Doctoral student Nurmoldayev Serik

Kurmangazy Kazakh National Conservatory, Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty

Kazakhization and in the context of the crisis of national identity

Musicology section

Abstract

The year 2017 was marked for modern Kazakhstan by the decision on the transition of the Kazakh alphabet from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin script. This practice is not new for post-Soviet countries. However, for the citizens of Kazakhstan this decision again raised the urgent issue of the country's national identity. A Society, still torn between identities "Kazakh" - "Kazakhstani", cannot come to the common denominator of one national identity. On the one hand, the factors of the unshakable influence of the Soviet heritage and and the need to change the language position of the Russian and Kazakh languages on the principle of the center-periphery. On the other hand, the new challenges of globalization have a very contradictory effect on the young state, with a fragile national identity. In this paper, we made an attempt to determine the historical and political prerequisites for the current crisis of the national identity of the state, and also to highlight the current situation of this problem. In the context of the study, the central position is occupied by the Kazakh language as one of the main symbols of the national identity and the youth of Kazakhstan, as the main bearer of changes and most influenced by the tendencies of globalization. One of the independent solutions of the Kazakhstan youth for the above-mentioned problems is the emergence of the so-called youth subculture "q-pop". The role model of q-pop was the genre of modern pop music k-pop - the main driving force of the Korean wave.

Introduction Trying to determine his national identity, modern man asks the question: "Who are we?" And he gives an answer based on his attitude to the political and cultural institutions and symbols of the society in which he lives. If we address this issue to determine the national identity of Kazakhstan, it turns out that there is no unambiguous answer common to all of its citizens. One part of the citizens of Kazakhstan answers "We are Kazakhs", while the other part of citizens does not want to recognize themselves as Kazakhs and instead offers another answer - "We are Kazakhstanis" 1 . It turns out that today in Kazakhstan there are two national identities, depending on how different parts of society answer the question: "Who are we?". One of these identities can be defined as Kazakh, because it relies on the definition of "we are Kazakhs". Another identity can be defined as Kazakhstan, because it proceeds from the formula "We are Kazakhstanis". Russification is the factor that forms a complex and ambiguous attitude of Kazakhs that fuels the competition of Kazakhstani and Kazakh identities for the status of the national identity of Kazakhstan. On the one hand, they want Kazakh symbols to become dominant in the new society. On the other hand, many Kazakhs do not want the symbols of Russian culture and Soviet time that have become habitual to go to the periphery of Kazakhstan society. The success of the formation of a single national identity in Kazakhstan, capable of uniting the youth of all ethnic groups, largely depends on the successful solution of the language issue - in other words, overcoming the currently existing cultural and linguistic division of Kazakhstan's society. The latter is possible only through the successful introduction of the Kazakh language as a really functioning state language. As a bearer of great intellectual potential, and special abilities for creativity (heightened sensuality, perception, imagery of thinking, etc.), youth is the accelerator of introducing new ideas, initiatives, new forms of life into practice, because by nature it is opposed to conservatism and stagnation. Thus, the youth age today is a concept not so much demographic as social and political (Teslenko A.N 2013) [1]. One of the independent solutions of the Kazakhstan youth for the above-mentioned problems is the emergence of the so-called youth subculture "q-pop". The role model of q-pop was the genre of modern pop music k-pop - the main driving force of the Korean wave. Successful indigenization of pop music in Kazakhstan is due to a number of factors

