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8410406

Mura, Susan Zachary Swan

GRICEAN PRAGMATICS AS RHETORIC: PROSPECTUS AND PROOF FOR A METATHEORY

The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1984

University Microfilms i nternstionsiso o n .z e e b Road, Ann Arbor, Ml48106

GRICEAN PRAGMATICS AS RHETORIC:

PROSPECTUS AND PROOF FOR A METATHEORY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Susan Zachary Swan Muray A.A., A.B., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1984

Reading Committee: Approved By

James L. Golden

Victor D. Wall

Neal P. Johnson Adviser Department of Communication © Copyright by Susan Zachary Swan Mura 1984 To the memory of my grandparents,

Kelly Edmund Bennett

and

Ola Tela Zachary Bennett

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation represents the conclusion of five and one half years of graduate work at The Ohio State University. At the times when I thought of giving up, certain people were always there to pick up the pieces and help me put events back into perspective. This has been especially true during the past two years; I would like to thank these individuals publically. First, I would like to thank my adviser. Dr. James L. Golden. He has set an example for me, not only of how to be a scholar and a teacher, but of how to be a better person. I would also like to thank Drs. Vic Wall and Neal Johnson; Dr. Wall for lending some measure of consistency to my chaotic graduate career and for being open enough to not hold my first year against me; Dr. Johnson for his encouragement, for always being there when I needed him, and for being adventurous enough to sit on a non-experimental dissertation committee. Thanks go to Bill Brown and Wayne Beach for reading early drafts of the metatheory. Although we still do not agree on all points, their suggestions have been important to the development of my theory. Finally, many, many thanks go to the friends and family who have weathered this with me. Special thanks must go to a few of these friends. From OSU, Lee Snyder (for his fancy footwork) and Beth Waggenspack (for everything) deserve thanks. From Dayton, Joan and A.J. Wagner, Tom and Charlotte Zawodny, Helen and John McKibben, and Mark and Nancy Frey, are thanked for keeping me sane. And most of all, thanks must go to my husband, Paul. He has read every draft, retyped chapters which the computer ate, and tolerated the heckles of coworkers as he cooked, cleaned, shopped, entertained, and commiserated with me throughout. And he still loves me.

iii VITA

November 30, 1956, Born - Tampa, Florida

1975 ...... A.A., Brevard College, Brevard, North Carolina

1977 ...... A.B., Duke University Durham, North Carolina

1978-1983 .... Teaching Associate, Department of Communication,The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1980 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1983-1984 .... Instructor, Department of Communication and Theatre, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

"Linguistic Sexism: A Rhetorical Perspective." In The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 3d ed. James L. Golden, Goodwin P. Berquist, and William E. Coleman. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/ Hunt, 1983, pp. 151-159. With Beth M. Waggenspack.

"Licensing Violations: Legitimate Violations of Grice's Conversational Principle." In Conversational Coherence: Form, Structure, and Stratecv. Eds. Robert T. Craig and Karen Tracy. Beverly Hill, Ca.: SAGE Publications, 1983, pp. 101 -115.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Communication

Studies in Rhetoric. Professor James L. Golden

Studies in Communication Theory. Professors Victor D. Wall and Jack E. Douglas.

Studies in Experimental Psychology. Professor Neal F. Johnson. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

VITA IV

LIST OF FIGURES ...... V

Chapter

I. A MODERN VIEW OF STYLE: AN INTRODUCTION . 1

II. PRAGMATICS: SEMANTICS IN WOLF'S CLOTHING? 10

The Origins of Pragmatics: Charles S. Peirce 11 Pragmatics as Semiotic: Charles Morris. 13 Pragmatics as Speech Act: John Austin . 19 The Controversies of Pragmatics...... 25

III. PRAGMATICS : PERSPECTIVES ON A METATHEORY. 31

General Criteria for a Metatheory. 33 Specific Criteria for a Metatheory 36

IV. PRAGMATICS: PROSPECTUS FOR A METATHEORY . 63

Basic Assumptions for a Pragmatic Theory 63 Critical Elements for a Pragmatic Theory 67 Summary: A Metatheory for Pragmatics. . 111

V. GRICEAN PRAGMATICS: A REVIEW OF THE THEORY 115

A General Overview of Grice's Theory . . 117 The Development of Grice's Meaning Theory 119 An In-depth Review of Conversational Meaning 132

VI. GRICEAN PRAGMATICS : A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY 160

A Comparison of Basic Assumptions 161 A Comparison of Critical Elements, 168

VII. GRICEAN PRAGMATICS : EVALUATION AND EXTENSION 194

VIII. A THEORY FOR MODERN RHETORIC ...... 211 ENDNOTES

Chapter I 216 Chapter II 218 Chapter III 222 Chapter IV 226 Chapter V 236 Chapter VI 241 Chapter VII 246 Chapter VIII 249

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 250

VI LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Schemata of Grice's Categories of Meaning 118

vii A MODERN VIEW OP STYLE; AN INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

The goal of rhetoric, since the first manual on speech was written by Corax, is to understand humankind as communicators or symbolic beings. This is true whether the understanding is sought as "knowledge for the sake of knowledge" or as part of a "pervasive effort...to better 1 communication. To accomplish such a goal,

...we must study our symbolic behavior. We understand ourselves by studying our own creativity with symbols. We must, accordingly, cope with the meaning of symbols, with relationships of symbols to reality and to our values, with the relationships of symbols to each other, and with symbols as the content of our communications.

The theorist and practitioner of rhetoric then must investigate and understand the importance of the relationship between language— what the ancients referred to as style— and communication. The two are integrally and inseparably related, despite linguist Noam Chomsky's claim 3 to the contrary. Language is the overt representation of that symbolic activity which is crucial to human existence.

It is a constant reflection of the communication process which is the basis for forming conceptualizations of both 4 self and other. Through it, we objectify subjective reality 2

and, in so doing, create ourselves and our society. We then

crystalize this reality in the very means of its creation— 5 language.

One may go about studying this phenomenon of language

in many ways, focusing on its phonology to understand the

sound system, its syntax to understand the sequencing

system, or its semantics to understand its conventional meaning system. To stop here, however, is, according to

George Campbell, to remain outside the proper province of

rhetoric. It is to be only concerned with form, ignoring the

intent of eloquence "to convey our sentiments into the minds 6 of others, in order to produce a certain effect upon them."

Using only this approach, one would be led back into the

continuing struggle between those who have "trumpeted the virtues of oerspicuity" and those calling for "eccentric ■ 7 ornateness." This struggle over proper form, represented by

Aristotle, Quintilian, the Augustans, and Bacon on the side of perspicuity and the Sophists, Cicero, Lawson, and Peacham on the side of ornamentation, has continued for centuries; yet it is no closer to being resolved now than it was in ancient Greece. To rise above this petty controversy then, the rhetorician must understand that the most important aspect of language lies in its function, not in its form.

While grammar or form is important in that it is the art of conveying thoughts in the words of a particular language, eloquence or rhetoric supercede form in being "that art or 3 8 talent by which discourse is adapted to its end.” As

Campbell so succinctly put it, "where grammar ends eloquence 9 begins." There also should begin the rhetorical/ communicational study of language, focusing on its pragmatics— the use of language to communicate.

What this means is that the domain of pragmatics, as defined by Morris as the study of the "relation of signs to

interpreters," falls properly and naturally into the realm of rhetoric and not into the traditional realm of 10 linguistics. It is concerned with understanding the practical use of language and the communication competence of the typical speaker rather than the structure of language 11 and the linguistic competence of the ideal speaker. This focus calls for a union of form and meaning within a social context toward an understanding of the function of language and the nature of the language users. Although rhetoric has always been concerned with the "strategic and pragmatic aspects of communication," implicit in the nature of pragmatics is a need to go beyond the traditional realm of focus as public address to include the varied aspects of rhetoric which are found in everyday conversational 12 discourse. This expansion however has had to await the arrival of a modern paradigm for the field of rhetoric— in essence, a "new rhetoric." This shift represents a change in the primary metaphor of the field; using Ehninger's systems of rhetoric, the metaphor becomes one of sociology. 4 13 representing a strong concern with human relations. This

approach provides a means for understanding the integral

relationship between language use and community or social

thought; additionally, it provides for the development of

intervention strategies into the process of communication

for the purpose of developing better relationships.

This focus could not and cannot develop in isolation,

however; it must be built upon a we11-developed grammar of rhetoric and a we11-developed psychology of rhetoric.

According to Ehninger, these have been provided by the theorists of the Classical (600 B.C.- 430 A.D.) and British/ 14 Continental (1600 - 1850) periods of rhetoric. Concomitant with the shift in metaphor, a shift in the philosophy of the field is required such that symbolic interaction is viewed as a system of action and not merely as a system of being.

Some evidence of this shift may be found in modern rhetoric

in the work of I.A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, 15 and Karl Wallace. In addition, some attention historically has been given to the study of what Isocrates called "the art of discourse," including Castiglione's Book of the

Courtier (1528), Giovanni Della Casa's The Arts of Grandeur and Submission (1665)> and Thomas DeQuincey's Letters to a 16 Young Man, and Other Papers (1854). In general, though, the development of a systematic research program in pragmatics has had to await prompting from other disciplines. Thus those in such areas as linguistics. psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and sociology have gotten a head start into the study of language vis-a-vis communication while many in the field of rhetoric and speech communication have turned their backs on it. It was not until 1972 with Cushman and Whiting's outline of a rules theory that theorists in our own field began to see the 17 potentiality in this area. In the years that have followed, publications have begun to emerge slowly looking at the rules theory base for pragmatics, the development of pragmatic competencies in children, and such specific rules of doing conversation as demand tickets, indirect answers to questions, exploiting pragmatic rules for devious purposes, sequencing structures in conversation, and negotiating 18 interaction.

The theoretical bases for these studies have varied, but the trend has been toward developing theories of different aspects of pragmatics, such as topicality, turn-taking, deception, and indirect answers, while too often neglecting to consider how they might fit into a whole. There has been a general dependence upon the speech act theories of John Austin and John Searle and, more recently, upon the conversational theories of H. Paul Grice, but even these theoretical bases have been used without an in depth consideration of their comprehensiveness or their specific applicability to rhetorical or communication 19 theory. The time has now come for a comprehensive set of 6 criteria to be set forth to "delineate the domain of the field" and to act as a guide for future theoretical and critical inquiry if pragmatics is to play the important role it should in modern rhetorical theory.

What is called for is the development of a metatheory to establish the essential criteria for a full theory of pragmatics. Ideallyf this will be a schema which will be applicable on an inter-disciplinary level and will provide for a variety of approaches addressing the question of the nature of pragmaticsr although the primary concern will be with providing a model which is amenable to a rhetorical/ communicational perspective. In order to do this, the following questions must be answered:

1. With what is the study of pragmatics

directly concerned?

2. What criteria have been suggested

to guide the study of pragmatics?

3. What minimum criteria must be

established to provide for a

complete theory of pragmatics?

Answering these questions toward proposing such a metatheory will be the first goal of this paper.

Once this is accomplished, it will be necessary to backtrack and examine the work of specific theorists such as

Austin, Searle, and Grice to determine whether or not they meet the standards established in the metatheory. It is 7 beyond the scope of this paper to compare all three of these approaches to the metatheory and therefore I will focus in on the one which seems to be most rapidly gaining adherents to it as a basis for research— Grice's cooperative theory of conversation. A look at this theory is particularly important in that most current uses of it have not been based on an informed examination of it, but have rather focused on a single work by Grice, "Logic and 20 Conversation." As evidence of this lack, one need only look at the citations to Grice's work as represented in the

Social Sciences Citation Index; even though Grice's now classic lecture on conversational logic is backed by a strong theoretical base in a series of articles beginning in

1957, almost no one seems to be aware of this or of the 21 further development of the theory in more recent articles.

In fact, of the 347 citations to "Logic and Conversation" from 1969 to 1982, only 8% of the authors also cite background articles. Of these, 5.7% cite a single article,

1.1% cite two, and only .6% cite three. Of the 257 citations from 1979 to 1982, only 2% of the authors cite the 1978 extension of the theory and only .8% cite both a background article and the extension. If Grice's theory is to be used as a basis for the development of theory and research in pragmatics, some steps must be taken to understand the theory as it is presented by Grice and to understand its relation to the development of a theory of pragmatics. In 8 order to accomplish this understanding of Grice's cooperative theory of conversation and its usefulness in a rhetorical study of pragmatics, the following questions must be addressed:

1. What are the essential constituents

of Grice's theory of conversational

logic?

2. How does Grice's theory represent

the nature of pragmatics?

3. How does Grice's cooperative theory

of conversation compare to the

pragmatic metatheory proposed

herein?

4. What potential does Grice's theory

hold for providing a heuristically

useful approach to the study of

language in communication?

Only when these questions are answered may one determine the validity of the present use of Grice's theory and the potentiality of it for future use. In addition, a survey of the present use of this theory across the various fields where it is being cited is necessary to determine how it is currently being interpreted as well as to determine its potentiality for use in future research in pragmatics. Such a review and critique of Grice's theory will be the second goal of this paper. 9

Once the review and critique of Grice's theory is accomplished, one final concern must be dealt with. If

Grice's theory is inadequate to meet the standards of the metatheory, it will be important to develop a theory which will be adequate. Should this be necessary, I will undertake to propose a theory which will meet the minimum requirements for a viable theory of pragmatics. I will do this by building upon the base presented by Grice and then picking and choosing from other theories available to come up with a composite to answer all the needs of a comprehensive pragmatic theory. Developing this theory would be the third and final goal of this paper.

In overview, then, the goals of this paper are to first present a schema outlining the minimum requirements of a viable pragmatic theory; to develop a model representative of Grice's coooerative theory of conversation and to compare this model with the metatheory developed in part one; and, finally, if Grice's theory does not fulfill all of the requirements of the metatheory, to propose a theory which will. It is to meeting the first of these goals that I will now turn. PRAGMATICS; SEMANTICS IN WOLF'S CLOTHING?

CHAPTER TWO

Before proceeding to analyze Grice's theory specifically, a considerable digression is called for to look at the study of pragmatics in general. As mentioned in the last chapter, the theoretical bases for the pragmatic studies conducted in the field of rhetoric and communication have varied. This is a trend which is characteristic of the study of pragmatics in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and elsewhere. In fact, theorists in all of these areas have been unable to come to an agreement on what constitutes pragmatics as a field of study or even on whether it should be considered as a separate area of study. In order to establish a metatheory to guide theoretical development, one must first review the development of pragmatics and then delineate the domain of pragmatics with which this metatheory would be concerned. To do this, I will begin by discussing the work of three theorists critical to the development of pragmatics. (It should be noted that there is a fourth theorist who is considered to be central to the development of pragmatics— H. Paul Grice, but since his theory is of primary focus to this work, discussion of his

10 11 views will be delayed until a later chapter.) The first of these, Charles Peirce, is credited with naming and thus somewhat legitimizing pragmatics. The second, Charles

Morris, is credited with clarifying the relationship of pragmatics to other aspects of the study of signs. The third, John Austin, is credited with establishing the premier theory of pragmatics; his approach joins the primary tenets of the theories of Peirce and Morris. From there, I will discuss various reactions to these landmark conceptualizations of pragmatics.

THE ORIGINS OF PRAGMATICS; CHARLES S. PEIRCE

As a named field of study, the existence of pragmatics dates from the 1890's with a term coined by Charles S.

Peirce to designate a new approach to the study of symbols.

He based the term, pragmatics, on the Greek word pragmatisch which expresses "a relation to some definite human 1 purpose." It is not based, as was and is commonly believed, on the Greek word praktish which dealt with practicalism.

The theory of pragmatism which was built on this term was an attempt to demonstrate a relation between rational cognition and rational purpose or, in other words, between thinking and doing. The doctrine derived by Peirce to deal with this relation focused in part on achieving an understanding of the human use of symbols and represented a refocusing of the 12 nature of symbolic meaning.

Traditionally, meaning had been treated solely as

Reference, its nature residing in denoting or pointing out objects to which symbols directly referred. While Peirce granted that this function, or at least the like of it, may enter into the determination of meaning by providing a general and non-individual basis for interpretation, he was not convinced that it was the whole of meaning. Rather, he proposed a view of meaning as residing in Action, being concerned with the achievement of human purposes. Thus, the meaning of a word or other expression would lie in "its 2 conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life." This meaning might have a base in the general and common denotation of a symbol, but its true significance would lie in its situational and specific use. Through interaction with a given context for a given purpose, the symbol would obtain a self-identity and a uniqueness of meaning. Thus, for Peirce,

the entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires* would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.

The determination of this intellectual purport or meaning was to be through observation of the "logical and experimentally testable consequences" of a given proposition and thus must possess phenomenological validity as well as 4 display theoretical consistency. In summing up his theory,

Peirce claimed that it was not a radical departure from past 13 approaches but was merely "an application of the sole principle of logic recommended by Jesus; 'Ye shall know them 5 by their fruits.' "

Following Peirce came other Pragmatists who built upon the meaning-action relation. Many of these theorists were contemporaries of Peirce and included such notables as 6 William James and John Dewey. Additionally, George Herbert

Mead's highly influential theory of social behaviorism used

Peirce's pragmaticism as a centering perspective; for him, language was the instrument for transforming a mere 7 biological being into a social, self-aware human.

PRAGMATICS AS SEMIOTIC; CHARLES MORRIS

The most influential theorist for modern pragmatists was Charles Morris who drew heavily from both Peirce and

Mead. In 1938, he presented a schema for the science of 8 semiotic— the study of signs and sign systems. This new science, later refined in 1946 and 1964, derived its name 9 from a Greek word meaning "to signify." Although originally this term referred to signification in regard to medical diagnoses, its use was broadened by Morris to deal with sign systems in general, particularly as represented by natural languages, logic, mathematics, and aesthetics.

Drawing still more from the ancient Greeks, Morris built 10 upon their five-dimensional conception of a sign. These 14 critical dimensions included a sign vehicle, or the actual sign itself; a designatum, or that to which the sign referred; an interprétant, or dispositions to certain reactions in the face of certain signs; interpreters, those using the sign; and contexts, or the situations in which the sign vehicle is used. From this schema, Morris proposed a semiotic consisting of three dimensions; syntactics, 11 semantics, and pragmatics. He roughly paralleled sign vehicle with syntactics and designatum with semantics. The remaining factors of interprétant, interpreter, and context were united to form pragmatics. A brief survey of each of these three dimensions follows.

Syntactics, the structural level of semiotics, is defined by Morris as the "relation of signs to one 12 another." It "deals with the combinations of signs without regard for their specific significations or their relation 13 to the behavior." Syntactics then is a purely structural component of the study of signs, focusing on the logical and grammatical structure of language with its formations and transformations.

