F a S T Update Azerbaigan Nuarterly Risk Assessment February to May

F A S T Update

Azerbaijan

Quarterly Risk Assessment

February to May 2006 T

FAST Update

Azerbaijan | February to May 2006 | Page 2

Contents

Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3

Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) 5

Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) 7

Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 9

Appendix: Description of indicators used 10

The FAST International Early Warning Program 11

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Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 06 Dr. Bahodir Sidikov Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast

FAST Update

Azerbaijan | February to May 2006 | Page 3

Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative)

Average number of reported events: 109 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • Country Stability fell smoothly but insignificantly from February to April. Then, in April, there was a significant improvement of this indicator with a stable tendency towards positive change. From February till March the decline in the Country Stability was accompanied by a simultaneous strengthening of Conflictive Events. Since March there has been a downward trend of Conflictive Events. • A reciprocal relationship between the two indicators was observed from February till March and from April till May. Two factors can explain the uncharacteristic simultaneous diminishing of the two indicators between March and April. The first one is the improved weather conditions in the beginning of spring, hence the improved road conditions resulting in intensive mobility of the population, which in turn decreases Conflictive Events through conflict avoidance at the local level. At the same time, raised mobility retrenches Country Stability, because conflict potential in the country's capital city increases with the massive influx of people from the regions. The second factor is the massive cut down of financial savings by the population, caused, among other things, by price increases for basic food products since the beginning of February. From April till May the reciprocal relationship between the two indicators is restored, and there is a stable tendency towards maintaining the symmetry. The primary reason is that Azerbaijani guest workers are going to Russia and other neighboring countries (mainly to Iran and Turkey). The departure of these active groups of the population depresses the overall level of Conflictive Events, while their money transfers into Azerbaijan from abroad enhance Country Stability. • During the period under review, the country did not encounter any serious conflictive situations. Student protests against the closure of one of the universities, as well as protests of Nardaran residents against Prophet Muhammad cartoons were locally limited and did not have many participants (for details see Domestic Conflict and Cooperation). • The issue of whether there are political prisoners in Azerbaijan is still a disputed one between the government and national human rights groups. The Azerbaijani government considers the problem of alleged political prisoners closed. "All alleged political prisoners were released by a presidential act of grace. There can be no problems on political prisoners in a country belonging to the Council of Europe. Those who think they are political detainees can appeal to the European Court. So, this issue is not active now…" the socio-political officer of the President's Administration ,Ali Hasanov, declared on 29 April.

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• An effect of fruitless talks between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia (10-11 February, 2006 in France) was that the public mood in favor of a military solution of the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh had become stronger and more persistent. According to the last public opinion poll by the Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO), 60 percent of the Azeris support military solution to the Karabakh problem. Their main reason is that the peace talks yield no fruits and the international community does not regard Armenia as an aggressor. • Unless the situation around Iran’s nuclear program and Nagorno-Karabakh changes radically, the aforementioned tendencies in Country Stability and Conflictive Events will remain unchanged until late fall when the problems of gas and electricity supply will become acute again.

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Azerbaijan | February to May 2006 | Page 5

Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted)

