Once the Decision Toestabl1sh Ullkhontowe Sizwe Had Been Taken
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once the decision toestabl1sh Ullkhontowe Sizwe had been taken by the underground leadership by mid 1961, the next step was to set into motion the necessary machinery to bring this about. Not a great deal is known about the process and exact manner in Which this was done or exactly when UJlkhonto was estabUsbed, except that it was done sometime In November, according to Kandela.(1) The reason why so little information is available on the formation of Umkhonto is not difficult to understand i£ one takes into account that not only was Uakhonto a revolutionary underground organisation designed to conduct a campaign of armed violence against the State, bUt Its very existence after November 1961 depended on its abillty to maintain absolute secrecy and not to reveal anything about its leaders or structure that might lead the pollee to its door. Although some information has been revealed over the years since the beginning of the armed struggle, thls does not amount to a great deal, with the result that any account of the organisation's for- matton in 1961 remains sketchy and incomplete. Perhaps the three most usefUl and informative sources on the formation of Umkhonto are Bruno Ktolo's Umkhonto we Sizwe: The Road to the Left, which covers the origins and development of Umkhonto in Natal up to the beginning of 1963: EdWard Feit's Urban Revolt in South Africa, which deals with the history of Umkhonto in more general terms during the same period and which makes extensive use of Mtolo's court evidence in 1963/6(; and thirdly, the recently published monograph by Howard 1. Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom, p.110. see also Barrell, MK, p, 7 and Dawn Souvenir Issue, pp. 24 - 28. Barrell, 11K, the ANC:s armed struqqle. The latter source, which is the first up to date account of Uakhonto in years, contains inte- resting information and points of view on Umkhonto and this has been incorporated as far as possible in this chapter and the rest of the study. The setting up of an underground National High Command (NHC) for Ullkhonto was the task of Nelson Kandela. For this he was given the allber light by his colleagues in the ANC's Emergency COllaittee(of Which he was the Chairman) and the SACP's Central COllll.ittee.Hewas assisted by Joe Slovo who had been especially appointed to the task by the SACP. At its birth Umkhonto was thus a ~oint venture of radicalANC ieaders and the SAcp.(a) According to Howard Barrell In the SACP there was no equivocation on the issue. After dissolving in 1950 under threat of the SUppressJon of Communism Act, the Communist Party had secretly regrouped In 1953. At an underground congress held In a private house in Johannesburg shortly after the lifting of the post-Sharpeville state of emergency in August 1960, the SACP leadership had resolved to create an armed force •..• In view of the SACP's overlapping aembershlp with the ANt. and the vital role the Party had played from underground in keeping the Congress Alliance alive dUring the post-Sharpeville emergency, the SACP's decision strongly reinforced the argullents for araed activity coming from leading ANC nationalists such as Kandela.( S) Raving decided to form Umkhonto one of the first steps taken by the combined underground was to find a suitable place to set up an underground headquarters from which the formation and eventual operations of Umkhonto could be conducted with relative safety. Since Umkhonto was the brainchild of bOth the ANC and the SACP, the headquarters (HQ) had to be situated in an area Where the presence of Barrell, ftK, p. 7. see also ~ Souvenir Issue, pp. 24 - 28. Barrell, KK. p. 6. see also Dawn Souvenir Issue, pp. 24 - 28. Whltes~ Blacks and Indians and the constant movement of these people in and out of the area would not attract undue attention from nelghbOurs. These requirements immediately ruled out any of the Black urban areas (townships) around the country. Secondly~ the proposed headquarters had to be as close as possible to the workplace and homes of most of the underground leaders. With the majority of the underground leaders of the ANC and the SACP either working or living on the Reef, Johannesburg was a logic choice. Moveover, It was thought to be the last place that the pollee would look for such a set up. The logic behind this thinking was borne out by the fact that when the pollee began their search for Mandela and the newly created underground headquarters of the ANC (and later the SACP and Umkbonto), they first concentrated on the African townships around the Witwatersrand-Pretoria area.c.) According to the eVidence presented to the court at the trial of the NHC of Umkhonto In 1963~ the SACP played a signifIcant i£ not the leading role~ In the establishment of the underground headqUarters that facIlitated the establishment of Ullkhonto some months later. It was for instance instrumental both in the purchasing and running of the various premises at Rivonia, Travellyn and Mountainview that came to comprise the underground headquarters of the ANC and Uakhonto by the end of 1961.