Environmental Defense Institute News on Environmental Health and Safety Issues
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Environmental Defense Institute News on Environmental Health and Safety Issues September 2019 Volume 30 Number 9 Small Nuclear Reactor Explosion in Russia Kills Seven People News of the explosion of a small nuclear reactor in northern Russia that killed seven people continues to trickle out giving some clues about what happened. Near the city of Severodvinsk, radiation levels are said to have briefly spiked up to twenty times normal levels. 1 In early August, during retrieval efforts to retrieve a sunken nuclear-powered cruise missile, 2 the reactor apparently went prompt critical. A prompt critical accident means that suddenly the reactor’s neutron populations increased so rapidly that the heat generated caused the reactor fuel to melt. High power levels can be reached rapidly before displacement of the fuel shuts down the reaction. The reactor had remained subcritical while submerged in water, so introduction of water, a moderator, by in-leakage to the reactor, would not seem to be the cause. Rapid withdrawal of control rods or structural elements that absorb neutrons or rapid movement of fuel inside the reactor could be the cause. There may have been no way to assure the internal structural integrity of the reactor before lifting it. Several radioactive isotopes that are short-lived indicate that the reactor went critical and generated fission products. Near the accident location, the Russian weather agency detected strontium-91 (half-life 9.3 hours), barium-139 (half-life 83 minutes), barium-140 (half-life 12.8 days), and lanthanum-140 (half-life 40 hours). 3 Probably many other radionuclides were released. Radioactive debris has washed up on the Dvinsk Bay shores and local residents have been warned to avoid the radioactive debris. The Guardian reported that there are reports suggesting that doctors who treated victims of the explosion have tested positive for cesium-137. 4 Perhaps more frightening that the accident and radiological release itself are the descriptions of the intended use of this nuclear-powered cruise missile. Concepts for such a nuclear-powered missile were explored by the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s. These cruise missiles would have longer 1 Kyle Mizokami, Popular Mechanics, “Why the U.S. Abandoned Nuclear-Powered Missiles More Than 50 Years Ago,” August 13, 2019. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a28690053/russia-nuclear- powered-missile-skyfall/ 2 Mark Krutov et al., Radio Free Europe, “Did A Botched Bid To Recover A Sunken Missile Cause The Russian Radiation Blast?” August 30, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-radiation-explosion-sunken-missile- investigation-nyonoksa/30138178.html 3 Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, “Russia Confirms Radioactive Materials Were Involved in Deadly Blast,” August 10, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/world/europe/russia-explosion- radiation.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article 4 Matthew Bodner, The Guardian, “Russia says radioactive isotopes releases by mystery blast,” August 26, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/26/russia-confirms-radiation-spike-after-weapons-test-blast Environmental Defense Institute P a g e | 2 flying range than conventionally powered cruise missiles. The concept involves the ability to fly at supersonic speeds, the ability to fly at low altitudes, near 1,000 feet, to avoid radar detection, and the ability to drop several nuclear bombs on different targets. Nuclear Reactor and Nuclear Waste Industries Fail to Adequately Address Hydrogen Explosion Hazard It shouldn’t surprise me that the Department of Energy is lax on understanding, preventing and mitigating hydrogen gas buildup in transuranic waste drums because the nuclear power industry also relies more on fiction than on adequate prevention measures for preventing hydrogen explosions at nuclear reactors. Not only was there a hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel, there was a hydrogen explosion at the Three Mile Island – II (TMI-2) accident in 1979 from melting zirconium cladding. 5 There were the hydrogen explosions — detonations — at the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. 