An Experimental Analysis of the Driver's Attention During Train Driving

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

An Experimental Analysis of the Driver's Attention During Train Driving Open Eng. 2020; 10:64–73 Research Article Radovan Madleňák*, Jaroslav Mašek, and Lucia Madleňáková An experimental analysis of the driver’s attention during train driving https://doi.org/10.1515/eng-2020-0011 technical means and relations between them which con- Received Oct 30, 2019; accepted Dec 18, 2019 tribute to the safety of railway operation. In particular, by controlling or replacing the activities of transport staff in Abstract: The article deals with the experimental monitor- the management of rail transport. The safety system in ing of the driver’s attention during train operation. SMI railway transport is modern and still upgrading. Railway eye-tracking technology and eye-tracking glasses we used transport is very safe, but like in every transport system, to measure the train driver’s attention. This unique exper- the human factor is still critical [1, 2]. iment we performed on the Slovak railway (ŽSR) line no. The safety systems used in railway transport are cate- 120 Bratislava - Žilina, in the section Žilina - Púchov. The gorised in four categories: measurement took place in the spring of 2017,and the pas- senger train was operated by the ZSSK electric unit series • Station interlocking equipment; 671. The article analyses in detail the monitoring of the • Crossing interlocking device; driver’s attention during train operation. We analysed two • Train protection system; typical processes during train driver work: driving at the • Line signalling equipment. section (without stopping) and driving through the train station (with stopping). Realised analysis can lead to the identification of critical points on the line, to a better un- 1.1 Train protection systems derstanding of the driver’s way of work and to contribute to increasing railway safety. The unique measurement pro- The train protection system is the technical equipment cedure and the used technology did not affect the safety of used on the railway tracks. It transmits signals to the trac- the train operation. tion unit to check the driver for compliance with the train’s limitations (speed). In the event of a breach (over speeding Keywords: eye-tracking measurement, driver’s attention, or non-response to the STOP signal), the train automati- train operation, railway safety cally stops. Train protection functions are: • informing the driver of the signal to which the train 1 Introduction is approaching; • control driver vigilance (vigilance button, dead Railway transport performance in EU according to Euro- man’s button). stat (in 2018) was 471 701.6 million passenger-kilometres The train protection system consists of trackside and and 9 919 851 thousand passengers. The crucial require- mobile parts. The mobile part is placed on traction vehi- ments for the transport system are of high quality, rea- cles or driving cars. It can also be used to transmit and dis- sonable price, connectivity, but the most important is its play signals to the driver’s station. It includes a vigilance safety. High level of safety in railway is based on railway button. signalling system. Railway signalling equipment is a set of The train protection system is a railway safety system that communicates track status and condition informa- tion to the train driver of a locomotive, railcar or multiple *Corresponding Author: Radovan Madleňák: Department of units [3]. The data is continually updated, giving an easy Communications, University of Žilina, 010 26 Žilina, Slovakia; to read the display to the train driver. Email: [email protected] The most straightforward systems display the track- Jaroslav Mašek: Department of Railway Transport, University of Žilina, 010 26 Žilina, Slovakia side signal, while the systems that are more sophisticated Lucia Madleňáková: Department of Communications, University of also display allowable speed, location of nearby trains, Žilina, 010 26 Žilina, Slovakia and dynamic information about the track ahead. Cab sig- Open Access. © 2020 R. Madleňák et al., published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License An experimental analysis of the driver’s attention during train driving Ë 65 nals can also be part of a more comprehensive train pro- • AWS (UK, Ireland, India); tection system. They can automatically apply the brakes • TPWS (UK, Northern Ireland, Australia). stopping the train if the operator does not respond appro- Continuous train protection systems have the added priately to a dangerous condition. benefit of failsafe behaviour in the event a train stops re- The primary purpose of a signal system is to enforce a ceiving the ongoing incident relied upon by the cab sig- safe separation between trains and to stop or slow trains nalling system. Early systems use the rails or loop conduc- in advance of a restrictive situation. The cab signal system tors laid along the track to provide continuous