Moving up to the next level, semantics is characterized as the "relation of signs to the objects to which the signs 14 are applicable." It "deals with the signification of signs 15 in all modes of signifying." It is the traditional realm of meaning as denotation and is primarily concerned with the truth conditions relative to the application of a sign to an 15 object. It, along with syntactics, is a logical component of semiotics and is concerned primarily with the logical relations of the signs to what they signify or represent.

The modern study of semantics, as based on Morris' view, is typically equated with the study of the linguistic form of an utterance from which may be derived truth- 16 conditional propositions. It focuses on the logical and analytical truths of these propositions after decontextualization and abstraction away from the 17 situational and intentional variables. This truth conditional approach sets up a basis for analyzing from a structural perspective such aspects of linguistic meaning and linguistic reference as:

1. meaning specification or propositional content,

2. ambiguity, or multiple interpretations of a single

utterance,

3. synonymy, or multiple means of creating a single

proposition,

4. contradiction, or use of logically incompatible

elements within a proposition, and

5. entailment and presupposition, or logical inferences

made strictly from the semantic and syntactic 18 relations of an utterance.

However, as Morris well knew, this truth-conditional analysis is insufficient to account fully for language use.

As Lyons was to later assert. 16

"what the words and sentences of a language mean, in the last resort, are both theoretically inexplicable and empirically unverifiable except in terms of what the speakers of that language mean by their use of those words and sentences."

Morris' way of dealing with this inadequacy of semantics and syntactics was to present his final component of the semiotic— pragmatics. The component was originally defined as the "relation of signs to interpreters," with interpreters, a la Mead's motion of significant signs, 20 including both sender and receiver of the sign. In 1946, though, Morris clarified this definition and added that pragmatics was also "that portion of semiotic which deals with the origins, uses, and effects of signs within the 21 behavior in which they occur." At least in terms of its focus on consequences, this view follows directly from

Peirce's conception of pragmatics. Morris further demonstrates this connection in asserting the close relation between pragmatics and human action, particularly as reflected in the link between the use of signs and the psychological, biological, and sociological subsystems of 22 general behavior. Additionally, Morris follows Peirce in rejecting a meaning theory based on denotation. He felt that the use of signs went beyond the designative or denotative to include also the appraisive (evaluative or expressive) 23 and the incitive (prescriptive or manipulative). This means that language does not merely present confirmable hypotheses about the world, but reveals information about 17 the interpreters and the contexts in which the signs are used. It may be used to control the behavior of self and of others, and it may be used expressively or artistically in aesthetics. These varieties of usage are not bound by the truth conditionals of semantics but instead "vary with the 24 purpose to be served." The study of these variant uses, according to Morris, is the study of meaning as action and therein lies the domain of pragmatics.

Morris also expands beyond Peirce in seeing pragmatics as representative of the point of union between semiotic and axiology; for him, sign choice is inherently value dominated and thus inseparable from considerations of intentionality.

Pragmatics is based on deliberate, purposeful, and voluntary choices between perceived alternatives. Consequently, pragmatics rules are stated as dispositions to act or habits in making choices and not as causal stimuli or responses. As such, these rules represent perceived regularities in the use of a "sign vehicle under certain circumstances" and are inherently probabalistic in nature rather than 25 deterministic. This distinction parallels classical approaches to rhetoric which view speech or communication as enthymematic, being dependent on contexts and interpreters for meaning and validity. Logic, on the other hand, which corresponds more closely with syntactics and semantics, depends upon internal structure for meaning and validity.

The strengths of this parallel increase in light of Morris' 18 claim that "historically, rhetoric may be regarded as an 26 early and restricted form of pragmatics." Additionally, he lays the groundwork for a modern rhetoric-based pragmatics in his assertion that "semiotic is the framework in which to fit the modern equivalent of the ancient trivium of logic, 27 grammar, and rhetoric."

In sum, pragmatics as depicted by Morris is a critical aspect of the study of signs. It must presuppose both semantics and syntactics, just as semantics must presuppose syntactics. But, as language cannot be abstracted from its users, syntactics and semantics must in turn be supplemented by pragmatics. Of course, the fullness of language is only realized by the union of these three dimensions under the rubric of the semiotic. To achieve the goal of semiotics as a systematization of sign systems, though, one cannot begin at the fullest level of the semiotic. One must first develop a systematization of the rules of each of the components and then proceed on to the systematization of the rules 28 governing the interaction of these three. Initially, separate focuses on each aspect will be critical. Morris suggested that the beginnings of this systematization already existed as early as 1938 in the fortes of the formalist, the empiricist, and the pragmatist. According to him,

the formalist is inclined to consider any axiomatic system as a language, regardless of whether the system is actually used by any group of interpreters; the empiricist is 19

inclined to stress the necessity of the relation of signs to objects which they denote and whose properties they truly state; the pragmatist is inclined to regard a language as a type of communication activity, social in origin and nature, by which members of a social group are able to meet more satisfaction in their individual and common needs.

Morris saw though a danger in the division of semiotics which lay in the tendency for the proponents of each perspective to fall into the trap of believing that only

their component is necessary to explain signs and signification. However, according to Morris, if this tendency can be avoided, the three may unite eventually to supplement one another and to arrive at the ultimate goal of

a complete theory of semiotic. Interestingly enough, this same danger has been pointed out quite recently by Donald

Cushman in his discussion of the future of rules theory. He and Morris could claim in unison that "what should be obvious now is that while a given researcher may focus on one or more of these elements to the exclusion of others, in the long run a complete theory will need to utilize all 30 three in a non-reductive manner."

PRAGMATICS AS SPEECH ACT; JOHN L. AUSTIN

Some seventeen years after Morris first presented his original conception of semiotics, John Austin delivered, in the William James Lectures at Harvard University, a series 31 of lectures entitled, "How to Do Things with Words." These 20 lectures, not published until 1962, were based on ideas which were formed as early as 1939, according to Austin, and 32 had surfaced publicly as early as 1946. In these lectures, he picked up on one of the major concerns of Charles Peirce, the relationship between meaning, reference, and action. As

Austin put it,

it was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact,' which it must do either truly or falsely.

In reaction to the restrictions put on the philosophy of language by this "descriptive fallacy," he set out to propose a new approach which was grounded in a performance orientation wherein speech was a means to ^ something, either in saying something (as in promising) or ^ saying 34 something (as in persuading). Utterances which did not describe or refer to something were classified as

Performatives; utterances which were used primarily to describe or report were dubbed Constatives. Unfortunately

Austin became bogged down in the distinctions between these two types of utterances, failing to see that the most reasonable conclusion (and indeed one of the most valuable contributions deriving from his work) was that every utterance possessed both reference and action aspects. This conclusion was one which Peirce and Morris both found necessary to accept, despite the same initial quandaries experienced by Austin. 21

From here, Austin was led into an investigation of

Performatives which entailed a consideration of the utterance itself, the intention with which the utterance was uttered, and the consequences which resulted from the

issuance of the utterance (both desired and incidental).

Eventually this resulted in his famous tri-level division of

the elements of a speech act, in which each act consists of

1. a locutionary aspect, being the literal or

linguistic meaning;

2. an illocutionary aspect, being that which the

speaker intends to convey by the utterance; and

3. a perlocutionary aspect, being the consequences on

the thoughts, feelings, and/or actions of the 35 hearers.

Although Austin felt that the most troublesome distinction would be that between the perlocutionary and

illocutionary acts, he considered the most important distinction to be that between the locutionary and the

illocutionary aspects. (As it turns out, it is this latter distinction which has been the most controversial, forming the basis for the controversy which makes the distinction between semantics and pragmatics so hotly contested.)

Generally, he felt that the traditional dependence on sense and reference has erroneously led theorists to treat "all problems as problems of 'locutionary usage,' " and that the

locutionary/illocutionary distinction might mark the shift 22 toward a reformulation of meaning as more than just sense 36 and reference

In line with this concern, Austin presented a further breakdown of the locutionary act to clarify what it entailed. At the most basic level, he suggested a phonetic aspect to account for speech as a behavioral phenomenon.

This aspect treats the speech act as "merely the act of ■ 37 uttering certain noises." He did not see speech as reducible to mere motion, but saw the interface with physiological and psychological capabilities to be critical to a full understanding of the speech act. Moving to the next level, he postulated a phatic aspect which would place the phonetic noises in the context of a certain language.

Here phonetic input would be manipulated according to the lexical and grammatical constraints of a certain language.

It would become structurally organized and would incorporate the general areas of phonetics, morphology, and syntactics.

Finally, a "more-or-less definite sense and reference" would be incorporated into the accounting for an act to arrive at 38 the rhetic aspect. This adds the elements of naming and referring and yields as a result a decontextualized proposition. For all practical purposes, this rhetic aspect is equivalent to Morris' conception of the semantic dimension of semiotics. Here, according to Austin, lies meaning in the traditional sense. With the union of all three levels, the locutionary aspect captures the literal or 23 linguistic meaning of an utterance, incorporating the phonological, syntactic, and semantic bases of language. The referential and sequential components, thus, become available through linguistic structure for use inferentially

in the performance of illocutionary acts and the achievement of perlocutionary acts.

An understanding of the locutionary act, however, is not enough to provide an understanding of the total speech act. One must be concerned in addition with those variables which "underlie, not linguistic competence in the form of fixed rules for producing grammatical sentences, but mastery of the entire linguistic system in the service of saying 39 what one wants to say in a way one wants to say it." Upon establishing an approach to the locutionary aspect, then,

Austin proceeded to the next two levels. Unfortunately, these two do not separate as easily from one another as they do from the first aspect. The relationship between the two is almost symbiotic in nature in that the rules which regulate the use of illocutionary acts are, in most cases, derived from knowledge of the possible effects of the acts.

In other words, to understand the illocutionary aspect requires not only an understanding of the structure of these acts, but also an understanding that the choice of this structure must depend upon a projection of what the perlocutionary force or effect will be. Any act of speech then is embedded in a complex of "content, context, and 24 communicative intention," and must be judged on a "normative or evaluative" basis in regard to the appropriateness of the 40 choice made.

The structure of the illocutionary act itself, focusing on what Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish refer to as speaker meaning and speaker reference, calls for a delineation of the rules which govern what acts of speech count as what in 41 a given situation. At the basic level, this means laying out a system of classification for speech acts and the con ditions, termed felicity conditions by Austin, which govern their use. At a higher level, the illocutionary acts are closely tied in with the goal-oriented perlocutionary aspect which is concerned with the "effects of the utterance and illocutionary acts on the thoughts, feelings, and actions of 42 the hearer." This close relationship is necessary for it is indeed the goal which the speaker has in mind that is the ultimate determinant for the choice of the speech act; in turn, it is the "projected" goal by the hearer which governs the interpretations of the illocutionary acts of others 43 through a use of practical reasoning. In the end then it is only with the consideration of the locutionary, illocu tionary, and the perlocutionary dimensions that Austin feels it is possible to understand the total speech act. And, after all, he claims, "the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the 44 last resort, we are engaged in elucidating." 25

THE CONTROVERSIES OF PRAGMATICS

Although the base established by Peirce, Morris, and

Austin is central to the modern conception of pragmatics, not all theorists have agreed upon the specifics of the definition of pragmatics and so a diversity of perspectives have appeared. At one extreme are the radical pragmatists who have taken as their starting point the "hypothesis that many linguistic phenomena, which had previously been viewed as belonging to the semantic subsystem, in fact, belong to 45 the pragmatic subsystem." These radical pragmatists, however, are not committed to eliminating semantics, but rather are concerned with emphasizing the critical role pragmatics plays within the total semiotic complex. They are vitally concerned with "staking a claim" for pragmatics and

"trying to defend a crucial distinction on which the 46 division between semantics and pragmatics is based." As such, they are far more representative of the main stream controversies surrounding pragmatics than are the reductionists of whom I will speak below.

Taking less extreme positions are those whose focus is on redefining pragmatics, particularly in redefining what

"context" it is that pragmatics is to be concerned with. For some, pragmatics is an area strictly limited to considerations of the effect of context on utterance 47 interpretation. Typically, this context is limited to the 26 immediate effects of social role and social situation, although Carnap further narrowed this context to include 48 only the speaker or user of the sign as relevant. For others, the proper content of pragmatics is the further development of the model of linguistic structure begun in syntactics and semantics; their goal is to provide a taxonomy of speech acts to relate the signs used to the 49 intentions of those that use them.

Montague adds a further variation on context as he defines pragmatics as the study of deictic or indexical features in an utterance; these are features which have meaning only in reference to a specific context or speaker, 50 as for example with pronouns. This approach is supported 51 in Stalnaker and in the early works of Bar-Hillel. Many theorists, however, consider this approach to be semantic in nature since indexicals can be specified in a symbolic logic without any loss of structural integrity of a proposition. I will concur with this opinion and thus will eliminate indexicals as a pragmatic problem and return them to the 52 realm of semantics where they belong.

Another variation sees pragmatics as focusing on the

"principles or strategies for arriving at inferences about the intentions one's interlocutor has in saying what is 53 said." This perspective would be manifested through general principles of cooperation, suggesting that pragmatic competence is not purely a linguistic matter, but is tied 27 into communication and social competencies also; this requires inclusion of a much broader context than has been suggested in the other redefinitions of pragmatic context.

In general, it is clear that there is a wide diversity of approaches to pragmatics, so wide that Gazdar has taken a backdoor into defining it for his own theory. He suggests that pragmatics is "those aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straight forward reference to truth conditions of the sentence uttered. Put 54 crudely: Pragmatics = Meaning - Truth Conditions."

Not all theorists agree with this approach to pragmatics and have gone beyond redefining and refining to rejecting and reducing the realm of pragmatics, proposing alternate approaches to the study of language instead.

Although in the minority, the influence of these theorists has been great. At the extreme end of the controversy is

Noam Chomsky who rejects the social or interactive nature of language, seeing it instead as a "system of generative 55 processes." Defining linguistics as a study of language as a pure sign system, he totally rejects any "observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits and so on" as being irrelevant to the "actual subject matter of 56 linguistics." He rejects the component of pragmatics totally and relegates semantics to being merely an interpretative tool of syntactics, the only "true" component of linguistics. 28

Other attempts at reductionism have typically been based directly on Chomsky's views, representing primarily the theories of generative grammarians. The most vocal of 57 these have been Jerrold Sadock and George Lakoff. Sadock quite openly attempts to reduce pragmatics to semantics. He claims that every language naturally has the means to encode directly speaker's intentions and assumptions about speech situations and that the illocutionary acts which represent 58 this means are derived conventionally and semantically. He rejects several of the major tenets of pragmatics, including the belief that language is the embodiment of attitudes and the notion that language, as represented in the illocutionary force of a sentence, has the "unique ability 59 to change the real world."

Lakoff also is interested in eliminating pragmatics as unnecessary. It is his contention that formal logical semantics can be made to account for all language concepts, including even social interaction, politeness, cooperativeness, and formality, if one assumes that the performative is an inherent aspect of underlying logical 60 structure. In so doing, he claims that "what we have done

is to largely, if not entirely eliminate pragmatics, 61 reducing it to garden variety semantics."

Kempson has identified these attempts at reductionism as generally presenting "speech act semantics" as an 62 alternative to traditional truth-based semantics. 29

Proponents of this approach lay claim to a conception of semantics which could explain meaning in terms of what a speaker does with a sentence, what act is achieved, and what assumptions or presuppositions are held. In this alternative view, pragmatics is either greatly reduced or eliminated.

The weakness of this approach, according to Kempson, is in the lack of relation between the conditions which define non-literal or non-conventional illocutionary force and the 63 meaning of the sentence itself. One must go beyond the purely semantic to include conditions of appropriateness for communicative behavior in general and this simply cannot be accounted for in the meaning of words or through a system based on formal logic.

Most theorists, however, accept that the purely semantic is insufficient to account for general communicative behavior and so, despite the influence of the reductionists, acceptance of pragmatics as a separate field of study is fairly common. Due to rather vague uses of the term, however, theorists represent a fairly wide range in defining what is actually involved in pragmatics. The question one is left with at this point is how exactly is one to conceive of pragmatics? Certainly if the study of it is to develop and to achieve any sort of theoretical rigor, the object of study must be clear. From the overview of

Peirce, Morris, and Austin, it would seem that the primary focus must be on a union of Action and Context. In other 30 wordsr what one is concerned with will be an understanding of the purposeful use of structured signs plus an understanding of the role that users, norms of usage, and situational contexts play in colouring the interpretation of

signs. But how exactly does one conceptualize a pragmatics which has such understanding as its goal? How does one

systematize the diversity of variables which must be

accounted for if one is to achieve this goal? Indeed, can one systematize such a diversity? It is to a survey of the various attempts which have been made in answering these questions that I will now turn, confident that, at least, we are dealing with a phenomenon which has importance in its own right and not just with another breed of semantics in wolf's clothing. PRAGMATICS; PERSPECTIVES ON A METATHEORY

CHAPTER THREE

The formal study of pragmatics has progressed from its formalization by Peirce in the late eighteen hundreds through its development by Morris and into the present with little substantive change in its essence. And, at its fullest, pragmatics is not merely a sub-part of a theory of language, but rather is a powerful means to explicate the interface between language and communication, uniting linguistic, cognitive, and cultural competence in an 1 interlocking whole. It provides a unified theoretical approach to the study of interaction of symbolic use and social reality; and it allows for the combination of

"content, context, and communicative intention" under a 2 single rubric. It uniquely calls for and then provides a context for understanding the union of the varying phenomena which have traditionally characterized the study of particular disciplines: from linguistics, it brings the study of language form or structure; from philosophy, the study of propositional meaning, epistemology, and ethics; from sociology and anthropology, the study of social institutions and sociology of knowledge; from psychology,

31 32

the study of information processing; and from classical

rhetoricr the study of language as an instrument for

achieving purposes. But, as Hymes' puts it,

one cannot simply take separate results from linguistics, psychology, sociology, ethnology, as given, and seek to correlate them, however partially useful such work may be, if one is to have a theory of language (not just a theory of grammar); pragmatics provides the means to combine structural, social, cognitive, and instrumental factors into an interacting 3 dynamic whole.

In attempting to establish a sketch of the theoretical development of this field, regardless of the name under which it appears, one is astounded at the wealth of

information available. Indeed, the problem becomes one of how to organize this vast amount of material. Various attempts have been made to unite the different perspectives on pragmatics into a concise whole, but only one seems especially fruitful— the integration of pragmatic theory

into the well-developed body of rhetorical theory in its modern embrasure of epistemology, human action, meaning, and 4 value. Both are aimed at achieving an understanding of those very processes which allow human society to exist as

it does, based on symbolic interaction.

