INTERVIEW WITH BILLY NAIR

INTERVIEW WITH BILLY NAIR INTERVIEWED BY P. BONNER. B HARMEL NEDBANK GARDENS, 13 JUNE 1994 PART TWO TRANSCRIBED BY COLLEEN BARKER PB The point you were making about Chief Luthuli and Moses Kotane and the encompassing issues, particularly the move to violence one. BN Moses Kotane and Chief Luthuli were very close friends apart from the fact that Moses was the regional secretary of the underground South African Communist party and Chief Luthuli was President, they exchanged confidences and as a matter of fact one of the first people to actually read Chief - the speech that he was to deliver at Oslo upon receiving the Nobel peace prize - was Moses Kotane. Moses used to travel regularly to Braadville to meet Chief Obao, Moses was restricted to Johannesburg at the time, he used to travel clandestinely to meet Chief and go back. The issue of violence, or rather the issue of violence and the formation of what ultimately led to the formation of Umhonto was canvassed by both Chief Luthuli and Moses Kotane, even before the formation of Umkhonto, that is, there was a thorough going analysis and then they debated the issue and form and then brought the issue to'the joint congresses for discussion and debate. And so with all other important policy matters were first canvassed between Moses and the Chief. Moses may have, in the eyes of the ruling block, Moses was regarded as a tyrant always, but he was the most deep going thinker in the entire movement. He played a very important role in the ANC, and played the role of winning over the various factions that developed during the course of the struggles. He brought together left and right and put down any form of extremism that became manifest in the movement. The Bafabagia, all the people die dancing, who wanted to die dancing that were in the ANC in the days gone by, or on the other hand, the ultra-militant group within the party that emerged from time to time. He was able to, through reasoned argument, help bring those factions together, solved problems that arose within the Congress Alliance, the issue of violence and all the broad strategy and tactics was always canvassed between Moses and other leaders, Chief Luthuli, Dr. Mike and others. Even people like Michael Harmel or Braam Fischer, although Michael Harmel used to be, was always, one of our leading theoretician in the party, but he made bold to argue his case in the Congress Alliance and never in fact for one moment held back his true passion, or his true feelings on issues, and he was actually liked for his forthrightness. It was fantastic that people like Chief or, on the other hand, some who were conservative were won over by the force of his arguments on many important issues. Nothing was actually foisted on members of the Alliance, people in the party had the benefit of prior discussion at times on issues, or you may have had party members who were more theoretically sound on some issues, they never foisted this, they argued it, discussed it and thrashed this out in all the forums, the assemblies and so on,and so with the ANC conferences. This went for even people like Rev. Ntlalata, or you take the old guard, J.B Marks was also widely accepted in the Democratic Congress. So that party members, take David Bopape or Dan Mshume, Moses Kotane, J.B Marks and Braam Fischers and all the Michael Harmels, they were always accepted as dominant characters, on the contrary, as equals, and their arguments, or rather their contribution to the building of the organisation, the development of the broad democratic struggle was always lauded. Yussef Dadoo played a very important role. Party members were not seen as outsiders imposing their will, on the contrary, they were accepted as equals and as people who had played a valuable role both in the trade union movement and in the National Democratic struggle. Hence Nelson, when he was asked by Peter Mboka when he was at Victor Verster Prison that he should eschew violence and also break the alliance with the Communist party he dealt with that forcefully and had rejected the suggestion that the Communists were imposters or people who were imposing their will on the ANC or were in control of the ANC as was ...... from Peter's argument. He wrote at length, while in prison, on both these issues and ...... that both are addressed, again reiterating the standpoint of Chief Luthuli and others who were in the national movement. I recall Chief had the ...... trying to bait Chief Luthuli at a mass meeting of white liberals here in Durban, and Professor Cooper was actually chairperson of that meeting when Chief Luthuli decided to leave the chair - he was actually asked to chair that meeting, or rather Professor Cooper was chair of that meeting - and he left that to put the question on communism, indicting the ANC for having promoted communists to key positions in the ANC, among others he named Moses Kotane, Marks and others. This was in the 50s, before the banning of the ANC. Chief Luthuli, in response, actually said that he was very