nature and agenda of Canadian foreign policy (see chapter 2). This debate largely took place among political scientists and former government officials who occasionally had their own agenda to promote. Economists, it appeared, saw the measurement of Canadian burden sharing in the Alliance somewhat more comprehensively and point to the difficulties of measuring such contributions. This was largely due to the different methodologies applied by the researchers and the indicators they choose to measure. Economists have developed different models by which they measure the contribution to collective defence. They point out that the NATO burden sharing debate was about "the actual contribution of each nation to collective Alliance defence and the fairness of each state's contribution."197 It needs to be pointed out that the debate of NATO burden sharing was nearly as old as the Alliance itself. The change of NATO strategy from one of flexible response to crisis management in the 1990s ignited the debate again and Canada's role and standing in it. The debate became
Veterans Affairs Canada, "Canadian Forces in the Balkans," available at htt^/wwSLXSCz acc.gc.ca/youtli/suli.cfm?source=history/Canadianforces/factsheets/balkans. accessed 1 April 2008. 197 Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, "NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 6 (November 1999): 668. 339 particularly heated after the Alliance decided to enlarge and take in new members.198 As demonstrated in earlier chapters, NATO enlargement has brought about benefits and costs for existing allies as well as new ones. Nonetheless, agreement was needed on the fair distribution of enlargement costs among all members.
The choice of measurement depended heavy on what was to be measured. In our case civilian and military indicators were used during the Cold War to examine Canada's burden in the NATO Alliance. To put it frankly, different indicators produce different rankings. This was why the United States, for example, when assessed of its allied contributions, always refers to the absolute level of defence spending, because high growth rates in the US also mean high defence expenditures. In comparison to other countries then, this puts the US in a more favourable position. Some of the European countries respond by stating that most of their forces were based in Europe and committed to the defence of the continent and thus higher costs would occur to them.
There will always be a debate in NATO to find the single best indicator for evaluating the burden of the common defence. As will be shown below, such a measurement could produce not only different results, but multiple measurements are required in order to get a more comprehensive picture of the actual burden. For example, the defence expenditure measured in relation to the country's GDP is a measuring tool that was first used during the Cold War. However, in a post-Cold era security environment and an emphasis on
NATO crisis management operations and with the process of NATO enlargement under way, this point of reference produces a rather incomplete picture of allied burden sharing.
For details of this debate see the earlier chapter on NATO enlargement. 340
The traditional benchmark used to measure allied contributions was to calculate defence spending as a share of the gross national output (GDP), because it would reflect the level of military strength of the allies. It was the most common benchmark used in the
NATO Alliance and calculates the burden that defence places on the economy of states.
The reason for the US, as stated earlier, always referring to the defence spending/GDP ratio is because the United States spends proportionally more on defence than other countries (except Turkey and Greece). The following table demonstrates this:
Table XI:
Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product
Average Average Average Average Country 1980- 1985 - 1990- 1995- 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1984 1989 1994 1999 Based on current prices Belgium 3,2 2,8 2,0 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,3 Czech Republic II // // // 2,2 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,2 Denmark 2,4 2,0 1,9 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,6 France 4,0 3,8 3,4 2,9 2,7 2,6 2,5 2,5 2,6 Germany 3,3 3,0 2,1 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,4 Greece 5,4 5,1 4,4 4,6 4,8 4,9 4,6 4,3 4,2 Hungary II // // // 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,9 1,9 Italy 2,1 2,3 2,1 1,9 2,0 2,1 2,0 2,1 1,9 Luxembourg 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,9 Netherlands 3,0 2,8 2,3 1,8 1,8 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 Norway 2,7 2,9 2,8 2,2 2,1 1,8 1,7 2,1 2,0 Poland II // // // 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,0 Portugal 2,9 2,6 2,6 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 Spain 2,3 2,1 1,6 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 Turkey 4,0 3,3 3,8 4,4 5,4 5,0 5,0 4,9 4,8 United Kingdorr 5,2 4,5 3,7 2,7 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,4 2,4 NATO-Europe 3,5 3,2 2,6 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,0 2,0 2,0 gtifeHHK ««»., United States mm5,6 6,0 4,7 3,3 3,0 3,1 3,1 3,4 NATO-Total 4,5 4,6 3,5 2,7 2,5 2,6 2,6 2,7 2,7\
Raw Data Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2003.
However, the GDP indicator has its limitations for many reasons: first, not all countries have adopted the same accounting procedures and standards to collect and interpret their financial data. Hence, the definitions of defence spending could vary from country to country. Second, some countries calculate pensions and costs for research and development as part of their total defence spending. Third, some countries, like Germany and Turkey, have conscript armies, which put them in a disadvantage in terms of 341 measuring their efficiency.199 Fourth, the GDP level does not reflect the differing income levels among NATO allies.200 Fifth, the GDP benchmark does not give any indication as to how NATO member states structured their forces for NATO missions envisioned in its new strategic concept that was adopted in 1991 and that placed great emphasis on more flexible and lighter forces. Six, especially smaller militaries such as Canada did not devote many troops and military equipment to the defence of the Alliance, but in light of the transformations taking place in Europe, they devoted large amounts of the defence budgets to peacekeeping missions or technical assistance to CEE. Seven, the GDP yardstick does not reflect the real defence spending. In the case of Canada, as Philippe
Lagasse argued, Ottawa's level of defence spending is consistent with Canada's geostrategic realities because Canada lives on a peaceful continent and far away from hot spots of international crisis. Therefore, using Canadian defence spending as a percentage
201 of GDP, "obscures a contextualization of Canada's strategic situation."
In short, to reach a more comprehensive understanding of NATO's burden sharing, it is required to seek additional, new indicators other than the total defence expenditure measured against the national GDP.
Contribution to Rapid Reaction Forces
With the end of the Cold War, as examined in Chapter 2, a transformation of the political, economic, and military landscape took place, particularly in Europe. During the Cold
War, the level of burden sharing of NATO allies was evaluated according to how many
199 For a greater discussion of all the disadvantages see Hartley and Sandler, "NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future," 669. 200 John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, NATO Burdensharing after Enlargement (New York: Novinka Books, 2003), 2. 201 Phillippe Lagasse, "Specialization and the Canadian Forces," Defence and Peace Economics 16, no. 3 (June 2004): 212. 342 troops and equipment a country was able to put into the field. These, however, have become obsolete measures in the post-Cold War era. On the military side, an alternative indicator of measuring the contribution of nation states is the contribution they make to
NATO's reaction force, which are forces that maintain a high level of readiness. These are also the forces that NATO would draw upon for out-of-area missions. NATO's rapid response units include multinational command structures and formations such as the
Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Land Force, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC) for ground forces, and the Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces (Air). The
ACE force consists of 5,000 troops and is supplied by 14 NATO states. Canada earmarked an infantry battalion group to ACE. In addition to the land forces, NATO also maintains Standing Naval Units, for example, the SNFL. This force consists of six to ten destroyers and frigates. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States all send one ship on a permanent basis.
