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Memorial of Nicaragua

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Memorial of Nicaragua MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA MÉMOIRE DU NICARAGUA PART ONE THE EVIDENCE- ~ -- OF-. COSTA ~ ~ RICA'S LEGAL- - RESPONSIBII~II'YFOR MlLlTARY AND POI.II'ICAL ACTIVITII.:S INTEKDEI) TO OVI<RTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA INTRODUCTION 1. On 28 July 1986, Nicaragua filed its Application in the Court alleging that Costa Rica, by organizing, assisting, fomenting, participating in and tolerating acts of armed force in and against the territory of Nicaragua, committed by armed bands of counter-revolutionaries hased in Costa Rican territory had violated its obligations ta Nicaragua under international law. The Application asked that the Court declare the conduct of Costa Rica to be in breach of inter- national law and to order Costa Rica to cease and desist from such activities. II rcquesied the Court IO declaie ihat Co\ta Rica is undrr a dut). IO make com- pensation for al1 injury caused ta Nicaragua hv ihr brca:he\ oi intcrnaiional la\\, found by the Court. 2. On 17 October 1986, time-limits were set for the presentation of written Memorials on the merits of the case, under which the Memorial of Nicaragua was to be filed on 21 July 1987, and the Memorial of Costa Rica was to be filed nine months later. On 16 July 1987, the Court extended the date for the presen- tation of Nicaragua's Memorial to 10 August 1987. CHAPTER 1. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 3. The Government of Costa Rica has permitted counter-revolutionary organizations dedicated to the armed overthrow of the Government of Nicaragua to use Costa Rican territory to conduct military and political activities against Nicaragua, and has actively collaborated in these activities. Costa Rica's actions constitute a blatant and ongoing intervention in Nicaragua's intemal affairs, and a use of force against Nicaragua, in violation of its legal obligations to Nicaragua under general international law. the Charters of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, two hilateral treaties of amity, the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, and other multilateral instruments. A. The Use of Costa Rican Territory with the Knowledge and Approval of the Costa Ricsn Government 4. There is overwhelming evidence that Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary (or "confia'? organizations have used Costa Rican territory to conduct military and political activities aimed ai overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua by armed force. At least two of these politico-military organizations, ARDE' (from 1982 to mid-1986) and UNO' (from mid-1985 to 1987) were oermitted bv Costa Riran aurhoritiesto estnblish headquartcrs fasilities in San Jose, and to maintain nunierou\ miliiary camps in the northern part of the country. closc to the border with Nicaraaua. The headouarters facilities were used to hold reaular public assemblies of c~nrraleaders, where military and political strategieswere developed for forcihly replacing the Government of Nicaragua, for organiza- tional activities in connection with this effort. for issuine- =nublic declarations calling for armed struggle against the Nicaraguan Government, and for co- ordinatine,. supply ~~~ and logistical services in suooort. of the military activities con- ducted from the camps Tn the north. 5. The military camps themselves were used as staging points for armed attacks in and against Nicaragua, as safe havens for contra forces after comple- tion of their combat inissions inside Nicaragua, as training grounds for new recruits, and as military supply depots. By 1985, ai least 27 of these camps were in oneration. (Ann. C. Attachment 5. Table 1.) There were also at least nine îirskips in ~~staRican tcrriiory that wcre used to airdrop supplies IO contra forces during missions inside Nicaragua. (Ann. C, Attachmeni 5, Table 2.) Thc evidence demonstrates that this was no small-scale oneration. but a full-fledaed war effort. According to the United States ~mbassadorto costa Rica, as many as 2,800 contra combatants operated from the Costa Rican camps, spread al1 along the border with ~icaragua.(Ann. 1, Attachment 63.) They were heavily armed with automatic weapons, mortars, grenade launchers and even a small air force and navy. In five years of continuous fighting, they carried out more ' Alianza Revolucionaria Dcmacratica. or Democratic Revolutianary Alliance. ' United Nicaraguan Opposition. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 13 than 350 attacks inside Nicaragua, mostly by land but also by air and sea. There have been hundreds of airdrops of supplies to contra forces inside Nicaragua originating from Costa Rican airstrips. The consequences to Nicaragua, with a oooulation of barelv 3 million and a ver caoita. -eross national .nrodufl of $770. hate been staggering both in humanand economic terms'. 