(·) The search for a suitable premise to set up the underground headquar- ters apparently began shortly after May 1961, when Michael Harmel, a member of the SACP using the alias Jacobson~ began visiting various estate agents in the Johannesburg area. According to Jacobson he needed a relatively secluded place to house his brother-in-law who was sick and needed peace and quiet. Some weeks later, after a number of properties were found to be unsuitable for his ·sick t. The World (Johannesburg), 1961.05.14 (Police still looking for underground). 5. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64~ The State against H. Mandela and others, Opening Address by Dr. Percy Yutar, pp. 4 - 5. brother-In-law·, Jacobs"onfinally settled for a small-holding of some 28 acres In RivonJa just outsIde Johannesburg. The nalleof the property was Ll111esleaf Farm. The owner of the property, Mr. Fyffe, wanted R32 000 for it but In the end a purchase prlse of R25 000 was agreed upon. Of this amount R10 000 had to be paid as deposit while the balance of R15 000 had to be paid in three equal instalments of RS 000 each. (.) The "sick brother-In-law· on whose behalf the property was beIng purchased was Vivian Ezra. But Ezra was neither sick nor did he have the Jloney to pay for the property. He acted only as a front for the purchase of the property, which he bought on behalf of a company that was st1l1 to be formed called NAVIAN (PTY) LIMITED. The directors of this fictitious company were Vivian Ezra himself and a fellow member of the Communist Party by the nalleof Harold Wolpe. .Wolpe was a junior partner in the legal firm of KANTOR, ZWARENSTEIN AND PARTNERS in Johannesburg.(~) To meet the deposIt requirements for the Lililesieaf property, a cheque of R2500 and a bankers guarantee for the remaining 27 500 to make up RIO 000 were released to the estate agents handling the sale. Once this part of the transaction was completed the registration of Navian (Pty) Limited and all further dealings with the purchase of Ll11iesleaf was handed over to another Johannesburg firm of attor- neys. At thIs poInt, probably to erase any possible connection between the purchase of the Rlvonia property and the SACP, the naae of Harold Wolpe as co-director of Navian (Pty) Limited was removed froll all further documentation. Yet, Inspite of all this clever manoeuverIng, the firm of Kantor and Partners remained in control of Ll11iesleaf Farm. All payments in respect of the property, including the purchase of furniture, were done by Vivian Ezra through the offices of Kantor and Partners. To minlmlse the possibilIty of anyone 6. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Opening Address by Dr. Yutar, p... See also K. Norval, Inside the ANt, p. 63. 7. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Opening Address by Dr. Yutar, p... See also Norval, Inside the ANC, p. 63. beIng able to trace any of the purchases made In connection wIth the Rivonia property to the SACP or Lts .embers, most, If not all transactions, were made In cash,(.) which conH rmed the allegations made by Jordan Ngubanethat, since the SACP came to control the activities of the ANt after 1960, there were all of a sudden large amounts of money available to the organisation. (see Chapter two, pp. 84 - 89.) Once Lilliesleaf Farm had been bought, it was rented out to Arthur Joseph G01drelch, whom it later turned out was not only a senior member of the SACP (prObably a member of its Central Committee), but one of the founding leaders of Uakhonto. Goldreich, according to Slovo, served UIlkhonto In an auxilIary capacity as a member of its JohannesbUrg Regional Command.c.) Lilliesieaf farm was rented to Goldrelch and hIs family for a nominal rent of R100 a month with effect from I December 1961. No records, however, were ever found to confirm that he indeed paid the rent. thus, on the surface, Lillieslea£ farm was legally occupIed by Arthur Goldreich, hIs wife and two children as fro. December 1961, but in reality it was the headquarters of Ullkhonto'sNBC. (JoO) ",. While Goldrelch and his family occupied the maIn building, the out- buildings were occupied by the African and Indian members of Umkhonto's HaC, which presumably was set up between July and November 1961.