Using the contribution to NATO's Rapid Response Units as an alternative indicator for evaluating the burden sharing, it was apparent that Canada was the 6th largest nation in 1998 contributing the NRF force. As the following chart demonstrates,
Canada ranks among the top six contributors: 343
Table XII:
Member's contributions to NATO's Reaction Forces and to Gross Domestic Product in 1998 (in%)
Land Forces Naval Forces Air Forces Share of NATO'n GDP" Rank of Contributions Belgium 3 1.7 3,7 1,5 9 =— Denmark 2,3 3,4 1,2 1 11 France" 18,6 10,3 0 6,5 3 Germany 7,1 5,2 10,2 12,7 2 Greece 7,4 7,8 0,8 0,7 13 Italy 13,6 8,6 2,9 7 5 Luxambourg 0,2 0 0 0,1 15 Netherlands 2,2 6,9 5,6 2.2 8 Norway 0,7 4,3 0.8 0,9 12 Portugal 2,3 0.9 1.7 0.6 14 Spain 7,6 3.4 3,1 3,3 7 Turkey 6,7 7.8 6,2 1,2 10 United Kingdom 20 14,7 13,2 8,1 4 United States 7,4 21,6 49 48.6 1
Iceland***
NATO Total 100 100 100 100 15
Source: United States Congressional Budget Office, 2001
"France maintains its reaction forces separate from NATO "NATO's GDP is the total gross domestic product of all of the member states "** Iceland does not have military forces
One year later in 1999 this ratio changed when Canada increased its contributions to the
NRF. Canada moved up the ranks and placed 8th among the then nineteen NATO allies.202 The contributions to NATO's NRF could be understood as an important indicator because the NRF was the primary force of carrying out NATO's new strategy of crisis management of making forces rapidly available in crisis situations. Through its contribution to the land, naval, and air force contingents, Canada demonstrated that it took crisis management seriously. It was a committed ally and ranked in the top quarter of allied contributions to the NRF. This cannot be interpreted as a sign of "darkness" of the Canadian Forces but as a sign of brightness and commitment.
NATO had enlarged in 1999 (See appendix for details). For detailed accounts see United States. Dept. of Defense, "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the Us Congress," (Dept. of Defense, March 2000), 111-14. 344
Another trend in international security in the post-Cold War environment was an increase and new mandates of UN peacekeeping missions.203 Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations have frequently included military and civilian personnel and thus, the demand for peacekeeping forces and troops had gone up. Most of Canada's
NATO allies, including Canada itself, made substantial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. Their level of commitment depended on many factors, i.e. their military ability and capability to send troops. The most accurate indicator then of evaluating the burden sharing in UN peacekeeping operations was the ratio of the contribution of the states relative to its total labour force, because it depicts each nation's share of total manpower contributed to peacekeeping missions compared to its share of total labor force. The next chart reveals that Canada and France made 20% more contributions to UN peacekeeping than their labour force share (see table below) and thus
Canada contributes more to UN peacekeeping missions than most of its allies:
For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see for example Karns and Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, 308-26, 345
Table XIII:
UN Peace Support Personnel Sha re Relative To Labor Force Share 1999
R>l*«i ' | 1 1.4»/« Hnn£iuy J J o. /»/» Denmuk i -21 <®i> M«ttwnl*tir]s ; i -3.0W Cmdi Z^JZ.1 15.8"M> *Ww« i -21 4Vo Naiwajc i -71 S-VJ U was .1 King 4e»» i 5.8"V(i Ptoif*«*l I 1 -63 2% Gtimiy Sp*m ZZZJ •5 it*V -2,4 2M. 116.7V. United S*»*«* , 3 11.1% "HiAey 1 116.7°/'. Ca»eh KBpitife ~~J 137.S»/« »<*%\»u« 1 0 OVo Ka pab li; of Kt>» * 3 0.CS4 I -31 3% to d A rs&> &nii*t«s 0 0«/» S-MidiAiabia 0.0«A Qatw 0 0% o..™. 0 0% L.UMBntscniJK 0 0% Kuwait 0 0% f3*kr**n 0 0%
A ratio around i indicates that a country's contribution is m balance wiUi its ability to contribute. A ratio above I suggests thai a country is contributing beyond its "(air stiare," while a ratio below I means contributions! are not commemmiHte with ability to contribute
Source: United States, Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999), p. 111-15.
There is also a third benchmark for assessing allied contributions to NATO's common defence. On another scale that measures the percentage of the total national defence spending of the total national personnel expenditures, Canada ranked only slightly below the average. Again, this was indicative of Canadian priorities that were less centered on hard military capabilities and more on softer crisis management abilities.
This contribution was also consistent with NATO's Strategic Concept that gave guidance to the new role of NATO forces and the disarmament process in Central and Eastern
Europe. In essence, as these numbers suggest, the general trend of NATO allies when it came to defence spending was to reduce the level of Cold War-type commitments while transforming the Alliance into a global crisis management organization (see table below): 346
Table XIV
% devoted to personnel expenditures
Average Average Average Average Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004e 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999
Belgium 61,8 63,4 68,3 69,3 65,8 68,7 71,5 72,8 73,8 Bulgaria // // // // // II II 89,9
•HT // // II 42,8 46,0 45,5 41,9 51,1 1 CzecDenmarh Ref~Lk ..-- 54,6 56,6 57,5 59,8 54,6 52,3 52,0 51,4 51,4 Estonia II // // II // II II ,34,5 France .. 58,2 60,4 60,5 60,7 58,9 57,5 Germany 46,6 48,9 57,4 61,5 60,7 60,3 59,4 60,1 59,3 Greece 64,6 60,5 63,0 61,7 62,5 64,0 67,6 74,5 77,4 Hungary II // // II 48,7 47,9 49,3 48,8 49,4 Italy 59,1 57,8 63,6 71,8 71,4 72,3 74,0 72,7 75,7 Latvia // // // II // II II mj Lithuania II // // II // II II fl0,5 Luxembourg 77,5 76,9 76,2 79,1 76,0 68,4 79,5 78,8 75,0 Netherlands 55,3 52,8 56,9 54,6 50,8 48,0 51,2 52,6 49,8 Norway 48,8 43,9 40,6 38,0 40,8 39.1 37,9 40,1 40,3 Poland II // // II 62,3 64,3 64,9 64,6 60,6 Portugal 66,6 67,7 77,3 80,8 81,8 80,8 84,1 78,6 74,2 Romania // // // II // II II «1,7 Russian Federation // // // 44,5 42,5 42,0 45,9 47,2 44.9 Slovak Republic // // // II // II II X9,7 Slovenia // // // II // II II S8,7 Spain .. 64,9 66,5 63,9 63,4 54,9 55,7 53,9 Turkey 45,3 37,1 50,1 48,2 45,1 44,7 45,8 45,6 47,4 United Kingdom 37,4 38,6 42,2 39,4 38,2 I 39,4 39,8 39,6 39.4 United States 41,9 37,0 39,3 39,0 37,7 36,2 36,1 36,1 34,8 KMSmiMfSSSmM mmmmmmil^^W^^ W ^^^K
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Commitments to NATO's Infrastructure
In order to operate efficiently and functionally, NATO relied heavily on its common infrastructure as well as the infrastructure of its member states to be made available in cases of emergency. However, this infrastructure permanently required maintenance and continuous investments to upkeep, which were shouldered by all NATO member states.
