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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, Present, and Prospects for Resolution Special Issue Volume 6 Issue 4 2012

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Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council (Baku) ISMAILOV Tel/fax: (994 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Kenan Executive Secretary (Baku) ALLAHVERDIEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Azer represents the journal in Russia (Moscow) SAFAROV Tel: (7 495) 937 77 27 E-mail: [email protected] Nodar represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) KHADURI Tel: (995 32) 99 59 67 E-mail: [email protected] Ayca represents the journal in Turkey (Ankara) ERGUN Tel: (+90 312) 210 59 96 E-mail: [email protected]

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Zaza D.Sc. (History), Professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy ALEKSIDZE of Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has University (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Baku State University (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) EYVAZOV Rauf Ph.D. (Psychology), Leading research associate of the Center for Strategic Studies GARAGOZOV under the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) Archil Ph.D. (Geography), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and GEGESHIDZE International Studies (Georgia) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture, Institute of Strategic Studies of the GULIEV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Shamsaddin D.Sc.(Economy), Professor, Rector of the Azerbaijan State Economic University HAJIEV (Azerbaijan) Jamil HASANLI D.Sc. (History), Professor at Khazar University (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury; Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.K.) Roin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Academician of the Georgian National Academy of METREVELI Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Economy), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MURSHUDLI International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Michael Associate professor, Near Eastern Studies Department, Princeton University (U.S.A.) A. REYNOLDS Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi SANAIE Professor, Tehran University, Director, Center for Russian Studies (Iran) Avtandil D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Tbilisi University of International Relations, Corresponding SILAGADZE member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla D.Sc. (History), Professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

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Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2012 98 Alovsat Guliyev, AZ1009 © CA&CC Press®, 2012 Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2012 4 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 6 Issue 4 2012

Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, Present, and Prospects for Resolution Special Issue

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

EUROPEAN MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT SETTLEMENT Gulshan IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH PASHAEVA 7

NARRATIVE AND RECONCILIATION: Rauf POSSIBLE STRATEGIES OF GARAGOZOV, NARRATIVE INTERVENTION Rena IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT KADYROVA 16

U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: Nadana THE FORMATION OF NEW TRENDS FRIDRIKHSON 25

LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS Ekaterina IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS TREGLAZOVA 31

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF Ramil ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA DURSUNOV 38 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

THE OSSETIAN-INGUSH CONFLICT: CAUSES AND ECHOES OF Makka THE TRAGEDY OF THE FALL OF 1992 ALBOGACHIEVA 44

GEORGIA: Alexander CONFLICTS, CRIME, AND SECURITY KUKHIANIDZE 54

NATIONAL STATE CRISIS IN THE MUSLIM REGIONS OF NON-MUSLIM COUNTRIES: A REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN CASE STUDY Sergey (IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY) ISRAPILOV 63

GEO-ECONOMICS

MIGRATION CATASTROPHE IN ARMENIA AS A CONSEQUENCE OF Yakub THE CONFLICT YAGUBOV 76

STRATEGIC GAMES OVER THE CASPIAN Saadat RUSTEMOVA- DEMIRZHI 82

GEOCULTURE

THE CAUCASIAN WAR OF THE 19TH CENTURY: Irina CIVILIZATIONAL CONFLICT AND PASHCHENKO, ITS FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICS Amiran URUSHADZE 87

CONFESSIONAL CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AS LATENT INTERSTATE DIFFERENCES Beka CHEDIA 94

EROSION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Ibrahim IN THE NORTH CAUCASIAN REGION RASHIDOV 105

GEOHISTORY

ETHNOTERRITORIAL CHANGES IN THE CAUCASUS Rafik IN THE 19TH-20TH CENTURIES SAFAROV 115 6 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

EASTERN TRADE DURING THE HELLENIC AND ROMAN PERIODS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST-WEST TRADE Mehmet IN THE CAUCASUS TEZCAN 125

KHAZARIA, BYZANTIUM, AND THE ARAB CALIPHATE: STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OVER EURASIAN TRADE ROUTES Farda IN THE 9TH-10TH CENTURIES ASADOV 140

SOME FEATURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA AT THE END OF Denis THE 1980S-BEGINNING OF THE 1990S KOTENKO 151

INDEX THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Vol. 6, 2012 160 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Gulshan PASHAEVA

Ph.D. (Philol.), Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Baku, Azerbaijan).

EUROPEAN MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Abstract

he article looks at the possibility of that the so-called interim status of Nagorno- T using several key elements in some Karabakh developed on the basis of Euro- of Europe’s autonomous entities as a pean experience could later be an integral base model for settling the Armenian-Azeri part in determining the final status of this Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is presumed region.

Introduction

When analyzing the reasons for the existing or potential conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse, politicians and experts frequently refer to the lack of correspondence between the current political- administrative and the historical religious, ethnic, or linguistic borders. Furthermore, this lack of correspondence is characteristic of many countries, whereby world experience shows that direct attempts to set this matter to rights end in the emergence of new, even more complicated problems. In this context, the experience of European regionalization—the long-term strategy of the EU member states aimed at systematic and consistent expansion of the competences of regions in the political, socioeconomic, and cultural spheres—is of immense practical interest. That said, despite the fact that many 8 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

EU countries have regions where national minorities compactly reside, the separation of such regions based on ethnocultural factors alone is a relatively rare occurrence,1 while the main objective of the EU’s regional policy is to reduce the gap in the socioeconomic development levels of different regions. The principle of subsidiariness,2 which defines the approach to distributing powers among different levels of authority, is the legal basis of regionalism in the EU. Within the framework of this approach, management problems should primarily be resolved at the regional (and/or local) level, providing that their resolution is possible and effective. On the other hand, the central government traditionally reserves itself exclusive powers in such spheres as foreign policy, defense, currency regulation, customs and border service, and constitutional legislation, for example, whereby keeping in mind the legal interests of the regions. It is believed that this harmonious redistribution of rights and duties between the central and regional authorities promotes the establishment of the relevant procedures and institutions that make it possible to combine local self-administration and national interests, as well as defuse the ethnic, religious, and cultural tension that arises in multiethnic states. At the same time, the long and successful experience of regional autonomies in several Europe- an countries provides sufficiently compelling reasons for using these autonomies as models in conflict settlement. To confirm this, experts have even been discussing the possibility of adopting certain elements of the Åland model, for example, in relation to the so-called northern territories that continue to be the main bone of contention in Russian-Japanese relations.3 Another pertinent point is that as early as 1999, a group of members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe submitted a resolution draft on universal principles for resolving ethnic conflicts in Council of Europe member states, whereby the model of conflict settlement used on the Åland Islands was one of the successful examples pointed out.4 Beginning in the mid-1990s, the idea of using the positive experience of several European autonomous entities as a model of conflict settlement became quite popular among the representatives of several international organizations, state structures, the expert community, and the public of the South Caucasian countries. It is generally known that the European models of autonomy help to overcome the downside of extreme administration centralization and make it possible to create favorable opportunities for socioeconomic development and preservation of the national-cultural identity of minorities within a single state. And although the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group has still not led to any visible success in settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is obvious that studying European experience is of great practical significance both for Azerbaijan and for Armenia, since it makes it possible for the conflicting sides to delineate the basic outlines of the autonomy that the Armenian population of the region could be offered. One of the possible ways to withdraw from the impasse is to offer Nagorno-Karabakh a so- called interim status that would allow the sides to temporarily retreat from their extreme viewpoints on status definition and concentrate on resolving the region’s urgent socioeconomic and humanitarian problems. Baku believes that this approach, by ensuring the legitimacy of this self-governed territory,

1 See: Regionalnaia politika stran ES, ed. by A.V. Kuznetsov, Institute of World Economy and International Rela- tions, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2009, p. 9, available at [http://www.imemo.ru/ru/publ/2009/09024.pdf] (availability of all Internet resources checked as of 1 July, 2012.—G.P.). 2 See: I.I. Khokhlov, “Subsidiarnost kak printsip i mekhanizm politiki Evrosoiuza,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 5, 2004, pp. 95-101, available at [http://www.edu.ru/db/portal/e-library/00000045/ Hohlov.pdf]. 3 See: M. Ikegami, “Rost doveriia, bezopasnost cheloveka, smiagchenie suvereniteta: reshenie problemy ‘sev- ernykh territorii’, podskazannoe ‘Alandskoi modeliu,’” Analytical Reports of the Scientific-Coordination Council on In- ternational Studies of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University), Russian Foreign Ministry, Issue 4 (19), October 2007; Development and Stability in Northeast Asia, Papers from the Fourth Russian-Japanese Scientific Practical Conference, Moscow, 18 October, 2006, pp. 28-31, available at in Russian [http://www.mgimo.ru/files/11817/ad-19.pdf]. 4 See: Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Council of Europe Member States, Motion for a Resolution, Doc. 8425, 28 May, 1999, available at [http://www.assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc99/EDOC8425.htm]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION will allow the Armenian and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh, relying on European practice, to independently form legislative, executive, municipal, and other local bodies, the functioning of which will create favorable conditions for drawing up a consensus decision about the final status of the region.

European Autonomies: From Opposition to Cooperation

During the long years of their development, the leading European countries have been able to create diverse forms of autonomous entities that enjoy different degrees of self-government for protecting the collective rights of ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities. According to the fig- urative expression offered by Ruth Lapidoth, author of the book Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, “Autonomy is a means for diffusion of powers in order to preserve the unity of a state while respecting the diversity of its population.”5 In practice, a solution to this dual task is reached by heeding not only the majority’s, but also the minority’s opinion when making decisions on important issues, that is, in this case, “the principle of consensus” proves just as significant as “the principle of the majority.”6 At first glance, this mechanism does not entirely correspond to the generally accepted formula “one person-one vote.” However, experience shows the expediency of using particular conciliation mechanisms for making consensus decisions in the event that one of the sides (the central government or the autonomy) thinks that the other side has exceeded its legislative powers. With this in mind, such examples of autonomous entities as the Åland Islands (Finland) and Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol (Italy) are of particular interest. Despite their different historical experience, these European autonomies share several common factors, taking account of which could prove beneficial for reaching a conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. n First, these autonomies are essentially national-territorial entities, the majority of the population of which belongs to an ethnic community that is in turn a minority within the framework of the entire state. n Second, in order to retain the identity of the minority, these autonomies have the right to independently form their own legislative, executive, and other local bodies. n Third, each of these models of autonomy is continuously evolving, which leads to the dynamic redistribution of powers between the central government and the government bodies of the autonomous region, as well as influences the set of powers that applies to matters of their joint competence. n Fourth, these autonomies have effective guarantees,7 including international, to ensure their stable functioning. It is worth noting that a positive contribution was made to resolution of the conflict situations around several European autonomies precisely by those neighboring countries that supported the population of these autonomies in their opposition to the center due to ethnic kinship, on the one hand,

5 R. Lapidoth, Autonomy:Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, United State Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 3. 6 T. Fliainer, “Pravovye mekhanizmy i protsedury dlia predotvrashcheniia i resheniia natsionalnykh konfliktov iz opyta shveitsarskoi konstitutsii,” Kazanasky federalist, No. 3 (7), 2003, available at [http://www.kazanfed.ru/dokladi/jornal/kazfed_7.pdf]. 7 For more on guarantees in conflict settlement, see: St. Wolff, Guarantees and Conflict Settlements, available at [http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/Guarantees%20in%20Conflict%20Settlements.pdf]. 10 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and strictly adhered to the basic principles of international law, on the other. Particular mention should also be made of Sweden’s level-headed posture, which acceded to the League of Nations’ ruling that the Åland Islands belonged to Finland.8 To present another example, Austria and Italy struggled long and hard over the situation in South Tyrol, where different ethnic groups, whose current status depended on which of the two state entities this region belonged to, lived for many centuries. Before World War I, the Trentino-South Tyrol region belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while the Italians who made up the majority of the population in Trentino comprised the national minority in this empire. However, in 1919, in accordance with the Saint Germaine Treaty that de jure registered the fall of the empire, all the territories to the south of the Brenner Pass went to Italy. Venezia Tridentina, which comprises Italian- speaking Trentino and Alto Adige, populated mainly by a German-speaking population, who in turn became a national minority in the Italian State, was created in these territories. Furthermore, another ethnic minority has lived in this region from time immemorial—the Ladins, whose language belongs to the Rhaeto-Roman subgroup of languages and who presently comprise around 4% of the population of South Tyrol.9 It should be noted that despite the outcome of World War I, Austria did not consider the question of South Tyrol to be finally closed and hoped that Germany, as well as close cooperation between the Hitler and Mussolini regimes, would promote its favorable outcome. But the state interests of Germany and Italy took the upper hand and the German-speaking population of South Tyrol was offered the choice of either abandoning its homeland and adopting German citizenship, or remaining and having to deal with the real threat of assimilation by the Italians. The first attempt to finally settle the problem was made in 1946 after an interstate treaty between Austria and Italy was signed (the so-called Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement).10 Within the framework of this treaty, the German-speaking population of the province of Bolzano (South Tyrol) and the neighboring bilingual population settlements of the province of Trento were guaranteed complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants, the opportunity to obtain an education in their native language, and use German in public institutions and official documents; they were also issued a quota for entering the public sector. However, in 1948, when it adopted the first legislative act on the status of the autonomy, Italy united the province of Bolzano (South Tyrol) and Trento, thus forming a single region Trentino- Alto Adige. Having done so, ethnic Italians began to form the significant majority (around two thirds of the population) in this new autonomous region, which naturally aroused discontent among the German-speaking population. Austria supported the demands of the South Tyrolese, raising this question for the first time at the international level in the U.N. in 1960. A corresponding reso- lution11 of the U.N. General Assembly urged the two parties concerned to resume negotiations with a view to finding a solution for all differences relating to the implementation of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement. Eventually, in 1969, the Italian and Austrian Governments agreed to a so- called Package of some 137 measures designed to revise the 1948 Autonomy Statute, as well as an 18-stage Operational Calendar for the Package’s implementation.12 In 1972, a new significantly

8 For more on the special features of the Åland model in the context of defining the future status of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict, see: G. Pashaeva, “The Åland Precedent,” Caucasus International, No. 2, Autumn 2011, available at [http://caucasusinternational.org/article/30]. 9 See: “South Tyrol in Figures,” 2011, available at [http://www.provinz.bz.it/en/downloads/Siz_2011-eng.pdf]. 10 See: Treaty of Peace with Italy. Appendix IV, available at [http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Vol- ume%2049/v49.pdf]. 11 See: Resolution No. 1497 of the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly on “The Status of the German- Speaking Element in the Province of Bolzano (Bozen), Implementation of the Paris Agreement of 5 September 1946,” available at [http://www.un.org/ru/documents/ods.asp?m=A/RES/1497(XV)]. 12 See: A. Alcock, The South Tyrol Autonomy. A Short Introduction, 2001, available at [http://www.provinz.bz.it/ en/downloads/South-Tyrol-Autonomy.pdf]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION revised Autonomy Statute13 was adopted on the basis of the Package, however in practice, full implementation of all the agreements was not achieved until 1992, after which Austria officially declared in the U.N. that the dispute with Italy over South Tyrol had been terminated.14 Incidentally, the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement is still in effect, since it not only forms the legal basis for the current Statute of South Tyrol, but is also an integral part of the peace treaty between Italy and its allies, which in this case essentially act as the guarantors of its performance. This fact has played a significant role in the positive development of the situation around South Tyrol, since the borders of both Austria and Italy were enforced by several agreements adopted at the end of World War II, thus placing the conflicting sides within a strict legal framework. There can be no doubt that integration of Austria and Italy into a single supranational entity—the European Union, which en- tailed the creation of an interstate transborder alliance—the Euro Region, the territory of which includes the Austrian Federal Region of Tyrol and the Italian Autonomous Region of Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol also helped to remove the contradictions in South Tyrol. The problem of South Tyrol once more showed that effective settlement of an ethnopolitical conflict, particularly when the interests of many actors are affected, is entirely possible if its participants can forego their maximalist demands for the sake of achieving an end result, thus making a contribution to mutually advantageous integration and peaceful cooperation between previously conflicting nations. In particular, Austria, by supporting the fair demands of the German-speaking minority, treated the national interests and territorial integrity of Italy with respect, while the Italian government, by supporting the adoption of the region’s new Statute in 1972, performed its obligations to protect the rights of its German-speaking citizens. The representatives of the main linguistic communities of South Tyrol also played their role, with the joint participation of whom a harmonious system of political institutions was created in the region ensuring equal relations both between the communities and between the autonomy and the center.

Interim Status for Nagorno-Karabakh

As we know, one of the reasons the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has still not been settled, despite the many years of efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group, is the absence of generally accepted rules for resolving this kind of ethnoterritorial conflict. Unfortunately, the world actors have been unable to reach a common opinion about when the right to self-determination should be realized exclusively within the borders of countries that already exist and are recognized by the world community, although determination in precisely this issue would promote a reduction in the threat to the national security and territorial integrity of many states. Moreover, in recent years we have been increasingly witness to a selective attitude toward the basic principles of international law on the part of the leading nations, particularly with respect to the conflicts in the Balkan countries and in the post-Soviet expanse. We can talk as long as we want about the degree of guilt of the sides involved in the events of August 2008, but we would do well to heed the opinion of well-known specialist in international law Rein Müllerson, who believes that “by formally recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia acted as rashly as those Western

13 See: Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol) Special Statute, available at [http://www.gfbv.it/3dossier/diritto/ statuteng.html]. 14 See: Letter dated 17 June, 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A/46/939 of 19 June, 1992, available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N92/263/51/PDF/N9226351.pdf?OpenElement]. 12 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION states which recognized Kosovo; both sides thus further opened the Pandora”s box of territorial disputes.”15 As for Nagorno-Karabakh, to be fair, it is worth recalling one of the first attempts to officially delineate a conceptual framework of conflict settlement made at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996.16 The Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group recommended three principles at that time for settling the Armenian-Azeri conflict, which were: territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Az- erbaijan Republic; legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; and guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population. As we know, Armenia, which sees in absolute terms the right of part of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh not only to self-determination, but also essentially to self-secession and the creation of their own state, was the only country that refused to support these principles, in particular the principle of territorial integrity. Unfortunately, the consensus nature of decision-making in the OSCE is projected onto the whole negotiation process, which for many years now continues to be based on the principle of “consent to everything or nothing.” This hinders the opportunities of the Minsk Group to put pressure on the negotiation process, on the one hand, and creates the possibility for the sides in the conflict to reject practically any proposal of mediators based merely on their own vision of final settlement of the conflict, on the other. This became particularly obvious after 2001, when the details of the three settlement proposals offered by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group in 1997-1998 were published for the first time: the so- called “package solution,” “step-by-step” solution, and “common state” proposal.17 As we know, the “step-by-step” solution aroused the fewest objections, both sides expressing their preliminary consent to it. Unfortunately, the then President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian was unable to convince his political opponents of the expediency of adopting this solution and was forced to step down, after which Armenia officially abandoned these proposals.18 An analysis of the events of those years again confirms the thought that only those settlement proposals can be of practical interest in which the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is not defined until the subsequent stages of the negotiation process, since otherwise further development of the negotiations will inevitably be blocked by one or other of the sides. Evidently the co-chairmen proceeded from these considerations when they put forward new proposals for settling the conflict—the so-called Madrid Principles, which were officially presented to the sides at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the OSCE member states in Madrid in November 2007.19 As we know, during the previous three years, the co-chairmen had repeatedly confirmed their adherence to the approach based on the Madrid Principles in various joint statements and urged the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fulfill their obligations regarding coordination of the main principles for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.20 According to the Madrid document, which was first published in 2009, lasting settlement should be based on the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principles of refraining

15 R. Müllerson, “The World after the Russia-Georgia War,” 15 September, 2008, available at [http://www. opendemocracy.net/article/the-world-after-the-russia-georgia-war]. See: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lisbon Summit, 1996, pp. 15-16, available at [http:// www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true]. 17 See: “The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process,” Accord, Concilia- tion Resources, London, 2005, pp. 32-37, available at [http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/17_Nagorny%20Karabakh_ 2005_ENG_F.pdf]. 18 See: I.M. Mammadov, T.F. Musaev, Armiano-azerbaidzhansky konflikt: istoria, pravo, posrednichestvo, Baku, 2008, p. 126. 19 See: OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Issue Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, 29 November, 2007, available at [http://www.osce.org/mg/49237]. 20 See: Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and François Hollande, President of the French Republic at the Los Cabos Summit of the Twenty, 19 June, 2012, available at [http://www.osce.org/mg/91393]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION from the threat or use of force, respect for territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The document also asserts that settlement should be based on the following six elements21: n return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; n an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-govern- ance; n a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; n future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; n the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and n international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. It stands to reason that being in a state of profound confrontation, each of the conflicting sides interprets literally each of these elements, as well as the sequence for carrying them out, only from the perspective of their own interests. But the main thing is that the Madrid document does not assert the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, but only makes general mention of the mechanism for determining it by holding a referendum of the region’s population. So it goes without saying that such factors as the conflicting sides recognizing the legitimacy of a referendum, the mechanism, as well as the deadlines for holding it are becoming extremely important. Armenia thinks that the Azeris cannot return to Nagorno-Karabakh before holding a referen- dum22 and advocates the setting of clear time frames for holding it, presuming that owing to the numerical predominance of the Armenian community (as of the beginning of the conflict), the outcome of this referendum will be a foregone conclusion.23 It stands to reason that the international community will hardly support this approach since “this is too simplistic a reading of the possibilities a referendum could offer,” while “ideally it would cement a negotiated peace deal and secure popular approval for its implementation.” 24 And, of course, this mechanism of “guaranteed alien- ation” of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot suit the Azeri side, which, realizing the practical inapplicabil- ity of this form of “package” settlement of the conflict, prefers not to set specific time frames for this process.25 Moreover, as mentioned above, the European experience of settling ethnonational conflicts shows that the adopted decisions cannot always be legitimized by simple calculation of votes of the majority, since in this case the rights of the minority will inevitably be infringed upon. If settlement follows the scenario proposed by the Armenian side, the Azeri community of Nagorno-Karabakh will be that minority. To follow the logic of this scenario, the Armenian side should offer the Azeri community of Nagorno-Karabakh the same high status it demands for the Armenian community of this region. So either the Armenian side must agree that determination of the region’s final status requires

21 See: Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by U.S. President Obama, Russian President Medvedev, and French President Sarkozy at the L’Aquila Summit of the Eight, 10 July, 2009, available at [http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-nagorno-karabakh-conflict]. 22 See: President Serzh Sargsian answers the question of host of Vesti v subbotu Sergey Brilyov, 21 September, 2009, available in Russian at [http://president.am/events/press/rus/?year=2009&pn=1&id=37]. 23 See: Interview of Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Edward Nalbandian to the TV Channel Russia Today, January 2011, available in Russian at [http://www.mfa.am/ru/interviews/item/2011/01/30/russiatoday/]. 24 Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 167, 11 October, 2005, p. 16, available at [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng= en&id=13730]. 25 See: Exclusive interview of Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mamediarov to the Mediamax Agency, “Vremennýe ramki golosovania uslozhniat situatsiiu,” 11 March, 2011, available at [http://mediamax.am/ru-news-3-225.html]. 14 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION taking the opinion of the Azeri community into account, or continue to violate its rights, as it has been doing for more than 20 years now. Nor should we forget that apart from infringing on the rights of the Azeri community, the conflict also led to violation of the rights of the hundreds of thousands of people populating the entire Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, which from the historical and geographical viewpoint has always comprised the lower (valley) and upper (mountainous) parts. In the national economic respect, Kara- bakh was a single entity, which was largely due to the fact that the Azeri population of lower Karabakh has long used the mountainous part of upper Karabakh (as well as part of the territory of present-day Armenia bordering on this region) as its summer pastures. Owing to this, as well as to the geographic features of the region, transport routes between the mountainous and valley parts of Karabakh passed largely from east to west through the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Unfortunately, the objective existence of such a socioeconomic and geographic concept as Greater Karabakh is still underestimated or even ignored by both the Armenian side and the international mediators, who prefer to view the conflict exclusively within the framework of an ethnic confrontation between the Armenian minority and Azerbaijan state. Meanwhile, it is difficult not to agree with Anatoly Yamskov’s statement that determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Lachin corridor, the legal position of the city of Shusha, and other complicated matters is not enough for achieving lasting peace in the region. In his opinion, “true settlement of the Karabakh conflict is only possible with restoration and further development of mutually advantageous and truly vital economic ties for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent regions of Azerbaijan in transport routes, power engineering and communications, and the use of water resources.”26 So it is obvious that long-term settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh does not boil down to the notorious formula “territory in exchange for a referendum,” but demands taking solici- tous account of the interests of both the Armenian and the Azeri communities of the region, as well as of the residents of the entire Greater Karabakh. One of the elements of the Madrid Principles, the so- called interim status,27 can play an important role in defining the mechanism for coordinating these interests. The Armenian side is trying to diminish the value of this element, claiming that the interim status offered Nagorno-Karabakh should be defined only as “all that Nagorno-Karabakh has today, plus the international recognition of that” (a so-called status-quo-plus arrangement).28 Meanwhile, in contrast to the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the determination of which can be unequivocally interpreted by each of the sides as victory or defeat, the interim status is a priori intended for solving very different tasks. The Azeri side views the interim status as an inevitable and very important stage in preparing favorable conditions for consensus determination (but not predetermination) of the final status of this region, whereby the elements of this status should later become an integral part of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.29 When examining the question of granting Nagorno-Karabakh an interim status, we should also remember that the formation of modern autonomies in Europe has been a dynamic process stretching over long years. For example, over the more than 90 years that have passed since the Åland question first arose, the Law on Autonomy of this region has been amended several times. In particular, the

26 A. Yamskov, “Traditsionnoe zemlepolzovanie kochevnikov istoricheskogo Karabakha i sovremenny armiano-azerbaidzhansky etnoterritorialny konflikt,” in: Faktor etno-konfessionalnoi samobytnosti v postsovetskom obshchestve, ed. by M. Olkott, A. Malashenko, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 1998, pp. 168-197, available at [http://ethnoecology. ru/texts/yamskov/1998%20Traditsionnoe%20zemlepolzovanie%20kochevnikovistoricheskogo%20Karabakha.pdf]. 27 See also: G. Pashaeva, “In Search of Reciprocal Compromises,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, 2012, pp. 115- 167, available at [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/In-Search-of-Reciprocal-Compromises-15509]. 28 See: “The Security Challenges in the Foreign Policy of Armenia,” IISS Newsletters, September 2011, p. 13. 29 See: “We Can Calmly Reach a Peace Agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh,” Interview of Foreign Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic E. Mamediarov to Interfax, 13 July, 2011, available in Russian at [http://www.interfax.ru/ txt.asp?id=199137&sec=1483]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION first Law on Autonomy adopted by the Finnish parliament in May 1920, but rejected by the Swedish- speaking population of the islands, was revised again after the well-known ruling of the League of Nations of 24 June, 1921. It incorporated several guarantees concerning the language of instruction in schools, the right to own land on the Åland Islands, the right to vote at elections to the local parliament and councils, and the provisions on founding the institution of governor, which ultimately promoted recognition of this law by the population of the Åland Islands. After that, the Law on Autonomy was revised twice in 1951 and 1991 and approved by the parliaments of Finland and the Åland Islands. A similar situation has also been observed in South Tyrol, where settlement of the conflict lasted for almost 50 years, and more than seventy decrees of the President of the Italian Republic were needed to implement the new Autonomy Statute of this region in 1972-1992.30 Based on this, it seems that precisely “interim” conditions are the natural environment for drawing up political and legal mechanisms of collaboration both between the Armenian and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and between the relevant self-government bodies of this region and the government of the Azerbaijan Republic, as well as for establishing clear procedures for reaching a consensus in the event of a conflict of interests.

Conclusion

Despite the effectiveness of the European models of national-territorial autonomies, the attitude toward them in the Southern Caucasus remains ambiguous due to the significant differences in how institutions of regional self-government function in Europe and how they did in the former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet societies who are familiar only with vertical government management structures are still skeptical about the idea of non-conflict coexistence between the central government and national autonomies. However, neither Azerbaijan, nor Armenia, which for more than 10 years now have been members of the Council of Europe, as well as participants in the EU Eastern Partnership program, cannot ignore the successful experience of the formation of European autonomies, in particular, in the Italian region of Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol). Moreover, in contrast to the Åland Islands with their essentially homogeneous Swedish-speaking population, the pronounced dual community of South Tyrol and, correspondingly, the need to reach a consensus between two communities in important decision-making allow this region to be considered as a base model for settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. European practice shows that effective distribution of powers between the local and central government bodies and the use of consensus mechanisms for making joint decisions on matters of mutual interest can promote the formation of harmonious (essentially “non-vertical”) relations between ethnic regions and the center. The elements of these relations could be used to settle the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh if Armenia abandons the absolutely unpromising formula “territories in exchange for independence.”31 In this case, within the framework of an alternative triple formula “territories in exchange for an interim status, security, and economic cooperation,” the Armenian side can certainly count on certain legitimization de facto of the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities (providing the Azeris are involved in the self-government processes in the region), on Azerbaijan refraining from the

30 See: K. Rainer, “Zakonodatelstvo avtonomnoi provintsii Iuzhny Tirol,” Kazansky federalist, Nos. 1-2 (21-22), 2007, p. 54, available at [http://www.kazanfed.ru/dokladi/jornal/kazfed_21-22.pdf]. 31 Certain representatives of the expert community of Armenia also recognize the lack of prospects of this formula, suggesting that it be replaced by the formula “territories in exchange for security” (see: Agenda for Armenian Foreign Policy 2011: Expert Analysis of the Analytical Center on Globalization and Regional Cooperation, Erevan, 2010, p. 22, available at [http://www.fes.ge/images/Fes_Files/2011-Publ-AM/agenda%20for%20armenian%20foreign%20policy% 202011.pdf]). 16 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION use of military force (underpinned by international guarantees), and on the restoration of transport routes and Armenia’s full-fledged incorporation into regional cooperation. Whatever the case, it is obvious that a long-term solution regarding the final status of Nagorno- Karabakh is only possible in the event of a consensus. In this context, as of today, an interim status is the most realistic instrument capable of stimulating the negotiation process and promoting a resolution of the socioeconomic problems of the Armenian and Azeri population of Greater Karabakh. And only in this event will this region be able to once more perform its historical transit function between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time, full-fledged reintegration of the Azeri community into the sociopolitical and socioeconomic life of Nagorno-Karabakh should create favorable conditions for holding successful talks on the final status of the region. As the Azeri side sees it, only decisions made within the framework of an equal dialog between the two communities can be considered legitimate both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan.

Rauf GARAGOZOV

Ph.D. (Psychol.), Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Baku, Azerbaijan).

Rena KADYROVA

D.Sc. (Psychol.), Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

NARRATIVE AND RECONCILIATION: POSSIBLE STRATEGIES OF NARRATIVE INTERVENTION IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Abstract

he authors discuss narratives that can They have also formulated certain T be constructed and used to achieve principles to be applied to texts in order to reconciliation in ethnic and national transform “sealed off” and conflicting nar- conflicts; they rely on empirical material (the ratives into a “harmonized” narrative indis- Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Arme- pensable for reducing the sides’ negative nia and Azerbaijan) to illustrate their theo- attitudes and for achieving lasting peace retical deliberations. in the region. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It is good for everyone to know how to forget. Ernest Renan

…at the critical turning point of human existence he desired to amend many social conditions, the product of inequality and avarice and international animosity. James Joyce

Introduction

We have written this article to demonstrate how narratives can be constructed and used to achieve reconciliation in ethnic and national conflicts; we will rely on empirical material of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan to specify our theoretical constructs. What is “narrative?” Interpretations may vary, yet on the whole “narratives (stories) in the human sciences should be defined provisionally as discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience.”1 To put it in a nutshell, it is an oral or written account of certain imaginary or real events. The importance of narratives is not limited to individuals who, according to psychologists and specialists in psychotherapy, rely on them to perceive and explain their lives. Large social groups and communities rely on narratives to mediate collective remem- bering, among other phenomena. In fact, the functions of the narrative as an instrument of social cognition are much wider than it was thought before: the new social epistemology that took shape at the end of the 20th century concentrates on various types of narratives as forms of cognition of social reality. In this article, we will discuss the peacekeeping function of narrative and its reconciliatory role and will try to answer the question: What makes narratives peacekeeping, assuming that such narratives are possible in principle? For many reasons, we know less about the peacekeeping function of narratives than about other narrative types. Indeed, we know much more about “malignant” narratives that ignite conflicts, hatred, and wars. There is any number of speeches delivered by leaders of all hues kept in archives all over the world that have stirred up massive indignation and driven people to violence and conflicts. We, therefore, will start our analysis by re-formulating the question: What makes narratives “malignant” and driving people to violence? Texts must be very simple to be easily grasped even by the most primitive social groups; they must stir up the memory of past humiliations and injustice and remind people of their “glorious past” and “great future” worthy of sacrifices and crimes. Such narratives do not tolerate ambivalence or even the shadow of a doubt. A detailed discussion of these extreme forms brings the typical features of such narratives into bolder relief: all of them are self-contained; their logic is squeezed into pinching limits that seal them off from what the opposite side has to say; they are extremely one-sided, simplified, and mythological. Let us discuss the “sealed off” narratives about Nagorno-Karabakh used by Armenians and Azeris, the two opposing sides in the conflict.

The Armenian Narrative

In Armenia these narratives, ideas, and perceptions are of a multilayered and multilevel nature. On the surface, these narratives insist that “from time immemorial” Nagorno-Karabakh has been

1 L.P. Hinchman, S.K. Hinchman, “Introduction,” in: Memory, Identity, Community. The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences, ed. by L.P. Hinchman, S.K. Hinchman, State University of New York, New York, 2001, p. xvi. 18 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Armenian territory. This makes the Azeris newcomers who have no right to interfere in the affairs of the Armenian population and explains why the very fact of Nagorno-Karabakh becoming an autonomous region of Azerbaijan is perceived as a hostile act carried out by Stalin and resulting from the pressure the neighboring Turkish Republic exerted on the still fairly weak Soviet state. There is a deeper, metanarrative, layer—the “1915 genocide of Armenians” in the Ottoman Empire—through which Armenians perceive their own history.

The Azeri Narrative

The Azeri side has created the following narratives: the “inalienable” territorial, cultural, and historical ties between Karabakh and Azerbaijan, in which the large number of Armenian migrants from Turkey and Iran were nothing more than newcomers. It was Russia that largely encouraged migration and settled the new arrivals in Azeri lands. Contemporary Armenia appeared in the lands of the Erivan Khanate that Russia conquered in the 19th century and destroyed as a state. The Azeris perceive the appearance of the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region in Azerbaijan, when the Bolsheviks came to power, as evidence of Armenian influence on Moscow, on the one hand, and as a sign that Moscow had not abandoned the imperial “divide and rule” policy, on the other. In this connection, the desire of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to separate from Azerbaijan, which they articulated in 1988, was perceived by the Azeris as an Armenian attempt to destroy the territorial and state integrity of Azerbaijan and more evidence of the Armenians’ “primordial” hatred of everything Turkic. Here are two versions of the past events related to Karabakh that interpret the past, distant past, and even what happened in antiquity in two different ways.2 No mutually acceptable and sustainable peace can stand on such “sealed off” narratives. If the sides want to resolve the Karabakh conflict peacefully, another narrative must be introduced to “break the seals,” to start a dialog, and to correlate or “harmonize” the narratives. This leads to the question of possible strategies of narrative intervention: How can the narratives be “retuned” to achieve more harmony?

On the “Legal” Nature of Narrative Intervention

If we agree with post-neoclassical social epistemology3 and with what Hayden White wrote about the narrative discourse of historical representation,4 which say that there is a multitude of “truths” and opinions (rather than one and only one historical truth) for the simple reason that they have a multitude of sources, then we have to admit that the Armenian and Azeri narratives described above can be changed. Broken seals will lead the sides to dialog, the most important condition of mutual trust of the conflicting sides. In this case, we can and should ask: How should the communicative function of a narrative be organized? Or what are possible strategies of a narrative intervention as applied to the narratives of the conflicting sides?

2 See: F. Shafiev, “Ethnic Myths and Perceptions as a Hurdle to Conflict Settlement: The Armenian-Azerbaijani Case,” The Caucasus & Globalization, No. 1 (2), 2007, pp. 57-72. 3 See: P. Berger, T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, An- chor Books, Garden City, New York, 1966. 4 See: H. White, The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourse & Historical Representation, The Johns Hopkins University Press, London, 1987. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Before going on with a direct discussion of the problem, we would like to present an example of how artistic narratives are perceived and understood.5 This was written fairly long ago, but this analysis will help us find the best possible strategy of narrative changes of historical representations.

Reading as a Sense Producing Activity: Akutagawa’s “In a Grove”6

The composition of this story, written in 1922,—a collection of monologues of people who present their own contradictory accounts of a murder in a bamboo grove—set it apart. There are three main accounts:

A. The Robber’s Version. B. The Woman’s Version. C. The Husband’s (Samurai’s) Version.

More often than not the reader concentrates on the detective side of the story in an effort to guess who committed the crime and what “really” happened. The group of students to whom the text was offered as a psychological test, likewise, tried to find out which of the participants in the drama was telling the truth, who was lying, and who was the murderer. Nearly all the answers were built on personal preferences: one of the students was inclined to accept the version of the samurai because “women are the source of all evil;” another believed that the robber was the murderer. We cannot exclude the possibility that in the course of logical deliberations, the reader will discover the flaws of his strategy because the text does not contain any indications, that is, “objective” evidence that any of the versions is true/false. In fact, the reader is confronted with a “parallel” structure: three different events—A, B, and C—take place at one and the same time in one and the same place. This obviously contradicts the classical idea of unity of time and space according to which identical—but not mutually contradictory—events can coincide in time and space. This presents the reader with a dilemma that cannot be resolved by formal logic. In this case, the “detective” approach is useless—the reader must turn to other “paradigms.” The search for other paradigms inevitably reveals that these possibilities are equally true/false which defies logic; further analysis suggests that more “paradigms” should be found. A “map of alternative models of plot development” is one of the methods that stimulates this search, viz. the “logically justified possibilities of the plot” when all versions of the plot development are studied one by one. When complete, the procedures produce a process which, in its concise form, can be presented as a table (here we present a real “map of logical possibilities” compiled by N.K., one of the students):

A Map of Logical Possibilities of Plot Development

Development of the Plot Alternative Models of Plot Development

A. The Robber’s Version

1. Lured the man into a grove and tied him to a tree x—x

5 See: R.R. Garagozov, “Reading as a Sense Producing Activity,” in: Art & Emotions, The Perm State Institute of Culture, Perm, 1991, pp. 211-219. 6 See: R. Akutagawa, “In a Grove,” Transl. by T. Kojima, available at [http://ru.scribd.com/doc/3682435/In-a- Grove-by-Ryunosuke-Akutagawa]. 20 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(continued)

Development of the Plot Alternative Models of Plot Development

2. Raped the woman x—x

3. Fell in love with her and tried to persuade her to remain with him x—x

4. She agreed if one of the men died x—x

5. The robber untied the man and The robber murdered the man still tied killed him in a swordfight to the tree

Meaning definition: “…hard to say, I cannot define the meaning.”

Meaning 1: “…the robber would act dishonorably by killing the husband tied to a tree…”

Meaning 2: “…If the robber told the truth than he acted nobly or wanted to pass for a noble man...”

B. The Woman’s Version

1. Rape

2. The robber disappeared

3. The woman guessed that her husband She was aware of her husband’s hated her compassion and commiseration

4. Unable to survive disgrace in front of She untied her husband and they trailed her husband she decided to kill him along the road in deep sorrow. Or they and herself part ways… Or probably she untied him and he killed her and then committed suicide

5. She killed her husband, but could not kill herself

Meaning definition: “…she probably told the truth since she had every reason to kill her husband…”

Meaning 1: “She followed the code of honor as she understood it…”

Meaning 2: “…placed in a rigid system of ideas about honor she had either to kill her husband or to present the case in this way…”

C. The Husband’s (His Ghost’s) Version

1. Rape The robber killed the woman and disappeared. The husband vowed over the dead body of his wife to avenge her. His grief probably drove him to suicide

2. The robber tried to persuade the woman to remain with him

3. The wife agreed but demanded that the robber kill her husband Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(continued)

Development of the Plot Alternative Models of Plot Development

4. The robber enraged by the woman’s Since the woman was alive, the husband perfidy suggested that he and was killed either by the robber or by the husband punish her the woman

5. The husband did not want to punish the woman, who runs away

6. The robber loosens the ties binding the man and disappears

7. The man commits suicide

Meaning definition: “…The ghost is probably telling the truth since ghosts do not lie…” Meaning: “…If he was killed by the robber or by his own wife he was dishonored once more. It is much more honorable to commit suicide…”

While working on the map of logical possibilities the reader identifies the following rhythmic-meaning structure—repeated admissions of murder—in an effort to look honorable each of the characters claims that he/she committed the murder. In this case, the story can be interpreted as follows:

A. The Robber’s Version B. The Woman’s Version C. The Husband’s Version

A . Claims that he murdered B . Claims that she C . Claims that he the husband murdered the husband killed himself

Each claims the murder according to their own code of honor.

This rhythmic-meaning structure brings together the semantically opposite concepts honor/ crime and nobleness/murder as the basic axiological values of the story put in a nutshell. This rhythmic structure is a sort of a key to the story’s symbolic meaning, which reveals the story’s value “contradiction.” A paper submitted by one of the students (N.K.) demonstrated that, when properly identified, this rhythmic structure can lead deeper into the symbolism of the story. In his report, he wrote: “We do not know what really happened; this is of no importance… The fact that the three characters claim that they committed murder guided by their moral code of honor reveals the stifling nature of moral injunctions. The very title (the title of the Russian translation “V Chashche” suggests an impen- etrable forest.—Tr.) is symbolic. It means that people are still living in a forest of prejudices. A code or rituals is the true culprit to be brought to the court of justice! Our life brims with obsolete norms and “rituals” which make life unbearable.” The student went on to say that his parents very much devoted to old norms had objected to his marriage with a woman who loved him and thus ruined his happiness. The above suggests two conclusions. n First, the story can, to a certain extent, be regarded as a proto-image of the Armenian and Azeri historical narratives about Karabakh: very much like the accounts of what happened in the grove, they contain very different or even contradictory versions of what happened in the past. n Second, the conclusions of an analysis of the story deserve attention. 22 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Our experiment led to the following conclusions: there are four levels of understanding the story, which can be conventionally described as follows: Ø 1st level —the “formal” meanings stemming from a purely formal interpretation of the text; Ø 2nd level —the plot’s meanings, which reveal the rhythmic structure without stressing its “value” contradiction and without revealing its symbolism; Ø 3rd level —the author’s meanings, which reveal the symbolic side of the story; Ø 4th level —“personalized” meanings, which contain much deeper interpretations of the text and which include fragments of personal experience and its re-evaluation. We came to the conclusion that interpreting the meaning depends on what steps the reader carries out to this end, i.e. reconstruction of the plot; modification of the plot; or identification of rhythmic (repeated) constructions and their correlation with the meaning of the story. In fact, this is done to reconstruct the elements of the spatial-temporal (chronotopical) organization of a literary text. This pattern is, in fact, a model of chronotopical reading, that is, reading which relies on “chronotopical patterns.”7 Now we should move on to possible strategies of narrative changes.

Version 1: The Multi-Perspective Approach

Some researchers suggest that the so-called multi-perspective approach can serve as one of the forms of narrative change8 in which the analyst deals with several, rather than one, versions of the same event; this offers a chance to look at what is called historical truth from different perspectives.9 Those who support this approach insist: “This process entails understanding that we too have a perspective which has been filtered through our own cultural context, reflects our own standpoint and interpretation of what has happened and why, our own view of what is and is not relevant, and may also reflect other prejudices and biases.”10 In other words, it is suggested that having been exposed to different versions of the same historical events, students will follow the process of sense-producing or understanding we followed to describe the experiment with Akutagawa’s “In a Grove,” when the readers arrived at the conclusion that different accounts of the same event were, so to speak, conditioned by the story-teller’s cultural and axiological context. There are reasons to believe, however, that this approach will hardly achieve the aim specified above. First, as our experiment showed, understanding of the story stemmed from the reader’s system of “chronotopical actions” rather than being an inevitable result of reading the story. In this sense, exposure to historical versions may miss the desired aim of which the adepts of the multi-perspective approach write. The effect of the multi- perspective approach is limited due to one more reason directly related to the Karabakh conflict. In conflicts, in which the conflicting societies cling to mainly mythologized interpretations of the past, knowledge of various and equally mythologized interpretations of history cannot achieve the desired

7 R.R. Garagozov, op. cit. 8 See: K.P. Fritzsche, “Unable to be Tolerant?” in: Tolerance in Transition, ed. by R. Farnen et al. BIS, Oldenburg, 2001. 9 See: R. Stradling, Multiperspectivity in History Teaching: A Guide for Teachers, Strasbourg, 2003, available at [http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/historyteaching/Source/Notions/Multiperspectivity/MultiperspectivityEnglish.pdf], 28 September, 2012. 10 Ibid., p. 14. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION results, viz. revised attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices. They rely on “inflexible scripts (scenari- os),” a set of rigidly fixed convictions, perceptions, and ideas about the past.11 Moreover, the effect of representing conflicting versions might be different from what was expected: instead of diminishing negative perceptions and prejudices, they invigorate the existing ones.12 In this context we suggest a slightly different strategy of narrative changes, which we call the method of progressive narrative transformations.

Version 2: The Method of Progressive Narrative Transformations

We suggest that “step-by-step” transformations of the existing narratives should be used to arrive at a non-contradictory, integral, and perspective idea of the region’s past and future. It is not easy to arrive at a common or harmonized narrative; such narratives should be looked for and specified; they should reduce confrontation, while both sides should be equally “tempted” by them. The method of chronotopical texts described above can be used to make the task easier. In other words, the unsealing of “sealed off” narratives (this was done with the different accounts of one and the same event described in Akutagawa’s “In a Grove”) could be promoted by such action as searching for common elements of both versions of the history of Karabakh, that is, rhythmiza- tion of the narrative structures.13 There are three rhythmic figures in the Armenian and Azeri narratives: (1) both nations fall victim to a “third party” (blaming a “third party”); (2) both sides admit that they are both guilty; (3) future prospects.

Both Nations Fall Victim to a “Third Party” (Blaming a “Third Party”)

The Armenian and Azeri historical narratives agree that both nations were “victims.” The Ar- menian version describes the Armenians as victims of the Turks whom the Azeris supported; the Azeri version speaks of the Azeris as victims of the Armenians supported by Russia. From this it follows that a narrative about the Armenians and Azeris falling victim to the processes started by political disintegration of the Ottoman and Russian empires and, later, of the Soviet Union can be used as a starting point for narrative transformation.

11 See: J.S. Wistrand, Becoming Azerbaijani: Uncertainty, Belonging and Getting By in a Post-Soviet Society, Un- published doctoral dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis, Saint Louis, 2011. 12 Recently, several international organizations contributed to an attempt to write a textbook of this sort for the South Caucasian countries (see: Ocherki istorii stran Yuzhnogo Kavkaza: multiperspektivny vzglyad na istoriu, ATsGRS, Erevan, 2009). 13 See: R.R. Garagozov, “Chronotopical Schemas of Action as the Basis of Sense Producing,” in: Emotion, Creativ- ity and Art, ed. by L. Dorfman, C. Martindale, Perm State University, Perm, 1997, pp. 145-166. 24 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Both Sides Admit that They are Both Guilty

At the next stage, this narrative can become even more neutral either by passing over in silence the fact that both sides were guilty or by pointing to their guilt (James Gibson suggests this approach for South Africa).14 We all know that symbolic admission of one’s responsibility for past violence and crimes plays an important role in reconciliation of the conflicting sides.

Future Prospects

These modifications should contain “elements of future prospects.” This means that while changing the structure of narratives we can, finally, introduce changes that will offer a “picture of the future:” potential advantages of coordinated regional development if and when the conflict is resolved.

By Way of a Conclusion

The importance of detailed experimental studies of how different types of narratives affect the attitudes and emotions of groups of people cannot be overestimated. Our recent studies have demonstrated that the “common sufferings” narrative fanned negative feelings among the Azeri refugees toward Armenians and created a phenomenon we have called “comparative victim- hood.”15 Our experiments suggested, in particular, that narrative interventions should be differ- entiated according to audiences. Here we have discussed, or rather formulated, the problem of possible strategy of negative intervention and described certain principles for dealing with texts designed to transform “sealed off” and conflicting narratives into a sort of “harmonized” narrative that might diminish the sides’ negative attitudes toward one another and lead to stable peace in the region.

14 See: J.L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2004. 15 R. Garagozov, “Do Woes Unite Foes? Interplay of Narratives, Memory, Emotions and Attitudes in the Karabakh Conflict,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide, No. 5 (2), 2012, pp. 116-135. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Nadana FRIDRIKHSON

Director of the Institute of Demography, Migration, and Regional Development, Project Coordinator at the Center for Strategic Development Modeling (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: THE FORMATION OF NEW TRENDS

Abstract

his article examines the situation project to counteract the advance of the T around Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. U.S. into the region. and Russia have defined the main in- This paper also analyzes the possible terests in the region. Furthermore, where- risks for Russia if a Central Caucasian as Washington has its own interests and strategy is not drawn up, examines the new mechanisms for implementing its designat- trends in the settlement of the Nagorno- ed plans, Moscow, although it clearly val- Karabakh conflict, and notes the need to ues its presence in the Central Caucasus, revise the status of the OSCE Minsk Group has been unable to draw up an alternative and form a potential interregional leader.

And everyone is talking about Karabakh again Alexander Koreniugin

Introduction

Any region experiencing territorial conflicts is exposed to two main trends—it becomes a target of interest of major external players and a mechanism of influence on geopolitical competitors, on the one hand, while the countries party to the conflict may undergo a socioeconomic slump, thus creating prerequisites for the interference of external forces in political life, on the other. One of the most protracted conflicts in the Central Caucasus is the opposition between Azerba- ijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Unsuccessful talks have been going on between Baku and Erevan since 1994, whereby a consensus cannot be reached due to the diametrically opposite positions of the sides. Baku places the priority on preserving Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, with Nagorno-Karabakh as its integral part, while Armenia upholds the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act—the right of nations to self-determination. Furthermore, the OSCE Lisbon Summit of 1996, at which the co-chairs offered three main principles for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, was not a breakthrough, but only another link in a long chain of subsequent negotiations. Neither the subsequent Madrid Principles of 2007, nor the Zurich Protocols of 2009 were recognized or changed the current situation. 26 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On the whole, the mediation by external geopolitical players can provisionally be divided into five phases. n The first relates to 1992 when CSCE mediation dominated over independent attempts by individual countries to establish talks. n The second phase relates to Russia’s declaration of its interests, which led to a decrease in the influence and role of the CSCE. n The third phase—from December 1994 to the end of 1996—is characterized by an increase in cooperation and rise in trust between the OSCE and Russia, which ended in the Lisbon Sum- mit of 1996. n During the fourth phase, in 1997, France and the U.S., along with Russia, became co-chairs of the Minsk Group, which intensified international attention toward the conflict, as well as Azerbaijan’s discontent, since it saw France as a pro-Armenian force. n The fifth phase signified direct talks between the presidents of both countries, during which the OSCE was essentially relegated to the background. So today it has become clear that not one of the initiatives undertaken has yielded the necessary result. The OSCE Minsk Group finally succeeded in providing the sides with a permanent platform for holding talks on peaceful settlement of the crisis, as well as in monitoring the situation in the contact zone. However, this, on top of the constant reports from both the Azeri and the Armenian sides on violations and periodic human losses, is intensifying the irritation felt by the conflicting sides and demonstrating the acute need for new solutions. It is important to note that all of the external players drawn to one extent or another into resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue are pursuing their own interests, which is significantly complicating the resolution of one of the most arduous territorial conflicts in post-Soviet history. Furthermore, today, when talking about the Central Caucasian countries, it should be acknowl- edged that there are prerequisites in the region for forming a strong player capable of initiating a new integration project that will unite the member countries of the region and turn them into a single geopolitical entity that will pursue its own interests on the world stage. However, this requires restoration of a dialog between the states, which relates directly to the territorial disputes. It is precisely these aspects that are arousing the keen interest of external players who are essentially striving to integrate the region into their own political course and appoint their own protégé. So the region’s member states must monitor the initiatives they are being offered with particular care, correlate them with their own interests and prospects for future development, and strive to recreate a complete picture of the interests of foreign political players in order to identify partners and antagonists.

U.S. Policy in the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Washington’s interest in protracted settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is closely in- tertwined with U.S. policy as a whole in the post-Soviet expanse. It is worth noting that Washington perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union as one of the important victories of the 20th century. A vast territory subordinated to a single center and acting as a single geopolitical entity that formed the bipo- lar system in the world disintegrated into 15 states. Discussions about the reasons for the collapse are still going on today, while it should not be forgotten that a large number of American political scientists were drawing up a concept regarding the disintegration of the Union and trying to find the Achilles’ Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION heel of this extremely complex state entity. Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most influential representatives of the U.S. political elite, at one time reckoned that the national question was the Soviet Union’s weak link. It should be kept in mind that this mechanism of destabilization is still active today. In the initial period after the collapse of the Union, which can be provisionally defined as a “struggle for the Soviet Union’s heritage,” the United States kept a close watch on the processes going on in the post-Soviet expanse, striving to identify places in the region that might be potentially conducive to its own interests. Worried that Moscow might restore its former power, the Western players initiated different projects, the main aim of which, apart from supposedly assisting the establishment of a democratic system, was the desire to pull the former Soviet republics away from Russia. Keeping in mind the grievances and complaints that had accumulated against Moscow, this was not a difficult task. It stands to reason that when claiming world hegemony, the United States had a keen interest in the Central Caucasian region. This defines Washington’s tasks in the region: aggravation of the situation around Iran (and here it should be remembered that this problem affect the interests of Turkey— the historical rival of Iran, Israel, and Armenia—a state which, only by cooperating with Iran, can withdraw from its isolation), Azeri oil, and, of course, access to the Black and Caspian seas, which pave the way to further penetration into Central Asia. It is no coincidence that in August 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton declared the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea zones of U.S. national interests. If we look at a map of the region, we can follow the logical chain of Washington’s foreign political intervention—Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq—which legitimately lead to Iran, and given Turkey’s solidarity with NATO, the U.S. could soon control this important area. Nor should we forget the U.S.’s presence in Afghanistan. All of these aspects are closely related to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is vital for the U.S. to dominate in this region. n First, the Georgian political elite’s inclination toward Western policy allows the United States to be close to the rather unstable North Caucasian region, which, given the forecast of a new wave in the financial crisis, will make it possible for Washington to manipulate the situation. n Second, it is advantageous for the U.S. to control Georgia and Azerbaijan, without allowing, in so doing, Tbilisi and Baku to strengthen bilateral cooperation. This is particularly important given that Azerbaijan and Georgia are encountering similar problems today, primarily unresolved territorial disputes, and this aspect is very propi- tious with respect to manipulating sociopolitical opinion in these countries. Moreover, the presence of the U.S. in the region and its control over the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question will make it possible to squeeze Russia out of the area. In other words, as of today Washington is not interested in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since this will boost development of the Central Caucasus and eliminate the U.S.’s lever of pressure and manipulation. It is more advantageous for the U.S. to make use of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to solve its own tasks, establish its hegemony, and gain control over oil and access to the Caspian Sea, with further advance into Central Asia. This gives every reason to affirm that today the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the United States’ “window” to energy-rich Central Asia, where Washington will begin competing with China. So today Washington’s policy regarding Nagorno-Karabakh is directed toward creating prerequisites for further prolonging settlement of the conflict. It could use the national minority question and territorial bargaining in the context of the Iranian question as tools to achieve this end. For example, talks could go along the lines of “recognizing the independence of the “NKR” (the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and South Azerbaijan.” However, it is unlikely that such a proposal will come to fruition, if only because unification of South Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan Re- public will entail launching combat action against Iran. What is more, it should not be forgotten that 28 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION this scenario will require upturning the whole of public opinion formed in Azerbaijan over the last 20 years in the context of the need to restore Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity by returning Nagorno- Karabakh. This aspect returns us to the question of the possibility of forming a new player in the Central Caucasian region capable of launching the “gathering of land” mechanism within the framework of a new integration project. Given the resolution of territorial disputes, today Azerbaijan, which is capable of creating a political and economic bloc of regional states, could well become this state. An important element of this formation will be the supra-religious format, since this aspect could create another lever of pressure on the countries. It is important to note that the international community might have a contradictory opinion about the establishment of a new union. On the one hand, it could halt the advance of the U.S., while on the other, it will ultimately put an end to the question of integration of the regional states into the Eurasian Union. However, it is premature to analyze this situation since the project cannot be brought to fruition until the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, as well as several other problems and tasks have been resolved.

Russia’s Policy in the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Both the conflicting sides and the international community have a contradictory opinion about Russia’s participation in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, whereby both of these viewpoints are based on their personal perception of Moscow. It is important to note that today both Azerbaijan and Armenia are Russia’s strategic partners in the post-Soviet expanse, which makes Moscow’s interest in settlement this conflict feasible, on the one hand, while it arouses legitimate mutual irritation of the participants in the conflict, on the other. After Vladimir Putin designated a course toward establishing a Eurasian Union, insinuations began spreading, like an echo in the mountains, that Russia will make use of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a lever to promote Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s integration into the Eurasian Economic Union. Today, Russia’s political elite has been showing an understanding of all the negative and destructive consequences of this method for attracting countries. However, this has in no way changed the partners’ perception of Moscow. Therefore, Baku and Erevan are skeptical of this initiative, which of course casts aspersions on Russia as a mediator in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, in contrast to the tactics being pursued by Washington (even if they do not meet the interests of either Azerbaijan or Armenia), Russia does not have its own project today for ensuring its presence or influence on the processes in the Central Caucasian region. The statement by State Duma Speaker ex-head of the RF presidential administration Sergey Naryshkin1 shows that Russia’s political upper crust understands that it needs to have its own projects and solutions to counteract U.S. intervention, however there is nothing specific today, and the absence of solutions is fraught for Moscow with the conflicting sides losing their confidence in it, which is further aggravated by the absence of a political dialog with Georgia.