1 pl. meaning in Russian “the people of KZ”. of cultural affinity with South Korea (Kocca 2017) [2]. Fuller intercultural understanding, as well as national identity formation, can only be achieved through the interaction with and negotiation of culture, whether it is high or popular. In this vein, the significant contribution of this cultural phenomenon has been to challenge the existing binary division between dominant and dominated cultures, center and periphery, and unidirectional cultural flows (W. Ryoo 2009) [3]. And now, the Korean wave has reached the stage of creating new types of cross- border relations, overcoming territorial, theoretical, political, cultural and other obstacles on its way (Park 2006) [4]. According to W. Ryoo “Korean wave might be understood as a potential node of communicative practice for building a peaceful transnational community among many Asian countries that have experienced the harsh memory of colonialism and exploitation.” [3] (2009). In turn, q-pop can also serve as a similar platform for interethnic communication within the framework of one state, capable of formulating an absolutely new concept of a unified national identity of the renewed generation, born already in an independent state - the generation Z. A rich body of culture-specific research described associations between culture- specific music and national or cultural identity (e.g., Jones, 1995; McCann, 2004; Ochoa, 2001). Dolfma (1999) claims that through the consumption of music, individuals “express who they are, to which group they belong, what their identity is” (p. 1019). Similarly, Frith (1996) argues that“[. . .] music seems to be a key to identity because it offers, so intensely, a sense of both self and others, of the subjective in the collective”(p.110).Merriam’s(1964) seminal analysis of music highlighted the universal function of music in its ability to provide a solidarity point that engages individuals of a society “in activities which [. . .] remind them of their unity [. . .] and assurance of belonging to a group” (p. 226). Extant research draws attention to the meaning of music for the national and cultural identities of nationals as well as for immigrants and in diasporas. For instance, Ilari (2006) demonstrated that music was an important element of Dekasegi to maintain their personal and cultural identities as Japanese of Brazilian descent. Ilari’s (2006) work highlights that the study of music in times of globalization offers important insights into cultural and identity processes and has implications for citizenship and multicultural identity construction [5]. Since every culture exhibits unique music styles, yet different music styles seem to produce similar nationalistic effects according to previous qualitative research, there seem to be universal psychological processes underlying the culture specific phenomenon. Despite the omnipresence of American pop music, culture-specific (modern as well as traditional) music styles are highly valued and embraced, and further developed into contemporary hybrid styles [5]. As the general producer of the national music television and radio channel GakkuTV2 Timur Balymbetov says: "Now we are going to self-identification. Through music we try to prove to ourselves and others, in a good sense, that we have our own beginning. " He also claims that an unprecedented growth in the popularity of music content in the Kazakh language suggests that the generation of listeners has changed. Now songs in the Kazakh language are becoming popular among Russian-speaking listeners [6]. In this article, author attempted to identify the problems of the national identity of Kazakhstan, and also to trace the way of formation and development of q-pop as one of the tools of the national self-identification of the youth of Kazakhstan, including the role of the Korean wave in the face of k-pop in this process.

The phenomenon of K-pop subculture The change in the stages of the historical process is always characterized by the fact that certain tendencies and processes that are marginal in the previous period, that is, in fact, represented a subculture, suddenly appear in the mainstream of social life and determine the leading directions of the development of the society. Interest in the culture of South Korea most of all increases precisely among the Kazakh youth. The phenomenon of the success of the k-pop subculture in Kazakhstan consists of several factors. First, the common national roots - we are Asians. Secondly, modern Kazakhstani pop music is hopelessly behind the world trends in the music industry. Kazakhstani artists are more focused on the older generation of their audience