The table below lists the national contributions of the NATO member states as well as their average between 1994-1999. It also offers a comparison of investments into infrastructure during the Cold War. 347
A closer look at the numbers reveals that the investments into NATO's infrastructure increased in the post-Cold War era. Partial funding for these investments came from Canada, which was one of the few NATO allies that contributed above the
NATO average for common infrastructure projects. As a result, one could argue that
Canada was one of the leading contributing nations to keep NATO operational. The following table reveals this in more detail:
Table XV: % of total defence expenditure devoted to infrastructure expenditures
Average Average Average Average Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004e 1980- 1984 1985- 1989 1990- 1994 1995-1999 Belgium 5,5 4,0 3.4 3,9 1,9 3,7 2,7 2,5 2,6 Bulgaria // // II II II II II II 0,4
Czech Republic II II 3,3 4,6 6,1 4,2 5,8 // it Denmark 2,8 3,4 3,2 2.2 1,4 2,6 3,6 2,5 2,1 Estonia It II II II II II It 13,7 France // 3,9 4,5 4,5 4,2 4,8 5,2 Germany 5,4 5,9 4,9 4.8 4,9 4,4 4,4 4,1 3.8 Greece 2,8 2,2 1,7 1,9 1,8 1,4 1,3 1.4 1.2 Hungary II II // 2,9 5.7 6,4 6,6 7,0 Italy 2.3 // 2.6 2,4 0,8 1,2 0.9 0,8 1,1 1.0 Latvia // II II II II If II II 12,1 Lithuania // li II II II II II II 3,7 Luxembourg 10,3 7,3 10,4 4,2 4,9 7,9 2,1 1,5 2,3 Netherlands 3,7 5,2 5,2 3,8 4.3 4,2 3.7 2,9 3.0 Norway 5,0 8,2 9,2 6,3 5,0 5,1 5,9 5,9 5,8 Poland II II // 1,9 2,2 1.7 2,1 3,8 Portugal 5,9 // 3,7 2,3 1,0 1,5 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,9 Romania II II II II II II II 1.6 Russian Federation // II II 7.0 6.2 7,2 6,0 6,5 6,4 Slovak Republic // II II II II II II II 7,3 Slovenia // II II II II II II II 2,5 Spain // 1,2 0,8 1,7 2,2 2,1 2.1 2.3 Turkey 13.2 5,4 3,0 4.4 7.2 6.2 6,4 3,0 3,0 United Kingdom 2,7 3,9 5,2 5.2 4,3 0,8 0,9 0,9 1,5 United States 1,6 1,8 1,5 2,3 1.7 1.6 1,4 1,4 1,3
Data Source: North Attar tic Treaty Organization Indeed, as shown in the chart above, Canadian contributions went up since the 1980s.
Whereas Canadian investments into NATO's infrastructure averaged 2.3% between
1980-1984, it increased to 3.2% on average between 1990-1994, at a time when Canada was financially constrained considerably and had to close its bases in Germany (in 1994).
This development continued well into the late-1990 and indeed, when NATO enlarged in
1999 to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as new members into the
Alliance. By 2000, Canada shouldered 5.3% of the expenses of NATO's infrastructure.
This was a remarkable contribution and one that cannot be interpreted as a sign of 348 darkness in Canadian burden sharing, especially when Canada's more powerful allies such as Germany, Italy, and the United States actually reduced their shares of burden; in the case of the United States from 2,3% on average (between 1995-1999) to 1.7% in
2000.
NA TO's Civilian Indicators
Generally speaking, however, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contribute to the success of the organization in many different ways. The most common ones were financial contributions to the overall NATO budget as well as the deployment of NATO troops. The costs for deployments were shouldered by the individual NATO member states themselves rather than by NATO. NATO operated on three different spending accounts: the NATO civil budget, and the NATO military budget, and the
NATO Security and Investment Program (NSIP). It was only the latter that was negotiated every few years whereas the other two accounts remained relatively constant.
One of the civilian indicators was the contribution of NATO member states to NATO's common funding that included contributions to NATO's Security Investment Program, the military budget, and the civil budget.204 Those three budget items make NATO work; it is those three separate budgets that pay for NATO's common operational costs.
The NATO civil budget basically funded NATO's common infrastructure projects such as NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, joint military headquarters and others.
It was US$161 million in 1999 and has been relatively constant since 1955.205
International civil servants working at the headquarters (the International Staff) as well as
204 For a more detailed discussion see for example Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO; Past, Present, and into the 21st Century (Cambridge, U.K., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Lis and Selden, NATO Burdensharing after Enlargement, 25. 349 the supporting staff receive their salaries and benefits from this account. This budget also included the budget of the Office of the Secretary General, who functioned as the head of the entire NATO organization, and his staff. The International Staff provided support for
NATO bodies such as the North Atlantic Council and other committees. In short, the funds of this account pay for the salaries of the NATO civil servants, their benefits, travel, communication, utilities and overall supply and support of the administration.
Military Budget
NATO's military budget is the largest of the three accounts (US $ 496 million in 1999)206 and funds NATO's command structures and its operational headquarters at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) in Mons as well as NATO's Airborne Early
Warning and Control System (AWACS) based in Geilenkirchen, Germany. The Defence
Planning Committee based on a fixed formula determines the size of the military budget annually. The overall military costs are divided up among the twenty-six member states as opposed to 27, because France has not been a member of NATO's integrated military structures since 1967.
Security & Investment Program
NATO's security and investment program is formerly known as NATO's Infrastructure
Fund. The name was changed in 1993 along with the functions of the program. Since then, the program has become not only more flexible but also more mobile. The NSIP funds (US $458 in 1999)207 provide collective financing for NATO's support functions such as command and control infrastructure, communications, logistics, the maintenance of training installations, and storage facilities for equipment, fuel and ammunitions.
206 Ibid., XV. Because of the nature of the program, it is highly mobile and flexible and does not have
to be located in a NATO country. For example, the NSIP program has contributed to the
financing of American storage facilities in Europe.208 As the table below demonstrates,
Canada was the six largest nations contributing to NATO's Security & Investment
Program. Again, this was significant considering the domestic financial constraints in
Canada at the time and its low defence spending measured against its GDP.