communica- is an improvement over the wayside signal system, where tion between wayside signal systems and the train. These visual signals beside or above the right-of-way govern the systems provided for the transmission of more information movement of trains. It provides the train operator with a than was possible with contemporary intermittent systems continuous reminder of the last wayside signal or a con- and they enabled the ability to display a miniature signal stant indication of the state of the track ahead. to the driver “cab signalling”. Continuous systems are also more easily paired with Automatic Train Control technol- 1.2 Train protection system types ogy, which can enforce speed restrictions based on infor- mation received through the signalling system. That is be- cause the continuous cab signals can change at any time All train protection systems (cab signalling systems) must to be more or less restrictive, providing for more efficient have a continuous in-cab indication. It informs the driver operation than intermittent ATC systems. Continuous train of track condition ahead; however, these fall into two main protection systems include: categories. Depending on the method of transmission of information from track to train, trackside train protection • LS (former Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slo- equipment is divided into continuous and intermittent sys- vakia), tems. • MIREL (Slovakia and Czech Republic), Intermittent train protection systems at discrete points • EVM 120 (Hungary), along the rail line and between these points the display • RS4 Codici (Italy), will reflect information from the last update. Continuous • ALSN (Russia), cab signals receive a constant flow of information about • ATB (Netherlands). the state of the track ahead and can have the cab indica- tion change at any time to reflect any updates. The majority of cab signalling systems, including those that use coded 1.3 Modern train protection track circuits, are continuous. Modern train protection systems combine the advantages Intermittent train protection systems provide constant of both old systems - continuous information transmis- reminders to drivers of track conditions ahead, but they sion (not always) along with accurate vehicle location. The are only updated at discrete points. That can lead to situa- most important characteristic is that the train control sta- tions where the information displayed to the driver has be- tion receives overall information on the length and speed come out of date. Intermittent cab signalling systems have profile of the section ahead of the train for which thenext functional overlap with many other train protection sys- run is permitted. If the speed limit is approaching or the tems such as trip stops. The difference is that a driver or end of the section is approaching, the device displays the automatic operating system makes continuous reference maximum safe speed, which continuously decreases ac- to the last received update. cording to the brake curves. If this speed is exceeded, emer- Intermittent train protection systems include: gency braking is applied to prevent the train from passing • Stopper - the forerunner of all point safeguards. It beyond the leg for which it is allowed to run. These break- is used, for example, by the Berlin S-Bahn or the ers eliminate the possibility of errors caused by improper Prague metro; operation or inattention [4, 5]. The data transmitted to the • Crocodile (France, Belgium, Luxembourg); vehicle can also be used for automatic train control. • INDUSI and similar-PZ80, PZB90 (Germany, Austria, They consist of: Romania, Canada); • Stationary (tracked) parts (central or distributed) au- • Integra-Signum (Switzerland); tonomous devices mostly dependent on the state • ZUB 121 (Switzerland); data of SZZ, ensuring the processing of necessary in- • SHP (Poland); formation on the given route and their subsequent 66 Ë R. Madleňák et al. Table 1: Unauthorized driving across signalling prohibitions, including subsequent collision or derailment on national lines, regional lines and sidings (Source: Czech Rail Safety Inspection Oflce, 2019) The year 2019 The year 2018 No. of accidents Train Shunting No. of accidents Train Shunting January 14 12 2 12 8 4 February 21 12 9 15 11 4 March 21 15 6 6 4 2 April 11 8 3 8 5 3 May 7 5 2 19 16 3 June 14 10 4 12 10 2 July 10 4 6 13 9 4 August 11 7 4 12 7 5 September 6 5 1 23 20 3 October 8 6 2 11 7 4 November 17 13 4 15 11 4 December NA NA NA 2 2 0 No. of accidents 1.Jan. - 30.Nov. 140 97 43 146 108 38 No. of accidents 1.Jan. - 31.Dec. 148 110 38 transfer to a moving train with a particular transfer Some of these systems being nearly able to drive the train guarantee. automatically. • The mobile part, which is installed on individual units (or vehicles) and which receives signals or data from stationary parts, decodes them and it pro- 1.4 Human factor as part of railway safety vides information about the next section of the train path to the driver or vehicle computer.