proud of the contributions made by those communists and he challenged Professor Cooper and others of the Liberal party to try to equal, or try to outdo the contribution made by those communists and they will earn a place in the ANC National Executive as well. It is through dint of hard work and sacrifice they earned their positions in the top in the ANC and the Congress Alliance ...... So it was not through intrigue or any surreptitious work that they got on the place, on the contrary, it was just the reverse, it was recognition of their hard work. PB I know that the decision to go towards armed struggle created real tensions within the Indian Congress. Was there much support among the Indian Congress in or in Durban for that decision, or did most people go against it. So this is two issues, the influence of dandyism on you, that one. BN In my formative years, yes I was influenced by the underground movement and looked upon it as a unifying force, as one of the tactics that had to be employed to unite the people, and hence, I wasn't active at the time merely a supporter of the Congress movement, I attended all the rallies and meetings, took part in the marches, but did not actively participate in the ...... campaign of 1946 and 1948, but subsequently took part in the Defiance campaign which was also active resistance in a sense, in its element. That was the tactic that was being employed, influenced by Ghandi's ...... At the same time the form passive resistance took in was slightly different in the sense that we employed the Defiance campaign, then there was a Congress of the people, there were mass strikes, economic attack on the state through boycotts of particular products such as tobacco and certain selected products, and of course the potato boycott which was union wide. It led up to a violent form of struggle against the state. These were all tactical, tactics and not to be confused with principal. What I was opposed to elevating ...... to one of a fine principal, which had to be adhered to at all costs. Now this was fundamental in the sense that on reading the situation in India itself Ghandi himself in 1929 opposed initially the violent form of struggle undertaken by the Shitager Army invaders, for instance, and later on during the war years he was opposed to the idea of violence all together, against the British government. So this I basically differed with and felt that it could have actually brought an end to British rule if it had been adopted, because the Indian navy and there was a formidable army recruited by the British government which took part in the last ...... war, it was important to defeat Hitler, but at the same time it would have defeated the British army at home. So that would have actually brought an end to British rule and liberated India sooner. Basically it was the problem of sticking to ...... as a principal. The Indian Congress, there was disquiet and they felt like quite a number of others, even some of the ANC members or people like Roley Arenstein in the Congress of Democrats, who felt that it was wrong, we had not exhausted the normal methods of struggle. What was argued forcefully is that increasingly there was no room, or rather there was very little scope for non-violent struggle even a simple strike by the workers on an industrial basis, or, on a factory basis was brought down heavily. So, increasingly the state was turning to violence as the only option, not to concede, not to make any concessions what so ever. They regarded everything, practically, as revolutionary and it had to brought down heavily leaving us with no alternative but to resort to violence as a means to undo the system. PB At that point still my impression is that, I'm not sure whether it is completely accurate, but the majority of the Indian Congress would have been opposed to the armed struggle. I was wondering which bit would have been in support of it, which people would have been in support of the move to armed struggle? BN You can say quite a sizable section of the leadership, yes, but not necessarily all of them, but the ranks, the rank and file, especially the worker, the more conscious, those who were politicised over the years, they saw the need for a violent form of struggle. You had fairly large numbers joining Umkhonto. For instance, among the eighteen of us who were ultimately found guilty ten were Africans and eight were Indians, so as one Indian was found not -guilty, otherwise there would have been nineteen because he was through dint of good luck had people who refused to give evidence against him, and that was it. They were sentenced for refusing to give evidence and he was scot-free. Otherwise there would have been nine, almost equal to the African numbers. Then there were others who were fortunate in that they were not brought in, they were not charged so they were saved, quite a number had to flee the country soon thereafter, some of them trained abroad in MK ...... PB Now, the overwhelming bulk of them, all of them, came out of the trade unions, or...