Table XVI:
NATO Common Budgets Contributions and Cost Shares, 2004
Country Tola Contributions Total Cost Shares (% ) Rank Belgium 76,2 3.5 8 Bulgaria 12 0,5 20
Czech Republic 16,4 0.7 16 Denmark 52 2,3 9 Estonia 1,3 0.1 22 France 122,7 5,5 5 Germany 464 20,8 2 Greece 15 0,7 15 Hungary 11,8 0,5 19 Iceland 0,5 O.I 12 Italy 163,4 7.3 4 Latvia 1.7 0,1 14 Lithuania 3,6 O.I 25 Luxambourg 1.9 O.I 26 Netherlands 83.5 3.7 7 Norway 41.6 1,9 12 Poland 45,2 2 11 Portugal 12,1 0,5 15 Romania 13,3 0,6 17 Slovakia 5,4 0,2 21 Slovenia 28,4 1,3 14 Spain 50,8 2,3 10 Turkey 31,7 1,4 13 United Kingdom 255,1 11.4 3 United States 607,3 27,2 1
Total 2231,5 100 26
Source: Carl W Ek. NATO Common -unds Burdensharlng: Background and Currant Issues, CRS Report for Congress RL30150 (20 January, 200B)
This was a significant contribution by Canada. Ottawa contributed almost as much to
NATO's common funds as did other NATO countries. Especially some of those countries were much bigger than Canada, such as France and Italy, in terms of the size of their population. France, for example, has 1.9 times the amount of people, and its economy is
Carl W. Ek, NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues, RI30150, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (The Library of Congress, 2006). 351 almost twice as big as Canada's while Canada has a 6.44 times larger landmass to defend.209 The list below shows the distribution in greater detail. According to these numbers, Canada was the 6th largest contributor to NATO's Military Budget:
Table XVII:
Allied Contributions to NATO's Common Budgets in 1999 (in million of US$)
Member State NSIP Military Civil Percentage of Total NiHttkBudget
Belgium 21,1 4,4 rwa 1111 ^s,:;,. Czech Republic 0,2 3,8 1,4 0,5 15 Denmark 16,9 9,2 2,4 2,6 10 France 34,3 29,3 24,7 7,9 4 Germany 108 85,5 25 19,6 2 Greece 4,2 2,1 0,6 0,6 14 Hungary 0,1 2,7 1 0,3 17 Iceland 0 0,2 0,1 0 19 Italy 36,1 32,9 9,3 7 5 Luxambourg 0,9 0,5 0,1 0,1 18 Netherlands 25 15,5 4,4 4 7 Norway 13,2 6,4 1,8 1,9 11 Poland 0,5 10,3 4 1,3 13 Portugal 1,5 3,5 1 0,5 16 Spain 6,5 19,5 5,6 2,8 9 Turkey 4,6 8,8 2,6 1,4 12 United Kingdom 53,6 91,3 27,9 15,5 3 United States 115,2 129,7 36,2 25,2 1
Total 458 495,7 161,1 100 19
Source: United States Congressional Budget Office, 2001
Aid for CEE
Another non-military indicator of NATO's burden sharing is the contribution that NATO member states made to the peaceful transition of former Warsaw Pact countries in form of foreign economic aid, such as development assistance and loans.210 As demonstrated in
The population of France is 63,713,926 and Canada's is 33,390,141 (Ratio: 1.9 times); French landmass totals to 643,427 sqm, Canada's is 9984670 sqm (Ratio 6.44 times); the Canadian economy measured in GDP is $1,088 trillion, the French economy totals S2.149 trillion. Source: United States. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007). 210 For a detailed study on the effectiveness of foreign aid and assistance see for example Congressional Budget Office, The Role of Foreign Aid in Development (May 1997). 352 the previous chapters, this contribution was vital to NATO's enlargement process and contributed to relative stability in times of high economic stress. It was apparent that
Canada ranked fourth of giving economic aid to Central and Eastern Europe. More specifically, Canada shouldered nearly 10% of total amount of aid that the NATO allies gave to CEE. Once again, this was a very significant and functional contribution of
Canada, especially because the NATO transformation project only included a very minimal amount of Western forces being deployed into Central and Eastern Europe. This meant that civilian measures were more significant than military ones. It also resonates well with Canadian emphasis on NATO's Article 2 and its emphasis of strengthening
NATO as a political organization.
The numbers below suggest that in fact Canada contributed more to the peaceful transition of Central and Eastern Europe than did Canada's largest NATO allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. Only Denmark, Norway, and Germany have carried a larger burden than Canada. This was a significant contribution. It underlined its commitment to European security and argues against the hypothesis that this country was in decline. 353
Table XVIII:
NATO Member's Economic Aid to Central and Eastern European Countries per million S of their GDP in selected years, 1991-97**
1997 1991-97
ODA Loans Total % Rank ODA Loans Total % Rank
Belgium 44,1 0 -14 " 1,67% 12 159,8 58 217,8 5,15% 9
24«,3.. 0 248,3: •11Denma1i *. 486,4 85,1 571,5 21,60% 1 490,3 108,6 599 14,17% 2 France 217,8 3,3 221,1 8,36% 4 213,4 5,6 219 5,18% 8 Germany 184,6 23,6 208,2 7,87% 5 1.078,10 51,5 1.129,50 26,72% 1 Greece 0 0 0 0,00% 17 0 0 0 0,00% 16 Iceland n/a n/a n/a n/a 18 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Italy 22,3 11,9 34,2 1,29% 13 98,4 11,1 109,5 2,59% 12 Luxembourg 200 0 200 7,56% 6 194,7 0 194,7 4,61% 11 Netherlands 92 0 92 3,48% 11 184,1 33,2 217,4 5,14% 10 Norway 419 0 419,9 15,87% 2 416 16 432 10,22% 3 Portugal 2,5 0 2,5 0,09% 15 1,3 0 1,3 0,03% 15 Spain 5,4 -0,6 4,8 0,18% 14 3,4 4,3 7,7 0,18% 14 Turkey 0 0 0 0,00% 16 0 0 0 0,00% 17 United Kingdom 122,7 0 122,7 4,64% 10 106,5 0 106,5 2,52% 13 United States 166 6,9 173 6,54% 7 225,4 19,2 244,6 5,79% 7 NA TO - Europe 138,3 9,5 147,8 5,59% 9 226,6 22,2 248,8 5,89% 5 NA TO - Average 147,5 8,7 156,2 5,90% 8 228,2 20,5 248,7 5,88% 6
NATO Total 2496,9 148,4 2646,3 100,00% 17 3877,2 350,2 4227,5 100,00% 17
** Raw Data Sources: United States Congressional Budget Office, 2001; percentages and overall rank calculated individually
John Lis and Zachary Selden list different numbers in which the United States contributed US $11.7 billion, followed by France US $2.1 billion, and Canada US $ 1 billion.211
Canadian civilian commitments to regional stabilization in Europe
While the military operations were taking place in Bosnia, the international community also tried to help the region by introducing stabilization and arms control mechanisms. In
1996, the conflicting parties signed arms control agreements with the OSCE in Vienna, which worked as the monitoring or control agency in such matters. In addition, the parties
211 Lis and Selden, NATO Burdensharing after Enlargement, 17. 354 committed themselves to send crucial military data to the OSCE to create transparency. n
At a subsequent meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Florence, which was established to steer the implementation of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia, Serbia, and
Croatia signed an arms control agreement for the former Yugoslavia. The OSCE was given the responsibility to verify disarmament procedures as well as the inspection rights for storage facilities and the supervision of the destruction of weapons and ammunition.