Recommended publications
  • Signalling System
    CHAPTER 11 SIGNALLING SYSTEM 11.1 SIGNALLING 11.2 SIGNALLING AND TRAIN CONTROL 11.3 SPACE REQUIREMENT FOR SIGNALLING INSTALLATIONS 11.4 MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY FOR SIGNALLING SYSTEMS TABLES TABLE 11.1 SIGNALLING SYSTEM STANDARDS Chapter 11: Signalling System Chapter - 11 SIGNALLING SYSTEM 11.0 SIGNALLING 11.1 Introduction The signaling system shall provide the means for an efficient train control, ensuring safety in train movements. It assists in optimization of metro infrastructure investment and running of efficient train services on the network. 11.2 SIGNALLING AND TRAIN CONTROL 11.2.1 Overview Metro carries large number of passengers at a very close headway requiring a very high level of safety enforcement and reliability. At the same time heavy investment in infrastructure and rolling stock necessitates optimization of its capacity to provide the best services to the public. These requirements of the metro are planned to be achieved by adopting ‘CATC’ (Continuous Automatic Train Control System) based on “CBTC” (Communication based Train Control System) which includes ATP (Automatic Train Protection), ATO (Automatic Train Operation) and ATS (Automatic Train Supervision) sub-systems using radio communication between Track side and Train. This will: • Provide high level of safety with trains running at close headway ensuring continuous safe train separation and for bidirectional working. • Eliminate accidents due to driver passing Signal at Danger by continuous speed monitoring and automatic application of brake in case of disregard of signal / warning by the driver. • Provides safety and enforces speed limit on section having permanent and temporary speed restrictions. • Improve capacity with safer and smoother operations. Driver will have continuous display of Target Speed / Distance to Go status in his cab enabling him to optimize DETAILED PROJECT REPORT FOR NAGPUR METRO RAIL PROJECT NOV 2013 1/6 Chapter 11: Signalling System the speed potential of the track section.
    [Show full text]
  • PROVÁDĚCÍ NAŘÍZENÍ KOMISE (EU) 2019/773 Ze Dne 16
    27.5.2019 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie L 139 I/5 PROVÁDĚCÍ NAŘÍZENÍ KOMISE (EU) 2019/773 ze dne 16. května 2019 o technické specifikaci pro interoperabilitu týkající se subsystému „provoz a řízení dopravy“ železničního systému v Evropské unii a o zrušení rozhodnutí 2012/757/EU (Text s významem pro EHP) EVROPSKÁ KOMISE, s ohledem na Smlouvu o fungování Evropské unie, s ohledem na směrnici Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) 2016/797 ze dne 11. května 2016 o interoperabilitě železničního systému v Evropské unii (1) a zejména na čl. 5 odst. 11 uvedené směrnice, vzhledem k těmto důvodům: (1) Článek 11 rozhodnutí Komise v přenesené pravomoci (EU) 2017/1474 (2) vymezuje konkrétní cíle pro vypracování, přijetí a přezkum technických specifikací pro interoperabilitu (TSI) železničního systému v Unii. (2) Podle čl. 3 odst. 5 písm. b) a f) rozhodnutí (EU) 2017/1474 by TSI měly být přezkoumány s cílem zohlednit vývoj železničního systému Unie a souvisejících činností v oblasti výzkumu a inovací a aktualizovat odkazy na normy. (3) Podle čl. 3 odst. 5 písm. c) rozhodnutí (EU) 2017/1474 by TSI měly být přezkoumány s cílem uzavřít zbývající otevřené body. Je třeba zejména vymezit rozsah otevřených bodů týkajících se provozu a rozlišit mezi příslušnými vnitrostátními předpisy a pravidly vyžadujícími harmonizaci prostřednictvím práva Unie s cílem umožnit přechod na interoperabilní systém a vymezit optimální úroveň technické harmonizace. (4) Dne 22. září 2017 Komise v souladu s čl. 19 odst. 1 nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) 2016/796 (3) požádala Agenturu Evropské unie pro železnice (dále jen „agentura“), aby připravila doporučení pro provedení výběru konkrétních cílů stanovených v rozhodnutí (EU) 2017/1474.
