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Clampdown in South Africa an Interview with Themba Vilakazi of the ANC

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Clampdown in South Africa an Interview with Themba Vilakazi of the ANC i. d. a.! news notes Published by the United States Committee of the International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa P.o. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138 February 1988, Issue No. 34 Telephone (617) 491-8343 Clampdown in South Africa An interview with Themba Vilakazi of the ANC The following interview with Themba Vilakazi, zations, and intemational development agencies. There were also people the chair of the African National Congress in the from South Africa representing women's organizations, the labor front, US, was conducted on February 25, 1988, the day religious bodies, and professional organizations. after the South African government banned 17 The significance of the conference was to cap the celebration of the anti-apartheid organizations, including the UDF, 75th anniversary ofthe African National Congress; to provide an inter­ Detainees' Parents Support Committee, and Na­ national forum of people working to support the liberation struggle; to tional Education Crisis Committee, as well as compare strategies and projects; and to emphasize material and finan­ COSATU. Eighteen individuals were also banned. cial assistance to the liberation movement. It was also a successful at­ Thabo Mbeki of the ANC has said that tempt, I think, to further the diplomatic isolation of South Africa by the clampdown is a proof of the failure of increasing the diplomatic stature of the ANC, and to generate more sup­ all the repressive measures imposed by port for the ANC in the international community. the regime so far. Would you agree with One area that was clearly an issue for the ANC and for the supporters that? of the liberation struggle was the issue of violence by vigilantes. We have It certainly is that in part. But it's also a con­ seen how the attacks organized by Inkatha in the Pietermaritzburg area firmation of the continuing resistance of the have been translated by the regime and other forces opposed to the people in spite of the repressive measures Themba Vilakazi struggle as an indication of internecine strife, or what they call "black­ and the State of Emergency. It is a proof that the regime is absolutely on-black violence" and what Reagan calls "tribal violence:' There was incapable of accommodating the demands of the people, and that the an interest in focusing on how that sort of attack by apartheid can be only way it can sustain itself is by increased repression. I think it is also dealt with, and if possible eliminated. The state is now farming out some another sign that in South Africa those who seriously want to struggle of its repressive measures to vigilante gruups and structures such as for liberation and an end to apartheid have very little avenue within le­ Inkatha. Inkatha is assuming most ofthe repressive measures that were gally sanctioned behavior, and without resorting to armed struggle. practiced by the state on behalf of the state, in an attempt to consoli­ date its own position in the Natal area. Do you see any common thread among all the organizations and A lot of people who were previously assumed - and quite widely individuals that were banned? stated by the apartheid regime and by Buthelezi - to be ZUlus and there­ These are all organizations that have been a thorn in the side of the fore supporters of Inkatha, have gotten very disillusioned with Inkatha. regime. I think the banning of Albertina Sisulu and Archie Gumede [co­ In attempting to shore up its position, Inkatha is trying to force people Presidents of the UDF] is simply a demonstration of the effectiveness into its ranks. This is a major factor that has brought out the violence of the UDF in spite of the restrictions that have been imposed. These within Natal, more than any UDF-Inkatha struggle. It's simply a reflec­ two are very well respected, elderly figures who clearly pose no threat tion of something that has been happening much more on the group to the communities that they serve. Such a move really angers the level, with attacks on communities, and there is great concern about younger generation, and will end up having an immense radicalizing ~ 0 effect on what is already a very radical youth in South Africa. That's something the South African government for some reason is unable to see. Editorial Overview It's quite interesting that if the South African regime claims that these on p. 2 restrictions are being imposed to reestablish public order, that no res­ trictions have been placed on Inkatha, who according to all evidence have been the major purveyors of violence in the Pietermaritzburg area. Still an Emergency None of the warlords have any sort of restrictions upon them. This clearly In June 1987 South Africa's State of Emergency was renewed for a second year, serves to show which forces are on which side ofthe equation. It doesn't and resulted in an enormous new wave of political detentions. A drastic new portend well for the future. clampdown was imposed on 24 February 1988, banning the political activities of 17 major anti-apartheid organizations and COSATU, and banning 18 leaders. You attended the ANC's international conference in Tanzania last The ongoing repression has placed unprecedented strain on lOAF's ability to December. Who took part and how was it organized? provide legal defense for political prisoners and aid for their families. Please help us There was a wide representation ofpeople from all different nations, meet this crisis by mailing a contribution to lOAF, P.o. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138. All contributions are tax-deductible. including Parliamentarians, labor gruups, anti-apartheid solidarity organi- Editorial Overview The situation in Southern Africa during the period of the News Calendar been challenging the political control of Inkatha, which enjoys the favor and continued to be one of endemic civil conflict compounded by South Africa's the strength of the central govemment and its bantustan structures. Under the continuing destabilization-which were the features noted by the International State of Emergency regulations, severe restrictions have been placed on UDF­ Institute of Strategic Studies, London, in its annual report (released 11 affiliated organizations which prevent them from operating publicly. Inkatha November '87). Apartheid (and its defense) continued to be the underlying has not been affected by those restrictions. Worse still, in June '87 police cause of both domestic and regional instability. The human costs of this stations in many parts of Natal were transferred to the control of the kwaZulu instability are dear indeed, not the least being the health, sound minds and bantustan, leading to a new cycle of violence and intimidation. No early bodies, and the very lives of the tens and thousands of children from Cabinda, solution to this tragic focus of bloodshed seems to be in prospect. northern Angola to Durban, South Africa. If the innocent victims of this cruel In addition to its illegal military occupation of Namibia, South Africa's convulsion had been white instead of black, the rich and powerful of the military incursions into Angola assumed the proportions of another invasion, world would long ago have put an end to it, whether by effective sanctions first to help the UNITA rebels withstand a govemment offensive in southeast­ or military force. ern Angola, and then to mount an attack on the strategically important town Not content with hiding most of its cruelties from the outside world and the of Cuito Cuanavale, which Angola repulsed despite claims to the contrary. TV screens, the regime began to apply its new and additional system of South Africa admitted for the first time that it was fighting alongside UNITA. censorship (imposed August '87) to bring the more courageous section ofthe At least 7,000 South African troops backed by long-range artillery, armored South African press into line, with The Weekly Mail, South, City Press, and vehicles and aircraft were in use by January '88. South Africa's aim is to force especially New Nation under threat of being closed down or accepting an Angola to accept the US-backed UNITA rebels into the government ofAngola, official in-house censor. The editor of New Nation, Zwelakhe Sisulu, on 17 in order to protect a weak and cooperative regime in Namibia. November lost a court action against his detention without trial, which began The release on 5 November '88 of one of the ANC's top leaders, Govan in December '86. Mbeki, who had been serving a life sentence with Nelson tv\andela and Killings, mostly by the security forces and their surrogates, took place others, raised hopes of progress towards negotiations. These hopes were virtually every day during the period, especially around Pietermaritzburg, dashed, and events instead revealed continuing divisions within the regime where the South African police were so closely identified with the kwaZulu over whether political reason or yet further harsh repression should prevail. bantustan-based Inkatha "warlords" and their killers that the UDF/COSATU P. W. Botha's angry denial that Mbeki's release was a "trial run" for tv\andela's victims took the unprecedented step of calling for the intervention of the release (as claimed by two of his Cabinet Ministers) and the restriction order SADF, in the desperate hope that the troops might be less partisan and afford placed on Mbeki on 11 December showed which faction remained in control, some measure of protection. The growing membership of youth groups asso­ even before the big clampdown on the opposition of 24 February. Ciated with the UDF and Azapo, and the strength of COSATU in Natal, have Kenneth N. Carstens Southern Africa News Calendar November and December 198~ January 1988 The following news items are based primarily on shortwave broadcasts by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), The Voice of America (VOA), and Radio South Africa (RSA).
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