Anti-Fascism,” and Anti-Zionism: Antisemitism in Italy

Between Neo-Fascism, “Anti-Fascism,” and Anti-Zionism: Antisemitism in Italy

Emanuele Ottolenghi

I. Introduction

In Italy, as in the rest of Europe, open antisemitism is chastised and iso- lated through social condemnation and legal means. Most traditional antisemitism is confined to the publications and websites of extreme groups. Stereotypes of the Jew as a Christ-killer, the blood-libel, and the Jew as international manipulator of media, finance and politics are largely confined to the periphery of intellectual, political and public discourse. Nevertheless, these images resurface through the medium of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute, where they are occasion- ally conflated with rhetoric about the conflict, making old prejudices legitimate through the medium of anti-Israel sentiment. This is the main source of anti-Jewish phenomena in Italy today. This phenom- enon appears in the mainstream press of all political persuasions, as well as among extremists. It cuts across the ideological spectrum, unit- ing the anti-global left, the xenophobic and fascist right, pre-Vatican II Catholics, along with more mainstream segments of society. It is not so much Israel’s criticism per se, that constitutes antisemitism, but the confluence of antisemitic imagery and stereotypes with criticism of Israel. In some cases, criticism of Israel borders on antisemitism, espe- cially when antisemitic stereotypes make their way into the discourse on Israel’s present predicament (Ottolenghi: 2003a). Given that these two phenomena overlap but do not necessarily coin- cide, those who use antisemitic imagery to attack Israel usually deny the charges, claiming instead that their critics aim to silence legitimate criticism of Israel. Indeed, across Europe—Italy is no exception— Israel’s advocates protest that behind criticism of Israel there some- times lurks a more sinister agenda dangerously bordering on antisemitism (Ottolenghi: 2003). Critics disagree, arguing that attacks on Israel are neither misplaced nor the source of anti-Jewish sentiment. Israel’s behavior is reprehensible and so are those Jews who defend it (Milne: 2002; Mearsheimer & Walt: 2006). The lack of a precise boundary is 426 emanuele ottolenghi both cause and effect of how public opinion defines, understands and identifies antisemitism and the current spate of anti-Jewish hostility.1 Current debates focus on where the line between Anti-Zionism and antisemitism falls which makes it difficult to agree on a working definition of antisemitism.2 The tendency to minimize the nature of a threat hinders efforts to formulate a right response to the newest manifestations of antisemitism. Along with the existing prejudice comes a denial of its occurrence. Extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi manifestations of antisemitism are universally condemned. Other expressions of anti-Jewish prejudice are downplayed.3 Mainstream understanding of antisemitism is usually influenced by the Auschwitz paradigm. Presuming that anti- Jewish prejudice can only manifest itself as a racially driven hatred that invariably leads to Auschwitz prevents European societies from acknowledging anything but the most glaring expressions of anti- Jewish outrage, preferring to downplay or ignore its other currently more widespread manifestations. It should be self-evident that between Auschwitz and social harmony there are infinite shades of gray. The difficulty is precisely in recognizing that the racial antisemitism that eventually begat Nazism was neither the first nor the only form of anti-Jewish prejudice in Europe’s history. There should also be recog- nition that immunization against it does not necessarily guarantee that other forms of prejudice will not recur. Defining current antisemitism thus requires caution. Not everyone agrees that it can be associated with anti-Zionism, despite a clear correlation between the Middle East news cycle and the resurgence of antisemitic prejudice. Even strong

1 See for example Massimo D’Alema’s interview with the daily La Repubblica, on December 3, 2003, in relation to the October 2003 Eurobarometer poll: ‘Doesn’t the accusation to Sharon betray a basis of ‘left-wing anti-Semitism, as the EUMC dossier suggests?’ ‘Actually, it seems to me that the dossier refers not so much to ‘the left’ but to a few ‘fringes of the extreme left.’ Besides, to me Israel’s right to exist and to secu- rity is non-negotiable. But those who criticize Sharon cannot be labeled as antisemites, when he is sending the army to shoot on Ramallah at a time when [Palestinian Prime minister] Abu Ala is negotiating a truce with Palestinian terror groups. This has noth- ing to do with Israel, a great democracy. This has to do with its government, which is pursuing the wrong policy.’ 2 The EUMC working definition, while a significant step forward in this sense, is not universally endorsed by governments across Europe. 3 A notable exception—and perhaps a sign of trend reversal—was the recent speech by Italy’s President, Giorgio Napolitano, for Holocaust Memorial Day on January 27, 2007 (http://www.quirinale.it/Discorsi/Discorso.asp?id=32021).