    [Show full text]
  • Road Level Crossing Protection Equipment
    Engineering Procedure Signalling CRN SM 013 ROAD LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION EQUIPMENT Version 2.0 Issued December 2013 Owner: Principal Signal Engineer Approved by: Stewart Rendell Authorised by: Glenn Dewberry Disclaimer. This document was prepared for use on the CRN Network only. John Holland Rail Pty Ltd makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with the contents of this document shall be sufficient to ensure safe systems or work or operation. It is the document user’s sole responsibility to ensure that the copy of the document it is viewing is the current version of the document as in use by JHR. JHR accepts no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of this document by any party, and JHR excludes any liability which arises in any manner by the use of this document. Copyright. The information in this document is protected by Copyright and no part of this document may be reproduced, altered, stored or transmitted by any person without the prior consent of JHR. © JHR UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 1 of 66 Issued December 2013 Version 2.0 CRN Engineering Procedure - Signalling CRN SM 013 Road Level Crossing Protection Equipment Document control Revision Date of Approval Summary of change 1.0 June 1999 RIC Standard SC 07 60 01 00 EQ Version 1.0 June 1999. 1.0 July 2011 Conversion to CRN Signalling Standard CRN SM 013. 2.0 December 2013 Inclusion of Safetran S40 and S60 Mechanisms, reformatting of figures and tables, and updating text Summary of changes from previous version Section Summary of change All Include automated
    [Show full text]
  • Influence of Train Control System on Railway Track Capacity
    DAAAM INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC BOOK 2012 pp. 419-426 CHAPTER 36 INFLUENCE OF TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM ON RAILWAY TRACK CAPACITY HARAMINA, H.; BRABEC, D. & GRGIC, D. Abstract: The basic advantage of the train control methods based on the moving block technology compared to the fixed blocks where the headways of the slower trains, regarding their longer blocking times affects negatively the line capacity, lies in the fact that the position and the length of the moving blocks adapts to the position, dynamic characteristics, and actual speed of the successive train. Regarding a higher possibility for influence on the train movement characteristic during the moving block train operation, better traffic fluidity with more regular traffic flow can be achieved. Considering this fact an amount of regular recovery and buffer times needed for railway timetable stability can be decreased and thus more train paths in a particular dedicated time window can be added. In this way the moving block technology can increase the capacity of a railway line, especially in case of high density lines with significant heterogeneity of traffic. Key words: train control system, railway infrastructure capacity, moving block Authors´ data: Dr. Sc. Haramina, H[rvoje]; dipl.ing. Brabec, D[ean]* Dr. Sc. Grgić, D[amir]**; *University of Zagreb, Faculty of Transport and Traffic Sciences, Vukelićeva 4, Zagreb, Croatia, **Hrvatske željeznice, Mihanovićeva 12, Zagreb, Croatia; [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] This Publication has to be referred as: Haramina H[rvoje]; Brabec, D[ean] & Grgić, D[amir] (2012). Influence of Train Control System on Railway Track Capacity, Chapter 36 in DAAAM International Scientific Book 2012, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • Next Generation Train Control (NGTC): More Effective Railways Through the Convergence of Main-Line and Urban Train Control Systems
    Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Transportation Research Procedia 14 ( 2016 ) 1855 – 1864 6th Transport Research Arena April 18-21, 2016 Next Generation Train Control (NGTC): more effective railways through the convergence of main-line and urban train control systems Peter Gurník a,* aUNIFE – The European Rail Industry, 221 avenue Louise, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium Abstract The main scope of Next Generation Train Control (NGTC) project is to analyse the commonality and differences of required functionality for mainline and urban lines and develop the convergence of both European Train Control System (ETCS) and Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) systems, determining the level of commonality of architecture, hardware platforms, and system design that can be achieved. This will be accomplished by building on the experience of ETCS and its standardised train protection kernel, where the different manufacturers can deliver equipment based on the same standardized specifications and by using the experience the suppliers have gained by having developed very sophisticated and innovative CBTC systems around the world. The paper focuses on the analyses of the already produced NGTC Functional Requirements Specifications and is summarizing other project activities on various train control technology developments suitable for future train control systems. © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (©http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 2016The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V..). PeerPeer-review-review under under responsibility responsibility of Road of Road and Bridgeand Bridge Research Research Institute Institute (IBDiM) (IBDiM). Keywords: Railways; signalling; automation; ERTMS / ETCS; CBTC; ATO; ATP; ATS; FRS, SRS; Moving Block; IP Radio Communication; GNSS * Corresponding author.