In total, more than 4,000 tanks, jets, helicopters and artillery have been destroyed in accordance with the agreement.213
Four Canadian soldiers also served in the United Nations Mine Action Co ordination Centre in Kosovo (UNMACC) between June and December 1999. On 10 June
1999, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1244 and authorized the United Nations
Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), which lasted from June 1999 until August
2002. UNMIK was created to help rebuild the social and civil infrastructure of Kosovo.
Canadians were deployed to assist UNMIK in carrying out the tasks.
Conclusion
This chapter examined Canada's military contributions to European security in the 1990s.
In particular, it looked at Canada's military deployments to the liberation of Kuwait in
1991, to UNPROFOR in the Balkans, and finally to the liberation of Kosovo in 1999.
The second part of the chapter analyzed Canada's civilian contributions to allied security, such as NATO's common budgets, personnel and infrastructure expenditures, and
NATO's rapid reaction force. It was argued that the benchmarks of burden sharing that were commonly used during the Cold War, such as using the level of defence spending
212 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fact Sheet, 6 January 1997. Raymond Bonner, "Success in Balkans, as all sides destroy heavy weapons," New York Times, 23 October 1997, A6. 355 according to the country's GDP, became obsolete in the post-Cold War era when NATO had evolved to become more of a political organization. What mattered to NATO in a post-Cold War European security order were not just boots on the ground but political and diplomatic commitments. This means that the measures of Canadian defence spending in NATO could not be reduced to the level of its GDP or the size of its armed forces and that new, more accurate benchmarks for measuring national contributions in
NATO have evolved as alternative reference points. Such new reference points are national contributions to NATO's Rapid Response Forces, the level of aid to CEE for humanitarian and economic purposes, as well as the contributions made to NATO's civilian budgets. By examining these new categories and determining the Canadian share of the burden in them during the 1990s, it was apparent that Canadian foreign and defence policy did not face a period of "darkness." The 1990s were bright for Canada and
Canada was an active country. Also, contrary to accepted wisdom, Canada was not a bad ally. Quite the opposite: Canada strongly believed in NATO and supported its policies to the best of its abilities. It also contributed proportionally more to NATO's common tasks
(in relative terms) than other NATO allies: it became the 5th largest contributor to
UNPROFOR in the Balkans while shouldering nearly 22% of its total costs, it was the 8th largest contributing nation for SFOR, and the third largest contributing country in the
Kosovo campaign (including air and ground campaigns). Canada was also in the top-third percentile of contributing to NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces, it was on average with the expenditures devoted to infrastructure projects, and was the sixth largest contributor to
NATO's civilian budgets that allowed NATO to pay for its operating costs. In fact, one could conclude, Canada did more "NATO than NATO." This was not only good for 356
NATO but also for Canada at home and raises doubt as to if Canada would have been able to achieve this record if it had kept its boots on the ground in Germany at times when NATO became less of a military Alliance. 357
CONCLUSION
Canada...has been shown to have greater influence in several international organizations than in their specific environments or the general environment. The reason is that for a number of years Canada chose to make international organizations a principal vehicle for the expression of its foreign policies.1
Andrew Cohen and Jack Granatstein are two prominent scholars of Canadian foreign policy who suggested that Canada has declined from world politics in the 1990s. Their central argument is that Canada has become an irrelevant international actor. Andrew
Cohen, for example, suggests that "[w]e are no longer as strong a soldier, as generous a donor, and as effective a diplomat, and it has diminished us as people."2 This decline, according to proponents of this school, has continued in the post-Cold War era. This was partly so because between 1989-1994 Canada was faced with a fiscal crisis at home that forced the government to cut the operating budgets of all federal departments and thus gave the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade less resources to work with.
While this dissertation agrees with the fact that the government was faced with a fiscal crisis at home and that the Canadian forces, for example, had to do more with less in the 1990s - more operations with less money or capabilities - it argues that Canada was not in decline. Instead, Canada was a committed ally of NATO that helped to shape the new pan-European security order.
In order to understand Canadian actions in the 1990s I suggested using a different theoretical framework from the one Cohen provided. I showed that the declinist argument
Robert W. Cox and Harold Karan Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 410. 2 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, (Toronto: M&S, 2004), 2. 358 is based on rationalist assumptions, which do not apply in the post-Cold War security environment. I also suggested that the meaning of hard power, that is the size of troops, types of weapons and equipment, and level of defence spending according to the country's GDP, mattered during the Cold War, but that the meaning of those yardsticks have changed in the post-Cold War era. This change in meaning was influenced by the changing nature of the pan-European security order. It also means that the level of
Canada's post-Cold War defence spending, for example, could not be interpreted as an indication of a decline if it is not put into the larger historical context.
As part of this new theoretical framework, I suggest that Canada's political role in the Atlantic Alliance in the 1990s can best be understood in terms of Canada playing the role of an intra-alliance bridge builder, and one that was committed to export a security community to CEE. Canada built a transatlantic bridge for itself and has used it as a diplomatic mechanism to pursue its interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Canadian actions in Europe can be understood in the context of pursuing a pluralistic security community and extending NATO's values to CEE. The concept of seeing NATO as a security community is based on the work of Karl Deutsch and holds that a group of actors share values, norms and symbols that provide a social identity for that particular community.
This dissertation had three objectives: first, to disprove the assertions of a reductionist Canada that were developed by the declinist school of Canadian foreign policy, and that were chiefly represented by the writings of Andrew Cohen and Jack
Granatstein. A second aim of this dissertation was to show that Canada functioned as an intra alliance bridge builder. Canada was also a country that saw NATO's outreach 359 program to CEE as an act of extending NATO's security community to CEE. The third aim was to demonstrate that in light of the new security environment in Europe, Canada's political and military role in the alliance could be measured by applying new indicators, such as Canada's commitment to NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces, foreign aid given to
CEE, and the level of commitment to NATO's civilian budgets.
The following research questions were addressed in this study: Is the declinist argument correct in asserting that Canada was in decline in the 1990s? If it is not correct, how can we then describe Canadian contributions to European security in the 1990s in the context of a new security environment? And finally, did the new security environment in Europe change the parameters of examining Canada's role in the transatlantic
Alliance?