6 A report written by Mark Leyse for the Natural Resources Defense Council describes the unresolved problems involving hydrogen generation at nuclear reactor plants, even the new AP1000 nuclear reactors being built in the U.S. 7 The Department of Energy has methane and hydrogen gas buildup problems in its transuranic waste drums that it has failed to fully investigate or mitigate. A deflagration transition to detonation at a transuranic waste facility could involve worker fatalities and significant release of radionuclides to the environment. Yet, hazardous waste permits by States under RCRA hazardous waste laws don’t even consider what hazards nor the environmental consequences of the facilities the States grant RCRA hazardous waste permits to. It’s kind of a “don’t ask, don’t tell” arrangement on both the nuclear regulations and the hazardous waste regulations in regard to explosive hazards and potential consequences at the RCRA permitted facilities at the Idaho National Laboratory. The Revised July 2017 WIPP Enhanced Chemical Compatibility Requirements Apparently Ignored by Fluor Idaho and Department of Energy Idaho Operation Office The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) issued new chemical compatibility requirements for transuranic waste in July 2017. 8 The new requirements were created because of an accident at 5 Prepared by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, Analysis of Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Accident, NSAC-80-1, NSAC-1 Revised, EPRI-NSAC—80-1, March 1980. https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/13/677/13677904.pdf 6 Taeko Shinongag et al., Environmental Science & Technology, “Airborne Plutonium and Non-Natural Uranium from the Fukushima DNPP Found at 120 km Distance a Few Days after Reactor Hydrogen Explosions,” 2014. Dx.doi.org/10.1021/es404961w 7 Mark Leyse, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Report, Preventing Hydrogen Explosions in Severe Nuclear Accidents: Unresolved Safety Issues Involving Hydrogen Generation and Mitigation, R:14-02-B, March 2014. https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/hydrogen-generation-safety-report.pdf Environmental Defense Institute P a g e | 3 WIPP in 2014 involving an uncontrolled exothermic reaction in a drum from organic kitty litter absorbent and nitrate salts. The report with these new requirements describes how the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project at the Idaho National Laboratory is one of two programs that can certify waste for shipment to WIPP. The other program is managed from Carlsbad, New Mexico. Despite the increased focus on transuranic waste drum chemical reactions, four waste drums from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, that were to be sent either to WIPP or to the low-level radioactive waste disposal facility at Clive, Utah, rapidly overpressurized at the Idaho site’s Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V in April 2018. The four drums, one-by-one, breached their 55-gallon drum container, sent lids flying, smoldered at elevated temperatures, ejected most of the waste contents, created toxic airborne fumes and gases, created extremely high alpha airborne radiological contamination levels and reduced visibility due to the thick cloud of powdery materials. Personnel, fortunately, didn’t happen to be in the facility at the time of the explosions. But, emergency responders to the first drum that overpressurized and ejected waste contents narrowly missed being in the room when additional drums overpressurized. Methane buildup resulting from heating up beryllium carbides in the waste by the oxidation of uranium metal was determined to be the cause of the rapid overpressurization of the drums that overcame the drum vents within hours of being newly repackaged. 9 The July 2017 revised WIPP requirements state that chemical compatibility evaluation has been enhanced to require formal documentation and generation of a chemical compatibility evaluation memo for the waste stream, “as needed.” The chemical compatibility evaluations are based on the method described in the 1980 EPA method EPA-600/2-80-076, “A Method for Determining the Compatibility of Hazardous Wastes.” The evaluation begins with a list of all of the chemicals in the waste stream, based on the Accepted Knowledge Summary Report. The chemical compatibility evaluation is performed to determine if the chemicals in the waste stream are compatible. The quantity of the chemicals and materials for the waste stream are identified as being in quantities of (1) trace – less than 1 weight percent, (2) Minor – from 1 to 10 weight percent, or (3) Dominant – greater than10 weight percent. According to the WIPP July 2017 report, “incompatible” refers to the materials/chemicals that, when mixed, can lead to consequences including: • Generate extreme heat or pressure, fire or explosions, or violent reactions • Produce uncontrolled toxic mists, fumes, dusts, or gases in sufficient quantities to threaten human or environmental health 8 Alison Moon et al., U.S. Department of Energy Implementation of Chemical Evaluation Requirements for Transuranic Waste Disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, DOE-EM-4.21-01, July 2017. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1373361 9 Idaho Cleanup Project Core, “Formal Cause Analysis for the ARP V (WFM-1617) Drum Event at the RWMC,” October 2018. https://fluor-idaho.com/Portals/0/Documents/04_%20Community/8283498_RPT-1659.pdf Environmental Defense Institute P a g e | 4 • Produce uncontrolled flammable