GLOSSARY and Abbreviations
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Yayasan-Yayasan Soeharto Oleh George Junus Aditjondro
Tempointeraktif.com - Yayasan-Yayasan Soeharto oleh George Junus Aditjondro Search | Advance search | Registration | About us | Careers dibuat oleh Radja:danendro Home Budaya Nasional Digital Berita Terkait Ekonomi Yayasan-Yayasan Soeharto oleh George Mahasiswa Serentak Kenang Tragedi Iptek • Junus Aditjondro Trisakti Jakarta Jum'at, 14 Mei 2004 | 19:23 WIB • Kesehatan Soeharto Memburuk Nasional • BEM Se-Yogya Tolak Mega, Akbar, Nusa TEMPO Interaktif : Wiranto, dan Tutut Olahraga • Asvi: Ada Polarisasi di Komnas HAM Majalah BERAPA sebenarnya kekayaan keluarga Suharto dari yayasan- soal Kasus Soeharto yayasan yang didirikan dan dipimpin Suharto dan Pemeriksaan Kesehatan Soeharto Koran • keluarganya, dari saham yayasan- yayasan itu dalam Belum Jelas Pusat Data berbagai konglomerat di Indonesia dan di luar negeri? • Kejaksaan Lanjutkan Perkara Setelah Tempophoto Soeharto Sehat Narasi Pertanyaan ini sangat sulit dijawab oleh "orang luar". LSM: Selidiki Pelanggaran HAM • English Kesulitan melacak kekayaan semua yayasan itu diperparah Soeharto oleh tumpang-tindihnya kekayaan keluarga Suharto dengan • Komnas HAM: Lima Pelanggaran HAM kekayaan sejumlah keluarga bisnis yang lain, misalnya tiga Berat di Masa Soeharto keluarga Liem Sioe Liong, keluarga Eka Tjipta Widjaya, dan • Pengacara Suharto: Kejari Kurang keluarga Bob Hasan. Kerjaan • Mahasiswa Mendemo KPU Tapi jangan difikir bahwa keluarga Suharto hanya senang >selengkapnya... menggunakan pengusaha-pengusaha keturunan Cina sebagai operator bisnisnya. Sebab bisnis keluarga Suharto juga sangat tumpang tindih dengan bisnis dua keluarga keturunan Referensi Arab, yakni Bakrie dan Habibie. Keluarga Bakrie segudang kongsinya dengan keluarga Suharto, a.l. dengan Bambang • Yayasan-Yayasan Soeharto oleh dan Sudwikatmono dalam bisnis minyak mentah Pertamina George Junus Aditjondro lewat Hong Kong (Pura, 1986; Toohey, 1990: 8-9; Warta • Biodata Soeharto Ekonomi , 30 Sept. -
Nabbs-Keller 2014 02Thesis.Pdf
The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy Author Nabbs-Keller, Greta Published 2014 Thesis Type Thesis (PhD Doctorate) School Griffith Business School DOI https://doi.org/10.25904/1912/2823 Copyright Statement The author owns the copyright in this thesis, unless stated otherwise. Downloaded from http://hdl.handle.net/10072/366662 Griffith Research Online https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au GRIFFITH BUSINESS SCHOOL Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By GRETA NABBS-KELLER October 2013 The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy Greta Nabbs-Keller B.A., Dip.Ed., M.A. School of Government and International Relations Griffith Business School Griffith University This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. October 2013 Abstract How democratisation affects a state's foreign policy is a relatively neglected problem in International Relations. In Indonesia's case, there is a limited, but growing, body of literature examining the country's foreign policy in the post- authoritarian context. Yet this scholarship has tended to focus on the role of Indonesia's legislature and civil society organisations as newly-empowered foreign policy actors. Scholars of Southeast Asian politics, meanwhile, have concentrated on the effects of Indonesia's democratisation on regional integration and, in particular, on ASEAN cohesion and its traditional sovereignty-based norms. For the most part, the literature has completely ignored the effects of democratisation on Indonesia's foreign ministry – the principal institutional actor responsible for foreign policy formulation and conduct of Indonesia's diplomacy. Moreover, the effect of Indonesia's democratic transition on key bilateral relationships has received sparse treatment in the literature. -
Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite
CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE (Prepared by the Editors) Periodically over the last fifteen years we have prepared lists of officers hold ing key positions in the hierarchy of the Indonesian Armed Forced to help readers keep abreast of current developments. (The last previous listing was in Indonesia, No. 33 [April 1982] which included changes through February 1982.) We have been able to do so because changes of personnel have typically been incremental, and because when a major organizational change took place, as in October 1969, the transformation occurred quickly and smoothly, without involving any drastic redis tribution of power or personnel. This is not the case with the recent reorganiza tion. The changes that got under practical way in March 1983 are unprecedented in their scope and complexity, and seem unlikely to run their full course before well into 1984. Essentially, they can be understood as involving two distinct, yet interrelated processes: (1) a generational shift which has virtually eliminated the "Generation of '45" from the Armed Forces' hierarchy; (2) the organizational rever berations of the separation of the functions of Minister of Defense and Security and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces mandated by Law 20/1982. Perhaps fortu nately for the editors, the evidence for the generational shift was largely complete as of the beginning of July 1983, and seems reasonably susceptible to preliminary analysis. On the other hand, although General S. Poniman and General L. B. "Benny" Murdani assumed on March 28, 1983 the twin top positions that had earlier always been held by a single officer, the division of authority and responsibility between them has yet to be resolved; and until it is resolved many billets remain either empty or held on a caretaker basis. -