It is not just modern rhetoric which is comparative to pragmatics either, for as Morris noted, as early as

Aristotle there was interest in going beyond the purely referential aspects of propositions to the study of what is 33 5 today called performatives. In fact, the study of performatives can be seen as central to the field of rhetoric; formal structure, truth, and falsity were parts of logic and thus rhetoric focused on the building of a relationship between speaker and listener in order to 6 achieve ends. One need only glance through The Rhetoric to see Aristotle's concern with the very phenomena which today 7 are viewed as being pragmatic in nature. He includes the study of psychology in an understanding of pathos, linguistics in an understanding of style, sociology and anthropology in developing audience analysis; and philosophy in the understanding of reasoning and the relation of the rhetorical to the dialectical. From these points of analysis emerge a rhetoric which focuses on the functions of communication, the role of attitudes of intentions in directing these functions, and the types of strategies which may be used to increase one's effectiveness in achieving these functions or goals. Pragmatics then is none other than rhetoric by another name.

GENERAL CRITERIA FOR A METATHEORY

How does one go about the study of pragmatics under the auspicies of rhetoric? What criteria must a full-blown rhetorical/pragmatic theory meet in order to be adequate?

According to Samuel Becker, the goals of any communication 34 scholar must be

1. to identify and describe the various phenomena we label . . . communication in terms of a commonly understood and useful set of categories or concepts. 2. to describe the relationships which exist among these concepts as precisely as possible. 3. to identify the factors in various communication processes which can be altered with predictabie„results on other factors in these processes.

These goals hold regardless of methodological orientation and should guide the development of research programs. Hymes similarly suggests that a theory of communication must specify the components of the system, the relations between the components, the state of the components given any potential systemic perspective, and the activity of the 9 system. Additionally, Cushman and Pearce have suggested that any theory must meet the criteria of generality and 10 necessity. This means that a theory must be concerned with classes of events rather than idiosyncratic events and it must present patterns of regularities which specify relationships among variables, allowing for reasonable expectation of effects and for interpretation of meaning.

Cushman and Pearce further stress that since communication is concerned with the study of human symbolic behavior, this predictability must be based on practical necessity rather than causal or logical necessity. In other words, the predictability is normative in nature, implying obligation, prohibition, and/or permission, not determinism. Itkonen supports this stance, claiming that "the investigation of 35 human phenomena is, in one way or another, qualitatively 11 different from the investigation of physical reality." As such, Itkonen contends that the focus must be on describing normative rules rather than laws since certainty in predicting symbolic behavior is impossible; the proper mode of investigation then, according to him, is through describing rules which specify what is correct and incorrect rather than what is possible and impossible. To do otherwise would eliminate from consideration much of the actual communication behavior since any exceptions or mistakes on the part of the participants would invalidate rules with a deterministic origin.

Two additional criteria which have traditionally been benchmarks for theoretical development are parsimony, in that a given theory should be simple and elegant in its specification of the relevant variables and the relationships between them, and heuristicity, in that an adequate theory should stimulate thought about the phenomenon at hand and stimulate research programs to further understand this phenomenon. Any rhetorical/pragmatic theory then must meet these criteria just as any other theory must, regardless of subject matter. Only the relevant type of necessity would shift according to subject. These are not, however, criteria specifically relevant to the theoretical content of pragmatics; a review of the alternative metatheories of pragmatics is needed to derive 36 such criteria.

SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR A METATHEORY

In order to develop a system of specific criteria for a pragmatic theory, it is necessary to understand the past and current approaches toward achieving this goal. There are, however, about as many different notions of what constitutes appropriate criteria as there are theorists. And, while this is true of any field of study, it is intensified here due to the range of disciplines, each with its own perspective, which are interested in pragmatic theory. In fact, because of this diversity, it is not feasible to discuss every model or metatheory which has been proposed. The approach I will take is to review a sampling of proposed metatheoretical models for pragmatics. This review will be the topic of the remainder of this chapter. I will then present an overview of the basic assumptions which appear to underlie the various approaches to pragmatics and finally a summary of the critical elements which emerge as requisite to a pragmatic theory in preparation for proposing a comprehensive metatheory.

In surveying the different attempts to provide a metatheory for pragmatics, I will limit the sample primarily to those which have appeared over the past decade or so.

This is not to suggest that theories appearing prior to this 37 are not of importance; quite the contrary. The importance of

Peirce, Morris, and Austin has already been demonstrated.

The importance of Grice's early works is one of the prime focuses of this paper. And, other key contributions have been made also. Of note is Furfey who, in offering the first course in sociolinguistics in 1943, marked a milestone in legitimizing the study of the language function-social 12 structure relation. Wittgenstein's game theory of language which postulated two interrelated sets of rules— rules of structure and rules of use— is also critical to modern 13 pragmatic development. Wittgenstein saw that mere description of language was necessary but insufficient to account for communicative behavior in that its focus was purely structural; what was needed were descriptions of the strategic rules of language use to account for the function of language within the restrictions of social context and social conventions. Firth also made an important contribution. He was a pioneer in developing a theory of language which took context and function into account, building his theory of language on the premise that "normal linguistic behavior as a whole is meaningful effort, directed towards the maintenance of appropriate patterns of 14 life." These three theorists and their contemporaries together provide the necessary foundation for modern pragmatics, but as a field of study pragmatics has only been discussed widely in the past ten to twenty years and it is 38 that current discussion of the area with which I am interested here.

The approaches to spelling out a metatheory for pragmatics have varied and Gazdar has criticized most of 15 them for being "self-consciously informal." And, indeed, most of the approaches do tend to be rather informal, preferring to suggest lists of critical features, state general goals, or propose sets of component clusters to guide analysis rather than define strict parameters. Rather than seeing this as detrimental, as Gazdar obviously does, I see this instead as being the source of major contributions to an understanding of the nature of the pragmatic for without these more informal approaches to build upon, there would be no base upon which to build a formalized statement of the minimum requirements of a pragmatic theory. Since the domain of pragmatics has not been clearly defined (or least not consensually agreed upon), it has not been appropriate until recently to attempt the statement of a comprehensive metatheory. In reviewing what has been proposed, then, I will focus on two major perspectives, the component cluster approach and the critical parameters approach, and the theoretical models representative of them. 39

The Component Cluster Approach

The first major approach to establishing parameters for a pragmatic theory is through the use of sets of component clusters as the basis for analysis and investigation.

Morris' approach to the study of signs is an example of component clustering as it includes the five aspects of a sign; sign vehicle, interprétants or norms, contexts

(literary or external), interpreters, and referents, and 16 discussion of their relationships to one another. In rhetorical theory, this method has been of primary significance and forms the centering perspective for the theories of Kenneth Burke, Karl Wallace (following 17 Aristotle), and Dell Hymes (following Kenneth Burke).

Burke's Pentadic Analysis. Probably the most famous component cluster approach in rhetoric is derived from 18 Kenneth Burke's investigations into motives. He claims that the study of human interaction is based on an understanding of the attribution of motives and thus is not only relevant to an academic study but is critical to an understanding of the inference-making that is done in attributing motives and thus making sense of our own and others' actions. Formally, this theory is termed dramatism and holds as its basic tenet the assumption that human action is willful, being intentional and not instinctual

(although of course it is limited by the constraints of the 19 psychological and physiological nature of humanity). For 40

Burke then,

dramatism is a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is via a methodical inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions.

To accomplish the dramatistic study of human symbolic action, Burke proposes the pentad; a cluster of five key elements or terms centering on the act, the actual behavior being performed— what is being done. All other aspects are subordinated to the act although they are integral to an understanding of the act itself.

The other four elements include the agent, scene, agency, and purpose. The agent is the one who accomplishes the act. The scene is the context or setting in which the act occurs and may include both the microcontext in the immediate setting of the act and the macrocontext in the broader cultural and historical setting of the act. The agency is the means by which the act is accomplished and may include such varied aspects as rhetorical devices, media selection, use of physical objects, and the like. The fifth element is the purpose or reason for performing the act, the end for which the actor aims. Essentially these provide a means of understanding the basic who, what, when, where, why, and how of human action and are all important elements in the attribution of motive.

Burke also discusses a sixth element, one which he drew 21 from the work of Mead and Richards , attitude. He defines 41 attitude as "an incipient action" and roughly equates it 22 with Austin's illocutionary force. It is an element not easily pinned down for it spans the other five elements,

colouring each, functioning to relate the form of the act

(agency) to its purpose within the constraints of the situation at hand and thus indicating the orientation of the actor toward the act. This element is especially important

in pragmatics for it sets the tone of the act; in other words, it determines whether the act is to be taken seriously, ironically, sarcastically, humorously, as a warning, as a hint, and so on. This element is thus closely tied in with the other elements of the pentad, effecting the achievement of purposes, the selection of agencies, and the formation of the act.

It is critically important to note that these terms do not definitively specify the nature of each element for a given act but rather maintain a necessary ambiguity which allows the analyst to form, divide, and reform again the elements to achieve new perspectives and new insights on the 23 "same" action. This utility is most evident in Burke's use of critical ratios to test combinations of pairs of the pentadic elements. In this way, not only is insight gained into each element individually, but insight is gained into the relationships between the components to determine which are most salient in explaining a given act in a given situation. 42

Wallace's Causality Analysis. A second rhetorical approach which presents the metatheoretical model of pragmatics as a cluster of components is that by Karl 24 Wallace. Wallace suggests in his 1970 treatise on understanding discourse that the ultimate goal of rhetorical study is to

understand ourselves by studying our own creativity with symbols. We must, accordingly, cope with the meaning of symbols, with relationships of symbols to reality and to our values, with the relationships of symbols to each other, and with symbols as the context of our communication.

Essentially what he does to achieve this goal is present a set of components necessary to the fullness of rhetorical investigation. And, while he notes the need for "importing" ideas from other fields to shed light on rhetorical concepts, he cautions that rhetoricians must be careful not to lose the focal point for rhetoric: exploring the relation 26 of "meaningful rhetoric to a meaningful situation." This focal point represents for Wallace the uniqueness of rhetoric, and by extension the unique contribution of pragmatics, in its concern with more than the mere form of speech— its concern with the integration of speech into the total human experience.

The critical aspects of rhetorical, and hence pragmatic, analysis for Wallace are drawn from classical rhetoric as he builds on the component cluster proposed by 27 Aristotle to explain movement or process. This cluster is 43 made up of four "causes" of movement; material, formal, efficient, and final. The material cause is concerned with formless matter, and Wallace parallels it with the thoughts and intentions which guide the rhetorical act. Here also, he claims are the exigencies or creative tensions which call the act into existence and the constraints which are imposed upon the act because of its placement in a particular situation. (This claim follows Bitzer's theory of the 28 rhetorical situation.) The formal cause is concerned with giving shape to these unformed intents and attitudes, so

Wallace parallels it with linguistic and discourse structure which gives an overt form to the material cause of a communicative act. Through the union of the material and formal causes emerges the substance of a rhetorical act— form and meaning.

However, this substance marks only a potential act. The efficient cause is required to bring the act into existence and marks the point of interaction between the realms of motion and action. Wallace equates this causality with the motions of the speaker to carry out the act or process of speech. Ultimately, this efficient cause brings the communicative act into existence for the purpose of achieving some goal or end. The resulting effects of the act are the final cause and, similarly to Austin's perlocutionary act, may include intended or unintended 29 effects. Ideally the final cause will include the 44 reduction or elimination of the tensions which originally acted as the material cause for the act, completing the state to state process of communication.

As basic units of a metatheory then Wallace proposes that the following must be considered; the intents of the speaker, the situation which calls forth the act, the form of the linguistic act, the motions of the speaker in carrying out the act, and the effects of the act. Finally, he calls for an understanding of the reasoning processes which figure in rhetorical action. Since he considers rhetoric to be an art of which the fundamental data are acts of discourse addressed to audiences, those reasoning processes must be in the realm of probability. They are thus enthymematic, being based on practical reasoning, rather than syllogistic, being based on formal reasoning.

Wallace further proposes two types of acts which are relevant for rhetorical or pragmatic analysis: speech acts and rhetorical acts. The speech acts are single utterances which bring together the four causes. Rhetorical acts, however, proceed to the level of discourse or even rhetorical campaigns and represent the combination of speech acts into a sequence of planned events. This implies that formal cause has multiple levels with the higher levels having a social as well as a structural reality. The levels at a minimum include the form or structure as it exists with linguistic meaning only, the speech act wherein the form of 45 an utterance achieves social meaning, and the more complex level of the rhetorical act. This means that one must take into consideration the rules or strategies which relate speakers, situations, and intents. Consequently, this provides an entre into the study of values for in the very choices made in selecting the strategies to follow, one's orientation toward self, others, and the world is revealed.

Hymes* Ethnographic Analysis. The third component cluster is proposed by Dell Hymes, an anthropologist, and represents one of the most influential and important views 30 on communication as symbolic action extant today. In it he contends that "what is needed is a general theory and body of knowledge within which diversity of speech, repertoires, ways of speaking, and choosing among them find a natural 31 place." In order for this to be realized, however, cooperation is required to bridge the gaps between disciplines and thus build a comprehensive base for analysis and understanding of the interaction of language with social life. As a first step "toward toward [sic] a theory,"

Hymes offers up his own metatheory as a model for such 32 interaction." His primary concern is with achieving an understanding of the communicative competence of symbol users in speech communities, or rather, the ability of humans to put language structure to use to communicate in social situations. To do this, he establishes the communication event as the basic unit of analysis. 46 specifying four key aspects to be investigated; the basic components, the relation between the components (to be specified as rule sets describing the relations and the constraints upon them), the relevant centrality of each component for a given situation in achieving various 33 functions, and the activity of the system as a whole.

In presenting his model of critical components, Hymes specifies seven social units with which such a theory must deal: speech community, speech situation, speech event, speech acts, speech styles, components of speech, and rules of speaking. The first six of these are hierarchically related to one another with each highlighting a progressively smaller social unit, while the seventh acts as a linking agent between levels. The speech community then is the broadest level, but the most critical according to

Hymes, for it specifies those with whom one can communicatively interact. The speech community represents the basic social group which shares the rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech and possesses at least one variety of speech which is common to all.

The speech situation or the socially defined situations associated with speech can only exist in the context of the speech community and functions to establish appropriate settings or social contexts for the presence or absence of speech. Within these speech situations are speech events, which are activities governed by rules and norms for the use 47 of speech. This social unit is comparable to Wallace's 34 notion of the rhetorical act. These speech events are made up of speech acts, the minimal term of analysis for speech according to Hymes. In fact, it acts as the link between

"grammar and the rest of the speech event or situation in 35 that it implicates both linguistic form and social norms."

The next level is that of speech styles or "consistent patternings of speaking. . . which depend upon qualitative 36 judgements of appropriateness." This would include such styles as legal style, deferential and assertive styles, and 37 children's style, among others.

In understanding the relation between these social units, the following example may help: Imagine that Mark and

Nancy go to a party on Saturday night at a friend's house

(speech situation). While they are there, Nancy engages in a conversation with Judy and Tom (speech event). As a part of this conversation, Judy relates a joke (speech act).

However, she tells it in such a manner that the others believe that what she is saying is about something which had actually occurred (speech style) and it is not until she reaches the punch line that they realize the joke is on them. A full analysis of the communication competence of

Judy, Tom, Nancy, and Mark does not stop here though. Two more interrelated social units must be taken into consideration: the components of speech, which break down a speech act into its minimal units, and the rules of 48 speaking/ which specify the allowable relations between and combinations of the components.

In looking more closely at the components of speech,

Hymes contends that sixteen subunits are relevant, although he groups them into eight primary units. The first two, message form and message content, join to form the act sequence in a manner similar to Wallace's union of material and formal causes to create the substance of an act. Thus one must analyze how things are said through the linguistic structure and what is said through consideration of topic and utterance or speaker meaning of the act. In addition, one must consider the settings in which the act sequence occurs, both in terms of the actual physical circumstances of time and place in which the speech act occurs and in terms of the psychological and cultural scene which defines the occasion.

Next one must look at the participants involved, including the various potential combinations of speaker/ sender, addresser, hearer/receiver/audience, and addressee.

This leads into a consideration of the ends or purposes of the act, including the effects (as conventionally recognized and expected outcomes) and the goals or intents of the participants. One must also account for the key of the act in terms of the tone or manner in which it is presented, the channels or media through which the act is presented (for instance, oral, written, sung, hummed, whistled, drummed, or 49 tapped), and the forms of speech or instrumentalities as defined by the particular language, dialect, code, or register used to accomplish the act.

Norms too must be taken into consideration. Hymes specifies two types: (1) norms of interaction, specifying the "behaviors and properties that attach to speaking," such as turn-taking, interruption patterns, or use of demand tickets, and (2) norms of interpretation which govern the 38 meaning placed on the interaction. For example, with interruption behavior, it is considered acceptable or at least tolerable for a high status individual (A) to interrupt a low status individual (B), but not vice versa.

This is a norm of interaction. But as a result of these norms, the exact behavior— interrupting— on the part of A and B may be interpreted differently with A's behavior seen as exercising a right and B's seen as rudeness. Conversely, for A to restrain from interrupting may be interpreted as a show of extraordinary consideration for B while B's restraint may be interpreted as merely meeting minimum expectations.

One additional subunit is needed to complete the components of speaking: genre or categories of discourse with recognizable differences in patterns of organization.

For example, the differences between sonnets, proverbs, lectures, conversations, and story-telling reflect differences in genre. While genre are typically associated 50 with particular speech events, as s sermon within a church service, they are "analytically independent of them. . . and may occur in (or as) different events," as with the mocking 39 of a sermon within a joke. In review, Hymes proposes sixteen components of speech which must be a part of a theory of communication. Mnemonically, he summarizes them in the acronym "SPEAKING; settings, participants, ends, act 40 sequences, keys, instrumentalities, norms, genres."

These components do not exist in isolation, however, so one is brought to Hymes' final social unit, the rules of speaking, which define the relationships between components.

This entails uncovering the systematic relations between the various components, indicating where given components are relevant, where they are irrelevant, and how changes in the components can shift the character of the entire communication event. Hymes indicates that experimental delineation of these rules is only beginning, but sees the development of them as a critical path to a formal statement of "what it is a member of society knows in knowing how to 41 participate in a speech act." It is the unit of rules then which brings the other units back together into a comprehensive schema toward organizing and understanding the phenomena relevant to the use of signs to achieve purposes and meet needs.

The Critical Parameters Approach

The second major approach to defining and delimiting 51

the arena of pragmatics is the critical parameters approach wherein lists of key concerns for a theory to address are presented; some are presented as lists of goal statements, others as lists of constraints, and still others as lists of questions which any adequate pragmatic theory must be able to answer. They tend to point out the sorts of concerns previously suggested by Peirce, Morris, and Austin, although each represents a unique slant on the problem of pragmatics and can be classified into three broad categories reflective of these unique orientations: the communication perspective

(which could also be called a social interaction perspective), the speech act perspective, and the transformational grammar perspective.