2 Gakku TV («Гәкку ТВ» in Kazakh lg.) is the first music television channel in Kazakhstan, broadcasting exclusively domestic content. due to their solvency and, as a consequence, the abandonment of the youth audience. As they themselves note "there is no music of their own". Thirdly, the audience of k-pop is the centennials born "with a button in hand". Despite the colossal influence of Western and Russian cultures on Kazakhstan, young people, due to their age features, will always be in search of a new one that would satisfy their worldview characteristics and give individualism. The Korean wave became that new turn that allowed to "rest" modern young people fed up with the western immorality and immorality, to which it "fed" its audience from TV monitors and gadgets. One of the main reasons for the popularity of the k-pop subculture among the Kazakhstan youth, the k-poppers themselves note the national factor. In their opinion, the external similarity and attention to their national traditions, the emphasis on innocence favorably allocate this subculture among others. Chinese scholars also attribute the success of the Korean wave to Confucianism, with which the East Asian cultures are very familiar - to such traditional values as family, love and sons of respect, applied to the era of modern technology. The same values are propagated by the Islamic religion, which is the dominant one in the countries of Central Asia. To date, k-pop is the most massive subculture in the country and has the greatest impact on traditional culture. That is the testimony of the inclusion of k-pop content in its daily segment by leading entertainment channels (NTK, Muzzon, 31 channel, HitTv). Such success has not been achieved yet by any subculture in the country. It can be assumed that both Eurasian and Western youth subcultures are the result of conscious search for a new identity, building a new style. For the youth subcultures of the West, the Buddhist East, Africa, the culture of the North American Indians, etc., became the source of the construction of a romanticized and idealized image of a different from the existing civilization or culture ("cultural myth" or "cultural utopia"). In contrast to domestic practice, it was precisely construction, rather than borrowing: the image of another's culture was cleared of unacceptable features, replenished with its own interpretations of cultural phenomena. For the post-Soviet space, the West became such a source. Moreover, if in Western samples of subcultural styles were in many cases processed and reinterpreted in accordance with the peculiarities of the Russian mentality (hippies - Mitki, etc.), then the already prepared Russian "semi-finished product" was borrowed in Kazakhstan. But over the past ten years, from the semi-underground subculture in the face of the wiped disks and magneto albums, it has become a sphere of show business and has become part of the actual (mass) culture [7]. Against this background, the k-pop subculture again found itself in a favorable position, because unlike other, later mass subcultures, came to its audience directly through the Internet and social networks, without being subjected to the above filtering. As of the end of January 2017, Kazakhstan was ranked 44th in attendance on YouTube. A day recorded 2.8 million unique users, and on average each user viewed 14 videos and spent at least 24 minutes on the service. YouTube was the third site for attendance in Kazakhstan, second only to VK and projects Mail.ru. Today, an average Kazakhstani user spends more than 50 minutes a day on YouTube. More than 80% of Kazakhstan content is presented in HD format. More than 500 thousand views per day - this is viewing from applications in Smart TV. The female video service audience in Kazakhstan slightly exceeds the male audience - 53% of women, 47% of men. The core audience are users aged 25-34 years (39%). Young people from 18 to 34 years old do not just go to the Internet from the smartphone every day, they live there [8]. "The trend is that the most popular accounts in one way or another are related to children: gaming, family and in general" exploitation "of children. Generation Z has not watched TV for a long time, and parents to give the child give him a tablet with an open YouTube, "said Danil Ivanov, Internet marketing specialist at Genesis MCN (multi- channel network), which is the official and strategic partner of YouTube in Kazakhstan [9]. According to the agency Sparks & Honey, 85% of teenagers of the generation Z have at least once in their lives searched for information on the Internet. 52% of teens use YouTube and social networks for school assignments. Adolescents aged 13-17 are more likely to use the phone than watch TV (76% vs 72%), whereas children 8-12 years old are on the contrary (39% vs. 72%). One way or another, many a day have time to look at many screens: phone, TV, laptop, music player, tablet, e-book, game console. As a consequence, adolescents have a faster perception of information, but there is a difficulty in keeping attention on one subject for longer than eight seconds [10]. The term "clip-on thinking" that has become popular is favorably played out by the creators of the k-pop industry. Bright images of stars, often changing frames, saturated with small details, and the ever-dynamic beat of music have become a winning component of the success of the k-pop of centennials. To date, the leading Kazakhstani k-pop fan clubs are based in the social network VK. Kazakhstan K-pop Generation - a community for organizing various events related to Korean culture in the country, has 17,000 subscribers. Of these, 86% of the female sex, 17% of the male; women the greatest number of 18-21 years 25.6%, men from 21-24 years old 3.6%. This is the largest active audience, which works mainly in off-line mode. Stunning is the performance of the most popular group on the voice acting of Korean dramas in Kazakhstan - studio [SoftBox]. To date, subscribers on their page are 412 000 people. By the way, these are indicators not only in Kazakhstan, but throughout the CIS, as well. The dubbing is performed in Russian. This factor is a kind of unifying clamp for modern youth against the backdrop of the language policy of the state, as actively translate into dramas into Russian. In this regard, it can be said that the Korean wave partly came to us from Russia. The youth is watching translations in Russian. And while she is well aware of their foreign peers. "Here you have new cultural codes." Significant role in the popularization of the study of the Korean language among Kazakhstan's k-poppers was played by slang, as one of the main attributes of the youth subculture. Among the k-poppers, such words as "Oppa", "Nuna", "Saranghae" and many other words actively used in the everyday life of Korean speech have turned into subcultural slang. They actively use individual words or phrases in Korean in communication with each other. Clearly, to integrate into this environment, you need to master this slang.