    [Show full text]
  • Irse News Issue 161 November 2010 Irse Careers Page and Job Board
    IRSE NEWS ISSUE 161 NOVEMBER 2010 IRSE CAREERS PAGE AND JOB BOARD The IRSE Careers site is now live at www.irse.org/careers Here you can view signalling job vacancies, fi nd out about other careers options, and contact recruiting companies to help you fi nd the next step in your career. For more information on the advertising and branding opportunities available, please contact Joe Brooks on +44 (0)20 657 1801 or [email protected]. Front Cover: Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern train Second 170, bound from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Kansas City, Missouri, passes the radio-activated switch at the north siding switch Eckards, Iowa, on 4 October 2009. This is one of several locations on the DM&E system where radio-activated switches are used to expedite train operations without the expense of a full Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) installation. Photo by Jon Roma NEWS VIEW 161 Let’s plan for the future IRSE NEWS is published monthly by the Institution of The UK Government has unveiled their spending review during October, pledging to Railway Signal Engineers (IRSE). The IRSE is not as a invest more than 30 billion pounds on transport projects over the next four years, with body responsible for the opinions expressed in IRSE NEWS. this sector seen as a particular key driver for economic growth and productivity. © Copyright 2010, IRSE. All rights reserved. This includes 14 billion pounds of funding that will go to Network Rail to support No part of this publication may be reproduced, maintenance and investment, including improvements to the East Coast Main Line, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any station upgrades around the West Midlands and signal replacement programmes in form or by any means without the permission in writing of the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • ERTMS/ETCS - Indian Railways Perspective
    ERTMS/ETCS - Indian Railways Perspective P Venkata Ramana IRSSE, MIRSTE, MIRSE Abstract nal and Balise. Balises are passive devices and gets energised whenever Balise Reader fitted on Locomo- European Railway Traffic Management System tive passes over it. On energisation, balises transmits (ERTMS) is evolved to harmonize cross-border rail telegrams to OBE. Telegram may consist of informa- connections for seamless operations across European tion about aspect of Lineside Signal, Gradients etc., nations. ERTMS is stated to be the most performant Balises are generally grouped and unique identifica- train control system which brings significant advan- tion will be provided to each balise. It helps to detect tages in terms of safety, reliability, punctuality and the direction of train. There four types of balises ex- traffic capacity. ERT.MS is evolving as a global stan- ist based their usage - Switchable, Infill, Fixed and dard. Many countries outside Europe - US, China, Repositioning balises. Switchable balises will be pro- Taiwan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia have adopted vided near lineside signals and they transmit aspect ERTMS standards for train traffic command and con- of lineside signal, permanent speed restrictions, gra- trol. dient information etc., Infill balises are provided in advance of signals to convey aspect of lineside signals earlier than Switchable balises. Fixed balises convey 1 Introduction information in regard to temporary speed restrictions and Repositioning balises provides data corrections. Signalling component of ERTMS has basically Balises transmit data in long or short telegrams four components - European Train Control System and those pertaining to direction. They are of two (ETCS) with Automatic Train Protection System, types - standard and reduced.
