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Home , Appeal to emotion, Appeal to pity, Envy

Informal Logic X.2, Spring 1988

Appeal to the Angry

ALAN BRINTON Boise State University

To the multiplying of "informal have characteristically been regarded by " there is no end. This essay is real­ logicians either as inherently fallacious ly not about a at all, and the fallacy forms of or as not really forms it is really not about is the ad populum. of argument at all, as alternatives to Douglas Walton began an article ("Why is argument-as diversionary tactics for ex­ the Ad Populum a Fallacy?") some years ample. The prejudice against them among ago with an accurate description of the logicians goes back at least to Antoine Ar­ "standard" characterization of the ad naud's influential The Art of Thinking, populum: "the fallacy committed by direc­ published in 1662, and is traceable through ting an emotional appeal to the or philosophers and through the most influen­ enthusiasms of 'the gallery' or 'the people' tial logic texts published from Arnaud's to win assent to an argument not adequate­ time down through the present day. 2 Widely ly supported by proper ." 1 The used texts, especially those which speak ex­ arousing of "mass feelings, " Walton went plicitly of "ad populum," "ad misericor­ on to suggest, is what gives the ad populum diam, " and other sorts of appeals to emo­ its importance; but, since a fallacy is a tion, continue to deal with the question of mistake in argument, the real character of the role of in argument almost ex­ the in other clusively in negative terms. For example, aspects or elements of the situation. There despite qualifying his definition of argumen­ is, though, I want to suggest, a kind of argu­ tum ad misericordiam by adding "where the ment whose essential character is a matter conclusion is concerned with a question of of the arousing of group feelings or pas­ rather than a matter of sentiment" to sions. Whether this kind of argument is "the fallacy committed when is appeal­ what we generally mean or ought to mean ed to for the sake of getting a conclusion by "the ad populum" is a question which accepted, " Copi continues to list the ad may be left open to debate; but it can at least misericordiam or "" under be said, I think, that the kinds of rhetorical the heading "Fallacies of Relevance.'" The situations and performances in connection qualification suggests to us that there must with which the label' 'ad populum" seems be legitimate appeals to emotion, but he appropriate are ones in which the kind of makes no attempt to give an account of the argument I have in mind occurs. character of such appeals or to suggest Emotive appeals are, of course, made criteria for their evaluation. And his lead to individuals as well as groups, and they in this matter is still widely followed. 3 mayor may not deserve to be called Among the emotions or passions which ". " I suggest the label "Pathotic may be aroused in ad populum situations Argument" for any appeal to the emotions are some of the harsher ones such as , or passions which qualifies as an argument. , indignation, and . I plan I also suggest that some do qualify as to focus our discussion on these sorts of arguments and some of these as logically emotions. They may appropriately be call­ acceptable arguments. Appeals to emotion ed "the angry emotions," though among 78 Alan Brinton

them indignation-in the context of treating of them in certain degrees. some appeals to these kinds of emotions as These ordinary ways of thinking about a form of argument-has a kind of logical the emotions have to some extent been sup­ primacy; hence my title. In what follows, ported by, and further articulated in, the I will first briefly discuss the character of work of some moral philosophers. Aristo­ path otic argument; then I will consider the tle, for example, claims that is con­ angry emotions; finally I will focus on the cerned with passions as well as with actions, ad indignationem as a kind of argument, with how we are affected as well as with with attention to a couple of examples. how we act. "For instance," he writes in the Nicomachean Ethics, "both and and appetite and anger and pity Pathotic Argument4 and in general and may be felt both too much and too little, and in both That the emotions often interfere with, cases not well; but to feel them at the right or take the place of, a careful weighing of times, with reference to the right objects, reasons for belief or action seems beyond towards the right people, with the right dispute. And it is a stock complaint against motive, and in the right way, is what is both appeals to emotion that they are at best intermediate and best, and this is diversionary tactics and at worst attempts characteristic of virtue. "6 Virtue for Aristo­ to get people to act from unreason rather tle consists in "a state of character concern­ than from reason. On the other hand, in or­ ed with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the dinary life we do sometimes refer to fear mean relative to us, this being determined