Average number of reported events: 109 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • Despite the missing data from February to March, it is obvious that Cooperative Domestic Events do not have a direct impact on the level of Conflictive Domestic Events. Both indicators show a rather stable development, with the latter increasing somewhat in April. • On 7 February police forces attacked a group of residents of Nardaran, relatives of the late Ramiz Hasanov (6 policemen and 5 residents were injured). The latter was killed in a clash between the police and residents of this village on 23 January (2 policemen and a resident were killed). Nardaran, an important Shia pilgrimage center already in the Soviet time, does not subordinate itself to the Azerbaijani authorities since 1999, and the police often tried to establish control of the village. • On 5 March assailants abducted and severely beat up prominent oppositional reporter Fikret Hüseynli. Beatings, attacks and threats against the media and attempts to kill oppositional journalists have become regular practice and climaxed after the murder of Elmar Hüseynov, editor-in-chief of the opposition magazine Monitor in May last year. • Police forces on 5 April dispersed dozens of students who were picketing the Education Ministry. The protesters belong to the private Independent Azerbaijan University (IAU). The license of the IAU has been recently revoked by the Education Ministry, saying this year the IAU had accepted much more students than permitted under government-set quotas. Education Minister Misir Mardanov said that no IAU students would be allowed to graduate this year. IAU students are demanding that they be transferred to other universities or be allowed to sit graduation exams. Overall, corruption and bribery pervade educational activities, for example entrance examinations. Therefore the higher education system in Azerbaijan has become one of the "high-income" spheres, with continuously emerging conflicts between rival elite groups. Nowadays there are 28 state Soviet-styled universities and 17 private universities. State universities get about half their money from the state budget, depending on the number of the students, and the other half from tuition. Private universities do not get any public funding. • Bahaddin Haziyev, editor-in-chief of the oppositional newspaper Bizim Yol (Our Path), is in intensive care as a result of an attack on 18 May. According to Haziyev the attack was aimed to punish him for critical articles he recently published. Ali Kerimli, the leader of the opposition Popular Front of Azerbaijan, incriminated the authorities of being behind this and previous attacks on opposition journalists allegedly aimed against the freedom of the press.

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• On 19 May some residents of Mehdiabad village of Baku arranged a protest action outside the Taza Pir mosque, the headquarters of the Office of Caucasian Muslims (OCM), against an attack of a district military officer on a shop assistant in the Ahli-Beyt religious shop two days before. The head of the State Committee for Contact with Religious Organizations (SCCRO) Rafik Aliyev condemned the incident, saying that the district militia officer should be punished. The attack could provoke sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in the village. On 23 May the OCM dissociated itself from the incident in Mehdiabad, saying it was not responsible for conducting an investigation, but could appeal to the relevant organizations to do so. The OCM head, Sheikhulislam Haji Allahshukur Pashazadeh, declared that any Shiite-Sunni issue in Mehdiabad would be seriously taken into consideration. He also stressed that some people try to politicize the incidence. • The situation will remain unaltered: perhaps a slight decrease in Conflictive Domestic Events will stop by the end of the summer and there will be an increase again as winter approximates and a significant part of the work force returns from Russia and other contiguous countries.

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Azerbaijan | February to May 2006 | Page 7

Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted)

Average number of reported events: 109 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • Over the entire period, neither indicator changed dramatically. A reciprocal relationship can be clearly observed from February through May with a slight decrease of Conflictive International Events at the end of the reporting period. The increase in Conflictive International Events in April is primarily bonded to the attempts of the Azerbaijani government to run-down domestic conflict by squeezing Armenian forces at the ceasefire line. Both graphs reflect the dynamics of international mediation efforts aimed to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the situation around Iran's nuclear program. • Azerbaijani society still denotes a high degree of mistrust towards international organizations involved in resolving the Karabakh conflict. This mistrust, certainly, diminishes the willingness of the Azerbaijani side to cooperate internationally. For example, the Karabakh Liberation Organization deputy chairman Firuddin Mammadov said that his organization is "against the arrival of OSCE peacekeepers in Azerbaijan. We demand that the co-chairs trying to hand Karabakh over to Armenians leave the country immediately". On 7 February more than 20 members of the KLO organized protests outside the Foreign Ministry against OSCE mediators. They obstructed access to the building of the Foreing Ministry, and the mediators had to leave the building through the back door. • Some observers associate the disruption of negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, held in France on 10 February, with the blocking influence of Russia on the position of the Armenian party, in an attempt to retrench Azerbaijan's drift towards the United States. Late February Russian President Putin visited Baku and declared that he "promised the Azerbaijani President that we will initiate and conduct additional consultations with our Armenian partners". Then the Russian leader said: "I am going to contact the Armenian President soon and invite him to Moscow to hold further consultations on the problem of Karabakh". • The position of Azerbaijan on the international arena has been significantly undervalued by the inconsistent stance of the Azerbaijani government on the issue of Northern Cyprus, as well as on the so-called Southern Azerbaijan issue. During the 2nd World Congress of Azeris (initiated by the Azerbaijani government and held in Baku on 16 March), its leader Javad Derekhti said that measures might be taken to help Southern Azerbaijan to become independent (Southern Azerbaijan is the name of two provinces in Iran, which are inhabited mostly by ethnic Azeris). Derekhti said that helping the region to get independence or incorporating it into the Republic of Azerbaijan would be his organisation’s priority. Apparently, the leadership of Azerbaijan does not realize that by undermining, directly or indirectly, the territorial integrity of Cyprus and Iran, it undermines its own position, which is to preserve the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in any solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. © swisspeace