1 “We are against resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in accordance with ready solutions from the outside. We firmly believe that the problem can be resolved if the interests of both sides are ensured. If this kind of solution is found, Russia is ready to act as guarantor of such an agreement,” available at [http://www.yerkramas.org/2012/07/09/ spiker-gosdumy-rf-rossiya-protiv-resheniya-karabaxskogo-konflikta-po-gotovym-receptam/]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The statement made by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin2 during a conversa- tion with the Voice of Russia radio station gives reason to believe that Russia has faith in the success of further efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group, even though, as was indicated earlier, this structure has essentially failed to make any positive contribution to resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. All of these statements show that Moscow must dramatically change its strategy in this matter, since as of today Russia’s policy regarding settlement of the Karabakh conflict boils down to rhetoric about the need for preserving peace and the sides coming to a compromise agreement. There is a grain of truth in this position in the sense that it would be expedient for Baku and Erevan, after analyzing the efforts of the mediators over the last five-seven years, to try and exclude “extraneous third parties,” since the interest of mediators is largely hindering the search for a compromise solution. The matter concerns a possible change in the OSCE Minsk Group members or even the formation of a new structure, which, having accumulated previous work experience, will be called upon to find a solution to the problem. It is not the Western countries that should provide the vector for resolving this internal regional problem, but the states that have close ties with the Central Caucasian region and are interested in its establishment as a strong geopolitical entity. These countries are Turkey, Iran, Russia, and possibly Israel. If Moscow begins manipulating the Karabakh problem in the context of promulgating integration into the Eurasian Economic Union, defines a precise format of cooperation with Turkey in this issue (since ignoring Ankara’s position could have negative consequences), determines its position with respect to Iran keeping in mind the aspects designated earlier that have an influence on the Ka- rabakh issue, and comes to the understanding that Nagorno-Karabakh is the United States’ “window” to Central Asia, prerequisites will be created for forming Moscow’s new strategy on the Central Caucasus, which will proceed from an objective understanding of the processes that are currently unfolding, including the need to establish a regional leader. So with respect to the policy of the U.S. and Russia in the Central Caucasus, including in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, a situation is developing today in which Washington is striving to implement its own scenario of the development of events, exclusively lobbying its own interests, while Russia has still not ultimately formulated its regional position, evaluating events in the context of the prospects for establishing a Eurasian Economic Union and the need to use its projects to counter the West. Nevertheless, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still requires settlement. And this is conditioned both by the general situation on the international arena and by the domestic political and socioeconomic situation in the countries party to the conflict. There are always two ways to resolve such disputes—either war (which does not meet the interests of either Azerbaijan or Armenia, since it brings only destruction beneficial to external players) or peace, whereby the key aspect here is future development. The territories belonging to the states are asking for the authorities to meet several demands: an adequate level of socioeconomic life, protection from external threats, and the opportunity to produce and reap the benefits of their work. Unfortunately, these aspects are frequently relegated to the background, giving way to political rhetoric and the striving to reinforce one’s status on the international arena. What is more, involvement of the states’ authorities in productive forces development and regulation of economic relations would create entirely different conditions and change

2 “I think that we need to focus all efforts, as before, on the Minsk Group. There is a Minsk Group comprised of co- chairs and representatives of France, the United States, and Russia, as well as OSCE representatives who are working very conscientiously, traveling to the region, meeting with the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and helping them to find acceptable formulations for future documents. We support this activity in every way and believe that it will soon lead to a specific result,” available at [http://rus.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/65446337/83906817.html]. 30 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the overall appearance of the conflict. If a country claims territory not by war, but by peace, it must offer projects that correspond to the demands of this territory, for example, the restoration of industry, infrastructural projects, the creation of new jobs, the development of machine- and lathe- building, and so on. Only after finding a solution to these tasks can we talk about the next step— settlement of territorial disputes by means of integration, whereby integration initiated precisely by an internal player. Therefore, when talking about settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, mediators, and particularly Russia, should carry out an analysis of which of the rivaling states—Azerbaijan or Arme- nia—is capable today of offering the NKR the necessary conditions for development. This should not and will not become the key element in resolution of the problem, but will provide an entirely new vector. The Central Caucasian Region will be able to become an independent geopolitical entity not only with respect to regulating political aspects, but also in the post-conflict period when all the countries of the region will be able to develop their own potential. And here again it is appropriate to return to the question of establishing a regional leader that understands the price of peace, adequately evaluates the primary tasks, and is capable not only of acting as an initiator of unification, but also of formulating a general course for all the Central Caucasian states toward future development. However, this format is not advantageous to the West, particularly the United States, since if this happens its “window” to Central Asia will be closed.

Conclusion

Today we are witnessing a growing clash of interests among the major players in the Central Caucasus. The U.S.’s strategy to exclude Russia from the region is essentially being implemented in a non-aggressive form, while also producing the desired results. Such methods as information propaganda, close work with the countries’ elites, introduction of American culture, and so on, have already proven productive. And if Moscow is unable to provide an alternative program to counteract this advance and particularly if it shifts to an aggressive method, it will only accelerate its exclusion, as well as create prerequisites for local military clashes in the region. Although this article does not aim to model a military scenario of the development of events, it still makes sense to note that military provocation in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh question could rather quickly escalate into more serious clashes. In so doing, keeping in mind the situation with Iran, the Arab Spring events in several countries, and the absence of a single vector in the policy of the Central Caucasian states, it can be presumed that any potential military clashes would spread further than Azerbaijan and Armenia alone. So it is vital that Russia retain its partner relations with the Central Caucasian countries, define a format of interaction with Georgia (restoration of a political dialog with Tbilisi being one of the primary tasks of Russian diplomacy), and draw up and implement a “breakthrough” project in the region, which in the future could become Russia’s reference point. In this sense, settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not only promote strengthening of Moscow’s position, but will largely change the overall geopolitical reality in the region. And whereas for the U.S. the Karabakh question is a way to promote its own advance into Central Asia, for Russia it could become a springboard for forming a new strategy in the Central Caucasus. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Ekaterina TREGLAZOVA

Ph.D. Candidate, Department of International Relations, World Economy and International Law, Pyatigorsk State University of Linguistics (Pyatigorsk, the Russian Federation).

LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

Abstract

he Northern Caucasus can best be geted” terrorist acts that produce casualties T described as a complicated system of and destabilize sociopolitical and ethnic re- ethnic relations, the stabilization of lations remain the gravest dangers. The au- which remains one of the top priorities de- thor has turned to the varied methods and spite the obvious progress achieved in this instruments used to decrease tension and sphere. “Export” of local contradictions and defuse conflicts and looked at the role local conflicts to other regions, as well as “tar- self-administrations can play in this process.

Introduction

Ethnic and ethnoconfessional relations are unfolding in the ethnopolitical and socioeconomic context of the North Caucasian constituent entities. The following macroeconomic and social factors determine the situation in each of them: per capita GRD (Gross Regional Product); level of capital investments; standard of living; shadow economy indices; level of unemployment, etc. The content of ethnic relations, on the one hand, reflects and, on the other, affects the level of cohesion of the regional elites and their mutual support, the degree of popularity and cohesion of the regional elites and of the legitimate and informal leaders. The degree of ethnic tension largely depends on the presence of variously directed ethnic interests, the numerical strength, and the support level of the oppositional public organizations1; the degree of confessional tension depends on varied or even contradictory confessional interests, the numerical strength of their followers, and the level of popular support.2 Despite the factors conducive to ethnic tension that figure prominently in the social, economic and political processes, the region demonstrates a trend toward stabilization. In fact, it is very hard, if at all possible, to achieve peace and stability in one region, which means that cooperation among the government and administration bodies inside the regions and between them should be achieved by all

1 See: Stabilnost i konflikt v Rossiyskom prigranichie. Etnopoliticheskie protsessy v Sibiri i na Kavkaze, ed. by V.I. Diatlov, S.V. Riazantsev, Nauchno-obrazovatelny forum po mezhdunarodnym otnosheniiam, Moscow, 2005. 2 See: Iu.V. Vassiliev, Vosproizvodstvennye faktory etnosotsialnykh konfliktov kak ugroza obshchestvennoy bezo- pasnosti regiona. Sbornik dokladov i soobshcheni III nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii “Bezopasnost Stavropolia: dialog vlasti i obshchestva,” Stavropol, 2007, p. 47. 32 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION means.3 The current dynamics of Russian society, administrative reform, and reform of local self- administration presuppose the more active involvement of local societies. Cities are expected to play the main role in the process: they are the terrain in which democratic changes, dialog practices, and public compromises are realized.

The Nationalities Strategy in the Northern Caucasus

Within the nationalities strategy in the Northern Caucasus, the government and administration bodies of the Northern Caucasus are expected to continue integrating all sorts of urban communities inside the urban municipal entities and urban communities as a whole into the common Russian cultural and information space. To achieve this, we should first identify the new systemic correlation between the all-Russia social-cultural and local ethnocultural component. This is directly related to the problem of ethnic cooperation, since under definite conditions ethnocultural consolidation becomes a source of local ethno-radicalism and separatism. It should be said that at all times the large sociocultural centers in the North Caucasian cities (universities, creative unions and alliances) concentrated groups of ethnically oriented intelligentsia and sometimes developed into seats of spiritual separatism. Today, comprehensive integration of urban ethnic groups and diasporas united in ethnocultural public alliances and national cultural centers is the central task of the nationalities strategy in the Northern Caucasus. This integration is one of the dimensions of a much bigger systemic process of mutual understanding, that is, mutual sociocultural and mental adjustment. It should be said that ethnic groups adapted to the polyethnic environment of a Russian city develop into the vehicles of new practices and orientations among the main part of their ethnicities.4 Joint socialization in urban collectives has produced a unique community of peoples, languages, and religions; this unique phenomenon was further developed and today has acquired a new content and new forms. Cities should be involved in civil consolidation while developing common Russian values and preserving ethnocultural specifics: today this task has come to the fore. At the same time, urban societies are manifesting destabilizing factors that undermine the relations between ethnicities and threaten the stability of social processes. These factors manifest themselves as typical in the context of ethnic relations of the urban municipal entities of the Stavropol territory. Sociological polls conducted by the Committee of the Stavropol Territory for Nationalities and the Cossacks produced the following results: n 32.77% of the Territory’s population believes that there are national groups whose interests and rights are infringed upon; n 31.43% is convinced that ethnic origins produce certain privileges; n 48.0% believes that national relations are fraught with latent or open enmity among people of different nationalities. The same committee, acting together with the Territory’s expert community, has identified the causes of ethnopolitical instability in municipalities, the main ones being:

3 See: Sotsialnye konflikty. Ekspertiza. Prognozirovanie. Tekhnologiia razresheniia. Etnicheskaia i regionalnaia konfliktologiia, Moscow, Stavropol, 2002; Grazhdanskaia identichnost i patrioticheskoe vospitanie v polietnicheskom regione, YuNTs RAS Publishers, Stavropol, Rostov on Don, 2007. 4 See: M.A. Astvatsaturova, V.Iu. Saveliev, Diaspory Stavropolskogo kraia v sovremennykh etnopoliticheskikh protsessakh, SKAGS, Rostov on Don, Pyatigorsk, 2000; M.A. Astvatsaturova, Diaspory v Rossiiskoy Federatsii: formirovanie i upravlenie, SKAGS, Rostov on Don, 2000. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n The contradictory and latent conflict-prone nature of some of the legal acts and administrative decisions that contradict the traditions local peoples inherited from the past; n The absence of profound analysis of ethnopolitical processes; unqualified forecasting of their development and its possible repercussions; and long overdue political and administrative decisions taken at different levels to prevent negative development in national relations; n Rivalry among ethnic groups when it comes to distribution and redistribution of land and competition in trade, private business, and services, including sanatorium services and in the labor market; n Ethnodemographic changes and changes in numerical strength of ethnic groups caused by migration and population growth; n The far-from-easy adaptation of migrants to the local social-cultural landscape because of the different mentality of the old timers and the newcomers and the very slow cultural adaptation and adaptation to customs, as well as problems that slow down mutual understanding, especially in the territory’s eastern parts; n Problems of social adaption of young people and lack of jobs in some districts. Successive sociological polls reveal that negative stereotypes are fairly widespread in the Stav- ropol Territory, which calls for new forms of adjustment of the relations between ethnic groups, especially in places of their compact settlement.5 This is important both at the territorial and local level, where the resources of local self-administrations (operating in close proximity with local interests and local problems) can and should be used. The role of local self-administrations is especially important in the context of ethnic contradictions and conflicts. In May-June 2007 in Stavropol, the largest municipal entity and the capital of the Territory, a banal fight among young people developed into massive riots and caused casualties. It spread far and wide and became an ethnic conflict, into which the sides drew supporters from their own ethnic and confessional groups. Sociological polls conducted in October-November 2007 revealed that half of the city’s population knew that riots might flare up. People expected terrorist acts and national conflicts. The local self-administrations, government bodies, and civil society joined forces to carry out systemic and comprehensive work to strengthen ethnic relations, patriotism, and civil awareness. The 1999 Decision of the Governor of the Stavropol Territory “Main Trends of National and Regional Policy of the Stavropol Territory” and the related Comprehensive Program of Harmoniza- tion of Ethnic Relations in the Stavropol Territory for 2000-2005 are two important documents that laid the foundation of what the government bodies and the Territory heads were doing to manage ethnic relations and geopolitical processes. A new decision of the Governor of the Stavropol Territory of 26 March, 2007 (No. 163) was a follow-up to the previous document which endorsed the Territorial Special-Purpose Program “Development of Ethnic and Ethnoconfessional Relations in the Stavropol Territory for 2007-2009.” It consisted of several subprograms. Ø Subprogram 1. Drawing up regulatory and legal documents indispensable to the implementation of state national policy in the Stavropol Territory. Ø Subprogram 2. Developing and implementing models designed to regulate the ethnopolitical processes. Ø Subprogram 3. Coordinating what the government bodies, local self-administrations of municipal units, and the national-cultural autonomies are doing in the Territory.

5 See: V.A. Avksentiev, “Modelirovanie regionalnogo konfliktogennogo protsessa: osnovnye printsipy i formirovanie banka dannykh,” in: Sovremennoe sostoianie i stsenarii razvitia Yuga Rossii, YuNTs RAS Publishers, Rostov on Don, 2006. 34 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ø Subprogram 4. Educating young people in the spirit of patriotism, tolerance, and the culture of peace. Ø Subprogram 5. Inculcating a shared Russian identity, the culture of peace, and harmony by means of education. Ø Subprogram 6. Developing cultural integration and forming civil solidarity through culture. Ø Subprogram 7. Involving the media more in covering ethnosocial processes and ethnoconfessional relations. Ø Subprogram 8. Supporting national-cultural public structures and harmonizing national relations; creating civil solidarity, a culture of peace and harmony; and adapting and integrating migrant ethnic groups into public life. Ø Subprogram 9. Preserving and maintaining ethnoconfessional peace and harmony in the Stavropol Territory. This document is much better, both in content and in the organizational and material respect, than its predecessor of 2000-2005, which was never completely executed. This methodologically and methodically substantiated document has good prospects because of its systemic compatibility with the Security Concept of the city of Stavropol and the corresponding plans of the administration of Stavropol related to prevention of terrorism and extremism. These documents are geared toward interaction between peoples and ethnic groups through a dialog on ethnic and confessional issues. The cities of the protected ecological zone of health resorts of the Caucasian Mineral Waters have acquired greater resources, possibilities, and prospects in national harmony and civilian consolidation. The Caucasian Mineral Waters can be described as an area of very special social and cultural makeup, ethnic relations, and ethnopolitical processes. The ethnodemographic context consists of compact settlements of Abazins, Azeris, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Georgians, Jews, Karachays, Germans, No- gays, Ossets, Poles, Ukrainians, Circassians, and Chechens; members of these ethnic groups are also scattered all over the Territory, where they live among other ethnic groups. Russians predominate in the cities of the Caucasian Mineral Waters, followed by Armenians (the second largest group in Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, and Georgievsk); Greeks (Essentuki and the village of Essentukskaia), and Ukrainians (Mineralnye Vody, Zheleznovodsk, and Lermontov). There are about 40 registered ethnic public organizations in the area, including organizations of Abazins, Azeris, Armenians, Balkarians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Georgians, Jews, Karachays, Daghestanis, Germans, Nogays, Ossets, Poles, Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, Chechens and Ingushes, and Circassians; there are also very active Cossack societies.

How the Administration of Pyatigorsk Settled Ethnic Conflicts

Pyatigorsk, a city of extreme ethnic and confessional variety, stands apart from the other cities and towns of the Caucasian Mineral Waters area. Its unique diversity is a result of historical ethnogenesis and ethnic migrations. This is a city in which followers of several religions live side by side. Christianity is represented by Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and the Armenian Apostolic Church. There are several parishes of the Stavropol and Vladikavkaz Eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church; the Surb Sargis church belongs to the Armenian Apostolic Church; there is a cathedral of the Roman Catholic Church; a mosque of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and the Stavropol Territory; a synagogue, etc. The dialog in which all confessions are involved keeps the negative effects of their rivalry within acceptable limits; practically all of them figure prominently in public life through their social involvement; they work with the youth and do a lot to maintain peace in the region, a task of vital importance in the Northern Caucasus. Their communication reveals Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to the people the vast potential of the spiritual brotherhood of followers of different confessions and stresses the importance of the moral foundations of human life as opposed to aggression, violence, xenophobia, and greediness. Pyatigorsk is a rapidly developing city; the three factors of its success—security, uniqueness, and prestige—are objective and, at the same time, are recognized at the subjective-administrative level. Ø The factor of security is determined by the ethnopolitical specifics of the Northern Cauca- sus, which has been moving toward stability and dampened conflict potential. In the context of an “ethnopolitical timeout,” security is the central political issue determining the region’s future. Security attracts investments to the entire Caucasian Mineral Waters area and its cities and is absolutely necessary for the continued peaceful coexistence of all peoples and ethnic groups. Ø The factor of uniqueness is determined by the city’s advantageous geographic and geopolitical location in the very center of the Caucasian Mineral Waters area, which also includes the special territories of the Stavropol Territory, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino- Balkaria. Pyatigorsk stands apart for its recreational and balneological properties and the variety of its mineral sources; its unique historical heritage and culture recognized inside and outside Russia add to the city’s other attractions. Ø The factor of prestige is determined by the city’s status as a resort of federal importance, as well as its developed infrastructure, social diversity, and extensive ethnocultural landscape. The city’s further development and its prestige are connected with the general development trends of Russia’s South as outlined in the federal programs, the “points of growth” concept addressed to the subjects of the Southern Federal District, and taking account of the socioeconomic and social-cultural differentiation of the constituent entities. The city is successfully developing the well-substantiated three-sector social model, the entities of which—administration, public organizations, and business structures—are working actively together. The most important role in the process belongs to the following structures—the Duma of Pyatigorsk, the city administration, the municipal structures and enterprises, the institutions of civil society, business, the city branches of political parties, etc. In Pyatigorsk, people willingly join public structures according to their interests; there are over 20 public organizations, the most important among them being the national-cultural, veterans, women, charity, migrant, peacekeeping, youth, and organizations of disabled. There is a fairly well-developed movement of young volunteers involved in peacekeeping and charity; they work with children, disabled, veterans, and old age pensioners. Public organizations are involved in different initiatives and socially important projects: they find jobs for invalids; help migrant settle; address ecological problems; popularize a healthy way of life among the youth; and teach schoolchildren tolerance as opposed to xenophobia and negative ethnic stereotypes. The people in Pyatigorsk are especially interested in national-cultural self-identity; in fact, from time immemorial, the local people prefer to live in communities. From the very beginning, Armeni- ans, Greeks, Jews, Kabardins, Germans, Poles, Ossets, and Cossacks have been living in ethnocultural communities. Today, there are thirteen national-cultural public organizations in Pyatigorsk (3 of them are regional; 2 are national-cultural autonomies) founded on the basis of national-cultural self- identification by Adighes (Adighes, Abazins, Kabardins, and Circassians), Armenians (national-cultural autonomy); Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, and Germans (national-cultural autonomy); peoples of Daghestan (regional organization); Ossets, Chechens and Ingushes, Poles (regional organization), Russians, Tatars, and Ukrainians. The Cossacks (the Pyatigorsk division of the Terek Cossack Army) play an important role in public relations. Despite efficient cultural cooperation and consistent development of ethnic and cultural processes, there are still risks and conflict factors in the city and the region as a whole. Both risks and conflict-prone factors are rooted in the region, including: 36 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Terrorism and religious extremism in the neighboring regions of the North Caucasian Feder- al District; n Uncontrolled migration n Nationalist and xenophobic sentiments among the young people n Local self-administrations react rather than prevent n Lack of objectivity in the media n Prejudiced public opinion, widespread negative ethnic stereotypes and anti-migrant feelings. This means that the local self-administration should pay more attention to ethnic and ethnoconfessional relations as a very complicated and sensitive sphere of public life. The Duma and the city administration regard ethnic relations as an important sphere of their activities. Ethnic relations in the system of social relations need systematic, specific, and organizational impacts. In doing this, the Duma and the city administration are invariably guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the laws On the General Principles of Organization of Self-Administration in the Russian Feder- ation, On Public Associations, On the National-Cultural Autonomy, On Opposing Extremist Activi- ties, as well as the Concept of State National Policy of the RF, National Security Concept of the RF, and the Concept of Regulating Migration Processes in the RF. In the last 10 years, the Stavropol Territory has acquired a system of regulatory-legal acts which directly and indirectly deal with ethnic and ethno-cultural relations. The Stavropol Territory was among the first to declare the principles of its policies in this sphere at the level of doctrine. The local- self administration structures of Pyatigorsk are guided by the following documents: 1994 Charter of Stavropol Territory (2002 version) and the Territory’s laws On Local Self-Administration in the Sta- vropol Territory (2005), On Measures of Stemming Illegal Migration to Stavropol Territory (2002), and On the Cossacks of the Stavropol Territory (2002). The revised draft of the Charter of the Municipal Unit of Resort City Pyatigorsk offered for wide discussion in December 2007 says in Art 9 (The Guarantees of the Local Self-Administration of Resort City Pyatigorsk), Para 3: “The inalienable rights of all peoples and nationalities, ethnic minorities at their national specifics, culture, language, customs and traditions are recognized and ensured in Pyatig- orsk.” The local self-administrations proceed from this legal regulation to use adequate mechanisms to strengthen ethnic cooperation and satisfy ethnocultural interests. I have in mind the municipal target- oriented programs, public hearings, days of Letter to the City Head, reports in the media, etc. These mechanisms are in line with the main trends in administration and local self-administration reform; they not only improve the quality of administration (which is their main task), but also improve the quality of the state’s public services and ensure that the government remains open for the people. The Duma and the administration of Pyatigorsk regulate the ethnocultural and ethnoconfessional processes to achieve ethnic harmony on the basis of civil values common to all Russian citizens. The tasks are formulated as: strengthening ethnic cohesion; optimizing cooperation between confessions; and preventing xenophobia, tension, and conflicts. There are several aspects of this task: political-ideological, regulatory legal, organizational, and administrative. To achieve these aims the local self-administrations of Pyatigorsk cooperate with: n the Committee of the Stavropol Territory for Nationalities and the Cossacks; n the Council on Ethnic Relations under the Governor of the Stavropol Territory; n the Administration of the specially protected ecological resort region of the Caucasian Min- eral Waters area; n the Stavropol and Vladikavkaz Eparchy of ROC; n the Spiritual Administration of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and the Stavropol Territory; n the Armenian Apostolic Church in the South of Russia; n public organizations and movements and the Cossacks. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The regulatory legal relations and the fact that local self-administrations are also included in the territorial administration system of ethnocultural and ethnoconfessional relations allowed them to arrive at several administrative models designed to consolidate agreement and harmony in the urban community. They correspond, first, to the sociocultural parameters of Pyatigorsk and, second, they correspond to the territorial strategies and tactics of ethnic relations. Ø Administrative Model 1. Cooperation between the people and local self-administrations; realized on the basis of the Public Council of Pyatigorsk and designed to maintain a dialog between local self-administrations and the public and discuss urgent problems. The commissions of the Public Council concentrate on the development of the institutions of civil society, preservation of traditions, and, at the same time, modernization of the city’s social-cultural image and the education of young people. Ø Administrative Model 2. Realization of ethnocultural interests through a dialog between cultures on the basis of the House of National Culture of Pyati- gorsk. It organizes presentations of the ethnocultural interests of local communities; celebrations of national culture days and red-letter days; exchanges of cultural values in the context of values typical of the Stavropol Territory. Ø Administrative Model 3. Consolidation of all-Russia identity realized within socially important actions: n Day of People’s Unity; n Day of Russia; n Day of the Russian Flag; n Victory Day; n Day of the Stavropol Territory. Day of Pyatigorsk stresses the city’s multi-cultural and polyethnic factors; this is a factor for consolidating citizens as patriots of Russia. On that day, ethnic groups and Cossacks present their cultures at national exhibitions and concerts of folk ensembles. Ø Administrative Model 4. Cooperation with other regions and countries. It is realized through interaction of the cities of the Caucasian Mineral Waters area, as well as cooperation between Pyatigorsk and other North Caucasian cities—Nalchik (the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria); Cherkessk (the capital of Karachaevo-Cherkessia); Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia-Alania), and others. Pyatigorsk is the twin city of Schwerte (Germany); Trikala (Greece); Panagyurishte (Bulgaria), and Dubuque (the U.S.), which presupposed exchange of members of municipal structures, businessmen, and academic and cultural figures. The situation in the Northern Caucasus demands that cultural interaction in the cities of the Sta- vropol Territory remains consistent and continues to develop. The following looks advisable: n Elaboration and adoption of municipal programs called Interaction between Local Self-Ad- ministration Bodies and Civil Society Institutions for the Sake of Stronger Ethnocultural Relations; 38 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Special issues of Stavropol pravda, Pyatigorsk pravda, and other newspapers dealing with the foundations and prospects of unity of urban communities—both multicultural and poly- confessional; n Sessions of the youth multinational council at the Youth Committee of the Stavropol Territo- ry held at higher educational establishments of the Northern Caucasus; n The twin cities institutions should be used to consolidate cultural exchange and develop multiethnic communities.

Conclusion

The city assemblies (Dumas) and city administrations should be more actively involved in inculcating “Russian identity,” “civil identity,” and the idea of a “multinational people.” The self-administration structures should be more actively involved in the peacekeeping system when cooperating with civil society institutions and national-cultural public associations. The road toward closer ethnic interaction and cultural dialog for the sake of national and universal values lies through more active and closer cooperation between government and administration bodies and civil society institutions.

Ramil DURSUNOV

Ph.D. Candidate, Chair of International Law, the Yaroslav the Wise Law Academy National University (Kharkov, Ukraine).

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA

Abstract

his article aims to clarify the interna- which is the key to understanding how in- T tional legal status of Abkhazia and ternational law addresses the recognition South Ossetia. It examines the legal of states. The deliberations presented in the doctrines of Georgia, the Russian Federa- article are based on official regulatory acts tion, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia on this and international legal doctrines and docu- matter and how they correlate to the trea- ments, including U.N. resolutions. This ties, resolutions and declarations of inter- study is based exclusively on a juridical national law. This article sets out to exam- approach to the principles of international ine this problem and define the actual in- law and does not address any political de- ternational legal status of these territories, liberations on this matter. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s was marked by the creation of new states and the appearance of new sovereign territories on the political map of the world. “The sovereignty boom,” during which the former Union republics gained their independence, also promoted secessionist movements within these states. Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are just a few examples of territorial disputes that escalated into bloody military conflicts. However, in addition to the political facts and other factors that led to the establishment of territorial entities with an unclear legal status, there are also the regulations of international law. The main task of this article is to define the actual international legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is particularly relevant since these territories, although considered unrecognized states, have been recognized at this time by several countries. Therefore determining the status of these territories is of immense importance for the further international legal practice of state recognition. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is directly related to determination of the international legal status of Kosovo and constitutes the current practice of state recognition in international law. Study of this problem is also of immense theoretical and practical significance because each case of state recognition serves as a precedent and could encourage the development of secessionism in other countries. The conflicts we are considering have a non-classical complicated structure, since more than two sides are party to them: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia, and Georgia. There came a point when these countries launched the political and international legal mechanisms at their disposal to achieve the set goals. These actions resulted in the secession and then recognition of former administrative- territorial units of Georgia. It was the military conflict of 2008 that triggered the process for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The situation is complicated by the fact that most countries of the world do not recognize these self-declared state entities, however their recognition by the Russian Federation and several other states is an undeniable fact.

The International Legal Doctrine of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The Abkhazian and Ossetian international legal doctrine for justifying the legitimacy of the statehood and sovereignty of the secessionist territories is primarily based on the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognized by other U.N. member states. After the parliament of Abkhazia appealed to the Russian Federation on 20 August, 2008 for official recognition of the republic’s independence and Ossetia made the same appeal on 22 August, 2008, Russia responded accordingly and announced that the corresponding decrees would be signed. On 26 August, 2008, the Russian Federation officially declared its recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia. The Republic of Nicaragua was the second state to recognize the self-declared territories: on 5 September, 2008, President Daniel Ortega signed official decrees on the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The following year, in 2009, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized by Venezuela, which Hugo Chavez declared verbally and, in confirmation of his intentions, diplomatic relations were established between Abkhazia and Venezuela in 2010. Also in 2009, the Republic of Nauru established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was an act of recognition of these self-declared territories. In 2011, another two states—the state of Vanuatu and the state of Tuvalu—officially recognized Abkhazia and South 40 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ossetia. However, it should be noted that the state of Vanuatu only established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia.1 On the basis of the aforementioned “recognitions,” Abkhazian scholars claim that “the significance of the recognition of Abkhazia by four U.N. member states, one of which is one of the world’s great powers and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, is difficult to overestimate,”2 and that this in itself is confirmation of independence. The difficulty with this matter is that state recognition has not been codified. Nor are there specific regulations and criteria that must be met for a state to be recognized. At the present time, international law does not specify the number of states that must recognize another state in order for it to gain legitimacy as a newly established entity. Some international lawyers believe that recognition by one state is sufficient, while others insist that more states must declare their recognition. Still others think that state recognition should be carried out within the framework of universal international organizations, such as the U.N. There is also the opinion that there is no need for recognition by other states and that this international legal institution is a veiled form of interference in a state’s internal affairs, which, in turn, directly contradicts the principles of international law. One way or another, however, the fact that only five states have recognized self-declared Ab- khazia and South Ossetia at the present time is not sufficient to ensure their normal functioning as states. This is because states cannot fully function without participating in international structures and without interstate cooperation. However, to be objective, we must acknowledge the fact that full- fledged participants of the international community have legally confirmed their recognition. “Recognition is of special importance in those cases where a new State tries to establish itself by breaking off from an existing State in the course of a revolution. And here the question is material whether a new State has really already safely and permanently established itself or only makes efforts to this end without having already succeeded. That in every case of civil war a foreign State can recognize the insurgents as a belligerent Power if they succeed in keeping a part of the country in their hands and set up a Government of their own, there is no doubt. But between this recognition as a belligerent Power and the recognition of these insurgents and their part of the country as a new State, there is a broad and deep gulf. And the question is precisely at what exact time recognition of a new State may be given instead of the recognition as a belligerent Power. For an untimely and pre- cipitate recognition as a new State is a violation of the dignity of the mother State, to which the latter need not patiently submit. It is frequently maintained that such untimely recognition contains an intervention.”3 When trying to understand the international legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian politicians and international lawyers point significantly not to the tally of recognitions, but to the fact of such legal acts themselves. Furthermore, for some reason we forget that recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia primarily rests on the principle of self-determination and ignores the principle of territorial integrity. We also forget that militarized methods were used to achieve sovereignty. So recognition of the statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia jeopardizes all countries of the world with ethnic minorities. This primarily applies to the Russian Federation, which is currently pursuing a policy of double standards. On the one hand, it refers to the principle of territorial integrity preservation in order to eliminate separatist groups in Chechnia and Daghestan, while on the other, it upholds the right of the Abkhazians and Ossetians to self-determination. Nor are the Western countries headed by the U.S. any better—by giving Kosovo its independence, they have paved the way to frag- mentation of international law.

1 See: “International Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia]. 2 V. Chirikba, “The International Legal Status of the Republic of Abkhazia in the Light of International Law,” available at [http://abkhazworld.com/articles/analysis/285-int-legal-status-abkhazia-vchirikba.html]. 3 L. Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise, Vol. 1, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, Bombay, 1905, p. 112. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The crux of the problem lies in the fact that the international legal institution of state recognition is not codified—there are no universal documents that define the criteria of statehood required for recognition. So states are guided by international legal practice, international legal doctrines, and their own foreign policy interests. In international law, there are two main theories relevant to state recognition: the constitutive and the declaratory theory. The constitutive theory asserts that States and governments do not legally exist until recognized as entities of international law. The declaratory theory, on the other hand, claims that the political existence of a state is independent of recognition by other states, while the institution of recognition itself merely declares the existing state of affairs. However, both cases require that a state meet all the international legal criteria for statehood. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 set forth that a state as an entity of international law should possess the following qualifications: (A) a permanent population; (B) a defined territory; (C) a government; and (D) capacity to enter into relations with other states.4 It should be noted that although this document was of regional scope, it gradually became customarily accepted in international law as a whole. When the recognition of a state is examined from this viewpoint, it can unequivocally be said that Abkhazia and South Ossetia meet the qualifications of a state. They have a defined territory, population, and government that has entered into diplomatic relations with other entities of international law. However, even though all of these qualifications are met, there are certain aspects that cast aspersions on the legitimacy of the status of these territories. The international legal doctrine also sets forth other qualifications. n First, since the aforementioned state formations were created by military means with the participation of a third party, it cannot be affirmed that these two states are capable of independently exercising efficient power. Consequently, it cannot be said that they correspond to the criterion of an effective government. n Second, there has been no legitimate expression of will of the people, since the opinion of the local Georgian population was not taken into account. At the current stage of social development, international law is based on the protection of human rights. Therefore, any manipulations that lead to a violation of these rights should be regarded as a violation of international law. When Abkhazia and South Ossetia seceded from the Georgian state, not only was the political right to expression of will of all the people violated, but also the fundamental natural right to life. The large number of people killed and forced to move, the seizure of their property, and other such violations of humanitarian law and human rights confirm the aggressive nature of the secession of the said territories.

The EU’s International Legal Doctrine on Georgia

The international legal position of the EU is reflected in the report of the Independent Interna- tional Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. The Report sets forth instances of violations of the law of war and other violations.

4 See: Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), available at [http://www.taiwandocuments.org/ montevideo01.htm]. 42 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The report contains contributions from scholars on the international legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This problem is examined in the first two chapters of Volume II of the Report, which states clearly that recognition is not constitutive.5 This provision on the nonconstitutive nature of the institution of state recognition was also enforced in the Arbitral Commission of the Peace Conference in Yugoslavia, which states that “the existence or disappearance of a State was a question of fact.”6 The report begins by listing the three qualifications of a state: (1) a defined territory; (2) a permanent population; and (3) an effective government. It goes on to state the need to observe additional criteria: the principles of international law, the right to self-determination, and the prohibition of the use of force. The document defines three categories of entities: (1) states fulfilling the relevant criteria for statehood and universally recognized; (2) state-like entities fulfilling the relevant criteria, but which are not, or not universally, recognized; and (3) entities short of statehood (not fulfilling the relevant criteria, or only some of them, or only in a weak form, but eventually recognized by one or more states). The Report states that Abkhazia and South Ossetia meet the first two criteria (territory and population). However, it goes on to say that South Ossetia does not meet the principle of efficiency due to the systematic and constant influence imposed by the Russian Federation upon the state’s internal affairs. Abkhazia, on the other hand, according to the Report, is regarded as a state that is exercising effective control over its territory. However, the Report does not recommend recognizing Abkhazia, since it does not meet the basic requirements regarding human and minority rights and has never had a right to secession. The Report goes on to explain the absence of right to secession in compliance with international law: “…outside the colonial context, self-determination is basically limited to internal self-determination. A right to external self-determination in form of a secession is not accepted in state practice. The case of Kosovo has not changed the rules.”7 So the international legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is extremely problematic. A territorial formation becomes an entity of international law after the establishment of an effective and independent government. And the creation of a state can hardly be directly related to human rights violations and discrimination against national minorities—these matters should be addressed separately.

Conclusion

It stands to reason that defining the international legal status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is very difficult. The fact that these territorial entities have been internationally recognized by the

5 See: Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Vol. II, available at [http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf]. 6 Arbitral Commission of the Peace Conference in Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Official Papers, Vol. 1, ed. by B.G. Ramcharan, Kluwer Law International. 7 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russian Federation and five other countries complicates the already confusing situation. It is interesting that the Republic of Vanuatu subsequently withdrew its recognition of Abkhazia, which is something rare in the practice of state recognition. It is traditionally thought that recognition cannot be withdrawn. However, despite recognition by several states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to be isolated from the international community. The position of the EU countries is based on the territorial integrity of Georgia and the impossibility of recognizing regions that secede from it. The U.S. and the other countries of the world also confirm the territorial integrity of Georgia and state that recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia is a violation of international law. Although U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that “the question of recognition of svates is a matter for sovereign states to decide,”8 several international organizations—NATO, the OSCE, and PACE—claim that unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia contradicts the letter and intent of international law. Before the events of August 2008, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions containing provisions on the adherence of all member states to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders and clear indications that Abkhazia belonged to Georgia. The last such resolution numbered 1808 (2008) was adopted on 15 April, 2008.9 The situation dramatically changed after Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Whereas resolutions 1839 (2008) and 1866 (2009), adopted after this recognition regarding extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), still contained a reference to Resolution 1808 (2008), in June 2009, Russia put an end to the adoption of such resolutions by the Security Council by imposing its veto on the draft text. Instead, Russia proposed that the resolutions include reference to “the Republic of Abkhazia” and its borders, which was unacceptable to other Council members fundamentally attached to the territorial integrity of Geor- gia within its internationally recognized borders.10 These events led to cessation of the activity of the UNOMIG on 15 June, 2009.11 Therefore, although Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognized by several states, their international legal status has still not been clearly defined. Since these territories have not been recognized by most countries of the world, they cannot be considered full-fledged participants in international relations. The practice of state recognition in international law must be codified and universal and generally accepted criteria of statehood drawn up, which will make it possible to avoid similar situations in the future.

8 U.N. Chief Voices Concern about Russian Move on South Ossetia, Abkhazia, available at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008-08/27/content_9718891.htm]. 9 See: Resolution 1808 (2008) adopted by the Security Council at its 5866th meeting, on 15 April, 2008, available at [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,GEO,,4808a6582,0.html]. 10 See: 15 June, 2009 — Security Council: Georgia — Statement by Mr. Jean-Maurice Ripert, Permanent Repre- sentative of France to the United Nations, available at [http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article4008]. 11 See: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), available at [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/past/unomig/background.html]. 44 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Makka ALBOGACHIEVA

Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Research Fellow, Department of Ethnography of the Peoples of the Caucasus, Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation).

THE OSSETIAN-INGUSH CONFLICT: CAUSES AND ECHOES OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE FALL OF 1992

Abstract

he author takes an in-depth look into sult, all the Ingush who lived in North Os- T the causes of the ethnopolitical con- setia were driven from their homes to take flict in the Prigorodny District of North up residence in temporary refugee camps. Ossetia that developed on 31 October-4 She reveals the factors which keep the Os- November, 1992 into armed clashes with setian-Ingush conflict (inherited from the numerous deaths on both sides. As a re- Soviet Union) burning.

Introduction

It is an ethnopolitical conflict over territory; this type of conflict, very much like wars of independence, is much more acute than others and much harder to settle. In this case, the Prigorodny Dis- trict of North Ossetia is a disputed territory, the confrontation over which repeatedly led to armed clashes and produced numerous victims, as well as drove the Ingush from their home. Many of the destructive processes in the republic are directly connected to its past.

Going Back into the Past

During the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1917-1920, the Ingush actively supported Soviet power in the Northern Caucasus in expectation of fair settlement of the national question. In the course of state-building, the local nationalities were assigned their own administrative units, which were later transformed into autonomous regions of the R.S.F.S.R. In this way, on 1 September, 1921 the Kabarda District was separated from the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (G.A.S.S.R.); on 12 January, 1922, the Karachay District appeared; several days later, on 16 January, 1922, the Balkar District was formed; and still later, on 30 November, 1922, the Chechen District. By a Decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of 7 July, 1924, the G.A.S.S.R. was liquidated to be replaced with the North-Ossetian and Ingush autonomous regions and the Sunzha Cossack District.1 The autonomous regions had to share one center—the city of Vladikavkaz (Orjoni-

1 See: S.A. Tarkhov, “Izmeneniia administrativno-territorialnogo deleniia Rossii za poslednie 300 let,” Geografia, No. 15, 2001, p. 31. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION kidze in 1931-1944 and 1954-1990)—which, as an autonomous unit, did not belong to any of the regions. At the turn of the 1930s, the policy of relatively great autonomy of the national minorities was replaced with the policy of ethnic integration, speeded up by stricter administrative methods. In 1928, the C.C. All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) discussed the “possibility of uniting the Ingush and Chechens” as a practical step toward the desired aim. On 1 June, 1933, the VTsIK transferred Vladikavkaz to North Ossetian jurisdiction; this deprived the Ingush of their political, economic, and cultural center. All the administrative structures were liquidated, while industrial enterprises, educational establishments, and hospitals found in the territory of Ingushetia were transferred to North Ossetia. In January 1934, the Chechen and Ingush autonomous regions were united into the Chechen- Ingush Autonomous Region (no one bothered to find out what the people thought about this); two years later, the new administrative unit became the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic2 with its capital in Grozny (separated from Ingushetia by at least 100 km) where all cultural and educational institutions were concentrated. This “act of humanity” presupposed that, given special conditions, two kindred peoples will unite into a single ethnicity. This meant that, given “special conditions,”3 the Chechens (whose numbers were and still are four times higher than the Ingush) would engulf the smaller ethnicity. The Ingush, who had become accustomed to living close to their administrative center,4 became aware of the discriminatory policy of the people in power. As soon as the Great Patriotic War broke out in 1941, the Ingush did not hesitate: 11 thousand of the total 80 thousand (about 50% being children and old people) joined the army (not counting those conscripted elsewhere in the Soviet Union and those who had already been serving in the army). Nearly 4 thousand perished in the war; 46 were awarded orders of the Hero of the Soviet Union. In September 1942, Germans crossed into Ingushetia in the northwest (Malgobek District) and occupied its oil-producing center, Malgobek.5 The occupants were met with fierce resistance by the troops of the Transcaucasian Front and two thousand volunteers who did not let the Nazis break through to the Caucasian oil fields and halted their offensive.6 Despite these services to the Motherland, in 1944 the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. was liquidated, while the Chechens and Ingush were deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan as “traitors.”7 Those who had fought in the war and been awarded state orders and medals were sent into exile along with their relatives.8 “Between 23 February, 1944 and 1 October, 1945, the number of Ingush and Chechens dropped by over 91 thousand.”9 After reaching their places of exile, they found that there was no housing; they were expected to register every month at the commandant office; they could not leave the place of exile of their own will under fear of being sentenced to 25 years in GULAG camps; young people were deprived of the right to higher education. “Deprived of adequate employment and

2 See: M.M. Zyazikov, Na rubezhe stoletiy, Moscow, 2011, p. 10. 3 Yu.Yu. Karpov, “Obrazy nasiliia v novoy i noveyshey istorii narodov Severnogo Kavkaza,” in: Antropologiia nasiliia, St. Petersburg, 2001, p. 239. 4 Vladikavkaz is found in the center of Ingushetia, between its highland and lowland parts. The nearest settlement was found at a distance of 2 to 3 km; the farthest, at a distance of 8 km or more. 5 In 2006, Murat Zyazikov, the then president of Ingushetia, suggested that the Ingush city of Malgobek be granted the honorary title of the City of Military Glory, which President Putin instituted on 9 May, 2006, in compliance with the Federal Law on the Honorary Title of the Russian Federation “The City of Military Glory” adopted by the State Duma on 14 April, 2006 and approved by the Federation Council on 26 April, 2006. Under the Law, the title should be conferred on cities of Russia in which, or in direct proximity to which, defenders of the Fatherland demonstrated courage, staunch- ness, and mass heroism in the course of bitter fighting. Malgobek, a city of working people and warriors, added one of the brightest pages to the chronicles of the Great Patriotic War. 6 See: Istoria Ingushetii, Magas, 2011, pp. 408-409. 7 A. Uralov (Avtorkhanov), Ubiystvo Checheno-Ingushskogo naroda. Narodoubiystvo v SSSR, Moscow, 1991, p. 63. 8 See: Yu.Yu. Karpov, “O sotsialnoy kulture i obshchestvennykh praktikakh narodov Severnogo Kavkaza,” in: Kavkaz i Rossia—proshloe i nastoiashchee: materaily dlia nauchno-prakticheskogo seminara “Problemy tolerantnosti v peterburgskoy shkole,” Publishing House of the journal Zvezda, 2007, p. 56. 9 M.Zh. Aliev, Tak eto bylo, Nazran, 2007, p. 17. 46 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION confronted with the prejudiced attitude of the local population, members of the intelligentsia, representatives of the cultural front, numerous teachers, writers, academics, and Communist Party officials had to abandon their former professions and take those manual jobs that came their way.”10 In 1954, the right to higher education was restored; in 1955, the deported people were relieved from monthly registration; and in 1956, the Ingush were allowed to travel across the country (with the exception of the Caucasus). They sent a delegation to Moscow to get permission to go back home. After receiving oral approval and without waiting for an official document, they sold their homes and cattle for a pittance and moved to their homeland. Special travel documents were issued and special trains organized. When the first Ingush families started coming home,11 albeit without official permission, the Ossets moved out of the houses they had occupied to return them to their legal owners. The Ingush repaid the money Ossets had invested in their homes. The Ossetian authorities, however, banned these transactions.12 Circular No. 063 instructed the local authorities to prevent “organizations and private people from selling houses or rent out living space to the Ingush returning from exile; any completed deals were to be deemed null and void.”13 The heads of the village Soviets informed the local people about possible administrative and other repercussions; the state preferred to ignore the feelings and kindness of the ordinary people; it deliberately fanned a national conflict. Late in 1956, the first train from the Kostanay Region brought Ingush families to the Beslan railway station. People were returning in an orderly manner with tickets bought according to special documents. First Secretary of the North Ossetian Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U. Akkatsev instructed the local forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to encircle the station to prevent people from unloading and to send the train back. The passengers were kept inside the train under the threat of machineguns and bayonets and were returned to Kazakhstan.14 In 1957, the liquidated Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. was restored by a decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The restored republic had to work hard to find employment for those returning, supply them with housing, extend financial and material assistance, raise their educational level, professional skills, etc.15 Restoration involved administrative rearrangement of the region, which was not an easy task; in the summer of 1957, repatriation was suspended. Most of the Chechens and Ingush had returned by the spring of 1959; the process, however, went on until 1963.16 At home, the Ingush were confronted with another problem: only a third of them could settle back in their old homes; the homes of the rest had been appropriated by new inhabitants resolved to stay put. While the Ingush were in exile, the Prigorodny District and part of the Malgobek District, which had been parts of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., were transferred to the North Ossetian A.S.S.R. While Georgia, the Stavropol Territory, and Daghestan returned the land that had belonged to the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., North Ossetia tried to prevent repatriation of the Ingush of the Prig- orodny District; the militia and the army were instructed to move the repatriates outside the district. Some of the Ingush families, however, managed to retrieve their old homes with the help of identical family names (not infrequent among the Ingush and Ossets), bribes, and other methods.

10 Ingushi: deportatsia, vozvrashchenie, reabilitatsia, 1944-2004: dokumenty, materialy, kommentarii, Compiled by Ya.S. Patiev, Magas, 2004, pp. 332-333. 11 According to the All-Union Population Census of 1939, there were 33.8 thousand living in the Prigorodny Dis- trict, 28.1 thousand of whom were Ingush, 3.5 thousand Russians, and 400 Chechens. The territory comprised 34% of the total territory of five Ingush districts of Checheno-Ingushetia. 12 See: A. Nekrich, Nakazannye narody, New York, 1978, p. 89. 13 R.Sh. Albogachiev, Vera nas podderzhivala, Nazran, 2004, p. 22. 14 See: Tak eto bylo: Natsionalnye repressii v SSSR: v 1919-1952 gg., Compiled by S.U. Alieva, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1993, p. 135. 15 See: Groznensky rabochy, 8 June, 1957. 16 “‘Nakazanny narod.’ Kak deportirovali chechentsev i ingushey,” available at [http://www.stolicaplus.ru/ index.php], 12 January, 2012. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to the population census of 1970, there were 18,387 Ingush living in North Ossetia (about 11.7% of all Ingush living in the U.S.S.R.). Those who could not return to the old places tried to restore Ingush autonomy within the old borders. On 22-23 November, 1970, an Ingush delegation set off for Moscow with a request addressed to General Secretary of the C.C. C.P.S.U. Leonid Brezhnev to restore the Prigorodny District within the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. Later the same year, a group of communists and non-party members sent a letter to the C.C. C.P.S.U. “About the Fate of the Ingush People,” which clearly showed the position of the Ingush. “We are prepared to accept any variants of a solution to the Ingush question which will allow us to restore territorial integrity and national statehood of Ingushetia. We see two possible solutions: “(1) Creating an Ingush A.S.S.R. Ingushetia has all the conditions necessary for the development of its own autonomy. “(2) Creating an Ossetian-Ingush A.S.S.R. This variant will preserve traditional territorial integrity. “We want a variant under which the Ingush people can once more, like in the early years of Soviet power when it developed autonomously and independently, have the opportunity to fully reveal their creative forces in order to find a worthy place in the fraternal family of the Soviet peoples and to preserve their territorial integrity. “Out of the two possible solutions to the Ingush question and in view of the economic, cultural, and historical specifics, we prefer the first. Irrespective of this, the people who used to live in the Prigorodny District and the Keskemskie khutora area should be returned to their old places of residence as soon as possible. This is a matter of life and death for the Ingush and a question of friendship between the Ingush and Osset peoples.”17 The compromise variant—a joint Osset-Ingush A.S.S.R.—said that restoration of the lost territory where ancestors were buried was of fundamental importance. The country leaders preferred to ignore the request. On 14 January, 1973, however, the Ingush, who had learned that Secretary of the C.C. C.P.S.U. Mikhail Suslov would be coming to the republic to award orders and discuss the Ingush problem,18 demonstrated their determination; they converged on Grozny from all ends of the autonomous republic in great numbers. After three days of waiting, the 15 thousand people who had gathered in the republic’s capital were promised that Moscow would send a commission to look into their demands.19 The Ingush wanted to talk to the authorities, but were denied this opportunity. “The appellation near the building of the Grozny Regional Party Committee was a form of traditional sociopolitical and socio-psychological ‘symbiosis’ between the people and the government at the new (after Stalin and Khrushchev) development stage of Soviet society.”20 Those who organized the meeting lost their Communist Party cards and jobs and were stonewalled. In October 1981, North Ossetia was swept by huge rallies of Ossets who objected to the territorial claims of the Ingush; the people insisted on ethnic anti-Ingush cleansing and plundered the offices of the Supreme Soviet in Orjonikidze.21 This did not pass unnoticed. On 14 January, 1982, a Decision of the C.C. C.P.S.U. on Serious Shortcomings in the Ideological-Political and International Education of the Working People of the North Ossetian Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U. was issued. On 8 June, 1982, the bureaus of the North Ossetian and Chechen-Ingush Regional Committees of the C.P.S.U. met in Orjonikidze for a joint sitting in an effort to improve the situation. They drafted and signed a plan of joint measures of

17 B.U. Kostoev, Predannaia natsia, sine loco, 1995. 18 See: A. Nekrich, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 19 See: Tak eto bylo. Natsionalnye represii v SSSR, Vol. 2, pp. 140-141. 20 M.D. Yandieva, Obshchegrazhdanskiy meeting ingushey 1973 goda, Nazran, Moscow, 2008, p. 47. 21 See: Ya.S. Patiev, Khronika istorii ingushskogo naroda, Makhachkala, 2007, p. 191. 48 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ideological-political, international, and atheist education of the people. The Ingush culture and language received more attention in the Prigorodny District; several Ingush acquired posts in the administrative structures of North Ossetia. To put an end to the “territorial claims” of the Ingush, North Ossetia decided to “manage certain demographic processes, in particular to establish strict control over migration.”22 The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., in turn, passed Decision No. 183 on 5 March, 1982, which established a special regime for registration and real estate transactions in North Ossetia. The Ossets referred to the ecological and economic problems caused by the high population density in the republic to justify these measures.23 In 1985, the Ingush hailed the social and political changes in the Soviet Union in the hope that the situation regarding the Prigorodny District would improve. Early in 1985, E. Kushtova, an Ingush woman, was elected Secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the Prigorodny District on the insistence of Secretary of the North Ossetian Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U. V. Odintsov. This was the first time an Ingush person had been elected to a high post in the Communist Party in North Ossetia.24 It looked as if equality and justice would triumph. Meanwhile, the conflict persisted: according to official information there were at least 100 cases of national intolerance between 1984 and 1986: there were murders, desecration of cemeteries, and numerous acts of hooliganism.25 In 1988, the Ingush set up a popular-democratic union they called Niyskho (Justice) to insist on Ingush autonomy in the territory the Ingush believed to be their historical homeland. The newly established union tried to convince the Ossetian leaders to return the annexed lands to the Ingush.26 In October 1988, the Ingush expressed their indignation over the discrimination practiced against them in an address of the Ingush people to the leaders of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government signed by 8 thousand people.27 In January 1989, a cultural-historical society appeared in Ingushetia called Da’k’aste (Father- land) set up to restore the violated rights of the Ingush people. In February 1989, a wave of rallies timed to coincide with the 45th anniversary of deportations swept Nazran and the villages of the Prig- orodny District. The deportations were discussed by the First Congress of Peoples’ Deputies of the U.S.S.R. at the request of Ingush deputies Khamzat Fargiev and Mussa Darsigov. They asked the Congress to finally resolve the Ingush problems and liquidate the heritage of Stalin’s arbitrary rule, which still existed in the law-governed state. They transferred their request to Mikhail Gorbachev.28 On 9-10 September, 1989, the Second Congress of the Ingush People passed a resolution which demanded territorial rehabilitation of the Ingush: “Ask the C.C. C.P.S.U., the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and the Second Congress of People’s Deputies of the U.S.S.R. to finally resolve the problem of re-establishing our autonomy in the form of the Ingush Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Federation with its administrative center in the right-bank part of Orjonikidze.”29 Impressed by the repeated requests of the Ingush people and under pressure from protests by Soviet and international human rights organizations against the violations of civil rights of the Ingush and their discrimination, the Union and Russian centers finally turned their attention to the problem of the Prigorodny District. In 1989, numerous commissions (of the Council of Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R., the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., the State Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. on Nationalities, and others) began studying the question of restoring the Ingush autonomy. The decisions of the commission set up in March 1990 by the Nationalities Council of the Supreme Soviet of

22 V. Shanaev, “Terek—reka druzhby,” Groznenskiy rabochiy, 13 September, 1988, p. 2. 23 See: V. Snirelman, Byt Alanami. Intellektualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze v XX v., Moscow, 2006, p. 298. 24 See: Ya.S. Patiev, op. cit., p. 196. 25 See: V. Snirelman, op. cit., p. 299. 26 See: Ya.S. Patiev, Respublika Ingushetia. Sobytiia i liudi. Entsiklopedia: 1992-2008, Makhachkala, 2008, p. 60. 27 See: Ya.S. Patiev, Khronika istorii ingushskogo naroda, p. 200. 28 See: Tak eto bylo: Natsionalnye repressii v SSSR, Vol. 2, p. 141. 29 Vtoroy s’ezd ingushskogo naroda, Grozny, 1990, p. 212. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the U.S.S.R. were especially illustrative. The commission demanded that the Decision of the Council of Ministers of 5 March, 1982 On Limiting Registration in the Prigorodny District of the North Osse- tian A.S.S.R. and other discriminatory acts be revoked. It pointed out, however, that the suggestion that the capital of the Ingush autonomy be set up in the right-bank part of Vladikavkaz could not be realized for sociopolitical, demographic, and economic reasons.30 The leaders of Ossetia tried to put the “Cossack card” on the table to justify their claims to the annexed territories. They insisted that the Ingush had lived in the disputed territories for only 23 years— from 1921 to 1944—and deliberately ignored the earlier period. In the mid-19th century, the Ingush were turned out of their settlements and Cossacks took up residence there. For example, between 1859 and 1867, the Prigorodny District consisted of the Cossack village of Tarskaya (instead of the Ingush village of Angusht), the Cossack village of Sunzha (instead of the Ingush village of Akhki- Yurt), the Cossack village of Aki-Yurt (instead of the Ingush village of Tauzen-Yurt), and the settlement of Tarsky (instead of the Ingush village of Sholkhi).31 In addition to these settlements, there were about 40 more Ingush villages in the territory the Prigorodny District.32 In 1990, in an effort to defend the republic’s rights to the contested territories, the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R. passed a Declaration of State Sovereignty stating that its territory could not be changed without a referendum of the entire population. It was thought that the document was intended to confirm the rights of North Ossetia to the lands of the Prigorodny District claimed by the Ingush.33 Limited registration made it much harder to find jobs, gain access to social benefits, etc. On 14 September, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia passed a third decision banning real estate operations in the republic; the protest issued by the General Prosecutor Office of the U.S.S.R. was ignored. These and earlier decisions of that kind notwithstanding, refugees from South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia driven away by the Georgian-Osset conflict settled in the Prigor- odny District and received all sorts of social benefits and privileges. This flagrant violation of the Decision on Temporary Limitation of Mechanical Population Growth in the Territory of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R. added tension to the already tense atmosphere around the contested territories.34 In view of the Center’s obvious reluctance to interfere and set things right, the Ingush felt that they were being discriminated against. Mistrust and resentment mounted: the state proved unable to ensure genuine equality of all nationalities. On 20 April, 1991, at a meeting of people living in the Ossetian quarter of Vladikavkaz, it was decided to set up a self-defense unit with strict army discipline “to rebuff Ingush attacks.” On 21 April, 1991, military commandant of the Prigorodny District V. Medveditskov issued an order On Institut- ing a State of Emergency in the Territory of the Prigorodny District of the North Ossetian S.S.R.; the state of emergency was regularly extended until November 1992. The North Ossetian authorities used it to build up pressure on the Ingush diaspora and acquire a pretext to set up republican armed units. In November 1991, a Union of Border Guards in the Reserve was set up in Vladikavkaz; on 14 No- vember, a special session of the republic’s Supreme Soviet endorsed the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on setting up a State Self-Defense Committee of North Ossetia (SSDC) presided by Head of the Supreme Soviet Akhsarbek Galazov. The Supreme Soviet endowed the new structure with special powers and instructed it to set up a Republican Guard. “Neither at that time, nor later when North Ossetia acquired its Republican Guard and units of ‘people volunteers’ did Russia’s leaders and the federal law and order enforcers respond in any way to the appearance of illegal bodies of power and armed units obviously targeted at the claims of the neighboring people.”35

30 See: Tragedia ingushskogo naroda, Compiled by Yu. Tangiev, Grozny, 1991, p. 54. 31 See: Sbornik svedeniy o Terskoy oblasti, Vladikavkaz, 1878, pp. 373-374. 32 See: I.A. Novitsky, Upravlenie etnopolitikoy Severnogo Kavkaza, Krasnodar, 2011, p. 103. 33 See: G.Z. Anchabadze, Vaynakhi, Tbilisi, 2001, available at [http://www.magas.ru/osetino-ingushskii-konflikt], 2 December, 2011. 34 See: Ya.S. Patiev, 20 let bezdeystviia zakona, Nazran, 2011, p. 4. 35 I.A. Novitsky, op. cit., p. 103. 50 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Meanwhile, the Second Special Congress of People’s Deputies which passed the Law on Reha- bilitation of Repressed Peoples was going on in Moscow. It bred hopes among the Ingush that the territorial issue would be fairly resolved. Indeed, Art 3 clearly stated: “Rehabilitation of the repressed peoples means recognition and realization of their rights to territorial integrity that existed prior to the anti-constitutional policy of changing borders by force.” The country’s leaders, however, did not hasten to apply the law.36 It should be said that the new law exacerbated the situation in the Prigorodny District because it left many points unspecified. On 13-14 August, 1991, a Commission of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of Russia headed by Vice Premier of Russia Oleg Lobov started working in Checheno-Ingushetia and North Ossetia; it discussed its results at a joint meeting in Vladikavkaz at- tended by representatives of both republics. On 18 August, 1991, the delegation of Checheno-Ingushetia arrived in Vladikavkaz to discuss execution of the Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples; however, North Ossetia claimed it was unprepared. The talks and decision on an issue equally important for both nations were postponed. The dramatic events of late 1991 destroyed the Soviet Union and radically changed its administrative structure. The autonomous republics demanded independence. On 1 October, 1991 the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. split into the Ingush Republic within the R.S.F.S.R. and the independent Chechen Republic. On 15 September, 1991, a Special Congress of People’s Deputies of Ingushetia decided that Ingushetia should remain within the R.S.F.S.R.37 On 4 June, 1992, the RF Supreme Soviet passed a Law on the Formation of the Ingush Republic within the Russian Federation; the borders of the new republic, however, were not outlined. The In- gush hoped to resolve their territorial problem in the new reality and on the strength of the Law of the RF of 1991 On Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples, which presupposed “restoration of the national-territorial borders as they existed prior to their anti-constitutional change carried out with the use of force.”38 In Ingushetia, rallies followed one after another, while members of the intelligentsia wrote letters to President of Russia Boris Yeltsin and addressed him personally. On 24 March, 1992, he arrived in Ingushetia and spoke at a meeting in Nazran: “When representatives of the Ingush people approached me I invariably answered that I could promise nothing until I visited your republic, met representatives of the Ingush people, and looked them in the eye. This meeting should take place so that I can feel the pain in your hearts and realize how much you have suffered in the past and the last decades. I have understood this and I promise you my support.”39 The Ingush believed the head of state once more and dispersed, fully confident that their question would be positively resolved. North Ossetia responded with unconstitutional armed structures: it started setting up the Nation- al Guard and volunteer units to oppose “Ingush expansion.” The people in power infringed on the rights of the Ingush who lived in North Ossetia by provoking violence, which later could have been passed for a show of nationalist intentions by the extremist part of the Ingush people. In June 1992, the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia discussed draft laws to legalize, in one way or another, a republican army in the form of self-defense forces. In August 1992, the Russian military supplied them with a huge amount of automatic weapons, armored vehicles, and Grad and Alazan missile launchers. Speaking at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia, President of North Ossetia Galazov called on the deputies to annul the decision of 21 May (on weapon production in Vladikavkaz) because, he argued, “the republic was receiving enough weapons from the Russian Federation.”40

36 See: Ya.S. Patiev, Zakon o realibilitatsii repressirovannykh narodov: istoria soprotivlenia (K 10-letiiu so dnia priniatia zakona), Nazran, 2001, pp. 3-34. 37 See: Vtoroy s’ezd ingushskogo naroda, p. 211. 38 Yu.Yu. Karpov, “Obrazy nasiliya…”, p. 247. 39 “Salam aleykum, ingushi,” available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch], 20 December 2011. 40 I.A. Novitsky, op. cit., p. 104. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On 12 June, 1992, the RF Supreme Soviet, at North Ossetia’s request, declared a state of emergency in the Ossetian districts bordering on Ingushetia and Chechnia. This triggered murders and other crimes against Ingush; their houses were set on fire. The indignant Ingush rallied together to demand that the country’s leaders protect them against the arbitrary rule of the local authorities. On 23 October, 1992, People’s Deputy of the R.S.F.S.R. Issa Kostoev presented his analysis of the situation in the Prigorodny District where human rights of the Ingush were violated to the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. People’s deputies tried and failed to meet President Yeltsin.41 Issa Kostoev, likewise, asked the president to receive him and was ignored. In fact, hundreds of telegrams, complaints, and addresses from Ingush deputies were ignored.42 “There are enough documents to testify that the president, the government, the Supreme Soviet, and the federal ministries of state security and internal affairs knew what was going on in the Prigorodny District and Vladikavkaz.”43 The country’s leaders and people who headed North Ossetia insisted that the claims of the Prig- orodny District were unjustified; little by little this thought was accepted by the political, economic, and legal systems of North Ossetia and caused armed clashes.