or anger or other emotions as jutified or un­ by a rational principle ... " [Nicomachean justified, as reasonable or unreasonable, and Ethics 1106b-1107a]. "Rational principle" even as blameworthy. This despite some here is "logos." That is to say, in some tendency to think of the emotions as states sense getting it right with respect to how of mind or mental occurrences which "hap­ one feels is a matter of logos, of reason, pen" to us, as if they were not at all of our even of logic. Now, among the three own choosing. One sense in which emotions "modes of proof" distinguished in Aristo­ may be reasonable or unreasonable-and I tle's are both logos (the giving of now appeal to the authority of the over­ reasons) and (the appeal to emotions whelming majority of philosophical or passions). But if passions may be felt too treatments of the emotions, from much or too little, appropriately or inap­ down to the prodigious philosophical propriately, and if this appropriateness or literature on the emotions published during inappropriateness, etc., is a matter oflogos, the past thirty years-is that they may be then these two modes of proof are not en­ (and usually are) in some sense grounded tirely separable. And I do not believe that in beliefs or which are Aristotle ever meant to say that they were. themselves reasonable or unreasonable. 5 And so there ought to be room within Another sense in which emotions may be Aristotle's ethical-rhetorical scheme for a reasonable or unreasonable is that they may sort of logos of the passions. If we want to be, in various ways, appropriate or inap­ get some idea of the nature of this logos, propriate to, and in or out of proportion to, we can look to Aristotle's analyses of the the beliefs or cognitions in which they are passions in Bk. II of the Rhetoric. For ex­ grounded. There is an added dimension to ample, he characterizes pity as "a kind of this as well: kinds of action, or particular pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or actions, may strike us as appropriate or in­ painful, which befalls one who does not appropriate responses to the experiencing deserve it; an evil which one might expect of certain emotions, or to the experiencing to come upon himself or one of his friends, Angry Emotions 79 and when it seems near."7 Whether we for that reason give special attention to the agree with the particulars or not, this justification of anger. 9 Aristotle's view on characterization gives us some idea of what the matter is clearly expressed in the the logos of pity will consist in. It will con­ Nicomachean Ethics: Anger, as well as sist in certain propositions or beliefs, such some of its emotive cognates (though not as the belief that certain events have befallen all, for example not envy), is justifiable and some person, that these events are evil, that may be even obligatory, even though it is the person does not deserve this evil, and directed against another person. "The man so on. Belief in some such combination of who is angry at the right things and with propositions will be one among possible the right people, and further, as he ought, causes of pity; but, more to our present when he ought, and as long as he ought, point, it will constitute grounds for is praised" [Nicomachean Ethics 1125b], reasonable pity. Now, pathotic argument and' 'those who are not angry at the things consists, first and foremost, in the giving they should be angry at are thought to be of such reasons, the drawing of attention fools" [1126a]. (It is quite clear in the text to reasonable grounds for the or that Aristotle agrees with this sort of prais­ emotion or sentiment in question. 8 Ad ing and thinking.) The Stoics, as is well misericordiam will be a form of path otic known, tended to argue against the argument, and what distinguishes it from legitimacy of the passions in general, but other forms will be the special character of they were particularly vituperative in the pity, or the nature of the combination of case of anger. The strongest case against propositions which constitute the cognitive the angry emotions in classical thought is content or the logos of pity. As a result, the perhaps made in Seneca's long essay De form or forms of path otic argument which Ira. \0 If the passions in general, or if the involve the "angry" emotions will have to angry emotions in particular, have no be understood in terms of an understanding legitimate place in the moral life, then of those emotions. And if appeal to these pathotic argument will in every case, or at emotions constitutes the core of the ad least whenever it invokes angry emotions, populum (as I have hinted but not asserted), be faulty (though it will still be an iden­ then it can be properly understood only in tifiable and analyzable form of argument). terms of the special character of these har­ The remainder of this discussion, however, sher emotions. will proceed on the assumption that the Aristotelian position is correct, that some angry emotions at least are justifiable. So The Angry Emotions there are two different questions, one hav­ ing to do with the justifiability of anger and The harsh or "angry" emotions or pas­ cognate emotions-their legitimacy in the sions are those which are directed against moral life, that is; the other having to do other persons. Francis Hutcheson, in his with their justification in particular cases. Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Pas­ Having set aside the first question, we are sions and , calls them the concerned with the second. "unkind" affections and contrasts them We turn now to the particular angry with the "kind" or benevolent affections. emotions. Anger itself is characterized by Since the principle of benevolence is so cen­ Aristotle as "a longing, accompanied by tral to Hutcheson's moral philosophy, he pain, for a real or apparent for a regards the unkind affections as problematic real or apparent slight, affecting a man and in need of justification. This uneasiness, himself or one of his friends, when such a though not shared by Aristotle, is shared slight is undeserved" [Rhetoric 1378a]. In­ by a number of writers on the passions, who dignation, he says, is the antithesis of pity 80 Alan Brinton

and consists in "being pained at undeserv­ An animal for retaliation is enlarg­ ed good fortune" in others [1386b]. Envy ed by in the sentiment of , is a matter of being pained at the good for­ according to Mill, insofar as it is a moral tune of others, independently of whether it sentiment, so as to include all persons. is deserved. Now, what anger and indigna­ Earlier it was suggested that indignation tion share (and also share with pity) is an has, in the context of the present inquiry, essential reference tojustice. The good per­ a kind of logical primacy. This suggestion son should, according to Aristotle, be pain­ will have to be pursued in terms of a ed by injustice and desire to see it rectified somewhat wider conception of indignation [Rhetoric 1386b]. A good person's desire than Aristotle's. Suppose we first modify to see another person (in a sense) adverse­ Aristotle's "definition" of anger, replac­ ly affected is a desire for rectification. The ing "slight" with "intentional injury." reason Aristotle rejects the view that there Then suppose we define indignation as "a is a mean with respect to envy, it seems longing, accompanied by pain, for a real reasonable to say, is that envy is not ground­ or apparent rectification for a real or ap­ ed in a real desire for rectification-for parent intentional injury to some person, justice, that is. without regard to who that person is, when Those writers who are concerned with such an injury is undeserved. " What will the justification of anger (both with its distinguish indignation from anger, then, is general justification and in connection with that anger takes special account of one's the evaluation of particular cases) typical­ own case. Now, this distinction in the way ly focus their attention on the question of in which I have made it is artificial. We justice. Anger "seeks to inflict harm on often speak of indignation in cases in which another, " says Aquinas, " ... But the desire the identity of the sufferer does make a dif­ for revenge is a desire for something good, ference and also in cases which do not ob­ since revenge pertains to justice. "II And viously involve a sufferer at all. But it is he agrees with Aristotle that anger has a important to make a distinction between the cognitive component or is grounded in a "unkind" emotion which arises out of a : " ... reason somewhat causes disinterested view of injustice and that (or anger, by proclaiming the injury which those) which arises out of an interested, self­ causes anger. " 12 "The only way in which oriented view of injustice, even if in actual our reason and understanding can raise cases there is a mixture of the two and even anger, " writes Butler in his sermon "Upon if in practice we can never quite sort them Resentment, " "is by representing to our out. The important point is that the justifica­ mind injustice or injury of some kind or tion of the harsher emotions (in particular other. "13 In a sermon on "The Government cases), insofar as it is to be given in terms of Passion, " Samuel Clarke says that anger of justice, is grounded wholly in indigna­ is sinful "when it is stirred up without just tion as I have just defined it. Other aspects cause ... "14. The relationship between of the harsher emotions are of , to justice and anger is approached from be sure, but the core of these emotions, so another direction by John Stuart Mill in his far as their possible justifiability goes, is analysis of the concept of justice in Chapter a kind of indignation against injustice. 5 of . "The idea of justice, " "That passion, " says Butler, "from whence he writes, "supposes two things-a rule of men take occasion to run into the dreadful conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the of malice and revenge; even that pas­ rule. " This sentiment involes a desire for sion, as implanted in our nature by God, punishment of the offender and "the con­ is not only innocent, but a generous move­ ception of some definite person who suf­ ment of mind. It is in itself, and in its fers by the infringement" (of the rule). 15 original, no more than indignation against Angry Emotions 81