The Communication Perspective. Argyle's approach to establishing the critical parameters of a pragmatic theory begins with a specification that the pragmatic system must be goal structured, in that its purpose lies in attempting to satisfy needs and meeting goals through interaction with 42 others. Furthermore, it must contain a repertoire of elements needed to attain the goals, a specification of the rules governing the place of communication in social situations, the sequencing of elements within episodes and phases, the roles of the participants as they effect patterning of behavior, the concepts or constructs which organize the bits of information into cohesive wholes, the physical environment or setting in which the communication 52 takes place, and the skills required for adapting to the various communication contexts.

Allwood takes a similar tack, proposing the following as critical for consideration in a functional analysis of communication: intention and purpose of the communicative action, the actual overt form of the behavior used to perform the act, the context in which the act is performed, the actual effects achieved, and the social consequences or 43 conventional force of the communication act. In a companion article, he adds that a pragmatic theory must also account for the functioning of literal acts, the rules for institutionalized speech acts, shared background, and for the general rational and ethical norms that hold for all 44 human communicative interaction.

In addition, he states that while in rudimentary theory development, theorists typically assume an ideal situation with maximally effective information exchange, a complete theory must deal with why people do not always communicate in the ideal and how communication which departs from the ideal is still functional. Wright adds to this, asserting that going beyond the ideal involves an understanding of the rules which link conventional grammatical meaning, intention, and context, and how the rules are used to make inferences when faced with such "non-ideal" speech behavior 45 as jokes, metaphor, sarcasm, story-telling, and lying. To do otherwise would result in an inadequate theory of 53 communication. Theorists interested in metaphor and figurative language have been particularly concerned with the fallacy of the ideal communication situation, claiming that to assume an idealized model as a basis for theory development reduces communication analysis to the level of 46 rules of grammar. It is their contention that the metaphor is basic to the use of language to communicate, as a device to bridge from the known to the unknown, and therefore is not a deviance away from the ideal, but rather represents a critical parameter of human pragmatic ability.

Linell too proposes a communication based approach, but one focused on specifying the constraints or conditions on communicative acts which must be accounted for in an 47 adequate theory of language. This entails accounting for the phonetic or phonological conditions, as well as the morphological, syntactic, semantic, and finally the pragmatic. Linell further explicates the pragmatic, stating that it includes those conditions which determine situational appropriateness and which interact with the

"general principles of communication (e.g. agenthood, 48 rationality)" and social interaction. Linell postulates that communication begins at the pragmatic level, being concerned with intent, and that the structure of the other levels is manipulated according to certain strategies to accomplish that intent. One final requirement that he adds is that language must adhere to constraints on both a 54 conscious and unconscious level. The first of these levels is discussed above. The second, the level of the unconscious, is characterized by the limitations inherent in psychological and physiological processing of information.

In other words, Linell requires that a communication theory must account both for the human social rule-following nature and the biologically determined nature.

The final communication based parameters approach to be reviewed is one by Green and Morgan which stresses a need to incorporate a general theory of common-sense inference into 49 an account of the use and comprehension of discourse. As have many of the other theorists cited above, they see that linguistic structure is an inadequate basis for such a theory. To clarify the direction that an adequate theory of pragmatics should take. Green and Morgan propose two goals which must be met. The first goal is to account for the ability to construct and to understand various types of connected discourse; the second is to explain such aspects of discourse as coherence and text structure which cannot be accommodated at the linguistic level. Attaining these goals entails an accounting for five types of meaning: prepositional content, linguistic meaning, speech acts, implicatures or inferences about speakers, intentions, and literary interpretation. The implicatures are derived from the placement of the first three levels within a context and the literary interpretation is derived from the use of the 55 other four levels within a context. Using this multi-leveled meaning system. Green and Morgan call for a rejection of any pragmatic approach which depends totally on formal linguistic properties, claiming that their approach is the only sensible one, being as it is

based on a simple but pervasive human ability; the ability to interpret the actions of other people by forming complex hypotheses about goals, plans, and intentions that underlie acts. One might plausibly claim that this kind of interpretation is the most pervasive mental activity of human beings.

Eventually, they conclude that pragmatics is outside the domain of linguistics and fully within the domain of communication. Thus a complete theory within a model of communication must account for three key areas:

(1) Knowledge of language, as the speaker/hearer must possess linguistic competence in the use of phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics,

(2) Knowledge about Language and the Use of Language, as the speaker/hearer must possess pragmatic competence in the use of the conversational and literary conventions to manipulate language to achieve goals, and

(3) Knowledge of Communicating, as the speaker/hearer must possess communication competence in the use of the ongoing context, the cooperative principle (a la Grice), in projecting the hearer's model of the world in planning the communication (including his/her beliefs, reasoning ability, role, and perception of the speaker), and in possessing an 56 encyclopedic knowledge of the world (including such things as information about individuals and kinds, consequences of events, information about human nature and likely 51 motives).

Speech Act Centrality. Another approach to establishing critical parameters is one which is built upon the primacy of the speech act in pragmatic theory. For the advocates of this approach, "the study of speech acts is a central concern of pragmatics" and as such they "recast the project of surveying language uses as one of categorizing the nature 52 and variety of speech acts." For Itkonen, this bent is due more to a focus on intentions than on speech acts per se.

But, since he considers intentions to be "conceptually necessary parts of action, including speech acts," the speech acts must be considered part and parcel with the 53 intentions." He requires too that psychological and sociolinguistic evidence must be taken into account since intentions cannot be separated from either the cultural contexts which give them meaning or the psychological structures which limit their form.

Dore takes a similar approach, demanding that pragmatics must go beyond sentences as purely structural entities to include consideration of the intentions and beliefs of speakers in oroducing utterances and of the 54 effects of utterances on hearers. "Moreover," he claims,

"the pragmatics of language use (as distinct from the 57 grammar of linguistic structures) encompasses a larger domain, a domain that includes the relations among utterances in discourse and the rules for constructing 55 conversations." In establishing criteria for a pragmatic theory based on the above assumptions. Dore establishes the speech act as the basic unit and then details a list of parameters which are relevant to understanding the use of the speech act. Thus, he claims that one must (1) look at what speakers do in speaking apart from the truth value of the proposition, (2) provide a framework to discuss intention, beliefs, and expected effects of speakers, (3) provide a base to explain the relation between sentences and contexts, (4) account for use and understanding of ambiguity and metaphor, and (5) account for the various uses of language to negotiate interpersonal relations, persuade, manipulate, be ironic or comic, deceive, etc.

Another tack on a speech act-centered pragmatics is presented by Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish in their attempt to establish "the set of minimum requirements on an adequate 56 pragmatic theory." As they define it, a pragmatic theory

1. must contain a classification of speech acts ; 2. must contain analyses and definitions of the various speech acts; 3. must contain a specification of various uses of expressions: it must say that a. expression e is standardly (literally and directly) used to do X (in context C). b. expression e has n different uses. c. expressions e and e ' have the same use or uses; 58

4. must relate literal and direct language use to such phenomena as a. linguistic structure (semantics, syntax, and phonology), b. the structure of the communication situation, the course of conversations, and social institutions, c. speaker-meaning, implication, (pragmatic) presupposition, and understanding.

In reviewing their discussion of these parameters, though, it becomes evident that their conception of speech acts is more limited than that of Itkonen and Dore. Rather than using speech act to refer to the total communication act, including locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects, they redefine speech act (based on an earlier misuse of the term by John Searle) as being illocutionary in general, and performative in specific.

The Transformational Grammar Orientation. A slightly different approach to the problem of delimiting pragmatics 58 is given by Jerrold Katz. Coming from a background in transformational grammar, Katz is interested in clarifying the relation between pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic factors in creating or deriving meaning. It is his belief that the study of linguistic competence and the concomitant skills in phonology, syntax, and semantics is not enough to explain how speakers use sentences to do things for even in

"the simplest use of language, the grammatical meaning of a sentence type is changed, on the basis of aspects of the context, to become the special utterance meaning of that 59' token of the sentence. Therefore, an understanding is 59 required of the interaction between interpreting sentence meaning, based on knowledge of grammatical principles, and utterance meaning, based on knowledge of the context

(including beliefs and attitudes about the context and past experience in similar contexts).To explain the relationship between the grammatical component and the pragmatic, he proposes the following equation:

PRAG ( D(S^), I (C(t))) = ( R^...,R^) where D (S^) is the full grammatical description of the sentence, I (C(t)) is all the information in the context in which token t of sentence S occurs, and R is all possible 60 readings of S. If C (t) = 0, then the context is null.

It is then the role of the pragmatic theory to explicate

the principles speakers and hearers employ to work out the contribution that specific contextual information makes to utterance meaning, relative to the overall assumption that the closer a context is to the null context the larger the proportion of sentence meaning is utterance meaning and the less these principles are required to work out.

Thus Katz provides a means not only to account for semantics, characterized as grammatical or sentence meaning and concerned with the logical form of the prepositional content, but also for pragmatics, characterized as utterance or contextual meaning. Additionally, he spells out the relationship between them in that they overlap at the point of a null context (an idealization for theoretical purposes), but the further the context departs from null. 60 the more extragrammatical information is needed to determine utterance meaning and the less contribution semantics makes for the interpretation of the utterance. The use of pragmatics then involves a reasoning process to work out the correspondence between the propositions and their contexts.

Hurtig also has a starting point in delineating the proper domains of transformational grammar and discourse 62 analysis. While the specific questions he raises in regard to this issue are not relevant for my purposes, his conclusion that linguists need to maximize the descriptive and explanatory power of both approaches is important. In addition, he sketches out a series of constraints which must be considered in constructing a theory of discourse. Thus any discourse theory must recognize the limitations presented by (1) the linguistic constraints of formal syntactic and semantic properties. It must also recognize the extralinguistic constraints which occur as a consequence of the interaction of language with other formal systems of knowledge, including knowledge of general social behavior.

These constraints include those presented by (2) Gricean conversational postulates, (3) truth conditional correspondences with the "real" world, (4) logical scope relationships, and (5) social interaction variables such as context, participants, and topic. One further limitation is added in terms of (6) processing system constraints; in requiring this constraint, Hurtig is requiring that the 61 resulting discourse theory be psychologically real and thus compatible with the psychological and physiological 63 limitations of human nature.

Summary

As can be seen from the overview of the metatheories above, there is a wide range of perspectives on what constitutes the primary criteria of a pragmatic theory.

While this does not eliminate the possibility of concensus over relevant criteria, it does suggest that pragmatics is currently characterized by diversity. Points of agreement do seem to occur on a few vital elements, as for example that language structure is an insufficient mode of accounting for discourse, or that intentions are important to consider as well as the context in which the communication occurs.

Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that pragmatics is integrally related with communication and that the study of both would benefit with the inclusion of one another.

However, from here, the paths which the theorists take diverge. Some head toward a complete theory of pragmatics by way of speech acts, others by way of social interaction, and still others by way of rules theory. Which is right? Which will prove to be the most fruitful? Each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, so none of them are all wrong or all right. And, each would seem to have the potential to stimulate useful and interesting research. How is one to 62 choose between them then? The best approach I believe would be not to choose between them, but instead to choose among them, picking out the important contributions of each perspective and eliminating that which is redundant or

irrelevant. They could then be consolidated into a larger metatheory, but one which is now adequate to handle all the problems of pragmatic inquiry. It is precisely to just such a consolidation of ideas that I will now turn in preparation for my proposal of a master metatheory. PRAGMATICS; PROSPECTUS FOR A METATHEORY

CHAPTER FOUR

In deriving a comprehensive metatheory of pragmatics based on the perspectives presented in the last chapter, two sets of criteria must be considered. The first set of criteria is concerned with the basic assumptions which form the philosophical grounding of pragmatics as a valid area of study. These assumptions establish guidelines for theory building. The second set of criteria is concerned with the key elements which define the parameters of pragmatic analysis and organize efforts in pragmatic inquiry. Since the latter cannot be developed without the former, the first step in defining a master metatheory is to propose a system of central assumptions. Once this is complete, one may then proceed to derive from these assumptions a set of key elements which, when joined, form the subject matter of pragmatic theory and analysis.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR A PRAGMATIC METATHEORY

In reviewing the theories which are representative of the rhetorical/pragmatic approach to human symbolic

63 64

interaction, it appears that the most basic underlying assumption is that human behavior consists of ACTION, which involves qoals-oriented and choice-dominated responses, and 1 of MOTION, which involves cause and effect. At this most basic level, it is held that all human behavior must be grounded in motion— the realm of matter. This means that the physical nature of humans must be recognized and used to define system constraints, both psychologically and physiologically, for the development of action. Yet while this animal nature provides the grounding for human action, it is transcended through the use "of a conventional, arbitrary symbol system" making it possible to go beyond the 2 here-and-now limitations imposed by the realm of motion.

Only through this use of symbols can one deal with that which is not physically present, that which is past, and that which is future. Thus communicative action can not be reduced to cause and effect motions, but rather is characterized by the development of attitude and expectation as predisposition to and attribution of motives.

Consequently, communicative behavior may be assumed to be intentional, valuative, and descriptive as it provides for, respectively, (1) choice and control over one's own behavior, (2) the reflection of moral standards and ethical consequences in the choices made by the actors, and (3) 3 reference to objects, ideas, and events. This ability to transcend mere motion does not develop in isolation. 65 however;it can only develop within the context of interaction. And, in this need for interaction, lies the bridge to the second key assumption; "Communication occurs 4 in a social system."

This assumption is centered on the conviction that the study of pragmatics cannot occur in the absence of consideration of the social context in which it occurs.

Communication thus is seen as both a cause of the social system and a result of it such that who we are and the culture of which we are a part is integrally linked with 5 pragmatics. It has the power to alter society and yet it in turn is shaped by the social context in which it occurs. The importance of this assumption has been reinforced by Morris, by Goffman, and by Hymes, all of whom suggest that language is only a small part of the broader cultural behavioral 6 system.

Goffman further suggests that since general social action requires cooperativeness and a shared current orientation that communication, and particularly, language must also be characterized by this cooperation and 7 coorientation. This leads to the third basic assumption:

Communication is based in joint action and thus is rule-governed. In other words, because language, or more broadly communication, only exists in the context of a self and an other (however defined), it is inherently a form of social interaction which requires coordination between the 66 8 participants. This coordination must be governed by norms of interpretation and expectation; hence, it is regulated by rules of appropriateness and cooperativeness. As Higgins puts it:

communication involves shared patterns of expectations, rules, or conventions concerning the participants' social rules and the appropriate language to be used, with appropriate language use requiring that both the linguistic and extralinguistic context be taken into account. . . . Communication requires coorientation and monitoring between the participants, with each participant taking into account the other's characteristics and, especially, their communicative intentions.

This does not mean that each individual is bound in a deterministic manner to abide by these rules, but that these rules exist to coordinate and facilitate interaction. They may certainly be broken or violated, but in so doing, the violator may be subject to social sanctions just as one would in violating any other social norm for behavior.

In summary, then, the basic assumptions of a rhetorical/pragmatic theory are as follows:

1. Communication is action-dominated,

being intentional, value-laden, and

referential, yet it is grounded in

motion.

2. Communication occurs in a social

context, being both influenced by and

influencing social behavior.

3. Communication is manifested through 67

joint action and thus is rule-governed

to facilitate coorientation.

The specific criteria for any pragmatic metatheory therefore must take these assumptions into account. This would include, at a minimum, some accounting for intentions, psychological and physiological constraints on the interaction system, interaction with the broader social institutions, and rule schemas or strategies of coorientation. As is seen in chapter three, not all proposed metatheories have taken these particular criteria into account and still others have proposed additional aspects to be included and investigated. In final preparation for the presentation of a complete model for a metatheory, then, a summary of the minimal elements to be considered within a pragmatic theory as derived from these basic assumptions will be undertaken along with a discussion of why each is a requisite part of this model.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS FOR A PRAGMATIC THEORY

Given the assumed nature of pragmatics as social, rule-governed action grounded in motion, what constraints 10 guide the "natural genesis of such action?" Or, put another way, what are the minimal components which must be considered as adequate to account for pragmatics? To attempt to specify every single variable which must, at one time or 68 another, be accounted for in an analysis of a pragmatic event or situation is a task close to impossible. The very nature of pragmatics as responsive to the shifts in situation, among other shifts, should make this point clear.

What is needed instead is a consideration of classes of variables as integral to pragmatic function. From reviewing the extant theories and metatheories in the area (as sampled in Chapters 2 and 3), five interrelated classes of variables emerge as critical to the basic structure of pragmatic theory:

(1) structure, the patterning of the

communicative act at the linguistic, discourse,

rhetorical, and media levels;

(2) contexts, the situation in which the communicative

act occurs, and

(3) intentionality, the attitudes, ends, and goals

through which a communicative act is formed and

interpreted;

(4) rule systems, the strategies which guide the

interaction between structure, intent, and

context, and

(5) psychological reality, the biological and

psychological constraints guiding and delimiting

the development and use of communicative acts;

It is critical to note that these components do not exist in isolation from one another, but exist only in terms of one 69 another. Each component must be defined in relation to the other four and is qualified through interaction with them.

Each acts at once as a producer for and product of the other. Such interdependence is important in demonstrating that pragmatics is concerned with the study of real time occurrences of symbolic interaction rather than static manifestations of linguistic structure. Each component sheds new light on a communicative act toward achieving a fuller understanding in the ultimate union of the five perspectives.

In this approach, pragmatic analysis approximates closely the analytical flexibility and power which may be found in a Burkeian pentadic analysis wherein the critical aspects of act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose are 11 analyzed in light of one another. Here also aspects may be structured into critical ratios to gain insight into the key relationships of one specific aspect with another (as, for example, when the intentionality-structure ratio aids in understanding the selection of a particular structure to achieve a certain end or when the context-rules ratio sheds light on the appropriateness of strategies for a given situation). And just as the act in Burke's schema may be said to have primacy, so have many pragmatists assumed that the act itself, in the form of linguistic or discourse structure, has primacy. Yet, the act or structure may not be understood save in light of the critical elements which 70 shape it, calling it into being in a particular context, with a particular meaning derived from its specific purpose, and in conjunction with the natural psychological and physiological constraints of the human system. Thus while the analysis may be built upon the act, or upon any other single component, it must not be restricted to this component alone; if it is, the analysis is not one of pragmatics, but of linguistics, or psychology, or sociology instead.

To fully understand each component and ultimately the complex of their union, one must take each separately and analyze it in detail. However, in doing this, one must always look to how each will fit back into the whole, being cautious not to become enamoured of any single component. It is to such a discussion that my attention will now be directed.

Structure

If one assumes, as Brenner does, that "action involves specific behavioral forms," then an important aspect of understanding that action will be through an understanding 12 of the forms through which this action is made manifest.