6. The evidence is equally overwhelming that these activities were conducted with the knowledee and aooroval of the costa Rican Government at ils hiahest levels. Costa ~i&could hardly he unaware of the existence of contra Gead- quarters in its own capital city, of the much publicized presence of contra military and poliii:al leader. or the frrquent public arsemblies and dcclaraiionr calling for the armed overihrow of the Nicaraguan Govcrnmcnt. or thecounilcss other dailv activities of these ornanizations aimed at that end. It is eauallv incon- ceivable ihat Costa Rica could have been unaware of ihçexiensiveand soniinuous military aciivities of the contrar bascd in Costa Risan ierriiory. Like the conrras' oolitical activities in San José. their militarv activities in the northern oart of the country have always been matters of public knowledge in Costa Rica. The existence of the camps, the training activities conducted there and the constant cross-border attackson ~icaraeua- have been reoorted reeularlv-. in the Costa Rican press, and in the newspapers that the contra organizations themselves are , permitted to oublish and distribute in Costa Rica. The contras' use of Costa ~icanterritor; to waee war on Nicaraeua has been so ooen--~~~ that~~ ~~~ it~ is~ recoenized in official publicaiions oiihe United tat tes Deparimîni of Starï, ~uchas ihe Dir- rionary oflnternational Relations Ternis (1987). which defines the uord "Con- tras" as followi: "Shortened form of the word 'countrarevolucionarios' fcounter-revolu. tionaries), the term the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua uses for the guerrilla forces fiehtine aeainst them. The Contras cornorise former members of the ~omozisÏh'at~on~l Guard. disideni righi-ringformer Sandinirias. and the Miskito Indian minority: ea;h of ihcsc forccr operaie\ independenily. The Contras ooerate from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica. and receive politi- cal and maierial;uppori froni the United Siaics. Therc have bern rerurrent armcd clashes berreen Sandinista government iroops and the rebels since Marsh 1982." (Ann. F, Attïchment 1, p. 23 (emphasis suppliedj.) 7. Between 1982 and 1987, Nicaraeua delivered to Costa Rica more than 150 diplomatic notes protesting the contras' activities in or emanating from Costa Rica, in many cases providing detailed evidence of the use of Costa Rican ter- ritorv and the-active collaboration or oarticioation of Costa Rican officiais. (See. e.g.,.~nn.A, Artachmenis 109. 125,'172, i07, 228, and 237 (Diplornatic Note; of Nicaragua).) Nicaragua deliveied similar proicrts io the bilaieral hlixed Com- mission thai functioned from 1982 to 1984. and the Commission of Supervision and Pre\.eniion, esiablished in 1984 through the pood offices of the Coiitadora Group. (Ann. R. Artachment\ 1 and 2.) Both commissions were estahlihhed ai ~icaragua'surging in order to investigate and help resolve disputes arising from military activities hy contra forces based in Costa Rica. (See also Ann. B, Attach- ment 3.) Both directly and through these commissions, Nicaragua presented Costa Rica with concrete proof of the existence and locations of the following contra military camps inside Costa Rica, inter alia: 1. El Inferno - 5.5 km south-east of Penas Blancas. 2. Barrs de Colorado - 22.5 km south-west of San Juan del Norte. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, WortdDevelopmenr Reporr 1987, Oxford University Press (19871. 14 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS 3. El Valle - 9.5 km West of Cardenas. 4. Los Vueltas - 7.5 km south of Pefias Blancas. 5. Quebrada de Agria - 17 km south-west of Peaas Blancas. 6. El Murci6lago - 35 km south-west of Peaas Blancas. 7. Los Andes - 5 km north-east of El Naranjo (Monte Plata) 8. La Liberlad - east of Peaas Blancas. 9. Sarupiqui - 28 km south-west of San Juan del Norte. 10. Luno Azul - 10~~ km~ south-west~~ of El Castillo. II. Luno B1anc.a - south-ucsi of El Casiillo. 12. Tango Rojo 2 - 5W meters from Los Chiler. along ihc border. 13. Taneo 1 and 2 -- in~~~ the~~~~ El~ Castillo~ ~ cecior. 14. 21 and 22 - 12.5 km south-west of the El Papaturro border post. 15. Hacienda Conventillo - 3 km east of El Naranjo. 16. San Dimas - 4 km south of Peaas Blancas. 17. El Amo (Hacienda) - 21 km south of Peiias Blancas. 18. Verdum - 11 km south-east of Cardenas. 19. Santa Cecilia (Hacienda) - 14 km south of Mexico, along the border. 21. El Refugio - 2 km south of the Fatima border post. 22. Los Angeles - 6 km south of Fatima. 23. Berlin (Hacienda) - Il km from Fatima. 24. Santa Isabel (Hacienda) - 8 km south of Fatima. 25. Cerro Crucitas - 5 km south of Rio El Infiernito. 26. Fincas El Chivito and Escalera - 15 km south-west of El Castillo. 27. Laguna Garza - 8 km south of the San Juan delta. (Ann. C, Attachment 5, Table 1.) 8. As of the date of Nicaragua's Application to this Court, Costa Rica had made no serious effort to curtail the military activities of the contras emanating from these and other contra camps, or to restrict the other contra activities addressed in the diplomatic correspondence. Indeed, Costa Rica's refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the armed attacks against Nicaragua emanating from its own territory, or to take appropriate remedial measures, resulted in the failure of hoth the Mixed Commission and the Commission of Supervision and Prevention.
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