The hypothesis of this dissertation was that the arguments of the declinist school of Canadian foreign policy do not withstand the record of Canadian engagement in
Europe. Cohen and Granatstein's argument also does not reflect Canada's performance or its commitments in the alliance in the 1990s. In short, while using NATO as a case study to examine Canada's external relations and its role in the alliance, the principle argument of the declinist school cannot be verified. Hence, the notion of the decade of darkness in
Canadian foreign policy is, at best, incomplete. In this dissertation I suggested that
Canada was not in decline. It was a committed and dedicated NATO ally that helped to shape the new pan-European security order post-1989. In other words, neither were the
1990s a decade of darkness, nor did Canada sleep. However, this does not mean that the arguments presented in this dissertation universally apply to the performance of Canada in other regions of the world other than the one examined here. 360
Again, in sharp contrast to the assertion that budgetary cutbacks caused Canada to lose influence in world politics, this dissertation argued that Canada was actively committed to European security in the 1990s. Canada shouldered a considerable burden of the Alliance. It also pledged strong support for NATO's political and military transformation from a purely military to a political Alliance. For example, the Canadian-
German invention of the co-operative security concept gave guidance to NATO's evolving relationship with CEE. The goal of the new cooperative security model for
Europe was to manage and contain a militarily strong Soviet Union, which was politically isolated and resentful. The threat to Canada was a civil war in the Soviet Union or its new neighbours and instability in CEE. In short, the emergence of virulent nationalism, ethnic hatreds and conflicts was most dangerous to Canadian security interests. Canada's political vision for a post-Cold War NATO was to extend NATO's security community to
CEE. Ottawa pushed its allies at the London Summit and during NATO's process of enlargement in 1994 to promote and export NATO's political values of as democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights in CEE. Canada also helped shape legal and institutional arrangements, assisted in drafting defence legislation and norms for the conduct of civil-military relations, and guided the young democratic governments in restructuring their defense and interior ministries. Canada was a role player and helped to socialize the political and military elites of CEE. It engaged their former adversaries and rejoiced the hope for an ascendancy of liberal democratic values.
Thus, for Canada the construction of durable democracies was not only a moral quest but also a security imperative. In retrospect, this socialization process was the single most important motivation for allowing NATO to pursue a new role as a crisis manager and 361 gave the Alliance a new raison d'etre. In short, Canada was there when NATO needed it the most politically.
Also, contrary to the declinist school, Canada was prepared to pay the cost of its membership and actions in NATO. It did so in many ways. Politically speaking, the fact that states have remained members of the NATO Alliance and that the club has attracted considerable attention of states from CEE indicates that membership in such an Alliance remains worthwhile to this time. This certainly was true for Canada in the 1990s. As one
NATO official put it: "I don't believe in the irrelevance of NATO. For the PfP program, for example, I have more countries knocking on my door than I could accommodate."
NATO provided and continues to provide a unique forum for political consultation among allies who share similar values and beliefs. In the early 1990s, it was the preferred institution of the Canadian government because it was capable of managing the change in
CEE. Indeed, in the 1990s, NATO was the only pan-European security institution that was able to do both: to deter and contain its enemies militarily and engage in political outreach to CEE, expanding NATO's security community to CEE. NATO also provided a framework for anchoring West Germany into the collective Western defence system and reduced the historical fears of Germany's neighbours that a strengthened and united
Germany might once again pose a threat to Western Europe. This made NATO a unique organization for managing the transatlantic relationship. In addition, it offered Canadians a counterbalance to its powerful southern neighbour.
One of the foremost political interests of the Canadian government in this new security order in Europe was to ensure peace, security and stability. The threat of political
3 Confidential interview with NATO Official at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10 May 2007. 362 instability in CEE and resurging nationalist movements in Southern Europe combined with a weakened Soviet Union posed considerable threats to NATO allies after 1989.
These were new threats and Canada understood that NATO continued to be the primary organization to bring about stability and order.
Militarily speaking, one can argue that Canada's 1994 Defence White Paper was right. Canada made the right decision to retain combat capable expeditionary forces, which provided the government with options in a highly volatile security environment. It also allowed Canada's armed forces to be ready when the call came to deploy to the
Balkans to contain a humanitarian crisis. No doubt, while Canadian forces were in rough shape, they were, nonetheless, roughly similar in nature, although certainly not scale, to those of the U.S. They were also quite unlike those of most other NATO allies, which were postured to defend their own European homelands and highly immobile, inflexible, and incapable of deploying forces abroad.
Jointly with the fall of the Berlin Wall, a transformation of the role and importance of military power in international affairs took place. While using the armed forces extensively as a tool of statecraft during the Cold War, Western governments have done so less in a post-Cold War security environment. This was partly so because the size of NATO's armed forces was scaled back significantly. While Canada happened to be the first country in 1994 to close its bases in Germany, other NATO allies followed suit shortly thereafter and scaled back their forwardly deployed forces. In that sense,
Canadian actions were consistent with NATO's new defence policy.
Meanwhile, the significance and meaning of the national interest changed with the end of the Cold War. While advancing a country's national interest was the primary 363 foreign policy goal during the Cold War, other security dimensions such as environmental, human security, etc. gained increasing significance and required different kinds of resources and capabilities to deal with. In short, while nation states relied on their hard power tools as a tool of statecraft to gain influence over other states or regions during the Cold War, this has become less effective post-1989. Instead, soft power tools, such as diplomacy and negotiation became the new accepted tools of Canadian foreign policy. This shift affected the nature and role of NATO forces: in the Cold War they were trained and equipped for continental defence operations. Post-modern militaries, on the other hand, are required to adapt to new environments much more rapidly and carry out a multitude of tasks: peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, war fighting, and diplomacy.
This all describes the context in which Canadian external relations and decisions took place and, more importantly, how they affected the roles, tasks, and responsibilities of Canada's armed forces.
With regards to actual Canadian commitments in Europe, Canada answered the call to arms when asked by NATO and its allies to send troops to Bosnia in the early
1990s. Canadian burden sharing started with the Gulf War in 1990. Although Canada did not directly participate militarily in the liberation on Kuwait, it sent two-thirds of its navy to enforce the naval blockade in the Persian Gulf. In addition, it sent a selection of its special forces and a field hospital. In total, more than 6,600 Canadian soldiers rotated through this operation before, during, or after the hostilities.
Canada remained forwardly deployed in Europe and was one of the first countries to contribute to the first peacekeeping mission in the Balkans, initially though the 364
European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in Bosnia, and later on through the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In the case of the ECMM, peacekeepers
were invited into the country only after Canada and the United States committed troops.
The mandate of the Canadian contingent in UNPROFOR was to monitor UN Protected
Areas in Croatia, demilitarize these zones, and monitor cease-fire agreements. While
doing so, Canadians encountered some of the most difficult operational situations of
UNPROFOR: Canadian soldiers were in Srebrenica in 1993, they were also taken hostage
in Sarajevo in 1994, helped liberate Sarajevo airport, and were confronted with direct combat in the Medak Pocket crisis. One of the difficulties for the UN was to enforce a peace where there was no peace to keep. The Mulroney government had realized this and
lobbied its NATO allies for a Chapter VII mission. In total, Canada sent 2,151 soldiers
(or 5.44% of the total UN force) and ranked 5th of all contributing countries to
UNPROFOR.