BN No, not all. Most of them, yes. Some were communist members though, not trade unionists. The support from the rank and file was also, it drew support, and as a matter of fact more and more were enthusiastic as the days went by that the violent form of activity became the order of the day in the early 60s people were now encouraged and did not display any antipathy or opposition. So with the Indian Congress leadership, they too were won over and when I referred to people who said wish the boys well, they're doing a pretty good job, some of them were Indian Congress members who felt that initially they may have stood opposed but as the days went on they also felt the need for it and also were encouraged by the events. Of course you had some who steadfastly opposed, Roley Arenstein for instance, even the General Congresses and so on, who totally opposed and I think during our trial he was one of the instructing lawyers in our case, of course, both of us were unable to communicate because both of us were banned. But he sent notes to sayI told you so. So I asked him to go and jump in the lake, I was not going to listen to his story. He was dogmatic about it and that it why as the years went by he colluded with ...... would go to take part in the , or he actually encouraged the candidature of one of the people who stood in Lusekeseke in the Transkei election. Personally, while I saw this as ...... and took part in nonviolent, purely non-violent methods of struggle, but inwardly and after having read and becoming convinced about the ultimate goal of overthrowing the system and changing it through violent means, I felt that it is only through violence that we can undo the powerful state machinery that is employed against us. There were others, there were many others who felt likewise, not only from the ...... Marxism-Leninism, but in practice we saw what happened, the unleashing of terror, and so on. Even a person like Alan Paton while he was involved in ...... he firmly believed in non-violence, he too in the discussions he fully appreciated the problems that the movement was confronted with, although he was opposed to the idea of violence, there is no question about it. He appreciated those who took up arms against the state. He too was banned and restricted and so were the other ...... in the Liberal party. So we had the state coming down on all fronts and leaving very little scope for non-violent forms of activities. So this proved the point of those who were arguing in the early days, in the 60s, that there is no way out. PB To shift tack just a little bit, although it is an extension of the same point in some respects, did you yourself have the opportunity to, you were obviously debating strategy and tactics (end of side A) on operation Mayibuye. BN Well, I was not responsible for it, or we did have the document at a later stage after it was drawn up, but it was still in its formative stage, as a matter of fact there was no wide-spread discussion. But, we did have a meeting with, or more than one meeting, with people from the high command that had come over. Bruno Mtolo, himself, was given when he visited Rwanda and he was given some idea as to what - not the details of the document as such - but the plan to actually engage in mass scale sabotage, taking the form of an insurrection. That was still tentative, it was still being debated and discussed. We had had visits from the high command speaking along those lines, actually urging some of us to go underground immediately, with the object of pursuing them, that became the objective of bringing down the government, but we were arrested. These, the document that was found, the plans were tentative, we were as a matter of fact ...... during the trial, the in particular, nothing actually, some parts of it were implemented especially the infrastructure, some did go underground and they were in preparation for more activities that may take place in the future, others were sent abroad for training with the objective of returning. We didn't implement the major... PB Did you see that document yourself before you were arrested? BN No. PB But you knew the kinds of things that were debated, or raised, in it? BN Yes. PB Were you broadly sympathetic, what was your attitude? BN Well, one had the dimension, the scope of activity was vast, the questions that arose were very ...... scale and about adequate training and preparing. These were raised and what was required was a mass organisation, or rather, our infrastructure had to be sufficiently developed for such a vast scale of activity, it required resources, physical resources and it meant getting assistance from the outside. Otherwise, we did have the people who were organising through propaganda and through our home activity, but we didn't have a back-stage, a sufficient number of people. When I said that there were about sixty, they were the hard core, but we did have others at various stages of development. For instance, people had to go through a whole course of preparedness, that is even before they could be in the MK, they were given training without them knowing what they were about. So, we were in that stage of not recruitment as yet, but we were being prepared. We had quite a number of workers, trade unionists and activists in the townships who were already taking part in certain clandestine activities. For instance, distribution of leaflets clandestinely, ANC leaflets, or MK leaflets. It required some skill and was attendant on great risks. That was fairly well carried out, for instance, using the post boxes, dead letter boxes, hanging up leaflets on lampposts, using the mail, sending batches of it to the factories and these were in turn distributed. We dropped off leaflets clandestinely on the factory floor through our activists, they leave bundles of it in the cloakroom, in the toilets, and so on. In that way we had an infrastructure, but they did not know that they were being prepared for something more violent at a later stage. PB Am I reading you correctly to say then that you thought ...... was premature, I mean there were criticisms along those lines?