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• Azerbaijan attempts to withdraw the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process from the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) to the UN, NATO, the Council of Europe and the EU. The Armenian position is completely opposite: Armenia sees the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in the framework of the OSCE MG. On 28 March Peter Semneby, the EU special representative for the South Caucasus acknowledged the responsibility of the EU for a peaceful solution of the conflict. He said the EU would take a direct part in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The resolution of conflict in the South Caucasus would be one of the EU's priorities. This points to a more active involvement of the organization in the resolution of the problematic situation. • Another issue of concern are the cease-fire violations on the frontline that have become regular. It has been breached more than in previous years. Azerbaijan and Armenia issued declarations each accusing the other of violating the cease-fire agreement. • Despite various expectations that US military forces are establishing bases in Azerbaijan for the purpose of an attack against Iran, the Azerbaijani President said during his visit to Washington in late April that Azerbaijan had been an ally of the United States in Iraq from the very start. He even joked that his government sent soldiers to join the coalition, not merely drivers as Armenia did. But he said he could not help Washington in any hostile action against Iran. "We have a bilateral agreement with Iran which clearly says that the territories of our countries cannot be used for any danger toward each other," Aliyev said. "So it's very clear, and therefore our relations are regulated by international treaties." • In the months to come, internationally related conflict and cooperation are unlikely to change significantly, unless the situation around Iran becomes critical. With regard to the conflict with Armenia, the position of Azerbaijan will also remain unchanged ("neither war, nor peace"), despite the belligerent rhetoric.

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Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative)

Average number of reported events: 109 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • For the entire period both graphs show a direct reciprocal development: intensified Conflictive Government Events lead to an abatement of Conflictive Non-Government Events. The graphic has come out slightly blurred from February to March as Conflictive Non-Government Events overlapped with seasonal emigration of Azerbaijani guest-workers outside the country. • The graphic indicates the reality after parliamentary elections in November last year: a “strong” government vs. weak and highly fragmented opposition groups. Therefore the government could put pressure on the society without any serious resistance from the opposition groups. • Tensions between oppositional Muslim groups, namely the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA) supporting the residents of Nardaran in their confrontation with the authorities and the SCCRO are still high. In a press release on 15 May the IPA stated that "The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan condemns the statements made by Rafik Aliyev, head of the SCCRO, regarding the radical and anti-state activities of representatives of Shi'a Islam in Azerbaijan. Aliyev has made an incorrect statement about a movement with a millennium-long history in Azerbaijan. It could lead the Islamic world to confrontation.". • In autumn and winter the relationship between the two indicators are likely to be more observable. As the Conflictive Government Events increase, the Conflictive Non-Government Events will decrease and vice versa.

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Appendix: Description of indicators used | Page 10

Country Stability The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Conflictive Events (relative) Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict- cooperation scale* divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Cooperative Domestic Events Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) (average weighted) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Conflictive Domestic Events Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) (average weighted) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Cooperative International Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) Events (average weighted) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Conflictive International Events Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) (average weighted) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Conflictive Non-government Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict- Events (relative) cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a non-government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Conflictive Government Events Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict- (relative) cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

*The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting scale that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from –13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.

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The FAST International Early Warning Program | Page 11

Who are we? FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Bern, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

What do we want to achieve? FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers’ and their offices’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding.

How do we work? FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International’s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts.

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