When the UN left the Balkans, Canada did not duck and remained forwardly deployed in Europe, this time through NATO. The Dayton Peace Accords that established the Implementation Force (IFOR) with a total of 60,000 troops replaced UNPROFOR.
Canada sent 1,047 troops and was the 4th largest force contributor to Operation Air
Bridge, which supported the city of Sarajevo with humanitarian supplies.
When IFOR was replaced with the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996,
Canada continued to deploy 1,327 soldiers. It was the 8th largest contributing NATO country to SFOR, out of 18 countries in total. This was a significant Canadian contribution overall, and all of Canada's army units rotated through this operation. 365
In 1999, when ethnic Albanians and a Serb minority engaged in ethnic cleansing in the province of Kosovo, Canada again did not shy from its international responsibility and answered NATO's call. Canada was the 7th largest force contributor (out of 18 nations in total), and deployed 1,450 troops. It shouldered a disproportionate burden of operation Allied Force. Taken the ground and air campaign together, Canada was the 3rd largest contributing nation. This, again, was a significant contribution in relative terms of one of the smaller NATO countries. It can be seen as an indicator of Canadian international commitment rather than decline.
In addition to Canada's military contributions to solving the Balkan crisis, Canada shouldered a significant economic burden of NATO. In light of the new security environment in Europe, traditional measures of allied burden sharing, such as using the percentile of a nation's GDP devoted to defence became outdated. Thus, alternative tools of measuring allied contributions were needed in order to reflect the changes that took place and the contributions NATO member states made. In a post-Cold War environment, with an emphasis on crisis management operations, large conscription armies had become less relevant. Thus, one indicator of allied burden sharing then is the percentile of contributions to NATO's rapid reaction forces. Here, Canada ranked 6th. In addition, in
1999 Canada ranked 5th in a ratio of the contribution states made to UN peacekeeping missions relative to their total labour force. In 1999, Canada was also the 6th ranking country in the NATO Alliance when it came to contributions to NATO's common budgets. Furthermore, Ottawa gave proportionally more development assistance to CEE than most of its allies; here Canada ranked third. 366
Taken together then, this does not point to a declinist role of Canada in NATO.
Quite to the contrary, Canada played an active role in European security in the 1990s. It extended the Canadian bridge into CEE in order to assure access and political influence to the region. Support for Canadian decisions came from the highest levels. In 1989,
NATO's Secretary General Manfred Woerner addressed the issue of burden sharing and explicitly demanded that Western Europe must do more, not Canada. He said: "In the
Alliance context, it is clear Western Europe must do more: politically, economically, militarily."4 The debate about whether or not Canada was punching above or below its weight remains open. What is clear, however, was that Canada was punching and not out of the ring. It was active and committed to do what NATO asked it to do.
Thus, for a country that was faced with fiscal cuts in the early 1990s, only one conclusion can be reached: Canada was pulling its weight in the NATO Alliance in the
1990s and shouldered more burden than it was expected to or could afford to. There was no shortage of demand of troubled zones in Europe, and Canada was all over Europe in the 1990s. It was visibly committed and not in decline.
4 "Reshaping East-West Relations," Address by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to a Eurogroup Seminar on NATO: Partnership and Prospects, Washington D.C., 12 October 1989. APPENDICES
Appendix 1: NATO Regional Nuclear Strike Planning, 1964
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Source: Sean M. Maloney. Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970. (St. Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Pub, 2002), 193. Appendix 2:
NTS 1991-2005 FY >» 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FULL INCR. FULL (NCR. FULL INCR. t PERSONNEL t COST COST COST COST COST COST EUROPE UNPROFOR - CANBAT1 (Croatia) 860 l-Mar-92 l-Sep-95 6.100 1.000 127.000 49.000 163.000 66.000 UNPROFOR - CANBAT 1! (Bosnia) 826 l-Oct-92 l-Oct-9S 141.0O0 4 9.O0O 221 00O 8 7.000 UNPROFOR - OTHERS (Croatia & Bosnia) 340 l-Oct-92 I-Jun-96 UNHCR AIRLIFT - OP AIRBRIDGE (Sarajevo Air 48 l-Jul-92 l-Jan-96 20.OOO 3.000 20.000 7.000 ECMMY - OP Bolster 48 l-Jan-92 I-AUQ-95 UNCOE - OP JUSTICE {Former Yugoslavia) 7 l-May-93 l-Mar-95 I.GOG O.010 OP DENY FLIGHT (Former Yugoslavia) 13 l-Apr-93 l-Dec-95 IFOR - OP ALLIANCE (Balkans) (NATO) 1029 l-Dec-95 l-Dec-96 SFOR - OP PALLADIUM (Bosnia) (NATO) 1641 l-Dec-95 1-AuQ-04 EUFOR - OP BRONZE/BOREAS 83 X-Sep-04 TBO UNMACB1H - OP NOBLE - (Bosnia) 4 l-Apr-97 l-Jul-99 Total by FY 6.1O0 1-OO0 288.0OO 101.000 405.000 160.010 o © © o o © f-fc q q © •«r o -t r- r^ 3 u r-* © «-« © o © © o o © o q © 3 O K O i-^ u. U un \r\ V "fr
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o o O O o o © o c O O O O © fSj —* »-< r\i *r ^ •or y o fN CJ 04 d d d r*1 fN 01 5 u 10 O O CT, O O o o © CT, o cr- O O o o © r-t _J uo rvj ™< *-t r*j o o to p O rsi d <%i d : 112 . i 113 . i 1 23S . o o o o o o o o o o o r-l O FH q q q q q o o y o «sj- CO d r-j O ni m m ^r <—f I in m o o O O o o » © 1 O o o o o o © - fr o o © _j to q q q q 1 oi -• vo cri iH CO I 3 O CO —• w"t 00 in ' ' m o o o o O i-i i-t o o O o -( O rH o c © q © <~< CO qe-t rqn m in y o L/"! Irf'T fM d d m 1 2 u •«• O O o o o o © c O O o o c o 5 -J *^i q q o c q q © 3 O r^ r^ r-.' d r-t r-H in u. u "(J* *3- ID fN 09 rH r-i m 370
01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 TOTAL COST FULL INCR. FULL INCR. FULL INCR. FULL INCR. FULL INCR COST COST COST COST COST COST COST COST COST COST
530.300 203.200 626.100 248.100 125.100 39.100 75.200 15.200 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.020 2.000 0.011 203.300 52.700 4SS.100 162.900 472.900 180.700 472.900 180.700 122.700 45.300 3041.100 1061.400 10.100 2.700 10.100 2.700 2.500 0.900 4S5.100 162.900 472.900 180.700 472.900 180.700 132.800 48.000 4617.700 1623.331 371