BN Yes, I wouldn't say it was premature, but the ideas were good, but we had to - I think - were insistent upon building a stronger organisation. Premature, that depends on whether we were ready for it, or not. PB The basic idea you'd approve of, it would be a question of the timing. BN Yes. The strategy that was employed, tactically, if we had implemented immediately we would have plunged ourselves into a lot of difficulties. The state, on the other hand, I think throughout, you see, the state itself was always regarded as being powerful and having an infrastructure which could actually destroy us if they went heavily against us. And when it did happen, when they hit at Rivonia House they did collapse MK, internally at least. Then, of course, we had to change tactics, get our people trained and infiltrated into the country. It took a few years before that happened, where wide scale activities took place again. The clamp on the organisation clearly demonstrated the strength of the state. PB Were you having discussions about this kind of thing down here, about tactics, about the kinds of ideas that were present in operations? Where there any differences of emphasis, or opinion? BN Yes, there were. These were sent over to, I personally was enthusiastic about it, but the problem was that we really had the machinery to implement at that particular time. PB And the others? BN There were two ...... and we expressed our views even if there were differences, these were sent to.... It was a question of timing, basically it was that, while the principal was accepted were we strong enough to beat the challenge of the state. Otherwise, the reading was, generally speaking, that without being reckless - we shouldn't be reckless - the time was fast approaching when we had to take ..... steps, that is, without relying on outside assistance, we could if we wanted arms, we wanted other hardware from the outside. It was a question of adequate resources within the country where we could successfully hide for an indefinite period of time without being followed. You didn't have, like in the Latin American situation mountain hideaways, and so on, like the Sandanistas, or you take in El Salvador where you had El Salvadorians being able to conduct their struggle over a long period of time from the mountain hideouts and the American ...... for quite some time. We didn't have that, so we had to have a ...... home and an external base, Mozambique, Angola, but they were all vulnerable to attack. PB Also not independent. At that early stage were you envisaging a rural kind of incursion, or mainly urban, or an equal mixture of both?

BN That again was tentative, the ideas were formed, but you already had a fairly widespread rural reaction, but of course it stopped short, but it took the form of incursion, it took the form of a mass driven violent reaction to state. In Pondoland, for instance, it took a violent form, weapons were used. Chiefs, for instance, were all over the place. They came here to meet ...... who wanted weapons to deal with the government. They were in desperate need of it and we didn't have equipment on such a large scale. The Sekukunis in Sekukuniland also had a similar, we wouldn't say that it had been rural based because you had fairly highly conscious weapon class here, but the difference in the rural area poverty drove the people in the rural areas to take a militant from of action, which was not really apparently clear in the urban areas, it took the from of strikes, boycotts etcetera, fairly successfully, several times here, but it didn't take that mass form as in the rural areas. So, if at anything at all, if the people were fairly well equipped, even with a modicum of training, we would have had a different ball-game in the rural areas. PB That was where you saw the ...... BN Yes. I think it's the poverty, the real oppressive conditions, the Bantu authority system with the attendant oppression that, I think drove the people on the brink. PB Can you give me any more details about the people asking for arms in Pondoland, what happened there? BN Well, you see, there was a Hill committee during the Pondoland revolt and because of the massacres that took place some of the members of the Hill committee were the ones who came. Now, if I recall correctly, there was one