The exact nature of this form for communication, however, has been contested. From the point of view of many traditional linguists, the form is all that is worthy of note. But, many others have cautioned against, indeed even 71 railed against, domination by the structural approach, asserting that pragmatics is concerned with a larger domain than just the grammatical structures of traditional 13 linguistics. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out an ancient battle in Rhetoric in their argument that rhetoric has fallen into the trap of formal art and must be 14 rescued. Richards pursues a similar line in rejecting the

Proper Meaning Superstition, claiming that the substance of 15 rhetoric is not determined merely by its form. A more appropriate approach to structure, then, would seem to be one which is concerned with delineating the forms as they exist in patterning communication, but at the same time which avoids claiming linguistic structure to be the sole base of communication. It is to look at form or structure not as the "be all, end all" of pragmatics, but to look at it, as Burke does, as a tool for the "creation of an appetite in the mind of the audience and the adequate 16 satisfaction of that appetite."

One approach to form/structure which addresses this question of broadening the area is presented by Wayne 17 Brockreide. He argues that structure is too often treated as invariant, to the neglect of context and function, and proposes as an alternative view a dual level approach to form. The first level, the microlevel, is concerned with the logical connections of material ideas and encompasses the traditional realm of linguistics in its focus on phonemes. 72 words, and sentences. The macrolevel, his second level is concerned with the broader symbolic strategy of rhetorical form and looks at the creative uses of genre, i.e., the use of the play, the essay, the speech, etc., to communicate ideas.

An expansion of Brockreide proposed by Karl Wallace refines these levels a bit further, presenting for consideration three hierarchically related levels of 18 structure: linguistic, discourse, and rhetorical. The linguistic level, primarily Brockreide's microstructure, is concerned with the logical structure of communication and particularly the logical structure of language. It is here that one begins in order to understand the literal meaning of specific acts of speech. For it is only through a thorough understanding of an utterance phonologically, syntactically, and semantically that this literal meaning can be derived; but only through an understanding of this literal meaning can higher levels of language use or communication make sense. This level would include what

Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish refer to as linguistic-meaning and linguistic-reference; it sets up a basis for analyzing from a structural perspective such aspects as meaning specification or prepositional content, ambiguity (multiple interpretations of a single utterance), and synonymy 19 (multiple modes of creating a single referent).

Additionally, the referential and sequential components of 73 language become available through linguistic structure for use inferentially to achieve communication in a social 20 context. This interface of linguistics and communication is particularly important in distinguishing entailment and 21 presupposition from implication.

To stop at the linguistic level, though, is to sell short our communicative skill because not only do we pattern our actions at an utterance level, we organize them at a broader level which governs the patterning of utterances into discourse. It is at this level that the patterning becomes concerned with coherence, topicality, and general sequencing of interactant's contributions. Such studies as are germane to this level include those looking at question and answer sequences, turn taking in conversation, and use 22 of demand tickets.

The third level of the hierarchy is that of rhetorical structure which parallels Brockreide's macrolevel of analysis. It is at this level that the genre of a specific act is analyzed. The primary focus here would be on the structure of conversation in that it is the most common, although least recognized, genre of communication. In addition, it would focus on a variety of other genre derived from conversation, including poetry, riddles, literature, 23 songs, campaigns, and religious services.

One final aspect of structure must be taken into account— that of media structure. In other words, the 74

channels and instrumentalities of the act must be taken into

consideration; for, if McLuhan is correct and the media are but ways of extending our physical senses/abilities, the

structures used to extend our vocal abilities to create 24 speech in face to face situations must be considered. This

is particularly important in understanding variances in the uses and/or meanings of otherwise identical messages but as 25 sent via different media. At its broadest, this includes consideration of both verbal and nonverbal modes of symbolic

interaction. In addition, it will include primary modes of transmission, such as whistling, drumming, speaking, and signing, and secondary modes, such as radio and 26 television.

To look at structure alone, however, is to look at only a fragment of the total communicative act and to deny the critical aspects necessary to account for the relationship 27 of real utterances to speakers, hearers, and contexts.

Despite the complexities added in going beyond the

linguistic to the discursive and rhetorical levels and by adding consideration of the media through which the message is carried, the analysis of acts by such a means still deals with isolated references which are not necessarily "germane 28 to the act's communicative meaning in an episode." And, if one is interested in looking at such issues as "efficiency of information transfer, clarity versus ambiguity, conciseness versus redundancy, confidence versus 75 uncertainty, and identification versus alienation," one must go beyond structure to the consideration of the interaction of structure with the other dimensions of the 29 communicative act.

Context

In moving beyond structure, the question of concern now becomes one of discovering and organizing those variables which are critical in transforming decontextualized patterns into acts of communication. One critical step toward accomplishing this goal is to relate the communication act to the situation in which it occurs. In other words, one must add the critical component of context.

For many theorists, context has either been considered the starting point for pragmatics or it has been seen as 30 synonymous with pragmatics. Lyons uses context as the dividing line between semantics and pragmatics, seeing semantics as concerned with the analysis of maximally 31 decontextualized propositions. Katz follows this lead, accounting for semantics as grammatical or sentence meaning, concerned with the logical form of the prepositional content, and pragmatics as utterance or contextual 32 meaning. He spells out the relationship between them, postulating an identity at the point of a null context (an idealization for theoretical purposes); the further the context departs from the null, the more extragrammatical 76 information is needed to determine utterance meaning and the less contribution semantics makes to the interpretation of the utterance. Pragmatic theories then, according to Katz, explicate the reasoning process or strategies used to work out the correspondence between propositions and their 33 contexts. This requires an understanding of propositions

(structure), context, rules, and uses.

This awakening interest in context may also be seen in the field of rhetoric and communication also. The beginnings of this focus are seen in Aristotle's concern with audience adaptation and the predominance of interest in the British and Continental period with developing a psychology of the audience to be better able to suit rhetoric to the needs of 34 the situation. In general though, rhetoricians have, according to Brockreide, tended historically to neglect the

"totality of the rhetorical situation— its people, its functions, and its contexts" in favour of attempts to treat organizational patterns and logic progressions as invariant 35 structure. He concludes, however, that this tendency must change and rhetoricians must come to recognize that "a rhetorical act occurs only within a situation, and the nature of the act is influenced profoundly by the nature of 36 the encompassing situation." In line with this call for consideration of context, Bitzer goes so far as to define rhetoric in terms of the situation which calls it into existence, seeing rhetoric as a response to a situation— an 77 37 attempt to meet an exigency. Others, including Scott,

Mead, Buber, Laing, Phillipson, Lee, Wilder, Barnlund, and

Burke, continue this shift, seeing rhetoric or communication as only possible within a social matrix, existing in a 38 context of self defined in relation to other. In fact, the development of the field has often centered around understanding the effect of varying situations upon communication, including particularly the interpersonal, small group, organizational, public, and mass communication 39 situations.

What though is to be considered as part of the rhetorical situation or pragmatic context? For Carnap, context is limited to the consideration of effects of an 40 utterance on its user. This is a quite narrow conception of context and not representative of most approaches. More broadly , Sadock sees context as involving

the intentions of the speaker, the knowledge, beliefs, expectations or interests of the speaker and his [sic] audience, other speech acts that have been performed in the same context, the time of the utterance, the effects of the utterance, the truth value of the proposition expressed and some others involved in the same way.

Lyons extends this list to include determiners of contextual appropriateness, such as knowledge of: one's role and status, the space and time of the speaking situation, the degree of situational formality (a la Joos, 1962), the terminology to make utterances appropriate to the subject matter and to the current domain, province, or genre of the 78 42 discourse. Katz adds beliefs, attitudes, and past experiences with similar situations; Richards literary context or interinanimation; Argyle roles and settings;

Hymes speech communities, situations, events, acts, and 43 styles; and Goffman social situation. The list could go on indefinitely, but as the list expands, the concept of context becomes less and less useful. Potentially, one could define it as all which is not an immediate part of the grammatical structure or , as Lyons does, as any and all factors which systematically influence the form, 44 appropriateness, and/or meaning of an utterance. At the extreme, this would entail the other key components of uses, rules, and psychological reality; to do so, however, I believe would be counter-productive for it would deemphasize the importance of each of these other components and mask aspects of context which could be more profitably investigated. A better alternative would be to clarify what truly should be considered to be context and to deal with the remaining primary components as conceptually separate from but interrelated with context.

One of the strongest approaches to the organization of 45 contextual variables is provided by Prentz and Farrell. It is their contention that context is logically prior to the

"intelligibility of communication," and their goal is to provide a schema to describe context toward understanding 46 communication more fully. The schema they propose is 79 bilevel, consisting of a broader level of socio-cultural interaction, termed "Forms of Life," and a narrower level concerned with particularized social situations, termed

"Encounters." These levels roughly parallel Pike's 1954 distinction between the etic and emic approaches to 47 language.

Forms of Life. Borrowing from Toulmin, Frentz and

Farrell characterize Forms of Life as a formalization of world view or social reality, defining it formally as "those partially nonlinguistic constellations of activities which 48 fix the meanings of concepts and expressions." This level is further broken down into three dimensions: shared knowledge, patterning, and institutionalization. The first of these emphasizes the interactive nature of the relation between social knowledge and language, in that each is created and recreated by the other. This requirement is echoed by Hart in his claim that an adequate pragmatic theory must include a means to account for the influence of social interaction as "both a setting event and a consequent 49 event for language use." This knowledge is characterized as conceotual, aesthetic, and cultural and closely parallels 50 Douglas' notion of transcript.

The second dimension emphasizes the social imposition of patterns which, in use, create certain expectations which must either be fulfilled or, if deviated from, justified in order for communication to be meaningful. This I believe 80 would overlap with Allwood's general conditions for social behavior which include the principle of agenthood (action is voluntary and intentional), the principle of naturalness

(the action must be possible within psychological constraints), the principle of rationality (the action must be rational), the principle of sincerity (the action must be true and adhere to ethical norms), and the princiole of form 51 (the action must utilize conventional forms).

The third dimension, the institutional dimension, exerts indirect social regulation on communication events.

It includes consideration of procedures or forms in ritual, role relationships, and professional practices. According to

Frentz and Farrell, these forms are all "typified and constrained by the institutionalized structures found in 52 form of life." Hymes and Gumperz would see this dimension as concerned with the speech community within which a given 53 act of communication occurs.

If Allwood is correct in claiming that "one of the most powerful theoretical conceptions behind current research in pragmatics is the idea that a theory of linguistics is really only a general theory of human action," Frentz and

Farrell's conception of the Form of Life context is of particular importance for it places communicative action and thus pragmatics squarely within the greater system of human 54 behavior. And this is precisely where Morris, in his original conception of semiotic, saw pragmatics as 81 55 belonging. Frentz and Farrell thus reemphasize, along with

Pike, the key assumption of pragmatics

that language is behavior, i.e. a phase of human activity which must not be treated in essence as structurally divorced from the structure of nonverbal human activity. The activity of man [sic] constitutes a structural whole, in such a way that it cannot be subdivided into neat 'parts' or 'levels' or 'compartments' with language in a behavioral compartment insulated in character, content, and organization form other behavior.

This means that social situation must no longer be treated

as the "country cousin" of language study, but must be seen 57 as a superordinate context in which language exists. To

fully understand pragmatics therefore is to see that it is not just a part of a linguistic system existing in isolation

from other social systems, but is part of a greater system

of social behavior requiring joint or shared current

orientation. Thus communicative actions and intentions

cannot be separated from the social environment which gives

them meaning. "Actions can be understood (and, in the first

place, understood as actions), only if one has the 'cultural 58 key' to them."

Encounters. The second level of Frentz and Farrell's

system is that of Encounters, defined as "points of contact

. . .which particularize form of life through rules of 59 propriety." They see Encounters as here-and-now

manifestations of the more abstract forms of life. In a

manner similar to Coffman's theories of social interaction,

encounters require "acknowledgement of one another's 82 presence" and is often defined via external circumstances 60 (being for example in a bar as opposed to a church).

Within this level only do acts of communication become evident, defined first as episodes and then more specifically as symbolic acts. An analysis of a particular

Encounter according to this schema might reasonably parallel 61 Hymes' schema of speech situation, event, and act. The

Encounter, however, is constrained institutionally in that the "propriety of available communication choices," in terms of formality, politeness, etc., is negotiated socially prior to the situation and thus axiological considerations become 62 inherent to any Encounter, enacted or potential. Finally,

Frentz and Farrell characterize an Encounter as a " 'psych ological readiness' prior to the actual inception of communication," demonstrating the interplay between the

Burkeian notion of attitude/intent and the creation of 63 communication within a particular situation.

Through these two levels of context, then, Frentz and

Farrell capture the essential variables necessary to place the structure of a communication act into its appropriate situation. They have provided an approach which can clarify the area of interaction of communication with the greater social and cultural structures of action and which is concerned more particularly with the social impetuses for acts, the social consequences of acts, the adaptations of actions for social/cultural reasons, and the social 83 knowledge which is assumed as background knowledge for any communication event. The external elements of the situation thus become factored into the pragmatic complex. In so doing, various phenomena unaccountable for with structure alone can be dealt with. Metaphor, understandable only in terms of its pragmatic context, is rescued from what Honeck 64 calls the "linguistic netherworld." Language use is necessarily broadened from the purely referential and instrumental to include any use to which human action may generally be put. And a means is provided wherein the correspondence of particular modes of communication to particular social structures may be investigated, as for example, when one's perceived social role is reflected in 65 one's choice of words, as with bunny versus rabbit.

Intentionalitv

In one sense, the study of intentionality may be considered as an outgrowth of context, particularly if one assumes as Wittgenstein does that "an intention is embedded 66 in its situation, in human customs and institutions." Yet the importance of intentions goes beyond an understanding of cultural and situational contexts to focus on the role of the communicator as an active manipulator of the environment through symbolic means. This third component then centers attention on the purposes communicators have in acting symbolically and on the attribution of purpose or motive in 84

interpreting symbolic acts. It is concerned with the

illocutionary and perlocutionary intents of the speaker,

including consideration of attitudes, ends, and goals, and the influence on one's communication contribution (including 67 the decision of whether to make a contribution at all).

The importance of intentionality as a key component of pragmatics cannot be underestimated. It serves as a means of formalizing the basic assumption that human symbolic behavior is action. It is intentionality which distinguishes Burke's realm of action from the realm of 68 motion. And it is intentionality which establishes the dividing line between what may truly be considered communication, i.e. that which is goal-oriented and deliberate, and what may be considered to be merely 69 behavior, i.e. that which is reflexive and instinctual.

This approach to intentionality, of course, flies in the

face of the "You cannot not communicate" doctrine formalized by Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson and espoused by others 70 such as Barnlund and Dance. Rejection of their position, however, is necessary if one is to be able to distinguish between that meaning derived from natural events (such as

one's stomach growling in hunger) and that resulting from

symbolic events (such as one saying "I'm starved!). This

certainly does not mean that we are always aware of our

intentions or that we do not sometimes attribute intent to

natural events and thus derive meaning from them, but it 85 does emphasize that "intentions are conceptually necessary parts of action including speech acts. Thus every adequate theory of language must take speech intentions into 71 account." Scott, Isard, and Brenner echo this requirement, agreeing that intentionality, in its recognition of the communicator as an active agent, is a necessary although not sufficient condition for a complete explanation of human 72 action, generally, and human communication, specifically.

According to Scott, it is only through such an accounting for intention that "we are in a position to understand our behaviors as the actions of agents and to understand the behavior of others as like actions. And herein lies the 73 generating force of human communication."

In analyzing intentionality, it is important to note that it exists in an interactive complex with context and structure, although attention in pragmatics has primarily been given to the interaction between intentionality and structure. The counterpoint between these two has, in fact, provided the base for speech act-centered pragmatics. The proponents of this view take as the proper content of the pragmatics the development of a taxonomy of speech acts to relate the signs used to the intentions of those that use 74 them.

The primary contribution of this approach has been in pointing out the various acts which utterances may be used to accomplish. For example, Austin proposed five classes of 86

speech acts summarizing the primary uses to which utterances 75 were put. These included illocutions for making

judgements, exercising one's rights or powers, obligating

one's self to future action, adopting an attitude toward

one's own or another's behavior on a social level, and

clarifying the course of one's arguments or communications.

While this approach has its good points in that a taxonomy

of speech acts is valuable to understanding the various uses

of communication, it has two primary failings. The first

lies in a tendency to fall back on form or structure as the 76 ultimate determiner of intent. This results in a smudging

of the distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary

aspects of an act of communication and thus reduces

pragmatics to semantics, as Searle, Gordon and Lakoff 77 unhesitatingly point out. The second failing is that it

tends to highlight the illocutionary aspects to the

detriment of (and often total elimination of) the

perlocutionary aspects. Such neglect of ends is untenable

particularly since to understand the illocutionary aspect

one must not only understand the structure of the act, but must realize that the choice of structure must depend upon

an analysis of the context and a projection of what the

perlocutionary effect of that structure will be "on the

thoughts, feelings, and actions of the hearer" in that 78 context. In turn, it is only through attribution of motives (i.e. hypothesizing about the intentions of the 87 speaker) that the hearer comes up with an interpretation of a communication act. Speaker meaning cannot be reduced to a matter of form, but is the product of the interaction 79 between communicators, forms, and contexts. Therefore, in order to clarify the perlocutionary aspect of intentionality, it is necessary to go beyond the speech act taxonomies to look at the general uses to which utterances are put. Since rhetoric has traditionally been concerned with the effects of speech on audiences, I will turn to rhetorical theory in an attempt to fill in the gaps left speech act pragmatics.

Historically rhetoric has come to be associated almost exclusively with persuasion, bearing with it a stigma of manipulativeness and deceit; it is often misperceived as an art more concerned with the obscuring rather than the securing of understanding. Yet, even in classical rhetoric, the uses to which speech could be put went beyond just persuasion. In ancient Greece, three primary functions of rhetoric were recognized: the deliberative, the forensic, 80 and the epideictic. Roughly, these functions may be equated with informative, persuasive, and ritual uses for rhetoric, respectively. The deliberative was the outgrowth of the Athenian legislative process and its primary purpose was designative; it was intended "to present information, describe, define, amplify, clarify, make ambiguous, 81 obfuscate, review, or synthesize." The forensic, an 88 outgrowth of the Athenian legal system which required public self-defense, served an advocative function wherein rhetoric was used "to solve a problem, create indecision, reinforce a present choice, foster delay, choose a change alternative, resolve a conflict, propose a compromise, or stimulate 82 action." The third use of oratory, the epideictic, fulfilled the obligatory functions of ritual and was used evaluatively for purposes of praise or blame. It was typified by funeral orations and ceremonial presentations; with the rise of the Roman Empire, however, the forensic and deliberative functions almost disappeared and the epideictic became associated with rhetoric to entertain (since this was the only safe use of rhetoric left). A fourth function of rhetoric was added some five hundred years later by St.

Augustine; this function focused on rhetoric as a means of conversion and was aimed particularly at the altering of the audience's values. This use of rhetoric became known as 83 sermonic oratory.