The Armed Conflict

The latent conflict rapidly developed into an open confrontation: on 31 October-4 November, 1992, mass armed action supported by the army was launched against the Ingush settlements, which the local people tried to defend. For several days people were killed and taken hostage, while their houses were plundered and set on fire; the Ingush were driven out of the Prigorodny District and Vladikavkaz. The Russian leaders were on the side of North Ossetia. According to S. Belozertsev, “deportation and genocide were prepared well in advance. This means that neither the Ministry of Security of North Ossetia, nor the federal Ministry of Security could remain uninformed: bulk purchases of armored vehicles for North Ossetia were never concealed. By the time of the large-scale operation, even collective farms had armed themselves with tanks and armored vehicles. There were about 70 tanks and over 120 armored vehicles, nearly all of them adequately equipped. In Vladikavkaz, all the Ingush, registered and unregistered, were entered in special lists. This could not remain unnoticed!”44 A military contingent of up to 12.5 thousand servicemen and armored vehicles were moved into the republic. The Ingush could not understand why the federal center sided with the Ossets and encouraged the use of force instead of disuniting the conflicting sides. Issa Kostoev, who represented the president of Russia in the Ingush Republic, insisted that he had suggested that troops be moved into the conflict zone from Beslan, block it, and disarm the conflicting sides. At first, the people in power accepted the plan, but later they decided to move troops in from Vladikavkaz to push the Ingush out of it, which caused numerous deaths.45 Later, Valentin Tishkov, former head of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Nationalities, admitted that the position of the federal center during the so-called national conflict “was acceptance of ethnic cleansing aimed at citizens of another (Ingush) nationality.” Insurgent Chechnia was the true target of the operation planned by the RF Security Council and the heads of the federal defense and security structures.46 Experts studying the causes of the conflict

41 See: Ya.S. Patiev, Khronika istorii ingushskogo naroda, p. 250. 42 See: Ya svidetelstvuiu… Khronika krovavoy oseni 1992 goda v Prigorodnom rayone, Nazran, 1996, p. 43. 43 I.M. Sampiev, “Etnopoliticheskaia situatsia v Ingushetii: novye vyzovy i alternativy,” in: Severny Kavkaz: profilaktika konfliktov, Moscow, 2008, p. 39. 44 S.V. Belozertsev, “Narodny deputat SSSR,” Daymokhk newspaper, No. 31-32, January 1993. 45 See: S.V. Belozertsev, “Delo i v terminakh i v suti proiskhodiashchego,” available at [http://consultantsv. livejournal.com], 10 January, 2012. 46 See: “Indulgentsia na genotsid: ‘osetino-ingushskiy konflikt’ gotovilsia rossiskimi i osetinskimi politikami,” available at [http://criminalnaya.ru/publ], 6 January, 2012. 52 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION are of the same opinion. The conflict was carefully planned ideologically. Jokhar Dudaev, elected President of the Chechen Republic, was a thorn in the Kremlin’s side. Fully aware of this, the leaders of North Ossetia laid their plan of action on the table.47 To avoid a conflict Dudaev hastened to declare the neutrality of his republic on 2 November, 1992. The following confirms that what is written above is absolutely correct. On 8 November, Rus- sian troops approached the border between Chechnia and Ingushetia, not the administrative border between Ossetia and Ingushetia. An analysis of what the Russian troops were doing under the slogan of conflict settlement reveals that the action had been never aimed at the Ingush. On 5-6 November, 1992, after promptly routing the weak and disjointed units of Ingush volunteers, the federal units left the conflict territory to move further eastward, across Ingushetia to the Chechen border.48 On 10 November, 1992, Dudaev introduced a state of emergency and announced mobilization of the self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic. A week later the government and parliamentary delegations of Chechnia and the Russian Federation agreed to disengage the Russian and Chechen armed units. The events of the fall of 1992 in the Prigorodny District added intensity to the anti-Rus- sian feelings among the Chechens, who interpreted them as a stern warning.49 Ossetia and Ingushetia were used as a springboard for reaching Chechnia. Five days of “restoring constitutional order” by federal forces, the defense and security structures, and illegal armed units of North and South Ossetia ended in the deportation of tens of thousands of Ingush (according to some sources, 60 thousand were deported)50 ; official sources insist on 546 casualties: 407 Ingush, 105 Ossets, 186 missing Ingush, and 12 missing Ossets. Over 4,000 houses and apartments were plundered and destroyed.51 Here is what independent military experts of human rights organizations wrote about the prep- arations and course of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the territory of the Russian Federation: “The Ingush Republic had no state power structures, which meant that consistent and well-substantiated military preparation of the conflict was impossible. People armed themselves at random…”52 The experts were objective—there is no doubt about it. After 6 September, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic was disbanded and power was transferred to the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People. Until 4 June, 1992 the Ingush part of the Chechen-Ingush Republic remained suspended: the money allocated for the republic (including its Ingush part) remained in Grozny, which increased social, economic, and political tension in Ingush- etia.53 The republic was set up, but it lacked money and had no clear borders, two things indispensable for the smooth functioning of any new state.54 In these conditions Ingushetia, which had no money, could not prepare for an armed conflict.

After the Conflict

After the conflict, 52,828 people (9,606 families) applied to the immigration service of the In- gush Republic for the status of forced migrants. Many of them either could not wait or did not apply;

47 See: “Mark Deutsch: Osetino-ingushskiy konflift: u kazhdoy iz storon—svoia pravda,” available at [http://www. ng.ru/ideas/2007-11-02/10_konflikt.html]. 48 See: “Indulgentsya na genotsid.” 49 See: A.M. Bekov, Geopoliticheskie funktsii i rol Rossii: istoria i sovremennost, Moscow, 1997, p. 55. 50 See: Est prigovor, no net viny, Compiled by M.Yu. Zangiev, R.M. Ozdoev, Magas, 2006, p. 31. 51 See: Sobytiia oktiabry-noiabrya 1992 goda v interpretatsii Generalnoy prokuratury RF, Nazran, 2006, p. 2. 52 Ya svidetelstvuiu, p. 107. 53 See: I.M. Sampiev, “Etapy natsionalno-gosudarstvennogo samoopredeleniia ingushskogo naroda,” in: Vuzovskoe obrazovanie i nauka: materialy regionalnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, Magas, 2007, p. 254. 54 See: D.S. Kokorkhoeva, Stanovlenie i razvitie sovetskoy natsionalnoy gosudarstvennosti ingushskogo naroda (1917-1944), Elista, 2002, p. 141. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION they merely moved to other regions55 (Moscow, Rostov-on-Don, Tyumen, etc.) and to the Near and Far Abroad (mainly Kazakhstan). After going through a very complicated procedure, 47,045 people (8,554 families) acquired forced migrant status.56 According to independent experts, there were over 60 thousand unregistered Ingush living in the Prigorodny District and Vladikavkaz; the official figure being 32.7 thousand.57 Forced migrants wanted to return to their former places of residence; this was confirmed by a poll carried out by the Interregional Administration of the Russian Migration Service.58 On 19 May, 2007, there were 2,988 registered families (10,715 people) of forced migrants; 2,878 families (10,444 people) were Ingush.59 After November 1992, 143 federal regulatory legal acts were adopted to liquidate the repercussions of the events in Vladikavkaz and the Prigorodny District, including: n 47 decrees and instructions of the President of Russia; n 12 assignments and addresses of the RF President; n 50 decisions and instructions of the RF Government; and n 23 decisions of the RF Federal Assembly. The presidents and the governments of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of In- gushetia signed over 20 agreements, work plans and programs designed to resolve the problem. Not one of the above-mentioned regulatory legal acts that envisaged return of the forced migrants to their former places of settlement has been executed in full.60 The villages where Ossets and Ingush continue living side by side and where there are no ethnic enclaves (in the villages of Dongaron and Kurtat, for example) are marked by the best moral and psychological climate. A public opinion poll has revealed that people between 40 and 50 years of age with earlier experience of living together easily accept good-neighborly relations; young people who grew up during the conflict and after it (when young people of both groups were isolated from each other) are less receptive of the idea of contacts.61 The young people are divided by the current practice of separate schools for Osset and Ingush children in the Prigorodny District.62

Conclusion

The Ossetian and Ingush societies are prisoners of the stereotypes imposed on them in the last few decades; most of the people in both republics look back to the past with nostalgia. Both peoples have a huge number of relatives since for many centuries they lived side by side, which means that mixed marriages were quite common. The aristocrats of both peoples deliberately created kindred relations; this tradition has survived until today. During the deportations, many Osset wives preferred to follow their Ingush husbands into exile rather than stay behind (as they were advised); many of them died during these tragic years.

55 The present author was one of them. 56 See: R.Z. Sagov, “Etnopoliticheskaia situatsia vokrug Prigorodnogo rayona,” in: Severny Kavkaz: profilaktika konfliktov, Moscow, 2008, p. 58. 57 See: B.A. Akiev, E.D. Muzhukhoeva, R.Z. Sagov, Tragediia oseni 1992 goda v Prigorodnom rayone, Nazran, 1996, p. 109. 58 See: I.M. Sampiev, Etnopoliticheskaia situatsia v Ingushetii, p. 42. 59 See: F.P. Bokov, A eto i est fashizm, Kiev, 2008, p. 454. 60 See: L.Ya. Arapkhanova, “Rol federalnoy i regionalnoy politicheskoy elity v likvidatsii problem vynuzhdennykh pereselentsev na Severnom Kavkaze,” in: Sbornik nauchnykh statey filosofskogo fakulteta MGU, Moscow, 2010, p. 154. 61 See: “Osetino-ingushskiy konflikt 1992 g: istoki i razvitie (po may 2005 g.),” available at [http://www.memo.ru/ hr/hotpoints/caucas1/prigorod/msg/2005/05/m291.htm]. 62 See: “Mark Deutsch: Osetino-ingushskiy konflift: u kazhdoy iz storon—svoia Pravda.” 54 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Ossets and Ingush could have lived peacefully side by side if the people at the top had wanted this. This was amply confirmed by numerous cases when Ossets, in fear for their lives, helped Ingush escape from “self-defenders” and when Ingush saved Ossets from their enraged neighbors.63 Not infrequently Ossets and Ingush have common businesses. Our society can start thinking positively if it learns the lessons of history and traditions of its ancestors. It is our task to tell the truth about the hard crisis stages of the past without negative assess- ments and in a format of serious analysis very much needed to correctly assess the lessons of the negative and positive past of our peoples for the sake of future generations.

63 See: “Mark Deutsch: Osetino-ingushskiy konflift: u kazhdoy iz storon—svoia Pravda.”

Alexander KUKHIANIDZE

Ph.D. (Philos.), Professor, Chair of Political Science, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

GEORGIA: CONFLICTS, CRIME, AND SECURITY

Abstract

he end of the Cold War pushed civil of Georgia in the post-Soviet period; the T security concerns to the forefront, but Russian-Georgian conflict and the crimes no one can say that the war’s echoes and violence against civilians in the con- have died away: they can still be heard flict zones; the causes of Russia’s armed during local armed conflicts. The author an- intervention in Georgia; and Georgia’s se- alyzes the civil conflicts and criminalization curity issues after the August war of 2008.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War led to reassessment of the security system at the global, regional, national, and local levels. Collapse of the communist system put an end to the old fears of a nuclear war and pushed new threats to the fore: local armed conflicts; international and local terror; and the spread of fissionable materials and other forms of transnational organized crime (illegal trade in weapons, drugs and people, money laundering, violence, and violation of human rights in the zones of armed conflicts). Corruption, which can be likened to a malignant tumor, is spreading far and wide in all spheres of criminal activity; in the armed conflict zones it directly threatens the states’ national security. In the last few decades, it has become clear that the security conception should be readjusted to take into account the new threats caused by global warming (natural fires, earthquakes, floods, drought, and unexpected cold Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION spells); mankind should protect itself against so-called non-traditional threats. While during the Cold War the state relied on its military and defense capability as society’s main “security provider,” in the post-Cold War period this function is gradually being appropriated by all sorts of civil (governmental and non-governmental) organizations that concentrate on man and human rights. During the Cold War military security was the main concern in the global security system, while in the post-Cold War period civil security is coming to the fore. This is a contradictory trend which clashes with the echoes of the Cold War obvious in the relations between Russia and the West, in the local armed conflicts in the post- Soviet expanse, and particularly in the Russia-Georgia confrontation. Civil security is a fairly capacious and multisided concept; here I will concentrate on one of its aspects, that is, security of the civilian population in the conflict zones in Georgian territory. Security of the civilian population during a conflict should be seen as a civilized method of cooperation between the conflicting sides. In the Caucasus, the conflicting sides prefer to ignore their own responsibility to concentrate on hurling accusations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and ideological warfare at each other. Armed groups do not hesitate to shoot civilians, plunder and burn down their homes, and resort to other forms of violence; not infrequently, settlements are deliberately wiped out to make the results of ethnic purges irreversible. All sorts of volunteer paramilitary detachments are nothing more than armed bands of marauders and nationalists taking commands from their political leaders; guilty of grave crimes against civilians, they escape unpunished. Unlike in Western Europe, in the Caucasus, civilian security has not yet received full attention. Armed conflicts affect both the civilian and the military levels in conditions of limited democracies or openly authoritarian regimes that still exploit the Cold War rhetoric not only to perpetuate confrontation, but also to promote personal aggrandizement and enrichment through violations of human rights and violence against political opponents. None of the conflicts in which the civilian population is involved against its will is free from criminal acts committed for political or nationalist reasons and for the sake of personal gain. The still unresolved conflicts, stretches of state borders which await delimitation, strategically important transportation routes, oil and gas, and the clashing local, separatist, national, and global interests of cultures, ethnicities, confessional groups, and states make the Caucasus one of the most volatile regions of the world. Global and regional powers compete for oil, gas, transportation routes, and political influence, while local corrupt clans (particularly in the Northern Caucasus), criminal groups, and terrorist organizations are taking advantage of the political instability; they fan religious fundamentalism and ethnic enmity to control public opinion. Russia, with its high level of corruption and nuclear know-how, and Iran, seen by the international community as a potential nuclear threat, can be described as authoritarian states with interests in the Caucasus. In the post-Soviet era, instances have been repeatedly registered of smuggling nuclear and radiological materials from Russia through the Caucasus. The region is one of the corridors via which Afghan heroin reaches Western Europe and Russia. Russia’s war in Chechnia turned the Northern Caucasus into a war zone and a safe haven for corruption, organized crime, and religious radicalism. Terrorist acts, street fights, and murders on nationalist grounds in other Russian regions have become a common feature. In 2010-2011, a wave of nationalist clashes between ethnic Russians and people from the Caucasus swept Moscow, Saratov, Rostov on Don, and other cities.

Civilian Conflicts and Criminalization of Georgia in the Post-Soviet Period (1991-2003)

The collapse of Soviet ideology caused a political and economic crisis amid mounting destabilization, chaos, nationalism, and ethnic contradictions over the post-Soviet territories’ political fu- 56 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ture. Georgia, in which ethnic minorities live in compact groups, suffered more than many other republics. Disintegration of the state structures, demoralization of the law-enforcers, the spread of weapons of the Soviet Army across the formerly united country, and armed ethnopolitical conflicts led to full-scale criminalization of Georgia. In December 1991-January 1992, confrontation between the opposition and President of Georgia Gamsakhurdia, who was determined to set up an authoritarian regime, ended in a civil war; two weeks of fighting in the Georgian capital claimed over 100 young lives, while criminalization rapidly developed into an important factor obvious to all. The conflicting sides turned to the people for support; arms were distributed left and right. Many of those who got their hands on weapons then absconded with them. As could be expected, several months later, Tbilisi and the provinces were flooded with armed robberies and other violent crimes. Arms were in great demand, the Russian military and Georgian police being frequent targets of attack. However, more often than not, paramilitary and semi-criminal Georgian bands found a common language with the Russian officers and bought weapons from them. Within just a few weeks, bands developed into small armies equipped with the latest Soviet machineguns, pistols, grenades, anti-tank grenade launchers, and even armored personnel carriers. The Georgian police armed with small weapons was helpless; it quietly left the stage and abandoned the people to their fate. Unlike the purely criminal structures, the paramilitary units were set up by political groups of all sorts posing as independence fighters. Jaba Ioseliani set up a paramilitary group he called Mkhedrio- ni; Tengiz Kitovani became commander of a similar structure called The Guard. Both were instrumental in deposing President Gamsakhurdia. The military coup that removed him created chaos, not without help from the Russian military. These and similar paramilitary structures, which called themselves “brotherhoods,” were not alone; the Armenians who lived in compact groups in the country’s south formed their own armed units, while the Abkhazians in the northwest and the Ossetian separatists in the north did the same to pursue their own aims. Those who remained loyal to the deposed president controlled Samegrelo in the west. These groups were knocked together from ill-trained volunteers who knew next to nothing about discipline; they blindly obeyed their leaders, who ruled like feudal lords. They were not alien to plundering when fulfilling political assignments; Mkhedrioni was repeatedly dispatched to Western Georgia to suppress Gamsakhurdia’s supporters; it indulged itself in plundering the local people; it also fought in Abkhazia. Back in the 1950s, its leader Ioseliani, a hardened criminal crowned by the criminal community with several prison terms behind him, was caught after several residential holdups in Leningrad. Eduard Shevardnadze, who headed Georgia at the time, was not alien to using the paramilitary structures of Ioseliani and Kitovani against the armed detachments of former President Zviad Gamsa- khurdia. Known as crusades among the local people, these marches were accompanied by plundering, violence, robberies, and murders. Later, when the armed struggle spread to Abkhazia, these units did not miss the chance of plundering those who lived in the Soviet Union’s richest and most sumptuous region, known as the Soviet Riviera. Later, Abkhazian armed groups behaved in a similar way in the houses of ethnic Georgians. The war in Abkhazia, in which the Georgian armed units were defeated, helped Eduard Shev- ardnadze switch Georgian public opinion to Russia and the separatists, two external enemies of Geor- gia. By the same token, Shevardnadze delivered a heavy military and ideological blow on the Zviad- ists (supporters of Gamsakhurdia). Mkhedrioni and The Guard coped with the task; with the Zviadists out of the way, they became an impediment1: the leaders were imprisoned, and Mkhedrioni was disbanded in 1995. In 1992, Shevardnadze organized parliamentary elections to become the speaker and later president of Georgia; he restored the police, set up a Georgian army, and did not miss an opportunity to distribute the best posts among his former colleagues. In the 1990s, criminals crowned by the criminal community not only controlled the smaller fry in Georgia, they were also actively involved in the country’s economy—in privatization, money

1 The fate of Vostok, a Chechen battalion, was even worse after Russia’s attack of Georgia in 2008. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION laundering, control of the markets and small businesses, and smuggling. They worked together with the police, demoralized by the criminal and corrupt elements that had wormed their way into its ranks. Violations of human rights, torture, illegal arrests, extortion of businessmen and traffic offenders, bribery, falsification of investigation results, direct involvement in crimes, and even murders were common among the policemen. In 1991-2003, criminalization of the political sphere was manifested in illegal and unfair redistribution of public property through vouchers, privatization, and tenders, embezzlement of Western grants, widespread corruption, and direct involvement of politicians in crime and smuggling across the porous Georgian borders.2 In the 1990s, the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, emboldened by the weakness and absolute corruption of the central and law-enforcement structures and encouraged by Russia, stepped up their activities. Russia used all the methods at its disposal to restore its former influence in the region: it extended military, financial, moral, and political support to the separatist regimes and increased its economic, political, and direct military pressure on Georgia. In 1990-2003, large nation-states and international organizations paid particular attention to Georgia, not only because of Caspian oil, but also because of the wide-scale smuggling of drugs, weapons, fissionable and radiological materials, and people, illegal migration, and the international terrorist structures that sought refuge there. Georgia’s national security was threatened, while other countries did not feel safe either. Smuggling across Abkhazia and South Ossetia presented the greatest threat as an element of separatism and criminal activities in the breakaway regions. The self-proclaimed republics created zones, outside state control, in which force and crowned criminal leaders lay down the law; from them violence spread far and wide, while murders, abductions, and other grave crimes became a common feature. The unresolved conflicts allowed the local clans to remain in power by limiting democracy or destroying its remnants altogether, spreading militarism, and abusing power for personal enrichment. This threatened Georgia’s national security.3 The ailing economy, repeated budget cuts, disintegration of morals, social pessimism, and falsi- fied results of parliamentary and presidential elections pushed the country toward a deep political crisis. The regime change and radical anti-corruption and anti-crime reforms after the Rose Revolu- tion of November 2003 proved to be the only coherent answer to the threats and challenges.

The Russian-Georgian Conflict

After the Rose Revolution, Georgia demonstrated good progress in its struggle against organized crime and corruption and finally achieved noticeable economic growth. Relations between Russia and Georgia, however, were steadily moving from bad to worse: Russia openly supported the separatist sentiments in Georgian territory and frowned at Tbilisi’s bias toward Euroatlantic integration. In 2006, the spy scandal in Georgia sent the tension to its highest point. Russia introduced economic sanctions against Georgia: it banned the import of Georgian wines, mineral water, and agricultural products, discontinued car, railway, naval, air, and postal communications, and deported ethnic Georgians from Russia in great numbers. It was the ordinary people, rather than President Saakashvili’s regime, who felt the blow: the Georgians were deeply offended and developed a negative attitude toward Russia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Russia and Georgia moved rapidly toward a clash. In 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on 19 November, 1990 and enacted on

2 See: A. Kukhianidze, A. Kupatadze, R. Gotsiridze, The Problem of Smuggling in Georgia: Abkhazia and the Tskhinval Region, Tbilisi, 2004 (in Georgian), available at [http://traccc.gmu.edu/pdfs/publications/Georgia_Publications/ Kukhianidze_Kupatadze_Smuggling_Georgia_Geo.pdf]. 3 Ibidem. 58 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

9 November, 1992.4 This meant that Russia waived its obligation to close down its military bases in Georgia (the Gudauta base in Abkhazia, in particular); it even acquired the opportunity to build new bases (it did this after the August war of 2008 when Moscow set up military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). After the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 that denied Georgia and Ukraine the status of candidate states for NATO membership, the Russian leaders pulled out of the treaty of the CIS presidents of 19 January, 1996 on sanctions against the separatist regime of Abkhazia. From that time on, Russia was free to deliver all sorts of civilian and military cargoes to Abkhazia. Having blocked these international instruments, in May-July 2008, Russian paratroopers posing as peacekeepers moved in to occupy Abkhazia, which was part of Georgia; the Russian railway troops restored the railway between Sukhumi and the Ochamchira district, allegedly to bring humanitarian aid to the distressed population. The Georgian leaders interpreted this as the first steps toward occupation of the entire country and the first evidence that the military infrastructure was war-geared. By late July 2008, Tbilisi had been expecting an attack through the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, part of Georgian territory with a Georgian population. Early in August 2008, the situation in South Ossetia became severely aggravated: Ossetian separatists blasted a police vehicle; Georgian settlements around Tskhinvali were shelled; the Ossetian population began moving in great numbers into Russia; contrary to their obligations, the Russian peacekeepers refused to pacify the separatists; Russia organized wide-scale military exercises in the Northern Caucasus to coordinate invasion of Georgia via South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and the Russian public was consistently brainwashed to justify Russia’s attack of Georgia. The Russian leaders justified the attack by the need to defend the Russian citizens in South Ossetia, while an independent international fact-finding mission headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini pointed out that shortly before the war Russia had illegally imposed its citizenship on these people. This means that Russia’s attack was illegal. On the other hand, Georgia was responsible for the lives, health, and property of its citizens in its own territory: it had to intercept the criminal activity of the armed separatists who were shelling Georgian villages. The Georgian leaders, however, never realized that the events were unfolding according to a Russian scenario: the provocations of the Ossetian separatists were intended to draw Georgia into a big war. Russia was pursuing several aims: to detach Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia; to bring about a regime change in Georgia; to establish its control over the strategically important Southern Caucasus in order to disrupt the oil- and gas-transportation projects from the Caspian and Central Asia bypassing Russia; and to keep Georgia away from NATO. Moscow never achieved all of these aims: it occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but Tbilisi did not abandon its Eu- roatlantic orientation; and the plans to transport energy resources bypassing Russia (from the Caspian and Central Asia via the Central Caucasus to Europe) survived. “Russia did not accomplish its goals in the first war,” Baku-based political analyst Shahin Abbasov said in May 2009 on RFE/RL’s “Caucasus Crossroads” program. “The goal was not the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The goal was to shut the West out of Georgia and the entire region. That goal was not achieved.”5

Crime and Violence during Russia’s Military Invasion of Georgia in August 2008

War in itself means brutal violence and mass murder; however there is a great difference between armed clashes on the battlefield and the violence and crime perpetrated by the military or ill-

4 See: N.A. Baranov, “DOVSE i problemy ogranicheniya obychnykh vooruzheniy,” available at [http://nicbar. narod.ru/nazbez_lekzia10.htm]. 5 “Gruziiu ozhidaet novaia voina s Rossiei?” Novy Region, 27 May, 2009, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_A_New_RussiaGeorgia_War_On_The_Horizon/1740028.html]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION disciplined volunteers against civilians or disarmed POWs. The Russian-Georgian conflict proved to be a classic example of uncivilized treatment of the ordinary people. Admittedly, it differed in some ways from the armed conflicts of the 1990s in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnia. A decree issued by President of Georgia Saakashvili as early as 2004 banning all informal volunteer paramilitary units in Georgia, the largest being the Forest Brothers and White Legion gue- rilla units based in the Gali District of Abkhazia and the Zugdidi District of Megrelia, was responsible for the main difference. It meant that by the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, there was not a single “volunteer” non-state armed formation in the country, and the crime level had dropped to its historical lowest across Georgian territory, with the exception of the breakaway regions. All the armed units represented the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs; they had both been reformed: professional skills had been upgraded; equipment improved; discipline tightened; and responsibility increased, while corruption had been all but eliminated. By August 2008, Georgia had small, but well-trained troops equipped in keeping with NATO standards and a reformed and uncor- rupt police force at its disposal. This radically changed the nature of relations between the Georgian military and law-enforcers, on the one hand, and the civilians in the conflict zone, on the other. By that time, anticorruption and anti-crime reforms had practically eliminated organized crime in Geor- gia (with the exception of Abkhazia and South Ossetia); criminals no longer threatened the people both in the fighting zone and outside it. During the war and immediately after it, the sides vehemently accused each other of violations of human rights, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The world community, however, finds it hard to accept what the Russian Prosecutor General and South Ossetia are saying about the genocide of Os- setians by Georgia because the Russian side did not allow any of the international structures, even those representing the most neutral countries, wishing to investigate possible military crimes to enter the occupied Georgian territories. The Heidi Tagliavini commission concluded that there had been no signs of genocide of the Ossetians by the Georgian defense and security structures. On the other hand, from the very beginning of the fighting in South Ossetia and the Gori Dis- trict, numerous groups of armed volunteers from the Northern Caucasus, especially Cossacks and Chechens (well-known for their cruelty towards the civilians of the Northern Caucasus), joined forces with Ossetian criminal groups to murder civilians, plunder, and burn down their homes, as well as steal cattle and cars. When the war ended, they consistently destroyed one Georgian settlement after another around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The Russian army did nothing to stop them; the results of the deliberate destruction around Tskhinvali can still be clearly seen on the Internet (the Goodle.map program). The mass plundering and humiliation of the local people in which armed volunteers from Russia indulged was part of the operation known as “peace enforcement in Georgia.” One finds it hard to believe that Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin, who personally commanded the operation, knew nothing of these crimes against Georgians. Ethnic cleansing depopulated the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia when over 20 thousand Georgian citizens were driven away from South Ossetia (there were also ethnic Ossetians among them). The Russian military got their share too: they plundered the Poti sea port and Georgian military bases, taking everything they could lay their hands on (even toilet bowls and linen), and robbing civilian facilities, including automatic teller machines, in passing. This was recorded and shown on TV by Georgian and foreign journalists who worked in the conflict zone. According to a parliamentary commission of Georgia, the civil defense system failed to take civilians out of the zone of hostilities in South Ossetia, the Gori District, and the Kodori Gorge; and foreign tourists were unable to leave Svanetia, Ajaria, and other resorts. It proved next to impossible to extinguish the fires deliberately fanned by Russian helicopters in the Borjomi National Park of Georgia. The August 2008 invasion of Georgia fomented extreme hostility between the two countries, whereby there is no hope that their relations will return to normal any time soon. 60 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Georgian Security after Russia’s Military Invasion of August 2008

The August war aroused euphoria in the Russian military, political, and expert community. Russian military experts took up the pen en masse to prove that Georgia should be destroyed as an independent state or divided into vassal quasi-states. Mikhail Aleksandrov, Head of the Department of the Southern Caucasus at the Institute of the CIS Countries, criticized the Russian leaders, who, unwilling to aggravate the already faltering relations with the West, had halted the onslaught on Tbi- lisi; he wrote that Georgia should be divided to become a loosely connected confederation with its symbolic center in Tbilisi.6 Alexey Vashchenko, another Russian expert, believes that there is an anti-Russian arc in which the Silk Road project is being actively implemented with the direct participation of the West, China, and the CIS countries, all working against Russia. He insists that the arc crosses Georgia, NATO’s main toehold. It presents the greatest threat to Russia, which means that what remains of Georgia should be divided into smaller parts.7 In November 2008, during his official visit to Ankara, Defense Minister of Russia warned that if Georgia tried to join NATO, a more serious conflict between the two countries could not be avoided.8 Finally, in November 2008, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev openly admitted that the war against Georgia had been started to prevent Georgia from joining NATO.9 In Georgia these statements are interpreted as the real cause of the August war of 2008, while protecting the Russian citizens was nothing more than a pretext, similar to the one Nazi Germany used in 1939 to invade Czechoslovakia. The pet idea of the Russian leaders about certain exclusive influence zones and Russia’s special interests in the post-Soviet expanse are potentially dangerous for Georgia and the other Soviet successor-states: “Russia wants to be a Eurasian center of attraction of sorts with the other countries of the post-Soviet expanse obeying its commands.”10 The war between Georgia and Russia was not to protect Russian citizens: Russia was driven by very different values and foreign policy priorities. Georgia wants to join the Euroatlantic structures and hopes to join NATO and the EU some time in the future, while Russia is hostile toward NATO and wants to prevent Georgia’s EU membership. Georgia has already opted for Western liberal democracy as its political ideal, while Russia is still devoted to the Great Power ideas and claims the role of the center of the post-Soviet expanse. This shows that the gap between Georgia and Russia is wide indeed. The Russian leaders and the Russian army, which exterminated hundreds of thousands in Chechnia and treated all Chechen separatists as terrorists to be “soaked [here it means: killed] in the john” (mochit v sortire),11 invariably supported the Abkhazian and Ossetian separatists. While posing as a peacekeeper and intermediary, Russia illegally supplied the separatists with machine guns, tanks, armored personnel carriers, combat helicopters, and aircraft and

6 See: M. Aleksandrov, “Nachalo kontsa yeltsinskoy epokhi. Kak nam obustroit postsovetskoe prostranstvo,” 10 March, 2008, available at [http://www.apn.ru/publications/article20771.htm]. 7 See: A. Vashchenko, military expert, “Raschlenenie Gruzii kak politicheskaia neobkhodimost. Antirossiyskaya duga i ee arkhitektory,” 29 September, 2008, available at [http://www.apn.ru/publications/article20753.htm]. 8 See: “Glava MO Rossii: vtiagivanie Gruzii v NATO mozhet sprovotsirovat bolee ser’ezny konflikt,” Novy Re- gion, 18 November, 2008, available at [http://nregion.com/txt.php?i=27870]. 9 See: “Medvedev: Voyna s Gruziey predotvratila rasshirenie NATO,” Grani.ru, 21 November, 2011, available at [http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/d.193273.html]. 10 “Amerikanskiy ekspert ob otnosheniyakh Rossii i SShA: NATO, PRO, Gruzia, Ukraina, Iran, Nagorny Karabakh, Afghanistan,” 8 July, 2009, available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/georgia/1183941.html]. 11 A Russian jargon expression which President Putin used at one of the press conferences when talking about the leaders of the Chechen resistance by way of comment on the missile and bomb strikes on the airport of Grozny, oil refin- ery, and housing estates in the northern outskirts of Grozny on 23 September, 1999 (see: [http://ru.wikipedia.org.wiki]). Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION encouraged their use against Georgia. This ended in a military confrontation between the two countries and a dramatic worsening of the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, including the Northern Caucasus. Russia’s desire to preserve its monopoly on the energy resources of the Caspian and Central Asia (Georgia as a transit territory undermined this monopoly) was another reason for the war. Moscow is convinced that those who control Georgia control oil and gas transit to the West. Russia, which is pursuing a neo-imperialist policy, is striving for domination in post-Soviet territory (particularly in Georgia) to remain in control of the local energy resources in order to siphon billions of Euros from the European Union by setting exorbitant oil and gas prices. During the war, Russia showed that it knows how to disrupt Georgia’s strategically important transport communications; it blasted the main railway and bombed dangerously close to the BTC oil pipeline, which threatened the rest of the world as well. Before the war, the local people in the conflict zones feared organized crime which lived on smuggling; after the war, Russia’s military threat came to the fore as the main danger. A public opinion poll carried out in December 2008 among the people living on the cease-fire line along the Inguri (the Zug- didi District of Georgia) revealed that 80% perceived the Russian troops stationed in the Gali District as the main threat to their safety; 53% regarded the Abkhazian criminal structures as such; 41% feared the armed Abkhazian detachments; while 17% saw Georgian criminals as a particular menace.12 The recently adopted conception of Georgia’s national security describes Russia as the main threat to the security of the Georgian state and its people.13 Since in August 2008 neither side achieved its aim by force, the conflict has not been resolved; the lingering confrontation might erupt as an armed invasion. The Iranian nuclear file, the tension around it, and the threat of a clash between Iran, on the one hand, and Israel and the United States, on the other, do nothing to improve the situation in the Caucasus. Russia is trying to fortify its position by preparing for the Kavkaz-2012 military exercises in September 2012 to rehearse another invasion of the Central Caucasus.14 Indeed, in the past, the Kavkaz-2008 military exercises, which imitated invasion of South Ossetia, eventually developed into a war. Can Georgia ensure its national security by remaining a neutral country? In 1918-1921, the Menshevist government tried strict neutrality. German Social-Democrat Karl Kautsky, who was in Georgia from September 1920 to January 1921, wrote about the policy of strict neutrality, especially in relation to Russia and Turkey reflected in the Declaration of Georgian Independence adopted on 26 May, 1921, which announced that Georgia would remain neutral in all possible international conflicts.15 In February 1921, this did not save Georgia from the invasion of the 11th Red Army and Soviet occupation. The present leaders of Russia, likewise, are still determined to undermine Geor- gia’s statehood and its territorial integrity; this leaves Georgia no chance of preserving its sovereignty through neutrality. Can “soft power” ensure civil security and conflict settlement as is frequently suggested by Western politicians and experts? Soft power and a free democratic society have good prospects in Georgia, but they will not return Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the fold in the near or distant future.

12 See: A. Kukhianidze, “Ways of Resolving the Problems of Crime and Ensuring Security of the Population in the Zugdidi District of Georgia and Along the Left Bank of the River Enguri,” in: Georgian and Abkhaz Perspectives on Hu- man Security and Development in Conflict-Affected Areas. A Policy Research Initiative, CITpax, Madrid, May 2009. 13 See: “National Security Concept of Georgia,” pp. 7-8, available at [http://www.nsc.gov.ge/files/files/ National%20Security%20Concept.pdf]. 14 See: S.I. Konovalov, “Manevry osoboy vazhnosti. Genshtab razrabatyvaet plan masshtabnykh strategichsekikh ucheniy, iskhodya iz vozmozhnoy ataki Izraelya i SShA po Iranu,” 16 January, 2012, available at [http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-16/3_kartblansh.html]. 15 See: K. Kautsky, Georgia: A Social-Democratic Peasant Republic—Impressions and Observations, Chapter X, “The Foreign Policy of the Republic,” International Bookshops Limited, London, 1921, available at [https:// epress.anu.edu.au/archive/kautsky/1921/georgia/ch06.htm]. 62 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

This will only happen if Russia and the separatist regions plunge into a deep crisis. The two German states reunited because of the crisis in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, even though for many years South Korea remained an attractive example of success, the two Koreas have not yet unified. This will not happen until the communist dictatorship in North Korea collapses; in the same way the attractions of American democracy have not yet led to a regime change in Cuba where the communists have been ruling for the last 54 years. The hopes for democratic developments in Russia and its drawing closer to the West were dashed after the presidential election of 2012 and Vladimir Putin’s victory. So relations between the two countries in the coming decade will take the form of a small Cold War at best, or another military invasion by Russia, at worst. Only Georgia’s accession to NATO will avert the latter scenario, something the three Baltic republics have indirectly proven. Their membership in NATO has drawn a red line that Russia is unable to cross, and the military-political situation in the region has stabilized. So far Georgia is not protected by a similar red line and the situation remains unstable, while Russia is ready to attack from its military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The problem is that while it remains outside NATO Georgia is highly vulnerable to the threat of a direct military invasion. The declarations of Georgia’s future NATO membership and intensi- fication of the integration process do not guarantee Georgia’s safety in the face of the Russian threat. This means that the closer Georgia comes to joining NATO, the greater the threat of an armed invasion by Russia and the more vulnerable Georgia becomes. NATO is not providing any answer to the question of who will stop the Russian army if the Alliance decides to accept Geor- gia’s membership in the future.

Conclusion

The measures taken after the Rose Revolution—reforms of the army and the police and the ban on non-state volunteer paramilitary armed structures—have made life in the confrontation zones much safer. The existence of large volunteer Cossack and North Caucasian armed groups and local Ossetian bands had led in the past to a multitude of crimes being committed against the local people and their property by Russia and the Ossetian separatists. As distinct from the Russian side, which while readying for the attack evacuated most of the civilians from the Ossetian capital on time, the Georgians failed to do this because their civil defense system was not functioning. This meant that in the areas controlled by Georgia, people were killed and their property plundered, while Russian and South Ossetian marauders were involved in ethnic cleansing. Neutrality will not protect Georgia against the Russian military threat, while integration into NATO, too, will merely increase the danger of another Russian armed assault. So the only solution is for the U.S. and NATO to give Georgia legally binding guarantees of its safety even before the country joins NATO. Soft power and a free democratic society will make Georgia an attractive country, but without a deep-cutting crisis in Russia and the breakaway Georgian regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are unlikely to reunite with Georgia now or anytime in the future. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Sergey ISRAPILOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Lecturer at the History Chair of Daghestan State University (Makhachkala, Russia).

NATIONAL STATE CRISIS IN THE MUSLIM REGIONS OF NON-MUSLIM COUNTRIES: A REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN CASE STUDY (IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY)

Abstract

ased on a case study of the Repub- cal of Islamic countries and regions is B lic of Daghestan, this article exam- going on in the region. The term “national ines the political instability in the re- state crisis” implies the critical develop- gion from the viewpoint of destruction of ment of two complementary processes: an the national state in the Islamic countries increase in the combat activity of Islamist of the world and the Muslim-populated re- insurgents along with a decrease in the gions of non-Muslim countries. According legitimacy and efficiency of government in- to the author, a national state crisis typi- stitutions.

Introduction

The Republic of Daghestan is the most densely populated of the constituencies of the North Caucasian Federal District of the Russian Federation. It is well known that there are Islamist insurgents in Daghestan who are actively opposing the secular state and using terrorist warfare methods in their struggle. Religious political extremism was imported into the Caucasus as early as the 1990s and put down strong roots during the two armed conflicts in Chechnia. At that time, against the background of the acute social and political crisis, the first seats of extremism also emerged in Daghestan. How- ever, in the 2000s, religious-political extremism in Daghestan acquired a different nature: from support of nationalist moods in the Caucasus to rejection of the very idea of a state that is not built on the principles of Islam. This period in conflict development is particularly interesting since it coincides timewise with similar processes going on in many Islamic countries (hereafter—ICs) and Muslim-populated regions of non-Islamic countries (hereafter—MRs). In other words, the matter concerns the manifestation of a pattern characteristic of the entire Islamic World. 64 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Political Instability in Daghestan at the Present Stage

In 1999, Islamist insurgents led by Khattab and Shamil Basaev, who encroached from Chech- nia, were killed in Daghestan. At the same time, enclaves of armed insurgents (Salafis, or Wahhabis) in the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi who did not recognize the central authorities were eliminated. The war between the extremist underground and law-enforcement and power bodies of Dagh- estan was revived in 2002 and gained momentum in 2005. The dynamics of the war losses can be seen in Table 1. Table 1

Activation of Hostilities in Daghestan against the Background of Economic Recovery

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Dynamics of gross regional product, % 115.0 119.0 111.0 113.9 115.9 116.4 119.1 117

Real disposable personal income in % of previous year* 115.7 188.8 125.6 144.7 121.3 129.9 117.9 116.6 112.4 108.2

Number of 77— law enforcers accord- and servicemen ing to killed in the press terrorist war** statistics, 45— more more more accord- than than than ing to — 45 10 25 NATC*** 38 47 49 89 68****

Total number of other victims (insurgents killed, insurgents arrested, civilians killed, more more more more more more total injured, than than than than than than homeless) — ? ? ? 350 300 300 300 350 250

* Data of Territorial Branch of the Russian Statistics Board, available at [http:// dagstat.gks.ru/digital/region12/DocLib/Forms/AllItems.aspx]. ** According to the data of an analysis of current press announcements. *** Data of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee of the RF Federal Security Service, available at [http://nak.fsb.ru/nac/media/terrorism_today/history.htm]. **** A. Kuznetsov, “Na Degestanskom fronte,” Lenta.ru, 27 June, 2011, 18:39:15, available at [http://lenta.ru/articles/2011/06/27/Daghestan/]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It is typical that the war gained momentum against the background of rapid economic recovery, an increase in citizen prosperity, stabilization of the social situation, and higher-than-anticipat- ed infusions from the federal budget. For example, in the 2000s, direct aid to the Daghestan budget from the federal budget alone increased more than 6-fold, from 7.5 in 2001 to 46 billion rubles in 2011. Aid from the federal center was supposed to stabilize the political situation in the republic. But real stabilization did not occur. An ever increasing number of observers are coming to the conclusion that socioeconomic factors are not the main driving force behind the development of political instability in the region. Many politicians and officials also think that the increase in terrorism is in no way related to the economic or social situation in society. This is a significant revision of the traditional understanding of how political conflicts develop. As early as Soviet times it has been customary to believe that any conflict is prompted by socioeconomic factors. In the absence of another generally recognized school of conflict studies, this understanding of the nature of conflicts is still pertinent in Russia today. But it is obvious now that religious extremism cannot be understood by analyzing a specific socioeconomic situation alone. When people with a European one-dimensional “economic” mindset can no longer find socioeconomic reasons to explain the phenomenon, terrorism becomes “irrational,” since the terrorists are not looking for compromises and are not satisfied with receiving material benefits for themselves or any stratum of the population. We will note that religious Islamic extremism is a relatively new phenomenon. There are no countries in the world that could ultimately defeat this evil, although in some of them very severe punitive measures are taken to eradicate it. This phenomenon still requires in-depth study.

Crisis of the National State in Islamic Countries of the World

The increase in political instability and activation of Islamist insurgents in the Northern Cauca- sus are similar to the processes going on in many Islamic countries. At present, political crisis and terrorist acts have become chronic in more than half of the Islam- ic countries, and many governments are unable to exert any kind of control over the situation in their countries. We took an in-depth look at the problem of the national state crisis in Islamic countries of the world in the article “‘Problema defitsita legitimnosti’ kak osnova ottorzhenia institutov natsionalnogo gosudarstva v islamskikh stranakh mira” (The Legitimacy Deficit as a Reason for the Rejection of National State Institutions in the Islamic Countries of the World).1 Radical Islamic groups, the influence of which is growing, do not recognize the legitimacy of national states and governments at all. But they are not the only ones. For many other “peaceful” Muslims, the legitimacy of national states is disputable, which means there are not many people who want to fight with the insurgents and risk their health and life for this cause. For example, in the first half of 2011 alone, 24,000 trained soldiers—every seventh fighter—deserted in Afghanistan.2 The influential Washington Post also talks about this.3

1 See: Vestnik Dagestanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 78-83. 2 See: V. Feshchenko, “Afgantsy pobezhali,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, Federal issue, No. 5573 (197), 6 September, 2011, available at [http://www.rg.ru/2011/09/06/afganistan.html]. 3 See: J. Partlow, “More Afghan Soldiers Deserting the Army,” NATO Statistics Show, available at [http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/more-afghan-soldiers-deserting-the-army/2011/08/31/gIQABxFTvJ_story.html]. 66 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Today, in 27 of the 48 ICs, the political system is unstable. The central government is either unable to exercise any control over the country’s territory, or this control is ineffective. In several ICs, the national state in the form of the central government is incapable of controlling the situation in the country’s territory without foreign military participation. This applies to Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Sudan, Chad, Niger, and the Western Sahara. These countries can be said to be experiencing disintegration of the national state. So we can say that there is a permanent political crisis throughout most of the Islamic world expressed in an increase in the influence of insurgents, on the one hand, and the low competence of the national state, on the other. In the mid-20th century, the collapse of the colonial system in the ICs was accompanied by the formation of the national state with all its attributes.4 But as early as the end of the 20th century, the national state crisis began to intensify in the ICs. The main reason was the weak roots of nationalism in the consciousness of the IC population and, consequently, the weak roots of the national state in local political practice. The roots of nationalism, without which the fight for national unity would be impossible, are not deep in the Islamic world and are usually brought in from the outside along with foreign education and secular thinking.

Revival of the Interest in Islam as Way of Social Self-Defense

In my opinion, the growing revival in the interest in Islam, including in its radical manifestations, such as the rise in extremism, is a defense reaction of the IC population to the multifaceted crisis of contemporary society. In the 20th century, the economic and social structure of contemporary Western society has undergone extremely significant and multifaceted changes. Contemporary society has also achieved the greatest success in mobilizing the individual for economic activity. As a prominent Russian think- er, Alexander Zinoviev, wrote, today the task of ensuring that the individual is motivated to engage in economic activity is solved by enticement. But despite the fact that contemporary society has achieved enormous success in the economy, culture, and social development, “labor mobilization” by means of enticement has proven a high price to pay. It turns out that it harbors the threat of diversified destruction of the individual’s traditional relations with society and the state; destruction of society and the state themselves. For example, the average individual has evolved due to the motivating pressure of society. To- day he is so strongly motivated to achieve economic success that he does not want to burden himself with children. Social stimuli to obtain wealth and success are proving to be more important than the values of traditional society and natural instincts. This is threatening the demographic future of contemporary society, which is forced to look for means of defense. The liberal political doctrine and globalization are undermining the existing paradigms of public thought, such as nationalism or socialism, on which all modern states have been created and exist. This is causing latent destruction of the structure of society and then of the state. And, finally, the third most important problem lies in the fact that contemporary society, although it is highly efficient from the economic viewpoint, it is still not socially fair. So for most of the population, “mobilization” by means of enticement turns into suffering, for in reality many are unable

4 See: R.V. Engibarian, Iu.K. Krasnov, “Etnos v sovremennom mire. Kuda vedet etnicheskoe razvitie chelovechest- va?” Pravo i upravlenie, 21st Century, No. 2, 2008. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to realize their strengths and achieve the way of life being promoted. The contradiction between the increase in unfulfilled desires and reality of the socially unjust society is giving rise to a personality conflict. Indicators of this problem are the increase in mental and ubiquitous physical illnesses, as well as the increase in drug abuse, alcoholism, and departure from reality by means of culture. In this way, the current stage in the development of capitalism has given rise to profound and difficult-to-resolve internal personal and interpersonal conflicts, as well as to a conflict between the interests of the average individual and the interests of society and the state. It is not surprising that, having encountered these problems, the individual and contemporary society as a whole are looking for an acceptable solution. So far, not one of the versions makes it possible to take advantage of the possibilities of economic progress provided by contemporary “mobilization through enticement” in order to prevent demographic, social, and state destruction. Non-Western societies that are nevertheless drawn into the orbit of the influence of modern capitalism are also looking for their own solution. The many ICs are also looking for their own path. So far the most attractive ideas in the Islamic world essentially boil down to returning to the traditional values established many centuries ago. In this way, revival of the interest in Islam we see in the world is an allergic reaction rejecting those threats produced by the reality of modern capitalism. Of course, this path is valuable in itself and has the right to exist. But it also has its price. In particular, the Islamization of society implies the return of traditional interpersonal relations, precisely regulated by the Koran, which is difficult to bring into harmony with the existence of a contemporary multi-sectoral economy and contemporary political institutions.

Sensitive Reaction to the Social Crisis in Daghestan

Like everywhere else in Russia, in the 1990s Daghestani society underwent extreme social upheavals. But even after the shock of the 1990s subsided, society continues to feel the growing pressure of capitalist relations. The development of destructive trends, including religious extremism, was prompted by the mass discontent aroused by the systemic crisis in society. In particular, modernization and partial destruction of such an important institution as the traditional family are continuing. Specialists say that the Daghestani family began undergoing changes back in the 1970s. But in the 1990s, these negative trends greatly accelerated. In particular, the birth- rate dropped (see Table 2), while the number of marriages per 1,000 people of the population dropped from 10.5 to 6.7 per mille (2000) and 7.9 (2010). As is seen from Table 3, married couples in Dagh- estan began having fewer children. More than 11-12,000 abortions are carried out in Daghestan a year. Moreover, 49,100 women in the republic used hormonal contraception in 2006; while there were 3,244 cases of surgical steriliza- tion. Furthermore, statistics do not take into account so-called criminal abortions, which are still carried out. By the end of the 1990s, the moral degradation of society had become particularly apparent. For example, in 2000, more than 20,000 drug abusers were registered in Daghestan, including 8,800 chronic alcoholics and around 2,000 injecting drug users.5 The same year, 1,018 new cases of

5 See: Daghestan-2000, Statistical Collection, Part I, State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Daghestan, Ma- khachkala, 2001, p. 292. 68 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2

General Coefficients of Natural Population Changes (per 1,000 members of the population) in 1992-2010* Year Year Births Births Deaths Deaths Natural Natural Increase, Increase, Number of Number of Number of Number of Decrease (–) Decrease (–)

1992 23.6 6.8 16.8 2000 17.7 7.5 10.2

1993 21.6 7.6 14.0 2005** 15.5 5.9 9.6

1994 22.5 7.7 14.8 2006 15.3 6.0 9.3

1995 22.6 7.8 14.8 2007 17.0 5.7 11.3

1996 20.5 7.6 12.9 2008 18.3 5.9 12.4

1997 19.8 7.5 12.3 2009 18.5 6.1 12.4

1998 19.5 7.5 12.0 2010 17.5 5.7 11.8

1999 17.9 7.5 10.4

* Daghestan-2000, Statistical Collection, Part II, Socioeconomic Status of the Republic of Daghestan, Report, State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Daghestan, Makhachkala, 2001, p. 59. ** Data from the Territorial Branch of the Russian Statistics Board website for 20 July, 2011, available at [http://dagstat.gks.ru/digital/region1/default.aspx]. syphilis and 1,625 cases of gonorrhea were diagnosed in Daghestan, while in 2005, these figures had risen to 1,255 and 2,170, respectively. The number of abortions reached 15,000 a year. The beginning and course of the market reforms was marked by an unprecedented rise in psychic disorders. Over ten years of reform, the number of patients with various nervous disorders had increased more than five-fold in Daghestan.6 The increase in number of patients with different psychoses, particularly, schizophrenia, is directly related to the population’s difficulty in coping with the reforms. As early as 1991, the number of schizophrenics almost doubled, from 1,908 to 3,729, while at the end of 1996, this number had reached 5,346 people. In 2010, 125,500 mentally ill patients were registered in Daghestan, including more than 12,000 newly diagnosed people in one year.7 Society is living in a state of social stress. It is no accident that in the 1990s, heart disease took the highest number of lives. In 2007, more than 7,700 people died of heart disease in Daghestan, while more than 112,000 Daghestanis went to the republic’s medical institutions for treatment of heart complaints. The growing drug use in Daghestan also confirms the unfavorable situation.

6 See: Indices of the State of Health of the Population of the Republic of Daghestan in 2004, Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Daghestan, Makhachkala, pp. 7, 69, 71. 7 See: Data of the Territorial Branch of the Russian Statistics Board, available at [http://dagstat.gks.ru/digital/re- gion13/default.aspx]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3

Number of Registered Crimes Relating to Drug Circulation

1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2007

Drug-related crimes 196 879 969 2,105 2,359 1,857 2,250 1,264 1,954

Alcohol is becoming a popular means for coping with stress. Alcohol consumption increased 11.5-fold between 1992 and 2007 in Daghestan. And this is only the tip of the iceberg, since most of the alcohol market is in the shadows and not registered with the statistical services. During the years of reform, the number of registered alcohol-related psychotic disorders has increased more than 17-fold. A large number of crimes in the republic are committed under alcoholic and drug-in- duced psychosis. Table 4

Sales Volumes of Alcohol and Beer

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

In absolute alcohol:

Total, thou. dL 270 1,436.7 1,510.4 1,575.8 1,698.1 1,787.5 1,410.3

Per capita (liters) 1,2 5,4 5,7 5,9 6,3 6,5 4,7

In natural terms, thou. dL:

Vodka and other strong spirits 250.1 2,899.0 3,185.6 3,356.9 3,609.3 3,760.8 2,962.7

Wine 929.4 640.1 654.1 654.1 869.5 1,074.6 966.9

Cognac 29.9 85.2 91.1 94.0 88.7 92.0 95.6

Champagne 56.3 391.7 297.0 343.8 189.4 197.3 107.6

Beer 445.1 2,771.8 1,871.9 1,629.4 1,863.7 1,786.2 901.8

S o u r c e: Data of the Territorial Branch of the Russian Statistics Board, available at [http://dagstat.gks.ru/digital/region6/DocLib/Forms/AllItems.aspx].