Q-pop subculture of youth in the issues of popularization of the language policy of the country and "new Kazakh morality". According to V.N. Yarskoy, in modern society, the sphere of leisure is of paramount importance for young people, as it provides them with an additional cultural space for self-identification, self-expression and self-affirmation [11]. As the researcher A.C. Batnasunov, the role of leisure as a factor in the formation of the youth subculture grows as a result of the weakening role of traditional socialization institutions [12]. The youth subculture turns into a kind of game, and itself becomes by its nature one of the forms of the game. The players create a new community - a group that retains its composition even after the game is over. Consequently, the game and its elements can be considered as a mechanism for the integration of young people in a particular team. A significant role in the game is played by music, determining the way of life of young people. Musical preferences are understood by young people as part of their life world, as a factor that brings them closer to people of other countries, conditioned by the processes of globalization. Music determines the nature of the artistic needs of young people, becomes an important beginning of interpersonal communication, contributing to the formation of their group relations. E.B. Borisova focused on the fact that music, acting as an identifier for various groups of young people, is able to design a certain life style, which largely depends on the selection of certain musical preferences [13]. I.P. Saltanovich outlined the following functions of music in youth subcultures: entertaining, compensatory, sociocultural, functions of self-determination of the person, its protection and social support; function of self-assertion [14]. The excessive romanticizing of images of k-pop idols and, as a consequence, imitation of them both in life and on the scenes of various cover festivals held by fan communities, is rather a surface model of behavior conditioned by a trend rather than a deep-ideological motivation. In the early 1990s, hip-hop appeared in South Korean society as a musical style of break dance. It is based on imitation of popular American rappers, but soon it acquired its specificity due to the fact that rappers began to read texts about problems that are familiar to Korean teenagers in a language they understand. In the mid-1990s, hip-hop became a popular subculture in the South Korean youth environment. The same influence is rendered by the k-pop on modern music of the youth of Kazakhstan. Strange as it may sound, but k-pop became a kind of catalyst for the development of the language policy of the state. World popularity of the pop artists in the light of their external appeal, excelled in the world arena with their songs in native, Korean. Also, in popular bands there are representatives of other Asian nationalities who are not even citizens of the Republic of Korea but sing songs in Korean. The popularity of Korean pop music as an Asian song is not a precedent in world practice, but in the eyes of Kazakhstan's youth it is an example for imitation, for, for a country that, despite its 25- year history of independence, still has to fight for its national language in its own. The same country, the similar dominance of the Asian language in the world arena seems to be something phenomenal. In the youth's understanding, k-pop and pop music in general is the springboard to a successful future with a national identity without sacrifice to the detriment of their perceptions of fashion and trends. For example Ninety One group (91) is the most popular performers in q-pop. Their official public on the social network VK has more than 168 thousand subscribers. The success of the group has generated not a few followers of this genre. So, for today there are about a dozen q-pop artists such as Ziruza, Black Dial, MadMen, Newton, Moonlight, KitchenSongs, Cristals, Nintety One, Renzo and others. The phenomenon of group Ninety One bears a double meaning. On the one hand, in 1991 the broke up, and for young musicians - all of them were born and grew up in independent Kazakhstan - this date most likely symbolizes the independence of behavior and freedom of creativity. In Almaty and Astana, these five guys have a lot of devoted fans, especially they are liked by teenage girls and very young girls. The popularity of Ninety One may surprise, because not all of its participants have a musical education, but in Kazakhstan, and beyond, teenagers admire these guys. The network circulates the lyrics of the songs of the group - all of them are devoted to the themes of unhappy fervent love and interpersonal relations - from Kazakh to many other languages, including French and Greek. From many other Kazakhstani teams, it is distinguished by several moments: the songs are performed in the Kazakh language, but much attention is paid to the quality and non-standard scenic image of the project participants. Q-pop singers sing exclusively in the Kazakh language, noting this with their principled position, and also actively Latinizing using the Latin alphabet in the names of their songs. Secondly, up to today's success, the band, which has become a cult for Kazakhstan teenagers, has one