As the years progressed, however, the study of rhetoric passed into disrepute. With the advent of the age of reason, rhetoric was revived somewhat as a means to convey scientific discoveries, but any use beyond the purely instrumental conveyance of facts was looked at askance. This led many great thinkers of the day, including Descartes,

Bacon, and Locke, to define successful rhetoric as that which achieved maximally effective information exchange. The 89 controversies stimulated by this narrowing of rhetoric were epitomized in the struggles between Perspicuitists and the

Stylistics and are found today in the respective viewpoints 84 of Edwin Newman and William Labov. Fortunately, modern rhetoricians have, for the most part, shed themselves of the fallacy of informational transfer, and begun to broaden their conception of rhetoric.

One of the most useful contemporary conceptualizations of rhetoric in regard to an understanding of intentionality is provided by Kenneth Burke. Rhetoric, according to Burke,

"is rooted in an essential function of language itself,. . . the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing 85 cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."

Fundamentally, the function of rhetoric is to reduce division between people— to achieve identification or oneness with one another. Other rhetoricians and communication theorists have come to the same conclusion, although by slightly different paths. For Broadhurst and

Darnell and for Hawes, communication is a means of fighting 86 entropy, a means of bringing order out of disorder. For 87 Barnlund, it acts primarily in uncertainty reduction. For

Wallace and for Fearing, it is means of reducing tensions 88 between communicators. For Richards, it is the study of misunderstanding and its remedies as well as a means of 89 moving from the unknown to the known. For Perelman and

Olbrechts-Tyteca, it is a means for gaining an adherence to 90 90 values. For Toulmin, it is a means of establishing a 91 consensus. The premise under which this revised view of rhetoric/communication operates is, according to these theorists, thus one of reducing division and achieving identification or consubstantiality, a complete sympathetic 92 understanding among people.

Such an orientation redefines the criteria for judging successful or effective communication, shifting it away from purely instrumental criteria to a judgement based on the extent to which the interaction appears to satisfy the norms of cooperative communication as well as whether it achieves the ends for which it is intended. In so doing, one must allow for and indeed account for the existence of multiple purposes of communication, be they instrumental or consummatory, self- or other-serving, aimed for clarification or obfuscation. One must also account for the existence of multiple means to achieve these purposes. With this expansion beyond the purely instrumental criteria of achieving understanding, one is now able to deal with ambiguity, irony, wit, metaphor, tact, deception, and the like not as "breaches of patterns of normal communication,"

(with normal defined in terms of the "ideal" situation of maximally effective information exchange) or as linguistically deviant, but as artful uses of communication to achieve goals. After all,

we must not assume that the sole purpose of communication is to ensure full understanding 91

by every hearer. Such an ideal would entail the banishment of wit and vivacity from human discourse and the anesthetization of keener instincts by laborious explanation. In these matters the speaker must at times take calculated risks, sometimes his [sic] remark may fall on strong ground and he [sic] will have lost the gamble.

Such "side" purposes and alternate means to achieve these purposes add to the richness of our symbolic action and must be accounted for in an adequate theory of pragmatics.

A new focus has developed in rhetoric then to outline the range of purposes for which humans communicate and this is precisely where an adequate study of intentionality must begin. According to Condon, the range of purposes include ritual, catharsis, information exchange, phatic communion, 94 uncertainty reduction and magic. For Dore, intentions may be aimed toward negotiation of interpersonal relationships, persuasion, manipulation, understanding of ambiguity and/or 95 metaphor, or toward being ironic or comic. Malinowski, an anthropologist committed to the argument that language is "a mode of action, rather than a countersign of thought," proposes four essential uses: speech in action, ritual, 96 narrative, and phatic communion.

Hymes, along with Frentz and Farrell, propose schema which parallel function with type of episode in a manner suggested earlier by the ancient Greeks. With Frentz and

Farrell's system, a system based on Jakobson's episodic analysis, a structurally dominant episode (as with a High

Mass) may have a ritual goal, an informationally dominant 92 episode (as with a lecture) might focus on disclosing knowledge, and a relationally dominant episode (as with a date) might aim at forming, confirming, or undermining 97 oersonal relationships. With Hymes' schema, a more 98 elaborate set of function-focus interactions are provided.

He looks at the functions of each communication event as deriving from a concern with the capacity state of the components of participants, channels, codes, settings, forms, topics, and events; the predominance of any one of these would lead to the following respective functions, expressive/directive, phatic, metalinguistic, contextual, stylistic, referential, and metacommunicational.

These differing perspectives however lack a common bond to organize them into related groups. The final perspective on intentionality then that I will cover acts to summarize these diverse functions under four headings. The approach is one proposed by Golden as part of an attempt to clarify the 99 trends characteristic of contemporary rhetorical thought.

Although this approach is not intended to categorize the general perlocutionary uses of rhetoric, being meant rather to organize the research trends prevailing in rhetoric today, it is nonetheless enlightening for present purposes.

Indeed, the trends as schematized appear to capture the dominant functions of rhetoric so well that one is led to the conclusion that it is the desire to understand these critical functions which directs current rhetorical theory. 93

Golden's schema is centered in a "liberal" perspective on rhetoric which seeks to take the best of traditional theory and to reinterpret or modify it for current 100 relevance. Additionally, it is placed within Ehninger's contemporary system of rhetoric which characterizes rhetoric as sociological in nature, meaning that it is dominated by an interest in understanding the role of rhetoric in influencing human relationships. In other words, rhetoric is seen as a means of creating, or alternatively inhibiting, identification between rhetors.

The trends suggested by Golden present rhetoric from four interrelated perspectives; rhetoric as meaning, rhetoric as value, rhetoric as motive, and rhetoric as a way of knowing. The first of these builds on a traditionally philosophical approach to the use of symbols, its use to convey messages which have meaning. However, the proponents of this approach, including Ogden, Richards, McLuhan, and

Wallace, go beyond the limitations set by the purely referential approach of traditional philosophy and focus on understanding the nature of meaning and the nature of the interaction between communicators in creating and interpreting meaning. To do this, they advocate consideration of linguistic structures, psychological processes, and contexts in their impact on the interpretation of meaning. Rhetoric as value, the second major research focus, is concerned with the evaluative and 94 affective natures of rhetoric. It builds on the theories of

Perelman and Weaver, both of whom are convinced that one's values are inseparable from one's rhetoric. For them, therefore, the purpose of rhetoric is gaining an adherence to values.

The third view, rhetoric as motive, espouses the theory that rhetoric is more than a means of transferring information, but that it is more importantly a means of achieving action. Through this symbolic action, according to

Burke, our society is made possible. The understanding of rhetoric from this perspective then builds on the understanding of its dramatistic origins and the role of the agents, scenes, purposes, and agencies in effecting an act of rhetoric. Rhetoric is thus action dominated and instrumental in achieving ends beyond reference. Finally, the fourth view, rhetoric as a way of knowing, focuses on the epistemological nature of rhetoric. For the proponents of this approach, rhetoric is used to move from the known into the unknown, generating new knowledge or new understandings of old knowledge. This is achieved, according to Toulmin and Perelman, through practical argument based on an enthymematic, probabilistic reasoning rather than through a formal argument based on syllogistic reasoning.

Critical to this schema is the interrelatedness of the trends. They do not each exist exclusive of the other

(although certainly one may be dominant to another in a 95 given situation), but rather are seen as interacting with one another to provide a fuller insight into rhetoric and communication. Thus the flexibility for multiple purposes is provided and the explanatory power of the theory therein increased.

Rules

So far in this chapter, I have presented three key elements of an adequate pragmatic theory; structure, context, and intentionality. Consideration of each of these components is absolutely necessary in order to understand communicative behavior. They do not, however, exist in isolation from one another and an interface is called for with a system of rules or norms which function to mediate the interaction between them. These rules, although not deterministic, provide a means for organizing communicative behavior and their study a means for associating modes of speaking with particular settings and activities and with the attitudes and knowledge of the members of a speech 101 community. Thus this fourth component is concerned with the rule system which organizes each of the other components separately (as with defining sequencing patterns within a conversation or defining appropriate behaviors for a given social role) and then acts to guide the interaction between them. It focuses on the strategies used to manipulate the structure toward certain ends and within certain contexts 96 c u id must account both for strategies used in forming communication acts and for the interpreting or understanding of these acts.

The use of rules in pragmatic theory reflects a key departure from the more traditional laws or logical- positivism approach to the study of human behavior. The laws approach, derived from scientific attempts to systematically and totally explain behavior, assumes communicative action to exist on a veridical level, being causally determined and 102 predictable based on a formal logic. The rules approach, however, is built on the assumption that human action is not reducible to deterministic structures, although it must exist within the limitations imposed by the physiological and psychological constraints on the system. It assumes that communication is representative of an open system, negotiated between the participants, and instrumental rather than causal in nature. The study of human phenomena thus is seen as fundamentally different from the investigation of physical reality.

What this means is that the description of rules is the description of correct/incorrect behavior rather than possible/impossible behavior; the study of human action via rules is inherently normative in that one can never know how 103 an individual will act, although one can know the rules.

As a result, exceptions and mistakes do not invalidate the rules, as they would with laws, thus allowing for deviant as 97 well as normal behavior. Perhaps Brockreide sums up the need for a rules theory best in the conclusion to his 1968 essay on the dimensions of rhetoric;

If one accepts the central idea of this essay that rhetoric is a system of interrelated dimensions, he [sic] must conclude that a rhetorical logic must accommodate the function of dimensions other than the one concerned with formal relationships among propositions. Irrelevant to rhetorical analysis is any logical system which assumes that man [sic] is only rational and that men [sic] do not vary, that ideas can be divorced from their affective content and from their ideological contexts, and that the only situation is,that of the logician talking to the logician.

Through rules therefore the logic of human action is redefined, focusing it away from a logic formally defined a priori and toward a concept of logic dialogically defined through interaction. This rejection of formal, syllogistic logic for a negotiated, enthymematic logic is not a new phenomenon, having characterized the premier rhetorical theories of both the Classical and British/Continental periods, but its acceptance outside of rhetoric has had to 105 await more current debate.

In essence, what this approach to pragmatics recognizes is that communication is "an activity gaining meaning and significance from consensually shared rules," requiring communicators to take one another into account by devising and using communication rules to guide and constitute the 106 significance of their communication acts. These rules as the governors of human interaction are "social human 98 creations subject to change and recreation," yet they "form general and specific patterns of choice" which provide a basis for predicting and interpreting behavior based on what is natural and intelligible, relative to a particular 107 culture. They are, as Rosenfield defines them, relationship agreements which prescribe and limit behavior over a wide range of content areas; and thus a few rules can cover major aspects of behavior (e.g. "respect your 108 elders"). In studying these rules, the power of pragmatics is greatly increased, allowing it to provide predictability based on practical necessity rather than falsely claiming an absolute predictability based on a nonattainable nomic or logical necessity.

The trend toward rules is becoming more pronounced as time passes and is appearing in other fields besides rhetoric such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and linguistics. In 1972, Giglioli, in summarizing the current trends characterizing sociolinguistics, pointed out two 109 major themes. The first was that of communication competence, or the use of psychological, cultural, and social rules to discipline speech. The second was that of schematizing sociolinguistic rules, although he cites the treatment at that time as existing more through implication than through formalization. One exception cited to this lack of formalization is the highly influential work of John 110 Searle. He defines two types of rules as being central to 99 an explanation of communicative action; constitutive rules which are tautological constructs which create or define new behavior (i.e. X counts as Y), and regulative rules which regulate antecedently existing behavior (i.e. Do X or Y).

According to Cushman, these two types of rules may be understood respectively as structural rules, which act as constraints on human interaction preexisting in the social structure and which specify content and meaning of an action, and procedural or functional rules, which guide behavior in regard to a specific task and which specify what 111 procedures are appropriate to carry out a given action.

Searle then attempts to define the constitutive rules of illocutionary acts (his combination of the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of Austin) toward establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions to perform illocutionary acts and the rules for their production.

Rosenfield, from rhetoric, combines Searle's rule base with the game model typical of ordinary language philosophy, claiming that "in matters of human communication the game is 112 an ontic category with psychological validity." He sees the juxtaposition of rules, tactics, and customs critical to explaining why we play games at all, and concomitantly to explaining why we engage in any symbolic interaction: it

"allows humans to engage in a matrix of social 113 relationships." He establishes a three concept hierarchy to explain a rules-based rhetoric: rules, tactics, and 100 customs. Rules, to Rosenfield, are formal limitations which differ between various social institutions and activities.

Violations of these rules may lead to sanctions (e.g. having twelve football players on the field from the same team).

These rules, as grounded in symbolic interaction, are arbitrary, not natural (as any sandlot football game attests) and are subject to modification, but are generally static for the duration of a given transaction. Grammar, according to Rosenfield, as a formal, consensual system, falls into this category.

Tactics are behavioral patterns which seek to bring the activity to a satisfactory conclusion. They create

"purpose-based standards of appropriateness" and are the category which includes the instrumental and performative aspects of communication. Customs, derived from tradition, are the social influences on games and/or communication and may be entirely incidental to the stated activity (e.g. having Script OHIO at halftime of the Michigan-Ohio State game). While rule violations lead to sanctions, and tactical errors to contempt (as with committing a faux pas), custom change has social consequences, ranging from merely a raised eyebrow to active campaigning against the change.

In considering such rules, it is clear that one must move beyond the act of communication itself to include consideration of how acts of speech are embedded in the normal structure of conversation and how such mechanisms of 101 communication as coherence are "derivable from an underlying system of rational principles for producing cooperative 114 exchanges." In other words, an interface is called for with the system of rules or norms for appropriate speech action which are established or negotiated to handle the myriad of situations which occasion speech or communication.

Only through this though may one be led to a full understanding of pragmatics. These norms, represented as

hierarchically-ordered contracts /which con tain/ several sets of rules . . ., some rules which regulate other rules (meta-rules) and 'switching cues' which signal which set of rules is to be salient at a particular time, are critical to communication;

they provide expectations for one's own and the other's behavior. . . [while! also formalizing relationships between individuals, facilitating communication by averting the necessity to renegotiate relationships on each encounter and by enabling the development of sophisticated relationships which require considerable time to negotiate.

The specification of an inclusion of this rule base thus calls for a direct consideration of social interaction as it is manifested in "the structure of the communication situation, the course of conversations, and social institutions" toward assessing their impact on the use and 116 interpretation of a given message or utterance. In addition, it calls for a taxonomy of these contracts or rules according to their function, a schema of the manifestations of communication attitudes or intents as they are standardized into recurring patterns of inference for 102 the accomplishment of symbolic interaction in a social 117 situation. This taxonomy would include, according to

Cushman and Whiting, an indication of the circumstances in which rules are applicable and what action ought to, may, or must be performed under the rule as well as indications of the level of understanding of the operative rules, the range of the rules, their specificity, and their homogeneity among 118 the participants of the communication system. An adequate pragmatic theory, then, must be capable of describing rules according to these dimensions. In sum, this schema should provide for the various possible patterns reflecting levels of generality and necessity which are engendered by specific occasions, i.e. for A to bring C about (whether C be overt or covert), B (the pattern) may be (1) necessary and sufficient, (2) necessary, but not sufficient, or (3) one of 119 several alternatives, any one of which is sufficient.

Together then the social structure and the normative contracts which govern the interaction within that structure

interact with the locutionary- illocutionary- perlocutionary complex to form the core of a pragmatic theory and a basis for understanding the phenomenon of human communication.

Only with this interface may one make judgements regarding whether the purposes and means chosen are appropriate to a given situation or audience and whether they are effective

in achieving whatever it is they are intended to achieve. 103

Psychological Reality

One final criterion for a pragmatic theory is needed— specifications of the functioning of the system must reflect a psychological reality. In other words, one must be concerned with explaining the relation between mental processing and obseryed symbolic uses. This would be, in

Burkeian terminology, the specification of the relation between motion and action. As a language user, one uses many rules of which one is only tacitly aware. While it is true that one may be made oyertly aware of the rules followed in communicating, a typical language user operates on the basis of a coyert rule system. (An example of such rules would be the proper use of /s/, /z/, and /ez/ phonemes in pluralization or the obligation to reply when one is presented with a demand ticket.) To understand the psychological reality of this system would provide important information as to what rules one actually employs and how one combines these rules to act both proactively and reactively in a communication system. In fact, there is no other way one can hope to validate the existence of the structures and rules hypothesized from direct observation of language use. This fifth and final component then focuses on the psychological reality of the other four components and their interactions with one another. It represents a means of accounting for the biological and psychological constraints on communication and provides a check on 104 postulated theories in that they must be psychologically feasible. Through this interaction between the empirical and the conceptual, one may establish criteria against which to judge potential pragmatic theories and, hence, guard against accepting as valid those constructs which are artifacts of a limited phenomenological perspective.

In establishing psychological reality as a critical element of a metatheory, however, some clarification is called for since there are multiple interpretations of what psychological reality is. Indeed, there are four major approaches to this concept, according to Per Linell, each providing a variant conception of the relation between 120 action and motion. The approaches include what he classifies as radical physicalism, pessimism, naive optimism, and moderate realism.

Radical Physicalism. The first of these, radical physicalism, reduces language behavior to a series of physical events totally grounded in motor responses. Such a language system would exist completely in the realm of motion and thus would not be subject to the influences of acquired or social knowledge— it would in essence be a

"hard-wired" system. The psychological reality of this approach would be describable only as physiological correspondences between the behavior and the stimuli causally producing the behavior. This system is epitomized 121 in the language theories of B.F. Skinner. 105

Pessimism. The second conception of psychological reality is that which Linell refers to as Pessimism which may be likened to the "black box" perspective on psychology

(although Rejectionism might be a more apt term in light of the assumptions stated above as basic to pragmatics). Here speakers are seen as possessing the linguistic knowledge to govern their behavior, but the properties of the psychological structures behind the behavior is considered to be unknowable. Data for analysis then are derived strictly from a structural observation of language since anything else is unknowable. Deetz provides a variation of this view in his conception of phenomenology. He completely rejects experience as a "psychological phenomenon which takes place in the head," classifying it instead as that which can be discovered in the "structured world which comes 122 to meet us as we live, work, and play." The goal of such a study is to describe only what is directly observable, what Deetz refers to as "concrete and certain— the experience itself. Phenomenology is, then, a kind of radical 123 empiricism." A further variation is provided by the

American structuralism movement in linguistics. Following

Louis H je1mslev, proponents of this view claim that

linguistics must attempt to grasp language, not as a conglomerate of non-linguistic (e.g., physical, physiological, psychological, social) phenomena, but as a self-sufficient totality, a structure sui generis.