Crime has also been increasing with each passing year. At the peak of crime growth in Dagh- estan, more than 16,500 new crimes were registered, more than 12,000 people were sentenced, and many were sent to prison where they joined tens of thousands of others like them. An extremely important problem is youth policy. Today, the young generation is growing up in conditions of social, ideological, and political insecurity. And it is not surprising that most young people have embarked on the road to crime and extremism. There is a large number of young Dagh- estanis among the insurgents. And an even greater number of people are supporting, sheltering, and feeding extremists. So there is a strong destructive potential in the republic that has become fuel for aggravating war. 70 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

At the same time, it should be noted that in the 2000s, when economic growth began in Rus- sia, society also began to recover. Many social problems began to stabilize: the rate of the demographic slump slowed down, the crime situation improved, alcohol consumption decreased some- what, and so on. Considerable social recovery is also noted in the Republic of Daghestan. The situation has perceptibly improved compared with the indices of the 1990s crisis years (see Tables 2, 3, 6). Although the problems facing society are still extremely serious, there are nevertheless positive changes in Daghestan that compare favorably with similar achievements in most other Russian regions.

Table 5

Criminal Statistics of the Republic of Daghestan in 2000-2010

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Registered crimes — total, incl.: 15,692 13,658 16,496 14,730 12,241 12,437 11,640

Murder and attempted murder 224 200 243 170 172 204 296

Rape and attempted rape 91 76 87 76 68 76 40

Robbery with violence 150 162 186 171 139 143 127

Theft 257 586 650 552 386 435 361

Crimes relating to illicit drug circulation 2,250 1,185 1,600 1,954 1,739 1,624 1,442

Traffic and means of transportation violations 437 267 286 311 303 407 398

Involving the death of two or more people by negligence 158 166 182 189 160 185 220

Criminals exposed 13,896 8,489 9,145 8,411 7,729 7,186 6,797

Total accused 10,386 7,009 7,190 7,225 6,899 6,125 5,477

S o u r c e: Data of the Territorial Branch of the Russian Statistics Board, available at [http://dagstat.gks.ru/digital/region13/DocLib/Forms/AllItems.aspx].

Religion and religious organizations are playing a significant role in overcoming the defects of society. The Muslim vision of family problems, intolerance of drug addiction, alcoholism, and prostitu- Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tion, and bringing up the younger generation in the spirit of principles that do not contradict the generally accepted rules and moral standards have proven extremely beneficial for society and the state. The traditional religious organization (not only the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Daghestan, but also the Sufis) and state power bodies are pooling their efforts to fight extremism. Every year, not only law enforcers, but also clergymen die at the hands of Salafis in this fight. As Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Rawil Gaynetdin stated when he flew to Makhachkala in March 2007, “true Muslims are the bastion of society and the state.”

Stages of the National State Crisis in Some Islamic Countries of the World and in the Muslim Regions of Russia

According to many researchers in the contemporary world, globalization is leading to a decrease in the efficiency of the national state and its institutions, as well as to a weakening of the national idea on which nation-state building is based. But this process is developing at different rates in different countries and has its own special features everywhere in the world.8 The problem is that practically any state, even one populated only by Muslims, is built today on non-Muslim principles. And from the viewpoint of Muslim extremists, destruction of a state based on non-Muslim values is permissible, even desirable. For example, one of the extremist websites that prop- agandizes the actions of insurgents in the Russian Northern Caucasus writes: “Unfortunately, Muslims on the whole and Muslims of Russia9 in particular have lived so long and continue to live according to the principles that infidels have established for them concerning all aspects of life, including the question of statehood, that the official state will only be the one the infidels have drawn on the map and must have specific characteristics. It must have schools, hospitals, traffic lights, and so on. But the Muslim must break these stereotypes, these idols that the infidels have introduced through the Vremya program. As we know, the institution of state in Islam is a means for establishing religion, and it does not have a precise materialist designation either in the Koran or in the Sunnah, but when a community of Muslims can establish religion in a particular area of land (and this primarily means worshipping Allah alone, performing namaz, giving zakat, banning the condemnable, and following the approvable, in other words, the ability to practice the fundamentals of religion and prohibit the main obvious external sins in territory that is not under the control of infidels), this will be an Islamic state…”10 Despite the fact that the national state crisis in each of the Islamic countries has its own special features, there are also similar characteristics that make it possible to draw a general picture of the national state crisis in the ICs and establish how frequently it occurs. I believe the first stage or prehistory of the current crisis of the national state to be political cat- aclysms that weaken the efficiency of the national state and undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The establishment and existence of the national state, like national consciousness, is a long and complicated process requiring, among other things, the legitimacy of the national state in the eyes of the population. Due to historical patterns, nationalism and the national state have a relatively short

8 See: S. Makarenko, “Evoliutsiia ‘gosudarstva-natsii:’ popytka dekonstruktsii,” Kosmopolis, No. 2 (18), 2007, p. 123. 9 This is how it is in the original. 10 [http://vDaghestan.info/2011/02/06/protivnikam-kavkazskogo-imarata/]. 72 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 6

Stages in Destruction of the National State in Several Islamic Countries and Muslim Regions of Non-Muslim Countries in the Most Recent Period of History 1st Stage 4th Stage 5th Stage 3rd Stage 6th Stage 2nd Stage Extremists Turbulence National State Erosion of the Forces Aimed Regions of Non- Legitimacy of the Islamic Countries at Protecting and the National State Social Destruction slamic Countries of Restoring the State Victory of Religious I Revolutionary Attack of Extremists against the World and Muslim Interference of External

Afghanistan 1978, 1979, 1989- 1994- 1992- 1996 2001. State 1992 1994 1996 2001 restored

Somalia 1977-1978, since 2006- 1991- 2006, Unsuccessful 1991 1991 2009 2006 2009 attempt 1991-1995 (U.S. and U.N.). State collapsed. Second attempt 2006-2009 (Ethiopia). Also unsuccessful

Uzbekistan 1991 1991- 2005 1999- — — 1999, 2005 2004 (new measures by the authorities)

Chechnia 1917, 1943, 1985- 1991 1991- 1989, 1996 1989 2000 1998 2000

Daghestan 1985-1991 1985- 1991, 1991- — continuously 1989 1999, 1999 2005 history in Islamic countries and developed in competition with religious feeling and the religious understanding of citizenship. Moreover, the national state developed in unfavorable external conditions, which did nothing to boost its efficiency and popularity among the population. In the history of contemporary Daghestan, this was the time of unrest that preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist ideology itself, which created a political vacuum and state of indefiniteness and led to the beginning of radical changes in society. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The second stage, or period of social destruction, is the time when, due to the inefficiency of the national state, national feelings weaken and the state itself weakens along with them. This is the crisis stage, a reaction specific to Islamic regions to economic and social difficulties that arise during collapse of the world order that developed since independence was acquired. The first reaction of the population of Russia and other non-Muslim countries of the former Soviet Union to the crisis of the 1990s can be called “social scalding,” which resulted in all the internal forces of society being aimed at overcoming the economic collapse and sudden deterioration in living conditions. People began working more and living in a permanent state of social stress. This stress was a powerful mobilizing factor, but it also gave rise to a multitude of social problems. People began to fall ill more often and die earlier, fewer want to start families and have children, and alcohol and drug abuse has increased. In the ICs and Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union, the reaction to economic difficulties was slightly different. Thanks to rapid Islamization, some negative consequences of the social scalding in Muslim countries were constrained. For example, the family proved stronger and alcoholism (which has become a curse for Central Russia), crime, etc. had less of an effect on society. People, particularly women, did not begin working and toiling more. However, the economy (apart from the oil and gas sector) developed at a slower rate. At the same time, in the ICs and Muslim regions of non-Muslim countries, the economy, the development of which could not keep up with the population growth, and the progressing poverty gave rise to a multitude of other social problems. This caused destructive trends to take a greater toll, one of the consequences of which was the appearance of radical extremist groups. At the second stage, during the second half of the 20th century, social relations based on ideas of nationalism and socialism began to break down. A large number of the more educated and West- ern-oriented young people from Muslim regions went to Russia and the West. There was also de-socialization of the socially active stratum, among those who did not leave on time. Furthermore, political regimes continued to be propped up by people whose world outlook developed during the unchal- lenged influence of nationalism and socialism and was now outmoded. Furthermore, in the ICs and MRs rapid demographic growth was accompanied by the individual’s growing consumer needs. As ways to transmit information developed, the desire for ever new material benefits no longer corresponded to the real possibilities of the economy. In Daghestan, the economic difficulties of the 1990s greatly accelerated the development of political processes that were destructive for existing society. Rapid re-Islamization of the population was going on in the republic, every year hundreds of new mosques were built and thousands of young Daghestanis went to study in religious educational establishments all over the world. The first enclaves also arose (the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi) that did not recognize the local and Russian authorities or laws of the secular state. The third stage saw attempts to destroy the political system by revolutionary means. Sooner or later, against the background of public discontent over the enfeebled national state unable to create an efficient economy, religious and political extremists demanding the annihilation of the national state gained enough confidence in their strength to try and destroy non-Islamic institutions, including the state itself. In the post-Soviet expanse, the first attempts of religious extremists to demolish the national state took place as early as 1989-1991. These attempts in Daghestan and Uzbekistan were rebuffed, while in Chechnia nationalists and religious extremists had not yet defined their spheres of activity and the common victory there led to the beginning of a new conflict—this time between themselves. In 1999, the extremists in the former Soviet Union again tried to do away with the authorities of the national state. That year, religious extremists from Chechnia began invading Daghestan. In Chechnia itself, Maskhadov’s nationalists were already perceptibly weaker than Basaev’s and Khattab’s Wahhabis. In 1999, the extremists were stopped again, since nationalism and the national state were still strong. Repressions followed. In Uzbekistan, for example, supporters of the Islamic political party Hizb ut-Tahrir were arrested in throngs, while in Daghestan, extremists were routed by joint action of the Russian armed forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and local militia. 74 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The extremists attacked in force again in 2005. For example, armed Islamists provoked new upheavals in the Uzbek city of Andijan on 12 May, 2005. And the terrorist war in Daghestan gained momentum at this time. As can be seen from Table 1, the highest number of attacks in Daghestan took place in 2004-2006, which aroused a mass exodus of employees from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the second stage of the crisis, after which the national state was de-legitimized in the eyes of the population, its power became feeble and relative in the ICs. Neither the presence of a large army, nor the action of the police and special services, nor the bureaucratic system were able to guarantee preservation of the national state. In many countries of the world, religious extremists very successfully destroyed the power of the national state. For example, the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in 1994-1996. The Islamic Courts Union has been the most influential power in Somalia since 2006 and fought against the Ethiopian troops for quite a long time. After withdrawal of the Ethiopian army in 2009, the Union again subordinated the entire south of the country to its control.11 And in 2009, Sharif Ahmed, a representative of the Union, became the country’s president.12 Today, in several countries of the Islamic world, power is maintained artificially, by means of assistance from the outside (for example, in present-day Iraq and Afghanistan). One of the largest ICs, a nuclear power, Pakistan, received and still receives a great amount of assistance in maintaining its state department. In Daghestan, state institutions are being maintained by enormous financial, police, military and other assistance from the federal center. The fourth stage is the period of turbulence, which is usually the beginning of a severe struggle for power and property among clans, tribes, and bands. Islam puts great store by the traditional kindred tribe relations that were preserved after independence was acquired and became the main political force during the collapse of the state in the ICs.13 At this stage, power is temporarily seized by clans and criminal groups, which, however, cannot rebuff the Islamic fanatics and over time lose power to them. This is how it was in Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Sudan. For example, in Afghan- istan after Mohammad Najibullah was overthrown, warlords divided power and fought among themselves, causing the population great suffering. There were many opportunities for waging war—during the war years, immense military reserves were accumulated. When religious extremists gain vast political clout, and the national state, on the contrary, dramatically weakens, it is not capable of even minimal management of the socioeconomic and political processes. The fifth stage is characterized by the victory of the extremists. The people, tired of the tyranny of the warlords, ultimately support the religious extremists who promise justice. For example, in Afghanistan, the Taliban came to power after taking Kabul in 1996.14 Only Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Sudan of the ICs have gone through this stage. Russia and the post-Soviet expanse have passed through the fourth stage of the crisis, and only Chechnia reached the fifth stage during the period between the two Chechen wars. The sixth stage is interference by foreign forces aimed at reconstructing the national state. But the victory of the Islamists means a permanent conflict between the victors and the rest of the world. The export of revolution for the Taliban ended in interference from the U.S. and NATO forces, which launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. Today, the U.S. is trying to reconstruct a national state under Hamid Karzai. The foreign military forces (the U.S. and the coalition it heads) consist of 120,000 soldiers from 47 countries of the world. The U.S. attempt to carry out a peacekeeping operation in Somalia failed. It took the lives of 18 American soldiers and thousands of Somalis.15 The interference of the Ethiopian army in 2006-2009 was only slightly more successful.

11 See: D. Ignatius, “Ethiopia’s Iraq,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 13 May, 2007. 12 See: “BBC.Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts,” Tuesday, 6 June, 2006, available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm]. 13 See: N. Piskunova, “Raspad gosudarstva: lokalny fenomen ili globalnaia ugroza? K voprosu o krizise v Somali 1990-2008,” Kosmopolis, No. 3 (22), 2008, pp. 79-86. 14 See: V. Pankin, “Taliby idut,” Kommersant, No. 73 (1255), 21 May, 1997. 15 See: “BBC.Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts.” Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Accelerated Crisis Development

World experience shows that a crisis can be accelerated by bypassing several stages. For example, interference by Western countries removes the need for several intermediary stages. Those regimes that are supported by the West entered the destruction stage 20 years later than some former Soviet allies in the third world that the West tried to destroy. Another example is when the national state tries to integrate Islam into the political system. Some researchers note the great mistake of those political leaders that tried to subordinate Islam to state-building aims. They saw legitimizing the state-sponsored modernization as a task Islam could be subordinated to.16 However, Islam proved to be a much more influential system that cannot be subordinated to the desires of politicians. These politicians have not achieved the desirable results. And in the case of the Sudan, we see how an attempt to integrate Islam into the secular administration system even ended in the destruction of the latter. The world appears to be realizing that destruction of the ICs could be irreversible. Therefore, the West will not gain anything from destroying an unsuitable regime, since only chaos and extremists will come to replace it. As early as 2007, The Washington Post wrote about the events in Somalia: “It’s like Iraq and Afghanistan, in other words. A decisive military strike has destroyed one threat. But what’s left behind, when the dust clears, is a shattered tribal society that won’t have real stability without a complex process of political reconciliation and economic development.”17 But in practice, the West continues to make mistakes, trying to remove unsuitable regimes and in so doing destabilizing the situation in the East. In particular, extremists from Hizb ut-Tahrir took part in overthrowing Gaddafi18 under the cover of NATO aviation.

Conclusion

So the situation in the ICs and MRs shows a stable trend toward gradual destruction of the national state. This trend is developing in two interrelated areas: through an increase in the combat activity of Islamist insurgents (“increase in military threat”) along with a drop in the legitimacy of power institutions in the eyes of the population and, consequently, a decrease in their efficiency (“decrease in state legitimacy”). The political regimes in the ICs and MRs are trying with all their might to prevent the increasing destruction. Destruction of the political system in the ICs and MRs is occurring according to approximately the same scenario. But, with interference from external forces, destruction could be significantly accelerated. At the same time, it should be noted that interference of external forces aimed at supporting the national state could postpone the next stage of destruction for an indefinite amount of time. In this context, we can conclude that the situation in Daghestan is largely developing along lines that are characteristic for other countries of the Muslim world.

16 See: U. Holm, “Violence in Algeria: A Question of Securitization of State-Regime, Nation and Islam,” Alterna- tives, Turkish Journal of International Relations, Summer 2003. 17 D. Ignatius, op. cit. 18 See: O. Bakhash, “Gaddafi, the Enemy of Allah, His Messenger and the Ummah Kills Hundreds or Even Thou- sands of People,” Khilafah.com, 21 February, 2011, available at [http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/]. 76 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Yakub YAGUBOV

Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

MIGRATION CATASTROPHE IN ARMENIA AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONFLICT

Abstract

his article studies the migration situa- menia and carries out a comparative anal- T tion in Armenia. It examines the eco- ysis of economic development in Armenia nomic prerequisites of migration in Ar- and Azerbaijan.

Introduction

Researchers, politicians, and economists are extremely interested in the migration trends going on in the Caucasus since population flow dynamics reflect the country’s development. As we know, over the past twenty years, conflict situations in the Caucasus have turned from open armed opposi- tions into latent forms. But this does not mean that they have exhausted their potential for influencing migration today. One such conflict is the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This war based on territorial claims led to some territories of Azerbaijan being occupied by Armenia and around one million Azeris becoming refugees. And to this day they have been unable to return home. However, Armenia also suffered demographic losses. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Economic Development in Azerbaijan and Armenia Current Reality

After signing a ceasefire with Armenia in 1994, Azerbaijan, boosted by Heydar Aliev’s economic policy, became the strongest and richest state in the Central Caucasus. Oil contracts and the policy pursued to attract investments into the republic improved the socioeconomic situation in the country. The mass exodus of the population from Azerbaijan abroad stopped. Later, the regional socioeconomic development policy conducted by President Ilham Aliev gave the country an even greater opportunity to provide the population with jobs. Moreover, some people who migrated in the 1990s decided to return. Some of them came home with a certain amount of capital, which was also invested in the country’s economy. This put a stop to the negative migration trends in Azerbaijan. As of 2009, Azerbaijan took the lead among the CIS countries in terms of economic growth. For example, between 2003 and 2008, Azerbaijan’s GDP increased 2.6-fold, while the poverty level in the state dropped from 45% to 11%. In 2011, Azerbaijan’s economy was characterized by sustainable development—economic growth was maintained by an increase in personal income that led to a rise in sol- vent demand. Activation of the government’s social policy and burgeoning income in the private sector promoted a rise in personal nominal income in January-November by 19.2% and in average wages in the economy by 8.7% to 355.7 manats. As a result, the retail sales volume rose by 10.3%, while the service market increased by 7.4%. The consumer market growth indices for this year proved the highest in 20 years. Investment demand continued to increase, the dimensions of which topped consumer demand. In the first eleven months of 2011, investments in basic assets rose by 28.3%, amounting to 10 billion manats; there was a constant rise in investments in major construction projects due to the increase in construction, restoration, and reconstruction work to prepare for holding the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest in Baku. It should be noted that 73.6% (7,373,900 manats) of the funds invested in basic assets was used to develop the country’s non-oil sector. It is gratifying to note that Azerbaijan’s non-oil sector had increased by the end of 2011 by 9.5%, which corresponds to the government’s aims to reduce dependence on the oil-and-gas export, and thus achieve diversification of the country’s economy. Stabiliza- tion of the manat exchange rate was the main trend in the financial market throughout 2011. At the beginning of 2011, the Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) pursued its exchange rate policy against the background of an increase in supply channels in the foreign exchange market and the creation of a new operating mechanism. During the period under report, there was appreciation of the manat, but in order to prevent its extreme increase, which could have had a negative impact on the competitiveness of the non-oil sector, the CBA carried out sterilized intervention. As of today, the amount of currency intervention of the Central Bank is higher than $620 million.1 The trends mentioned above do not apply to Armenia. The figures of the Armenian National Sta- tistics Service regarding economic activity in March clearly indicate that Armenia has still not recovered from the economic crisis. After a drop to the level of 14.3% in 2009 (this was the second largest drop in level in the world), it could have been expected that two years later, after the world economy had already recovered from the crisis, the Armenian economy would undergo at least a 5-6% increase. However, it transpired that Armenia’s economic growth in March 2011, compared with the same period for the previous year, was zero. There were many reasons for the country finding itself in this situation. n First, in 2008-2009, the government failed to realize what a severe impact the world economic crisis would have on Armenia.

1 See: “Ekonomika Azerbaidzhana: itogi goda,” available at [http://news.day.az/economy/306048.html]. 78 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Second, even after it realized that Armenia could not avoid this impact, it was unable to develop and implement a corresponding policy. n Third, the enormous financial resources hastily attracted in emergency conditions were not used efficiently. n Fourth, the government was unable to find the courage to carry out the structural changes the country’s economy badly needed. This all brought Armenia to the difficult economic situation it finds itself in today. The country is confronted with a long list of economic problems. However, at the moment, from the macroeconomic standpoint, there are two in particular that require priority attention. The first is extremely low growth accompanied by high inflation (according to the latest data—11.3%),2 as a result of which poverty has increased. The second problem applies to four indices relating to the budget deficit. These are a budget deficit of 9% of GDP,3 a national debt of 43%4 of GDP, a negative trade balance of 23%5 of GDP, and national reserves that have been steadily dwindling as the result of greater currency interventions with the aim of retaining the dram exchange rate stability. It is a well-known fact that the ratio of national debt to GDP should be no higher than 50%. In Armenia, this ratio amounts to 43%, which reflects an extremely negative trend.6 Today there are another two financial circumstances in Armenia that hinder the country’s economic growth. The first is the extremely high interest rates on bank loans, which discourage investments. The second is superfluous financial interference, which makes it difficult to acquire alternative financing. In recent years, despite the government’s efforts, there has been no progress in either of these two areas. The main reason is that the government has been unable to create a suitable mechanism for ensuring that the monetary policy pursued by the Central Bank has a timely and efficient impact on private banks. In other words, adjustment of the Central Bank’s interest rate does not have an effect on the interest rates of commercial banks. Moreover, the government has been unable to create new monetary instruments that would form sources of extensive financing for investors. As a result, two extremely negative trends have developed today in Armenia’s banking system. n The first is that lending interest rates are continuing to rise instead of decreasing over time. n Second, mortgage and consumer loans have significantly decreased, while lombard credits have increased instead. People are mortgaging their last property in order to survive.7

Migration from Armenia as the Result of Conflict-Prone Policy

After entering the ceasefire agreement in 1994, Armenia found itself in a difficult situation. The country was unable to participate in major transnational projects in the Central Caucasus and

2 [http://www.armtoday.info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=43718&SectionID=0&RegionID=0&Date=05/08/2011 &PagePosition=1]. 3 [http://www.regionplus.az/ru/articles/view/1658]. 4 Ibidem. 5 Ibidem. 6 Ibidem. 7 See: “Vardan Oskanian: Nulevoi rost v ekonomike Armenii,” available at [http://www.yerkramas.org/2011/05/07/ vardan-oskanyan-nulevoj-rost-v-ekonomike-armenii/]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION its geo-economic opportunities were reduced to a minimum. Nor did the Armenian leadership take into account that the country’s resources, even counting those provided by the occupied territories, could not ensure its normal development. Armenia’s dynamic development proved simply impossible without establishing constructive relations with Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey. Moreover, Armenia rejected all diplomatic steps to normalize relations with these countries. As a result of this policy, the migration trends in the republic began demonstrating negative dynamics. In 2010, Ar- menia ranked 76th according to the human development index, which was the worst rating among the Central Caucasian states.8 In 2011, Armenia was one of the worst economies in the world. According to the data of recent years, it is mainly able-bodied people who are leaving Armenia. Migrants primarily go to Russia, which is largely related to historical prerequisites. Moreover, it should be noted that it is easy for Armenians to find a job in Russia, while its leadership, despite the statements in the media, is not hindering migration. Armenians also take advantage of this. According to some estimates, Armenian citizens working in Russia send around $10 million in remittances home every month.9 However, recently Armenian migrants have been diversifying their destinations. Armenian women are willingly going to Turkey, where they are mainly employed as nannies and household workers. More intellectual Armenians prefer the U.S. and other Western countries. The strong Arme- nian diaspora in the U.S. helps Armenians to become established there. All of these trends are leading to Armenia gradually losing its able-bodied demographic potential. The political situation in the country and lack of confidence in the government are the main catalysts of migration. When comparing their economic situation with neighboring states, Armenians are increasingly coming to the conclusion that the government is not making proper use of the country’s potential, which is inadequate anyway. The upheavals of the 1990s have passed and the population is less inclined to take the problems of historical opposition with neighbors seriously. People are not very happy that the country has essentially found itself in the grips of the Karabakh clan. As of 1 April, 2011, the population of Armenia amounted to 3,264,600 people. This was reported by head of the census and demography department of the Armenian National Statistics Service K. Kuiumjian. Furthermore, she brought attention to the negative migration balance with 458 fewer people being registered during the first quarter of the year. The figures themselves are so ponderous and fraught with consequences that they give grounds for concern. For example, whereas in 2011 30,000 people left the country and did not return, in 2012 this figure has significantly increased. K. Kuiumjian said: “On the whole, the situation should arouse great concern.”10 The U.N. Development Report Migration and Human Development: Opportunities and Chal- lenges notes that since 1991 700,000-1,300,000 people (about 30% of the population) have left Arme- nia and settled abroad.11 It also noted that furthermore highly-qualified specialists are leaving Arme- nia, which has had an extremely negative effect on the country’s development, particularly on the reproduction of social and cultural capital. According to the state migration service at the Ministry of Territorial Administration of Arme- nia, 65% of the migrants from Armenia chose Russia as their main place of residence, followed by the U.S. and Ukraine. G. Pogosian, an Armenian sociologist, notes that today it is primarily Armenians between the ages of 20 and 50 who are leaving the country, whereby it is mainly men who are emigrating, which is dealing a severe blow to the workforce potential. In this respect, the expert believes that “the prob-

8 [http://www.propertyy.ru/country/armenia/]. 9 See: A. Iskandarian, “Problemy migratsii i opyt ee regulirovaniia v polietnichnom Kavkazskom regione,” in: Tez- isy Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, SGU Publishers, Stavropol, 2003, pp. 110-115. 10 Specialists comment on the migration processes in Armenia, available in Russian at [http://www.aysor.am/ru/ news/2011/05/26/migration/]. 11 [http://europeandcis.undp.org/news/show/87B390CE-F203-1EE9-B95DF29A79F6080C]. 80 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION lem of labor force shortage will soon become acute in Armenia.”12 There is also the fear that Armenia will lose its combat efficiency. After all Armenia knows that Azerbaijan will never reconcile itself to occupation of its territory, and its resources far outweigh Armenia’s in every respect. The migration problems in Armenia are so serious that the country’s president himself often addresses them. Migration trends are a topic of general interest and concern in Armenia, said Arme- nian President Serzh Sargsian.13 In some publications, the migration situation in the country is even described as catastrophic.14 This situation provides grounds for several assertions. The mass migration of Armenians is making the country dependent on the situation abroad. The prospects for Armenia’s demographic development might be very different if the so-called external factor interfered in the development of events. The matter concerns a severe change in the socioeconomic and political situation in the countries (regions) where emigrants from the republic go en masse, as well as the possibility of a major review of their immigration policy and legislation, and so on. The sudden return of large numbers of emigrants could give rise to a phenomenon that is not only fraught with socioeconomic and demographic, but also with the most severe political consequences.15 So it should be noted that Armenia entered the third millennium facing a tense socioeconomic situation. And this is also having an effect on reproduction of the population, whereby the leading trend is a drop in the size of families.16 There can be no doubt that the Armenian government is taking steps to correct the current situation. An action plan for implementing the state migration regulation policy for 2012-2016 was presented on 5 August at a meeting of the collegiate of the Armenian Ministry of Territorial Administra- tion.17 Head of the Migration Agency of the Armenian Ministry of Territorial Administration G. Ega- nian explained that the program planned to enhance the Republic of Armenia’s migration regulation legislation and bring it into harmony with the legislation and best institutional structures of the EU. A unified system of migration monitoring will be introduced, analysis and evaluation of the situation conducted, mechanisms developed for obtaining information on migration from alternative sources, and studies carried out of migration flows every 2-3 years. The action plan will also be aimed at protecting the rights and interests of Armenian citizens living abroad. There are plans to enter bilateral agreements in the international labor market, as well as ensure that Armenia joins the current international agreements aimed at protecting the interests of labor migrants. In the next five years, the system for protecting foreign citizens and citizen-less persons will be improved and efforts to provide foreign citizens with asylum and permanent residency permits will be concentrated in a unified state structure. The action plan was discussed with the participation of representatives of state bodies and international and public organizations.18

12 See: “Migration in Armenia Has Been Replaced by Depopulation—Sociologist,” available in Russian at [http://i- news.kz/news/2011/12/10/6189504.html]. 13 See: “Migration Processes are a Topic of General Concern in Armenia—Sargsian,” available in Russian at [http:// www.newsarmenia.ru/society/20110720/42493895.html]. 14 See: N. Madatian, “Rossia i demograficheskaia katastrofa v Armenii,” available at [http://www.russian.rfi.fr/evropa/20110812-rossiya-i-demograficheskaya-katastrofa-v-armenii]. 15 See: R. Eganian, “Demograficheskie realii i perspektivy respubliki Armenia na poroge XXI veka,” in: Mezhd- unarodnaia migratsiia naseleniia: Rossia i sovremenny mir, Issue 5, Ed-in-chief, V. Iontsev, MAKS Press, Moscow, 2000, pp. 79-91. 16 See: V. Khodzhabekian, “Demograficheskie protsessy v Armenii v gorode i na sele,” Obshchestvo i ekonomika, No. 6, 2006, pp. 163-173. 17 Armenia is trying to regulate migration, available in Russian at [http://www.armtoday.info/ default.asp?Lang=_Ru &NewsID=48956&SectionID=0&RegionID=0&Date=08/07/2011&PagePosition=1]. 18 A five-year plan is presented in Armenia for regulating migration, available in Russian at [http://regnum.su/news/ 1446349.html]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

All of these measures are theoretically possible, but the thing is that in practice the actions of the Armenian government do not always coincide with the hopes placed on them. What is more, the Ar- menian leaders responsible for migration are themselves poorly informed about the real situation in this sphere. In an interview with the “News—Armenia” website, aforementioned G. Eganian said that when evaluating policy in a particular sphere, it should be kept in mind how much it contributes to implementing the tasks facing the state. Such criteria are most conducive to evaluating the success of policy in a particular sphere, including migration. But we should also remember that migration as a sphere of state administration is new for Armenia, in contrast to other spheres that have existed since Soviet times, such as social security, public health, and education. The concept “migration” is incom- parably wider. In addition to work with refugees, it encompasses the system of border control, the status of foreigners coming into Armenia, labor migration, providing asylum to foreign citizens, the labor activity of foreigners in the country, visa issues, and so on. It is still difficult to evaluate Armenia’s migration policy, although certain steps are being taken to regulate this sphere. A Concept of State Regulation of population flow has already been drawn up that notes the priorities in the migration sphere and the goals and mechanisms for achieving them, whereby the necessary legislative acts have been presented. Not only is the Migration Agency guided in its work by this document, but also other state bodies engaged in migration regulation. It is difficult to assert unequivocally that an efficient migration policy is being conducted. Many different issues require regulation. For example, Armenia has been trying for long years to bring a legislative initiative relating to work abroad to fruition. One of the reasons it is taking so long is that people are not entirely clear about the role the state bodies should play in this area. Migration is not the responsibility of only one department; various different departments are required to perform in this sphere, and it is extremely important that their work is coordinated.19 This fragment of the interview shows that Armenia’s migration policy is being managed by people who have very little idea about what migration policy entails and what methods should be used for regulating migration trends.

Conclusion

So it is evident that Armenia has achieved little success in implementing migration policy. The main obstacle to implementing this policy is the unresolved nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with affects all aspects of Armenia’s socioeconomic life. And only a change in Armenian policy for the better will halt the catastrophic migration trends. The country’s economy can only be boosted if relations with Azerbaijan are improved, which will require the withdrawal of Armenia’s armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. A comparison of the country’s demographic indices with its neighbors shows that the time has come to change the fundamental principles of the overall political course. If Armenia settles the conflict with Azerbaijan, it will gain access to transnational projects in the region and investments in Armenia will grow, leading to an increase in jobs in the republic, which will automatically stop people from leaving the country.

19 The influence of the world crisis on migration flows in Armenia will not become obvious until the spring, available in Russian at [http://www.newsarmenia.ru/exclusive/20090213/42025895.html]. 82 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Saadat RUSTEMOVA-DEMIRZHI

Ph.D. (Political Science), Coworker at the Chair of International Relations, the University of Çankýrý Karatekin (Ankara, Turkey).

STRATEGIC GAMES OVER THE CASPIAN

Abstract

his article examines the struggle over division, exploitation, and transportation of T the legal status of the Caspian relat- energy resources, as well as the geopolit- ed to conflicts of interests about the ical strategies of the leading world nations.

Introduction

The problem of the Caspian arose along with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Five actors immediately appeared on the scene, each of which strove to position itself in the geopolitical game over the Caspian. The main bone of contention is the still unresolved problem of the Caspian’s legal status, which is the key to resolving the division and use of its energy and biological resources. When the main world power centers joined the struggle over the Caspian, the status issue went international and is being keenly watched by the entire world community. The problem of the Caspian entails not only its subsurface and energy supplies, but primarily its geostrategic position, this being the crux of the matter for the powers that be in the region. The unresolved nature of the Caspian’s legal status is aggravating many issues relating to the use and development of resources. It is also leading to a global crisis, the consequences of which are fraught with ethnic conflicts and clashes among the countries rivaling for a primary position in the Caspian.

The International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

The geopolitical situation in the world, which dramatically changed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, brought the question of which states have claim to the Caspian Sea and, consequently, definition of its international legal status into sharp relief. All of the sovereign post-Soviet Caspian states, with the exception of Russia, immediately declared that they did not recognize the validity of the Soviet-Iranian treaties (1921-1940) regarding the Caspian. The existing status of this water basin sharply contradicted their national interests and infringed upon their legal rights to own- ership of corresponding parts of the sea.1

1 See: R. Mamedov, “Sovremenny mezhdunarodno-pravovoi status Kaspiyskogo moria: politika, diplomatiia i pravo,” available at [www.lawlibrary.ru/author.php?author...%D0], 13 July, 2012. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The legal status of the Caspian Sea was first reflected in the Treaty of Rasht between Russia and Iran of 1729 on demarcation and the cession to Russia of certain territories, which provided for freedom of commerce and navigation through the Caspian Sea and the Arax and Kura rivers. Later, under the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813 signed between the Russian Empire and Iran and the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828 that supplemented it, Russia was provided for all perpetuity with the exclusive right to have a naval fleet in the Caspian Sea. Persia only retained the right to commercial navigation. This meant full subordination of the Caspian Sea to Russian jurisdiction. In 1941, the Soviet Union abandoned complete monopoly in the Caspian, which led to the Soviet Union and Iran signing treaties in which the Caspian Sea was declared a common internal basin of both countries and could be used equally only by these two states.2 Apart from the status, which gave these states the right to free navigation and fishing within the limits of a 10-mile zone, there was no other mention in the agreement about division of the Caspian’s waters. There was only the unofficial Gasan-Kuli (Turkmenistan)-Astarachai (Azerbaijan) line recognized in 1935. Despite the unofficial status of this line, both sides adhered to it both in the water and in the air; it was a regulation that both countries observed.3 The agreements entered between the Soviet Union and Iran envisaged the Caspian as an internal sea, which was later confirmed by the world community, as well as in the doctrine of international law.4 The first crisis regarding the status of the Caspian occurred in 1994 when the Contract of the Cen- tury between Azerbaijan and 12 large Western oil companies on the joint development of three oilfields (Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli) was signed. Russia was against this agreement, declaring that it could not be valid because the Caspian is not an open sea, so the regulations of the international law of the sea cannot apply to it. Russia was the first to address this matter by requesting that the U.N. General Assem- bly hold a meeting on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Since then, the status of the Caspian has become even more complicated. The indeterminate nature of the Caspian’s legal status essentially suited Russia, which hoped, relying on its former status as an internal sea, to limit the access of Western companies to it, as well as maintain constant control over the exploitation and distribution of oil with the assistance of Russian companies.5 Azerbaijan was against this posing of the question since, according to Baku, when the Soviet Union disintegrated all the agreements entered by the Union lost their legal force. However, keeping in mind the fact that the Soviet Union signed all the agreements on behalf of all the Union members, this statement is not quite correct. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. does not mean that the treaties entered by the Soviet Union became invalid. Russia, as the Soviet Union’s successor, continues to be a member of the U.N., and the countries that have acquired sovereignty today under the relevant acts are obliged to continue executing the international treaties entered by the Soviet Union. In 1995, the U.N. confirmed Russia’s position, and not one of the countries was left with the legal power to withdraw from the agreements signed earlier by the Soviet Union and Iran. Russia’s insistence on adhering to the agreement on the general use regime, which is not subject to unilateral revision, has forced the Caspian countries to look for new ways to divide the borders. Two versions of the Caspian’s status have essentially been put forward: the first—the status of a sea, and the second—the status of a “border” lake. As of today, neither version has been able to gather enough votes to be finalized. If the Caspian is given the status of a sea, the 1982 U.N. Conven- tion on the Law of the Sea will apply to it. In this version, each of the Caspian countries will have the right to a 12-nautical-mile area of territorial waters (continental shelf) and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Since the sea is no wider than 200 miles at any point, it is proposed that the median line

2 See: A. Butaev, “Kaspiy: more ili ozero? 2. Status Kaspia,” available at [http://caspiy.net/knigi/kaspij-more-ili- ozero/24-kaspij-more-ili-ozero-2-status-kaspiya-.html]. 3 See: Z. Gabieva, “Pravovoi Status Kaspia,” Obozrevatel, No. 8 (175), 2004, pp. 100-109. 4 See: A. Butaev, op. cit. 5 See: G.G. Kona, Kafkasya Coðrafyasýnda Yaþanan Geliþmeler: Bölgesel ve Global Aktörlerin Bölgeye Etkisi, available at [www.turksam.org], 26.11.2007. 84 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION be used to determine the boundaries of the economic zone. This also makes it possible for other states that do not have access to the sea to freely navigate, fly over, and lay cables and pipelines in the exclusively free economic zone, as well as be able to carry out scientific research work. It also gives the Caspian countries the freedom to invite the companies of the states that do not belong to the Caspian region to develop their resources.6 In this version, the waters of the Caspian can be divided into five national sectors, as Azerbaijan suggests. But the same U.N. Convention sets forth that a fundamental principle of a sea is that it must be connected to the high seas. Consequently, due to its geographical location far from the high seas, the Caspian cannot be called a sea. If the state of affairs takes a different turn and the Caspian acquires the status of a lake, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot apply to it. Division of the water area must be carried out according to the principle of the median line, which also permits dividing the Caspian into separate national sectors. This will give the littoral countries more sovereignty, since a lake belongs to the internal waters and sovereign territories of separate states and, consequently, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of these states will be in effect. However, despite extensive talks, the littoral states have still not reached a common opinion. The commission on Caspian affairs held 15 meetings before 2004 alone with no results to speak of. The problem of the Caspian has long gone beyond the framework of discussing its status, and the actors concerned have moved on to another more important matter—division of the bed and development and exploitation of the Caspian’s energy and bio resources.

Division of the Caspian

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sovereign Caspian states began to claim their rights to separate parts of the Caspian. Iran took a particular stance by proposing that the Caspian be given the status of a lake, since otherwise it would acquire the areas with scant resources. If the Caspian is given the status of a lake, Iran proposes dividing it so that the boundaries of its section comprise a 20% sector of the sea, including the Araz-Alov-Sharq territory, where the greatest resources are concentrated.7 Not only is Azerbaijan actively against this division of the sea, but also Kazakhstan and Russia. Azerbaijan justifies its opposition by the fact that when the 1921 and 1940 agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and Iran, the latter was designated only 13% of the Caspian’s water area. Russia and Kazakhstan are also against this approach, since if the Caspian is given the status of a lake, these two states will receive almost half of the waters. Azerbaijan, in turn, is proposing the principle of dividing the Caspian into national sectors, pursuing the goal of affirming sovereignty in its national sector as soon as possible. Kazakhstan sup- ports it, which also wants to determine its boundaries in order to begin developing oil in Kashagan. This division would give Kazakhstan 29.6%, Azerbaijan 19.5%, Turkmenistan 18.4%, Russia 18.7%, and Iran 13.8% of the water area. But this division infringes on the interests of many of the Caspian states that will lose their common boundaries. Russia will lose its boundaries with Turkmenistan and Iran, Turkmenistan with Russia, Iran with Kazakhstan and Russia, and Kazakhstan with Iran; only Azerbaijan will retain its common boundaries with all the Caspian states.8 Turkmenistan put forward another alternative of division, based on the status of a sea, claiming that each of the littoral states has the right to a 12-mile area of territorial waters and a 35-mile exclusive economic zone. The rest of the Caspian, according to Turkmenistan, should be under common use and management. So each of the countries has been putting forward its own version of the Cas- pian’s status and its division, but not one of them has received the full support of all the states.

6 See: A.M. Butaev, “Kaspiy: more ili ozero,” available at [www.bname.ru/analysis/caspiy.net], 28 June, 2012. 7 See: M. Gokçe, Sovyet sonrasý Dönemde Hazar Çevresinde Yaþanan Rekabet, available at [www.sosyalarastirmalar. com/cilt1/sayi3/sayi3_pdf/gokce_mustafa.pdf], 17.07.2012. 8 See: A.M. Butaev, “Kaspiy: more ili ozero,” 28 July, 2012. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Caspian Oil

According to geological studies, the Caspian Sea is the third main oil-and-gas-bearing basin in the world. Precise data are not currently known; only the analyses of Western and Russian experts are available, the data of which do not coincide with each other. Western experts believe that Russia’s estimates are artificially low, since their data are much higher. The U.S. State Department noted that Caspian oil could become an important player in the oil market. Division of Caspian oil depends on the status the sea acquires. If it is designated as a lake, both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will have an advantage, accounting for the main share of Caspian oil. If, on the other hand, it is given the status of an enclosed sea, each of the littoral states will receive its share of the 10-mile sovereign zone and the right to develop oil deposits there. This alternative should logically give all the Caspian states equal shares of Caspian oil, although studies show that different sectors of the sea have different amounts of oil. For example, Russian experts have presented data showing that oil reserves in the Russian zone of the Caspian are 100 million tonnes more than the reserves in the Azeri sector.

Interests of the World Powers The U.S.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the formerly peripheral Caucasian-Caspian region turned into a zone of vital interests of the major world powers. For example, the U.S. openly declared the Caspian region a zone of its interests, not only due to its rich reserves of energy resources, but also because of its important geopolitical position. The Caspian region has acquired the status of a functional region that is also an energy storehouse, transport corridor, and zone of instability requiring a well-considered security policy. The U.S.’s interest in the Caspian is defined in three vectors—energy reserves, democracy, and security.9 Ethnic conflicts and drug trafficking, which are the main problems of the Caspian zone, give the U.S. a viable reason for bringing its forces into these territories. After the operations to combat terrorism and inculcate democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Cas- pian region became the next target of the U.S.’s energy policy, the Caucasus and Central Asia being of even greater strategic importance than the Caspian itself. Repeatedly emphasizing the significance of these regions, the U.S. is planning to pursue a policy aimed at establishing control over Caspian resources using Afghanistan as a bridge for pumping energy resources. America is striving to occupy its niche, primarily in the southern part of the Caspian region, in order to transport Turkmen gas through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the world market. These strategies justify all the military-political operations both in Afghanistan and, in the near future, in Pakistan, with Central Asia and the Caucasus likely to be the next in line. The Caucasian zone itself is very important for the U.S., where it is placing its main stakes on Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa projects, which are outside the zone of Russian control, are another trump card for the U.S. in the energy struggle.

The European Union

Caspian oil is of particular interest for the European Union, the oil consumption of which is growing with each passing day. Due to this, the EU, just like the U.S., is trying to occupy its niche in the region by advancing educational, scientific, economic, and cultural projects and grants, as well as

9 See: A. Cohen, “Advancing American Interest in Central Asia,” available at [http://www.heritage.org], 17 Janu- ary, 2007. 86 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION spreading European values there (the protection of human rights, liberal democracy, and so on). Both the policy of penetrating strategically important zones and gaining control over the Caspian’s energy resources are equally important for the EU.

China

China as the main consumer of Central Asian gas has also been pursuing an active policy of penetration into Central Asia and the Caucasus. In addition to the economic aspects, China sees the Caspian as an important zone in terms of security. China, which has an ongoing conflict in its Xin- jiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, needs partners in this zone in order to be able to control the intru- sions of Uighur separatists. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which China is a member, acts as the main cover for implementing this policy of security and reinforcement of its boundaries. For China’s fast-growing economy, the Caspian zone is an essential storehouse for ensuring its energy needs. In this context, China is planning to lay gas pipelines through Kazakhstan to transport Turkmen and Uzbek gas. China has already occupied its niche in this region by becoming Kazakh- stan’s main economic and trade partner, gaining an even stronger foothold when the Almaty-Urumqi- Beijing railroad line was opened. Today, China is the U.S.’s main rival in this zone.

Iran

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was destined to play an important role both in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. However, for the time being, Iran, which does not need the Caspian’s resources, has been pursuing a unilateral policy, which is in no way conducive to resolving the acute problems arising around the Caspian. Referring to environmental problems, it is trying to hinder the energy project between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that plan to lay a Trans-Caspian pipeline through the region for exporting gas to Europe. Iran is resolutely against Azerbaijan’s idea of dividing the Caspian into national sectors, which is explained by its fear that its possession of Caspian energy resources will give Azerbaijan more power. Moreover, Iran, in the territory of which more than 20 million ethnic Azeris live, is worried about Azerbaijan possibly supporting its fellow countrymen. All of this put together predetermines Iran’s position regarding the status of the Caspian and division of its resources.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

In my opinion, the geographic characteristics of the Caspian suggest that giving it the status of a “border” lake is the most acceptable solution. Its physical and geographical features indicate that it is a lake, which is scientifically confirmed by many leading researchers. Definition of the Caspian’s status will make it possible for the littoral states to reach a consensus about the development of its resources. This can only be achieved with effective cooperation among the countries of the Caspian region and their complete consensus in defining the rules and limitations for exploitation of the Cas- pian’s energy and bio resources, as well as their transportation. So talks among the Caspian countries should form the basis of partnership and concurrence in all disputes. Only this approach will guarantee that none of the sides’ interests are infringed upon, while all the littoral states will share responsibility in resolving the Caspian’s environmental issues. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Irina PASHCHENKO

Ph.D. (Philos.), Head of the Laboratory of North Caucasian Affairs, Institute of Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Studies, Southern Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (Rostov-on-Don, the Russian Federation).

Amiran URUSHADZE

Ph.D. (Hist.), Junior Researcher at the Laboratory of History and Ethnography, Institute of Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Studies, Southern Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (Rostov-on-Don, the Russian Federation).

THE CAUCASIAN WAR OF THE 19TH CENTURY: CIVILIZATIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICS

Abstract

he authors rely on the civilizational of the 19th century. With this aim in view, T approach and the theory of positive- they identify and analyze its functional re- functional conflict to discuss the nature percussions: the emergence and develop- and specific features of the Caucasian War. ment of cultural bilingualism; the transforma- They supply new arguments to substantiate tions in imperial policy; and the appearance the civilizational nature of the Caucasian War of the Caucasian theme in Russian culture.

The article was prepared as part of the project “Practices of Violence in the Northern Caucasus: Genetic Fea- tures, Forms, Dynamics and Trends”; grant of the President of the Russian Federation MK—4453.2011.6. 88 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

The Caucasian War is one of the central events in the history of the region’s incorporation into the Russian Empire. It cannot be described as merely a military-political confrontation; it has no clear chronological limits or geographical boundaries, no clear demarcation of the warring sides, nor is there a date on which the war was declared or a date on which a peace treaty was entered. Historians cannot agree on the conflict’s name—“the Caucasian War.”1 What we know about the conflict (its individual episodes and heroes) cannot be correlated with its understanding, which calls for concep- tualization of a vast body of empirical data. This, in turn, calls for a civilizational approach to the Caucasian War and its historical context, which allows us to draw on a wider range of hitherto un- tapped sources and reinterpretation of well-known evidence. The effects of the war on the destiny of the Caucasian world were overwhelming. The conflict not only destroyed, but also created new attitudes and meanings that go far beyond certain imposed confron- tational parameters. We will proceed from the positive-functional conflict theory formulated by Lewis Alfred Coser, one of the classics of conflictology. A conflict of the positive-functional type causes losses and destruction (inevitable in any war); it also stimulates social changes leading to a better social order, norms, and behavior. It defuses tension among those involved and preserves relations between the conflicting sides. Such conflicts are better described as interaction in which the sides come to know one another better, while better understanding helps to transform hostile relations into cooperation or, at least, coexistence. This means that we should discern in the Caucasian War, a far from simple, or rather, complicated event, “those consequences of social conflict which make for an increase rather than a decrease in the adaptation or adjustment of particular social relationships or groups.”2

The Caucasian War as a Civilizational Conflict

Historians of the Caucasian War agree on the whole that it was triggered in 1801 when the Kartli-Kakhetian Kingdom was joined to the Russian Empire. The decision was neither easy nor prompt: the top officials knew that the geopolitical dividends created by this new acquisition would be balanced off by new responsibilities—from that time on security of the Transcaucasian borders would be Russia’s concern. Russian historian Zurab Avalov wrote the following: “Indeed, we can see that unification of Georgia with Russia has caused a lot of disagreements on foreign policy issues in the State Council—an extremely rare occurrence in the history of the Council at that time.”3 After long deliberations, Georgia joined the Russian Empire and the royal Bagrationi dynasty was dethroned and deported. This meant that the fundamental problems created by acquisition of the Cauca- sus shifted from the theoretical to the practical sphere to create the political background of the Caucasian War of the 19th century, an armed clash between two different world outlooks and symbolic and axiological systems. Historians have arrived at the conclusion that the Caucasian War should be “more correctly described as a meeting and conflict of cultures in the area of civilizational fracture.”4

1 A group of researchers (the V.B. Vinogradov School) insists that this name is inapplicable. One of the most popular books on the history of the conflict is called The Caucasian Wars and Imamat of Shamil (N.I. Pokrovsky, Kavkazskie voyny i imamat Shamilia, ROSSPEN, Moscow, 2009, 580 pp.). 2 L. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Free Press, Glencoe Il., 1956, p. 8. 3 Z.D. Avalov, Prisoedinenie Gruzii k Rossii, Zvezda, St. Petersburg, 2009, p. 123. 4 D.I. Oleynikov, “Chelovek na razlome kultur. Osobennosti psikhologii russkogo ofitsera-gortsa v period Bolshoy Kavkazskoy voyny,” Zvezda, No. 8, 2001, p. 95. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The sides knew next to nothing about each other; very soon ignorance developed into mutual misunderstanding and a protracted conflict. The Caucasian peoples divided by different ethnic and religious affiliations and a multitude of local languages formed a community of sorts not limited “to similarity of approaches and facial features. This similarity went much deeper and sprung from geographical proximity and the impact of similar, to some extent, historical factors and similar everyday conditions.”5 This community survived and developed thanks to “common rules of the game,” common symbolic systems, traditions, and customs, and balanced relationships. The latter is best illustrated by the mountain dwellers of Daghestan and Georgia (the Tushins in particular), the relations between which are best described as “struggle/enmity which followed certain rules (today you steal our cattle and take prisoners, tomorrow we come to you to do the same) and which never developed into a war of extermination.”6 The Caucasian ethnicities remained very close in all spheres: economic, political, cultural, and religious. They had common highly specific sociocultural institutions and regulators—atalychestvo (fosterage), abrechestvo (robbers or guerillas), kunachestvo (blood brothers), and feud. As the Russian Empire pressed further into the mountains, it learned to exploit some of the local institutions to consolidate its position7 and to resolutely oppose others. In the late 18th century, the empire was still inclined to accept a certain share of local “arbitrariness;” in the early 19th century, the imperial administration launched an uncompromising struggle against “the predatory way of life of the local people.”8 Many of the Caucasian traditional sociocultural institutions could not coexist with the empire’s “civilizational mission.” Russian officers regarded the mountain people as “savages” to be “civilized and pacified” to become “peaceful” and “useful” subjects of the “white czar.”9 In the 18th and first quarter of the 19th centuries, the Russian generals and top officials dispatched to the Caucasus knew next to nothing about their new posts and the local specifics. Appointed commander of the troops and Chief Civilian Administrator, General Yermolov wrote the following to his friend Mikhail Vorontsov (who served as Caucasian Vicegerent in 1844-1854): “I shall rule the land of which I know nothing; I shall have to deal with problems absolutely unknown to me, which means that I stand little chance of pleasing the government. What a bitter thought! I shall do my best though!”10 By that time, the Georgian kingdom had been part of the Russian Empire for fifteen years, while the Russian administration had spread far and wide across the Caucasus. Very soon ignorance of the Caucasus turned into disinclination to get to know it11: the Russian authorities paid no heed to the local customs—they merely imposed new rules and insisted on their fulfillment. Here is what General Yermolov wrote to his friend Prince Vorontsov: “I am gradually sorting things out. The locals are not used to order and stupid people think it bizarre.”12 Disdain for the local customs and traditions is easily explained by the fact that, starting in the latter half of the 18th century, it was the Westernized elite that arrived in the Caucasus to look after Russia’s interests. These officers and bureaucrats, typical products of the era of rationalism, were absolutely sure of their

5 Formy natsionalnogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh: Avstro-Vengria, Rossia, Germania, ed. by A.I. Kastelianskiy, Print shop of the Obshchestv. Polza Partnership, St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 471. 6 Yu.Yu. Karpov, “Traditsionnoe dagestanskoe obshchestvo: k printsipam modelirovaniia sotsialnogo prostranst- va,” in: Lavrovskie (sredneaziatskie-kavkazskie) chtenia 2002-2003, St. Petersburg, 2003, p. 18. 7 Here is an example: the local imperial authorities borrowed the practice of hostage taking (amanats) from the local people and used it extensively. 8 It is interesting to note in this respect how the imperial administration readjusted its ideas about ishkil or baranta (seizure of property for debts) (for more detail, see: V.O. Bobrovnikov, “Ishkil v Dagestane XVII-XIX vv.: obychay ili prestuplenie na iuzhnykh granitsakh Rossiiskoy imperii,” Vostok, No. 2, 2006, pp. 67-73). 9 Kavkaz i Rossiiskaia imperia: proekty, idei, illiuzii i realnost. Nachalo XIX-nachalo XX vv., Zvezda, St. Peters- burg, 2005, p. 46. 10 Pisma A.P. Yermolova M.S. Vorontsovu, Zvezda, St. Petersburg, 2011, pp. 23-24. 11 See: V.V. Lapin, Armiia Rossii v Kavkazskoy voyne XVIII-XIX vv., Evropeyskiy Dom Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2008, p. 236. 12 Pisma A.P. Yermolova M.S. Vorontsovu, p. 37. 90 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION civilizational superiority over those whom they called “ignoble savages” and “perfidious and unreli- able people” who could not be trusted because of “their fickle and crude nature.”13 In his The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, British historian John Baddeley offered a striking example of mutual misunderstanding: after several days of fierce fighting over the Kumyk village of Aksai, the Russian generals invited several influential men for negotiations. The next day, “the men of Aksai, numbering 300, made their appearance and were escorted into the fort. Two Russian generals at once began abusing them in Tartar using insulting terms and accusing them of the grossest treachery.” Obviously unaware that in the Caucasus personal weapons were a sign of a free man, they rudely ordered the mountain folk to hand over their daggers. The response was prompt—the generals were slaughtered. “The soldiers inside the fort ran after the Kumyks, firing their guns, and those outside, seeing the fleeing crowd pursued by their comrades, attacked them in turn and destroyed them almost to a man.”14 Misunderstandings of this kind were fairly frequent. The mountain dwellers regarded the Russian Empire as a military power to be used in their interests. According to prominent expert on the Caucasus P. Butkov, the North Caucasian societies, which formally expressed their “obedience” to the empire, called themselves dosas (friends) of Rus- sia and no more.15 At the same time, “soldiers of the empire” demanded complete obedience from the locals. Punitive expeditions against the mountain dwellers who sheltered those who raided villages, Cossack villages, and forts along the border were the most frequent types of punishment because hospitality was a must among the mountain people as a sign of honor and dignity; those who diso- beyed fell into eternal disgrace. Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky described one of such episode in his long story “Ammalat- bek.” In vain a Russian captain demanded that those who sheltered the wanted khan obey the Russian laws, their oath of allegiance, and their duty—the mountain dwellers remained loyal to tradition.16 When penetrating the area of traditional Caucasian culture, imperial law and order tried to bend the autochthonous society to the disciplinary practices of modernity. As time went by, the sides, the empire in particular, realized that confrontation of that sort offered no way out. Russia sustained thousands of casualties; the war depleted the country’s material and financial resources, while victory remained as far away as ever. The Caucasian War proved a complete disaster. On the other hand, the war, which went on and on, brought the enemies closer together. First, they borrowed tactical tricks, weapons, and uniforms, then laws and customs of war, and later moved on to other spheres of human activities.