chief Madiketsela and Khanyile who was secretary of the Hill committee. These were people on the ground and they were the ones who were actually the leadership, they constitute the leadership ...... in Pondoland. They were putting the movement under pressure here, we didn't have, all we could do was to advise them to go elsewhere, Swaziland, they didn't have the ANC infrastructure which was in place in later years in Swaziland or the Frontline states. PB One interview has just given me the impression that the party itself had connections with the Pondoland revolt, and ...... its leadership. BN The party did have members in the Transkei, and I am not sure whether Khanyile himself was secretary of the Hill committee. He was a student at Fort Hare, I think it is Innocent Khanyile, if I am not mistaken, he was actually kidnapped and taken to Lesotho and he was almost killed there, if it were not for an urgent application that was made, his father wrote a note from there, that he was placed in a house there under guard, and so on, and this note I think came over to Roley Arenstein and he led the court application for his release. That was what exposed the hand of the state here. PB If we had gone to him he wouldn't know any names of any people, any party members there? BN No. I'm not too sure if Innocent was a party member, and to suggest that the party instigated the Pondoland revolt would be erroneous too. Then there was Port Elizabeth which was also intimately involved, and others from Port Elizabeth that I am not too sure, they also had links. There was no proper co-ordination between Natal and Port Elizabeth on supplying, giving help to the Pondos at the time. Natal was very much involved, Roley Arenstein was in the centre of things at thetime, he took up immediate issues, exhuming the bodies that were buried by the soldiers there, that created quite a furore, it was a massive victory too ...... action was taken to where the bodies were to be exhumed at the time. Then Khanyile's kidnapping. Then, horsemen, people who were good horsemen, they did battle, active battle - they had weapons - I don't know from where, they probably got it from the enemy, but they did do battle, but they were killed in the process. They wanted weapons, it was taken from there and it was far in advance of anything we ever had here. If you read the newspapers of 1959, late 1958 and throughout 1959, battles going on in Natal, practically every rural area, and it was fantastic the way the woman in one of the rural areas, I'm not too sure where, she held up a Saracen, an armed vehicle with a twig, and actually got it not to move, in fact it stopped the Saracen and said 'go over my dead body', and she halted the Saracen an old African woman in one of the rural areas, and this picture was publicised widely. The militancy was just simply unbelievable, and the ANC had to actually call a conference ...... from the other time, I think it was early 1960, before the emergency was declared. They had this Natal-wide conference where reps, chiefs, even the people, the rural people and so on sent representatives, the people were going to form, to stop the violent reaction, they cut the fences for the Betterment schemes, and brought down the whole Bantu authority system. Some of the chiefs were reactionary, in that they didn't go along with people, they were heavily dealt with in some of the rural areas, many chiefs joined the people. Even Gatcha Buthelezi, if I remember correctly, was playing a more positive role. He was one of those who stood opposed to the Bantu authority system, and he worked very closely with the ANC, particularly Chief Luthuli, responsible for getting famous De Wet Nel who was at the time the Bantu commissioner, Minister of Bantu affairs, he was struggling to get the chiefs to accept Bantu authority, he used to come and address an Indaba here every year on December 16, of the chiefs in Ulundi, or one of the areas famous meeting place for the chiefs. Every time the chiefs ...... rejected Bantu authority, of course, subsequently they ...... and things turned for the worse, this is in the 60s and 70s when Inkhata is formed and there is now an acceptance of the very system. PB You said you were recruited into the party, or joined the party in 1953, can you tell me how that happened?