injury and wickedness" [po 149]. misleading, since typically the main con­ When Aristotle says in the Nicomachean cern is to arouse the relevant passions, with Ethics that not angry in response to little need to then appeal to them as the bases unmerited indicates a defect of for action. There are indeed two character, and when he says in the Rhetoric distinguishable aspects in the case of such [1386b] that being pained at the sight of appeals: the arousing of the emotion, and unmerited good fortune is a mark of good the moving to action by means of the emo­ character, he is focusing our attention on tion. But it is the arousing of the emotion what is essential to the justification and to which is now the focus of attention. 17 the reasonableness of the angry emotions Among the available means for arousing the in general. It is this being pained at injustice passions is the giving of reasons or grounds (accompanied at least sometimes by a kind for anger, enmity, or whatever. As a result, of pleasure at the prospect of the injustice although the appeal to anger (say) is always being rectified), taken by itself, which we a rhetorical phenomenon, it may also be a call for the moment "indignation." Indigna­ logical phenomenon (if we may be permit­ tion in a larger sense and the other ted this manner of speaking). When such "unkind" emotions or passions are more an appeal is also a logical phenomenon, it than indignation in this narrow or "strict" will be an instance of the argumentum ad sense. But, even in the strict sense, indigna­ indignationem. The logical correctness of tion is not a mere cool assessment or judg­ an argumentum ad indignationem will be ment; it is, or includes, a feeling or com­ a matter of at least two things: (1) whether plex of feelings-it is an emotion or pas­ the reasons given for the emotion are good sion. As such, it is a motivator to action, ones, whether the truth of certain proposi­ which is why it is appealed to in rhetorical tions, namely those which are appealed to, situations, for example in public speeches would in fact justify the feelings which they whose aim is to get people to take certain are supposed to arouse; and (2) whether the courses of action. degree or intensity of the emotional response (or intended emotional response) is appropriate to the reasons given, in the The Ad Indignationem l6 context of the rhetorical situation considered as a whole. The usual sort of distinction bet­ Let us then call the form of path otic ween truth of premises and logical correct­ argument which consists in giving grounds ness can be made as well. for the angry emotions the Argumentum ad Let us now turn our attention to two ex­ Indignationem. There are certain rhetorical amples, each instructive in its own way. The phenomena which we may refer to as the scope of the present account allows for on­ "appeal to indignation," "appeal to ly brief treatment of each of the two. At the anger," "appeal to envy," "appeal to en­ same time, an adequate understanding of the mity," "appeal to ," and so on, kind of argument we are considering re­ at least one each for each identifiably quires attention to larger bodies of discourse distinguishable harsh emotion. These, we than the usual textbook examples, as well might say, when used on a crowd, are as attention to their rhetorical contexts. So, subspecies of the sort of rhetorical despite space limitations, I introduce for phenomenon for which the label "ad consideration two fairly complicated ex­ populum" seems appropriate. I say amples. The first is a speech made by "rhetorical phenomena," because what I Frederick Douglass (the "Reception have in mind here is the attempt to arouse Speech' ') in England in 1846. The second the relevant emotions by any of the available is the speech of Cleon, in the Athenian means. The expression "appeal to" is debate over the fate of the colony of 82 Alan Brinton

Mytilene. In each, at least one main pur­ affected in the appropriate way will indicate pose of the speaker is to raise indignation a defect of character. This view, that failure or other angry emotions against certain per­ to be appropriately affected is indicative of sons. And each involves the giving of a weakness or deficiency of character, is reasons for those emotions. essentially Aristotelian. (1) Douglass was a former slave who I certainly do not want to make all this had escaped and for a time fled to Great Bri­ sound simpler than it is. It might seem as tain, where he gave speeches attempting to though somehow a "moral premise" is enlist British support for the abolition of essentially involved and has gone unnotic­ slavery in America. He begins by saying ed, or that there is a certain amount of moral that his purpose is to inform his audience theory entering into the move from so-called about the" character of this institution" of "premise" to so-called "conclusion." This slavery. But the underlying purpose is ex­ is correct. It might also be sug­ pressed graphically at the end of the speech: gested that the conclusion, if there is one, I want the slaveholder surrounded, as by is a proposition such as "You, my hearers, a wall of anti-slavery fire, so that he may ought to feel indignant"; and the account see the condemnation of himself and his certainly could be put in these terms. 