The Functions of Conflict: Cultural Bilingualism, Transformations in Imperial Policy, the Caucasian Theme in Russian Culture

The Caucasian War had no theater; clashes flared up across the entire vast territory of the Cau- casian macro region (the Northern Caucasus and the Transcaucasus). Hostilities differed greatly from

13 M. Khodarkovsky, “Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800,” available at [http://www.vaynahgb.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224%3Amichael-khodarkovsky- of-christianity-enlightenment-and-colonialism-russia-in-the-north-caucasus-1550-1800&catid=63%3Agenocide&Itemid= 100&lang=en]. 14 J.F. Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, Bombay and Calcut- ta, 1908, pp. 150-151. 15 See: Yu.Yu. Karpov, “Traditsionnye gorsko-kavkazskie obshchestva: k probleme osobennostey funktsionirova- niia v svete istorii interpretatsiy,” in: Traditsii narodov Kavkaza v meniaiushchemsia mire: preemstvennost i razryvy v sotsiokulturnykh praktikakh. Sbornik statey k 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Leonida Ivanovicha Lavrova, Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie, St. Perersburg, 2010, p. 124. 16 See: A.A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, Kavkazskie povesti, Nauka Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1995, p. 13. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Russian army’s previous experience in Europe. In the Caucasus, an officer familiar with the very specific “Caucasian method of warfare”17 could be proud of this. The situation demanded detailed knowledge of the region; Russian officers acquired it in the course of service; in many cases this knowledge became a way of life. Relatively recently Russian historiography acquired a new concept—“cultural bilingualism.” In linguistics, bilingualism means perfect command of two languages, while in culture this denotes the dual nature of man living under the influence of two different cultures.18 This concept can be used to identify different types of cultural bilingualism in the Caucasus. The individual type of cultural bilingualism could be observed among the Russian soldiers and officers of the Separate Caucasian Corps (since 1858 the Caucasian Army), bureaucrats of the imperial administration, and those Caucasian mountain people in czarist service and/or educated in Russian educational establishments. Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov, who fought in the Caucasian War with the Tenginskiy infan- try regiment, spoke about a “true Caucasian, semi-Russian, and semi-Asian creature in whom devotion to Oriental customs predominates.”19 The poet had in mind both the military and civilian bureaucrats of the Russian Empire who, for different reasons, found themselves in the Caucasus. The “true Caucasian” phenomenon was a type of cultural bilingualism, namely, service bilingualism. Service cultural bilingualism is a product of adaptation to the places of everyday activities. This quality was not predetermined in the Russian military and civilians who served in the Caucasus, but it was potentially present. In other words, service cultural bilingualism was an instrument which harmonized relations with the reality of the external world and an alternative to permanent civilizational confrontation. Service cultural bilingualism was a catalyst of strong corporative mobilization. The non-Russian officers perceived themselves and the Special Caucasian Corps as a whole as “a special bellicose people which Russia has opposed to the belligerent peoples of the Caucasus.”20 There were mountain dwellers who rose high in the Russian army and fought together with it in the Caucasian War.21 It is a well-known fact; the empire needed them to staff the chronically under- staffed military and administrative institutions in the Caucasus. In fact, officers from among the local mountain peoples knew the local traditions and customs and frequently enjoyed personal respect; this meant that they could better cope with the task of “final pacification of the Caucasus.” Besides service cultural bilingualism, the Caucasian War produced another phenomenon, viz. extreme cultural bilingualism, acquired by the individual in a borderline situation in the face of death. This is largely true of Russian soldiers and officers who were either taken prisoner or deliberately took to the mountains after committing a crime or serious official misdemeanor. To survive, these people had to adjust to the new ethnosocial milieu. Cultural bilingualism was a strategy or practice of survival in extreme conditions. Collective cultural bilingualism could be observed among the Cossacks of the Caucasian Line (the Terek, Grebenskaya, and Black Sea Cossack troops): their traditional cultural attitudes (the high status of men and militarized culture) were typologically close to the imperatives of the mountain dwellers’ everyday life. The Caucasian War limited but never disrupted the peaceful contacts between mountain societies and Cossack settlements on the Caucasian Line they maintained in the 18th and early 19th centuries.22 The Cossacks and mountain folk had little in common but were not

17 “Memuary grafa de Rochoira, adiutanta imperatora Aleksandra I,” in: Kavkazskaia voyna: istoki i nachalo. 1770-1820-e gody, Zvezda, St. Petersburg, 2002, p. 341. 18 See: D.I. Oleynikov, op. cit. 19 M.Yu. Lermontov, “Kavkazets,” in: Sochineniia, Vol. 2, Khudozhestvennaia literatura Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 590. 20 “Pismo kavkazskogo ofitsera k N.N. Muravyevu,” Russkaia starina, Vol. VI, 1872, p. 545. 21 The “non-Russian” units in the Russian army reached their maximal numerical strength (24 thousand) in 1878 (see: Stoletie Voennogo ministerstva, Vol. XI, Voennoe ministerstvo, St. Petersburg, 1902, p. 394). 22 See: Ocherki istorii Kubani s drevneyshikh vremen po 1920 g., ed. by V.N. Ratushnyak, Sovetskaia Kuban, Krasnodar, 1996, p. 296. 92 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION alienated. The Cossacks never indulged in racist deliberation, one of the favorite occupations of the military-administrative imperial elite. Many of the Black Sea Cossacks could speak the local languages; they knew a lot about the mountain peoples’ customs and were proud to be blood brothers of the mountain folk.23 The North Caucasian Cossacks were an intermediary of sorts in the civilizational conflict. For a long time, the Russian Empire remained convinced that military force was enough to “pacify the Caucasus”; it was expected that the military operations of the Russian generals would sooner or later convince the local people that resistance was futile. In fact, no military triumphs, the capture of Akhulgo in 1839 being one of them, quenched the gazavat of the mountain people—resistance was gathering momentum and became even fiercer. The 1845 Dargin catastrophe of the Russian army convinced the imperial top crust that the Caucasian policy should be revised. This task was entrusted to Prince Vorontsov, who was appointed the first Caucasian Vicegerent (1844-1854). The newly appointed vicegerent had little faith in a policy based on the use of force. “Violence will never be beneficial—its repercussions can be very bad indeed.”24 He was not the first of the Russian top appointees in the Caucasus who tended to avoid violence25; as distinct from his predecessors, however, the new supreme commander had a program of action and vast administrative and economic experience.26 Semen Esadze, famous pupil of Vassili Potto, a “chronicler of the Caucasian War,” summed up the policy of the Caucasian vicegerent as follows: “Prince Vorontsov was fully aware of Russia’s main interest: joining the area with its many different tribes to the empire. To achieve this, the administrative system must become interested in all details of the peoples’ lives.”27 As the Caucasian Vice- gerent, Prince Vorontsov reorganized education, encouraged trade, and institutionalized cultural life through public libraries, theaters, and periodicals. He opened new schools (for Muslim children among others) and increased enrollment in the functioning schools and colleges. He personally supervised drafting of the Regulations for Educating Children from the Caucasus and Transcaucasus on Budget Money in the Higher and Specialized Ed- ucational Establishments of the Empire.28 The Caucasian Committee, which discussed, amended, and enacted the Regulations on 21 July, 1849, opened the doors of the best Russian universities to young men from the Caucasus. The Caucasian Vicegerent personally supervised job placement for the “Cau- casian pupils” who returned home upon graduation. Prince Vorontsov’s educational efforts were appreciated: the local people realized that the empire was interested in them and their region. People of local origin rose high on the administrative ladder; many of them became lawyers, engineers, and doctors, an absolutely new phenomenon for the Caucasus. European education and enlightenment created new axiological landmarks, new aesthetic tastes, and cultural requirements. What was done to encourage trade went far beyond the purely utilitarian commercial tasks: the “trade industry” was expected to push the mountain people closer to Russian habits, customs, and legal regulations. Indeed, brisk trade would create “new demands and needs,” the satisfaction of which would overcome the local peoples’ “predatory way of life” and teach them to appreciate an

23 See: O.V. Matveev, Istoricheskaia kartina mira kubanskogo kazachestva (kon. XVIII—nach. XX: kategorii voin- skoy mentalnosti, Kubankino, Krasnodar, 2005, p. 359. 24 Quoted from: S.S. Esadze, Istoricheskaia zapiska ob upravlenii Kavkazom, Vol. I, Guttenberg, Tiflis, 1907, p. 89. 25 General I. Anrep, who in the early 1840s filled the post of the commander of the Black Sea coastal line, serves as the best example. According to his contemporaries, he tried to win the mountain people over to his side “by his elo- quence” (for more detail, see: Ya.A. Gordin, Kavkaz: zemlia i krov, Zvezda, St. Petersburg, 2001). 26 From 1823 to 1844, when he was appointed Caucasian Vicegerent, Prince Vorontsov was Governor of Novo- rossiya. 27 S.S. Esadze, op. cit. 28 Russian State Historical Archives (RGIA), rec. gr. 1268, inv. 3, f. 17, sheet 28. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION affluent and well-organized lifestyle. In short, the Russians and the locals would profit from this; trade would increase mutual trust and encourage the mountain dwellers’ peaceful habits.29 The administration of the Caucasian General Vicegerency opened exchange offices.30 Trade contacts went far beyond commodity/money operations: peaceful trade contacts with the Russian newcomers gradually changed the lifestyle and everyday habits of the local people. All of this was done to bring the recent settlers and autochthonous population closer together: Russia’s military failures convinced the imperial top crust that escalation of violence would lead nowhere. The time had come to test cultural modernization and Kulturträger (a bearer of culture) instruments. The Caucasian War fanned the interest of the Russian educated classes in the Caucasus and its people despite the scarcity of relevant information. It was at this time that a Caucasian tradition31 began taking shape in Russian literature. Pushkin, Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, Lermontov, Leo Tolstoy, and numerous less famous authors poured out a wealth of information in the form of their literary creations. In Russia, the Caucasian literary tradition lived through the periods of Romanticism and realism. The works of the period of Romanticism set Russia against the Caucasus in many respects. Authors who followed the tradition started by Lord Byron’s celebrated Oriental Tales and influenced by the exotics brought into fashion by European Romanticism presented the Caucasus as the myste- rious Orient. In the first half of the 19th century, the educated public in Russia concentrated on the problem of serfdom. This explains why Russian writers treated the Caucasus as the “country of freedom” and the abode of the “spirit of freedom.” As such, it was counterpoised to the rest of the country. Romanticism stressed the geographic dissimilarities of Russia and the Caucasus; its paradigm hyper- bolized the specifics of nature and, especially, the specific features of the mountain dwellers’ psychology and social relations. Romanticism was responsible for glorifying violence in what Russian authors wrote about the Caucasus; they also lauded the new merciless “imperial Conquistadors” who terrified local population. The Russian Romantic literature helped the Russian educated class to grasp the meaning and the historical context of the events that took place in the Caucasus in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. While in the early 19th century, Russian society had known practically next to nothing about the Caucasus, by the middle of the same century, the literature of Romanticism supplied the audience, which wanted to know more about the Caucasus, with numerous substantiated ideas about the region. In the 1830s-early 1840s, realism started moving to the forefront of artistic representations of the Caucasus. It was at this time that authors displayed much more interest in the region’s ethnography; they developed a fundamentally different idea of war as a “curse” of mankind and an obvious desire to show man in everyday circumstances. Leo Tolstoy demonstrated the most resolute departure from the tradition of Romanticism. In some of his works he openly criticized the images born by the first period of the development of Russian literature about the Caucasus.32 The Caucasian literary tradition made the Caucasus fashionable in Russia and supplied wider knowledge about the region. It was mainly thanks to the Caucasian tradition present in the works of Russian writers and poets that the empire finally achieved the symbolic appropriation of its southern outskirts. The region struck root in Russian culture and found a place of its own on the mental map of Russian man.

29 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 26, f. 8, sheet 193. 30 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 26, f. 11, sheet 411. 31 See: A. Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845- 1917, McGill-Queen’s University, 2002, p. 4. 32 See: L.N. Tolstoy, Kazaki. Povesti i rasskazy, Khudozhestvennaya literatura Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 27. 94 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Conclusion

The Caucasian War is one of the largest civilizational conflicts in history. The clash between traditional culture and the culture of modernity revealed their incompatibility, led to a prolonged armed confrontation, and produced numerous casualties on both sides. The scale of the conflict, which to one extent or another engulfed the entire population of the vast Caucasian region (the North- ern Caucasus and Transcaucasus), destroyed the borders and the frontline of confrontation. It became a frontier territory—an area of peaceful contacts, interaction, mutual understanding, and cultural bilingualism. The Caucasian War, which seemed endless, forced imperial power to switch to a policy of cultural and social-economic expansion. These functional specifics of the Caucasian War made the Caucasus part of the Russian Empire.

Beka CHEDIA

Ph.D. (Political Science), Head of Publishing Projects of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia).

CONFESSIONAL CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AS LATENT INTERSTATE DIFFERENCES

Abstract

he article examines the interaction foreign policy. Special attention is given to T between politics and religion in Geor- the confessional differences that exist be- gia and their influence on forming and tween Georgia and several of its neighbor- implementing the country’s domestic and ing countries.

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ideological vacuum arose that needed to be filled. Religion became the new content of the spiritual and political guidelines of the former Union republics. Instead of portraits of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, civil servants decorated the walls of their offices with various religious attributes, icons, and so on. The religious revival in the former Soviet Union largely coincided with the collapse of the communist ideology. Furthermore, religion gradually became a guiding vision in many countries of the former Soviet Union, including Georgia. It is worth noting that 20 years ago, religion was a mobiliz- Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ing factor in state-building in several post-Soviet countries. It is currently common procedure for some of the Caucasian countries and their neighbors to use the religious factor to achieve their political goals. In 2011, religious disputes broke out in Georgia among several confessions; they not only aggravated the domestic political situation, but also had a negative impact on the country’s relations with its regional neighbors. However, a closer look at this problem shows that it was related not so much to religion as to the differences that existed among the countries, right down to mutual territorial claims (although tacit). In this context, the dispute between the Georgian and Armenian patriarchies serves as a good case in point. It is worth noting that these countries pursued a policy of fraternal relations at the state level, while the Churches were left to deal with their differences between themselves. It should also be kept in mind that for some countries religion was a tool for achieving long-term political goals. So it becomes clear that any conflict between confessions, the adherents of which comprise the majority of the population, cannot help but affect the state; ignoring this problem could have extremely negative consequences.

Political Orthodoxy and the Conflict between Two Orthodox Countries

The term “political orthodoxy” is becoming increasingly popular in the Georgian political community. It implies using the Orthodox Church to achieve geopolitical goals. For example, Russia refers to the fact that both countries share the same faith to promote its foreign policy interests, in so doing applying “soft power” of sorts against Georgia. In Georgia, the term “political orthodoxy” is used to designate a potential threat to its national security. It has become tantamount to the concept “political Islam” that exists in international politics. It is worth noting that despite the aggravation in Georgian-Russian interstate relations, the Or- thodox Churches of these two countries continue to cooperate. So we have an exceptional case where relations between the countries are much more balanced (although not cloudless) at the confessional than at the state level. Although espousing the same faith as the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the Georgian Or- thodox Church (GOC) has several differences (style of church architecture, use of Georgian polyph- ony, and so on). In this context, it seems appropriate to present an excerpt from a special letter sent in 1940 by Georgian Patriarch Kallistrat Tsintsadze to Secretary of the Georgian Central Committee of the Communist Party Kandid Charkviani: “The Georgian Orthodox Church is our oldest cultural institution. It has been a source of spirituality for our people, saved it from Tatarization and Russifica- tion, and preserved its own national image. Its dogmatic teaching does not differ from the Churches of other Orthodox nations, but over the centuries it has developed its own unique intonation of liturgical recital and singing and way of writing and performing church services, which is passed down from generation to generation orally, since, apart from a small amount of liturgical singing, everything mentioned above has not been put to music or written down. Not only has the Holy Synod of Russia not been engaged in such creative endeavors, but its enlighteners have even called the language of Giorgy Khutses and Shota Rustaveli the bark of dogs.”1 Both during the Soviet era (despite the atheism prevalent in society) and the independent period, religion was a means of self-identification for the Georgians and an arena of anti-Soviet struggle.

1 National Manuscript Center of Georgia, Kallistrat Tsintsadze Foundation No. 77, Art 73. 96 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia that occurred after the August 2008 war, Orthodoxy has increasingly become the main link binding these countries together, whereby the main paradox is that when they coexisted within the Soviet Union, it separated them. However, the fact that Russia and Georgia share the same faith has a negative impact on the foreign policy preferences of the latter. Since it is a country striving to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures, Georgia’s affiliation with the Orthodox world creates certain risks associated with the strengthening of the ROC, which is cooperating all the more closely with the Russian authorities. This is causing collisions between the Georgian authorities striving for the West and the GOC, which is criticizing alien values and inclining toward Russia. Today a “cold war” between the country’s Church and Government is in full swing. Furthermore, the authorities are loath to directly accuse the Church of spreading pro-Russian sentiments, although the printed matter and electronic media they control are publishing more and more supposedly independent articles that denounce the GOC; latent tension is also felt in the social networks. Well-known public figures and active government supporters frequently post comments (at times very blatant) to photographs and video clips showing close cooperation between the ROC and the Kremlin. This places the Georgian Patriarchy, which cooperates with the ROC, in an uncomfort- able position, to put it mildly. More evidence of the tense situation was a statement made in 2011 by Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II, in which he said in particular: “Very often what comes from the West is unacceptable for Orthodox Christians, so this is precisely why the Georgian people must protect the history, past, and traditions of their country.”2 Moreover, Ilia II announced the following on the Ekho Moskvy radio station: “Georgia and Russia cannot remain enemies… Georgia still deeply respects Russia, its culture, history, and philosophy… I think that the Russian people also think kindly of Georgia. Recently, a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said to me: ‘We do not need Abkhazia.’ I certainly hope the same does not apply to Georgia. Is it possible to replace Georgia with Abkhazia?”3 In Georgian political circles, on the contrary, the danger of political orthodoxy coming from Russia is being increasingly emphasized. According to the country’s president, “The ROC has declared a crusade in order to restore the Soviet Union and it is very open about this, whereby it is aimed against Georgia’s independence.”4 Such fears are related to the fact that in 2011, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the collapse of historical Russia;”5 moreover, his geopolitical project to form a Russian World presented in 2009 is also worth mentioning.6 The Patriarch called Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and partially Moldova the nucleus of the Russian World; he said the Russian culture and language were its other fulcrums. In his opinion, a Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian, and Georgian can belong to the Russian culture because it has imbibed the traditions of many peoples. Patriarch Kirill also notes that the Russian culture is a phenomenon that is not limited to one state or one ethnicity and is not related to the interests of one state. Today it is very important to understand that the Russian World is not a tool of the Russian Federation’s political influence. This organization has entirely different aims and different tasks.7 At the same time, the Patriarch pointed

2 [http://www.interpressnews.ge/ru/2010-05-25-09-34-46/34565-2011-11-10-12-22-31.html]; “Katolikos-Patriarkh gostit v Ruis-Urbnisskoi eparkhii,” 10 November, 2011, available at: [http://www.apsny.ge/2011/soc/1320968377.php]. 3 [http://echo.msk.ru/guests/790262-echo/], 8 July, 2011. 4 Statement by President Mikhail Saakashvili at a sitting of the Georgian government in Kutaisi, 22 November, 2011, available at [http://netgazeti.ge/]. 5 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/11/111111_russian_patriarch.shtml]. 6 Speech of His Most Holy Patriarch Kirill at the ceremonial opening of the 3rd Assembly of the Russian World, 3 November, 2009, available at [http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html]. 7 Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION out that the Russian World should be founded on a union “similar to the British Commonwealth of Nations or the commonwealth of French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries.” In turn, Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II hopes that relations between Georgia and Russia will be restored. Confirmation of this are his following words: “We have always been close to each other and should remain that way… Rapprochement between Georgia and Russia occurred on the grounds of Orthodoxy. It is unnatural that we have raised the sword against each other… Therefore we should repent and forgive each other.” However, Ilia II’s attempts to improve relations between the two states have not been crowned with success so far.

Spiritual Separatism

Spiritual separatism is another graphic example of how religion is being used to achieve political goals. The open military opposition between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 led to the spiritual clergy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia taking the side of their governments. Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchy repeatedly declared that it does not recognize the Orthodox Churches of Abkhaz- ia and South Ossetia outside the canonical territory of the GOC. Despite the fact that Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians largely profess Christianity, there is also a confessional conflict among them that, in all likelihood, is directly tied to political orthodoxy. For example, in contrast to the occupied Tskhinvali region, which belongs to the Vladikavkaz eparchy, Abkhazia decided to create its own Church. Abkhazia’s self-proclaimed spiritual leader said that in 1943 the Abkhazian Church was forcibly joined to the Georgian and now “historical justice has been resorted.” The GOC described Abkhazia’s decision to secede from the GOC as the action of “a group of impostors,” while Ilia II called for not taking such statements seriously.8 Abkhazia has always been an integral part of Georgia; correspondingly, there could not be an independent Church in its territory. The Tskhum-Abkhaz eparchy existed in the territory of the Ab- khazian principality, but after the Russian Empire abolished the autocephaly of the Georgian church in 1811-1814, an end was put to its activity. The autocephaly of the GOC was restored in 1917 and the Tskhum-Abkhaz eparchy fell under the jurisdiction of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia. But the ROC did not recognize the autocephaly of the GOC until 1943; this decision of the Moscow Patriarch and members of the Holy Synod applied not only to the Tskhum-Abkhaz eparchy, but to the whole of the Georgian Church. Not one of the 15 Orthodox Churches (including the Russian) recognizes the independence of the Abkhazian Church and, despite the appeals from members of the Abkhazian clergy, the position of the ROC in this issue remains unchanged. During the August 2008 war, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill, supporting the Kremlin’s policy regarding Georgia, stated: “We bow our heads to the fighters who sacrificed their lives to protect the fraternal Ossetian people from aggression.” However, the ROC depends on the GOC in some issues; the matter particularly concerns the possible withdrawal of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) from the subordination of the Russian Patriarchy. If this happens, most of the Orthodox Churches, including the GOC, which enjoys great authority, would have to recognize the autocephaly of the UOC. The Russian Patriarchy is worried that if the UOC becomes independent, it could lose its influence on Ukraine along with much of its congregation. This is why the Russian Patriarchy is trying to retain friendly relations with the GOC and is not willing to forfeit, because of the Abkhazians, the enormous number of believers in Ukraine who recognize only the ROC.

8 [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/159465/], 17 September, 2009. 98 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

No one in Georgia doubts that representatives of the Moscow Patriarchy are instigating the Abkhazians to engage in “spiritual separatism,” but only the political leaders permit themselves to hint at this. As for the main spiritual figures, they prefer to classify the “spiritual separatism” of the Abkhazians as self-willed action. Despite the August military conflict in South Ossetia, the ROC and GOC have confirmed their fraternal relations. For example, on 8 December, 2008, Ilia II performed the requiem at the grave of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II in the Christ the Savior Church in Moscow; the service was held in Georgian. However, at the same time in Abkhazia, with the knowledge of the Moscow Patriarchy, the architecture of ancient Georgian churches is being changed (since 2008), and since Abkhazia has never had an ecclesiastical architectural style of its own, its churches are being made to look like Russian churches. On 13 March, when congratulating Vladimir Putin on his election as Russian president, the Patriarch of Georgia did not fail to add that Georgia would definitely return Abkhazia and South Ossetia to its fold and expressed the hope that this would happen during Putin’s presidency. The Georgian media and public began actively discussing the wisdom of this step on the patriarchy’s part.

The Danger of Political Islam Penetrating the Country

Historically, Georgia is an Orthodox Christian country, but the representatives of other confessions also live there, among whom the largest religious community is represented by Muslims (both Shi‘ites and Sunnites); approximately 300-400,000 people of the 4.5-million population confess Is- lam. There are also Muslims among the Georgians who live in the Ajaria region. According to the 2002 population census, there are 240,552 Orthodox believers and 115,161 Muslims in Ajaria, and a confessional conflict is unfolding precisely in this region, which borders on Turkey. After official Ankara made a decision to return all Christian communities (Greeks, Armenians, Russians, and so on) their historical churches, the GOC expressed the desire to restore the semi-ruined Georgian churches in the territory of northeastern Turkey, where there are dozens of them. Initially, the Georgian side claimed only a few churches that are particularly significant in the historical and cultural respect. The matter concerns the Georgian Orthodox churches of Oshki, Khandzta, Ishkhani, and Otkhta. These monuments are historical symbols and are extremely important in reinforcing the Georgians’ national self-consciousness. They are in territories that are considered the cradle of the czarist dynasty of Bagrationi and Georgian statehood and should not be destroyed. After all, they are not simply religious buildings, but evidence confirming the past existence of the Georgian state in northeastern Turkey. But instead of restoring these churches in its territory, Turkey proposed restoring three churches and building one mosque in Georgia. Meanwhile, according to international law, Turkey has pledged to unconditionally protect world cultural heritage monuments. In turn, the Georgian Patriarchy has repeatedly recommended that its country’s government ask UNESCO for help. However, the authorities made concessions to Turkey, which aroused a wave of discontent among the Orthodox Christians of Georgia. Furthermore, Georgian society’s greatest concerns are related to the fact that there are proposals to rebuild the Azizie mosque in the center of Batumi, which was erected in 1868 on the orders of Ottoman sultan Abdul-Aziz. It symbolized Turkish military might and testified to the presence of the Ottoman Empire in Ajaria. Orthodox Georgians are also annoyed by the fact that both the Turkish side and the Georgian authorities are calling building the mosque from scratch “restoration.” Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Moreover, no knows exactly where in the city this mosque will be built; in the 1940s, it burned down and now another building stands in its place. The question of restoring the semi-destroyed mosque of Akhmed in Akhaltsikhe (close to the Turkish border) is also controversial. Georgian society is precisely irritated by the fact that over the last 20 years, attention has been paid to the cultural monuments of all confessions. In Georgia, hundreds of mosques are not only being restored, but also built, which are not simply museum pieces, but active religious establishments. This is happening while dozens of ancient Georgian churches in Turkey are in a sorry state and no one is bothering to rescue them; with each passing year they are becoming more and more decrepit. During the years of independence, approximately 300 mosques (Shi‘ite and Sunnite) and other Islamic establishments have been opened in Georgia (not only in Ajaria, but also in other regions). Ten religious boardinghouses operate near Batumi that are financed by the Islamists of Turkey. Chil- dren of secondary school age from disadvantaged families living in the mountainous areas of Ajaria are taught at these learning establishments. They are taught the Islamic traditions and then usually sent to study at religious establishments in Turkey. Several dozen young people taught in Turkey have already returned to Ajaria; these newly-qualified religious figures preach Islam and try to popularize it among the local population. Nevertheless, Orthodoxy is the time-honored religion of the Ajarian-Georgians. Society is very well aware that recruiting adolescents from disadvantaged families and teaching them Islam is fraught with the loss of national and cultural identity for the Georgians living in this region. At the end of 2011, Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II sent a letter to the prime minister of Turkey asking him to return at least a few churches.9 Moreover, the GOC thought the decision to built new mosques in Georgia in exchange for saving the semi-destroyed Georgian churches in Tur- key to be unfair. The patriarchy suggested a compromise to solve the problem: keeping in mind that there are already hundreds of mosques in Georgia (primarily in Ajaria), it proposed restoring and opening only two of the four above-mentioned controversial churches in the territory of northeastern Turkey. Ethnic Georgians live compactly in northeastern Turkey (which the Georgians call Tao-Klar- jeti), the precise number of whom is unknown; they all confess Islam. The restoration of Georgian churches in this territory is strictly of cultural-historical significance for Georgia. As for the newly- built mosques in Georgia, they are not simply museums and architectural monuments, but capable of becoming active religious centers in the future. It should be noted that these restored mosques will be a political symbol of Turkey’s presence in Ajaria and other adjacent areas, where the growing economic and cultural influence of this country is felt as it is. Recently, the Georgian authorities consented to the conditions put forward by the Turkish side without waiting for the reply to a letter sent by Ilia II, that is, circumventing the country’s religious leaders. The authorities said they were willing to build mosques in Georgia in exchange for restoring the Orthodox churches in Turkey; this decision was reported by the media during the Patriarch’s visit to Germany. The situation was also aggravated by the fact that the Georgian authorities did not disclose the details of the preliminary agreement reached with Turkey, thus arousing immense displeasure in the GOC and among Orthodox believers. Nevertheless, the country’s authorities believe that the worries about spreading Turkish influence to Georgia by means of Islamic institutions are much too exaggerated. However, the wave of protest that arose in the country forced them to pacify society; the mosques were presented not as Turkish cultural heritage, but as the property of Georgian Muslims. This rhetoric by the authorities had absolutely no effect on Georgian society. On 9 February, 2010, after verbally announcing a preliminary agreement between the governments of the two coun-

9 [http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/archive/news/20111023/3235/2759.html].?id=24368548], 23 October, 2011. 100 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tries, the Patriarchy of Georgia sent out a written statement and accused the authorities of holding separate talks with Turkey; furthermore, it unexpectedly changed its tactics. It demanded that a small church be restored and opened (at the expense of the Georgian Patriarchy) in the ancient Georgian episcopal town of Ardasheni situated in the territory of the present-day Turkish region of Rize. The Patriarchy announced that only after this would it be willing to discuss the restoration of mosques and churches in Turkey and Georgia. According to Ilia II, if the Turkish side rejects this proposal for one reason or another, “it will not be acceptable for us to build a symbol of a difficult period in Georgian history in Batumi under the pretext of saving Oshki and Ishkhani, that is, the Azizie mosque.” He also noted that this mosque was built as a sign of Turkish dominance in Ajaria; it is not just a religious establishment, but a symbol of the Turkish occupation of Georgian territory. Despite the displeasure of the GOC, in the summer of 2012, a mosque and the Rabat castle, supposedly built as early as the 9th century, were restored in Akhaltsikhe. This would have seemed to have put a final end to the arguments between the Georgian authorities and the GOC; however pas- sions continue to fly. The GOC has already warned the authorities that such actions could provoke unprecedented tension between Muslims and Christians, as well as create a multitude of internal problems. It is also worth noting that even the Georgian Muslims living in Ajaria are against building mosques under Turkey’s supervision and funding.10 It should be noted that the GOC enjoys great popularity; the Patriarch is way ahead of all the political leaders in the ratings. According to a poll conducted by the American National Democrat- ic Institute in September 2012, 91% of the 2,038 polled said that they trust the Georgian Patriarch most of all. According to the same survey, 61% of the respondents expressed trust in the president of Georgia.11 In this context, it is entirely understandable that the patriarchy’s warnings could not help but worry the Georgian authorities. On 21 February, 2012, a governmental commission was set up for discussing issues envisaged by the Constitutional agreement between the Government and the Church. On 7 March, a working group for patronage over Georgian religious buildings, as well as for clarifying the origin and affiliation of churches joined this commission. On 4 March, after the above-mentioned statement by Ilia II, a so-called cautionary church service was held in Batumi; this religious-political undertaking was an expression of protest of Orthodox believers against the agreement on building mosques in Georgia. When a state-building strategy was drawn up in Georgia, it was kept in mind that political preferences and priorities may not coincide with the Orthodox faith. The first president of Georgia and former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a valiant fighter against Russia of the same faith. Despite the fact that the national-liberation movement has been unfolding against the background of Ortho- doxy’s revival, Gamsakhurdia popularized the idea of a free Caucasus. For example, he spoke of Is- lam as follows: “Peoples have been living together for many centuries in the Caucasus who have different religions and origin, but they are traditionally closely related to each other spiritually… The main argument of the adversaries of the Iberian-Caucasian peoples is the ‘religious differences between the Georgians and North Caucasians.’ It should be noted that these peoples are not characterized by religious fanaticism, Islamic fundamentalism, or extremism. They do not build relations with other countries and nations on the basis of religion. Moreover, in our age opposition between Islam and Christianity in the political sphere is not the same as it was during the time of the crusades. This kind of resistance has never been characteristic of the Caucasus, even in the Middle Ages… He who by harping on the religious factor tries to undermine our union, either does not understand the role of religion in human life and politics, or is doing this deliberately, with evil intention. Why do we forget

10 [http://www.argumenti.ge/?p=1039]. 11 [http://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Aug-2012-Survey.pdf]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that more than half of Georgians [in Turkey] confess the Muslim religion? What are we supposed to do—disown them?”12 The latest events around the building of mosques designated the boundary between political Islam and the Muslim religion as such. There are no confessional conflicts or Islamist political parties in Georgia; the prevailing worries are aroused not so much by fear of Islam, as by the increase in Turkey’s political influence. For example, in the last two months, inscriptions such as “No to Islami- zation!” and “No to Turkization!” have been appearing with increasing frequency on the walls of buildings in Ajaria.

The Conflict That Emerged From the Political Shadows: The Armenian Patriarch in Georgia’s Political Life

The Law on Registration of Religious Associations adopted by the Georgian Parliament in 2001 became the catalyst of a notorious political scandal and a hike in confessional tension; this event was preceded by public exposure of the Wikileaks materials. In 2009, the Patriarch of the Armenian Church sent the U.S. president a letter, which said in particular: “Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation in Georgia regarding the attitude toward religion has not changed. On the contrary, religious life, if we do not count the Georgian Orthodox Church, is very limited. Furthermore, religious and national minorities are under pressure and there is no tolerance toward them.”13 The Armenian Patriarch also asked the U.S. president to put pressure on the Georgian government with respect to the Armenian Church acquiring a status and having property transferred to it. The first sitting of the interdepartmental commission on drawing up a strategy for ensuring Armenia’s religious security held on 29 September, 2011 in Erevan looks particularly interesting in this respect. The content of its discussion shows the attitude toward all other religions in Armenia; as Secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council Artur Bagdasarian said, “ensuring religious security includes fighting infringements on the spiritual and cultural values of the Armenian people, creating the necessary conditions for the country’s spiritual and cultural development, and strengthening the role of the Armenian Apostolic Church as the main bastion of protection of national identity.”14 A fair question arises in light of the given quote: “Is it possible, after this, to accuse other countries of infringing on the rights of religious minorities?” A superficial glance reveals no obvious disagreements between Georgia and Armenia at the state level. However, the Armenian media have long been making (albeit latently) territorial claims against Georgia; and the Armenian Church has essentially assumed the role of voicing them. Since it occupies 20% of Azerbaijani territory, Armenia naturally cannot allow tension to escalate in its relations with Georgia. So the Armenian Church is moving to the forward line of the “Geor- gian Front.” Furthermore, the rhetoric of the Armenian political elite sounds approximately as follows: “We are fraternal countries, while the Churches can work out their problems themselves;” such rhetoric, if nothing else, looks naïve. On 10-15 June, 2011, for the first time in 100 years, the Head of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) made a patriarchic visit to Georgia and met with government representatives and the Patriarch

12 Excerpts with Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s statements from the book “Georgian Nation, Choose!” (in Georgian). 13 [http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/politika/177814-garegin-meore-baraq-obamas-saqarthveloshi-religiuri-umcireso bebis-mdgomareobith-dainteresebas-sthkhovda.html]. 14 [http://www.newsarmenia.ru/politics/20110929/42531285.html]. 102 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of Georgia. During the meeting, the Armenian Patriarch demanded that a law be adopted regulating the registration of the AAC in Georgia and transferring property to it (the matter concerns several churches the Armenian Church has claim to). The Georgian Patriarch promised to assist in this matter, but only after a similar law was adopted in Armenia. The 10th-century Akhtala Monastery Complex is one of the Georgian Orthodox churches in Armenia that will be returned to the Patriarchy of Geor- gia if the law is adopted. It is situated in the historical Georgian region of Lore, which on the initiative of Georgian communist Sergo Orjonikidze was transferred to Armenia in the 1920s. The architecture and wall paintings of the controversial Orthodox churches in Armenia testify to their Georgian origin, and it would be incorrect to declare that they belong to the Gregorian Church. In this respect, the idea has emerged in Armenia to create an Armenian-Chalcedon Church that will inherit the Georgian churches not only in Armenia, but also in Georgia. Moreover, the Arme- nian Church is also making claims to the Georgian churches in Turkey.15 The law the Armenian Patriarch mentioned was adopted immediately after his visit, circumventing the Georgian Patriarchy, regarding which the country’s authorities received a thank you letter from Echmiadzin. This event extremely aggravated the situation inside Georgia. On 11 July, 2011, the Holy Synod of the Georgian Patriarchy demanded that the country’s government begin talks on the status and out- of-state property of the Georgian eparchies with the participation of religious figures. Furthermore, representatives of the Orthodox clergy noted the insistent need to step up state efforts to return Geor- gian national and spiritual monuments (the matter primarily concerns the Georgian churches in Ar- menia). It is worth noting that for a long time after it gained its independence, the Georgian Patriarchy kept a low profile regarding the return of the Georgian Orthodox churches in the territory of other states to prevent its activity from running counter to state interests. However, after the AAC intensified its claims to churches in Georgia, it abandoned its “defensive policy.” The GOC demanded that a parity agreement be entered that envisaged the transfer to the Armenian side of the above-mentioned churches in exchange for the return of Georgian cultic buildings. The Armenian clergy evidently did not expect this turn in events and could not accept it. In this context, it is appropriate to recall the so-called march of Orthodox believers in Tbilisi held in 2011 immediately after the Georgian government adopted the law on registration of religious associations without taking into account the patriarchy’s opinion. The fact that 100,000 people participated in this march demonstrated the extent of the patriarchy’s influence on the country’s population. Moreover, the campaign, which was dubbed “anti-Armenian,” became clear evidence of a latent conflict between Georgia and Armenia, but in no way between their Churches, as the governments of both countries tried to claim. In order to minimize the tension in the country, the Georgian authorities were forced post factum to clarify several provisions of the law they adopted. The Wikileaks document publicized, which was dated 22 December, 2008, attracts special attention. It reflects issues that were discussed at the meeting between Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II and the then U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Taft. Ilia II told the ambassador that he had met with Catholicos of Armenia Garegin II at the funeral of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II. Garegin II demanded transfer of the church of Norasheni located in Tbilisi. In response, Ilia II proposed creating a bilateral commission of academics, but Garegin II rejected this idea. The document said that Ilia II considers the best way to resolve the problem of the church of No- rasheni is to turn it into a museum. According to Ilia II, the Catholicos of Armenia is trying to exacerbate this matter even more among his followers. He also told the ambassador that Garegin II’s intolerant attitude was influenced by his allegiance to Russia, since his brother is a bishop in Moscow.16

15 See: “Vosstanovit’ Armiano-khalkidonitskuiu tserkov v Armenii,” Armenia Today, available at [http://armtoday. info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=47452]. 16 [www.apsny.ge/2011/soc/1315533014.php], 8 September, 2011. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Armenian society and media were extremely irritated both by Garegin II’s visit to Georgia and by Ilia II’s proposal regarding the return of the Georgian churches. The country’s public thinks that “taking possession of the church today means making legal claims to territory tomorrow. The Geor- gians have chosen this way to make their demands.”17 Armenian analysts are of the same opinion, saying that to avoid a possible threat to the interests of the country’s national security, these churches cannot be returned to Georgia. Here the following question arises: “Why should Georgia not see the demands to transfer some churches located in its territory to the Armenian Patriarchy as a potential threat to its national security?” After all, following the same logic, it can be presumed that Armenia will first take possession of the churches and then make claims to the territory in which they are situated. It may be entirely legitimate to assert that these spiritual disputes have nothing in common with religion; “the root of evil” should be sought in interstate problems. In this case, the matter concerns in particular the latent contradictions associated with Armenia’s territorial claims. In 2010, during a visit to Armenia, the Georgian Foreign Minister was asked a question concerning the Georgian region of Javakheti, the name of which was mentioned in distorted form “Javakhk.” There can be no doubt that this “mistake” conceals an attempt to give the Georgian region an Armenian- sounding name. The minister replied that there is no Javakhk region in Georgia, but there is Javakheti, thus arousing indignation in the Armenian media, which long continued to discuss his failure to give the correct rendition of the name. This reaction by the Armenian media is graphic confirmation of the fact that the thought has long matured in Armenian society of making territorial claims to Georgia. Aggressive statements toward Georgia are also heard with increasing frequency from Armenian politicians, who state: “Erevan’s policy of friendship with Georgia has a high price tag, this policy is costing us the loss of Javakhk.”18 However, since Javakheti is an inalienable part of Georgia, it is not clear what loss is being referred to here. Shirak Torosian, a deputy of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, goes on to say the following: “Georgia’s impudence has reached the point where the time has come to change Armenia’s policy toward this country.”19 The AAC is one of the main destabilizing factors in the region; this is confirmed by the “accu- satory” letter the Armenian Patriarch (who knew about the Georgian government’s fear of being “rep- rimanded” by the U.S.) wrote to Barack Obama after his visit to Georgia. Garegin II’s letter encouraged an increase in anti-Armenian sentiments in Georgian society, the majority of which believes that “if Armenia makes claims to the historical Georgian territory of Java- kheti, it is time for us to make claims to those territories that the communists took from the Georgians and gave to the Armenians in the 1920s.” The matter concerns the historical Georgian region of Lore (the area of which is approximately equal to 2,500 sq. km), now situated in the north of Armenia. In contrast to Georgia (where the Government and the Church compete with each other), in Armenia the state has great influence on the Church. For example, the tension that arose in 2001 between the Churches of the two countries did not appear without the silent consent of official Erevan. It is also worth noting that on 7-8 June, 2011, even before Garegin II’s scandalous visit, the Armenian Foreign Minister visited Georgia. Georgia is trying to maintain good neighborly relations with Armenia, but the church disputes are bringing the serious contradictions that exist between these two countries to the surface. The only solution to the situation might be Armenia’s rejection of its territorial claims (by the Armenian church leaders) against Georgia. Despite the rhetoric of the Georgian authorities about fraternity and good neighborliness, Armenia figures only as a good neighbor in Georgia’s national security conception; this is more evidence that all is not well between the two neighboring states.

17 “Vosstanovit’ Armiano-khalkidonitskuiu tserkov v Armenii.” 18 [http://www.georgiatimes.info/news/43891.html]. 19 [http://armtoday.info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=32627&SectionID=0&RegionID=3&Date=03/15/2011& PagePosition=11]. 104 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Religious Boundaries vs. State Boundaries?

The confessional disputes existing around Georgia are directly associated with re-examination of the state borders. The current administrative-political borders of the post-Soviet states (a few of which have still not carried out their delimitation and demarcation) were established during Soviet times; from the legal perspective, they can provisionally be called state borders. The problem is that in many cases they do not coincide with the religious boundaries. There are 42 eparchies in the Georgian Patriarchy. Five of them are in different corners of the world (in Europe, in Australia, in America, etc.); on the official website of the Georgian Patriarchy they are designated as “eparchies abroad.” Some eparchies, which exist on paper, simultaneously encompass both part of Georgian territory and the adjacent areas of neighboring states. For example, the eparchy of Batumi and Lazeti in reality covers only the territory of Georgia (in particular, Ajaria). As for the region of Lazeti, it is in the territory of present-day Turkey. The eparchy of Akhaltsikhe and Tao-Klarjeti in reality covers only a few southern areas of Georgia (the Georgian historical region of Tao-Klarjeti is also in the territory of present-day Turkey). The above-mentioned “discrepancies” allow the GOC to believe that the church boundaries de jure do not coincide with the state boundaries. The GOC’s tough position is evidently related to the fact that, without the support of the authorities of its country, it is assuming the main burden of the interconfessional disputes. The creation of the Administration of Georgian Muslims (AGM) in 2011 headed by Jemal Bag- shadze, a Georgian from Ajaria, can be directly related to the question of incompatibility of the religious and state boundaries. This aroused the displeasure of the Administration of Caucasian Muslims (ACM), which perceived the event as a political act. Before establishment of the AGM, the citizens of Georgia who confessed Islam were subordinate to the ACM based in Baku. Most of Georgia’s Mus- lims are ethnic Azeris, as well as some Georgians living in Ajaria. It is worth noting that in 1996, at the request of the then president of the country Eduard She- vardnadze, a branch of the ACM was established in Georgia. It was headed by A. Aliev, a Georgian citizen and ethnic Azeri. Head of the ACM sheikh Allahshukur Pashazadeh called the decision of official Tbilisi on the establishment of the AGM “incorrect” and expressed his regret that some of the Azeri officials in Georgia supported it; this also makes them responsible for all the consequences.20 So here we have a graphic example of how all religious problems are political in nature. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Georgian government is not interfering in the activity of the Orthodox churches in Azerbaijan (in territories where ethnic Georgians live). Moreover, when there are strategic relations between states (as in the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan), confessional problems are resolved without difficulties. Georgia has never made any territorial claims (openly or latently) against neighboring states. This only happened once when Georgia became part of the Soviet Union and cannot be perceived as a targeted policy or as an important historical fact. However, strange as it may seem, Georgia was able to activate the religious factor at that time, whereby in a state where atheism reigned. The matter concerns Georgia’s territorial claims against Turkey during Stalin’s rule. On 14 December, 1945, the Georgian newspaper Kommunisti and on 20 December Pravda and Izvestia published a joint article by Georgian historians N. Berdzenishvi- li and S. Janashia titled “On Our Legal Claims to Turkey.” Some time later, on 8 January, 1946, a letter was published in the Georgian newspaper Kommunisti in the rendition of the then Patriarch of

20 [http://lnka72.ru/Newsm/804-Saakashvili-vyvodit-musulman-Gruzii-iz-pod-vliyaniya-Azerbajjdzhana]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Georgia Kallistrat Tsintsadze devoted to the same topic21 (as noted above the ROC did not recognize the autocephaly of the GOC until 1943).

Conclusion

It is obvious that the countries of the region perceive religious security as an inalienable part of their national security. There is an obvious conflict among the states, but it is religious entities rather than the political elites that are involved in it. Even now it can be asserted that the religious differences that affect Georgia and the Caucasian region as a whole are in no way of a strictly confessional nature. They only lay bare the real and more serious problems that exist between the countries of the region in hidden form; it is apparently very convenient to use priests as a cover, even though in some countries of the region religion acts as the official ideology, while in others it is the political underground. It should be noted that religion is most effectively used for political aims in Russia, Turkey, and Armenia, since in these countries the dominating confessions enjoy strong support from the government. In Georgia, however, the Church and State are more rivals than allies. The confessional disputes in the Caucasus require speedy settlement; any more serious conflict among the states of the region must be nipped in the bud. It is obvious that the time has come for the countries of this explosive region to admit that there are problems among them hidden under religious camouflage; they, like a gun hanging on the wall as decoration, could sooner or later “go bang.”

21 See: Address of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Kallistrat to the vanguard of society and the leaders of the United Nations on the return of Georgian land from the Ottoman Empire, Kommunisti, 8 January, 1946 (in Georgian).

Ibrahim RASHIDOV

Leading Fellow at Daghestan State University, Member of the Supreme Council of the Congress of Peoples of Daghestan (Makhachkala, the Russian Federation).

EROSION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE NORTH CAUCASIAN REGION

Abstract

his article examines de-ethnicization, the indigenous peoples’ spiritual culture T the erosion of ethnic identity, and the caused by Russia, assuming the role of the destruction of the basic elements of dominating nation, practicing historically de- 106 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION veloped strategies (assimilation, population dependence of Russia’s nationalities poli- migration, formation of prejudices, and so cy and the drop in the conflict-prone thresh- on) in the Caucasus. It looks at the inter- old in the region.

Introduction

Russia’s policy in the Caucasus has been based throughout history on several strategies es- poused by the dominating nation identified in sociology (assimilation, population migration, formation of prejudices, and so on), which has led to continued de-ethnicization, erosion of the ethnic identity of the indigenous peoples, and destruction of the basic elements of their spiritual culture. The annihilation of the ethnic identify of the indigenous peoples is reflected in the sociopolitical, crimino- logical, and conflict-prone situation in the Northern Caucasus.

Reasons Why the Concepts “Identity” and “Ethnic Identity” Have Become Pertinent

In the past few years, the concept “identity” in its different connotations and diverse aspects has come to be used all the more frequently both in the special scientific literature and in public life. What is identity and why are problems of identity such a burning concern for scientists, politicians, journalists, and ordinary citizens alike? The term “identity” has been widely used in the humanitarian sciences and interdisciplinary research since the end of the 1970s thanks to the studies of Erik Erikson.1 In the Sociological Ency- clopedic Dictionary, identity is defined as a person’s conception of his or her personal idiosyncrasies as distinct from other people’s.2 According to Touraine’s definition, “identity is the conscious self- identification of a social entity.”3 While Dragunskiy puts it as follows: “Identity selects, formulates, packages, and transmits social values, social action skills, situation assessment, and stereotypes for perceiving the outside world.”4 “Identity, that is, self-determination of the individual in relation to others/another, him/herself/others, is a social construct. A person always has to feel him/herself a part of “we,”5 writes Magomedova. Identity is a quality that is immanently inherent in humans and human communities. Of all living creatures, only humans have special idiosyncrasies engendered not only by natural and biological, but also by moral, ethnic, and esthetic factors. For example, the literature likes to affirm the existence of national, ethnic, ethnocultural, racial, cultural, social, age-related, professional, regional, property, political, and several other types of identity. “It is precisely these predicates to the concept of ‘identity’ that are generally recognized and the most frequent.”6

1 See: E.H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, W.W. Norton, New York, 1968. 2 See: Sotsiologicheskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slivar, Editor-Coordinator G. Osipov, NORMA-INFRA Publishers, Moscow, 2000, p. 94. 3 A. Touraine, Production de la société, Paris, 1973, p. 360. 4 D. Dragunskiy, “Natsionalnaia identichnost: infrastrukturno-institutsionalny podkhod,” in: Problemy identichnosti: chelovek i obshchestvo na poroge tretego tysiacheletiia, Moscow, 2003, p. 46. 5 M. Magomedova, Identichnost i tolerantnost kak uslovie stabilnosti severokavkazskogo sotsiuma, Makhchkala, 2009, p. 150. 6 S.Iu. Ivanova, E.A. Arakelian, “Stanovlenie grazhdanskoi identichnosti v polietnicheskom sotsiume,” in: Vektor identichnosti na postsovetskom prostranstve: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo “kruglogo stola,” Southern Scientific Center of RAS Publishers, Rostov-on-Don, 2007, p. 80. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Social identity is becoming more pertinent in Russia due to the various transformations that are changing not only social relations, but also people’s internal world, and also to the fact that “basic values are being realized through identification of the individual with a real or imaginary human community, as well as through assimilating social roles and standards of behavior based on their reproduction or copying.”7 In the context of this vector, the problem of ethnic identity becomes particularly pertinent, that is, the individual’s affiliation with a particular ethnicity. Modern science regards ethnicity as the affiliation of people with a group that differs from others in the sum-total of its material and spiritual values. “Ethnic identity is viewed from different standpoints and the objectives of research differ to a certain extent. For example, psychologists are interested in the role of ethnicity in the self-consciousness and behavior of the individual, while social psychologists understand ethnic identity as a special conceptual type through which the members of an ethnic group comprehend ethnic significance.”8 It is well known that there is no such thing as an extra-historical or extra-national individual, since each person belongs to a particular ethnic group. “Ethnic identity is recognizing oneself as the representative of a particular ethnicity, the human experience of identity with one ethnic community and separation from others.”9 As T. Stefanenko believes, “ethnic identity is a component of an individual’s social identity, the psychological category that relates to recognizing one’s affiliation with a specific ethnic community.”10 According to N. Skvortsov, ethnic identity is a multilevel concept: at the first level, identification emerges that serves as the basis for forming the “we-they” juxtaposition, at the second level, images of other ethnic groups form, that is, they are endowed with certain characteristics (cultural, status, and so on), and at the third level, ethnic ideology arises as a sum-total of ideas about the past, present, and future of one’s own ethnic group in relation to other ethnic groups.11 “Identity is one of the most important mechanisms of personal development of social reality on which the system of personal meanings is based. A person organizes and directs his or her behavior in keeping with subjectively designated identifications.”12 Without repeating the definitions already known to science, I’ll try to give my own understanding of this concept. Ethnic identity is the sum-total of external and internal features inherent in a particular ethnicity and distinguishing it from other ethnicities, both in the eyes (ideas) of the bearers of the particular identity and in the eyes (ideas) of people of another ethnicity. Or to be more precise: identity is the sum-total of characteristics, real and archetypical, that distinguish one ethnicity from another, have deep historical and psychological roots, and are the most important (perhaps even sacral) values for its bearers. With respect to the problem being researched, sociologists are interested in the collective meaning of ethnicity and its manifestation in society13 or the constructivism of ethnic identity,14 while

7 Ibid., p. 78. 8 Ibidem. 9 M. Magomedova, op. cit. 10 T.G. Stefanenko, “Sotsialno-psikhologicheskie aspekty izucheniia etnicheskoi identichnosti,” Flogiston, Mos- cow, 1999, available at [http://flogiston.ru/articles/social/etnic]. 11 See: N.G. Skvortsov, “Etnichnost i transformatsionnye protsessy,” in: Etnichnost. Natsionalnye dvizheniia. Sot- sialnaia praktika, Collection of articles, St. Petersburg, 1995, pp. 10-11. 12 M. Magomedova, “Etnicheskaia identichnost kak uslovie mezhkulturnogo vzaimodeistviia v polietnicheskom sotsiume,” in: 20 let reform: itogi i perspektivy, Collection of articles, ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, A.-N.Z. Dibirov, Moscow, Makhachkala, 2011, p. 508. 13 See: G. Williams, “Sociology,” in: Handbook of Language & Ethnic Identity, ed. by J. Fishman, New York & Oxford, 1999, pp. 164-180. 14 See: V. Voronkov, I. Oswald, “Vvedenie. Postsovetskie etnichnosti,” in: Konstruirovanie etnichnosti. Etnichesk- ie obshchiny Sankt-Peterburga, St. Petersburg, 1998, pp. 6-36. 108 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sociolinguists, in turn, are interested in the linguistic behavior of the group and the changes occurring between ethnicity and language.15 The cultural value of ethnic identity is very high since it provides more opportunity than any other group identity for the self-realization of an individual. For an individual, it is precisely the ethnic group he or she belongs to that appears more important and greater than the person him/herself and that largely defines the boundaries and direction of his/her life strivings, continuing to exist after he/she is gone. This at once sacral and natural perception of one’s ethnicity stems from the fact that the person does not choose it. The reason this concept is becoming pertinent at present is explained by the tectonic processes in social life caused by the global and extensive restructuring of all former relations in the human community, as well as the restructuring of all public institutions responsible for the stability and sustainability of both personal relationships and relationships between groups, ethnicities, and nations. In the second half of the 20th century, processes intensified that were characterized by a sudden wak- ing up to one’s ethnic identity—affiliation with a specific ethnicity or ethnic community. The heightened awareness of ethnic identity that has affected the population of many countries has been called the ethnic paradox of the present day, since this process is occurring during greater economic, political, and cultural unification among peoples. At present, an ethnic renaissance is seen as one of the main factors of human development.

Problems of Ethnic Identity in Present-Day Daghestani Society

Most contemporary societies are keenly interested in preserving ethnic identity as an integral part of an individual’s social identity. “In a polycultural environment, ethnic identity is becoming a particularly sensitive issue and is an unwavering value that provides certain psychological support.”16 Today processes are going on in the world that are causing serious deformations of the identity of ethnicities and threatening their existence. This deformation process is taking place in different ways in different places and in different ethnicities. But nowhere is it going on entirely unnoticed. The sensitive attitude toward deformation of identity or its loss is a natural and entirely understandable phenomenon. In the context of this article, I am interested in the influence of deformations that change ethnic identity or threaten its existence on the conflict-prone situation in general and in the Northern Caucasus in particular. Ethnic identity is not a trend or passing fad, or even a religion, it is the reflection of many centuries of communicative and sacral experience of a specific ethnicity related to relations both within the ethnicity and outside it, and imprinted at a conscious and subconscious level in every member of a particular ethnicity. Ethnic identity is not only an understanding of one’s affiliation with an ethnic community, but also its evaluation, the significance of membership in it, and shared ethic feelings (feelings of worth, pride, insult, fear) that are the most important criteria of ethnic comparisons. These feelings are based on deep emotional ties between the individual and ethnic community and moral obligations toward it, and are formed during socialization of the individual.

15 See: J. Fishman, “Sociolinguists,” in: Handbook of Language & Ethnic Identity, pp. 152-163. 16 A. Leontiev, “Rossiia: mnogokulturnost i tolerantnost,” in: Mezhkulturny dialog: isseldovaniia i praktika, ed. by G.U. Soldatova, T.Iu. Prokopieva, T.A. Liutaia, Media Center of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 2004, p. 188. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ethnic self-awareness functions in “the context of inter-group relations, that is, there has to be another group position.”17 Stability of identification ensures a person’s ability to achieve a harmonious correlation between his/her own idea of him/herself and the ideas of others, between the social and individual “I.” However, adaptation is a dynamic process since during human development identity is tested by the reality of the changing external world, the active understanding of one’s place in the world, one’s goals, strivings, and relationships with others. This makes it possible for a regulated and psychosocial crisis, also first noted by Erik Erikson, to occur. A crisis arouses similar reactions in both the individual and the group—frustration, depression, aggression, and internal conflict. Nevertheless, according to Erik Erikson, a psychosocial crisis is an inevitable stage in self-development of the individual on the way to acquiring a new, more mature identity. He also emphasized the close ties between a crisis of identity and crises of social development. This is because an identity crisis usually occurs when a collapse (which begins under the influence of an acute social crisis) in the ideals and values inherent in a previously dominating political culture forces people to look for new spiritual guidelines for understanding their place in the changing society and their relationship with the state and the social environment. Positive and negative elements are singled out in the structure of identity. The formation of identity is always accompanied by a standoff between these elements. Depending on how intensive the social crisis is, a situation could arise when negative elements in large groups of people come to the fore and overshadow positive identity. “Negative identity is built on ‘I/we are not like that’ and harbors non-acceptance or negation of a particular social object or total opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’… Positive identity is conscious communality with positively significant others (with ‘we’), without severe opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Negative identity, on the other hand, is consolidation of the ‘we’ community based on total opposition to negatively significant others (‘they’).”18 Multitudinous studies have also shown that there is a close internal tie between positive group (ethnic) identity and outgroup tolerance (between ethnic groups). Professor N. Lebedeva notes that ethnic tolerance is understood as the absence of a negative attitude to another ethnic culture, as well as a positive image of another culture while preserving a positive perception of one’s own, that is, “ethnic tolerance is not a consequence of assimilation as rejection of one’s own culture, but a characteristic of integration between ethnic groups.”19 Threat of the loss of ethnic identity, not to mention its actual loss, is perceived by the bearers of this identity as a threat to the existence of the ethnicity, its annihilation. The energy released from this annihilation (even if it is not real but only felt by the bearers of identity) finds different expressions and frequently not the most pleasant, including armed conflicts and wars. So the state, particularly a polyethnic one, must safeguard the ethnic identity of the people residing in it, it should not be a casual observer in this issue nor a protector of the ethnic identity of an especially chosen, even the numerically largest ethnicity or separate group of ethnicities. While eroding ethnic identity, globalization cannot destroy it completely and create a new person who exists outside ethnicity and culture. At historically critical moments, it is ethnic ties and relations that people turn to, since they provide a sense of stability, which can often be seen in the modern world. F. Cassidy notes: “In our opinion, globalization, the Internet, and other latest information means can promote the manifestation of the best or worst, highest or lowest aspects of human nature. But they cannot give birth to a new person, that is, a person outside a particular ethnicity or

17 G.U Soldatova, “Ustanovochnye obrazovaniia v etnokontaktnoi situatsii,” in: Dukhovnaia kultura i etnicheskoe samosoznanie natsii, Issue 1, Moscow, 1990, p. 224. 18 T.N. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, Boulder, London, 1993, pp. 677-679. 19 N.M. Lebedeva, “Teoretiko-metodologicheskie osnovy isseldovaniia etnicheskoi identichnosti i tolerantnosti v polikulturnykh regionakh Rossii i SNG,” in: Identichnost i tolerantnost, Moscow, 2002. 110 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION leading civilization, or outside the large ethnicities, the history and culture of which go back for mil- lennia.”20 Ethnic mentality is the primary form of mentality of any sociocultural entity, since all other forms of mentality are specific modifications of ethnic mentality. From the viewpoint of the sociocultural approach, ethnic mentality is a kind of memory people have of the past, a psychological determi- nant of behavior of millions of people true to their historically developed code in any circumstances, including catastrophic. Let us take a look at the policy of the Russian Federation in the light of the problems that interest us, that is: the ethnic identities of the indigenous (non-Russian) ethnicities living in the Russian Fed- eration and deformation of the ethnic identities of these peoples caused by the nationalities policy of the Russian Federation. In keeping with its name, the Russian Federation is a federative state or at least positions itself as one. However, is it really a form of state structure in which several state entities that legally have a certain amount of political independence form one union state? The Russian state developed in territories historically populated by numerous indigenous (non- Russian) peoples with their own languages, cultures, traditions, models, and ways of behavior, and so on, as well as territories (areas) of their own habitation (emergence, residence, livelihood, and development). Despite its declared federative nature, the Russian Federation is essentially a unitary state (in many respects even stricter than the Soviet Union). Neither the state structure (let us not be con- fused by the existence of so-called national republics in the Russian Federation: they are no different from other regions of the Russian Federation that do not have this status), nor the legislation takes into account the polyethnic and polycultural nature of the population of the Russian Federation, although the absolute majority of all the non-Russian ethnicities live within the boundaries of their historically developed place of traditional settlement (within one or several adjacent constituent regions of the Russian Federation). It should be noted that there are no laws in the Russian Federation that are openly directed against the identities of the indigenous peoples residing in the Russian Federation or that openly declare their de-ethnicization and Russification. But this does not stop the destructive impact of the state on ethnic identities. Daghestan, which is 50,270,000 sq. km in area and has a population of 2 million 910,249 people, is home to the representatives of more than 30 nationalities with their own languages and dialects. Language is the custodian of the entire diversity of accumulated knowledge, life experience, and customs of the ethnicity preserved in time and transferred on to the next generations. This generates the idea about the natural affiliation of the bearer of a particular language to the linguistic and national community “we.” Not only the destiny of the languages of the peoples of Daghestan with their unique cultures, but also the destiny of the peoples themselves who are the bearers of these languages and cultures depend on the extent to which a correct linguistic policy is carried out in the Republic of Daghestan. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Daghestan (Art 11) “the Russian language and the languages of the peoples of Daghestan are the state languages of the Republic of Daghestan. In the Republic of Daghestan, all the peoples living in its territory are guaranteed the right to preservation of their native language and the creation of conditions for its study and development.”21 However, it is not entirely clear which languages in particular are considered the languages of the peoples of Dagh- estan as envisaged by the Constitution of the Republic of Daghestan, since according to different estimates, there are between 28 and 32 languages in the republic. At present, only the Russian language successfully performs the state function to the fullest extent. Not one other language in Daghestan, regardless of how it is declared, performs the high mis-

20 Quoted from: S.V. Popova, “Etnicheskaia identichnost v globaliziruiushchemsia mire,” in: Vektor identichnosti na postsovetskom prostranstve: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo “kruglogo stola,” p. 209. 21 Constitution of the Republic of Daghestan, available in Russian at [http:// constitution.garant.ru/ region/ cons_dagest/ chapter /1/#100]. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sion of being the state language. Not even at least one third of the population speaks in any one of the languages of Daghestan in the republic. Not one language of Daghestan, apart from Russian, of which more than 80% of the population has a command, is a language that unites the whole of Daghestani society. None of the current Russian laws—On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federa- tion, On Education, the Russian Federation Constitution, or the Constitution of the Republic of Dagh- estan—resolves the question of the status of languages. They state that study of the Russian language is mandatory, while study of native languages is voluntary, that is, a citizen has the right to study his or her native language. As the real practice that has been going on in our country for dozens of years shows, the principle of voluntary study of native languages has led to a drop in their social functions and to their perceptibly passive use. The sphere in which native languages are used (even if they are still spoken) has been narrowed down to the family and the non-mandatory school subject “native language,” as well as to newspapers and magazines (in far from all the national languages) that few people read due to poor knowledge of the particular language and the biased content, as well as the small number of national theaters that usually located in the capital and so not very accessible to most of the people. After all, the principal goal of linguistic policy is to ensure conditions for the functioning of language as a cultural factor promoting national integration. The problem of the disappearance of languages has frequently been raised in the scientific literature and media. “An entire generation of people has appeared that belong to a particular ethnicity of Daghestan but at the same time do not know their native language, speak in Russian, wear European clothing, and essentially have nothing to do with the community and bearers of the language, customs, traditions, and culture of the ethnicity to which they say they belong. Who are they?”22 asks sociologist A.-N.Z. Dibirov. “The existence of a large number of ethnicities and languages, the absence of a deeply con- ceived theory and methodology of nationalities policy and legal norms in a multiethnic state, as well as the different level of development and functioning of languages do not make it possible to carry out a linguistic policy in practice aimed primarily at real provision of equality of all languages.”23 “Since peoples who do not have their own information channels receive information from other states, they form not a national, but a colonial mentality that ignores their own spiritual values. This is now so obvious that there is no need to give any examples.”24 The languages of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus should be preserved and perform their important ethnocultural functions not only in the family and cultural sphere. Their development is in need of state support in the form of textbooks and other literature in the national languages, support of national media and programs on television, and so on.

Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation and Drop in the Conflict-Prone Threshold in the Region

Let me say a few words about the policy being carried out by the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucasus, and to be more precise in one of the Russian constituencies in the Northern

22 A.-N.Z. Dibirov, “O ‘piatnadtsatoi narodnosti’ Daghestana,” in: 20 let reform: itogi i perspektivy, p. 472. 23 G.I. Magomedov, “Rodnoi iazyk-sredstvo razvitiia i sokhraneniia obshchestva,” Mykhabishdy, Issue 9, available at [http://www.etnosmi.ru/rutul/one_stat.php?id=332#]. 24 J.B. Biazrova, “Globalizatsiia i problemy natsionalnykh tsennostei,” Filosophiia i obshchestvo, No. 4, 2004, p. 67. 112 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Caucasus—the Republic of Daghestan. From the very beginning of the establishment of Soviet power in the Daghestan Republic a policy was carried out aimed at “colonizing” the valley (lowland) territories. This policy was pursued by moving the mountain people down into the valleys, creating new settlements, collective farms, and state-run farms, assigning land to them, and also setting aside land for mountain farmers to engage in distant-pasture cattle rearing and preparing fodder. Distant-pasture cattle rearing has long become a thing of the past, but the land set aside for temporary use is still used by and remains the essential property of the people moved down to the valleys. This policy pursued not only economic, but also ethno-demographic goals. Proof of this is the documents of the 1920s that apply to the territories taken from the Mountain Republic (Tersk Region) and joined to the Republic of Daghestan and state the need for carrying out a so-called localization policy of the local population of the acceded territories. However, no localization was carried out. On the contrary, there was de-ethnicization and Russification of the Daghestanis resettled in the cities and valleys. It can be said that they have essentially lost their traditional national cultures and customs. The initially controversial nature of the national-territorial demarcation of peoples carried out with violations of historical and ethnic reality led to the current ethnic conflicts that have destabilized the ethnopolitical situation in the region. The functioning of the Republic of Daghestan as an integral and effective administrative entity is characterized by the diversity of its ethnonational communities, the interests of which frequently come into direct conflict with respect to a whole series of vitally important issues. One such issue in the Republic of Daghestan is the clash of interests of different peoples, communities of certain villages, and population of the suburban settlements of cities with the interests of the city administrations in claims to the possession of certain territories. These land-territorial conflicts have already brought certain indigenous peoples to the brink of defending their interests with arms. Land-territorial conflicts continue to disturb the republic in different areas today and are often accompanied by mass demonstrations in Makhachkala, which sometimes leads to severe clashes with the law-enforcement bodies. A deep and comprehensive study of this phenomenon is needed in order to understand the nature of the land-territorial conflict phenomenon and the mechanisms that cause an increase both in the number of people drawn into the process and the geography of its dissemination in Daghestan. More- over, this study should embrace all the forms of its manifestations, the reasons for them, and the negative trends that might cause a conflict to spiral out of control. However, it seems to me that the reaction is unjustifiably indifferent: from several publications it can be concluded that both for the authorities and for science, the deformation being experienced by the Daghestani ethnicities is an obvious and indisputable fact. “Indeed, whether we like it or not, the Daghestani languages will at some point leave the arena of communication. The same fate awaits the languages of other national minorities. This is an objective process that cannot be stopped by any decrees or orders…”25 we read in the republican newspaper Daghestanskaia pravda. The same thought was voiced at a conference on the Problems of Genre in the Study of Language and Literature of Daghestan in a report by Shaban Mazanaev, who, “ad- dressing the topic of how the languages of numerically small peoples—the Rutul, Aghul, and Tsakhur peoples—are dying out, talked about the inevitable processes of assimilation and the magnitude of the Russian language as the main one that Daghestanis speak.”26 Loss of language and loss of name mean loss of identity. Erosion of ethnic identity inevitably leads to a breakdown in ethnic and moral barriers and restrictions in the society, both at the level of the

25 G. Nurmagomedov, “Iazyk do rodiny dovedet,” Daghestanskaia pravda, 15 November, 2011, available at [http:// dagpravda.ru/?com=materials&task=view&page=material&id=20197]. 26 Kh. Nisredova, “V krugu filologov,” Daghestanskiy universitet, No. 1, 2012. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION individual and of society. In this respect, the viewpoint of Daghestani political scientist A.-N.Z. Dibi- rov on the negative consequences of the appearance of a new “fifteenth nationality” of Daghestan is rather interesting. It is easy to manipulate for one’s own ends the group behavior of the “fifteenth nationality,” which has a more emotional than rational foundation. It is obvious that it is precisely representatives of this nationality that are currently the main targets of the religious expansion of Is- lam, since when deprived of objective grounds subjective ethnic self-identification searches for a stronger foundation on which to build its identity. “Torn from their intrinsic national soil, with a weakened genetic memory, they are inclined to blow even small problems out of all proportion and interpret many social problems through the prism of nationalism. Without their own identity, without knowledge of their native language, unable to be bearers of the culture of their people, they are largely inclined to be disparaging of the cultural uniqueness of others.”27 Whereas some elements of identity, particularly language and formal knowledge of religious and ethic norms, can still be retained when creating certain conditions, restoring a moral and sacral attitude toward them requires exerted efforts both from the ethnic elites and from the state. Tradition plays the most important role in ethnic culture. Cultural tradition is one of the vital mechanisms for maintaining and preserving the sustainability of norms, values, and images of ethnic culture. The incident when guns were fired during a Daghestani wedding celebration in Mos- cow (September 2012) showed not devotion to traditions, but their loss, which the state takes very calmly. Such incidences have long become par for the course in Makhachkala. One year ago, on 18 Octo- ber, 2011, a press conference was held at the editorial office of Daghestanskaia pravda, at which, as a correspondent of RIA Daghestan reports, the question was raised of wedding processions that drive around Makhachkala violating traffic regulations and public order (firing into the air using guns and traumatic pistols, speeding, and so on). “According to the Highway Traffic Safety Ad- ministration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Daghestan Valery Gromov, road traffic wardens have the authority to halt the procession, disarm its participants, and fine them for violations. But no one does this because the police do not want to spoil the party.”28 No comment, as they say. And those who refer to traditions to justify their actions and claim innocence should know that sociocultural identification is structured and interaction with the representatives of other ethnicities is regulated on the basis of tradition. Tradition also performs the function of a selective mechanism with respect to innovations. It ensures that only those are selected who do not have a destructive effect on ethno-specific characteristics and those are rejected who threaten them with serious structural changes. The problem cannot be resolved without an interested and informal attitude to the question of preserving traditions. The state should realize that ensuring public peace is impossible without guaranteeing the invi- olability, preservation, and development of the ethnic identities of the peoples that historically popu- late it. In order to achieve these goals, several, what we consider, priority tasks must be solved: (a) stopping the exodus of the population from the places of their historical settlement; (b) creating an infrastructure that corresponds to contemporary needs, including a transport network, means of communication, and fuel supply in the regions, particularly mountainous (where the Daghestani ethnicities traditionally reside); (c) restoring and developing traditional public institutions of the indigenous peoples in correspondence with the ethnic and legal norms of specific ethnicities and communities; and (d) creating conditions for live and literary use of the languages of the peoples of Daghestan.

27 A.-N.Z. Dibirov, op. cit., pp. 474-475. 28 K. Ragimkhanova, “Valery Gromov: ‘My mozhem zaderzhat svadebny kortezh za narushenie PDD, no ne khotim portit liudiam prazdnik,’” 18 October, 2011, available at [www.riaDaghestan.ru/news/2011/10/18/120143/]. 114 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

And most important—any transformations that affect particular aspects of the life of the ethnicities should be carried out only after in-depth study of the ethnic identity problems. These studies should encompass all aspects of the life and sphere of activity of the ethnicities. Such studies will be much more effective if independent experts participate in them. They can subsequently be used to bring about changes in the life of the ethnicities and motivate the state and society to take steps to reduce the conflict-prone situation in the Northern Caucasus right down to complete elimination of the existing threats and their potential instigators. Every nationality is the custodian of priceless and unique historical experience. If globalization causes national cultures to disappear and only standardized forms of life to remain, the human race might ultimately lose its true essence. As I. Zarinov notes, the existing models of ethnicity, “despite all their apparent opposition, should have points of contact, since they have to do with the same social phenomenon, even though they may be manifested through different historical and social realities.”29 This equally applies to those concepts that formally do not belong to the indicated theoretical vectors. Only an integrated approach to studying the phenomena of ethnicity will ultimately bring us closer to a more or less precise definition of the object of study.

Conclusion

The nationalities and demographic policy being carried out by the Russian Federation with respect to the indigenous peoples of the Northern Caucasus has led to catastrophic deformations of their ethnic identities entailing significant erosion of ethnic norms, degradation of the traditional value system, and a drop in the conflict-prone threshold. The sociopolitical situation in the North Caucasian region is comparable to a smoldering fire that is ready to burst into flames at any point, making it possible to define the situation in the Caucasus as a global problem that different forces are striving to resolve from their own particular viewpoint. The nationalities policy of the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucasus is in need of rational revision. This policy should be based on the fact that protection of the ethnic identities of the indigenous peoples who historically reside in the Northern Caucasus should be the state’s priority function with respect to these peoples and in this territory. Only guaranteed protection of ethnic identities able to develop uninhibited, as well as a developed economy and social infrastructure, and not only reinforcement of the defense and security structures and vertical of power, will ensure the sustainability and stability of the Russian state in the Republic of Daghestan and in the Northern Caucasus. Preserving the individuality, singularity, distinctness, and uniqueness of each ethnic group in a multinational state and creating in it an atmosphere of mutual respect and spirituality are problems that must be resolved by joint efforts in the interests of the future generations. Lack of attention to the problems of protecting the ethnic identities of the indigenous peoples of the Northern Caucasus will inevitably lead to a more widespread humanitarian disaster in the Caucasus and destroy the Russian statehood in the Northern Caucasus making its long-term existence in the region all the more doubtful and threatening the peace and calm of the peoples of the Caucasus and Russia.

29 I.Iu. Zarinov, “Vremia iskat obshchy iazyk (problemy integratsii razlichnykh etnicheskikh teoriy i kontseptsiy),” Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, No. 2, 2000, p. 16. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Rafik SAFAROV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ETHNOTERRITORIAL CHANGES IN THE CAUCASUS IN THE 19TH-20TH CENTURIES

Abstract

he author traces the ethnoterritorial tween Hither Asia and the Great Steppe, T changes in the Caucasus caused by the Caucasus has felt the impact of its migration during the Russian conquest neighbors from time immemorial. During the of the region. two hundred years of Russian domination, The mountainous country has always radical ethnopolitical and ethnodemographic been a land of isolated ethnicities, the set- shifts noticeably altered the ethnoterritorial tlement pattern of which took final shape dynamics and ethnic composition of the in the early Middle Ages. Squeezed be- Caucasian population.

Introduction

According to traditional geography and history, the Caucasus is situated between Asia and Eu- rope; this is nothing more than a convention invented in Antiquity and preserved by Herodotus. It has nothing to do with dividing the ecumene into ethnogeographic/ethnotopographical cohesive areas/ regions. According to the conception of the local civilizations, the Caucasus, along with Asia Minor 116 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and the Balkans, belongs to a single ethnogeographic region conventionally called Byzantine. In the south it borders on Afrasia (North Africa, Syria, and Iran); in the north on Eurasia (the steppe, forest- steppe, and forest zones of Eurasia); and in the west on Europe. The Caucasus, separating Eurasia from Afrasia, is a mountainous country bound by the Cas- pian and Black seas. From the historical-geographic viewpoint, the Northern Caucasus stretches north to the Terek, Kuban, the upper reaches of the River Kuma, and the left-bank tributaries of the Terek; the ethnotopographical boundary with the Great Steppe runs along the valleys of the same rivers. Still, it is commonly accepted that the northern border of the Caucasus passes along the Kuma-Manych Depression which, together with the territory that reaches the river valleys of the Terek and Kuban (usually called the Caucasia, or the Fore-Caucasus), is found in the steppe zone of Eurasia. This explains why the common historical-geographic and ethnocultural features of the Fore-Caucasus and the steppe zone are very different from the Caucasus. The southern border of the Caucasus is normally drawn along the former Russian/Soviet borders (today they are the southern borders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia with Turkey). In the absence of natural dividing lines between Asia Minor and the Caucasus, the adjacent Turkish provinces can be regarded as belonging to the Caucasus. From the viewpoint of physical and economic geography and on the strength of cultural and historical specifics, the Caucasian space can be regarded as the Northern Caucasus and the Transcau- casia/Southern Caucasus.1 The topographical border between the two sub-regions runs along the central part of the watershed of the Main Caucasian Range; in the east it starts in Southern Dagestan, where it passes along the Samur basin and reaches the Caspian near Derbent; and in the west it goes along the mountain range of the Psou toward the Black Sea. This means that on the southwestern slope of the northwestern stretch of the Main Mountain Range, the Northern Caucasus traditionally includes the Black Sea coast up to Abkhazia. This historical-geographic division follows the local terrain.

The Ethnopolitical Situation in the Caucasus on the Eve of the Russian Conquest

The Caucasus, home to numerous ethnicities and sub-ethnicities, is rightly described as one of the polyethnic regions of the world. Most of these ethnicities are very old (relict); the ethnic age of others is much less, their ethnogenesis dating back to the not too distant past. The region owes its ethnic diversity to at least two factors: the terrain, which preserved its ethnogeographic isolation and protected the ethnic identity of the autochthonous groups against external pressure, and the inflow of new ethnic groups into the Caucasus. Before looking into the ethnoterritorial changes we need to gain an idea of the way Russian and Soviet ethnography divided the local peoples into ethnic groups in accordance with the territories they occupied or with their tribal and clan names. For political reasons this was applied to ethnically related peoples (or to peoples using the same name) who refused to accept the Russians in the Cauca- sus or even opposed them. The Azeris, for example, were divided into Tatars, Karapapakhs, Turk- mens, Persians, Tats, etc.; the Georgians into Imereti Georgians, Megrels, and so on; the Adighe people into Kabardins, Circassians, and Adighes; the Abkhazians into Abazins and Jigets; the Balkars

1 See: E. Ismailov, “Globalizatsia i Kavkaz: istoriko-politikal aspect,” IRS-Nasledie, No. 1 (9), 2004. The author expounds a slightly different point of view. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION into Karachays and Balkars; the Vaynakhs into Chechens, Ingush, Karabulaks, and Akkintsy; the Avars into a multitude of groups scattered around the villages, etc. Those peoples who accepted Russia’s aggressive intentions in the Caucasus enjoyed its complete support. The empire granted special privileges and promoted ethnic consolidation of the Ar- menians and Ossets who supported the new authorities in the turbulent region and were, therefore, considered reliable. In the case of the Armenians, Russian benevolence took the form of forced Ar- menianization and assimilation of groups of North Azeri Albanians who belonged to Christian Gre- gorianism. Russia’s extremely biased ethnic policy, which was part of its colonialist policy pursued under the “divide-and-rule” slogan, created a hopeless melee and a bulky ethnonimic Caucasian nomencla- ture that needed to be trimmed and better organized. The following ethnic names can be used to describe the real number of Caucasian ethnicities according to their own self-identity: Adighes, Ab- khazians, Balkars, Chechens/Vaynakhs, and Azeris. The names of countries and regions corresponded, on the whole, to the ethnic composition of the Caucasus and its ethnoterritorial divisions. In the past, the historical-geographic space of the Southern Caucasus was occupied by Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the 15th century, the latter fell apart into Kartli, Kakhetia, Abkhazia, and several small kingdoms and princedoms. The northern slopes of the Caucasian Range (from Derbent to Taman) were occupied by Daghestan, Chechnia, and Circassia (consisting of Larger and Smaller Kabarda and the trans-Kuban area) which stretched along the Black Sea littoral from the mouth of the Kuban to the borders of Abkhazia. The Balkars and Ossets were contingent on Kabarda. On the whole, by the 16th-17th centuries, the ethnic territories in the Caucasus had assumed their final shape; the settlement pattern corresponded in many respects to the ethnic situation of the previous period. Borders, however, remained more or less flexible and could be changed, albeit insig- nificantly, under the impact of military-political, economic, and demographic factors. Azeris occupied the largest ethnic territory in the Caucasus: a large part of the Southern Cauca- sus within the historical areas of Northern Azerbaijan (Shirvan, Karabakh, and Chukhursaad). The latter consisted of the provinces of Irevan, Shuragel, Kars, and Kagyzman and included the right-hand bank of the Arax.2 This places Northern Azerbaijan between the Caspian and Georgia in the basins of the Alazani, Iori, and Debeda rivers, and the River Arax to Pasinler in the territory of contemporary Turkey. There were Christians among the Azeri; they were descendants of the Caucasian Albanians who, when the local population embraced Islam en masse, settled on both slopes of the Lesser Cauca- sus in Karabakh and Chukhursaad where the narrow strips of their enclaves were encircled by Azeri settlements.3 Armenian settlements were scattered in Shuragel and around Ejmiadzin, as well as in eastern Georgia, when the third Armenian Patriarchate was set up in 1441 in the Chukhursaad village of Uchkilsa (future Ejmiadzin).4 The Georgian ethnic territory occupied a large part of the Southern Caucasus; its border stretched from Kakhetia in the east (where it was situated between the Alazan and Iori rivers) to Kartli (from the river Khrami) to the west (the Rioni basin in Imeretia and the Inguri basin in Meg- relia were parts of Georgia). In the 16th-17th centuries, Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria and mainly Turkic-speaking Muslims of Akhaltsikhe (Meskhetia-Javakhetia) lived in the country’s south. Beyond the Javakheti Range came Borchali and the southern border of Kakhetia populated by Muslim Azeris.

2 See: R.F. Safarov, Izmenenie etnicheskogo sostava naseleniia Irevanskot gubernii v XIX-XX vekah, Baku, 2009, pp. 27-29, 58-60. 3 See: Ibid., pp. 39, 188-190. 4 See: Ibid., pp. 55, 126-127, 190. 118 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The ethnic territory of the Abkhazians was found between the Inguri basin, Circassia, and the Black Sea; it stretched beyond the mountain range to the Northern Caucasus, south of the trans-Kuban Circassia and the Black Sea littoral, the ethnic territories of two kindred peoples—the Ubykhs and the Abkhazians (Abazins). The Adighes occupied the largest part of the Northern Caucasus (they lived in the trans-Kuban area and Kabarda). The Balkars and Ossets mainly lived in the mountainous part of Greater Kabarda, squeezed by the Adighe settlements at the ends of gorges and the upper reaches of rivers. In the latter half of the 17th century, some of the Balkars moved to the watershed range between the Terek and Kuban to form a new ethnic area in the trans-Kuban Karachay.5 The Osset ethnic territory was situated between the Digor gorge in the west and the left-hand bank of the Terek. In the 16th-17th centuries, Ossets moved in great numbers to Georgia, thus expanding their ethnic territory to the southern slopes of the South Caucasian Range. They settled in compact groups between the upper reaches of the Rioni and Xaniya and Aragvi rivers.6 Chechens lived in the eastern part of the Northern Caucasus between the left-hand bank of the Terek and the Axai; in the Kumyk lowland and along the Andi Range, they bordered on Daghestan.7 Kumyks lived further on, in their own ethnic territory in the plains and piedmont along the Caspian; their territory stretched to Derbent. The Daghestani-speaking peoples (Avars, Dargins, and Laks) and the Lezghian-speaking groups (Lezghians, Tabasarans, Aguls, Rutuls, and Tsakhurs) occupied the rest of Daghestan and part of Azeri territory along the right-hand bank of the Samur. Nogays, who were steppe nomads, roamed across the vast territory between the rivers Yaik and Danube (including the areas between the Azov and Caspian seas and the Fore-Caucasus). They constituted a large part of the population of the Crimean Khanate. The places where Nogays roamed and settled can be described as part of their ethnic territory in Piatigorie, the upper reaches of the Kuma, the left-hand bank of the Kuban, and its lower reaches as far as Anapa. The ethnic diversity of the Caucasus (there were dozens of peoples living there even in Antiq- uity) was accompanied by confessional diversity. The Caucasian peoples mainly belonged to Islam and Christianity; however, within both confessions there were different patterns of ethnic behavior—the key distinctive feature of each ethnicity. These distinctive features divided the Muslims into Azeris, Kurds, Turks, Ajars, mountain peoples (Adighes, Abkhazians, Ubykhs, Balkars, Os- sets, Chechens, and Daghestanis), and Nogays who lived in the steppe. Most of the Azeris and some of the Kurds were Shi‘a; others, including the North Caucasian peoples and Nogays, were Sunni. Georgians who belonged to Orthodox Christianity and Georgian Ossets who embraced Christi- anity under Georgian influence constituted the larger part of the Caucasian Christians. The Georgian and Azeri Armenians and the majority of the North Azeri Albans (including the Sheka Udins and the Shirvan tatophones) belonged to the Gregorian persuasion; a smaller number of them were Orthodox Christians.

Ethnoterritorial Changes in the Caucasus in the 19th Century

After defeating the Turks and Azeris in the 18th and early 19th centuries, Russia moved into the Crimea and the Caucasus, where there was a predominantly Muslim population. The Northern Cauca-

5 See: N.G. Volkova, Etnicheskiy sostav naselenia Severnogo Kavkaza v XVIII-nachale XX veka, Moscow, 1974, p. 96. 6 See: Ibid., pp. 111-112, 131. 7 See: Ibid., pp. 142-143, 187-188. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sus was the home to Islamic peoples; in the Southern Caucasus 45% of the total population were Christians. Sixty percent of the Muslims of the Transcaucasus were Shi‘a. On the whole, the Muslim- Christian ratio in the Caucasus was 3 to 1. Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus caused gigantic ethnic and demographic shifts; in fact, demographic changes were part of Russia’s colonial policy: Muslims were replaced with Christians; they were energetically squeezed out of their territories during and after the war. For over a century, Orthodox missionaries (who came to the Caucasus in the mid-18th century) increased the number of Christians by peaceful means, albeit on a modest scale: only a few thousand Ingeloys of Jara, Georgian Muslims in Akhaltsikhe, and Abkhazians were converted to Christianity, while the missionaries were able to convert over half of the North Ossetian population. The demographic balance was tipped by military and political means; the outflow of Muslims was intensified by the Azeri, Turkic, and Caucasian wars. Each of the peace treaties the Russian Empire signed with the defeated side contained a clause under which Russians could move Muslims to Iran and the Ottoman Empire and bring in Christians. After establishing itself in the Crimea and the Steppe, Russia moved into the Caucasus. The first wave of evictions of Muslims to Iran and Turkey took place during the first third of the 19th century when Russia captured Azerbaijan. On the whole, between 1801 and 1831 about 147 thousand left Northern Azerbaijan; Chukhursaad lost the largest number of people, from 85 to 90 thousand (some of them being killed during the hostilities); and Karabakh came second with a slightly lower number of human losses. In 1828-1829, Russia captured Turkic Akhaltsikhe, which lost 80 thousand Muslims from its population. After each of the consecutive Turkish wars, Abkhazians were driven to Turkey: 5 thousand in 1810; 10 thousand in 1829-1830; and 20 thousand in 1855-1856.8 Russian sources normally quote an approximate figure of half a million people evicted from the Caucasus in 1858-1865; it related to part of the population of trans-Kuban Circassia.9 The total number of losses among the Caucasian mountain peoples is 850 thousand; this figure included the Adighes, who were not counted in the official statistics, and migrants from Kabarda, Ossetia, and Daghestan, including those killed in the war or who died on the Black Sea coast while waiting for ships to take them to Turkey (most of them were Adighes). At that time 740 thousand from trans- Kuban Circassia, 60 thousand from the Terek region, 30 thousand from the Stavropol Gubernia, and 10 thousand each from Daghestan and Abkhazia died in the Caucasus or were evicted from it. According to Turkish sources, in 1855-1866 740 thousand Caucasian mountain dwellers arrived in Turkey.10 According to the 1873 population census, the share of Muslims in the Caucasus dropped to 40.46% (2,171,889 people); the mountain people together with the Nogays (minus Christian Ossets) accounted for 19.88% (1,067,906 people).11 The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the riots in Chechnia, Daghestan, and Abkhazia it incited started another round of Muslim emigration to Turkey. After winning the war, Russia acquired Turkish territories: Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Between 1878-1882, 98 thousand Muslims emigrated to Turkey of their own free will.12 The 1880 population census conducted by Russia discovered 94,112 Muslims among the 114,282 people who lived in the Kars region.13 According to the census,

8 See: Z. Chichinadze, The Great Resettlement of Georgian Muslims to Turkey, Tiflis, 1912, p. 169 (in Georgian). 9 See: A. Berge, “Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza v 1858-1865 godakh,” Russkaia starina, Vol. XXXIII, January- March 1882, p. 167. 10 See: A. Ubicini, P. de Courteille, Sovremennoe sostoianie Otomanskoy Imperii, St. Petersburg, 1877, pp. 32, 61 (A. Ubicini, P. de Courteille, Etat présent de l’empire ottoman, Paris, 1876). 11 See: Sbornik svedeniy o Kavkaze, Vol. VII, Tiflis, 1880, pp. I-XXIX (further SSK). 12 See: V.I. Masalskiy, “Ocherk pogranichnoy chasti Karskoy oblasti,” Izvestia of the Russian Geographic Society (IRGO), Vol. XXIII, Issue I, 1887, St. Petersburg, p. 21. 13 See: SSK, Vol. VII, pp. XXVIII-XXIX. 120 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

30-32 thousand moved out of Batum.14 During 1877-1882, 162,847 people were driven from the Caucasus after the Russo-Turkish War. Between 1801 and 1914, the Caucasus lost over 1.3 million Muslims (not counting those who came back); some of them died, others emigrated to Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The Northern Caucasus lost the largest number: over 900 thousand, among whom 781 thousand were from trans- Kuban Circassia; 74 thousand from the Terek region; 30 thousand from the Stavropol Gubernia; and 20 thousand from Daghestan. The Southern Caucasus lost 456 thousand, 213 thousand left the former Turkic domains (Akhaltsikhe, Kars, and Batum); Azerbaijan lost 147 thousand; and Ab- khazia 96 thousand. Nearly all the Caucasian peoples (the Adighes, Abkhazians, Chechens, Ubykhs, Daghestanis, Balkars, Ossets, Nogays, Turks, Muslim Georgians, Azeris, and Kurds) sustained losses. The repercussions of the Russo-Turkic and Russo-Iranian armed opposition in the Steppe and the Caucasus were catastrophic. The Steppe, Circassia, Abkhazia, Akhaltsikhe, Kars, part of Azerba- ijan (Pambak-Shuragel, Irevan, and part of Nakhchivan and Karabakh) were depopulated; ethnicities disappeared from the ethnic map of the Caucasus. The Ubykhs disappeared altogether, while the numerical strength of the Nogays, Adighes, and Abkhazians dropped dramatically. The ethnic territory of the Adighes shrank several times; the area of their compact settlement disappeared and they found themselves dispersed among small scattered enclaves in the valleys along the Kuban. The same thing happened to the Abkhazians’ ethnic territory. The Nogays preserved their steppe roaming space on the Caspian coast between the Kuma and the deltas of Terek and Sulak. The northern borders of the ethnic territories of the Kabarda Adighes and Chechens were shifted to the south; the Azeris lost their ethnic territories in Pambak-Shuragel, Lori (the southern part of Borchali), and the northern and central part of Irevan. The Turks were squeezed out of Akhalkalaki and from parts of Akhaltsikhe, Kars, and Kagyzman. The 1873 population census supplied a graphic picture: about 100 thousand of the autochthonous population still clung to their homeland in trans-Kuban Circassia and 78 thousand Nogays in the Stavropol Gubernia.15 In 1882, that is, after the war in Abkhazia, only 56 thousand Abkhazians were left.16 Since that time, no one has been living in the mountains of Circassia and Abkhazia. In 1826, the Muslim population of the Irevan Gubernia was 240 thousand strong (80.3% of the total population); in the next fifty years the number remained the same to reach 234 thousand (42.8%) Azeris and Kurds in 1873.

How New Ethnic Territories Appeared in the Caucasus

To consolidate its position in the Caucasus, Russian colonialism moved Christians to the Steppe and the Caucasus; a Slavic population appeared in the Northern Caucasus; Armenians were invited to the Southern Caucasus; and Christian colonists settled in the lands vacated by the Muslims (who either died or emigrated). After annexing the Crimea in 1783 and winning another Russo-Turkish War, the Russians were able to remove 100 thousand Nogays from the Kuban area, after which they moved the Azov- Mozdok fortified line and started a Black Sea line of outposts along the Kuban in 1792. Slavs were

14 See: Sh.V. Megrelidze, Zakavkazie v Russko-turetskoy voyne 1877-1878, Tbilisi, 1972, p. 273. 15 See: SSK, Vol. VII, pp. I-XXIX. 16 See: Izvestia of the Caucasian Division of the Russian Geographic Society, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Tiflis, 1883, pp. 91-92. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION put next to the Caucasian borders, along the Terek and Kuban; as soon as the Caucasian War began, the fortified lines were moved further into the Northern Caucasus, to Chechnia and Circassia, thus widening the area of the future Russian ethnic territory in the Northern Caucasus. These were Cos- sack settlements that advanced into the lands of the mountain people; “they alone could fortify Russia’s borders.”17 By the early 19th century, 92% of Armenians lived in Turkey; there were about 100 thousand Armenians in Iran; in the Caucasus, most of the 133 thousand Gregorian Christians were Albanians. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the ethnic map of Armenian settlement changed a lot: there was a continuous inflow of Armenian migrants into Russia.18 Armenian migrants were distributed in accordance with the military-strategic interests of Rus- sia; thousands of Armenians were sent to the Muslim lands along the border and in the key operational sectors (Akhaltsikhe, Shuragel, Irevan, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh). Armenians started arriving in great numbers under the Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828; in the next two years, 200 thousand Iranian and Turkish Armenians arrived in the Southern Caucasus.19 Between 1801 and 1831, up to 220 thousand Armenians (including a small share of Greeks, Assyrians, and Yezidi Kurds) arrived from Iran (about 80 thousand) and Turkey (140 thousand) to settle in the former Muslim territories of Azerbaijan, as well as Akhaltsikhe and other East Georgian provinces. Between 147 and 150 thousand of them were moved to Chukhursaad (the future Irevan Gubernia). This meant that most of the new migrants were accommodated in the north and center of the Irevan province and in Pambak-Shuragel. Russia did not limit itself to administrative and political concessions to the Armenians in the form of an Armenian region set up in 1828 instead of the Irevan and Nakhchivan khanates; it resolutely moved into the religious sphere. Early in the 19th century, there were about 73 thousand followers of the Albanian church among the nearly half-a-million-strong population of Northern Azerbaijan. Starting in 1461, Turkish Arme- nians had their own patriarch in Istanbul; in the absence of their own statehood, the national church was the only vehicle through which the Albanians could express their national identity and political aspirations. They continued to regard themselves as Caucasian Albanians until the Russian authorities liquidated the Albanian church. By a law of 11 March, 1836, it was transferred to the Ejmiadzin Patriarchate in order to impose Armenianization on the Albanians and consolidate the Armenian outpost in Hither Asia. By the early 20th century, the Gregorian Armenians had been completely Arme- nianized; the area of compact settlement of Armenians in the northern and central part of the Irevan Gubernia and the places of Albanian settlement in Kazakh and Borchali became one vast area. There is a commonly accepted opinion that mass Armenian migration to the Transcaucasus began after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. This coincides with the time when the Great Powers actively interfered in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, when the Armenian question appeared on the agenda, and when the Armenians started setting up clandestine organizations, which ended in bloodshed. The mass Armenian riots during 1890-1905 in Turkey were stirred up by the revolutionary and terrorist activities of Armenian organizations (the most radical or even extremist among them being Dashnaktsutyun and Gnchak).20 Russia repeatedly closed its Turkish border to keep Armenian rioters and fighters away; for this reason many of the Armenian immigrants from Turkey arrived in Russia via Iran.

17 V. Potto, Kavkazskaia voyna v otdelnykh ocherkakh, epizodakh, legendakh i biografiiakh, Vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1888, p. 80. 18 See: V.M. Kabuzan, Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia (1719-1989). Formirovanie etnicheskikh i po- liticheskikh granits russkogo naroda, St. Petersburg, 1996, pp. 104-105. The author cited the figure 80%, yet his figures suggest 88%; if the number of Armenians in Turkey is specified and the Caucasian Albanians are not counted, we arrive at a figure of 92%. 19 See: Ibid., p. 105. 20 See: K. Gürün, Armianskoe dosye, Baku, 1993, pp. 156-209 (K. Gürün, Ermeni Dosyasi, Ankara, 1988). 122 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The ethnodemographic situation in the other former Turkish lands was more or less similar: the Armenians living in Akhaltsikhe formed a compact ethnic territory that shared a short section of its border with the Armenian settlements of Chukhursaad. This meant that a small Armenian ethnic area was wedged between the lands of Akhaltsikhe Turks and Borchali Azeris. The mass Christian inflow into Kars did not cause ethnic delimitation, although it squeezed the local Azeris and Turks into smaller ethnic territories. There were more Armenians among the population in these regions, including in the Kars and Kagyzman districts, although they lived in fewer settlements. The Armenian ethnic territory cut across the hitherto continuous Muslim territory. Sergey Glin- ka was succinct and to the point: “…greater numbers of kindred Christian people will fortify the borders of Russia against the unfriendly actions of neighbors, especially Turks, Persians, and mountain dwellers.”21 The war ended and the vacated lands of the mountain dwellers created favorable conditions for launching mass Russian-Slavic colonization of the western and central parts of the Northern Caucasus. The huge flows of Russian and foreign migrants that went to the Northern Caucasus in the wake of the Caucasian War pushed the region into first place among other colonized regions within the Russian Empire. Between 1782 and 1915, 2.7 million internal colonists arrived in the Northern Caucasus22; later about 0.4 million moved to the Southern Caucasus. Between 1801 and 1914, 110 thousand Armenians from Iran, 675 thousand Armenians, Greeks, and Yezidi Kurds from Turkey, and about 45 thousand Germans from Germany and Austria-Hungary arrived in the Caucasus.23 Between 1801 and 1914, the share of Slavs in the Caucasian Vicegerency (together with the Stavropol Gubernia which had been its part) increased from 5 to 40%; the share of Muslims dropped to 30% (22% in the Northern Caucasus and 39% in the Southern Caucasus). In the regions, the share of Muslims dropped to 49.7% in Kars; 39% in the Irevan Gubernia; 31% in Akhaltsikhe; and 37% in Abkhazia. While the share of Muslims shrank, the share of Armenians in the Southern Caucasus rose from 7-8% early in the 19th century to 25% in 1914.24 The results exceeded the boldest expectations: by 1914, there were 1,685,100 Armenians in Russia. Whereas previously Russia had been home to only 7.3% of all Armenians, more than a hundred years later 47.5% of the world’s Armenians lived there. As a result of 130 years of persistent efforts to replace the Muslims with Christians, Russia finally tipped the demographic balance between them. The Steppe became completely Slavic; the Cau- casus became two-thirds Christian: there were Slavs in the north and Armenians in the south. Rus- sians, Armenians, Greeks, and members of other Christian and non-Christian peoples who settled in the abandoned Muslim lands in the Southern Caucasus created ethno-confessional strips in Karabakh, Chukhursaad, Kars, Akhaltsikhe, and Abkhazia.

Ethnopolitical Changes in the Caucasus in the 20th Century

In the first quarter of the 20th century, once the mountain peoples had been finally pacified, the settlement pattern of Slavs-Russians in the Northern Caucasus became more or less stabilized in

21 S. Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia armian adzerbijanskikh v predely Rossii, Moscow, 1831, p. 93. 22 See: L.G. Beskrovny, Ya.E. Vodarsky, V.M. Kabuzan, “Migratsiia naseleniia Rossii v XVII-nachale XX veka,” in: Problemy istoricheskoy demografii SSSR, Tomsk, 1980, pp. 26-32. 23 See: S.I. Bruk, V.M. Kabuzan, “Migratsii naseleniia. Rossiiskoe zarubezhie,” in: Narody Rossii. Entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1994, pp. 54-56. 24 See: Kavkazskiy calendar na 1915 god, Tiflis, 1914, “Otdel statisticheskiy,” pp. 218-269. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Circassia and the Terek regions. In the 20th century, the Armenian ethnoterritorial core in Northern Azerbaijan became the main factor of the ethnoterritorial dynamics in the Caucasus needed to set up a national Armenian state at the expense of the territories of neighboring peoples. The migration of hundreds of thousands of Armenians became the main factor that tipped the ethnic balance in favor of the Armenians and strengthened the Armenian ethnoterritorial core, which became slightly larger after the Armenian-Muslim slaughter of 1905-1906. These events echoed in the Southern Caucasus and invigorated national delimitation there. It was then that a new term, Arme- nia, came into use. By the early 20th century, the Armenians regarded Turkish Armenia and Russian Armenia as their homeland, even though they remained in the majority in only a few fairly small areas within both Armenias. Those who nurtured plans of their unification were fully aware that the Mus- lims of Eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan should be driven away or exterminated. During World War I, the Muslims of the Caucasus lost lives, territory, and property. They were not conscripted into the Russian army and, therefore, did not fight in the war. The Russian punitive expedition in 1915 cost the Muslims of the Batum and Kars regions, which supported the Turkish onslaught, 88 thousand Muslim lives.25 In 1915-1918, the Armenians who fought in the Russian army (there were 200 thousands of them) and fighters of Armenian armed bands26 (there were 100 thousands of them) who operated in the vilayets of Trabzon, Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van captured by the Russians exterminated 1.19 million Muslims of Eastern Anatolia.27 The Turkish government had to start moving Armenians out of Eastern Anatolia to the south; the Armenian counteroffensive raised another high wave of Armenian migration to the Southern Caucasus. During the war, 420 thousand Armenians moved from Turkey to Russia. By the time of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, there were 2 million Armenians in Russia28; numerically they became equal to the Azeris of the Cau- casus. As ninety years earlier, on the eve of Russia’s disintegration, another round of concentration of Armenian migrants greatly complicated the situation of the Muslims of Azerbaijan. In January 1918, when there was no power and the Russian army had left, the Armenians launched monstrous pogroms of the Russian Muslims in Kars and Irevan.29 In March-July 1918, detachments of Dashnaks and Bolsheviks exterminated from 30 to 50 thousand Muslims in the Baku Gubernia. With the Russian Empire no longer on the political stage, the Caucasian peoples organized a Republic of Mountain Peoples of Daghestan and the mountain areas of the Terek region; the Tran- scaucasian Federation was replaced with the republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The latter covered an area of 9 to 11 thousand sq km and was situated in the Armenian ethnoterritorial core in the north of the Irevan Gubernia. As a new ethnopolitical unit in the Caucasus, Armenians claimed neighboring territories, especially in the Azerbaijan Republic, in an aggressive and determined way. The new Armenian state (set up on Azeri land), a result of the purposeful activities of Russian and Western imperialism, treated extermination of the Muslims as its domestic and foreign policy priorities. Between 1918 and 1921, the Armenians captured the larger part of the gubernia (except Nakhchivan which remained Azeri). Among the ministers of the Armenian Cabinet there was a minister for pogroms (!!!).30 In this way, vast areas became depopulated, in which Armenians promptly took up residence.

25 See: Ibidem; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1917 god, Tiflis, 1916, pp. 177-237 (see also: T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan. 1905-1920: The Sparing of National Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 78-79). 26 See: Tverdokhlebov, “Memuary Russkogo ofitsera,” in: Istoria Azerbaidzhana po dokumentam i publikatsiiam, Baku, 1990, pp. 121-148. 27 See: J. McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims. 1821-1922, Princeton, New Jer- sey, 1995, pp. 229, 338-339. 28 See: S.I. Bruk, V.M. Kabuzan, “Etnicheskiy sostav naseleniya Rossii (1719-1917),” Sovetskaia etnografia, No. 6, 1980, pp. 6, 24-25. 29 See: Bakinskiy rabochiy, 28 (15) May, 1918. 30 See: B.A. Borian, Armenia, mezhdunarodnaia diplomatia i SSSR, Vol. II, Moscow, Leningrad, 1928, pp. 81-82, 195. 124 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Only 10 thousand Azeris and not a single Kurd out of the total number of 290 thousand who lived in the territory of contemporary Armenia in 1918 survived the three years of Armenia’s determined extermination efforts.31 This policy was pursued in Kars, Irevan, Nakhchivan, Zange- zur, Karabakh, and other provinces, as well as in Iranian Azerbaijan. This unprecedented and persistent cruelty, which cost 0.6 million Muslims of the Southern Caucasus (mainly Azeris) their lives, allowed the Armenians to finally unite their scattered ethnoterritorial enclaves into a single whole. Sovietization brought even worse suffering to the Muslims of the Caucasus, as well as cruelties reminiscent of the imperial period. Part of the Azeri ethnic territory in Borchali and Derbent was joined to Georgia and Daghestan; during its independence, Azerbaijan lost part of its ethnic territory around Tiflis and Gardabani; in 1921, the Azeri territory of the Surmala uezd (Igdira) was transferred to Turkey. Armenians acquired their ethnic territory in the Caucasus with the help of Soviet Russia, which spared no efforts to make them its own outpost in the region, their loyalty being rewarded with Azeri lands. The Armenian S.S.R., an outpost of the Caucasus, was comprised of Azeri lands from which Armenians had diligently driven away all the Azeris to remain the sole masters in this land and create the Armenian state; in this way it captured 30 thousand sq km of Azeri ethnic territories. Armenia’s claims did not stop here; it was determined to build up a Greater Armenia at the expense of its neighbors. In the first three years of its existence, it realized part of its territorial claims to the Azeri lands. Armenian politicians wanted to capture Karabakh and sent Armenian agitators there. In 1923, Stalin approved setting up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region inside Azerbaijan to give autonomy to the Karabakh Armenians. This was when the city of Shusha and its Azeri-populated environs (contrary to what these people wanted) were included in the newly established unit. In its approaches the Kremlin demonstrated that it was prepared to reward reliable Caucasian peoples with administrative-national units: Armenians acquired the Armenian S.S.R. and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region in Azerbaijan, while the Ossets were rewarded with the North Ossetian A.S.S.R in Russia and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region in Georgia. The Soviet Union continued the imperial policy of evicting Muslims from the Caucasus and moving Christians into the region. Armenians started flocking to the Soviet Union in great numbers: between 1921 and 1975 about 290 thousand came from abroad; 250 thousands of them settled in Armenia.32 Significantly, the new arrivals and their ancestors were not born in Armenia, the Cauca- sus, or the Soviet Union: the territory on which they settled throughout the 19th and 20th centuries had never been their homeland. During World War II, the Soviet Union, despite the Great Patriotic War it was waging, never let the Middle East out of its sight. To bolster its rear, the Soviet government deported part of the Muslim population of the Crimea and the Caucasus (Vaynakhs, Karachay-Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Turks of Akhaltsikhe, Kurds, and some of the Georgian Azeris) to Kazakhstan and Central Asia in 1944. The Soviet Union regarded Soviet Armenia as the best foothold from which Turkish territories could be annexed. The Muslim Kurds (3 to 4 thousand people) who survived the Armenian atrocities and returned to Armenia were deported to Kazakhstan in 1937. The foothold had to be cleansed of Azeris; under a decision of 1947 signed by Stalin, 53 thousand Azeris were moved from Armenia to Azerbaijan in 1948-1953. The lands these people vacated remained unpopulated; deportation of the Azeris contracted their ethnic territory around Tiflis. The ethnic territory of the Vaynakhs was deformed to an even

31 See: Z. Korkotian, Population of Soviet Armenia in the Last 100 Years (1831-1931), Erivan, 1932, p. 184 (in Ar- menian). 32 See: V.E. Khodjabekian, “Armenian S.S.R.,” in: Naselenie soiuznykh respublik, Moscow, 1977, p. 274. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION greater extent: Ossets moved into the Prigorodny District previously populated by the Ingush; and in Daghestan, Laks settled in the Khasaviurt District vacated by the deported Chechens. The reha- bilitated Vaynakhs and Karachay-Balkars came back in the 1950s to enter into opposition with neighbors who had been living on their lands since the time of their deportation. The partly rehabil- itated Akhaltsikhe Turks were allowed to remain in Azerbaijan but were not allowed to return to their homeland.

Conclusion

In the past there was a demographic and ecological balance in the Caucasus. Russia did a lot to tip the demographic and ethnoterritorial balance between the Muslims and the Christians. Its policy spelled death or emigration for many members of the Caucasian peoples; as a result the region acquired new ethnic territories—the Slavic-Russian and Armenian. The Soviet regime, like imperial power before it, assigned the Armenians an important strategic role in the Caucasus and set up an Armenian outpost in Azeri territory. The Ossets were another force that supported Russia. In this way, during the last 200 years Russian power in the Caucasus became a factor of ethnic tension that created new conflicts between the local and alien ethnicities. From time to time, when the czarist and communist regimes weakened and the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union fell apart, these conflicts developed into open clashes and local wars.

Mehmet TEZCAN

D.Sc. (Hist.), Assistant Professor at the Chair of History, Department of Literature, Karadeniz Technical University (Trabzon, Turkey).

EASTERN TRADE DURING THE HELLENIC AND ROMAN PERIODS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST-WEST TRADE IN THE CAUCASUS

Abstract

hroughout their histories, the states road to the Orient to ensure their political T that replaced one another in Anatolia and economic domination. The states in Ira- invariably tried to find the shortest nian territory (crossed by the land route to 126 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Orient) displayed a lot of interest in region finally convinced the academic com- Anatolia and the Caucasus and interfered munity that what Strabo and Pliny had writ- with the smooth functioning of the land ten in their time about a cross-Caspian route. trade route that extended to the East and The Hellenic states in Iranian territory reached China was true. and to the east of it waged a perpetual This route was used until the late 3rd war among themselves: until the 1st cen- century, that is, until the end of the Kush- tury, the political situation in western Cen- an Empire and the Chinese Han Dynasty; tral Asia remained vague. trade was disrupted around the 4th-5th In the 3rd century B.C. the Seleucids centuries when the Oxus (Amu Darya) tried to reach the Orient by crossing the changed its course and no longer reached Caspian. Later, when the land route across the Caspian; antagonism among the states Iran became unsafe or was even blocked in Iranian territory and the instability in off altogether, Rome and Byzantium had no Bactria were two more negative factors. In choice but to follow in the Seleucids’ foot- the mid-6th century, when the Turkic Kha- steps. The numerous archeological artifacts ganate was set up, trade was revived along produced by wide-scale diggings in the the north Caspian route.

Introduction

Late in the 2nd century B.C., Rome conquered Western Anatolia and reached Asia. It should be said that Anatolia held a special place among the other Roman domains in Asia. In the mid-3rd century B.C. the Seleucids (312-64 B.C.) ruled in the larger part of Anatolia and the territories which are today western Syria and Iraq; Iran was ruled by a Parthian dynasty of Arsacids (249 B.C.-228); the Graeco-Bactrian Kingdom (250-125 B.C.) occupied Bactria and Northern India; Northeastern Anato- lia, the east and the middle part of the contemporary Black Sea region, and the Crimea were united into a Pontic Kingdom (280-63 B.C.); it survived until 343 as the Bosporan Kingdom; the Ptolemies (323-30 B.C.) ruled Egypt until it was conquered by Rome. Early in the 2nd century B.C., a fairly strong Pontic Kingdom occupied the area between the middle part of the Black Sea region and the shores of Colchis (in contemporary Georgia). In 189 B.C., the Romans defeated the Seleucids in the Battle at Magnesia (Manisa); and in 188 B.C., Antiochus the Great signed the Treaty of Apamea and retreated to the north of the Taurus Mountains. In this way, by the late 2nd century B.C., the Romans dominated Anatolia, its western part, and the Mediterranean coast; the eastern part of Anatolia and its northern and southeastern regions remained an apple of discord and a cause of wars, which repeatedly flared up between the local states, Iran and Rome. From time immemorial, Anatolia attracted its neighbors because of its strategic position at the crossroads of important trade routes and its considerable subsoil and other resources. Nearly all the Hellenic states that appeared in the territory of Anatolia and Iran fought one another and Rome (starting with the 2nd century B.C.); this did nothing to benefit either the region or world trade. Later, the Romans who were fully aware of Anatolia’s importance undertook several military inroads and finally captured the larger part of Anatolian territory. They sought control over the Fertile Crescent (Anatolia and the fertile lands of contemporary Iraq, Syria, and Egypt), the main sea and land trade routes that crossed Anatolia, and the ports of the Great Silk Road in an effort to keep the Persian Achaemenid Dynasty away: in the 6th century B.C., it captured the entire territory of Anatolia, from which it regularly attacked Greece (across the sea and by land). The Persian dynasty established control over the trade routes that crossed Hither Asia and interfered with trade contacts of the states to the west of the area. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

While devising new conquests in the East, the Romans were aware of possible political threats in the Black Sea region. Had they conquered this region, they could move in to the Greek colonies (set up there in ancient times) in order to continue unhampered trade with the Orient (also selling the commercial goods of the newly conquered region). Rome, however, never realized its plans in full: the Parthian Kingdom (set up in the 3rd century B.C. in Iran) and the Sassanid Empire (founded in the 3rd century), which controlled the main trade routes (the land stretch of the Great Silk Road, in particular, which crossed Iran), were determined to keep the Romans away from the cheap Oriental goods. The Romans sought other roads to the Orient; they crossed the Red Sea to reach India or moved by land to the ports of Georgia and further on across the Transcaucasian Route and the Caspian Sea to Turkestan.

Silk and the Great Silk Road

The term Great Silk Road (Seidenstrasse) was coined by German academic Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877. The road,1 which the Romans needed so much, connected the East and the West. It began in the Chinese capitals—Luoyang and Changan; after crossing the Gansu province, it branched off to the north and the south and after passing through the city-states along the northern and southern margins of the Taklamakan Desert, the two roads reunited in Kashgar and went further to the West. The western stretch of the caravan roads went across Sogdiana and Merv, or across the Pamirs, Northern Afghanistan, and Balkh, depending on the political situation and the roads’ safety. Both routes led to Iran; if these routes became dangerous, another route was used: it started in the Kingdom of Khotan in Eastern Turkestan, crossed contemporary Pakistan and India, and followed the River Indus to reach the northwestern Indian ports. After unloading, the caravans returned, while the goods were moved across the Red Sea to Egyptian ports and further on to Mediterranean ports.2 Egypt was the main hub of Roman trade with the Orient. Strabo informs us that 120 ships de- parted from one Egyptian Red Sea port to India every year; he mentioned even larger flotillas.3 The Roman Empire did not limit itself to silk in its trade with the Orient: it bought raw materials, including lapis lazuri (lazurite), jade, resins used to make medicines and dyes, and spices. During antiquity, the Greeks and Romans called China “the Seres” (Serica), a word derived from the Chinese word for silk; in the latter half of the 1st millennium B.C. silk became one of the main Chinese products; in the 4th century B.C., silk technologies reached India and then the oases

1 For more on the Great Silk Road and its main trade routes, see: A.A. Ierusalimskaya, “Ýpek Yolunda Kaf- kaslar, in: Türkler, ed. by H.C. Güzel, K. Çiçek, S. Koca, Vol. 3, Yeni Türkiye Yayýnlarý, Ankara, 2002, S. 243, 244; B.Ia. Staviskiy, The Silk Road and its Importance in the History, in: The Turks, ed. by H.C. Güzel, C. Cem Oðuz, O. Karatay, Vol. I, Ankara, 2002, pp. 222, 225; M. Tezcan, Ýpek Yolu ve XIV. Yüzyýla Kadar Ýpek Yolu Ticaretinde Trabzonun Yeri, in: Trabzon ve Çevresi Uluslararasý Tarih-Dil-Edebiyat Sempozyumu Bildirileri 3-5 Mayýs 2001, I. Cilt. Tarih / Yayýna Hazýrlayanlar: Prof. Dr. Mithat Kerim ARSLANYard. Doç. Dr. Hikmet ÖKSÜZ, T.C. Trabzon, 2002, S. 70-74; M. Tezcan, “The Iranian-Georgian Branch of the Silk Road in I-IV Centuries,” in: 1st International Silk Road Symposium 25-27 June, 2003, Tbilisi, Georgia, Ýzmir, 2004, pp. 208-210. 2 There are two important works dated to the 1st century which supply information about the marine silk route, the main trade routes, and commodities: Stathmoi Parthikoi contains valuable information about the Iranian route of the Silk Road, while Periplus Maris Erythraei is practically the only source of information about Rome’s trade with the Orient. For more information, see: [http://parthia.com/parthian_stations.htm]; L. Casson, The Periplus Maris Erythraei, Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 50-93. 3 See: B.Ia. Staviskiy, op. cit., p. 224. 128 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of eastern Turkestan; in the 1st-2nd centuries, they reached Hami, and early in the 5th century, Turpan. According to historian al-Masoudi, Iran started silk production under Sassanian King Shapur II (309-379); cultivation of mulberry silkworms and silk production began in Byzantium in the latter half of the 6th century under Emperor Justinian I (527-565).4 The Great Silk Road, the safety of which depended on the political situation on the continent, changed its routes throughout history.5 The main West-East trade route started in the contemporary Turkish port of Antakya, crossed the Euphrates and Seleucia at the Tigris, Ecbatana in Western Iran (contemporary Hamadan), Rhages (Rey), and Merv to reach Central Asia. Depending on the political situation and security in the East, the road went further either across Sogdiana to Western Turkestan, or through Balkh and the Pamirs to Eastern Turkestan. At Tashkurgan, it joined the roads from the east; according to western authors merchants exchanged their goods at this point. For safety reasons, the main trade route of the Great Silk Road, which crossed China to reach Iran and Ecbatana (in the northwestern part of the Iranian Plateau), branched off to the north or the south. A legend says that Indian goods were moved across the Caspian and the Kura and Phasis; Pliny confirms this information. David Braund6 doubted this and pointed to natural obstacles, such as the Surami (Likhi) Range in Western Iberia; another author pointed out that “there was a parallel northern route through Caucasian Albania, Iberia, and Colchis debouching to the Black Sea.”7

The Route from Iran to the Caucasus and the Black Sea

According to Tabula Peutingeriana (the Peutinger Map) of the latter half of the 4th century, the route that ran along the southern Caspian coast from Ecbatana in two different directions—to the northwest and to the south—reached Tabriz and continued on to Artaxata, which during the time of the Arsacids (the Parthians) was the region’s center on the left-hand bank of the Arax; it ran further on to Dvin and the territory of contemporary Georgia. Tabula Peutingeriana contains information about numerous roads which ran, in particular, “from Artaxata (Dvin) to Iberia—Armastika (Armazi) and Tiflis (Tbilisi); to the cities of Aksaraporti and Akvilei in the east; and to Dioscurias (Sebastopolis/Sukhumi) and Phasis (Poti) on the Black Sea

4 See: E. Rtveladze, Velikiy shelkovy put. Entsiklopedicheskiy spravochnik. Drevnost i rannee Srednevekovie, State Academic Publishing House Uzbekiston milliy entsiklopediyasi, Tashkent, 1999, pp. 11-12. 5 On the main trade route, see: W.W. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria & India, Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge, 1951, pp. 61, 112; A. Aymard, J. Auboyer, Rome et son Empire (Troisième Edition revue et corrigée). Tome II, Histoire Générale des Civilisations, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1959, pp. 612-619; T.T. Rice, Ancient Arts of Central Asia, Thames and Hudson, London, 1965, p. 176; R. Grousset, L’Empire des Steppes. Attila. Gengis-Khan. Ta- merlan, Quatrième edition, Payot, Paris, 1969, pp. 78-80; Vostochny Turkestan v drevnosti i rannem Srednevekovie. Ocherki istorii, ed. by S.L. Tikhvinskiy, B.A. Litvinskiy, Nauka Publishers, Main Editorial Office of Oriental Litera- ture, Moscow, 1988, pp. 212-222; A.R. Mukhamedjanov, “Economy and Social System in Central Asia in the Kushan Age,” in: History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. II, The Development of Sedentary and Nomadic Civilizations: 700 B.C. to A.D. 250, ed. by J. Harmatta, UNESCO Publishing, 1994, p. 287; B.Ia. Staviskiy, op. cit., pp. 765-766. 6 See: D. Braund, Georgia in Antiquity: A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia, 550 BC-AD 562, Claren- don Press, Oxford; Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 40-41. 7 D.M. Lang, “Iran, Armenia and Georgia,” in: The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 3 (1), The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods, ed. by E. Yarshater, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 509. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION coast at the mouth of the River Phasis (Rioni) in the west.”8 Artaxata was founded by King Artashes in 176 B.C. and developed into a large trading center; it connected Sebastopolis and Phasis on the Black Sea coast with Ecbatana and other trading centers.9 Some believe that in antiquity (before Christ), the route between Artaxata and Anatolia went to Amisos and Sinope through Comana on the southern Black Sea, not to Trapezus (Trabzon). Accord- ing to Tabula Peutingeriana, it reached the River Phasis and Dioscurias which, according to William Tarn, “was one of the most polyglot of ports”10 ; the road leading to Trapezus was built in our era when the Roman emperors came to power in the entire region.11 The old trade route, which went from Ardabil to Tiflis and connected Iran and Dvin, later ran across the city of Partaw (Perozapat, now Barda), which was the capital of Arran during the period of Caucasian Albania and the Islamic period.12 From Tiflis, the trade route followed the Kura and Phasis rivers and ended at the port of Poti (Phasis), its westernmost point. Phasis and Dioscurias were big centers of transit caravan trade. Strabo called it a “Colchis storehouse of goods;” this city was an important point of Roman control. The River Phasis, which reached the inner areas, was a natural route for goods and soldiers, while the fortress of the same name protected trade.13 From that point, goods were sent to the west by sea.