more distinctive feature - in the eyes of the guardians for the national culture, musicians have become almost the embodiment of evil. The main marginal component of the performers of this genre was that in addition to nationality and content in the Kazakh language, there was nothing in it that would correspond to the values of the traditional culture of the state. The first tour of the band across the country in 2016 caused a wave of ethno-cultural protests both among the representatives of culture and among the youth-traditionalists themselves. So, the planned concerts were universally canceled, and often the concerts were threatened with the use of force by the protesters. A few days before the concert in Aktobe about two dozen local "artists" invited journalists and expressed their indignation. Local musicians, who mainly play at weddings, outraged the appearance of Almaty colleagues. "They dye their hair, in the ears of the earring - this is unacceptable! Tickets for them are bought by high school students, who then imitate them. They are hounding our youth, propagandizing foreign culture!” – singer Dastan Suleimenov said on the air of the channel of the КТК [15]. This practice, when the k pop influenced the traditional culture of another country is not a precedent for the countries of Asia. For example, some of cultural industries in the Southeast Asia either copied or made boy and girl bands similar to K-pop boy and girl bands in order to achieve the economic and cultural effect shown in the case of the spread of the Korean Wave. Those glocalized boy and girl bands seem to be popular among local teenagers. Similarly, in the , some of local boy and girl bands were made very similar to K-pop idol groups, such as 1:43pm, Pop Girl, XLR8. However, they could not earn popularity. Local people regarded those groups as a failure of -pop because those groups just copied the styles of K-pops rather than reflecting the characteristics of original Philippine music and recreating hybridized pop music. It can be meaningful that the popularity of K-pop is accepted and sustained by the local cultural characteristics [16]. The style of performances of Ninety One is strikingly different from the manner adopted in Kazakhstan to behave on the stage, although life in Central Asia does not stand still. Ambiguity of the situation the participants of Ninety One experienced in the beginning of autumn, when they went on tour around the country. In several cities, boycott concerts provoked an angry reaction because of unusual for Kazakhstan scenic energy and the appearance of performers - dyed hair, use of cosmetics, up to lipstick, flashy metal jewelry, narrowed trousers, short fur coats. This is the characteristic features of the K-pop subculture, which has conquered the youth world with its videos in social networks. The same features of the image of Ninety One outraged the critics. Tense for Ninety One was a tout in the second half of October in Kyzylorda, a southern city of conservative sentiments with a population of 200 thousand people. To the displeasure of local teenage girls, aggressive groups of young people demanded that the forthcoming concert be canceled at the music club-restaurant. Participants Ninety One seemed to them prone to homosexual manifestations, their appearance and behavior - not corresponding to the image of the Kazakh man. In addition, the displeasure was caused by the very name of Ninety One: they say, the cheeky style of K-pop turned out to be connected with the date of Kazakhstan's independence proclamation. Trouble on this did not end. In Shymkent, a city not far from the border with Uzbekistan, "young traditionalists" organized a protest group on social networks in advance, seeking the cancellation of the performance of Ninety One. Claims are the same: the appearance of musicians does not correspond to Kazakh traditions and offends the memory of ancestors. The authorities of the city of Zhezkazgan in Central Kazakhstan after the repeated demands of the "public" banned the concert, fearing possible complications - the enemies of Ninety One did not even have to hold rallies of protest. Around Ninety One faced the indigenous traditions of Kazakhstan and transformed in eastern western liberalism, religious beliefs and craving for new music. Participants of the group are accused of promoting non-traditional sexual relations and detrimental effects on young people. However, the very appearance of Ninety One marked a new trend for Kazakhstan: the society was divided into two camps. "Why do young people listen to Western music?" Producer Erbolat Bedelkhan asks, "Because we do not have high-quality modern music with lyrics in our native language, that's why the guys took the audience easily - we gave the youth what they expected" [17]. It was the "factor 91" that led a few intellectuals to express their concerns that Kazakhstan is developing in the wrong direction in addressing this issue of its national identity. In society, a new trend in the war of ideologies – Uyat3 or Uyatmania. The so-called "new Kazakh morality" arose recently. More precisely, it moved to social networks from the real world, but on the Internet its representatives quickly overgrown defenders and support groups. They are fighting for hijab, "dress" statues,