BN I ...... in the political ...... in the early 50s, before I became secretary of the Dairy Workers Union, 1951, I was already a ...... Marxist classes, read fairly widely Marxist literature and I tried to come to grips with some of the teachings of Lenin, which were beyond me, and I used to attend classes in order to get clarity, but I did a lot of reading on my own. This, naturally, got me closer and closer to the idea of even forming a party where it didn't exist, to work underground, the underground party it was dissolved in 1950, and there was a vacuum during that period, and there was a move towards the formation of a party. I joined it in 1953, I was recruited actually, by one of the members of the party if I recall correctly it was MP Naiker who was a member of the old party, because he too used to attend the classes, the political classes. Within a short while I became the District Committee member, apart from the ...... already it was a member of the executive of the Indian Congress for the party. Then in personal secretary for a number of unions, they were, shall we say fusspots(?), and within this short while I was District Committee member. I attended one of the conferences, I'm not too sure which one, 1954 1 think, Johannesburg, that was a National conference. I began recruiting and setting up cells in practically all the unions, in the factory committees, for instance, which were doubling Trade union committees, but were also party cells. The early full-time functionaries which came in from about 1954 came from these political classes, full-time trade unionists to assist and they took over quite a number of these unions, became fulltime organisers, or secretaries of these unions. PB That District committee, how many people on the District committee? BN Six. PB Who else was there, besides you? BN There was MP Naiker, and later on it was, I think Moses Mpita was one of them, later it was Steven Dlamini, both of them are dead, there was Michael Hathorne, Dr. Michael Hathorne - he was the sonof a one-time Judge President - he was a lecturer at the Medical school, and his wife also lectured there, she was also a doctor. Roley was also a member, I'm not too sure at what stage he came home, because he came in later because he had to be recruited by the Central committee, I think he was a District committee member and a member of the party in the old days, he was recruited by the Central committee and then brought in. At any one stage there were only six members on the committee. PB What would be the membership of the district, was the district Natal? BN In Natal (telephone ringing, conversation inaudible)

- 10 PB The size of the membership of the party in Natal that we were talking about. BN Initially, the Durban district catered for Pietermaritzburg, and other areas like Pinetown and northern Natal, but thereafter we established a district in Pietermaritzburg, we had one in Pietermaritzburg to cater for the ...... and so on. The size of the membership of the party, I'm not too sure, we had a good few hundred who were formed into groups of three, maximum four in a particular cell, they were in the ANC or in the Indian Congress, or in the trade unions, in the Congress of Democrats, in the civic organisations, civic meaning Presidents associations or rate-payers. Where we had less than four in a particular organisation we mixed them, or joined them. As far as possible we made sure that ANC members were not joined with Indian Congress and the trade unions so that we had.. .(END OF PART TWO)

INTERVIEW WITH BILLY NAIR INTERVIEWED BY P. BONNER NEDBANK GARDENS, DURBAN 13 JUNE 1994 PART THREE TRANSCRIBED BY COLLEEN BARKER PB You were saying that you had these meetings in Johannesburg, was that meeting in Johannesburg with the, sort of, provisional high command, meeting with Natal representatives? BN Yes. PB Now, how many people went from here to those meetings? BN I'm not too sure of the number, you see, they were terribly tentative, and subsequent when we got the structure together there were meetings here, and of course ...... Ronnie ...... and I played the king-pin role and subsequently ...... Solomon Mbandlo(?) who were both full-time trade unionists. Kani, Bruno, Mandla and I were full-time functionaries in the trade unions, and Ronnie was, of course, in the Congress of Democrats and he was also a member of the party, all five of us members of the partyas well and at the same time we were members of the ANC, all of us, and also SACTU we were officials. So the, if I recall correctly, when we got the five together, I'm not too sure who came down here whether it was Joe Modise initially, or, Jack Hogdson, somebody had come down for our first meetings that took place. Then there was Errol Straken, he instructed us on ...... he was not an organiser but was just drafted on on the technical aspect, bomb making, and so on. Then, of course, we had also Jack giving us some talk on that, he didn't need all of us together just two of us, Ronnie and I, met with him and then we subsequently conveyed the teachings to the rest. Of course, it was largely technical, and to some extent organisational. Of course, we had constant communication with the network with coded methods that were used and when Rivonia was set up we were communicating with Rivonia. Bruno Mtolo, through sheer accident was taken to Rivonia, he was actually to go for technical training