In sum, this perspective on language is oriented on action. 106 as manifested in structure, in absence of motion. According to Garvin, it "includes no existence postulate or axiom, and its definitions must be strictly FORMAL or OPERATIONAL, NOT

REAL— that is— without reference to metaphysical 125 'reality.'" Its goal is to rid the discipline of semiotics of any taint from a sociological or psychological basis and thus this approach is inappropriate to a study of pragmatics.

Naive Optimism. At the opposite extreme is an approach, termed Naive Optimism, which claims to depend exclusively on an internal reality. Represented by the work of the transformational generative grammarians, particularly

Chomsky and the early work of Jerrold Katz, this approach originally purported to combine the overt and covert 126 manifestations of language.

It promised to be more than merely an elegant systematization of linguistic data; it also aimed at providing a theory of covert psychological realities, i.e., the fluent speaker- listener's mental organization for his [sic] linguistic knowledge... However, over the years it became increasingly obvious that orthodox Chomskyan grammar was an^almost complete failure in this respect.

The source of this failure lies in the conceptualization of 128 language along a competence/performance dichotomy. As such, the stated purpose of transformational grammar is the explication of a universal grammar based on innate ideas about language; from these innate notions, it assumes that one may construct a priori "the class of possible grammars. 107 129 independently of any empirical data." This tacit or innate knowledge of language is what Chomsky refers to as linguistic competence. For him, then,

linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors in applying his [sic] knowledge of the language in actual performance.

Any actual language behavior is relegated to the realm of mere performance and is rejected as irrelevant to the construction of the theory. Primary psychological evidence is thus ignored and convenient fictions are utilized as the 131 basis for claims to psychological reality. The transformational generative grammarians thus end up defining that which is psychologically real, with V. Fromkin, as that which "is permitted by the general theory which places constraints on the kinds of rules and forms of rules which 132 occur in any language."

This, of course, leaves the notion of psychological reality empty and unempirical. The theory damns itself in refusing, in what is purported to be a generative account of language, to allow for a mechanism which can generate the imperfect as well as the perfect. It can neither provide evidence for a claim of psychological validitv nor of 133 phenomenological validity. As Roberts so aptly sums up the arguments against this view. 108

the requirements of a phenomenologically unreal ideal speaker-hearer constitutes an arbitrary and unjustifiable constraint on what really constitutes linguistic data. The result is that our linguistic theory is less capable of accounting for very ordinary aspects of linguistic,activity and is therefore less empirical.

Moderate Realism. Fortunately, the final perspective on psychological reality is far superior to the other three.

This view, tagged as Moderate Realism, assumes that in order to explain a speaker's knowledge and use of language, one must take linguistic, biological, psychological and 135 sociological variables into account. Indeed, this view asserts that

one cannot arrive at a plausible overall understanding of the nature of language, its structure and functions, without considering the psychological aspects. For example, conditions on the production and perception of strings may explain why certain syntactic structures are excluded, while others are preferred . . . The kind of linguistic theory needed in the description and explanation of language acquisition, foreign language learning, speech performance (including, e.g. speech errors and aphasia)-must of course be psychologically adequate.

One must go beyond pure structure or pure mentalism to unite the external evidence with knowledge of the way the mind works in dealing with language. It is this approach which I take to be a central requirement for a full theory of pragmatics. Action, or overt behavior is dependent upon the causal motion of mental processing, although it is not 137 reducible to it. Only in this view is mind united with behavior. Communicative behavior is seen as the result of 109 information processing, yet it is neither reduced to nor excludes psychological correlates. One can therefore take a view which is justifiably mentalistic without being 138 subjected to the spiritualistic world of the black box.

Hence psychological reality, in this conception, establishes a correspondence between the structures and rules of language and the mental operations through which they are put to use. This means placing both internal and external conditions on a theory; it must be compatible with evidence regarding the structure of language, language acquisition, speech errors, conscious awareness of language, and the general systems of information processing, among other phenomena.

This requirement for psychological reality then emphatically denies the claims from the one side that the psychological processes are unavailable and from the other side that the behavioral manifestations are irrelevant. And, although the body of evidence presently is small, a growing number of theoretical constructs regarding the nature of language and language use have been validated and found to have a basis in psychological processing. This includes the validation of such constructs as consonants and vowels, phonological features, morphemes, vowel harmony, phonemes, 139 and topicality. Additionally, research has been conducted in an attempt to validate or invalidate the theoretical constructs of transformational generative grammar. As a 110 result, evidence for validation of the structural system in this grammar has been presented, including evidence for syntactic structure, the basic sentence taxonomy, the constituent analysis, the phrase structure system, and for 140 certain deep structure relations. Little evidence, however, has been found in support of the transformational 141 system itself.

Most of this evidence has been gained experimentally, yet the potential for methodological plurality is demonstrated in the use of phenomenologically available evidence also. So, for example, the study of speech errors has been used to support the psychological reality of phonological theory as has the use of the behavioral evidence in the "natural presence of alphabets, rhymes, 142 spoonerisms, and interphonemic contextual constraints." I suspect that this sort of phenomenological evidence of psychological reality will be particularly important in the development of pragmatic theory; this is a system highly sensitive to the social structure of which it is a part and as such users should be particularly sensitive to what is appropriate behavior and what is not. It will of course not always be easy to make language users aware of the knowledge which they possess, but a little creative thinking should provide a means to tap into this store of information.

Certainly traditional linguistics has made the development of this awareness into phonology, syntax, and semantics Ill their stock and trade. I see no reason why pragmatics should prove to be any less accessible. Therefore, although in the beginning, much of that theorized in regard to the nature of pragmatics must be armchair speculation, "as far as the general theory is concerned, one can at least strive for a theory that is psychologically and behaviorally interpretable, and that is plausible given some well-founded 143 assumptions about the functioning of the mind."

SUMMARY; A METATHEORY FOR PRAGMATICS

As has been shown in this chapter, there are certain key assumptions in which an adequate theory of pragmatics must be grounded and certain elements which must provide the minimal structuring of such a theory. These do not provide and are not intended to provide a specification for every detail needed to complete a full pragmatic theory, but rather provide a starting point and a benchmark against which to measure proposed theoretical constructions of pragmatics. In review, a pragmatic theory which is aimed at delineating the "relationship between an utterance and the social, psychological, and physical context in which the 144 utterance is embedded" must:

1. be built on a philosophical base which assumes that

communication

a. is action-dominated, being intentional. 112

value-laden, and referential, yet it is

grounded in motion;

b. occurs in a social context, being influenced

by and influencing social behavior;

c. is manifested through joint action and thus is

rule-governed to facilitate coorientation.

2. provide for structural analysis which relates an

act of communication to

a. linguistic structure (phonology, semantics, and

syntax), so as to account for literal and

direct meaning;

b. the structure of discourse, so as to account

for such phenomena as sequencing, coherence,

and topicality;

c. the structure of rhetorical events or episodes,

such as with conversation, songs, campaigns,

stories, etc.;

d. the media structure, so as to account for the

influences of the medium, whether verbal or

nonverbal, on the message.

3. interface with social structure and in so doing

relate any communication act to

a. the broader context of social action;

b. the particularized context of a given speech

situation or encounter.

4. relate any communication act to the purposes for 113

which it is intended and in so doing

a. define and analyze the system of illocution

used to relate utterance meaning to speaker

meaning;

b. define and analyze the system of perlocution

used to relate an illocution to the ends

intended and/or achieved.

5. outline the system of rules used to relate

structure, contexts, and intentionality and in so

doing

a. delineate norms of appropriate speech actions,

including those norms of politeness and tact;

b. define the constitutive and regulative rules of

appropriate language use;

c. delineate the underlying system of rational

principles for producing, interpreting, and

responding to cooperative exchanges.

6. reflect psychologically real constructs.

From such a theory as would meet these requirements, one would be granted insight into the process by which a speaker with a specific purpose selects a particular pattern to achieve that purpose and to thereby evaluate the effectiveness of that pattern. In addition, one would be able to

discover the features of a communication situation that allow interpreters to infer which propositions were intended by a given utterance [and toi locate the patterns 114

involved in various types of linguistic acts that allow an interpreter to.infer an utterance's specific intent.

Through this, one would be provided with the means to improve one's own communication and this is, after all, the ultimate good of the study of symbolic action and communication. GRICEAN PRAGMATICS; A REVIEW OF THE THEORY

CHAPTER FIVE

With a metatheory of pragmatics now proposed, I will turn to the evaluation of a particular theory of pragmatics to see how well it stands up against the criteria established. Specifically, I will examine H. Paul Grice's theory of meaning. As mentioned in Chapter One, the work of

Grice is becoming an established basis for current research in pragmatics, along with the work of John Austin and John

Searle. As early as 1975, the year in which Grice's most prominent essay was published, Morgan states that while the current state of development in linguistics in the areas of syntax and semantics is due to the work of Chomsky and his followers, the development of the pragmatic component is 1 largely due to the work of Grice. In 1977, Allwood cites

Grice's work as being the most interesting attempt to understand all the factors involved in linguistic communication, while Gazdar, in 1979, cites Grice and Searle 2 as being the most influential thinkers in pragmatics. And in the preface to Radical Pragmatics, a 1981 anthology representative of the leading edge of pragmatic research.

Cole notes that Grice's 1975 and 1978 essays form the base

115 116 3 for much of the current work in pragmatics.

As an indication of the degree of influence held by

Grice, one need only glance at the range of citations to his 4 work in the Social Sciences Citation Index. Since 1975,

Grice's work has been referenced 521 times in 134 different journals representing a wide range of disciplines interested in his approach to pragmatics, including communication, artificial intelligence, philosophy, linguistics, psychology, medicine, law, sociology, and education. Of these references, 64% have been to his 1975 article, "Logic 5 and Conversation." The widely increasing popularity of the theory presented in this article is suggested in the 388% increase in references to it, from only 17 in 1976 to 83 in

1982. Two problems, however, are apparent in the use of his work. First of all, many of the researchers citing Grice appear to be using the citation as a reference to a

"standard source," accepting his ideas as basic knowledge rather than examining them critically. Secondly, 90% of those citing "Logic and Conversation" are doing so without the use of other works by Grice to provide a supporting context for his theory and so those that are critiquing his ideas tend to be doing so from an uninformed position.

Therefore, what I would like to do is to provide a review of

Grice's theory of pragmatics from a holistic perspective, taking into account the full range of articles which he has written relevant to the subject, and then undertake a point 117 by point comparison of this theory with the metatheoretical criteria proposed in chapter four.

A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF GRICE'S THEORY

In 1957, Grice initiated a series of articles, continued in 1961, 1968, 1969, 1975, 1978, and 1981, aimed 6 at explaining the nature of meaning. In these, he offers a system of meaning, delineating the different types of meaning which must be understood in order to understand meaning as a whole. (I have schematized this system in 7 Figure 1. ) He initiates the system by distinguishing between two major senses or categories of meaning: natural and nonnatural. This distinction is roughly the distinction which I discussed above between behavior and communication; it also parallels a fairly well-established distinction between meaning as derived from signal or symptom (natural meaning) and that derived from symbol (nonnatural meaning).

Grice's primary interest though is with nonnatural meaning since it is this type of meaning which he feels is 8 "specially connected with communication."

The second level of division in Grice's system begins an extensive look into nonnatural meaning. First of all, he distinguishes between what he calls "timeless" meaning and

"occasion" meaning or, in other words, between "what is said" and "what is meant." By timeless meaning, he refers to 118

MEANING

NATURAL NONNATURAL

TIMELESSOCCASIONAL

CONVENTIONAL NONCONVENTIONAL

CONVERSATIONAL ??????

PARTICULARIZED STANDARDIZED GENERALIZED

FIGURE 1

SCHEMATA OF GRICE'S CATEGORIES OF MEANING

a type of meaning based strictly on an acontextual sense of

"what is said" in a given utterance; this type of meaning approximates Austin's locutionary aspect and Searle's notion 9 of propositional content. By occasion meaning, he refers to the meaning and intent held by the speaker in making a particular utterance; this is essentially Austin's 10 illocutionary aspect. Since, in Grice's view, occasion meaning is the very heart of communication, the next level of distinction focuses on subdividing occasion meaning into 119 conventional and nonconventional meaning. The difference is that with conventional meaning the move from "what is said" to "what is meant" is based on implications derived from the utterances themselves; with nonconventional meaning, the move is based on some knowledge outside of the conventional meaning of the words or symbols used. Next, nonconventional meaning is subdivided, although Grice only discusses one aspect of it— conversational implicature. This type of meaning, derived from knowledge of the norms of discourse and general behavior, forms the base for Grice's most famous contribution to pragmatic theory— the Cooperative Principle of conversation. Finally, conversational implicature is split into three varieties, two of which Grice discusses explicitly, particularized and generalized implicatures. The third, standardized, is implied in the intersection of the other two. Thus, particularized implicatures occur when maxims are flouted in a specific context, generalized occur due to the form of the utterance given nonlinguistic discourse conventions, and standardized occur when maxims are observed according to social and discourse conventions in a specific context.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GRICE'S MEANING THEORY

With this general overview in mind clarifying the relationships between the types of meaning, I may now 120 proceed to look at the specifics of Grice's theory. The first distinction which Grice makes, and one which forms the grounding for the rest of his theory, is that between 11 natural and nonnatural meaning. He justifies the amount of attention given to this distinction, asserting that

by paying serious attention to the relation between nonnatural and natural meaning, one might be able not only to reach a simplified account of utterer's occasion-meaning, but also to show that any human institution, the function of which is to provide artificial substitutes for natural signs, must embody, as its key-concept, a concept possessing approximately the features which I ascribe.to the concept of utterer's occasion-meaning.

He essentially bases this distinction on the presence or absence of intent.

Natural Meaning

More specifically, natural meaning is that which is not governed or dominated by the intent of the communicator and does not depend on the recognition of intent by an audience to gain meaning. It is found in the symptomatic derivation of meaning wherein what is meant is integrally related to the sign through which it is conveyed. For example, if one blushes conveying embarrassment, this meaning is derived from knowledge of blushing as a sheerly physiological indication of emotion. The blush is causally related to embarrassment and its meaning is derived through an aware ness of this cause-effect relation, just as Grice suggests that "spots means measles" only if one is aware of the 121 natural connection between spots and measles. In either case, the meaning is neither governed by the intent of the communicator nor dependent upon recognition of intent to be understood. And, while natural meaning may actually coincide with what the communicator intends to convey, its source of meaning lies not in the recognition of intent, but in the recognition of the natural connection between the symptom/ signal and its cause. In other words, even though I may want the doctor to know that I have the measles (or my friend to know I am embarrassed), I do not deliberately break out in spots (or blush) just to convey this nor does the derived meaning depend upon my intention to convey such knowledge; the natural meaning is so strong as to render the nonnatural irrelevant. Grice also extends natural meaning beyond physiological phenomena intimating that natural meaning may exist socially such that things as the "leading economic indicators" are explained as signals/symptoms of a natural, causal relationship between the indicators and the state of the economy. Obviously the possibility for misinterpretation is present whether the source of meaning is physiological or social. For example, the doctor may misdiagnose my measles, my friend may incorrectly surmise that I am angry rather than embarrassed, and economists may "misread" the economic indicators; in such cases, the meaning may be invalid, being based on an ignorance rather than a knowledge of the causal factors involved. 122

Nonnatural Meaning

Nonnatural meaning, on the other hand, is directly related to the intent of someone to convey a specific meaning. A test for this would be if the meaning of the utterance could be placed in quotes, as with "A means 13 (meant) by x that where A is a human agent. The example which Grice gives is of a conductor ringing the bell on a bus three times to indicate to the people waiting at the stop that "the bus is full." This nonnatural meaning is intended by a human agent and, according to Grice, is derived through a recognition by the audience that it was intended as such (as opposed to being seen as random or accidental). Therefore, in order to mean something nonnaturally by a given utterance (x), one must intend to convey a certain belief or attitude to one's audience; must intend x to be recognized as being so intended; and the intended effect must be under the audience's control. (This third specification allows Grice to eliminate causal or behavioral explanations for nonnatural meaning.) Grice formally defines this type of meaning as occurring when U

(utterer) utters x meaning-intending that A (audience) should think that U holds the prepositional attitude that p 14 (whatever the prepositional attitude is). The conductor in this example intends the three bells to convey the prepositional attitude, "the bus is full," in the expectation that those waiting will recognize this intent 123 and thus understand why the bus does not stop. (At this point, I should note that Grice uses utterance in a non-restrictive sense to apply to "any act for performance which is or might be a candidate for nonnatural meaning;" thus an utterance may be both verbal or nonverbal in Grice's 15 use of the term.)

Grice's Five Stage Program

Grice sees this analysis of nonnatural meaning as being the basis for gaining an understanding of (1) how a given utterance (x) can mean something (i.e. how it can mean anything at all) and (2) how a given utterance (x) can mean p (i.e. a particular prepositional attitude). A more extensive analysis is needed, however, and he proposes a five step research program to achieve the necessary depth of ■ 16 analysis. This program, according to Grice, arises out of the need to make a distinction

within the total signification of a remark: a distinction between what the speaker has said (in a certain favoured, and maybe in some degree artificial, sense of 'said'), and what he [sic] has 'implicated' (e.g. implied, indicated, suggested, etc.), taking into account the fact that what he [sic] has implicated may be either conventionally implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of some word or phrase . . . used) or non-conventionallv implicated (in which case the specification of the implicature falls outside the specification of-the conventional meaning of the words used).

The five stages are ordered in what Grice considers to be the proper order for deriving meaning. Stage one requires 124 that a distinction between "what is said" (timeless meaning) and "what is meant" (occasion meaning) be made. Stage two requires that occasion meaning be defined in such a way as to establishing intent as the origin of meaning. From the intent of the utterer, the particular meaning of an utterance for a particular occasion may be derived. The defining of this particular meaning is the second goal of stage two. Stages three and four require that timeless meaning be defined, firstly, in terms of the alternatives for meaning available for x as a decontextualized utterance and, secondly, in terms of the particular alternative appropriate for a given context is selected; these stages are sequentially ordered after occasion meaning for Grice believes that timeless meaning is derived from occasion meaning and thus ultimately from the intent of the utterer.

Stage five reunites occasion meaning and timeless meaning requiring that the conditions be specified under which "what is meant conventionally" is implicated by virtue of "what is said." This research program, as delineated by Grice in

1968, then centers on explicating the relation between "what is said" and "what is meant (conventionally)." A sixth stage is later added in "Logic and Conversation" to deal with the 18 relation to nonconventional meaning.

In looking at these stages in more detail, the first step to achieving an understanding of nonnatural meaning is in specifying the distinction between occasion meaning (or 125 speaker meaning) and timeless meaning (or sentence meaning).

Grice explicates this difference formally as the difference between "U meant (nonnaturally) something by x," where U is an utterer and a human agent, and "x means (nonnaturally) 19 (timeless) Less formally, what Grice attempts to capture by this distinction is the respective difference between the specification of the intent of the utterer and the specification of the literal and direct meaning of x.