Appendix 3: Deployment of Canadian Foreign Service Officers, 1987- 1992 Year: 1987/88 Program Pe rsonnel Suppo rt Pe rsonnel Canada-based" localy engaged"* Total % Ca nada-based Localy engaged Total % Europe 282 144 42S 26,68 236 922 1158 26,03 us 149 146 295 18,47 67 338 405 10,12 Asia •+ Pacific 250 126 378 23,54 119 689 1008 25,18 Africa + Middle Easl 174 48 222 13,90 118 700 818 20,43 Latin America + Car Ibean 155 65 220 13,78 74 436 510 12,74 Int'l organizations 56 2 58 3,63 49 55 104 2,60
Total 1066 531 1597 663 3340 4003
Year: 1988/89 Pr ogra n Pe son tel S jpport Pe r.onn.l Canada-based Localy engaged Total % Canada-ba sod Localy engaged Total Europe 281 187 438 33,84 Z25 93? 1162 25,89 us 158 161 319 17,37 66 360 426 9,49 Asia + Pacific 270 148 418 22,75 121 971 1092 24,33 Africa + Middle East 260 74 334 18,18 143 999 1142 25,45 Latin America + Car bean 175 90 265 14,43 75 481 556 12,39 Int'l organizations 60 3 63 3,43 52 58 110 2,45 0 Total 1204 633 1837 682 3806 4488
Pr ogra n Personnel Support Pe son nel Canada-based Localy engaged Total % Ca nada-basod Loc aly engaged Total Europe 289 188 4S7 23,69 226 950 1176 26,20 US 155 169 324 16,80 59 364 423 9,43 Asia + Pacific 289 171 460 23,85 117 1010 1127 25,11 Africa + Middle East 262 85 347 17,89 141 990 1131 25,20 Latin America + CarribBan 185 92 277 14,36 76 497 573 12,77 Int'l organizations 61 3 64 3,32 51 69 110 2,45
Total 1241 688 1929 682 3806 4488
Yoar: 1990/91 Pr ngratii Pe rsonnel Suppc rt Personnel Canada-based Loc aly eng aged Total % Canada-based Localy engaged Total ; : <: ; : : ; HjarQp>^. 4::..\- •'-•*• •; '"'-":-- 'V •."•'• 294 •t81 : 47s '24i82; -- : '• -JKir ••••-;, •<-:J-''-":?-si(iW--"-: W '••\-3«** V • ••'".3"7,Z7: :•' us 144 176 322 16,69 55 404 459 10,23 Asia + Pacific 290 165 475 24,62 111 1085 1196 26,65 Africa + Middle East 261 81 342 17,73 139 1056 1195 26,63 Latin America + Carribean 186 100 286 14,83 73 543 616 13,73 Int'l organizations 59 3 62 3,21 51 59 110 2,45
Total 1241 688 1929 682 3806 4488
Year: 1991/92 Pr ograrr i Personnel Su ppo rtPe rson lei Canada-based Localy eng aged Total % C anada-based Localy engaged Total Europe 294 178 472 24.47 178 9&3 1161 25,87 us 143 178 321 16,64 45 396 441 9,83 Asia + Pacific 290 184 474 24,57 106 1072 1178 116,87 Africa + Middle East 261 81 342 17,73 137 1042 1179 26,27 Latin America + Carribean 186 99 285 14,77 68 532 600 13,37 Int'l organizations 57 3 60 3,11 51 59 110 2,45
Total 1241 688 1929 682 3806 4488
* Included in the Canada-based number are all Canadian foreign service personnel posted to Canadian embassies abroad. They do not include Canadian bureaucrats working at regional desks in the Foreign Affairs headquarter (i.e.'European Desk')
** Included in thfs number are all locally employed people working at Canadian embassies and missions abroad Appendix 4: List of NATO member states and their year of accession
Country Year of NATO Membership
Canada Czech Republic Legend: Denmark Founding members of NATO Estonia Enlargement during the Cold War France 1st round of post-Cold War enlargement Germany 1955 2nd round of post-Cold War enmarlegement Greece 1952 Hungary 1999 Iceland Italy Latvia 2004 Lithuania 2004 Luxembourg Summary: NATO in Cold War vs. Post Cold War Netherlands in 1949: 12 member States Norway in 1989: 16 Member States Poland 1999 in 1999: 19 Member States Portugal in 2004: 26 Member States Romania 2004 Slovakia 2004 Slovenia 2004 Spain 1982 Turkey 1952
Total 26 states 373
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CURRICULUM VITAE
Benjamin Zyla, is a fourth year Ph.D. candidate in the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. He was born in Gelsenkirchen, Germany and was schooled at the University of Goettingen (Germany) and Uppsala University (Sweden), where he received his B.A. Hons. In 2003 he completed his M.A. in Political Science at Carleton University in Ottawa and started his Ph.D. the same year.
Ben was the holder of a two-year Government of Canada Scholarship by the International Council for Canadian Studies (ICCS). Before that he held an M.A. scholarship of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He is a student affiliate with the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance Project at Queen's University, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Canada. Ben was a sessional lecturer at RMC, Carleton University, and Queen's University. In April 2006 he was elected to the Executive Board of the Young Researchers Network of the European Community Studies Association Canada (ECSA-C).
His major publications include (selection): Co-authored with Joel J. Sokolsky, "More NATO than NATO? - Canada and Afghanistan post-9/11", in: David G. Haglund David Bosold (ed.), Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) [forthcoming]; with Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, "NATO, the EU and Darfur: Separate but Together," in: Peter Schmidt (ed.) A Hybrid Relationship: Transatlantic Cooperation beyod NATO (Frankfurt a. Main: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 147- 160; "Canada and NATO's first round of enlargement," in: Natalie Mychajlyszyn (Ed.), Adaptation of NATO: From the North Atlantic Treaty to Security in Pakistan, BISON Paper 11 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2007), pp. 85- 107; "Understanding American Foreign Policy: US Foreign Policy Traditions and the George W. Bush administration," in: Tomasz Pludowski (Ed.). American Politics, Media, and Elections. Contemporary International Perspectives on US Presidency, Foreign Policy, and Political Communication (Warsaw and Torun: Collegium Civitas Press and Adam Marszalek, 2005); "Riding the Asian Tiger? - How the EU Engaged China Since the End of the Cold War," Special Issue of Current Politics and Economics of Europe (Guest editor Amy Verdun), vol. 17, no.l (Fall 2007), pp. 1-21; "A Bridge just far enough? - Canada and the transatlantic link today," London Journal of Canadian Studies, no. 23 (2007), pp. 131- 153; and "Multilateralism a la carte? - The George W. Bush administration and traditions of US foreign policy", WebTrends, Zeitschrift fur Internationale Politik und Vergleichende Studien 54 (spring 2007), pp. 113-126.