3 in Kazakh language “Shame”.

forbid girls to marry Chinese and other "foreigners". They turned the expression "Uyat bolady"4 into a slogan, and increasingly the basis of their concern for morality is the ultra- religious norms. Experts consider the phenomenon of "Uyatman" 5 and radicals as a disease of growth of the Kazakh society. For the sake of justice - the "new morality" is as old as the world. However, social networks, where it is so easy to assemble an army of support, and to which authorities sometimes listen, sometimes turn "uyat" into a sharp instrument. For many, this state of affairs no longer seems harmless. Under the blows are the values of the secular part of society: the right to admire the statues in their primordial form, kissing and holding hands in public, not to be obstructed for "wrong" marriage or any "shameful" act. The average post-Soviet person does not understand this, not only in Kazakhstan, in any CIS country. Religious groups, including jamaats, can play on discontent, earning themselves ideological points. Here, civil society should become a natural instrument of regulation, but it is unique and rather undeveloped in the country. Then the state comes to the fore. When it comes to serious things, such as extremism, the state intervenes, as a rule, using mostly repressive methods. It should be so, however, the state should also have ideological, even propagandistic levers, which we observe today in the minimum amount. As they often say: the authorities have withdrawn from social, including, from asocial questions, asocial behavior. Therefore, we are faced with attempts to correct something from the inside - from the point of view of secular values, from the point of view of values of traditional or religious values. A stranger who does not live here can have a brain rupture. Something for us is "uyat-uyat-uyat!", however billboards, newspapers and sites are full of nudity. Contradictions collide, giving rise to deaf discontent, social apathy or aggression. Despite the presence of *bearded people in our country, Kazakhstan is a secular state, democratic, only in this capacity it has not yet gained strength and experience. In the society itself, there were no more antidotes, the ability to build a dialogue. Therefore, everywhere there is confusion and vacillation, and against the background - sometimes funny, sometimes ominous bursts.

4 in Kazakh language “to be ashamed”. 5 in Kazakh language “Man who has a conscience”.

We must not forget that our society has passed through a series of very strong, painful transformations in the shortest possible time - global changes of moral, moral foundations. "There was, as is sometimes said, "scoop"6, with its iron norms, then came the charm of Westernization, which, by the way, has not gone anywhere. Now comes the traditional culture. People are simply tired of flickering ideological formats, some of them literally "reach the Mauser", and some appeal to the spirits of tough leaders, confusing all contexts, images and tools. There is no monolith of ideology anywhere. For example, in the country the interest of the public to the Russian "stars" has practically disappeared. They now mostly sing in the casino on Kapchagai7. Kazakh show business has developed. What do you think will happen if the radicals come to power? Kairat Nurtas8 does not need them the same way as Kirkorov9. They are generally against the idea of entertaining the people with secular music. When the people are tired and confused, they begin to want strict limits. And while the so-called secular people are laughing at the "obscurantism" in the coffee shops, the radical, ultra-religious trend is expanding, they are roughly digging the earth. Specialists who understand how to not even remedy such a situation, but at least smooth out - one, if they exist at all. That's what's scary. Question: will the government cope with the upheavals? In this respect, the "appointment" of officials responsible for ideology is beneficial to the radicals from the standpoint of propaganda " [18].