19 The system glaring down in letters of light. I reason for these difficulties is this: what we want him to feel that he has no sympathy have here is a form of argument which is in England, Scotland, or Ireland; that he has inseparable from a certain kind of backdrop none in Canada, none in Mexico, none among the poor wild Indians ... I would have of moral theory. The very character of this condemnation blaze down upon him in every kind of argument cannot be fully and ade­ direction, till, stunned and overwhelmed quately understood unless we see that it is with and , he is compelled a kind of moral argument. The reason ad to let go the grasp he holds upon the per­ popuJum argument, ad misericordiam argu­ sons of his victims, and restore them to their ment, argument, and a number long-lost rights." 18 of other kinds of argument, which have for The body of the speech consists almost so long suffered at the hands of logi­ entirely of graphic descriptions of the evils cians, have not been properly understood and injustices and barbarity of slave owner­ is that the cases in which, and the extent ship as practiced in mid-19th Century to which, they are forms of moral argument America. There are rhetorical flourishes, have not been sufficiently appreciated. 20 to be sure, but the appeal made at the end Moral argument typically aims to produce is well grounded in a series of empirical moral belief or moral action; and the pas­ claims (some documented by the speaker, sions or emotions are essential to moral others at least documentable). As I sug­ belief or action, since they are essentially gested earlier, the two usual sorts of ques­ involved in the matter of the manner in tions about arguments can be raised: (1) Are which we believe or act, which is itself the "premises," in this case the empirical essential to moral belief or action. 21 claims in which the "conclusion" (the feel­ (2) Cleon's speech, as reported in Book ing of indignation) is supposed to be Three of Thucydides' History of the grounded, true? and (2) Do those Peloponnesian War, raises its own dif­ "premises" support that' 'conclusion," in ficulties. Mytilene, one of the richest and other words, in this case, is indignation the allegedly least imposed-upon states in the appropriate response? Douglass quite clear­ Athenian empire, revolted in the fourth year ly thinks more than just that indignation is of the war, attempting to forcibly unify the the appropriate response; his view is that island of Lesbos into one state allying itself for any good and decent person such a with the Spartans against the Athenians. response will be unavoidable-failure to be After the defeat of the Mytilenian fleet, the Angry Emotions 83 question was whether to execute only per­ is the degree or pitch of anger which Cleon sons taken as prisoners in the battle or to aims to evoke proportional to the put to death the entire adult male popula­ "evidence"? And then a third question is tion. Cleon's speech is in favor of the har­ likely to come up in this case, about the ap­ sher measures. He argues that no other ci­ propriateness of the course of action pro­ ty has ever committed such injury and in­ duction of which Cleon wants to stoke the sult against Athens: anger of his hearers. Personally, I can make allowances for those who revolt because they find your rule intolerable or because they have been forc­ Conclusion ed into it by action. Here, however, we have the case of people living on an I have been suggesting with respect to island, behind their own fortifications, with the kinds of rhetorical situations and nothing to fear from our except an maneuvers which give rise to the notion that attack by sea against which they were ade­ quately protected by their own force of there is such a thing as an ad popuJum triremes; they had their own independent fallacy, that there is a describable and government and they were treated by us with analyzable kind of argument, in which the greatest consideration. Now, to act as theory at least may be in particular cases they acted is not what I should call a logically acceptable.23 That kind of argu­ revolt. .. ; it is a case of calculated aggres­ ment is what I am calling the ad indigna­ sion, or deliberately taking sides with our tionem. If there is an ad indignationem bitterest enemies in order to destroy us. 22 fallacy, it must be a way of going wrong There is a good deal more to the speech. logically in ad indignation em argument, it Cleon aims to get the Athenians to follow must consist in some failure in the relation­ a certain course of action; but he knows ship between premises and conclusion. very well (as we could see more clearly