The Transcaucasian Route across the Caspian

Another route from the Orient went across Azerbaijan and Georgia; it used the River Uzboy, the old bed of the Oxus (Amu Darya), and stretched further across the Caspian into the Transcau- casia. According to certain sources, there was a fourth route between the Far East and the Mediter- ranean rounding the northern coast of the Caspian Sea. It was widely used in the first half of the 1st century.14 The sea route, as well as the land route across the northern Caspian coast to the Black Sea, appeared because the frequent clashes between Anatolia and Iran15 interfered with the use of the

8 N.V. Pigulevskaia, “Vizantiyskaia diplomatia i torgovlia shelkom v V-VII vv.,” Vizantiyskiy Vremennik, XXVI (1), 1947, p. 197; N. Pigulewskaja, Byzanz auf den Wegen nach Indien. Aus der Geschichte des byzantinischen Handels mit dem Orient vom 4. bis 6.Jahrhundert, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Institut für griechisch-römische Altertumskunde, Berliner byzantinistische Arbeiten, Bd. 36, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin; Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1969, S. 156. 9 See: R.H. Hewsen, Armenia. A Historical Atlas, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2001, p. 62. 10 W.W. Tarn, op. cit., p. 112. 11 See: H.A. Manandian, The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade, Transl. from the Second Revised Edition by Nina G. Garsoian, Livraria Bertrand, Lisbon, 1965, pp. 51-52, 106-110. For more detail about this route, see: Ya. Manandian, “O mestonakhozhdenii Caspia via and Caspia portae,” in: Ya. Manandian, “Kaspiyskaia doroga,” in: Proceedings V, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R., Institute of History, AS of A.S.S.R. Publishers, Erevan, 1984, p. 359. 12 The territory on the eastern bank of the Kura was called Arran (Ar-Ran), while the territory on its northern bank was Shirvan (see: V.F. Minorskiy, Istoria Shirvana i Derbenda X-XI vekov, Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan S.S.R., Institute of Oriental Studies, Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1963, p. 38). 13 See: H.A. Manandian, op. cit., p. 50; D. Braund, op. cit., p. 192. 14 For more detail, see: Cl. Rapin, “La route commerciale de l’Inde au Pont-Euxin chez Strabon: entre mirage carto- graphique et réalité archéologique,” available at [http://claude.rapin.free.fr/1BiblioTextesGeogrPDF/Rapin_StraboFr_ incomplet.pdf]; S. Suleymanova, Transkaspiyskaia doroga i istoria sviyzey mezhdu Tsentralnoy Aziey i Kavkazom, Þerqþünaslýq Ýnstitutu-50 Elmi Araþdýrmalar, Baký, 2008, pp. 315-317. 15 See: N.V. Pigulevskaia, op. cit., p. 196. 130 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION other routes; for the same reason, the Caucasian roads became important trade routes. However, some members of the academic community (E.H. Bunbury, V.V. Bartold, W.W. Tarn, K.V. Trever, H.A. Manadian, S.P. Tolstov, and P. Daffinà) doubted that the trans-Caspian route was used at all. William Tarn who, having studied the question of whether the Oxus entered the Caspian,16 Greek sources, Strabo and Pliny in particular, and information extracted from what Vasily Bartold wrote about Arab evidence, concluded that Prof. Herrmann’s theory could be either right or wrong; in the absence of physical or documentary evidence, “the ‘Oxus question’ will, for the Greek scholar, remain forever the nightmare which it has always been.”17 Edward Bunbury earlier arrived at the same conclusion18: there had never been a trade route between the Transcaucasia and the Black Sea (along the rivers of Kura and Phasis) across the Caspian. Strabo, in his time, merely mentioned this possibility as a fairly easy option. Later his words were distorted or misinterpreted (by Pliny, in particular) and used as proof that this route had existed.19 Sergey Tolstov, for example, relied on air photographs and geological surveys to insist in practically all his works that the Uzboy had never carried the waters of the Oxus. It was after the studies carried out in 1955 and 1956 that he admitted that in the 4th-5th centuries there had been a stream which entered the Caspian, because the Amu Darya entered the Sary Kamish depression. He also agreed that Igly Kala, the fortress on the left-hand bank of the Middle Uzboy had been built in the 4th century by the Xionites to defend against attacks by the Sassanids.20 P. Daffinà, well known for his works about the Sak tribes, agreed that there had been a branch of the Oxus called Uzboy, but in ancient times it had been dry.21 Hakob Manandian, in turn, concluded that Indian goods did not arrive in the Northern Caucasus and southern Russian steppe across the Caspian, they were brought by land across the Median Empire and Atropatena. He argued that the Caspian was a fairly stormy sea little suited to navigation and supported his argument with the fact that no Central Asian coins had been found in the Transcaucasia and vice versa.22 Recently this has been refuted by new finds in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Geological surveys carried out after the 1970s between the Aral and Caspian seas revealed a Parthian settlement (Igdy Kala) and western goods. This and information supplied by Herodotus, Strabo, and Pliny convinced A. Herrmann, M. Vorobieva, A. Ierusalimskaia, B. Staviskiy, H. Iusupov, D. Durdyev, B. Vainberg, O. Lordkipanidze, H.W. Haussig, P. Callieri, Cl. Rapin, and S. Suleymanova that the Oxus entered the Caspian through the Uzboy.23

16 See: W.W. Tarn dwelled on three main routes when discussing the Oxus issue (see: W.W. Tarn, “Patrocles and the Oxo-Caspian Trade Route,” JHS, The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, XXI, 1901, pp. 10-11). 17 W.W. Tarn, The Greeks... p. 493. 18 See: E.H. Bunbury, A History of Ancient Geography among the Greeks and Romans from the Earliest Ages till the Fall of the Roman Empire, 1879, Vol. I, p. 574, Note. 3; Vol. II, p. 411. 19 “There was never then in existence more than one independent statement about an Oxo-Caspian trade-route … and the word ‘easily’ shows that its real meaning was, ‘You can easily make a trade-route from Bactria across the Caspian to the Black Sea if you like.’ …There is no evidence at all that, in Greek times, any such trade-route from India ever existed” (W.W. Tarn, The Greeks…, pp. 488-490). For the final conclusion Tarn made with respect to this argument, see: W.W. Tarn, Patrocles…, p. 28. 20 See: S.P. Tolstov, “Khorezmskaia arkheologo-etnograficheskaia ekspeditsia 1955-1956 gg.,” Sovetskaia arkhe- ologiia (SA), No. 1, 1958, pp. 110-111, 125, 127. 21 See: P. Daffinà, “Aral, Caspio, Tanais,” RSO, No. 4 (43), 1968, pp. 366, 377-378. 22 See: H.A. Manandian, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 23 See: A. Aymard, J. Auboyer, op. cit., pp. 616-617, Fig. 30; H.G. Franz (Hrsg.), Kunst und Kultur Entlang der Seidenstrasse, 2., verbesserte Auflage, Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1987, p. 19; B.Ja. Staviskij, La Bac- triane sous les Kushans. Problèmes d’Histoire et de Culture, Edition revue et augmentée, traduite du russe par P. Bernard, M. Burda, F. Grenet, P. Leriche, Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, Paris, 1986, p. 190, Note 79; (see also: B.I. Vainberg, Etnogeografia Turana v drevnosti. VII v. do n..e.—VIII v. n.e., RAS, Miklukho-Maklay Institute of Ethnology and An- thropology, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, RAS, Moscow, 1999, p. 223). Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

When writing about the Massagetae, Herodotus (1.202) said that “he has heard dimly of the Oxus or Jaxartes as a river with 40 mouths, all ending in marshes but one, which flows clear into the Caspian; there are islands in it as big as Lesbos, inhabited by savage fish-eaters and other strange people.”24 Igor Pyankov believed that Herodotus had borrowed information from Heca- taeus.25 Yahya Gulyamov, likewise, wrote that in antiquity a stream had branched off the Oxus and headed for the Sary Kamis depression, filling it with water that then ran into the Uzboy. There was another stream that ran along the Uzboy and was filled with water at least part of the year. In this way, Khwarezm maintained contacts with the Middle Eastern states via the Karakum desert (the Shakhris- tan Route); according to Gulyamov, the long chain of ancient cities and fortresses along the route was the best proof of the above.26 A. Ierusalimskaia based her opinion that goods came to the Northern Caucasus not from Sassa- nid Iran, but from China and Sogdiana on the artifacts of immense archeological and cultural value found in the Northern Caucasus (the Moshchevaia Balka site, in particular). Sogdian merchants brought Chinese silks together with goods produced in Sogdiana; this is confirmed by information supplied by Alexander Iessen. Dr. Ierusalimskaia calculated the percentage of silk products in the total number of archeological finds in the Northern Caucasus and concluded: “There was a constantly used trade route between Central Asia and Byzantium that crossed the Northern Caucasus.”27 This is confirmed by a great number of Byzantine coins found recently in Central Asia and China. Boris Staviskiy, well know all over the world as an expert in the Kushans and the East-West trade, also believes that the route existed.28 B. Vainberg relies on the finds of the last ten years to write that throughout antiquity, there was a large stream which ran into the Sary Kamish depression between the Aral and Caspian seas. Written sources and numerous archeological finds confirm that there was a shorter trade route across the Caspian that connected Khwarezm and the large states in the West.29 Igor Pyankov agrees with this.30 Some believe that the route was used in Kushan times; in the 1st century, the Kushans set up a large state at the site where the busiest routes of the Great Silk Road met: it is surmised that there was a route that led to the Caspian and ran along the lower reaches of the Oxus and its old (dried by that time) stream called the Uzboy. The diggings along the Uzboy route (between the Aral and Caspian seas) produced numerous evidence of ancient cities and water canals, as well as of what remained of Oriental goods. This means that even at the time of the Persians, people still lived there in cities and trade was flourishing. Otar Lordkipanidze supplied information about the stretch that ran from the Caspian across the Caucasus and about regular trade between India and the Western world in the 4th-3rd centuries

24 W.W. Tarn, Patrocles..., p. 22; I.V. Pyankov, “Massagety Gerodota,” VDI, No. 2, 1975, p. 47. 25 See: I.V. Pyankov, op. cit., p. 56. 26 See: Ya.G. Gulyamov, “Rabovladelcheskiy period,” in: Istoria Khorezma s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney, ed. by I.M. Muminov, [Monograph], Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek S.S.R., Institute of History, Fan Publishers, Tashkent, 1976, pp. 37-38. 27 A.A. Ierusalimskaia, “O severokavkazskom ‘Shelkovom puti’ v rannem Srednevekovye,” SA, No. 2, 1967, pp. 68-72 (see also: idem, “Alanskiy mir na ‘Shelkovom puti’ (Moshchevaia Balka—istoriko-kulturny kompleks VIII- IX vekov),” in: Kultura Vostoka. Drevnost i rannee Srednevekovie, Collection of articles, The Order of Lenin State Hermitage, Department of the Orient, Avrora Publishers, Leningrad, 1978, pp. 152-160; A.A. Ierusalimskaya, “Ýpek Yolunda Kafkaslar,” S. 244-249). 28 See: B.Ia. Staviskiy, op. cit., p. 765. 29 See: B.I. Vainberg, op. cit., p. 26. 30 Igor Pyankov substantiated his position in his books and articles: Sredniaia Azia v antichnoy geograficheskoy traditsii, Moscow, 1997; Istoria i kultura Aralo-Kaspia, Collection of articles, Almaty, 2001; Velikie reki—attractory lokalnykh tsivilizatsiy, Dubna, 2002. 132 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

B.C. He relied on archeological finds to conclude that one of the main transit trade routes ran “from India to the Caspian, crossed the Transcaucasia along the Kura, crossed the Suram pass and went further on to Phasis;” it then crossed the sea to reach Asia Minor and the Mediterranean.31 Iusupov and Vainberg agreed that by the 4th century B.C., the Uzboy was filled with water from the Oxus; archeological finds from Ichyanly depe speak of the people on the northern bank as cattle breeders.32 In the 1st century B.C.-1st-3rd century A.D., the Oxus changed its course; by the 4th century, water no longer reached the Sary Kamish depression; this made the 5th-7th centuries the “dark- est” period in the history of the Oxus. Archeological finds testify to the fact that between the 7th century B.C. and the 4th-5th centuries A.D., Sary Kamish Lake and the stream that brought water to it were filled by the Oxus.33 In the 4th century, when the Uzboy dried up, people left its banks. Information about the lower reaches of the Oxus, which flowed to Iran, is no less interesting. It is supplied by a Chinese source called Shui-ching-chu published by Luciano Petech; it was written in the early 6th century and was based on much earlier information. One of the manuscripts called Shih- shih Hsi-yü-chi compiled by an anonymous Buddhist monk (probably in the 4th century) writes about the I-lo-ch’i-ti river (probably the Oxus). Petech relies on this information to write about the western part of the same river and its functions.34 This source suggests that, at least in the 5th century, the Oxus entered the Aral Sea; in the 5th or 6th centuries or between 1220 and 1570, the Oxus changed its course.35 Hans Wilhelm Haussig referred to Strabo to assert that the route between Khwarezm and the Caspian reached the Kura by water where it split into two roads, one of them going to Artaxata,36 the other followed the Arax, crossed Iberia, Mtskheta, and Colchis to reach the Black Sea.37 This is confirmed by what other sources say about a transit trade route that followed the Kura and Arax rivers and reached Ecbatana. According to Aelianus Tacticus who lived at the turn of the 2nd century, caravan trade in fish glue was going on between the Caspian and Ecbatana; there was no such trade between the Caspian and Black seas.38 During the Parthian period, Parthian merchants played an important role in the trade along the Great Silk Road.39 In Kushanic times, the merchants crossed the Caspian and landed in the Transcau- casia, on what is now the Azeri coast. B. Vainberg offered a figure of about 350 km, the length of the sea route between the mouth of Uzboy in the Turkmen Bay of the Caspian to the Kura and the Sefíd-Rûd (Qizil Uzun) river. It led to

31 See: Arkheologia SSSR. Drevneishie gosudarstva Kavkaza i Sredney Azii, ed. by G.A. Koshelenko, Nauka Pub- lishers, Moscow, 1985, p. 52. 32 See: B.I. Vainberg, H.Iu. Iusupov, “Kultovy kompleks drevnikh skotovodov na Uzboe,” in: Kulturnye sviazi narodov Sredney Azii i Kavkaza. Drevnost i Srednevekovie, ed. by A.M. Leskov, B.Ia. Staviskiy, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Culture, State Museum of the Art of Peoples of the East, Nauka Publishers, Main Editorial Office of Oriental Literature, Moscow, 1990, pp. 30-31. 33 See: B.I. Vainberg, op. cit., pp. 32-36, 233. 34 See: L. Petech, Northern India according to the Shui-ching-chu, Serie Orientale Roma, II, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Roma, 1950, p. 62: “The unknown monk who compiled the Shih-shih His-yü-chi seems to have very hazy idea about the Farthest West. He connects the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf and perhaps even with the Mediterranean and Black Sea, to form one great ocean surrounding Iran.” 35 See: H.G. Franz, op. cit., p. 19. 36 See: J. Marquart agreed that there was a route mentioned by Ptolemy and Tabula Peutingeriana—it ran from Ar- taxata to the Caspian and back (see: J. Marquart, Skizzen zur historischen Topographie und Geschichte von Kaukasien. Das Itinerar von Artaxata nach Armastica auf römischen Weltkarte, Studien zur armenischen Geschichte, Mechitharisten- Buchdruckerei, Wien, 1928, p. 63, Tafel I, Abb. 2). 37 See: H.W. Haussig, Die Geschichte Zentralasiens und der Seidenstrasse in vorislamischer Zeit, Grundzüge Bd. 49, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1983, p. 79. 38 See: M. Bais, Albania Caucasia. Ethnos, storia, territorio attraverso le fonti greche, latine e armene. Mimesis, saggi e narrazioni di estetica e filosofia, Milano, 2001, p. 71; D. Braund, op. cit., p. 41. 39 See: Arkheologia SSSR. Drevneyshie gosudarstva Kavkaza i Sredney Azii, p. 222. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Atropatena, Media, and Gilan and from there into the Diyala basin and on to Ecbatana, the administrative center of the Achaemenid Kingdom.40 The river divided into two streams (the Kura and the Arax), crossed Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and entered the Caspian.41 In order to reach the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, merchants went up the Kura, crossed Georgia, and reached the Black sea by the Phasis.42 According to Warmington, during political disturbances in the Iranian State when merchants could not use the land routes, they moved their goods from India via the Caspian to the Transcaucasia, following land routes westward—first from the mouth of the Arax to Artaxata and then closer to the western areas of Asia Minor where the road bifurcated.43 This is confirmed by Strabo (60 B.C.-A.D. 25) in his Geographica and by Pliny the Elder (23- 79) in his The Natural History. Both wrote about a trade route that ran from India to the Caspian, crossed the Transcaucasia, and reached the Black Sea.44 Strabo referred to earlier sources (Aristobulus in particular) to write that during the time of Alexander the Great, the Oxus had been navigable; goods were brought across the Caspian, which Strabo called the Hyrcanian Sea.45 Pliny the Elder wrote that the Oxus flowed into the Caspian.46 He also wrote that people could have been moved along the Oxus, into the Caspian and up the Kura, while Indian goods could be brought to Phasis (at the mouth of the eponymous river) separated from the Colchis by five days of travel.47 Pliny the Elder probably referred to this route48 when he wrote that Seleucid Emperor Seleucus I Nicator (312-281 B.C.), who was very interested in the eastward water routes, had wanted to dig a

40 See: B.I. Vainberg, op. cit., p. 26. 41 See: R.H. Hewsen, The Geography of Ananias of Širak (AŠXARHAC¡OYC¡). The Long and the Short Recen- sions, Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1992, p. 133. There is no agreement on whether in antiquity the Kura and the Arax flowed into the Caspian as one river or separately. 42 See: E.H. Warmington, The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India, Second edition, revised and en- larged, Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, Delhi, 1974, p. 26. 43 See: Ibid., p. 26. 44 For more on Pliny’s information, see: E.H. Bunbury, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 411; and on the transit trade route from India to the Black Sea, see: O.D. Lordkipanidze, “O tranzitno-torgovom puti iz Indii k Chernomu moryu,” Soobshchenia AN Gruzii, 1957, pp. 377-484. 45 For more detail, see: M.G. Raschke, “New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East,” in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. II. Principat, 9.2, Hrsg. H. Temporini, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1978, p. 746, n. 435; M. Tezcan, Ýpek Yolu… p. 73, n. 18; Cl. Rapin, op. cit. 46 According to B. Vainberg, Igor Pyankov translated what Pliny had written about the Amu Darya, which reached the Caspian through the Uzboy, in the following way: “The river flowed through Lake Oax.” This means that Pliny faith- fully described the situation whereby the streams of Amu Darya entered Sari Kamish Lake to leave it as the Uzboy (see: B.I. Vainber, op. cit, p. 226; O. & E. Lattimore, Asia Seen through the Eyes of its Discoveries. Silks, Spices and Empire, Delacorte Press, 1968, pp. 11-13). 47 See: H.A. Manandian, op. cit., p. 47; E.H. Warmington, op. cit., p. 26; Cl. Rapin, op. cit. W. Tarn offered the following translation: “Pliny (i.e. Varro) says that it was found out (not ‘explored’) on Pompey’s expedition that in seven days goods came through (or could come through) from India to the river of Bactra, which ran into the Oxus, ‘and from the Oxus the goods, carried (or ‘if carried’) across the Caspian to the Cyrus, can be brought down the Phasis to the Black Sea with a land porterage not exceeding five days” (W.W. Tarn, The Greeks..., p. 489). He studied the entire body of information about the means and methods used to deliver Indian goods across the Caspian and Black seas in the Hellenic period and said that there was no evidence that this route ever existed and no reason whatever for supposing that it did (see: ibid., pp. 112-113). 48 See: R.N. Frye, The History of Ancient Iran, C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich, 1984, p. 153; M. Bais, op. cit., pp. 70, 76, Note 302 (see: Pliny VI.31: “aliqui inter Pontum et Caspium mare non amplius interesse tra- diderunt, Cornelius Nepos: tantis iterum angustiis infestatur Asia. Claudius Caesar a Cimmerio Bosporo ad Caspium mare prodidite aque perfodere cogitasse Nicatorem Seleucum quo tempore sit ab Ptolemaeo Cerauno interfectus, a Portis Cau- casiis ad Pontum esse constat fere,” available at [http://www.ku.edu/history/index/europe/ancient_rome/L/Roman/Texts/ Pliny_the_Elder/ 6*.html]—“Some authorities have reported the distance between the Black Sea and the Caspian as not more than 375 miles, while Cornelius Nepos makes it 250 miles: by such narrow straits is Asia for a second time beset. 134 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION canal49 between the Caspian and the Black seas to control the Caspian Sea.50 In 283-282 B.C., with the same aim in view, great seafarer Patrocles studied the Caspian littoral.51 The Kura and Phasis were connected by a stone-paved road,52 the journey along which took four days; goods were then moved along the River Phasis, which flowed in the gorges close to the Sarapana Fortress and reached the Black Sea. In 66-65 B.C., defeated ruler of Pontus Mithradates VI Eupator (120-63 B.C.)53 escaped to Colchis; after conquering Iberia, Roman military commander Pompeius moved to Colchis.54 The Roman general went down the Kura to the River Phasis, from which he moved to Sarapana and reached the Black Sea via Kutaisi and Phasis (Poti).55 The Sebastopolis-Artaxata route reached the Kura valley and crossed the Zekar Pass.56 It took merchants several days to get from the Black Sea via Phasis to the important ports of Amisos and Sinope57 ; in Roman times, the Orient began beyond Colchis,58 the last point of the road, which ran across the Caspian and the Kura and Arax. It was in the 20s B.C. and at the time of Tigranes the Great (95-55 B.C.) that the Romans consolidated their presence in the region; in 66 (or 72) B.C., thanks to Pompeius, it became (together with Pontus) a Roman province.59 After 66 B.C., the Romans established good relations with the Albanian and Iberian tribes, which radically changed the situation in the East.60 Historical sources supply information about the route of the later expedition of Pompeius to Albania and back.61 The land route from the Orient ran along the Tigris past Rhages (Rey) and Ecba-

Claudius Caesar gives the distance from the Straits of Kertsch to the Caspian Sea as 150 miles, and states that Seleucus Nicator at the tune when he was killed by Ptolemy Ceraunus was contemplating cutting a channel through this isthmus. It is practically certain that the distance from the Gates of the Caucasus to the Black Sea is 200 miles,” available at [http:// www.archive.org/stream/naturalhistory02plinuoft/naturalhistory02plinuoft_djvu.txt]). 49 See: D. Braund, op. cit., p. 42 (“presumably to be cut north of the Caucasus mountains”). 50 See: T.T. Rice, op. cit., p. 22. 51 See: W.W. Tarn, Patrocles…, pp. 14-21; M. Bais, op. cit., p. 70, 76; Cl. Rapin, op. cit. 52 On the Kura-Rioni/Phasis route, see: Arkheologia SSSR. Drevneyshie gosudarstva Kavkaza i Sredney Azii, p. 98. 53 N. Lomouri wrote that Mithradates ascended the throne in 121 B.C.; he proceeded from the date of his birth in Sinope (133 B.C.); it is known that he ascended the throne at the age of 11 or 12 (see: N. Lomouri, Iz istorii Pontiysko- go tsarstva, Part I, AS Georgian SSR, Metsniereba, Tbilisi, 1979, pp. 48, 73-74); M. Arslan uses the date 120 B.C. (see: M. Arslan, Mithradates VI Eupator. Romanýn Büyük Düþmaný, Odin Yayýncýlýk, 2007, S. 73). 54 See: N. Lomouri, op. cit., p. 113. 55 See: H. Manandian, Tigrane II & Rome, Nouveaux ecclaircissements à la Lumiere des Sources originals, Traduit de L. Armenien Oriental par H. Thorossian, Imprensa Nacional, Lisbonne, 1963, pp. 180-181; Ya. Manandian, op. cit., p. 227 (Map 2). A merchant who moved in the opposite direction either went up the River Phasis or moved to the opposite side of the Caspian littoral mountains and went down to the Oxus valley, to the Afghan passes and India (see: G.I. Bratianu, La mer Noire. Des origines à la conquête ottomane, Societas Academica Dacoromana, Acta Historica tomus IX, Monachii, 1969, p. 73). 56 See: Ya. Manandian, op. cit., pp. 366, 371 (“the Meoto-Colchis road”). 57 Neither archeological, nor literary, nor historical sources confirm that a land route existed from Phasis to Trape- zus; this confirms that the route from Phasis to Amisos and Sinope was used (see: R.H. Hewsen, Armenia..., p. 65). 58 See: H.W. Haussig, “Die ältesten Nachrichten der griechischen und lateinischen Quellen über die Routen der Seidenstrasse nach Zentral- und Ostasien”, AAASH, No. 28, 1980, S. 14. 59 See: M.-L. Chaumont, “L’Arménie entre Rome et l’Iran. I. De l’avènement d’Auguste a l’avènement de Dioclét- ien,” in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. II. Principat, 9.1, Hrsg. H. Temporini, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1976, p. 67; D.M. Lang, op. cit., p. 16; Arkheologia SSSR. Drevneyshie gosudarstva Kavkaza i Sredney Azii, p. 56; R.H. Hewsen, The Geography…, p. 125; idem, Armenia.., p. 38; M. Bais, op. cit., p. 75 (see also: D. Braund, op. cit., pp. 152-170). 60 See: N. Pigulevskaja, “Les Villes de l’État Iranien aux Époques Parthe et Sassanide. Contribution à l’histoire so- ciale de la Basse Antiquité,” in: École Pratique des Hautes Études-Sorbonne, Documents et Recherches sur l’Économie des Pays Byzantins, Islamiques et Slaves et leurs Relations commerciales au Moyen Âge, Préface de Claude Cahen, Mou- ton & Co, La Haye, Paris, 1963, pp. 56-57. 61 On Pompeius’ back route via “Caspia via,” see: H. Manandian, Tigrane II…, p. 185; Ya. Manandian, op. cit., pp. 232-233 (Map 3); 233-237 (Map 4); S. Suleymanova, op. cit., pp. 321-322. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tana on the Great Silk Road and connected them with Artaxata. It was completely controlled by Parthian Iran, but it was impossible to control the Caspian and Caucasian tribes that lived father north.62 From this it follows that the Oxus and the Caspian helped promote East-West trade. There is information that in the late 1st and early 2nd centuries, under emperors Trajan (98-117) and Hadrian (117-138), Rome and the Kushans established some sort of diplomatic relations.63 A. Mukhamedjanov, an archeologist from Uzbekistan, has studied not only the goods that reached the West via Central Asia late in the 1st century, but also the routes that connected the Med- iterranean countries with India and the Far East to conclude that this trade route did exist.64 German historian A. Herrmann was of the same opinion.65

Relations between the Roman Empire and China; Interference of Iran and the Struggle for Eastern Trade in the Transcaucasia

The relations between the Mediterranean and China are four thousand years old; the history of the Great Silk Road goes back two thousand years. The traditional history of China says that it appeared in 115 or 105 B.C.; on the whole, information about this period is scarce. Roman merchants were the first to investigate the Great Silk Road. Geographer Ptolemy, who lived in the mid-2nd century, wrote that in the 100s a certain Macedonian merchant called Maes Ti- tianus sent his people to the east to find stone milestones—trail markers; according to legend they were taken for Buddha messengers.66 Ptolemy also wrote that the first valuable and reliable information on the Great Silk Route had been provided in the 110s by great geographer Marinus of Tyr in his Corrected Geographical Tables. The original did not survive; we know about it thanks to Ptolemy, who included the information it supplied in his work titled Geography.67 Ambassador Chang Ch’ien, whom Chinese Emperor Wu-ti sent to the West in 136-128 B.C., supplied a report about what he had seen in Western Turkestan and about the road to the West. This information68 helped the Chinese emperors “establish and maintain diplomatic and trade relations with the Parthian Kingdom in Iran and through it with Rome.” In 97, ambassador Kan Ying,69 sent by

62 See: E.H. Warmington, op. cit., pp. 26-27, 34. 63 See: B.N. Puri, “The Kushans,” in: History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. II, pp. 256-257. 64 He wrote the following: “From there (Bactria) merchants travelled by boat down the Amu Darya, over the Cas- pian Sea and across Transcaucasia to the Black Sea” (A.R. Mukhamedjanov, op. cit., p. 285). 65 See: A. Herrmann, An Historical Atlas of China, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 18-19. 66 See: G. Bratianu, op. cit., p. 102. 67 See: E. Rtveladze, op. cit., p. 233. About Titianus, see: E. De La Vassière, Histoire des Marchands Sogdiens, Bibliothèque de l’Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, Vol. XXXII, Collège de France, Institut des Hautes Études Chi- noises, 2002, p. 43. 68 See: B.Ia. Staviskiy, op. cit., p. 223. 69 See: I.M. Franck, D.M. Brownstone, To the End of the Earth. The Great Travel and Trade Routes of Human His- tory. Facts on File Publications, 1984, p. 385. Some believe that the ambassador did not reach the eastern borders of the Roman Empire, but turned back after reaching the Euphrates because the Parthians tried to prevent direct contacts between China and Rome (see: B.Ia. Staviskiy, op. cit., p. 223). On Kang Ying’s travels and routes about which he informed 136 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Viceroy of Han Emperor He-ti in Eastern Turkestan Pan Ch’ao, reached a region of the Roman Em- pire that the sources of the 3rd century called Ta Ch’in (later Fu-lin). It seems that they were the Ori- ental domains of the Roman Empire—Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, or Egypt.70 There is information that ambassadors of the Roman Empire paid return visits to China. In 166, in the days of Ta-ts’in Emperor An-tun (Marcus Aurelius Antoninus [161-189]), Rome sent an embassy to China to deal with the problem. Information about the mission can be found in the Chinese sources Hou Han-shu and Liang Shu. Regrettably, no Roman sources contain similar information.71 Some of the Roman emperors sent ambassadors to the Kushan rulers, whose empire was situated in Northern India; they were probably looking for trade routes with the Orient outside Parthian Iran. The return missions show that Rome had its own reasons to seek trade ties with the East; it avoided the main Great Silk Road that crossed Iran and preferred other routes. Here is a detailed description of the trade routes mentioned above. All attempts by the Roman Empire to organize regular trade with the Orient, and with China in particular, were cut short, first, by the Parthians and later by the Sassanids72 who clutched at the lucrative role of middleman in silk trade with China.73 No wonder they spared no effort to prevent direct contacts between China and Rome. The Parthians and later Sassanids profited from the geographic location of their empire: at that time, “the Western merchants could not reach the East and the Chinese, the West.” In the 570s Parthi- ans and Sassanids interfered with the silk trade between the East and the West on land and at sea. They either bought up everything from the caravans that crossed their lands or set impossibly high prices.74 In an effort to reach the Orient, the Roman Empire waged several wars against the Parthians; each of them ended in a truce: the Parthians were not strong enough to capture the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. In 66, the sides signed a peace treaty for 50 years so as to derive maximum profit from the silk trade.75 The Iranian stretch of the Great Silk Road remained open during this period. Stathmoi Parthikoi (Parthian Stations) by Isidore of Charax is one of the most important sources about the overland trade route that ran across Iran in the early 1st century. It contains information about the goods and some of the stations along the road, which began in Antioch, ran across Zeugma, crossed the Euphrates, reached Horasan (the Parthian capital), and went on to Kandahar.76 Despite the truce, the Parthians, who enjoyed considerable gains from the silk trade, preserved control over the Great Silk Road that ran through Media, Armenia, Colchis, and the Black Sea ports.77 By the end of the century, however, silk and many other Oriental commodities were moved by sea (not via Iran) to the Mediterranean ports.78 In the 2nd century, when Rome finally prevailed over the emperor, see: D.D. Leslie, K.H.J. Gardiner, The Roman Empire in Chinese Sources, Università di Roma “La Sapien- za,” “Studi Orientali,” Bardi Editore, Roma, 1996, pp. 141-148, 166. 70 See: E. Rtveladze, op. cit., p. 216. 71 For more on the Roman embassy to China, see: D.D. Leslie, K.H.J. Gardiner, op. cit., pp. 53-158; S. Lieu, “By- zantium, Persia and China: Interstate Relations on the Eve of the Islamic Conquest,” in: Silk Road Studies IV. Realms of the Silk Roads: Ancient and Modern, Proceedings from the Third Conference of the Australian Society for Inner Asian Studies, ed. by D. Christian & C. Benjamin, Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, Brepols, 2000, p. 47. 72 See: N.V. Pigulevskaya, Vizantiyskaia diplomatia i torgovlia shelkom…, p. 186. 73 See: K. Enoki, G.A. Koshelenko, Z. Haidary, “The Yüeh-chih and Their Migrations,” in: History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. II, p. 187. 74 See: M. Tezcan, Ýpek Yolu..., p. 75. 75 See: T.T. Rice, op. cit., p. 91. 76 See: Parthian Stations by Isidore of Charax. An Account of the Overland Trade Route between the Levant and India in the First Century B.C., available at [http://parthia.com/parthian_stations.htm]. 77 See: T.T. Rice, op. cit., p. 91. 78 See: M. Tezcan, The Iranian-Georgian Branch..., p. 209; L. Boulnois, The Silk Road, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1966, p. 56. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Parthia, it started looking for sea trade routes, partly through the ports in Indian territory. At that time, Artaxata, on the banks of the Arax, was part of an important route that connected the Black Sea ports of Phasis and Sebastopolis with Ecbatana in Iran and other trading centers.79 The goods brought there were moved to the west and northwest either by the Phasis to the Black Sea (according to information supplied by Tabula Peutingeriana) or through Comana to Samsun (Amisos) and Sinope, but not to Trapezus.80 The Romans, who captured Artaxata in 163, turned it, in the first half of the 4th century, into an important center; they established their domination over the trade route that led to the Black Sea area. A short truce was established in 363 under Iranian Emperor Shapur II (A.D. 309-379) and Roman Emperor Jovian (363-364). A year later the wars resumed with even greater ferocity (364-367); the Sassanids recaptured Artaxata and other cities; Rome lost its direct political power and trade influence in Armenia and Iberia (Georgia).81 After 428, Dvin, built a little ways to the north of Artaxata, became the region’s center. Tabula Peutingeriana mentions the routes between Artaxata-Dvin, Tiflis, and Sebastopolis/Phasis on the Black Sea coast.82 Phasis was another trade hub where Chinese and Indian goods were stored. Situated on the southeastern Black Sea coast, it was the westernmost point of the road, which began south of the Caspian Sea and went to the northwest via the River Arax. In the 2nd century, it was a target of political and trade rivalry between the Romans and Parthians. According to written sources and certain archeological finds, the city was the westernmost point of the route which, starting in the 1st century A.D., connected, for 300 years, the Black Sea and West- ern Turkestan across the Caspian and the important centers in the Kushan Empire trading in Chinese and Indian goods.83 The finds of western goods in ancient settlements on the eastern Caspian coast prove that the East and West traded along the Uzboy (the old riverbed of the Amy Darya), which dried up in the 4th century. A certain number of coins (dated to the 2nd century B.C.) from the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom, which existed in Western Turkestan, were found in the Black Sea and Caucasian regions (in Tiflis, in particular).84 When writing about a trade route that started in India, went to the Caspian (Hyrcanian) Sea, and further on across the Transcaucasia to the Black Sea, Strabo and Pliny the Elder pointed out that, since the times of Alexander the Great, the Oxus (which ran into the Caspian) was navigable. It was used to bring goods to the Caucasus.85 There was a northern route which started at the ports on the northern Black Sea coast, ran along the northern Caspian shore, and went along the Aral coast and the Syr Darya to Western Turkmenistan, or further north to Moghulistan and China. Back in the 5th century B.C. Herodotus mentioned this “Northern” or “Steppe” route when writing about the steppe tribes living in the East. This road was little used in antiquity; at the turn of the Middle Ages, however, when the Sassanids and the Turkic Khaganate were locked in bitter rivalry, the route became much more popular.

79 See: R.H. Hewsen, Armenia..., p. 65. 80 See: H. Manandian, The Trade and Cities of Armenia, pp. 51-52. 81 See: E. Honigmann, Bizans Devletinin Doðu Sýnýrý. Grekçe, arabca, Süryanice ve Ermenice kaynaklara göre 363den 1071e kadar. Tercüme eden: Prof. Dr. Fikret Iþýltan, Ýstanbul, 1970, S. 4. 82 On the main routes, see: M. Tezcan, The Iranian-Georgian Branch..., pp. 211-212. 83 For more on this trade road and its main routes, see, for example: Ibid., pp. 212-214. 84 See: P. Callieri, “L’esplorazione geografica dell’Iran in epoca ellenistica e romana: il contributo dell documen- tazione archeological,” OCNUS, No. 7, 1999, p. 41. For more on the recent finds of ancient goods and coins in Azerbai- jan, see: S. Suleymanova, op. cit., p. 316, Note 2. 85 See: W.W. Tarn, The Greeks..., p. 489; P. Callieri, op. cit., p. 38; M. Tezcan, The Iranian-Georgian Branch.., p. 213. 138 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Certain finds (Roman and Bosporan coins found in Jungaria and in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Graeco-Bactrian coins found in the Black Sea and Caucasian regions, as well as Chinese goods)86 point to direct trading contacts between Rome and China. For example, the gravestone dated to the 2nd-3rd centuries found in the Crimea had a relief and an inscription in Chinese dated approximately to the Han Dynasty.87 The city of Tanais at the mouth of the Don was the main Black Sea station of the Northern (Steppe) route. Hou Han-shu said the following about the situation caused by the Parthian (An-hsi) policy of interference: “They [Rome (Ta-ts’in)] traffic by sea with An-hsi [Parthia] and T’en-chu [India], the profit of which trade is ten-fold… Their kings always desired to send embassies to China, but the An- hsi [Parthians] wished to carry on trade with them in Chinese silks, and it is for this reason that they were cut off from communication. This lasted till the ninth year of the Yen-hsi period during the emperor Huan-ti’s reign [=A.D. 166].”88 As mentioned above, in A.D. 166 the Roman Emperor An- toninus sent an embassy to China. It was obviously highly important to somehow “push aside” the Parthians’ political power to trade in silk directly with China. In the first three centuries A.D., the role of middleman in Roman overland silk trade with the Orient belonged to the Kushan Kingdom, which occupied the territories of Northern India, Afghani- stan, and Bactria. At that time, China and India traded across the Pamirs or Bactria, while the eastern part of the caravan routes was controlled by Kushans. The Kushan Kingdom reached its heyday in the 1st and 2nd centuries when Northern India, Bactria, and the south of Sogdiana became very rich. Kushan merchants figured prominently in their trade with China.89 Merchants from Western Turkestan, likewise, played an important role; they brought Buddhism to China and founded colonies in the oases of Eastern Turkestan, Changan, the capital of China, and elsewhere. They were mostly interested in silk and other Oriental products. The Sogdians90 were also involved in silk trade with China; early in the 4th century, they brought the written language to Central Asia and organized colonies in Central Asia and even in the steppes of Moghulistan.91 In 370-750, Sogdiana was known as a “trading empire;” its language was lingua franca, that is, the language of trade and traders.92

Conclusion

The Roman Empire, which persisted in its efforts to contact the Orient across the Caspian (something which the Sassanids tried to achieve in the Hellenic period) by overcoming the obstacles—the Parthians and later the Sassanids—in carrying out overland trade on the Great Silk Road, never completely succeeded.

86 See: M. Tezcan, The Iranian-Georgian Branch..., p. 210. It remains unknown how these objects reached these lands 87 See: B.Ia. Staviskiy, op. cit., p. 225. 88 F. Hirth, China and the Roman Orient. Researches into their Ancient and Medieval Relations as represented in Old Chinese Records, Ares Publishers Inc., Chicago, 1975, p. 42; D.D. Leslie, K.H.J. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 51; A.A. Ieru- salimskaja, Die Gräber der Mošèevaja Balka. Frühmittelalterliche Funde an der nordkaukasischen Seidenstrasse, Hrsg. Bayerischen Nationalmuseum München und von der Staatlichen Ermitage Sankt Petersburg, Editio Maris, München, 1996, S. 120; M. Tezcan, Ýpek Yolu…, p. 76; M. Tezcan, The Iranian-Georgian Branch..., p. 209. 89 See: E. De La Vassière, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 90 For more on the role of the Sogdians in trade with China and India B.C. and early A.D., see: De La Vassière, op. cit., pp. 40-97; Liu Xinru, The Silk Road in World History. The New Oxford World History, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 67-69. 91 See: R.N. Frye, “The Merchant World of the Sogdians,” in: Silk Road Studies VII. Nomads, Traders and Holy Men along China’s Silk Road. Papers presented at a symposium held at The Asia Society in New York, 9-10 November, 2001, ed. by A.L. Juliano, J.A. Lerner, Brepols, 2001, p. 72. 92 See: E. De La Vassière, op. cit., pp. 102-192. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In 64 B.C., Rome, which wanted to enter the Transcaucasia, conquered the Pontic Kingdom and captured its fleet (based in Trapezus), which dominated the Black Sea. At first Rome intended to join the region to the empire to ensure safe trade navigation between the Sea of Marmara and Phasis on the eastern Black Sea coast and establish Roman control over the road to Armenia. The Roman Empire, however, might have been looking further: it might have planned to reach the so-called Gates of Al- exander, spread to the northeast,93 and reach the Caspian to establish control over the eastern trade route between India and Bactria and the Black Sea via Oxus, the Caspian, and the Kura.94 According to the historical sources, in the 1st-2nd centuries, Rome established ties with the Kushan Empire (which occupied Northern India and Bactria) to gain access to Indian and Chinese goods. We also know that at that time China sent their ambassadors to the West to establish direct contacts: the main stretch of the Great Silk Road went across Bactria; it belonged to the Kushans who had grown rich in silk trade and intended to trade with the West themselves.95 In the 1st century the Kush- ans began moving Oriental goods along the Uzboy to the Caspian and further on to the west. In the 3rd century, the Chinese Han Dynasty fell; very soon the Kushan Empire collapsed, which plunged the region into instability. At the turn of the 5th century, the Uzboy dried up; in the 6th century, trade across the Caspian was discontinued. This and the changed relations between the Tur- kic Khaganate and Byzantium moved this route to the north of the Caspian. Later, the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire tried to open the road to the Orient and the Tran- scaucasia. In the 6th century, Shakhinshah Khosrau I (Anushirvan), who ruled in Iran, interfered in the overland and sea routes that crossed the Red Sea (Yemen). This forced Emperor Justinian I (527-565), who wanted to gain access to the Orient, to turn his gaze toward the Caucasus and start talking to the Turks. When dispatching a diplomatic mission across the Caucasus, he probably instructed them to explore the territory and to revise the records of the Hellenic and Roman periods.96 The Roman emperor decided to explore a more dangerous route that moved north along the Caspian coast because of what was going on in Iran. The Sassanids, who controlled the Daryal and Derbent passes, closed the road that went from the north down to the south and the ancient sea route between the East and the West. Meanwhile, after the 4th century, the Uzboy no longer flowed into the Caspian. We know that Emperor Heraclius I organized and personally commanded two marches, in 624-625 and 627-628. The Eastern Roman Empire organized similar military campaigns in the Caucasus. Heraclius I initiated the expeditions97 to find allies to oppose the Khazars and Sassanids, establish his rule in the Transcaucasia, and take control over safety of the ancient trade route.

93 See: D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ, Vol. I, Princeton Univer- sity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1950, pp. 561-562. 94 See: Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1418. 95 Liu Xinru, op. cit., p. 48 (“The Kushans also controlled both the steppe and oasis routes of the Central Asian Silk Road. Both the rulers and traders of the Kushan Empire profited from the trade and enjoyed goods from all over Eurasia”). 96 Writing about the relations between Justinian I and the Orient and Iran, British historian Edward Gibbon deemed it necessary to clarify the geographic location and ethnic composition of the Caucasian region (for more detail, see: Cl. Rapin, op. cit.). 97 For more on Heraclius’ expeditions and routes, see: Ya. Manandian, “Marshruty persidskikh pokhodov imperatora Iraklia,” in: Ya. Manandian, Proceedings V, pp. 375-405. 140 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Farda ASADOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Head of the Department of History and Economy of the Arab Countries, Z. Buniyatov Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

KHAZARIA, BYZANTIUM, AND THE ARAB CALIPHATE: STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OVER EURASIAN TRADE ROUTES IN THE 9TH-10TH CENTURIES

Abstract

he author traces the ups and downs of over the main arteries of the Great Silk Road T the struggle among the largest powers and its echoes in the future of the Eurasian of the 9th-10th centuries for control countries and peoples.

Introduction

For three centuries, starting in the mid-7th century, the Khazar Khaganate controlled the key hubs of the Silk Road arteries and profited from the transit advantages of these vast territories. Strong enough to collect tribute from the local populations (including the Eastern Slavs), it remained a trading partner in lucrative international trade. Byzantium and the Arab Caliphate were two other great trading powers and, therefore, the Khaganate’s strongest rivals.

Rus Vikings Come to Eastern Europe

The Scandinavian Vikings who came to Eastern Europe where they set up political entities with Slavic populations supplied another dimension to the rivalry between the Khaganate, Byzantium, and the Arabs. Confronted by a new factor and the inevitable necessity of taming it, the principal players had no other choice but to gear their foreign policies accordingly. Merciless invaders and plunderers, the Vikings were described by medieval West European annalists as a scourge and the worst of God’s punishments. In Western Europe they were known as Normans, people from the North. It is commonly believed that the West was invaded mostly by warriors from Norway and Denmark, while people from Sweden boarded their ships to invade the East. Scholarly writings used the blanket term Scandinavians and described their military operations as hit- and-run tactics: armed detachments would disembark from their ships, quickly plunder the coastal villages, jump back on their ships, and disappear. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

At a time of incessant feuds, these inroads were nothing out of the ordinary and as such not worthy of comment in the annals. The first documented military march of the Scandinavians on Eng- land took place in 793 when a Viking detachment plundered the Anglo-Saxon Monastery of St. Cuth- bert on Lindisfarne Island off the English northeastern coast. This marked the beginning of the so- called “Viking Age of Invasion.”1 It was an age of plundering and looting of European towns and villages and feeble Scandinavian attempts to set up their political entities (in northern France, on the British Isles, and in Sicily) invariably hostile to the local dynasties and state units and invariably locked in struggle for political domination. In Britain, the Norman states were gradually tamed by the local Anglo-Saxon rulers; in France King Charles the Simple had no other choice but to transfer a region in northwestern France to a Norman. The area became known as Normandy, while in 1066, William the Conqueror, descendant of the first Scandinavian ruler of Normandy, occupied England to become its king. The Viking inroads to the East are still a subject of heated discussions in academic circles; the Scandinavian sources, sagas, are mostly myths and poetic accounts of the heroic campaigns of military Scandinavian chieftains and their warriors. Some of them distort historical facts beyond recognition; an Icelandic saga recorded in the 13th century (circa 1200) by Snorri Sturluson is one of the pertinent examples. It tells how Odin, the central figure of Scandinavian mythology, and his army came to Scandinavia from unidentified southeastern lands. The details inspired Thor Heyerdahl, a prominent Norwegian traveler, to seek the roots of part of the Scandinavian ethnicity (its political elite to be more exact) in the Caucasus and the Northern Black Sea coast. Gravestones and memorial plaques of Scandinavian konungs (kings) offer much more reliable, and chronologically related, information about the events and names of heroes, even though inscriptions are too few and far between to serve as a historical source in their own right. Russian chronicles say next to nothing about the earlier stages of Scandinavian inroads to the East: history begins in 860 when Rurik and his armed Scandinavian detachment were invited to rule in Novgorod (Holmgard).2 Arab sources supply us with the richest details about the time Scandinavi- ans reached Eastern Europe, the Northern Black Sea littoral, and the Caspian in particular. There is direct evidence that large units of armed Scandinavians came to the East in the late 9th and first half of the 10th centuries.3 They fought the local people and the states for control and military domination over the captured territories and the international trade routes that ran across it. This was when the Rurik dynasty established itself in Kiev captured by Oleg. It shifted the balance of military force and political power in the lands crisscrossed by trade routes.

Russian Historians about the Rus

Arab authors used the word “Rus” to describe hitherto unknown people. For want of space I will not dwell on the vague origins of the term. Arab and Byzantine sources used the word to describe predominantly Scandinavian armed detachments with probably small Slavic components. This gave rise to the term “Rus’” that later became the contemporary term “Russia.” Russian historians insist that the statehood of the Eastern Slavs is rooted in the pre-Rurik Slavic tribes and that, therefore, all assumptions or even assertions about the much earlier presence of Scan- dinavians in Eastern Europe and on the trade routes leading to the south and the east do not hold water. A recent collection of articles by Russian academics published in 2010 Izgnanaie normannov iz russkoy istorii (Eviction of Normans from Russian History) gives an ample idea of what has been

1 “The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. Part 2: A.D. 750-919,” Online Medieval and Classical Library Release, No. 17, available at [http://omacl.org/Anglo/part2.html]. 2 See: Povest vremennykh let, Transl. by D.S. Likhachev, available at [http://old-russian.chat.ru/01povest.htm]. 3 See: V.V. Bartold, “Arabskie izvestia o rusakh,” in: Sochinenia, Vol. II, Part 1, Moscow, 1963, pp. 810-858. 142 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION written lately about the Scandinavians’ advent to the Russian territories.4 Certain facts and historical evidence cast doubts on what this group of Russian authors has written in their collective work. n Archeological finds testify that in the mid-8th century there were Scandinavian settlements in northwestern Russia. While earlier artifacts are not indisputably Norman, the finds in Staraia Ladoga on the southeastern coast of Lake Ladoga (dated 750) are undoubtedly Scandinavian.5 n The hoards of Muslim coins discovered along the eastward trade routes are dated to the early 9th century.6 One such buried treasure, found in Staraia Ladoga, can be dated to the late 8th century. n There is evidence that the Rus invaded what is now the South of Russia in the early half of the 9th century, that is, several decades before 882 when Oleg, Rurik’s relative and military leader conquered Kiev. —The earliest information about this can be found in the Slavic text of The Life of St. Stefan of Surozh compiled in the 15th century. It tells the story of an inroad of a certain Bravlin, who, at the head of a Rus detachment, plundered the Crimea, probably in the 790s.7 —The so-called Paphlagonian expedition of the Rus is recorded in The Life of St. George of Amastris. There is no agreement about the exact date, however most researchers relate the expedition to the first quarter of the 9th century.8 —According to the Annals of St. Bertin, in 838, the so-called Rus Khaganate dispatched its embassy to the Byzantine Empire; the names of the ambassadors quoted in the document are unmistakably Scandinavian. The embassy was diverted to the court of the King of the Francs in Ingelheim because the return route had become too dangerous.9

Trade Routes across the Eurasian Steppes

The above suggests that trade contact between Scandinavian merchant-warriors and the local population of southeastern Europe and the Caucasus was fairly intensive; this is confirmed by the finds of Islamic coins in the regions of northwestern Russia controlled by Scandinavians as early as late 8th-first half of the 9th centuries. Silver dirhams minted in the Middle East and by Muslim rulers of the Central Caucasus and Central Asia were the most convenient and practically only means of payment. Coins minted by the Samanides (819-999), an Iranian dynasty, occupied a special place. At the height of its power, the dynasty spread its political influence to the entire stretch of settled agriculture in Central Asia; in 900, Ismail al-Samani defeated Amr ibn al-Lauth and expanded his power to the southeastern Caspian. Security was the key to flourishing international trade; peaceful borders guaranteed uninterrupt- ed trade and an inflow of money when foreign goods crossed borders. New empires invariably sought direct control over the world trade routes, their ambitions trimmed by no less ambitious neighbors. Sooner or later the sides arrived at mutually acceptable compromises.

4 See: Izgnanie normannov iz russkoy istorii, Russkaya panorama, Moscow, 2010, available at [http://statehistory. ru/books/11/Izgnanie-normannov-iz-russkoy-istorii/]. 5 See: Th.S. Noonan, The Islamic World, Russia and the Vikings, 750-900: The Numismatic Evidence, Variourum Collected Studies Series: CS 595, Ashgate Publishing, UK, 1998, p. VII. 6 See: Th.S. Noonan, “Why Vikings First Came to Russia,” Jahrbücher für Geshichte Osteuropas (Stuttgart), No. 34, 1986, p. 346. 7 See: A.N. Sakharov, Diplomatiia Drevney Rusi. IX-pervaia polovina X vv., Mysl Publishers, Moscow,1980, p. 28. 8 See: Ibid., p. 36. 9 See: M.I. Artamonov, Istoria Khazarii, Hermitage, Leningrad, 1962, p. 366. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Before the Arabs, the Göktürks, who set up the Great Turkic Khaganate, pursued similar foreign policy priorities. Their state clashed with the Hephthalites and Iran; after defeating the Hephthalites, the Turks and Iran vacillated between military clashes and drawing closer to protect their obviously common, including economic, interests. Until the rout of the Sassanides, the interests of the Great Silk Road partners guaranteed more or less regular trade from China via Iran or along the northern route (via Khwarezm and Khazaria). Hostility and even armed clashes could not be avoided because of the internal instability in the state of the Sassanides and the interests of Byzantium as the third power. The world of the late Sassanian Iranians and their contemporaries, the Turks of Central Asia, could no longer remain a system of mutually exclusive values. The Muslim merchants could no longer bring their merchandise from China to Europe across the lands that once belonged to the Sassanides: since the latter half of the 7th century, they were controlled by the Arabs; the relations between them and Byzantium were hostile. This made the Eurasian steppes the only transit territory, which forced the Caliphate to spare no effort to establish peaceful relations with the local peoples and states where their attempts to establish control over the trade routes with the use of force had failed. The new power did not pave new roads, but followed in the footsteps of its predecessors. After the collapse of the Sassanian Empire, the Arabs found it much harder to press forward in the Cauca- sus; they were stopped by the Khazars led by the Khagans of the Ashina dynasty, relatives of the ruling dynasty of the Great Turkic Khaganate. Under Caliph Harun al-Rashid (786-809), who concluded “peace and union” with the Khazars, an end was put to several decades of fierce fighting.10 In the same 8th century, the Arabs were engaged in never-ending fighting with the Central Asian Turks, whereby the Arab viceroys of the captured lands of Maverannahr strengthened the walls along the borders with the Turkic relatives of the Khazars.11 Hostilities invariably ended in establishing peaceful contacts with the survivors and ensuring security of the Great Silk Road, which brought huge incomes to merchants and intermediaries. Under Harun al-Rashid, peaceful contacts were restored both in the Caucasus and Central Asia and trade was revived. He dispatched a diplomatic mission headed by Tamim ibn Bahr to the capital of the Uyghur Khagan on the Orkhon, probably to receive political guarantees of the safety of the trade route between the Caspian and China.12 The exact dates of the mission have not been established: it is dated to the period between 752 and 822. This is of little importance: what is important is the fact that there was a turn toward peaceful coexistence and closer diplomatic relations between the Caliphate and powerful rulers of the Turkic steppes. Still, one of the suggested dates—before 808—allows us to relate the event to the last years of Harun al-Rashid. It was during his rule that integration between the west and the east of the empire became more pronounced and, hence, peace on the Caliphate’s eastern borders became a priority. Depending on the political context, international trade along the Silk Road in the Caspian area used the two competing routes that connected Central Asia with Europe: either the northern one from the Khwarezmian city of Gorgan across the north Caspian areas of Khazaria, or the southern route across the Southern Caspian and Horasan and further on to Asia Minor and Byzantium. Gorgan and Dikhistan, the south Caspian areas, deserve special mention in the context of the relations between the Rus and Khazars and the way trade was organized with the Arab Caliphate. For more than a century, Khazaria, which had gained a lot of military might and influence, remained in control of the areas of intensive trade turnover; this was also promoted by a peace with the Caliphate established in the 9th century. According to historical sources, the Khazars managed to create and play the first fiddle in trade-political unions that ensured the movement of commodities from the north to the south to the central areas of the Caliphate and from the east to the west to the borders of Western Europe.

