Yerevan Press Club ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN: SEARCHING FOR NEW MODELS OF DIALOGUE This research was funded through a Department of State Public Affairs Section grant, and the opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the Author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State. YEREVAN PRESS CLUB www.ypc.am Yerevan 2019 2 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 THORNY TRACK-2 9 DIFFERENT VIEWS ON COMMON PROBLEMS 19 ANNEX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FOCUS-GROUPS AND IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 46 ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY OF THE MONITORING OF THE COVERAGE OF ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS 49 ANNEX 3: CHARTS OF THE MONITORING 54 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The main purpose of this study was to consider the feasibility and prospects of revival of the Track-2 diplomacy and the development of appropriate recommendations. Although it was conceived and supported by the US government even before the political changes in Armenia, its relevance was confirmed by the intensification of the dialogue at the official level between Yerevan and Baku in the summer of 2018. Certain characteristics of the renewed interest in the informal communication was the visit of the Azerbaijani journalist Shahin Hajiyev to Yerevan in February 2019, and the interest of his Armenian colleagues towards the trip to a neighboring country. The work in the framework of the study, including the preparatory period and the summarizing of the results, was carried out for 14 months. Its components were as follows: - The “Historical background” (see Chapter “Thorny Track-2”), which reflected the path of “civil diplomacy” over the past 30 years (of course, it to some extent reflects the subjective hindsight of the project implementers, but in any case it allows to present the main trends of the process). - Focus group discussions on a single list of issues (see Annex 1). Both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia, 4 focus groups were formed, which included representatives of NGOs, the expert community, journalists and the mixed group of the social network activists. - In-depth interviews (on the same questionnaire as in focus groups) with representatives of official structures, opposition politicians, NGO leaders, experts and journalists. Both in Azerbaijan and Armenia, interviews were conducted with 20 respondents (40 in total). - Monitoring of mass media of different political orientation. In each country, four media were selected, which were studied over two different time periods (from September 16 to October 15 and from November 16 to December 15, 2018) - to identify possible dynamics in approaches, in particular, taking into account the campaign for the elections to the National Assembly of Armenia on December 9, 2018, as well as different reactions to the results of the meetings of Azerbaijani and Armenian officials and international mediators (see the monitoring charts with quantitative data in Annex 3). The monitoring studied the frequency and attitude of each media to the 24 conditional statements related to the Karabagh conflict and formulated jointly by the project partners (see methodology and list of statements in Annex 2). The last three components of the study formed the basis for the analytical notes, which became the main product of this project (see Chapter “Different views on common problems”). The study confirmed that the intensity and content of the informal dialogue between the parties to the Karabagh conflict are currently at the lowest level since the beginning of the confrontation in 1988. Separate initiatives supported by international organizations and involving certain groups of Armenians and Azerbaijanis remain little known to the public. In contrast to the situation before, around, 2010, when the contacts and interaction between the non-governmental organizations and the journalists were carried out relatively autonomously from the official negotiation process, today their revival is directly dependent on the interest of decision-making personalities and structures at the state level. At the same time, as practice shows, the lack of communication in an informal format, adversely affects the nature of the official process of the problem resolution. 4 Distrust in matters regarding Nagorno-Karabagh largely determines the nature of relations not only between the representatives of Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, but also within each of them. Therefore, initiatives of a disruptive, challenging, “shock” nature, such as joint peace-making statements by the well-known public figures, or loud demonstrations rejecting stereotyped perceptions of each other, often lead to discrediting their initiators in the eyes of the public, or at best are ignored by the latter. However, as the results of the study show, the parties depart from the total denial of the idea of Track-2 diplomacy, although they are not inclined to treat it with the enthusiasm inherent in the times after the end of the “hot phase” of the conflict in 1994. The linkage between the Track-1 and Track-2 does not imply the acceptability of artificial, manageable, manipulative forms of dialogue, such as so-called “civil platforms for peace” or meetings organized at the nomenclature level. Those were forgotten as quickly as sharply they had activated after the relative freezing of the vibrant interaction. This does not mean giving up any formats of dialogue - be they initiated by absolutely independent organizations, “first ladies”, clerics or representatives of the Armenian or Azerbaijani diaspora - the main thing is that they are aware of the responsibility for any steps that can aggravate contradictions, and sincere interest in the modest but positive final result of their initiatives. The study of different aspects of the conflict reveals which of them have a perspective in determining the content of the civil dialogue, and which are at risk zone and can hinder mutual understanding. Naturally, the factor of persons involved in the initiative with a specific content, as well as the degree of openness of the latter to the general public, is also important. At the same time, as the secondary analysis of the research data shows, preferences are given to the open contacts that send positive signals to the whole society. One of the peculiarities of the study was the respondents' perception of their own role in it. Some of them, participating in the discussions or answering the questions, considered the problems regardless of their own affiliation to a particular party to the conflict, while the other part proceeded solely from their own national interests and aspirations. This difference of approaches has particularly affected the content of the thematic sections on the methods of settlement (peaceful or military), the formats of the negotiation process and, of course, the models for solving the problem. It is in these very sections that the most fundamental differences are recorded. And the conflict between the desired and the realistic, given the aspirations and capabilities of the other side, makes it difficult to find compromises. Meanwhile, these disagreements are not the basis for the denial of the dialogue. The recognition of the priority of a peaceful settlement (even if a certain part of the societies allows war as an alternative in case of failure of negotiations) serves as a basis for at least attempts to find a common language. The mediation of the Minsk Group co-chairs, despite all the expressed discontent and preferences of other formats, is taken for granted and, at least, does not impede the dialogue. And actually the search for a settlement model is one of the tasks of interaction, therefore the temporary status quo despite the contradictions regarding its duration is another reality on the basis of which contacts can be built today. It should be borne in mind that any dialogue without a progress towards a solution to the problem sooner or later leads to fatigue. This factor, along with other obstacles, was one of the causes of the Track-2 crisis in the previous stages. 5 Another significant difference is due to the mutually controversial perceptions of the cause- and-effect relationships. For the majority of Armenian respondents, the involvement of the representatives of Nagorno-Karabagh in the frameworks of official negotiations and civil diplomacy, the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, the removal of restrictions on various forms of contacts and other steps towards reducing tension are conditions for an effective settlement process. For their Azerbaijani opponents all these steps should follow the result of the progress in the agreements achieved at the official level. A characteristic feature of the study was the relative proximity of opinions of different categories of Armenian respondents, as well as the media, which became the object of monitoring, on most issues, while in Azerbaijan the positions differed significantly. This has affected attitudes connected to the “war and peace” thematics, and the assessments of the international organizations activities. The comparison of the results of this study with the statements of the authorities and other categories of the public of previous years allows us to conclude that the current “disposition” of many aspects of the conflict was formed in the last three years and it was largely influenced by the April escalation of 2016. To be precise, the most tangible changes caused by the four-day war occurred in the mood of the Armenian public, including in the circles most prone to compromise – they became much tougher. Whereas in Azerbaijan the effect of the war and the changes of positions caused by it are less noticeable. In fact, the difference in the level of uncompromising attitude to many problems in Armenia and Azerbaijan has been significantly smoothed. On the one hand, this greater polarization of views may be a cause for concern, but on the other, it creates an environment in which participants in a potential dialogue are ready (or, more precisely, not ready) for it to the same extent.