by When the grounds appealed to are inap­ looking at the whole account) that they will propriate or inadequate, either for indigna­ do so only if their anger against the My tile­ tion, or for the called-for degree of indigna­ nians can be raised to a certain pitch, and tion, then there will be a logical failure. I so his immediate aim is to arouse their pas­ do not take myself to have provided an sions. This situation is somewhat more com­ analysis of adequate grounds for indigna­ plicated. Whether there are adequate tion, but only to have pointed out that an grounds for anger or indignation is one adequate conception of the nature of in­ question. To Athenian sympathizers it may dignation will provide the basis for such an well appear that Cleon succeeds in giving analysis. The question of the relationship adequate grounds for the emotion. But one between grounds and degree of indignation ought to at least read the surrounding is more complicated. chapters or even perhaps the whole of Moral theory, I have also suggested, Thucydides' history before making a judg­ enters unavoidably into the evaluation of ment about that; and of course one probably this sort of argument. Supposing that this ought to look into the circumstances even is the case, it should come as no more deeply than that. This does not mean if the evaluation of this form of argument that instances of the ad indignationem are lacks the kind of precision "standard" logic not really susceptible to evaluation. It just textbook writers to impose on their means that their evaluation is often difficult subject-matter. Aristotle's warnings (in and often has to be tentative, or has to be Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics) about made relative to a restricted point of view. not expecting more precision than the But now another question about the emo­ subject-matter admits of ought to be heed­ tion arises: Assuming that anger is justified, ed in this context. To say that judgments 84 Alan Brinton

about the appropriateness of emotive 2 See Part III of The Art Of Thinking response to the of a given case are in­ (often referred to as The Port-Royal exact is not to say that they are arbitrary. Logic), Ch. 19, "Sophisms: The Dif­ It may be, and it seems to me that it is, the ferent Ways of Reasoning Incorrectly, " case that there are fonns of argument whose trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James evaluation is more like the critical evalua­ (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). For tion of a work of art or literature than it is a brief, but fairly comprehensive, ac­ like the evaluation of a categorical count of the history of philosophical and syllogism. These less exact kinds of evalua­ logical opinions about these matters, see tion are grounded in analysis and theory just c.L. Hamblin's Fallacies (London: as fully as are the more exact kinds, and Methuen, 1970). the exact modes of evaluation are as inap­ 3 Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, 7th propriate to some forms of argument as the edition (New York: Macmillan, 1986), inexact modes are to others. Section 3.2. Copi is closely followed in There are, of course, other ways of this by his sincerest flatterer, Patrick arousing the angry emotions, which are not Hurley, A Concise Introduction to forms of argument at all. When these are Logic, 3rd edition (Belmont, CA: deceptively mingled with ad indignationem Wadsworth, 1988), Section 3.2. Howard argument, as they often are, it is appropriate Kahane's widely used Logic and Con­ to complain of an abuse of that kind of argu­ tempoary Rhetoric, 5th edition (Belmont, ment. And then the premises may be false. CA: Wadsworth, 1988), does the same, Butler's account of some of the ways this as does Vincent Barry and Douglas Soc­ may happen is worth quoting: " ... when, cio's Practical Logic, 3rd edition (New from partiality to ourselves, we imagine an York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston injury done to us, when there is none: when 1988). A recent text which is more this partiality represents it to us greater than ex~ plicit in making the point that not all ap­ it really is: when we fall into that ex­ peals to emotion are fallacious is James travagant and monstrous kind of resent­ Freeman's Thinking Logically ment, towards one who has innocently been (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, occasion of evil to us ... " ("Upon Resent­ 1988), Ch.3; still, though, Freeman has ment", Para. 10). The temptation is to speak of an "ad populum fallacy," con­ "Emotional Appeals" as a main sidering these and a disproportion subheading under' 'Informal Fallacies," between grounds and degree of anger or in­ and he also offers no positive account of dignation all together as one kind of legitimate appeals. Some of these (and mistake, and then to be puzzled as to other) texts also take some account of the whether or not this mistake is a logical one. role of the emotions in argument in sec­ So conceived, the ad popuJum is a rhetorical tions on "emotive meaning," but almost phenomenon, one which usually, though not exclusively in terms of abuses in the use always, involves a kind of argument, the of emotive language. Trudy Govier's A ad indignationem, a kind of argument which Practical Study of Argument, for in­ is sometimes, though not always, logically stance (2nd edition (Belmont, CA: unacceptable. 24 Wadsworth, 1988)), does not include ap­ peals to emotion in its discussion of fallacies of relevance, but its brief discus­ Notes sion of "emotively charged language" is concerned just with abuses (pp. 48-50; I Philosophy and Rhetoric, 13 (1980), see also p. 16). Despite an occasional 264. bow in these texts in the direction of a Angry Emotions 85