F Re E P O Rt and the Suharto Regime, 1 965–1 9
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE Fre e p o r t and the Suharto Regime, provided by ScholarSpace at University of Hawai'i at Manoa 19 65–19 9 8 Denise Leith In functioning democratic economies a structural balance must be found between state and capital. In Suharto’s autocratic state, however, a third variable upset this equation: patronage. By using access to resources and business as the major lubricant of his patronage style of leadership Suharto actively encouraged the involvement of all powerful groups within the ec o n o m y . Eventually, the military, politicians, and the bureaucracy became intimately involved in the most lucrative business ventures to the point that to be successful in Indonesian business one required an influential partner in at least one of these institutional groups, preferably with direct access to Suharto. When Freeport began negotiations with the new military regime in Jakarta in 1967 to mine the copper in West Papua, the American transna- tional with the valuable political connections was the more powerful of the negotiating parties, enabling it to dictate the terms of its contract. As Suharto’s political confidence grew and as the American company’s finan- cial investment in the province increased—and by association its vulner- ability—the balance of power shifted in Jakarta’s favor. Eventually Free- port became another lucrative source of patronage for the president. E a r ly Histo ry of Fr e e p o rt in West Pa p ua In 1936, while on an expedition to the center -
The End of Suharto
Tapol bulletin no,147, July 1998 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1998) Tapol bulletin no,147, July 1998. Tapol bulletin (147). pp. 1-28. ISSN 1356-1154 The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/25993/ ISSN 1356-1154 The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign TAPOL Bulletin No. 147 July 1998 The end of Suharto 21 May 1998 will go down in world history as the day when the bloody and despotic rule ofSuharto came to an end. His 32-year rule made him Asia's longest ruler after World War IL He broke many other world records, as a mass killer and human rights violator. In 196511966 he was responsible for the slaughtt:r of at least half a million people and the incarceration of more than 1.2 million. He is also respon{iible for the deaths of 200,000 East Timorese, a third of the population, one of the worst . acts ofgenocide this century. Ignoring the blood-letting that accompanied his seizure of In the last two years, other forms of social unrest took power, the western powers fell over themselves to wel hold: assaults on local police, fury against the privileges come Suharto. He had crushed the world's largest commu nist party outside the Soviet bloc and grabbed power from From the editors: We apologise for the late arrival of President Sukarno who was seen by many in the West as a this issue. -
In ,East 11Mor
Tapol bulletin no, 94, August 1989 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1989) Tapol bulletin no, 94, August 1989. Tapol bulletin (94). pp. 1-28. ISSN 1356-1154 The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26197/ The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign '· ,, ,,.·X . TAPOL Bulletin No. 94 August 1989 New wave of arrests in ,East 11mor Sinqe April this :vear, many people have'been arrested ffu""8Jl Rights InsU~ut.e st.epa in . in Dili,' Baucau, Venilale, Man,a~.i.ito, Airiaro and, other The Jakarta-based Institute for the Defence of Ruman places. The're are also .reports of dozens of ~eople Rights has, for . the first time, pyblicly .expressed being summarily executed in Baucau and elsewhere. concern abm,1t the hiJman rights situatio.n. in East , According to a clandestine documen~ ~ated 15 April 'j:'imor. In a letter to G~r;ieral 'fry Soetrisno, com~ 1989, twenty people were shot dead between 12 - 15 mander-in-chief of the Jndonesian Armed Forces on 15 March by troops under the command of Colonel June 1989, the In~titute said it had been informed Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto. The that "at the beginning, in the middle. and. at . the .end killings took place in Bere-Coli, Bauca.u and all those pf May, . h~ndred$ of peqple had ,been a,rreste~ S.1?~ put to . dea~}l were from , the locali,tr. -
The Philippines Vs. Indonesia: a Tale of Two Leaders