Conclusion

6 Scoop (in accordance with the word "Soviet") - a term that appeared in the 70’s among the forefathers and in the bohemian dissident and artistic environment. Then spread in general in modern Russian society. The nickname given to the adherents of the Soviet way of life, the Communists, in general people who demonstrate signs of the Soviet mentality, prejudices, etc. It has a negative meaning. Usually, such qualities as ideology, spiritual lack of freedom and inner lack of independence, social and dependent attitudes, antidemocratism, intolerance to someone else's opinion and alien individuality are typical for a "scoop". But in practice and in most cases this term is used as a response critique. Also, "Soviet dust", "soviet" refers to phenomena related to the Soviet era. 7 Kapshagai is a main Casino city located in Almaty Region of Kazakhstan. 8 Kairat Nurtas (born February 25, 1989, Turkestan, Chimkent region, Kazakh SSR, USSR) is a famous Kazakh pop singer. laureates of the state youth award "Daryn" (2016). Chevalier Order of Kurmet RK (2016). 9 Philip Bedrosovich Kirkorov (born April 30, 1967, Varna, ) - Soviet and singer, actor, composer and producer. People's Artist of the Russian Federation (2008).

Due to historical, cultural and other reasons, the dominance of the Kazakh language in modern Kazakhstan remains an unattainable goal. As in other post-Soviet societies, the nativization is confronted with the strong positions of the and Russian- Soviet culture, which they gained in the Soviet period and continue to dominate because of the inertia of the cultural processes in the post-Soviet society. In addition, the state conducts a policy of civic nationalism and multiculturalism in the polyethnic society of Kazakhstan, supporting Russian and other languages. This causes criticism of the authorities by Kazakh national patriots who urge her to apply harsh measures against those who do not respect the state status of the Kazakh language and violate the law on languages. Thus, today the Kazakhs, based on romantic nationalism, face serious obstacles in achieving the dominance of the Kazakh language as the main symbol of the ethno cultural symbolism of Kazakhstan. The contradiction between Kazakh and Kazakhstani identities contributes to the uncertainty in the formation of Kazakhstan's national identity. Critics say that "bad" nationalists are trying to create a Russophobic atmosphere in Kazakhstan, using various pretexts for this, including "hitting the ribbon of St. George"10 or pro-Russian opponents in social media. Against the backdrop of interethnic problems of , the question of switching to the Latin schedule, the ongoing discussions about the positive and negative influence of such a step on the development of multiculturalism and interethnic dialogue, along with attempts to consolidate the authority of the Kazakh language, so far exacerbate the national identity crisis in the country. Optimists say that interethnic conflicts in Kazakhstan will not be possible if all citizens of the country are considered Kazakhstanis without specifying their nationality in their passports. An attempt by the authorities to introduce the concept of "the Kazakhstan nation", in this case all citizens of Kazakhstan regardless of ethnicity were written by the Kazakhs (at least in foreign passports), failed under the pressure of nationalists, experts say. Also, according to experts, the government's proposals to call all citizens Kazakhs failed, because representatives of both the Kazakh ethnos and leaders of some ethnic

10 St. George's ribbon is a ribbon consisting of two colors (orange and black), which in pre- revolutionary Russia relied on several awards dedicated to the Victorious St. George.