    [Show full text]
  • Responses to Consultation on New ORR Guidance on Principles of Level Crossing Safety – Published June 2021
    Responses to consultation on new ORR guidance on Principles of Level Crossing Safety – Published June 2021 Aberdeen City Council Amey Rail Ltd ASLEF Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport (ADEPT) Atkins British Horse Society (The) Central Bedfordshire Council Costain Dartford Borough Council Denbighshire County Council Dumfries and Galloway Council Ed Rollings Associates Ltd Essex County Council Friends of the Far North Line Furrer+Frey Overhead Contact Lines Gloucestershire County Council Individual number 1 Individual number 2 Individual number 3 Individual number 4 Individual number 5 Individual number 6 Individual number 7 Individual number 8 IOHS Kilnside Farm Network Rail North Yorkshire Moors Railway Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) Peak and Northern Footpaths Society Rail Crossing Safety Consultants Limited Rail Delivery Group Ricardo Rail Limited RSSB Shropshire County Council Sotera Risk Solutions South Lanarkshire Council Suffolk County Council Surrey County Council Systra The Ramblers The Ramblers – Dorset Area The Ramblers – Swindon and North East Wiltshire Group Transport for London (TfL) UKTram Victa Railfreight Warwickshire County Council West Somerset Railway PLC From: Graeme McKenzie (Aberdeen City Council) Sent: 26 February 2021 18:15 To: Level Crossing Principles <[email protected]> Subject: ORR Consultation - "Principles for managing level crossing safety" Please find a response on behalf of Aberdeen City Council with respect to the ORR consultation on the proposed guidance "PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING LEVEL CROSSING SAFETY". 1. Who are you responding as (an individual/for an organisation) and what is your role? Operations and Protective Services, Aberdeen City Council – Technical Officer, Traffic Management and Road Safety 2.
    [Show full text]
  • System for Investigation of Railway Interfaces (SIRI)
    6 System for Investigation of Railway Interfaces (SIRI) Sanjeev Kumar Appicharla 1Institution of Engineering and Technology 2The International Council on Systems Engineering, UK 1. Introduction This chapter presents an abstract system framework called ‘’System for Investigation of Railway Interfaces’’ (SIRI), to study potential or past railway accident(s). The aim of the study is to learn about the multiple causal factors (elements or conditions) which represented together can be called a cause leading to the undesired state called potential or accident situation. Safety studies like SIRI can be used in conjunction with the quantitative risk estimation method (PRA) to help highlight or uncover decisions leading to assumption of unreasonable risk or human error in engineering and management factors needs to be studied. Author accepts the viewpoint of George E.Apostolakis on the utility of quantitative risk analysis (QRA) or probability risk analysis ( PRA) techniques in general (E.Apostolakis 2004). The questions of human error and organisational learning are clarified later in the chapter in the context of acceptance of QRA method. The SIRI Framework uses synthetic mode of thinking as opposed to analytical mode of thinking. Analytical mode of thinking is like decomposing water which does no longer contains anything liquid and has taste. The SIRI Framework synthesises multiple study methods into a cohesive process represented as a system. The study methods used in stages to arrive at the decision of a potential accident situation in an unambiguous manner are Hazard identification method (HAZOP), Event Causal Factor Analysis (ECFA), Energy Barrier Trace Analysis (EBTA), accident investigation technique (MORT), and cognitive human factors framework (SRK) and systems thinking integrated into a cohesive system framework.