-2 abroad, to Algeria, but he missed the train and he stayed over and missed it all together, he was not sent out of the country. If he had, it would have been a blessing in disguise, but he remained and then he was taken to Rivonia and he saw the place, and he was recognised later, he had a retentive memory, a photographic memory, and he then used this very successfully as evidence against Nelson. When Nelson ...... 1962 after his trip abroad, it was the Africa trip, he went to Britain too at that time, he came back soon after his arrival he came over to Durban first and he was going to go on a South Africa wide tour to meet MK cadres. He was, of course, the Commander-in- Chief of MK. We met him, all five of us, and he gave us an account of his trip and he also underwent some military training himself, and we had the benefit of his travels for practically the whole day, this was subsequently revealed in the trial by the famous Mr ...... There were a number of contacts made apart from the technical aspect, we were in constant touch, both physically and through the post, with headquarters. Ronnie Kasrils played a really king-pin role, he was very active, spent a great deal of time both in the technical aspect as well as organisation, and so with all of us in mobilising our forces, especially among the trade unionists it was a collective, it was mainly the functionaries of a sector who played the role ...... was not SACTU, the, a minority, you know, the Congress Alliance, and it was just simply tow the line, as it were, or, on the other hand that the entire movement was driven by the Communists, rather than the other way around. What must be stressed is that there was broad agreement that ...... idea of violence, or, even what some of us described as the movement, Congresses, expressed our personal feelings these were never, while we acted as individuals during the boycotts, during strikes, and so on, it was not an organised affair, it only becomes organised with the broad agreement of the entire Congress movement, especially the ANC. That is not to say that the mass campaign being peaceful and non-violent methods of struggle were now had to give way all together to the violent, balance was practical, and it was only one of the many methods of struggle to employ against the regime ...... were to continue with the activities and indeed in the course of our activities and, of course, more so our subsequent arrest, the trade union movement did suffer in that some of the leading countries were actually sent into prison, but there was no alternative to that, we had to set in motion a method of struggle that was to challenge the state, and they were concerned, they were worried by it, and we had not gone into passive guerilla activities, and so on, or ordinary sabotage, the

-3 taking of lives and so on, that was to come later. Even to meet the state head-on, or its machinery, armed forces and so on, we were not equal to it at that stage so it was clandestinely sabotage activity that was paramount to harass, to weaken the state and to disperse its forces. Also, the whole idea of armed propaganda, it was never really employed in the early stages, we used the media fairly attractively and they tried to clamp on the media, van den Berg who subsequently became a general boasting that he had the media in his office in Pretoria, the whole of the press, and it was one of the ways of killing any such movement was to get the press to snuff us out, we had to ...... publicity, but they were forced to, especially when the lights go off because of mass sabotage, they were forced to give some publicity. So it was that factor that actually inspired the people to continue with the struggle. The state reacted violently to it, they brought about a whole host of laws, the Sabotage Act, and so on, which gave powers to the cops to sentence us to long terms of imprisonment, not even people who had a good chance of winning their cases in court, there was a case in Cape Town, Alexandra ...... who we thought should have not been sentenced at all, because all they did was to document what they called 'The Way Forward', nothing more than that, but they were all sentenced to long terms of imprisonment from five to ten years just for possessing those documents, or pinching. PB When you had those meetings in Johannesburg discussing the formation of MK, what date was that, do you remember? BN It was in 1961. PB You don't remember when in 1961? BN No. I am convinced that the initial meetings took place in Johannesburg, you see, there were expressions, in fact documents used to pass constantly, all secretly done, of giving our views on certain aspects of the struggle and in our own analysis of what happened from 1958 through to 1960, we felt convinced that we were lagging behind, especially the rural people, and so on.