The Philippines vs. Indonesia: A Tale of Two Leaders by Kristian Osmeña Rüegg An honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science Undergraduate College Leonard N. Stern School of Business New York University May 2020 Professor Marti G. Subrahmanyam Professor Peter Blair Henry Faculty Adviser Thesis Adviser Rüegg 2 Abstract: Previous work emphasizes the correlation or casual impact between institutions and economic performance (e.g. property rights, independent judiciaries, and access to education all encouraging investment and growth). Economists, Peter Henry and Conrad Miller, provide a counterargument to this claim in their paper, “Institutions vs. Policies: A Tale of Two Islands.” They argue differences in macroeconomic policy choices, not differences in institutions, were responsible for the divergence of economic growth between Jamaica and Barbados throughout the late 20th century. This thesis provides another counterexample, but with particular emphasis on leadership. Specifically, the Philippines and Indonesia are two archipelagos that have had similar institutions in terms of weakness, but radically different economic outcomes, particularly under the leadership of dictators, Ferdinand Marcos (term: 1965-1986) and Suharto (term: 1968- 1998), respectively. Indonesia’s average growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita under Suharto was roughly four times greater than the Philippines’ under Marcos. Ultimately, the divergence of the economic growth between the Philippines vs. Indonesia, more than anything, is a story of these two corrupt leaders—with one having significantly more effective macroeconomic policies than the other. Rüegg 3 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Peter Henry, for his guidance throughout my senior year. -
Power Politics and the Indonesian Military
Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:05 09 May 2016 Power Politics and the Indonesian Military Throughout the post-war history of Indonesia, the military has played a key role in the politics of the country and in imposing unity on a fragmentary state. The collapse of the authoritarian New Order government of President Suharto weakened the state, and the armed forces briefly lost their grip on control of the archipelago. Under President Megawati, however, the military has again begun to assert itself, and to reimpose its heavy hand on control of the state, most notably in the fracturing outer provinces. This book, based on extensive original research, examines the role of the military in Indonesian politics. It looks at the role of the military histori- cally, examines the different ways in which it is involved in politics, and considers how the role of the military might develop in what is still an uncertain future. Damien Kingsbury is Head of Philosophical, International and Political Studies and Senior Lecturer in International Development at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. He is the author or editor of several books, including The Politics of Indonesia (Second Edition, 2002), South-East Asia: A Political Profile (2001) and Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition (2001). His main area of work is in political development, in particular in assertions of self-determination. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:05 09 May 2016 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:05 09 May 2016 Power Politics and the Indonesian Military Damien Kingsbury Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:05 09 May 2016 First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. -
Politik Ingatan Adalah Politik Waktu Melawan Lupa. Inilah
olitik ingatan adalah politik waktu melawan lupa. Inilah kewajiban untuk melindungi seluruh warga negara Indonesia 1. Peristiwa 1965 (1965-1970) 4. Penembakan Misterius Kesulitan lainnya adalah Komnas HAM belum bisa memetakan kunci dari untuk memahami kekerasan politik masa dari politik rente, kroni, dan tindakan yang tidak bertanggung pihak-pihak yang bertanggung jawab, khususnya dalam Plalu. Ada memori yang melekat dalam benak individu jawab lainnya yang akan merugikan kehidupan demokrasi, Pelanggaran berat HAM yang dilakukan secara keji ini telah ‘Petrus’ (1982-1985) menemukan pelaku lapangan untuk dimintai keterangan. dan kolektif atas peristiwa masa lalu yang mengakibatkan penegakan hukum, dan hak asasi manusia di masa depan. menyebabkan lebih dari 1.500.000 orang dibantai secara rasa trauma hadir tak berkesudahan. Jika trauma hadir, itu massal. Korban sebagian besar merupakan anggota PKI atau Munculnya sebuah kebijakan negara yang oleh masyarakat menjadi tanda bahwa memori-memori yang tersimpan adalah Kiranya Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono benar-benar ormas yang dianggap berafiliasi dengannya, seperti SOBSI, dinamakan sebagai peristiwa penembakan misterius (Petrus). penanda represivitas dari gejala penyimpangan kebijakan bisa menentukan prioritas politik yang tidak mencederai arah BTI, Gerwani, PR, Lekra, dan organisasi-organisasi lainnya. Kebijakan itu merupakan jalan pintas untuk mengurangi angka 5. Tanjung Priok (1984) politik masa lalu. Pembenaran ini digunakan secara resmi perjuangan demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia di masa depan. Selain dibunuh dengan keji, sebagian besar dari mereka kejahatan. Caranya dengan mengeksekusi mati dan menembak Tindakan represi militer terhadap massa yang berdemonstrasi untuk membenarkan kembali pilihan dan gaya kebijakan dipenjara tanpa adanya proses hukum yang sah. Banyak di tempat orang-orang yang dituduh sebagai preman dan Sekali lagi, kita masih terus melawan yang kekal dan abadi: menolak asas tunggal Pancasila di Jakarta. -
The Development of Political Public Relations in Indonesia
POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS IN INDONESIA UNDER THE YUDHOYONO PRESIDENCY: PAST DEVELOPMENTS AND NEW FORMATIONS Rendro Dhani This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Arts–Murdoch University December 2018 ii Declaration I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work that has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution. Rendro Dhani Perth, December 2018 iii Abstract This thesis is about political public relations in Indonesia. It draws on the tremendous changes after the fall of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The transformation of the political system from authoritarianism to democratic government quickly led to the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in the country. Consequently, new governments in the post-Soeharto era sought to develop new strategies and models of communication in the new political atmosphere. This thesis is concerned with analysing the rapid growth and the exercise of political public relations under Indonesia’s sixth president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). It focuses on how Yudhoyono harnessed political public relations during his presidency to maximise political and popular support. A multiple approach to public relations, i.e. system, rhetorical, and critical were used in this thesis to examine the concept, development, practices, and effects of political public relations. A single case study is employed in this thesis to analyse how Yudhoyono improved the quality of political public relations and thus could safely ‘democratise’ propaganda in Indonesia. The thesis argues that the term ‘political public relations’ in the context of Yudhoyono’s presidency can be considered as ‘soft propaganda’ because the president and government apparatus basically used old and new methods of propaganda in their political communication through sophisticated and subtle ways. -
CONCORD REVIEW Democracy Combined with Stagnant Economic Growth
After gaining independence from the Dutch at the conclusion of the Second World War, Indonesia found itself in a tumultuous period of Western-style parliamentary THE CONCORD REVIEW democracy combined with stagnant economic growth. During this period, a postwar THE economic boom occurred for the global timber industry beginning in the early 1950s and extending into the late 1980s. In 1959, the Philippines and Malaysia were the two largest exporters of hardwood, while Indonesia’s timber industry was still a fl edgling business.1 Indonesia, however, had an untapped forestry sector, CONCORD REVIEW with three-quarters of the entire archipelago covered in forests.2 These forests would play a pivotal role in the geopolitics of Indonesia in the ensuing decades. A longtime nationalist, President Sukarno, Indonesia’s fi rst president, created the I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it. 1960 Basic Agrarian Law ostensibly to safeguard the Indonesian people’s basic K’ung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects rights to the land. Article 21 paragraph one of that law stated “Only an Indonesian Yes, these are3 citizen may have rights of ownership [to forest land].” Over time, the legisla- President Suharto Jun Bin Lee tion served to push out foreign businesses from Indonesia, leaving Indonesia’s Jakarta Intercultural School, Jakarta forestry industry in tatters, as most of the sector had been composed of investors Judicial Independence Perri Wilson and corporationsHigh from abroad. Without School the support of foreign businesses, the Commonwealth School, Boston, Massachusetts growth of Indonesia’s logging operations stagnated, leaving the country with just Winter 2016 Athenian Democracy Duohao Xu $4 million in timber exports up until 1966.4 1 St. -
Michael Malley
T he 7th D evelopment Cabinet: Loyal to a Fault? Michael Malley Five years ago, amid speculation that B. J. Habibie and his allies in the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) would gain a large number of seats in the cabinet, State Secretary Moerdiono announced that "expertise" would be Soeharto's chief criterion for choosing ministers. This year, despite the economic crisis that enveloped the country, few people even thought to suggest that Soeharto sought the most technically qualified assistants. As the outgoing cabinet's term wore to a close, the jockeying for influence among ministers and their would-be successors emphasized the most important qualification of any who would join the new cabinet: loyalty. As if to diminish any surprise at the lengths he would go to create a cabinet of loyalists, Soeharto fired his central bank chief, Soedradjad Djiwandono, in mid- February, just two weeks before the 6 ^ Development Cabinet's term expired. Together with the finance minister, Mar'ie Muhammad, Soedradjad had worked closely with the International Monetary Fund to reach the reform-for-aid agreements Soeharto signed in October 1997 and January this year. Their support for reforms that would strike directly at palace-linked business interests seems to have upset the president, and neither were expected to retain their posts in the 7 ^ Cabinet. But Soedradjad made the further mistake of opposing the introduction of a currency board system to fix the rupiah's value to that of the US dollar. The scheme's main Indonesian proponents were Fuad Bawazier, one of Mar'ie's subordinates, and Peter Gontha, the principal business adviser to Soeharto's son Bambang Trihatmodjo.