10 See: Z. Buniyatov, Azerbaijan v VII-IX vv., Baku, 1965, p. 115. 11 See: V.V. Bartold, “Turkestan v epokhu mongolskogo nashestviia,” in: Sochinenia, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1963, pp. 121, 163-164, 229-230. 12 See: F.M. Asadov, Arabskie istochniki o tiurkakh v rannee Srednevekovye, Baku, 1993, pp. 31-33. 144 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Arabian Authors on Trade between the Khazars and the Rus

A comparative analysis of two outstanding works of Arabic geographic literature supplies us with information of how trade was organized, which political forces were involved, and how long the routes organized by the Khazars remained in use. Here I have in mind the instructions related to postal communication and trade routes compiled in the 9th century by Abu’l-Kasim Obaidallah ibn Abdal- lah Ibn Khordadbeh,13 head of the postal service under Caliph al-Wasiq (842-847), and a geographic work by Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn al-Husain ibn Ali al-Masoudi (896-956), a well-known traveler, historian, and geographer.14 Ibn Khordadbeh wrote in the mid-9th century; those who published the text and those who studied it suggested that there was an earlier version written no later than 233 M.E. (847/848) and a later version dated 882-886. Dutch Orientalist M.J. De Goeje, who published and translated the fullest version, based his conclusion about the two versions and their dates on the fact that the shorter one, published by his predecessor Barbie de Meynard, did not mention a single fact that took place after 233/847; the fuller version published by M.J. De Goeje contained two extracts that can be reliably dated to the period between 882 and 886.15 Al-Masoudi’s geographical work appeared nearly a century later than Ibn Khordadbeh’s.16 The author posed himself the task of finding out whether the Caspian had an outlet to other seas. The famous geographer, historian, and traveler followed the southern Caspian coast to ask the local people whether the Caspian Sea was connected to the Azov Sea of which he had read in various sources. No one confirmed his surmise and merely pointed to the mouth of the Volga from where the Rus came to sow fear among the Caspian Muslims.17 The ancient geographer used his stories about the Rus and their military inroads to hold forth about the water routes and trade roads that connected Western Europe with the Caspian. The same author left us the fullest account of one of the biggest military enterprises of the Rus who marched on Arran in Northern Azerbaijan in the early 10th century. A comparative analysis of what Ibn Khordadbeh and al-Masoudi, separated by a century, wrote reveals the changes that occurred in politics and trade in the Caspian region between the mid-9th and the mid-10th centuries. Ibn Khordadbeh left us the fullest description of all sorts of routes used by Jewish merchants who traded with Europe in Chinese goods. There is no agreement among the researchers about the origins of these merchants and the terms which described them. The main sources and the extant manuscript copies offer various spellings of the same term: ar-rosaniyya, ar-rodaniyya, ar-radhaniyya, and ar-rahdaniyya. Experts in Arabian texts came forward with different versions of the term’s etymology, which survived in Ibn Khordadbeh’s work. Early in the 10th century, ibn al-Faqih used the same term (independently of the primary source) in his Kitab al-Buldan. Those who tried to explain the term and clarify its etymology associated it with a trading corporation, nautae rhodanici, which carried construction materials in Southern France (derived from Rhodanus, the Latin name of the River Rhona), or with al-Rasan area in the Iranian Interfluve. Prominent Dutch expert in Arabian studies Reinhart Dozy relied on the manuscript of a book by ibn al-Faqih (ar-rahdaniyya)18 to suggest that the word should be translated

13 See: Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik. Auctore Abu’l-Kasim Obaidallah ibn Abdallah Ibn Khordadbeh. Quae cum versione gallica edidit M.J. De Goeje, Lugduni Batavorum, Leiden, 1889. 14 See: Murudj az-Zahab wa Maadin al-Djauhar, Talif Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn al-Husain ibn Ali al-Masoudi, Dj. 1-4, Dar sadir, Beirut, 2005. 15 See: Ibn Khordadbeh, Kniga putey i stran, Transl. from Arabic, commentaries, investigation, indices and maps by Nailya Velikhanova, Elm, Baku,1986, p. 18. 16 In several places al-Masoudi mentioned that he wrote his book in 332 AH (943/944) (see: Murudj az-Zakhab, op. cit., pp. 142, 144). 17 See: Ibid., p. 95. 18 See: Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, ed. by M.J. de Goeje, Vol. 5, Lugduni Batavorum, Leiden, p. 270. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION from the Persian as “those who know the routes.”19 Some scholars believed that the merchants got their name from the city of Rey in Iran.20 Relatively recently, Polish Orientalist Franciszek Kmietowicz joined the polemics with a fairly original interpretation of the term as veredarius (courier).21 Nailya Velikhanova, a prominent Azeri expert in Arabian studies and the author of the contemporary commented translation of Ibn Khordadbeh’s work, is convinced that these merchants descend- ed from the Medina Jews and that the term ar-rasaniyya applied to them was derived from the ar- Rasan village on the Arabian Peninsula. Many researchers, however, rely on the fact that in certain other manuscripts of Ibn Khordadbeh’s text, the word ar-rahdaniyya (which looks similar to ar- rasaniyya) is applied to Jewish merchants; they argue that this term stemmed from the Persian and meant “those who know the routes.” J. Marquart22 and Russian Orientalist V. Rozen23 accepted this interpretation. This looks more plausible since the merchants about whom Ibn Khordadbeh wrote in his time probably cooperated with the Jews who had fled Iran driven by the movement of Mazdak and who settled in Byzantium and Khazaria (more details below). The academics have not yet agreed on what Ibn Khordadbeh wrote about the trade of the Rus; he called them people from “Saqaliba” and said that they traded in furs and swords which they brought from the remotest corners of the country of Saqaliba to the “Rum Sea” and paid taxes to Byzantium; they also brought their merchandise up the Don to the Khazarian city of Hamlij,24 where they paid taxes to the Khazars.25

Al-rahdaniyya, A Jewish Merchant Guild

Ibn Khordadbeh’s story about the Rus is wedged between two parts of the story relating to the trade routes used by the Jewish merchants called ar-rasaniyya.26 There is a frequently aired opinion (shared at one time by Vasili Bartold) that this inset, which cut the otherwise complete story about the Jewish merchants into two parts, was hard to explain.27 This explains an opinion that the story about the Rus was added by later copyists.28 Nailya Velikhanova, the author of the Russian translation of and detailed commentaries to Ibn Khordadbeh’s work, agreed with M.J. De Goeje, who published Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik, and arrived at the conclusion that the piece about the Rus belonged to Ibn Khordadbeh himself.29 The Azeri Orientalist ended her textological analysis with this conclusion; she obviously did not intend to look for a logical connection between the stories about the Rus and the al-rahdaniyya merchants. Prominent Orientalist Omelyan Pritsak, an American of Ukrainian extraction, offered numerous arguments in favor of different authors of the extracts about the al-rahdaniyya and the Rus. He be-

19 R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes, Tome Premier, E.J. Brill, Leyde, 1881, p. 562. 20 See: S. Katz, The Jews in the Visigothic and Frankish Kingdoms of Spain and Gaul, Cambridge Mass., 1937. 21 See: F. Kmietowicz, “The Term of Radaniyya in the Work of Ibn Khurdadbeh,” in: Folia Orientalia, Tome XI, 1969, Krakow, 1970, pp. 169-171. 22 See: J. Marquart, Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzuge, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 24, 350. 23 See: A. Kunik, V. Rozen, Izvestia al-Bekri i drugikh avtorov o Rusi i slavianakh, Vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1903, p. 142—“those who know the routes.” 24 There is any number of different opinions about the term’s origin and interpretation, as well as about the localization of Hamlij. For want of space I will not go into details and will not offer my own opinion. Today, it is commonly believed that this word is related to the Turkic Khanbalyk (the city of Khakan), that is, the capital city. This name could have been applied to that part of the Khazarian capital Itil where the khakan’s residence was located. 25 See: Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik, p. 154. 26 See: Ibidem. 27 See: V.V. Bartold, Arabskie izvestia o Rusakh, p. 827. 28 See: Ibid., p. 826; B.N. Zakhoder, Kaspiyskiy svod svedeniy o Vostochnoy Evrope: Gorgan i Povolzhie v IX-X vv., Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 85-86; Ibn Khordadbeh, op. cit., p. 38. 29 See: Ibn Khordadbeh, op. cit., p. 39. 146 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION lieved that the extracts about the Rus related to a much later period than the information about the trade routes of the al-rahdaniyya merchants. This does not suggest, however, that the story about the Rus was a later addition made either by Ibn Khordadbeh or later copyists. Pritsak wrote that the story about the Rus appeared later than a certain account of the routes used by the al-rahdaniyya merchants; by this time, he argued, the corporation of Jewish merchants had lost much of its significance and control over the trade routes. In the 830s, when the Khazar fortress Sarkel appeared in the Volga-Don interfluve (the closest distance between the two rivers), the Rus merchants replaced the Jewish merchants and controlled all the major trade operations in the area until 886, the latest date for Kitab al- Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik. The piece about the Rus merchants was inserted after 830 by certain officials while Ibn Khordadbeh included this combined text in the second version of his book.30 The fact that the first part of the text about the Jewish merchants describes the southern sea routes of al-rahdaniyya deserves special mention. These people traded mainly in hides, furs, swords, and slaves imported from the northern countries and Western Europe. They were moved across the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the ocean to India and China, where they bought spices and incense to be sold in Byzantium and Western Europe. The first part concentrates on the marine routes of the Jewish merchants; the land route is mentioned in order to explain how goods were moved from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea port of Kulzum. A land route from Antioch to the Euphrates and down the river to Baghdad was another alternative; commodities were moved to the Tigris and down the river to Ubulla on the Gulf coast. In the first part the author was concerned with marine routes which, according to the author of Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik, were “interconnected.” The second part of the same story about the Jewish merchants was subtitled “about their land routes.”31 It deals exclusively with the land routes that connected Europe and China; the chain of trade hubs that stretched from Western Europe to Northern Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, Iran, India, and China arouses involuntary admiration of the merchants’ enterprising spirit and the scope of their trade. We do not know whether any of them covered the entire stretch of the route, but nor can we say that this was impossible. Let us note that what Ibn Khordadbeh wrote in his work predated Marco Polo by five centuries.

The Rus Merchants and Transcaspian Trade

I have already written that a large part of the trade routes ran across the Muslim-controlled territories in which the Muslim merchants and Muslim governments created conditions that were max- imally favorable for the financial and technical support of long-distance international trade; there was an infrastructure of haulage trade points and a network of reliable trade agents,32 which made it possible to use clearing instruments analogous to bills of exchange.33 The same part of Ibn Khordadbeh’s account contains the following comment, which deserves special mention: “Sometimes they select routes outside Rumiyya (Byzantium.—F.A.) in the country of Saqaliba, from which they reach the Khazar city of Hamlij, the Jurjan (the Caspian.—F.A.) Sea, and go on to Balkh, Maverannahr, the country34 of the Tuguzguzes, and China.”35 The furs, hides, and

30 See: O. Pritsak, “Arabic Text of the Trade Route of the Corporation of Ar-Rus in the Second Half of the Ninth Century,” in: Folia Orientalia, Tome XII, 1970, pp. 243-254. 31 Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik, p. 154. 32 See: Ibid., p. 123. Ibn Khordadbeh wrote that every year the Caliphate spent 159 thou. dinars or 676 tons of gold (a large sum at that time, about $17.6 million in today’s terms) to maintain the stations in good shape. 33 See: Taqi al-Din al-Maqrizi, Kitab ighathat al-Umma bi-Kashf al-G’humma (Book of Help to the Nation in Dis- closing the Distress), Cairo, 1957, p. 68. Al-Maqrizi quoted a story about a merchant who showed a piece of strange-looking silk paper, which in Khanbalyk, the capital of China, was worth five dirhams. 34 Wurt in the text. Nailya. Velikhanova believes that the word is derived from Turkic yourt—fatherland or country. 35 Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik, p. 155. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION swords that the Jews exported to India and China were made in the areas to the north of the Black Sea and the Caspian. The Rus merchants paid tribute to the Khazars, “one sword and one squirrel skin per fireplace.”36 Al-Masoudi demonstrated no mean knowledge about the quality of different furs brought to the Khazar capital by the Volga tributaries.37 Ibn Khordadbeh wrote that the Jewish merchants could move these commodities across By- zantium or across Khazaria. In both countries there were influential Jewish communities that had arisen after the two waves of Jewish exodus from Iran. The first left Iran after the victory of the Maz- dakit movement to settle in Byzantium; the second wave consisted of the Jews who embraced the Mazdakit idea of equality and, therefore, had to move out of Iran when the movement was defeated. Neighboring Khazaria proved to be the nearest place. After installing themselves in the hub of north- south and north-east trade, these communities produced the bulk of the al-rahdaniyya merchants. Khazaria proved to be the best place: very much in line with Turkic nomadic statehood, the khakans of the Ashina clan kept away from the life of their settled subjects and their religion. Russian historian Lev Gumilev, who analyzed these circumstances in the political and religious context of Byzantium, the Arab Caliphate, and the Slavic world, concluded that as soon as the economically flourishing Jewish community in Khazaria got the chance to realize its political ambitions, it moved to the fore in east-west trade. The Khazar Khaganate, the rulers of which adopted Judaism, developed into a merchant state with a complicated and not entirely disentangled, political structure with a Jew- ish king and a Khazar Khagan with very limited powers.38 While the Jewish merchants probably owned the goods they moved to the sea ports from which ships went to India and China, this did not suggest that they were shipbuilders and seafarers. They probably moved their merchandise by Byzantine ships in the Mediterranean or by ships of agents from other Chris- tian and Muslim countries of the same region. In the south, it was the Arabs who moved goods across the sea; the fairly developed system of crediting, mutual settlement, and chartering of vessels guaranteed the merchants their right to the goods, while agents in different trade hubs followed their instructions. While goods were moved from one point to another along the long trade route, they changed owners several times, that is, goods were sold in big trading centers. This deprived the original owner of a large chunk of his potential profit, which meant that he wanted to remain an owner as long as possible. This was not equally obvious when commodities were moved across Khazaria: from the mouth of the Volga, where the Khazar capital stood, the goods had to be delivered to the haulage points controlled by the Arabian Caliphate and the local Muslim dynasties. Ibn Khordadbeh wrote that the goods of Jewish merchants crossed the Caspian to reach Gorgan; significantly, he mentioned this in the section dealing with the land routes of the al-rahdaniyya. The Rus followed the same route on their ships: Ibn Khordadbeh wrote about this in the text adjoining the section dealing with the naval routes of the al-rahdaniyya. Abaskun was the most important of the Gorganian ports.39 The bulk of the merchandise was brought there to be moved further on to the east. Neither the Khazars nor the Jews had ships suitable for crossing the fairly stormy Caspian Sea. Only al-Masoudi mentioned the boats (zawariq) the Khazars could have used to bring commodities from the north along the Volga tributaries to Itil.40 Vasili Bar- told believed that this did not mean that the Khazars had their own ships and insisted that, since they politically dominated the Rus, they regarded the ships the Rus seafarers used as their own.41 In fact, Ibn-Haukal wrote that the Khazars brought what they grew in their fields and kitchen-gardens to the river to move everything to the capital by the river. This meant that they travelled by water; al-Masou- di wrote that they had river boats, but no sea-going vessels.

36 Povest vremennykh let. 37 See: Muruj az-Zahab, op. cit., pp. 143-144. 38 See: L.N. Gumilev, Drevniaia Rus’ i Velikaia step, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1989, pp. 113, 136-137. 39 See: Muruj az-Zahab, op. cit., p. 146. 40 See: Ibid., p. 143. 41 See: V.V. Bartold, Arabskie izvestia o Rusakh, p. 832. 148 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

So it was probably the Rus who moved Jewish commodities from Itil across the Caspian; they could have transferred their own goods together with the cargoes of the Khazar and Muslim merchants. In the 9th century, the scope of these operations was probably considerable: Ibn Khordadbeh quoted his friend poet al-Buhturi, who wrote that the merchants with trade contracts signed in Hamlij (capital of Khazaria) enjoyed a lot of respect in Baghdad.42 It seems that the Rus landed not only in Abaskun, but also along the entire stretch of the southern and eastern coast: according to Ibn Khordadbeh, “they sail the Gorgan Sea and land anywhere they like.”43 This is indirectly confirmed by what al-Masoudi wrote later, in the 10th century, when the picture had changed radically. The Rus, no longer peaceful merchants and seafarers, had become cruel invaders and plunderers. They attacked the coasts of Gorgan, Tabaristan, Gilan, Deylam, and Azerbai- jan,44 of which they knew enough to be aware that they were worth plundering. Separated by one century, Ibn Khordadbeh (mid-9th century) and al-Masoudi (mid-10th century) left us two very different accounts of how the Rus penetrated the Caspian area and sailed the Cas- pian Sea. Ibn Khordadbeh wrote about trade operations: the Rus brought traditional northern commodities and acted as reliable counteragents of the Khazar-Jewish and Muslim merchants; like many other merchants in the Muslim world they followed the familiar trade routes as far as possible to come back with as much money as they could earn. Sometimes they sold their cargoes on the southern Caspian coast; sometimes they went as far as Baghdad. Arabic sources say nothing about their eastward trade expeditions with merchandise: it seems that the East received the goods bought by Muslim merchants in Abaskun and other south Caspian ports from the Rus who delivered them. According to Ibn Khordadbeh, the route went from Gorgan to Balkh and Maverannahr and across the land of the Tuguzguzes to China. There is the opinion that as late as the Middle Ages, during Arab times, the Oxus (Amu Darya) or one of its branches could have flown into the Caspian along the currently dried-up riverbed called Uz- boy. Information supplied by ancient geographer Strabo suggests that in pre-Arab times, the Uzboy was navigable and goods were moved along it. This confirms the opinion that in antiquity the now dried-up branch of the Oxus was a stretch of one of the trade routes that connected China, India, and the world of Classical Antiquity. Travelers used the Oxus branch to reach the eastern Caspian coast, crossed the sea, entered the Kura River and moved up the Kura and its tributaries to finally find themselves on the Black Sea coast. It remains unclear how this trade route functioned: we still do not know what sort of ships were used to cross the Caspian and who manned them. If this route did exist, the Greeks, the best seafarers of antiquity who sailed along the Black Sea coasts, could have sailed the Caspian as well. The question is: can we rely on information about the Rus trade operations and their crossing the Caspian to surmise that this route was functioning at the time we are talking about? Indeed, those engaged in trans-Caspian trade could have been tempted to go up the Uzboy. We cannot exclude the possibility that the ships were unloaded at the mouth of the Uzboy, but did the Amu Darya run into the Caspian? It seems that archeological finds, which have already proven that the Rus moved further east along the Silk Road, can serve as indirect evidence that the Uzboy was navigable as far as the Amu Darya main riverbed. Even if the Uzboy was no longer navigable in the 9th century, the caravans that started at the Khwarezmian city of Gorgan (today Konya-Urgench) could still reach the Caspian shores to board ships of the Rus. A vague echo of this can be found in the legend about buildings with green cupolas amid impassable marches to the east of Khwarezm as told by al-Garnati, a 12th-century author. A chance traveler found an emerald bowl there and presented it to the shah of Khwarezm who, together with his warriors, tried to reach the green cupolas. Failing, he decided to dig a channel from Amu Darya to the buildings and died without accomplishing this task.45

42 See: Kitab al-Masalik Wa’l-Mamalik, p. 124. 43 Ibid., p. 154. 44 See: Murudj az-Zahab, op. cit., p. 146. 45 See: Puteshestvie Abu Hamida al-Garnati v Vostochnuiu i Tsentralnuiu Evropu (1131-1153 gg.), Published by O.G. Bolshakov and A.L. Monggayt, GRVL, Moscow, 1971, p. 47. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 149 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The road from Kwarezm to Europe started in Gorgan; it ran across the north Caspian steppes, the home of the Oghuzes and Pechenegs. It also ran to Khazaria, Rus, and the north where Bjarmia was situated. An alternative to the route across the Caspian, it became actively used in the 10th century when political shifts in the relations among Khazaria, Byzantium, Kievan Rus, the Caliphate, and the nomads of the Northern Caspian and Northern Black Sea coastal area made navigation in the Caspian too hazardous.

Conclusion

After spreading across Sassanian Iran, the Arabs had to find the best possible mode of coexistence with the local people and political forces in the region. For political and ideological reasons, the clash with Byzantium led to a never-ending confrontation. The war with the Turks of Central Asia was exhaustive; for the first time the Arabs had to switch, on the border, from offensives to defens- es.46 For nearly one-and-a-half centuries, the Arabs remained locked in a stubborn struggle against the Khazars for control over the Central Caucasus. It was under Harun al-Rashid that the confrontation was finally resolved in a peace treaty and an alliance.47 In this way, by the early 9th century, the Arab Caliphate reached the Chinese borders, having solved the task of creating trade and political alliances to ensure security of the trade routes from China to the Middle East that crossed the former Sassanian possessions. The southern route from China to Western Europe could function only if there was sustainable peace on the border between the Caliphate and Byzantium. This was never achieved: the relations between the two empires remained strained: they were locked in an ideological and economic conflict. Short periods of peace were cut short by regular inroads of Arabic border units into Byzantium. In 838, Caliph al-Mut’tasim (833- 842) completely routed the Byzantine army; the enemy captured the fortress of Amorium, one of the strongholds in the west of Asia Minor. This was predated by a no less destructive march of Byzantine Emperor Theophilos (829-842), which was probably deliberately coordinated with the anti-Arab re- volt of the Khurramites led by Babak in Azerbaijan (816-836). It comes as no surprise that Caliph al- Mut’tasim moved against the city of Amorium, the home city of the Amorium dynasty of Byzantine emperors. Significantly, the Khazar Khaganate, an enemy of the Caliphate in the Central Caucasus in the previous period, kept away from Babak and the Khurramites, this neutrality being the price of the Khazars’ involvement in the trade between China and Europe and Europe and the Middle East carried out across the Eurasian steppes and the Caspian. Five years before Emperor Theophilos’ march on the Arabs, the Khazars asked Byzantium to help them build a border fortress, Sarkel, at the place where the Don and the Volga interfluves were the shortest. The emperor dispatched one of his architects to help the Khazars. The fortress built in the shortest time possible stirred up heated discussions among historians, who have not yet identified the enemy against whom the fortress was built in the first place. Later, it was used for tax collection and inspection of the goods the Rus merchants brought to the Volga to move them down the river to the Caspian and further on across the sea to the Middle East. At the time the fortress was built, Hungarians had already appeared in the Black Sea steppes. They never threatened the Khazars, but paid tribute to them; the Khazars had arranged their political system and brought the Arpad dynasty to power, which in 896 led the Hungarians beyond the Carpathians to Pannonia.48

46 See: V.V. Bartold, “Istoria Turkestana,” in: Sochinenia, Vol. II, Part I, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1963, p. 244. 47 See: Z. Buniyatov, op. cit., p. 115. 48 See: M.I. Artamonov, Istoria khazar, Hermitage, Leningrad, 1962, p. 346. 150 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It seems that the Sarkel Fortress changed the balance of power and alliances; as a result, Byzan- tine found itself in political and trade isolation. Constantinople expected that its assistance to the Khazars would allow it to control the nomads of the Black Sea steppes. This did not happened which is indirectly confirmed by the disagreements that erupted with the Khazars while the fortress was still being built. Mikhail Artamonov, who assessed the Byzantine influence and its real contribution to the project, pointed out that it had nothing in common with Byzantine architecture. The columns that architect Petronas brought remained unused. The fortress was built by local people, while the Byzan- tine architect limited himself to technical suggestions. He was dispatched to the region to assess the recent changes brought about by the Khazars’ adoption of Judaism, arrival of the Magyarok (Hungar- ians),49 and the Rus as a new political force. The Khazars probably outwitted Byzantine diplomats: it was at that time (834) that the above-mentioned embassy of the Rus Khagan came to see the emperor of Byzantium. Some researchers even thought that the embassy staffed with Scandinavians had been dispatched by the Khazar Khagan. Even if those who sided with the hypothesis were wrong, the embassy could have been dispatched jointly by the Rus and the khagan: by that time they were tied together by a political and trade agreements to protect the trade routes across the Caspian against the politically loose nomads who threatened the smoothly organized trade. Oleg’s capture of Kiev tipped the military-political balance in favor of the rapidly growing state of the Rus; Scandinavian units arrived from the north to be strengthened by the local Slavs who paid tribute. The growing state had to select the main axis of advance and directions of peaceful trade. The marches on Constantinople that followed early in the 10th century show that at first the new state continued the confrontation probably inherited from the traditional policy of the Rus Khaganate based on an alliance with Khazaria and a triple trade alliance between Kiev, Khazaria, and the Arab Caliphate. There is information that the semi-legendary peace treaties of the early 10th century offered favorable conditions to the Rus merchants in Constantinople and in transit trade across Byzantium. This means that political and trade priorities were changing. Propaganda of Christian Orthodoxy among the Kievan political elite was equally important. Constantinople could finally end its political isolation by allying with Kievan Rus. There was no hope of convinc- ing the Rus to challenge the Arab Caliphate, the formidable sworn enemy. It could have been weakened, however, by destroying the triple Khazar-Arab-Rus alliance. As a result, in the first half of the 10th century, the Rus marched on the Caspian to plunder the Muslim regions. This upset the political component of the international trade alliance and destabilized the situation inside Khazar- ia. The former allies resumed their rivalry up to and including acts of retribution carried out by the Muslim guard of the Khazar Khagan against the Rus units returning with rich spoils of war pro- cured in Azerbaijan and Gilan in 913 and 943. The Caliphate resorted to diplomatic measures to bypass the Jewish government of Khazaria to contact the Volga Bulgars who although ruled by the Khazars were still their rivals. The well-known embassy of Ahmad Ibn Fadlan was dispatched between the two largest marches of the Rus on the Muslim Caspian regions (921-922). Khazaria was facing isolation and was finally isolated: even if the march of Prince Svyatoslav supported by nomads (Oghuzes) of 965 did not destroy the Khazar Khaganate, it shattered it to its very foundations. The Rus captured Sarkel and started calling it Belaya Vezha (White Tower, a literal translation of the Khazar name into Slavic). This ended the three-hundred-year long era of Khazar domination in international trade in the region.

49 See: M.I. Artamonov, op. cit., p. 302. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Denis KOTENKO

Ph.D. Candidate at the Altai State Pedagogical Academy (Barnaul, the Russian Federation).

SOME FEATURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA AT THE END OF THE 1980S-BEGINNING OF THE 1990S

Abstract

his article examines the special fea- of factors of political, territorial, and ethnic T tures of separatism in Georgia and the affinity that are instrumental in bringing to- Northern Caucasus through the prism gether the radical forces in the region.

Introduction

The sovereignization processes set in motion by the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the appearance of new radical elements that strove to seize power not only within their own national territorial entity, but also to achieve their once lost independence by taking advantage of Center’s inabil- ity to manifest real political force. When the struggle for independence becomes the be-all and end-all and the right to the nation’s self-determination is placed higher than the state’s territorial integrity, searching for allies in the same political situation and rapprochement with them becomes the only possible alternative of further existence. In this article, I’ll try to show the urgency of this problem for the Caucasus and how kindred and territorial interrelations among the ethnicities living there are influencing the political processes in the region.

Separatism during the Soviet System Crisis

Perestroika and the democratization processes that took place during the crisis of the Soviet system at the end of the 1980s assisted the nation-state building of the peoples living in Soviet territory. During the crisis of the Soviet system, the “democratic wing” of the Russian Congress of Peo- ple’s Deputies headed by Boris Yeltsin began advocating the establishment of a democratic, legal state in Russia,1 which became a serious threat for preserving the Soviet Union. In order to prevent

1 See: A. Surkov, Chechnia v plameni separatizma, Volga Region Academic State Service Publishers, Saratov, 1998, p. 17. 152 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Union leadership placed the stakes on Russia’s autonomies. The law adopted on 26 April, 1990 on dividing functions between the center and federation constituencies granted the autonomies full power in their territories.2 The call of the Union leadership to separatism was not only heard by the party leadership of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., but also put into effect. The Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic on 27 November, 1990. The adopted declaration pointed out that even if the republic entered into treaty relations with other republics, or states, or an alliance of states, it would still “retain full power in its own territory.”3 The Union analysts hit the bull’s eye. The Russian autonomies, tempted by the law of 26 April, 1990, rushed to adopt their own declarations on state sovereignty, which paved the way to signing a new Union agreement. When it adopted the “Law on Autonomies,” the Russian Federation found itself faced with real disintegration into dozens of individual state entities. The dangerous process of sovereignization created by the Union Center gave Boris Yeltsin reason to declare in December 1990 at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union: “The Union leadership is regrouping its forces in order to hold onto its previous position at all costs.” Re- lying on the Russian Declaration on State Sovereignty, Boris Yeltsin promised the Federation constituencies maximum expansion of rights, but within the framework of the Russian Federation. The stakes the Union leadership placed in its fight against Boris Yeltsin on the autonomies, which were to have the same status as the Union republics, caused the sovereignization processes to escalate out of control. The weakening of the political and ideological power of the Communist Party slowly led to the ensuing vacuum being filled with political forces propagating radical ideas. The new state-building that began during the collapse of the Soviet Union quickly exhausted the democratic ideas and moved separatism to the forefront.

Chechen Separatism

During political chaos, when the right to self-determination becomes more important than state integrity, new political players inevitably appear who, taking advantage of the situation, strive for power. In Chechnia’s political life, along with the official administrative structures, sociopolitical movements began to appear that were in favor of national independence. In March 1991, the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCP) adopted an address to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic Doku Zavgaev that justified the impermissibility of holding the referendum in the republic scheduled by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet for 17 March, 1991 on the question of preserving the Soviet Union, referring to the absence of Chechen laws on referendum.4 The political crisis developed at lightening speed not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Chechnia. At the second NCCP congress in July 1991, Dzhokhar Dudaev became the leader of the movement and stated that Chechnia was not part of the Soviet Union or the R.S.F.S.R. The only legal power body was the executive committee of the NCCP headed by Dzhokhar Dudaev. The August coup of 1991 and the fight of the Russian president against the coup instigators gave the Chechen separatists the green light to seize power in the republic. The leadership of the republic headed by Doku Zavgaev, which was losing its influence, supported the August coup of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) and this immediately deprived it of support from the Russian leadership. As a result of the seizure of power on 3 September, 1991, Dzhokhar Dudaev declared the overthrow of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic.

2 See: The Law on the Division of Powers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Subjects of the Federation, 26 April, 1990, available in Russian at [http://cominf.org/node/1142062416]. 3 Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, 27 November, 1990, available in Russian at [http://constitutions.ru/archives/2915]. 4 See: A. Surkov, op. cit., p. 60. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 153 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

So, in the struggle against the Russian leadership headed by Boris Yeltsin, the Union leadership suffered defeat by playing in favor of the autonomies and trying to bring their status up to that of the Union republics. In turn, the Russian leaders, in their attempt to take the initiative in the struggle for influence on the autonomies, played a decisive role in overturning the old authorities and bringing the radical elements to power. For example, in September 1991, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia Ruslan Khasbulatov actively encouraged the deputies of the republic’s Supreme Soviet to carry out self- disbandment.5 As a result, both the Union and Russian leadership suffered defeat in the struggle for the autonomies. On 8 October, the NCCP declared itself to be the only power in the republic and on 27 October, 1991, it held an election for Chechen president. According to the results of the election, Dzhokhar Dudaev became president of the Chechen Republic. In his first decree, Dzhokhar Dudaev declared that on 1 November, 1991, the Chechen Republic became a sovereign state. The arrival on the political scene of separatist political organizations and politicians on the wave of sovereignization of separate regions and ethnicities in the Caucasus made it imperative to search for allies in the region that were in a similar political situation.

Special Features of Separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The crisis of the Union system prompted the peoples living in Georgia to raise their national status. An assembly of representatives of the Abkhazian people on 18 March, 1989 in the village of Lykhny in the Gudauta District of Abkhazia adopted the Address of Representatives of the Abkhazian People to General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev, asking for its status to be changed from an Autono- mous Republic to a Soviet Socialist Republic. According to the participants in the assembly, the formation of the Abkhazian S.S.R., equal in status to the Georgian S.S.R., was necessary since the Un- ion, Union-republic, and republican systems of administration were hampering the socioeconomic, cultural, and political development of Abkhazia.6 At the same time, the problems that had accumulated in ethnic relations and the collapse of the Union system in Georgia encouraged consolidation of the Georgian population against the decisions of the Lykhny assembly.7 At a meeting held on 9 April, 1989 in Tbilisi, the activists of unofficial parties stated: “While Soviet power exists, we will not be able to abolish the autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”8 The calls for Georgia to secede from the Soviet Union led to a severe rebuff by the authorities, which resulted in the meeting being scattered by Soviet troops, leading to victims among its participants. The upswing in national self-awareness of the Georgian people was prompted by their desire to preserve a united Georgia during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Against the background of statements to abolish the autonomies, the Soviet of People’s Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region adopted a decision at an emergency session on 10 Novem- ber, 1989 on transforming the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.9 In response to this, Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s movement organized a multi-thousand march on the capital of South Ossetia Tskhinvali on 23 November, 1989. The march was unable to break into the city, the columns of Zviadists being halted on its outskirts by the police and city residents.

5 See: Ibid., p. 65. 6 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, Compiled by M. Volonskiy, V. Zakharov, N. Si- laev, Russkaia panorama, Moscow, 2008, p. 92. 7 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1992, Compiled by K. Kazenin, Evropa, Moscow, 2007, p. 38. 8 Ibidem. 9 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 165. 154 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The rise in status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Socialist Republics would be a serious political challenge for Georgia with respect to establishing an independent state. The borders of the Georgian S.S.R. had not been legally regulated since the Agreement between Russia and Georgia of 7 May, 1920 was signed, and after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia an unofficial administrative-territorial border formed between Russia and Georgia.10 On 25 August, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian S.S.R. adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty, in which the Abkhazian S.S.R. declared state sovereignty.11 The Declaration adopted raised the republic’s political status and paved the way for entering the Union Treaty and Agreement with the Georgian S.S.R.12 On 20 September, 1990, the Soviet of People’s Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty, in accordance with which the status of South Ossetia was raised from an autonomous region to a Democratic Republic in the Soviet Union. Decla- ration of the sovereignty of the South-Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic was a necessary condition for its further participation in the Union Treaty.13 In the throes of the fight for Georgia’s independence, the authorities in Tbilisi took rapid steps to legally assess the changes in the republic’s national-state and administrative-territorial structure. On 26 August, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian S.S.R. declared the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian S.S.R. of 25 August, 1990 to be null and void.14 The decision of the Soviet of People’s Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of 20 September On Sovereignty and the Status of South Ossetia was also deemed null and void.15 As a natural extension of these events, at the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Georgia held on 28 October, 1990, the “Round Table—Free Geor- gia” election bloc headed by dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia sustained an overwhelming victory. The countdown began. On 16 October, 1990, the Soviet of People’s Deputies of the South Os- setian Democratic Republic approved the decision it had made about transforming the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic16 and deemed the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Georgia in South Ossetian territory illegitimate.17 Bent on entering a Union Treaty that could extricate South Ossetia from the crisis in its relations with Georgia, the Soviet of People’s Deputies decided to change the name of the South Ossetian So- viet Democratic Republic to the South Ossetian Soviet Republic,18 as well as to give it the right to participate in signing the new Union Treaty.19 By removing the word “Democratic” from the republic’s name, the deputies counted on signing the Union Treaty on an equal footing with the other Soviet Republics. In order to approve the political status of South Ossetia as a Soviet Republic, elections were held on 9 December, 1990 to the Supreme Soviet of the South Ossetian Republic. The elections were boycotted by residents of Georgian villages. The Supreme Soviet of Georgia assessed the elections in South Ossetia as infringement on the territorial integrity of Georgia and adopted a Law on Abolishment of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region on 11 December, 1990.20 South Ossetia represented a region with a population of 100,000 people, mainly populated by Ossetians, but with a large (30%) Georgian community. Since most of the population in the region

10 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 180. 11 See: Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic, 25 August, 1990, available in Russian at [http://www.apsuara.ru/portal/node/1013]. 12 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1992, p. 64. 13 See: K. Tanaev, Osetinskaia tragedia, Evropa, Moscow, 2008, p. 265. 14 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 23. 15 See: Ibid., p. 24. 16 See: Ibid., p. 174. 17 See: Ibidem. 18 See: Ibid., p. 175. 19 See: Ibid., p. 176. 20 See: Ibid., p. 27. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 155 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION was Ossetians, it was difficult for Georgia to count on keeping South Ossetia within Georgia. So in the small hours of 6 January, 1991, police and Georgian national guard squads were brought into the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali. In compliance with the Law on Local Administration during the Transition Period adopted on 29 January, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia also began eliminating the Soviet power bodies in Abkhazia, which according to the Abkhazian Constitution comprised the foundation of the political system. The local state administration bodies in the districts and cites were to be appointed by the Supreme Soviet of Georgia and headed by a prefect.21 The Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia assessed the appointment of the prefect of the Gali District as the first step toward eliminating the constitutional structures and then the statehood of Abkhazia.22 As a result, Georgia’s striving to make Abkhazia an ordinary administrative-territorial entity prompted the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia to raise the question of establishing equal relations with Georgia.23 Expression of the people’s will acquired great significance in the political self-determination of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia. For example, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia abandoned the idea of a referendum on preservation of the Soviet Union, which was supposed to be held on 17 March, 1991, and scheduled a referendum on restoration of Georgia’s independence on 31 March, 1991. As a result of the referendum held in Georgia on 31 March, 1991, its participants unanimously voted for the restoration of state independence. Based on the referendum results, on 9 April, 1991 the Act on Restoration of Georgia’s Independence was adopted.24 The idea of building an independent Georgian state during crisis of the Soviet system met with resistance from the Abkhazians and Ossetians. The increase in national self-awareness and consolidation of the Georgian population with respect to preserving territorial integrity led not only to recognizing the role of the Georgians in the state, but also to a bloody conflict in South Ossetia and a political conflict in Abkhazia. At the same time, at the referendum on preservation of the Soviet Union held on 17 March, 1991, 98.6% of the participants in the voting in Abkhazia25 and 99% of the participants in South Ossetia26 were in favor of preserving the Soviet Union. As we know, according to the official results of the referendum, 76.4% of the participants in the voting were in favor of preserving the Soviet Union. So it can be concluded that the Soviet model of relations between the Center and the republics can largely be blamed for the worsening political situation in the country. Building republics according to the national, and not territorial attribute has always been a powerful lever of influence on their policy. At the end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s, this mechanism led to a breakdown in former political relations, as a result of which the authorities of the breakaway republics began to call for their independence. Since the new authorities did not have real support for reinforcing all the political changes that occurred, the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus only had one alternative in the current conditions—to create their own state entity.

“Kindred” Separatism

A special feature that strengthened the plans for nation-state building of the breakaway Caucasian republics was the fact that the Abkhazians and Ossetians had kindred ties with the peoples of the North Caucasian constituencies of Russia, who actively supported the separatist strivings of their brothers.

21 See: Ibid., p. 39. 22 Ibid., p. 110. 23 See: Ibid., p. 109. 24 See: Ibid., p. 45. 25 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1922, p. 75. 26 See: K. Hajiev, Geopolitika Kavkaza, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Moscow, 2001, p. 162. 156 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

At the 3rd Congress of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) held in Sukhumi on 1-2 November, 1991, representatives of the Abazin, Abkhazian, Avar, Aukhovek- Chechen, Darginian, Kabardinian, Lak, Ossetian (North and South Ossetia), Circassian, Chechen, and Shapsug peoples entered an Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. In its practical activity, the CMPC announced the beginning of the restoration of the sovereign statehood of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus and declared the CMPC to be the legal successor of the Repub- lic of the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasian (Mountain Republic) formed on 11 May, 1918. Ac- cording to this agreement, the CMPC had all the attributes of state power. The administration bodies were built on the principle of division of power27 and consisted of the Congress of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the President, the Parliament, the Caucasian Communities, and the Arbitration Court.28 The power bodies were formed by delegating authorized representatives. The city of Sukhumi was chosen as the location (headquarters) of the ruling bodies of the CMPC.29 In terms of the content and nature of the Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peo- ples of the Caucasus and Provisions on the Ruling Bodies of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the CMPC replaced the state power bodies. In its activity, the CMPC not only tried to recreate the Mountain Republic, but also do this by means of Russian and Georgian territory. According to Chairman of the Confederation Parliament Musa Shanibov, transformation of the CMPC from a confederative union into a state entity was to occur as the Russian Federation continued to collapse.30 Chechnia also began to make claims on leadership in the struggle against Russia in the CMPC. In March 1992, an address was adopted at an emergency meeting of the Chechen parliament to the peoples of the Caucasus asking them to urgently unite to fight Russia and accelerate the creation of Caucasian armed forces.31 Such calls showed that Chechnia was demonstrating the same leadership qualities as it did during the 19th century Caucasian war against Russia. Discontent with the policy of the Russian government also spread in North Ossetia. The Osse- tians demanded that representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense immediately arm them, otherwise they threatened to take weapons by force in the contingents deployed in the republic. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia Akhsarbek Galazov said that if the war in South Ossetia was not stopped, the Supreme Soviets of South and North Ossetia would hold a joint session in Vladikavkaz or Tskhinvali and declare the creation of a united Ossetia—an independent state outside Russia, in so doing breaking the federative agreement.32 The situation in North Ossetia was also complicated by the activity of the CMPC, which decided to manifest itself as a real political force capable of resolving the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. President of the CMPC Musa Shanibov asked the Georgian side to cease fire, warning of the possibility of armed forces being brought into South Ossetia. “Our appearance in Vladikavkaz is the last warning,” said Musa Shanibov. “A voluntary squad will enter Tskhinvali not to help one of the warring sides, but to perform a peacekeeping role.”33 Aggravation of the political situation in the Caucasus, when the CMPC appeared on the political scene as a real player capable of resolving any political problems without Russia’s interference, scared the Russian democrats and forced them to take rapid measures to stop the conflict. Blood spill- ing in South Ossetia was stopped, but the problem itself was not resolved, since a war broke out, this time in Abkhazia.

27 See: Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus of 2 November, 1991, available in Russian at [http://www.nasledie.ru/oborg/2_4/0002/agnk_17.html], 18 July, 2012. 28 See: Provisions on the Ruling Bodies of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus of 2 November, 1991, available in Russian at [http://www.nasledie.ru/oborg/2_4/0002/agnk_16.html], 18 July, 2012. 29 See: Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus of 2 November, 1991. 30 See: A. Surkov, op. cit., p. 117. 31 See: A. Kazikhanov, “Chechnia prizyvaet sozdat kavkazskuiu armiiu,” Izvestia, 10 March, 1992, p. 1. 32 See: A. Kazikhanov, “Rossiia opazdyvaet k sobytiam v Iuzhnoi Osetii,” Izvestia, 29 May, 1992, p. 2. 33 A. Kazikhanov, “Severnaia Osetiia: situatsiia kontroliruetsia,” Izvestia, 16 June, 1992, p. 1. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 157 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Provisional Supreme Soviet of Georgia made a decision in February 1992 to transfer to the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921, in which relations with Abkhazia were not defined. Moreover, the Georgian authorities said that relations with Abkhazia would temporarily, until a new model was developed, be built on the former principles. Taking into account political reality, Abkhazia asked Georgia to restore broken state relations on a new equal basis.34 On 14 August, 1992, the troops of the Georgian State Council began a military operation against Abkhazia. Adopting Abkhazian conditions on equal relations could lead to not only Abkhazia, but also other regions of Georgia demanding such privileges, which might bring about the collapse of Georgia. Guided by the aim of preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity, the Georgian leadership decided on military interference. The conflict that began in Abkhazia led to acute aggravation in the Northern Caucasus. The CMPC accused Russia of supporting the Georgian troops that invaded Abkhazia. The CMPC’s address to the world community, organizations for the protection of human and national minority rights, the leaders of Western and CIS countries, and the League of Islamic States said that, relying on their superiority in armored vehicles and aviation, as well as on the Russian airborne regiment deployed in Abkhazia, the Greater and Lesser empires (the Russian Federation and Georgia) had set themselves the goal of squelching the island of freedom and national statehood in the Caucasus (first Abkhazia and then the Chechen Republic) and, in so doing, closing off the mountain peoples of the Caucasus from freedom and sovereignty.35 The statements by the CMPC about the imperial ambitions of Russia and Georgia show that this war was perceived as a continuation of the struggle for independence begun by the Caucasian war of the 19th century. During the Caucasian war, the Georgian population of the region actively promoted further reinforcement of the Transcaucasus as part of Russia, integrating its elite into the military- estate and economic structures of the Empire and becoming a considerable social bastion of the Rus- sian state in the region.36 The image created of Russia and Georgia as empires striving to conquer the free peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Abkhazia caused the leaders of the separatist elements to take more decisive steps. The leaders of the CMPC, alarmed by the situation in Abkhazia and striving to show that their organization was a real political force, announced that volunteers would be sent to Abkhazia to carry out combat activity and called for denouncing the Federative Agreement with Russia.37 Abkhazia became a political arena where the future Chechen warlords won popularity and authority. Particular mention should be made of Shamil Basaev who, in his own words, “decided to come with the boys to fraternal Abkhazia to fight against the Georgian politicians who have un- leashed war with the blessings of the Russian politicians.”38 Shamil Basaev fought more for Chech- nia’s political interests, striving to defend the independence of his republic on “alien ground.” For such figures as Basaev, Abkhazia was one of the stages in the new Caucasian war that had to be stopped in order for the Caucasian peoples to resolve their internal problems without the participation of a third side, that is, Russia and Georgia. Basaev’s statement showed that the separatists were trying to unite and prevent Russia and Georgia from having a political influence on the Cauca- sus. The common political interests in strengthening independence based on a confederative state turned the conflict in Abkhazia into a common cause for the residents of the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus. The national composition of the participants fighting in Abkha-

34 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1992, pp. 80-81. 35 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 236. 36 A. Tsutsiev, Atlas etnopoliticheskoi istorii Kavkaza (1774-2004), Evropa, Moscow, 2006, p. 18. 37 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, pp. 238-238. 38 Belaia kniga Abkhazii. Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva. 1992-1993, Compiled by Iu. Voronov, P. Florensky, P. Shustova, Moscow, 1993, available at [http://www.apsnyteka.narod2.ru/v/belaya_kniga_abhazii/glava_2_voina_v_ abhazii_v_publikatsiyah_i_dokumentah/index.html], 19 July, 2012. 158 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION zia confirms these convictions: Chechens, Ingush, Adighes,39 Ossetians, Kabardinians, Balkarians, Circassians, and Karachays.40 The ethnic factor was of immense significance in the conflict in Abkhazia because the Abkha- zians are ethnically close to the Kabardinians, Adighes, Shapsugs, and Circassians, and all of these peoples form the single Abkhaz-Adighe ethnicity. Since they had common ethnic and historical roots, these kindred peoples could not ignore the conflict in Abkhazia, and the ideas of independence within the framework of the future state only intensified the desire of the volunteers to participate in the war. The factor of ethnic solidarity and support was manifested in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The ethnoterritorial contradictions between North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic formed in the summer of 1992 led to an armed conflict over the Prigorodny District of North Ossetia. The week-long war ended in more than 600 losing their lives and more than 40,000 losing their homes.41 The Ir team from South Ossetia fought on the side of North Ossetia. The problem of interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in Georgia and the Northern Caucasus gradually became the trump card in the policy against Russia and Georgia in the region. Basaev accused Russia and Georgia of causing the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and said that, in his opinion, “the Ossetians and Ingush could come to terms themselves, in a peaceful and civilized way.”42 The interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in the Caucasus was well noted by Geor- gian President Eduard Shevardnadze. “One separatist movement gives rise to another. If there had been no Abkhazian war, there would have been no Chechen war,” said he.43 In other words, conflicts in the territory of the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus could not exist independently and, due to their territorial and ethnic affinity and common political interests, peoples striving for independence and to build their own nation-state entity could only uphold their ideas and interests together. The example of the political and territorial interests of Chechnia is the most vibrant. When the republic essentially became independent from Russia, against the background of the war in Abkhazia it began to call on the North Caucasian republics to join together to fight Russia, furthermore sending the residents of its republic to Abkhazia to fight. Chechnia viewed the war in Abkhazia as part of the struggle for independence from Russia, and the fighting experience gained there allowed the Chechen insurgents in the future to successfully act in the future against the troops in Russia in the war that had already begun in Chechnia itself. We believe that the ethnic factor was one of the decisive issues in the conflicts in Georgia and the Northern Caucasus. For example, people from the Northern Caucasus participated in the hostilities in Abkhazia and Ossetians from North Ossetia went to South Ossetia; then people from South Ossetia helped their “relatives” in North Ossetia in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in the Caucasus also explains the fact that the Russian and Georgian armies were unable to destroy the separatist movements in the region. The military is not to blame for this at all since it was not faced with a specific enemy, but with peoples whose rights had been infringed upon in the years of the Russian Empire and Soviet power. Historically, the interrelation among the conflicts in the Caucasus was manifested in the fact that the fight for independence was perceived as a continuation of the struggle for independence that started during the Caucasian war.

39 See: Belaia kniga Abkhazii. Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva. 1992-1993. 40 See: N. Akkaba, “Severokavkazsky faktor v abkhazo-gruzinskom konflikte,” APSNYPRESS, 25 May, 2012, available at [http://apsnypress.info/analytic/6359.html], 19 July, 2012. 41 See: A. Tsutsiev, op. cit., p. 87. 42 Belaia kniga Abkhazii. Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva. 1992-1993. 43 Quoted from: N. Broladze, “Eduard Shavardnadze: ‘Poseem mir, nozhnem blagopoluchie,’” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 15 July, 1996, p. 3. Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 159 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Conclusion

The democratic trends that gained momentum during the collapse of the Soviet Union failed to become a reality. Radical ideology and separatism quickly came to replace the democratic ideas. In the absence of real political power in the Caucasus capable of curbing the radical forces, the ideas of independence led to separatist movements looking for support beyond their republics among kindred peoples in the same political situation. Due to the territorial and ethnic kinship of the people living in them, the military conflicts in the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus could not exist independently. Ethnic and political solidarity motivated the Caucasian peoples, who could only defend their interests, ideals, and territorial integrity with weapons in hand. The common political interests in fighting for independence helped the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus to arrive at the idea of creating a common state based on Russian and Georgian territories. In such conditions, the Chechen factor became pivotal largely because the Chechens perceived the war as a continuation of the struggle for independence since the time of the Caucasian war. Chech- nia gradually became the leader of the rebel movement in the Caucasus. The interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in the Caucasus became the main special feature determining their great sociopolitical consequences for the region in the future. Tied by multiple kindred bonds, historical friendship, and common political goals, the peoples of the Caucasus will always react sensitively to political events that occur in any of the Caucasian regions. In such conditions, the authorities of the regional states must pursue a well-balanced policy keeping in mind the opinions of all the national groups. The conflicts in the Caucasus have still not been resolved largely due to the absence of such a policy. 160 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Index THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Vol. 6, 2012

Author Article No. Pp.

Nazim MUZAFFARLI PREFACE 1 7

GEOPOLITICS

Jannatkhan THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM EYVAZOV IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS: POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND CONFLICTS 1 8 Kamran THE FORCE OF LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE SHAFIEV IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1 22 Alla CONFLICTS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: YAZKOVA AN ABKHAZIAN CASE-STUDY 1 32 Przemys³aw LEGITIMACY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADAMCZEWSKI THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH REPUBLIC IN COMPLIANCE WITH SOVIET LEGISLATION 1 39 Hans-Joachim GREAT POWER PREDICAMENTS AND SPANGER THEIR ROLE IN THE CAUCASUS CONFLICTS 1 48 Grigory THE “VULTURES” OF TROFIMCHUK THE CAUCASIAN PEOPLES 1 57 Niyazi THE ARMENIAN-AZERI NIYAZOV NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AZERBAIJAN’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 2 7 Polina ZETI, INFORMATION OPPOSITION Elena TO EXTREMISM AS A WAY TO REDUCE TENSION ZHIRUKHINA IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS 2 22 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 161 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp.

Andrey INDIVISIBLE SOVEREIGNTY: SETBACKS OF ZAKHAROV FEDERALISM IN THE CAUCASUS AND AROUND IT 2 30 David THE CONFEDERATION OF MATSABERIDZE MOUNTAIN PEOPLES OF THE CAUCASUS AND THE CONFLICT OVER ABKHAZIA 2 39 Parvin SEA POWER IN CAUCASIAN GEOPOLITICS: DARABADI PAST AND PRESENT 2 48 Argun BAªKAN, Tanju TOSUN, THE MAIN PARAMETERS OF Aydýn TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND IBRAHIMOV THE POST-2008 CENTRAL CAUCASUS 2 58 Vladimir THE U.S.-IRI: RELATIONS EVSEYEV IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT 2 65 Fikret ON THE GEOPOLITICAL AND SADYKHOV LEGAL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 2 74 Alexander PSEUDO CONFLICTS AND RUSETSKY QUASI PEACEKEEPING IN THE CAUCASUS 2 82 George SECURITY THREATS AND TARKHAN- DE-SECURITIZATION OF CONFLICTS MOURAVI IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS 2 89 Martin RUSSIA AND THE CONFLICTS HOREMU IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS 3 7 Dmitry GEORGIA’S FLIRTATION WITH IRAN AND SHLAPENTOKH ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 3 15 Andrei KAZAKHSTAN AS A PLATFORM FOR GALIEV HOLDING TALKS ON SETTLEMENT OF THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 3 28 Kamal COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL MAKILI-ALIYEV HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE ATROCITIES IN SYRIA AND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 3 35 Khazar ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT AND IBRAHIM EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY 3 42 Marat INSTABILITY IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: ILIYASOV REASONS, FACTORS, AND IMPLICATIONS 3 48 Israpil THE CONFLICT IN THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT SAMPIEV AND THE CITY OF VLADIKAVKAZ: THE CRUX OF THE MATTER, THE STATE’S ROLE, AND WAYS TO RESOLVE IT 3 58 Sofia THE FIRST RUSSO-CHECHEN CAMPAIGN MELIKOVA (1994-1996): CAUSES AND FACTORS OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION 3 72 162 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp.

Gulshan EUROPEAN MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND PASHAEVA THE PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH 4 7 Rauf NARRATIVE AND RECONCILIATION: GARAGOZOV, POSSIBLE STRATEGIES OF Rena NARRATIVE INTERVENTION KADYROVA IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 4 16 Nadana U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY FRIDRIKHSON IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: THE FORMATION OF NEW TRENDS 4 25 Ekaterina LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION AND TREGLAZOVA SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS 4 31 Ramil THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF DURSUNOV ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA 4 38 Makka THE OSSETIAN-INGUSH CONFLICT: ALBOGACHIEVA CAUSES AND ECHOES OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE FALL OF 1992 4 44 Alexander GEORGIA: KUKHIANIDZE CONFLICTS, CRIME, AND SECURITY 4 54 Sergey NATIONAL STATE CRISIS IN THE MUSLIM ISRAPILOV REGIONS OF NON-MUSLIM COUNTRIES: A REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN CASE STUDY (IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY) 4 63

GEO-ECONOMICS

Vladimer ECONOMIC COMPONENT OF PAPAVA THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT 1 61 Giulia THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRELZ PROTRACTED CONFLICTS: OLTRAMONTI ABKHAZIA, SOUTH OSSETIA, AND VIOLENCE MITIGATION 1 72 Alexander SOUTH CAUCASIAN ENERGY TRANSIT: KRYLOV PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1 81 Stanislav ZHUKOV, Oksana CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN: REZNIKOVA LONG-TERM ENERGY STRATEGIES 2 98 Amil ECONOMIC POTENTIAL MAGERRAMOV, OF THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS UNDER Hajiaga THE PRESSURE OF RUSTAMBEKOV TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS 2 127 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 163 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp.

Zurab REGIONAL ENERGY PROJECTS GARAKANIDZE FOR GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 3 80 Abdurakhman RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OF HUSEYNOV THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (A NORTH CAUCASIAN CASE STUDY) 3 88 Yakub MIGRATION CATASTROPHE IN ARMENIA AS YAGUBOV A CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONFLICT 4 76 Saadat RUSTEMOVA- DEMIRZHI STRATEGIC GAMES OVER THE CASPIAN 4 82 GEOCULTURE

Elmir GULIEV THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS: FROM THE SOVIET UNION’S DISINTEGRATION TO THE NEW CAUCASIAN POLICY 1 89 Lyubov THE ABKHAZIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT: SOLOVYEVA THE PAST AND PRESENT OF ETHNOCULTURAL TIES 1 111 Teymur AZERBAIJAN: INDEPENDENCE AND ATAEV THE RELIGIOUS PARADIGM (THE ISLAMIC QUESTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TWENTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE) 2 135 Lyubov NATIONAL CULTURES SATUSHIEVA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE 19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES 2 146 Ahmet ISLAM AND THE CONFLICT YARLYKAPOV IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS 3 97 Rasim EAST-WEST: AN INTERCULTURAL DIALOG. ABDULLA FROM MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO INTEGRATION 3 108 Davud PROLIFERATION OF RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL KAKHRIMANOV EXTREMISM IN DAGHESTAN: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS 3 116 Irina THE CAUCASIAN WAR OF PASHCHENKO, THE 19TH CENTURY: Amiran CIVILIZATIONAL CONFLICT AND URUSHADZE ITS FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICS 4 87 Beka CHEDIA CONFESSIONAL CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AS LATENT INTERSTATE DIFFERENCES 4 94 Ibrahim EROSION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AND RASHIDOV ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE NORTH CAUCASIAN REGION 4 105 164 Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp. GEOHISTORY

Jamil “THE IRANIAN EPOPEE” OF THE BOLSHEVIKS: HASANLI THE DEEPENING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN CASPIAN (1920-1921) 1 119 Oleg EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL KUZNETSOV INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES IN TRANSCAUCASIA 1 145 Rizvan MONUMENTS OF MATERIAL CULTURE AND HUSEYNOV CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS (A FORTRESS OF IREVAN CASE-STUDY) 2 156 Zurab ANOTHER LOOK AT ONE OF PAPASKIRI THE FALSE HISTORICAL POSTULATES OF THE ABKHAZIAN SEPARATIST IDEOLOGY: ON THE QUESTION OF ABKHAZIA’S POLITICAL-STATE STATUS IN 1921-1931 2 168 Irada THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CONFLICTS, IDENTITY, BAGIROVA AND INTEGRATION IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS 3 127 Revaz THE CONFLICT-PRONE POTENTIAL GACHECHILADZE OF THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF EMPIRES: POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC APPROACH (A CASE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN TRANSCAUCASIA, 1917-1923) 3 134 Ikram GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR AND AGASIEV THE SETTLEMENT POLICY OF CZARIST RUSSIA IN THE CAUCASUS IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY (A GERMAN COLONIZATION CASE STUDY) 3 146 Rafik ETHNOTERRITORIAL CHANGES IN THE CAUCASUS SAFAROV IN THE 19TH-20TH CENTURIES 4 115 Mehmet EASTERN TRADE DURING THE HELLENIC TEZCAN AND ROMAN PERIODS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST-WEST TRADE IN THE CAUCASUS 4 125 Farda KHAZARIA, BYZANTIUM, AND THE ARAB ASADOV CALIPHATE: STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OVER EURASIAN TRADE ROUTES IN THE 9TH-10TH CENTURIES 4 140 Denis SOME FEATURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOTENKO CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA AT THE END OF THE 1980S-BEGINNING OF THE 1990S 4 151