PB 'We' is who? BN That is the people, the leadership of the entire, the ANC, the party... PB Down here? BN Throughout the country. It was... PB In the sense that you were lagging behind, that was not necessarily the majority view down here, the ANC leadership... BN No. It was an issue we take in the soundings, in discussions this in fact... is through Alliance, so what you do is to collate this in an analysis and especially we take the party's training, then of course this was also things were analysed at the ANC level, or at the Joint Congress level, we used to actually give them our views as well, SACTU or the party, the party was at the time illegal and was not a member of the Congress Alliance, so if I am SACTU ...... opinion I made my view, views, or we would get others, even opposed like Roly Arenstein, he was totally opposed to violence in principal and he thought it was a disaster, failing to realise that people accept things in motion, this was hotly debated at the Joint Congress level, notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority felt that - the entire Congress Alliance felt the time had come for. PB About 1958 onwards, when you were ...... you had to move in a different direction. BN It became clearer from 1959 onwards. Throughout that period there was no question of me thinking, or, active highly conscious leaders ...... were thinking along those lines, sometimes unexpressed, but there were questions about it becoming impossible to use the old methods, strikes were being put down heavily, a boycott was clamped down ...... rental boycott because of its success they had to clamp on it and the emergency, of course, ended it, so the Snyman brothers from the Eastern Transvaal were heaving a sigh of relief. You take the boycott of the United Tobacco Company, or, the Rembrandt Group, that too was brought down. They brought legislation to curb, and with the attendant stiff penalties for advocating economic sabotage. In its time the state went ahead trying to clamp, so this was brought in in the debates, discussions that was dominating our thinking at the time, more and more leaning towards, and what we did we issued leaflets asking the people to stop the violence in the rural areas. The reaction of the people was different, they continued, but they had yet to meet Congresses demand that violence be ended, but ...... we had no solutions to the problems. We really had no solutions at all, we had people taking the violence up again. PB The group that came to be the nucleus of the Natal MK, how did that come together, in the sense that was it a rise up of people that you knew were prepared to go that route, or expresses themselves in favour of going that route? How was that selection done? BN Well, it was a combination of factors. First, they were the most disciplined and advanced, they expressed the feelings, they expressed all the time, then their understanding of the risks that were involved. They were selected, even the recruitment subsequent to this, they had to be sounded out very carefully, told quite plainly that ...... very great risks and that they could be sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Then with the passing of the Sabotage Act especially to clamp on violence it became even more clear that.... These people were actually brought in because they were close to the reality in that they also expressed feelings over a period of time and by their actions, their militancy, and so on, they became really easy to recruit, I did some of the sounding out, and it was without hesitation that they threw their weight. PB Did you initiate the process of sounding out, or, did someone else initiate the process of sounding out? BN It is very difficult to say, you see, I may have, and Ronnie and I may have done that jointly, it was I, personally, and Ronnie in judgement, he was young but he was very honest type person who can be relied upon. Kani also played a role, the three of us actually were the core, and then Bruno Mbandlo was subsequently brought in in the capacity he was in ...... Now the question is what qualifications did they have to have, posses some skill or some political consciousness before, it was largely the track record, not necessarily in MK, because as yet... PB How many people did you bring into MK by the time you were arrested in Natal? BN Not very many, we had, at the height of MK activities in Durban, we had between 50 and 60, that is in Durban. Then, of course, we had a fairly strong group in Pietermaritzburg and Hammarsdale, about 40 or 50 there, then in northern Natal, Ladysmith, Dannhauser and so on, there were a smaller grouping, but they were spread out. In some areas, not very many, just one or two of them. I'm not too sure of the actual figures because when we were arrested, 19 of us who were actually charged, one was found not-guilty and discharged, some of them had to flee the country, quite a number we sent out of the country ...... MK here who took part in sabotage activities. I think I forgot to mention when we spoke about earlier days the sugar cane fields were also set alight because of economic sabotage, we don't want Philip to know about this. They were not charged for it, actually, but they could have laid a charge for criminal activities don't expire so there is no moratorium or prescription period for it. In any event they took some of the people who were responsible for it were arrested and they were unable to charge them, this was even before MK was formed, because of the compromising position with the farmer himself having been exposed, so they were sent out immediately for military training. Now there was in some instances it was spontaneous, it was not organised, but in other instances it was some of our leading cadres that is taking the message, giving them the message just using a lighted candle placing it under thatch through the trees in the ...... and so on. Subsequently we did use ...... (END OF INTERVIEW)