    [Show full text]
  • B COMMISSION DECISION of 7 November 2006 Concerning A
    2006D0860 — EN — 24.01.2013 — 004.001 — 1 This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents ►B COMMISSION DECISION of 7 November 2006 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European high speed rail system and modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/679/EC concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system (notified under document number C(2006) 5211) (Text with EEA relevance) (2006/860/EC) (OJ L 342, 7.12.2006, p. 1) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Decision 2007/153/EC of 6 March 2007 L 67 13 7.3.2007 ►M2 Commission Decision 2008/386/EC of 23 April 2008 L 136 11 24.5.2008 ►M3 Commission Decision 2010/79/EC of 19 October 2009 L 37 74 10.2.2010 ►M4 Commission Decision 2012/463/EU of 23 July 2012 L 217 11 14.8.2012 2006D0860 — EN — 24.01.2013 — 004.001 — 2 ▼B COMMISSION DECISION of 7 November 2006 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European high speed rail system and modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/679/EC concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system (notified under document number C(2006) 5211) (Text with EEA relevance) (2006/860/EC) THE COMMISSION
    [Show full text]
  • View / Open TM Database Composite.Pdf
    • • • • TRANSPORTATION-MARKINGS • DATABASE • COMPOSITE CATEGORIES • CLASSIFICATION & INDEX • • • -­ • III III • 1 TRANSPORTATION-MARKINGS: A STUDY IN CO.MMUNICATION MONOGRAPH SERIES Alternate Series Title: An Inter-modal Study of Safety Aids Transportatiol1-Markings Database Alternate T-M Titles: Transport [ation] Mark [ing]s / Transport Marks / Waymarks T-MFoundations, 4th edition, 2005 (Part A, Volume I, First Studies in T-M) (3rd edition, 1999; 2nd edition, 1991) Composite Categories A First Study in T-M: The US, 2nd edition, 1993 (Part B, Vol I) Classification & Index International Marine Aids to Navigation, 2nd edition, 1988 (parts C & D, Vol I) [Unified First Edition ofParts A-D, University Press ofAmerica, 1981] International Traffic Control Devices, 2nd edition, 2004 (Part E, Volume II, Further Studies in T-M) (lst edition, 1984) Part Iv Volume III, Additional Studies, International Railway Signals, 1991 (Part F, Vol II) International Aero Navigation Aids, 1994 (Part G, Vol II) Transportation-Markil1gs: A Study il1 T-M General Classification with Index, 2nd edition, 2004 (Part H, Vol II) (1st edition, 1994) Commllnication Monograph Series Transportation-Markings Database: Marine Aids to Navigation, 1st edition, 1997 (I'art Ii, Volume III, Additional Studies in T-M) TCDs, 1st edition, 1998 (Part Iii, Vol III) Railway Signals. 1st edition, 2000 (part Iiii, Vol III) Aero Nav Aids, 1st edition, 2001 (Part Iiv, Vol III) Composite Categories Classification & Index, 1st edition, 2006 (part Iv, Vol III) (2nd edition ofDatabase, Parts Ii-v,
    [Show full text]
  • Nl — 24.01.2013 — 004.001 — 1
    2006D0860 — NL — 24.01.2013 — 004.001 — 1 Dit document vormt slechts een documentatiehulpmiddel en verschijnt buiten de verantwoordelijkheid van de instellingen ►B BESCHIKKING VAN DE COMMISSIE van 7 november 2006 betreffende de technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „Besturing en seingeving” van het trans-Europees hogesnelheidsspoorwegsysteem en tot wijziging van bjlage A bij Beschikking 2006/679/EG betreffende de technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „Besturing en Seingeving” van het conventionele trans-Europese spoorwegsysteem (Kennisgeving geschied onder nummer C(2006) 5211) (Voor de EER relevante tekst) (2006/860/EG) (PB L 342 van 7.12.2006, blz. 1) Gewijzigd bij: Publicatieblad nr. blz. datum ►M1 Beschikking 2007/153/EG van de Commissie van 6 maart 2007 L 67 13 7.3.2007 ►M2 Beschikking 2008/386/EG van de Commissie van 23 april 2008 L 136 11 24.5.2008 ►M3 Beschikking 2010/79/EG van de Commissie van 19 oktober 2009 L 37 74 10.2.2010 ►M4 Besluit 2012/463/EU van de Commissie van 23 juli 2012 L 217 11 14.8.2012 2006D0860 — NL — 24.01.2013 — 004.001 — 2 ▼B BESCHIKKING VAN DE COMMISSIE van 7 november 2006 betreffende de technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „Besturing en seingeving” van het trans-Europees hogesnelheidsspoorwegsysteem en tot wijziging van bjlage A bij Beschikking 2006/679/EG betreffende de technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „Besturing en Seingeving” van het conventionele trans-Europese spoorwegsysteem
    [Show full text]