legitimate role for the emotions in argu­ of Hume) is that the connection between ment, the implications are clear. The the circumstances which give rise to (and same applies to many textbook perhaps justify) pity and the feeling of treatments of ad hominem argument; pity is, for all we know, accidental, a despite even wider acknowledgment that connection which we discover by obser­ not all ad hominem arguments are ving constant conjunctions. Hume is able fallacious, "Ad Hominem" is still com­ to take this view because he regards the monly a subheading under "Fallacies of emotion as just the feeling (so that for Relevance. " him the difference between pity, say, and anger, is that each consists in a unique­ 4 A fuller account of the nature and ly distinct, qualitatively different feel­ justification of this general kind of argu­ ing). The more common view, especially ment is to be found in Alan Brinton, in the recent philosophical literature, is "Pathos and the '': that different emotions are distinguish­ an Aristotelian Analysis, "The History able in terms of differences in cognitive of Philosophy Quarterly, 5 (1988), content, or in objects, or in terms of 207-219. something or other which is above and 5 The approach recommended in Book II beyond the mere feeling. The latter kind of Aristotle's Rhetoric for arousing or of view lends itself more readily to some calming the passions is almost exclusive­ more detailed account of the connection ly cognitive. A useful collection of re­ between "premises" and "conclusion" cent philosophical articles on the emo­ in path otic argument. tions is Explaining Emotions, Amelie 9 Hutcheson's Essay was published in Rorty (ed.), (Berkeley: Univ. of CA London in 1728. His own attempts to Press, 1980). A leading contemporary provide a justification of the passions (in advocate of the cognitive view of the general, though with a particular concern emotions is Robert Solomon, whose view with the harsher passions) are on pp. 48ff is most fully worked out in The Passions and 181-182. Butler's justification of is (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976). given in Paragraphs (1) and (12)-(16) of his sermon "Upon Resentment." 6 l106b, trans. Sir Ross (London: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1925). The Ross 10 Seneca: Moral Essays, trans. l.W. translation will be referred to henceforth Basore, in The Loeb Classical Library, by EN. For a very illuminating discus­ (London: Wm. Heinemann, 1928), Vol. sion of the role of the passions in Aristo­ I. See also Plutarch's essay "On the Con­ tle's ethics, see L.A. Kosman, "Being trol of Anger," Plutarch's Moralia, Properly Affected: and Feelings trans. W.e. Helmbold, (London: Wm. in Aristotle's Ethics," in Amelie Rorty Heinemann, 1939), Vol. VI. Seneca and (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics Plutarch both, however, although they (Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press, 1980), recommend elimination of the angry pp. 103-116. emotions, agree with Aristotle in taking a cognitive view. Their detailed recom­ 7 The Art of Rhetoric, trans. l. H. Freese, mendations for calming ourselves and The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: others down are very largely cognitive; Harvard Univ. Press, 1926), l385b. in effect they advise us to entertain and 8 An issue which I pass over is the ques­ to focus our attention on certain proposi­ tion of the nature of the connection bet­ tions. This is no less a kind of pathotic ween the content of the propositions and argument than the attempt to arouse the the specific emotion. One view (the view emotions by the same kind of means. So 86 Alan Brinton

even from this point of view there is a itself problematic. The view is not in­ place for the kind of argument we are frequently expressed that we ought to act talking about. on the basis of reasons rather than in response to our emotions. That view is, II Summa Theologica, Second Part, Part in my view, simplistic and fails to ap­ I, Q. 46, Art. 2, trans. Fathers of the preciate the role of our passional nature English Dominican Province, revised by in the moral life; our present concern is, D.J. Sullivan, in Great Books of the however, with the arousing and the justi­ Western World. (Chicago: William Ben­ fying of emotions rather than with the ton, 1952). question of the relationship between 12 Ibid. Article 6. emotion and action.