groups opposed this. Kazakh nationalism should not be critical, but self-critical, says political scientist Berik Abdygaliyev. Whatever it was, there are far more differences in positions of experts than similarities. Experts agree that, against the backdrop of silence by the authorities about the difficulties and incidents in the sphere of interethnic relations, the accumulating problems can break out. Against the backdrop of the positive development of the popularization of the Kazakh language among young people and the development of modern culture, other tendencies of the negative influence of globalization in the Kazakh society have been revealed. On the one hand, like the development of their own culture in their native language, pop music plays a big role in strengthening the national consciousness of the young state. Producer Gakku TV Timur Balymbetov believes that music, which is heard in their native language, forms a feeling of pride for their country among the youth of Kazakhstan. At the same time, music in the Kazakh language promotes the growth of national identity. "We suffered from the syndrome of our younger brother, being a neighbor of Russia. We are used to the fact that everything that comes from Russia is better than our own. Now we can compete in the field of music". The growth of competitiveness of Kazakh music is evidenced by the growing interest in it in other countries of Central Asia. It began to be listened in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. "Out of love for the motherland, something is often done dirty and impudent. But it's an opportunity to listen to music in our own language without shame, which people like so much for our country, "says Timur Balymbetov. Western civilization took the risk of antisocial leisure, realizing that individuals seduced by leisure do not want to return to the fold of social institutions, to the burden of daily duties. The risk of social detraining, the demobilization of generations, undoubtedly existed and exists, but it is of the same order as the risk of entrepreneurship or scientific creativity. Perhaps, the nonconformism of youth leisure in the face of k-pop and q-pop is one of the ways to interrupt the inertia of personal development, which today are met with

distrust, and tomorrow, it is not excluded, will become urgent? I think this precedent will not take long. Firstly, on the one hand, a significant part of young Kazakhstanis, due to their age predisposition, strive for self-realization and self-affirmation. On the other hand, in Kazakhstan society there is a great need for charismatic personalities who can manifest themselves fully and without dangerous consequences only in youth culture. Secondly, the confrontation of the eastern mentality to the Western, which today is regarded as a problem, tomorrow can give birth to that form of tolerant culture to which the whole world aspires. And if for other countries, this trend is rather a form of expectation and desirable changes, then for a multicultural Kazakhstan such a form of socio-cultural integration is organically necessary. Being at the junction of the West and the East both geographically, culturally and politically, Kazakhstan is experiencing the need for a practical solution to this problem. Since the difference in the perception of the world is more intense here, because different in their very basis cultures coexist in each particular Kazakhstani city or village [7][27]. On the other hand, under the conditions of globalization, no traditional ethnic idea can be competitive, since it does not work for full integration into the world community and creation of an attractive image of the country. But it creates a threat of closure and self-isolation, which is detrimental in the context of growing interdependence of the modern world. The tasks of strengthening statehood and the participation of young Kazakhstanis in modernizing the country require a powerful internal mobilization of young people. Civil state nationalism should become the fundamental principle of the state youth policy. The tendency of the spread of ethno religious identities in the person of "uyatman" is fueled by the significant traditionalization of youth relations. This is evidenced by the hierarchy of informal relations of young people on the principle of seniority and its active involvement in other rigidly hierarchized structures and associations of a traditionalist type (country communities, tribal communities, religious communities, etc.). The key reason for these processes including the crisis state of the development environment: the surveyed small towns and villages on visual observations can be attributed to the peripheral zone of the political and economic space of the republic. The first - poorly fit in the modern social and urban standards. In the latter, it is still not possible to restore the

destroyed technological base of local economies. The development of the situation in the mode of a systematically deepening crisis provokes a new cycle of primitivization of local economies, which leads to the degradation of the development environment and to a significant traditionalization of social relations. However, this vector of development of ethnoreligious identifications of Kazakhstan society requires separate discussion. When considering identity issues, we have a primordial approach, where ethnicity and religiosity are perceived as a reality, with which one must learn to work. While rarely realized that this is, more often than not, a constructed image, in relation to which people define themselves. This is especially true for the Kazakh identity, which is in the process of reconstructing through media and other tools. There is a strong competition between these constructs, and the main question here is which image is the most viable and will serve the country's progress.

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