13 Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preach­ 18 In Speeches by Black Americans, ed. ed at Rolls Chapel, (London: 1726), Ser­ Daniel J. O'Neill (Belmont, CA: Dicken­ mon 8. son Pub. Co., 1971), p. 41.

14 Sermon XLVI, The Works of Samuel 19 There are reasons, however, for not Clarke, Vol. I, (London: 1738). 18th characterizing the conclusion of pathotic Century British moral philosophers and argument as a proposition, at least not moralists tended to be preoccupied with unless we grant that the proposition the passions. The view of Hutcheson and essentially has a kind of emotive force. Clarke that the moral life consists largely The point is that mere cool assent to the in the proper regulation or "govern­ proposition "You ought to be indignant" ment" of the passions was widely shared is not the speaker or arguer's objective. by popular moralists and sermonizers. A number of works from the period are 20 The sometime moral character of ad specifically concerned with the justifica­ hominem argument will perhaps not be tion and regulation of anger. See, for ex­ apparent from what I have said here. Ad ample, Jeremiah Seed's sermon "Of hominem argument is a form of moral Anger, Meekness, etc." in The argument most conspicuously in those Posthumous Works of Jeremiah Seed, cases in which it aims to undermine Vol. I (Dublin: 1750), and An Essay on (sometimes justifiably) the moral authori­ Anger, by John Fawcett (Leeds: 1787). ty or ethos of a speaker or writer or ad­ visor; one of its ends, that is, in certain 15 (1863; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, contexts, is a kind of moral disapproval 1957), edited by Oskar Piest, p. 65. I am or disqualification. For a fuller account, grateful to an anonymous referee for see my "A Rhetorical View of the Ad drawing my attention to Mill's discus­ Hominem," The Australasian Journal of sion of this matter. Philosophy, 63 (1985), 50-63, and 16 This label is inspired partly by the con­ "Ethotic Argument," The History of ception of indignatio in classical Philosophy Quarterly, 3 (1986), 245-58. rhetorical theory. Indignatio as a 21 The point I mean to make here is ap­ rhetorical device consists in the arous­ proached, I think, in comments made by ing of angry emotions against opponents. Charles F. Kielkopf in "Relevant Ap­ See 's De In ventione , trans. H.M. peals to Force, Pity, and Popular Hubbell, The Loeb Classical Library Pieties" (Informal Logic, 2 (1980), 1-5, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Pr., 1949), though from a different direction, when I, 1iii. he says that most accounts of the ad 17 This is not to say that the moving to ac­ populum, the ad baculum, and the ad tion "on the basis" of passions is not in misericordiam are superficial in that they Angry Emotions 87

are "based on a failure to distinguish bet­ 22 Thucydides: History of the Peloponne­ ween reading a conclusion primarily as sian War, trans. Rex Warner (Baltimore: a description as opposed to reading it Penguin Books, 1954), pp. 182-183. primarily as a prescription" (p. 2). I 23 "Ad Populum" is sometimes used of ap­ think Professor Kielkopf is also correct peals to popular opinion. That applica­ in emphasizing that "considerations tion is not the one I have in mind-which which are irrelevant as reasons for think­ is not to say that it has no connection at ing" may be "relevant as reasons for ac­ all with the application to the arousing ting" (p. 3), although I would want to of group emotions. say that they may be relevant as reasons for thinking about acting, especially for 24 I am grateful to Michael Wreen for en­ moral thinking. couragement in this project and also to The essential involvement of the two anonymous referees for suggesting emotions in moral believing or acting improvements with respect to an earlier perhaps provides justification or at least draft. establishes the appropriateness of rhetorical flourishes in the presentation of the' 'premises" of pathotic argument. Professor Alan Brinton, Department of I am grateful to Mary DiPietro for poin­ Philosophy, Boise State University, Boise, ting this out to me. Idaho 83725 D