The second stage spotlights occasion or speaker meaning in order to provide a more precise conceptualization of this type of meaning. This is a two part process with the first goal being to understand what Grice refers to as "the 20 utterer's occasion-meaning." This meaning has as its specific focus the intent of the utterer in uttering x and thus would more appropriately (and less confusingly) be called "the utterer's intended-meaning." The definition of

"the utterer's occasion-meaning" turns on understanding, generally, that "U meant (nonnaturally) something by x," and, specifically, "by (when) uttering x, U meant that *p," where U is an utterer, * is a dummy mood indicator, and p is 21 a specific proposition. Translated into English, this means understanding that occasion meaning exists when a particular human agent makes an utterance, intending that utterance to produce a particular effect in an audience by means of the audience recognizing this intention. The particular immediate effect, according to Grice, is that the 126 audience think that the utterer holds the prepositional 22 attitude p. In describing utterances and their meaning, this sense of meaning is cued by the presence of indirect speech to describe it. So, for example, if an utterer says,

81; If I shall then be helping the grass tOg? grow, I shall have no time for reading.

If, in saying this, the intent of the utterer (U) is that the audience should think that U believes that if s/he were dead, U would not know what was going on in the world, this description of intent would represent the utterer's occasion meaning.

Once the goal of defining occasion meaning in terms of intent is accomplished, the second goal of defining the specific occasion meaning of the utterance may be approached as a derivative of the first. One is ready to abstract back a step to understand that because somebody meant 24 (nonnaturally) something by x, "x meant something." This level of meaning is termed by Grice as "the occasion-meaning of an utterance-type" and is concerned with specifying the timeless prepositional equivalent of the proposition which is meant by the particular speaker on the particular 25 occasion by uttering x. So, if in saying, from SI, "I shall then be helping the grass to grow," the utterer means the proposition, "I shall then be dead," this would represent the occasion meaning of the utterance, or rather 26 the occasion meaning of the first clause of the utterance.

This type of meaning is cued by the use of quotes as an 127 indicator of propositional meaning. The difference between

"an utter's occasion meaning" and "the occasion meaning of an utterance" is a subtle one, indeed, and may seem so subtle to some as to be insignificant; the distinction, however, is based on a critical difference in perspective.

For the utterer's occasion meaning, the focus is on the utterer— the human agent and his/her intentions in making the utterance; for the occasion meaning of the utterance, the focus is on the utterance— the linguistic product of the utterer.

From the occasion meaning of the utterance, one may abstract back still another step to gain an understanding of a standardized notion of meaning, formalized as "x means 27 (nonnaturally) (timeless) that so-and-so." The detailed analysis of timeless meaning as the focus of the third stage of Grice's proposed research program is centered on an

"attempt to elucidate the notion of the conventional meaning 28 of an utterance-type." In this category, Grice includes sentence or word meaning as representative of the conventional meanings which are present in decontextualized utterances-types ; the interest is not just with syntactically structured complete utterances, therefore, but also with the elements of which they are made, including words, phrases, and subsentences. This provides a means for understanding how timeless meaning is eventually related to utterance meaning (or speaker meaning) and how the 128 structured timeless meaning of utterance types or tokens relate to the timeless meaning of the elements of these tokens, i.e. in terms of the phrases and words which make up the structured utterance token. For any x, however, more than one conventional meaning, including idiomatic meanings, may (and indeed probably will) exist; the specification of timeless meaning, thus, should always be understood as "one of the meanings of x is '. . . rather than "X means '. . 29 . '. " An example which Grice gives of timeless meaning may be found in referring once more to SI (above). Here the timeless meaning of "grass," as an incomplete utterance type, does include more than one conventional meaning and thus the specification of its timeless meaning would include at least the two used by Grice; "lawn covering" and 30 "marijuana."

In discussing timeless meaning, Grice equates it roughly to "a procedure in one's repertoire" which connects

X to effecting an intended response, specifically the 31 holding of a particular propositional attitude. This established procedure can occur at least three levels, although not all of these levels will also represent conventional meaning.. The first level, including what Grice refers to as timeless "language meaning," is where "x is current for some group G;" this is the level most closely 32 associated with conventional meaning. Here meaning is roughly equated with what people in general intend to effect 129 by X. Thus meanings which hold social currency within a particular group, whether it be an entire culture or a subgroup, are said to be timeless. Of course, it should be clear that what Grice intends by timeless is not that which is eternal or never changing, but rather is established and regularized, to wit socially agreed upon, in terms of the connection between x and the end which x effects. Meanings at this level carry with them standards of conformity and the use of x may be judged in terms of correct and incorrect as well as in terms of usual and unusual. Grice thus defines timeless meaning as normative in nature; and, while an utterer may, certainly, deviate from this norm, in general

an utterer is held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage (e.g. he [sic] never knew or had forgotten the general usage). Similarly in nonlinguistic cases: we are presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions.

The second level of established procedure may be equated with timeless "idiolect meaning," wherein x is 34 current only for a specific utterer. This level is of limited use as a tool of communication, however, since success must in some way depend on the audience knowing the procedure used by the utterer and therein recognizing the intent of the utterer. The third level of established procedure occurs when x is not current, either to an individual or to a group, but is part of a system which has 130 been devised although not put into operation. This level allows one to speak hypothetically of what x could be used to mean if uttered in such-and-such circumstances and opens the doorway for metacommunication about what the meaning of

X should or should not be.

Realizing that timeless meaning alone is insufficient to account for "what is said," Grice moves to the fourth stage of his research program to focus on the "applied 35 timeless meaning of an utterance type." Since multiple timeless meanings are possible for a decontextualized x, a definition must be established to account for "x meant here that p." If there is any doubt between the alternatives available for the applied timeless meaning, one must look at the context of the utterance and see which of the alternatives are relevant to the other things being said or done; if, for example, one is fighting a fire and calls for a "pump", one expects to get a water pump and not a tire 36 pump. This is determined by looking at the utterance in its context and then relating x to the response which would generally be intended by it in that context.

It is possible that this applied timeless meaning may overlap in some circumstances with occasion meaning; if so, what occurs is that, by virtue of the applied timeless meaning of "what was said," the audience may figure out

"what was meant" (even though "what was meant" is not reducible to "what was said"). For example, given; 131

S2: Bill is_a philosopher and he is, therefore, brave.

While it can be true that in saying S2, in at least one of the timeless senses available, one has said that "Bill is engaged in philosophical studies" and that "Bill is courageous," it is not true, according to Grice, that S2 says that Bill's being courageous follows from his being a philosopher. Grice would claim that "therefore" (and other such words as "but" and "moreover") semantically function to

"enable a speaker to indicate, though not to say that a 38 certain consequence holds." What is needed, therefore, is a specification of the conditions under which "what is meant conventionally" is implicated by virtue of "what is said."

The fifth stage and final stage of Grice's original program is concerned with just this. To accomplish such a goal would, according to Grice, involve (1) the specification of a limited range of central or fundamental speech acts which may be used to relate occasion and timeless meaning, and (2) an accounting for those elements in conventional meaning 39 which are not part of what is said. Unfortunately, just exactly what Grice means by "speech acts" or even what sort of speech acts he has in mind as fundamental to relating occasion and timeless meaning is unclear for this stage has as yet received no more than an introductory treatment by

Grice. Further explication of it must await further development by him.

With this final stage, Grice's five stage research 132 program is fulfilled. The understanding of nonnatural meaning, however, does not end with the five stage program proposed by Grice for one element is missing— the explication of nonconventional meaning or implication. The next section will deal with Grice's attempt to fill in this missing piece.

AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF CONVERSATIONAL MEANING

In the five stage research program proposed by Grice, the primary focus is on establishing the relationship between timeless meaning and occasion meaning. It deals with occasion meaning only in a rather general way though and it is not until stage five that a more specific focus is found— on the type of occasion meaning which derives from the conventional meanings of the utterances. A second type of occasion meaning, nonconventional in nature, is introduced, yet the mention of it is brief; the notion is then set aside for later consideration. It is to this latter type of occasion meaning to which I will now turn for it is here that Grice's most famous contribution to pragmatics emerges.

Conventional versus Nonconventional Meaning

As with other levels of meaning hypothesized by Grice, nonconventional meaning is best viewed in contrast to its 133 antithesisr conventional meaning. From Grice's perspective, both are critical for a full-blown theory of meaning in that one provides a logical foundation for meaning while the other provides a means to account for the intentional foundation of meaning. Yet the distinction between conventional and nonconventional implication is key in that it establishes the dividing line between the semantic and pragmatic approaches to meaning.

Representing the semantic approach to the study of language, conventional meaning or implicature is grounded in the logical inferences made strictly from the semantic and syntactic relations in an utterance. Generally known as entailments and presupposition, these implicatures are closer to the timeless aspect of meaning than to the occasion aspect. They are derived strictly from the meaning 40 of the words used. For example, given S3;

S3: Smith has stopped cutting classes.

This statement can be said to imply that Smith has been cutting class. In terms of "what is said," S3 does not come right out and say "Smith has been cutting class;" but given the timeless meaning of "stopped" (or at least one of the timeless meanings of "stopped) as "to discontinue," this implication is invited; one must be doing something in order to be able to discontinue doing something. Logically, then,

"Smith has been cutting class" is a given for, or rather a presupposition of, "Smith has stopped cutting class." For 134 this conventional implication then, "the truth of what is implied is a necessary condition of the original statement's 41 being either true or false."

The type of implication Grice is most interested in, however, is nonconventional in nature. This sort of meaning derives from the "principles governing discourse" and is closely tied into the natural logic which governs our 42 interactions with one another. So, given 84:

S4: P: Where is Mark? N: He is either in the kitchen or the garage.

Conventionally speaking, if Mark is in either of the two rooms mentioned, the statement is true. Nonconventionally though an additional message, logically irrelevant to the utterance, is given: N knows that Mark is in one of the two rooms mentioned, but she does not know which one. The logical truth of the statement then is not related to the nonconventional implication. If the nonconventional implication turns out not to be true, i.e. N knew and was not telling, the logical truth is unchanged, but on a relational level, N may be perceived by P as playing games with him or being unfriendly and uncooperative. This illustrates the essence of nonconventional meaning; it is socially based and operates beyond the limits of conventional judgements of logical truth and falseness. 135

A "First Shot" at Conversational Implicature

This initial distinction between types of implication sets the starting point for Grice's investigation of nonconventional implicature, in general, and "conversational implicature," in particular. He centers in on conversational implicature as a special case of nonconventional implicature which is "essentially connected with certain general 43 features of discourse." In following with his nonrestrictive use of utterance, of course, these general features of discourse are not held to be limited simply to talk exchanges. They extend to those features which characterize the normal functioning of purposeful, rational 44 behavior, of which talk is merely a special case.

Regardless of whether one is dealing with talk exclusively or with the broader category of rational behavior though the key question remains: how are these general features to be characterized?

Grice's first attempt to characterize the general features of discourse came in 1961 as part of a symposium on 45 the "Causal Theory of Perception." In this essay, under the guise of shedding new light on philosophical approaches to perception, he investigates the means by which one may describe one's perceptions of material objects, especially in terms of ascribing properties to material objects causally. As a result of this investigation, he concludes that to discuss the causes of perceptions is not natural in 136 the course of normal conversation because of the implications which are attached to statements of description. For exampler if B were to remark, in looking at an OSÜ BLOCK 0 flag,

S5: it looks scarlet and grey to me, this would not be interpreted as merely a description of B's 46 perceptions, but would seem pointless or misleading. That is, it would unless there were some reason to doubt or deny that such a flag would, in fact, be scarlet and grey.

Therefore, even though the statement is literally true, if B uses it in absence of the "doubt or denial condition," B 47 "would be guilty in some sense of a misuse of language."

Another example looks at a slightly different type of description of perception— person perception. Take S6, in the context of a job reference for a university teaching position:

S6: Jones has beautiful handwriting and is never late to class.

Clearly, the description given of Jones is complimentary in terms of "what is said," but much of what should be said, in light of the context, is not. If one derives the interpretation just from the conventional implications of the utterance, one still seems to be missing the point for the meaning would be based strictly on the relative truth of whether indeed Jones has both beautiful handwriting and is prompt to class. If, however, one bases the implicature on the expectations inherent in the context, the inference is 137 suddenly noncomplimentary and indeed even derogatory. As

Grice describes it, in not coming right out and saying that

Jones is unacceptable for a university position, the advisor has chosen to make a "weak" statement rather than the

"strong" one which is expected and subsequently has implied 49 that the stronger statement cannot be made.

From this first attempt to understand conversational implicature Grice presents two conclusions. First, he concludes that nonconventional meaning may require a special context in order to "attach the implication to its 50 utterance." The example of the reference letter is illustrative of this point. In addition, he concludes that the move from "what is meant" to "what is said" may only be

"explained by reference to a general principle governing the 51 use of language." The "where is Mark" example is illustrative of this. Finally, based on these conclusions,

Grice attempts, in what he calls a "first shot" effort, to formulate a general principle of discourse:

One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing.

The Introduction of the Cooperative Principle

Hints of interest in nonconventional and conversational implication appear in Grice's 1968 and 1969 works, but it is not until 1975 that he returns, in published form, to a full consideration of it. Then, in the now classic work "Logic 138 and Conversationf" which originated in his William James

Lectures of 1967 (Harvard University), Grice focuses in once more on achieving a description of the general features of discourse. In so doing, he attempts to determine the centralizing factor of discourse (or, indeed, of rational behavior in general). The factor which he comes up with is cooperation. It is his contention that we as human agents cooperate with one another in order to accomplish things.

Thus, our interactions and, specifically, our talk exchanges are based on cooperative efforts such that each participant recognizes, "to some extent, a common purpose or set of 53 purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction." This is evidenced both by a lack of randomly generated contributions to conversation and by the indignation typically felt when someone in a conversation is clearly 54 uncooperative. Grice suggests, as a starting point, that one should assume the common purpose guiding cooperative interaction to be one of achieving "a maximally effective 55 exchange of information." As stated, however, this is not to be taken as a definitive statement of purpose, but rather as a tool to direct preliminary theory development. In

Grice's own words, "this specification is, of course, too narrow, and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the 56 actions of others."

Holding in mind then that cooperation is the 139 overarching precept of behavior, Grice formulates a general principle of conversation; the Cooperative Principle

(hereafter known as the CP). Stated prescriptively, the CP directs each communicator to:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of^the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Participants in a communication interaction are expected to observe the CP, therewith maintaining a state of cooperativeness. To do otherwise, of course, is not impossible, but such behavior would be subject to misinterpretation and, possibly, to social sanction.

As a means of further clarifying the CP and the sorts of behavior which would be expected to derive from it, Grice establishes four categories under which specific maxims of cooperation may be found: Quality, Quantity, Relation, and

Manner. Although these are not the only categories under which he expects to find regulators of conversation, Grice sees these four as those most closely related to the special purpose for which talk is adapted— information exchange. Of course, recall Grice's note that this statement of purpose is overly narrow. Persuasion is also to be considered as a purposive use of talk. In addition, he suggests other categories of maxims which would also generate nonconventional, but not necessarily conversational, implicatures. These include maxims which are "aesthetic, social, or moral in character, such as 'Be polite,'" and 140 which would certainly be relevant to purposes beyond that of 58 pure information exchange. The four main categories of maxims then would act to regulate (or at least to express the norms which regulate) conversation in terms of how much one should or should not say, the truth of what is said, the relevance of what is said, and the manner in which what is said is said. Grice formalizes these categories and their subordinate maxims as follows:

1. QUANTITY: a. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange.) b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 2. QUALITY: a. Try to make your contribution one that is true. b. Do not say what you believe to be false. c. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 3. RELATION a. Be relevant. 4. MANNER a. Be perspicuous. b. Avoid obscurity of expression. c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). d. Be orderly.

These maxims may be summarized, respectively, as: be truthful; be succinct, yet complete; be relevant; and be clear and orderly.

Ideally, these maxims serve to prohibit various sorts of behavior which would be considered uncooperative and, thus, Grice assumes that these four categories of maxims, at least, and the supraordinate CP will be overtly observed in order to preserve coherent and cooperative communication.

Concomitantly, he hypothesized that interactants would, in 141 general and "in absence of indicators to the contrary," proceed to interpret conversation in the manner prescribed 60 by these maxims. Nofsinger has formalized this aspect of

Grice's hypothesis as the "interpretative corollary," stated as: "Interpret the utterances of your conversational partners as being in accordance with the cooperative 61 principle and its maxims, if at all possible." The observance of the CP and its maxims, both by speakers and listeners, is critical in achieving effective communication.

Grice claims that the assumption of such observance is reasonable and rational given the argument that

any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/ communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the CP and the maxims.

Conversational implicature comes into play when they are not overtly observed. In such cases, one may fail to fulfill a maxim in terms of "what is said" (i.e. overtly) while actually keeping it in terms of "what is meant" (i.e. covertly) or may fail to fulfill a maxim while adhering to the larger CP. As a result, in using a conversational implicature, a double message is given: first, a literal or direct message (which fails to fulfill at least one of the maxims) and, secondly, a nonliteral or indirect message

(which maintains the maxim or the CP). The working out of 142 this nonliteral or indirect message is the process of discovering the conversational implicature. In absence of cues to the contrary (i.e. cues which clarify the interpretation of an utterance in relation to the CP or which indicate that the CP is not being adhered toy such as leakage cues), then, a listener will do his or her utmost to interpret a given utterance in accordance with the CP; the cues to the contrary, however, provide a potential explanation for how we make sense out of irony, figures of speech, hints, circumlocutions, ambiguities, and other nonliteral, indirect, or apparently uncooperative ways of saying things.

Violations of the CP

In general, Grice suggests that the expectation that conversation will proceed smoothly and nonproblematically is realized as interactants "orient their conduct toward one another and toward a common set of objects. In this mutual orientation of conduct, an effort is made by the participants to align their individual acts, one to another, 63 in the creation of joint or social acts." Failures to live up to expectations do, of course, occur and mismatches between intended acts and expectations may result; often these mismatches and the consequential misunderstandings are due to a failure to fulfill the CP and its maxims. Herein lies the potential for conversational implicature. Grice 143 recognizes this potential for nonfulfillment and suggests a 64 four class schema of maxim violation. Following this schema, one may, (1) violate a maxim "quietly and unostentatiously" with an intent to mislead; (2) opt out of a situation by withdrawing from the interaction when one is unwilling or unable to be cooperative; (3) be faced with a clash of maxims such that the choice of one maxim violates another; or (4) flout a maxim by blatantly violating it with 65 an intent for strategic or artful cooperation.

Misleading. Violations which occur with an intent to mislead are representative of conversational deception wherein only an appearance of cooperation is desired. The speaker hopes that any cues unwittingly given will go undetected. Deception, of course, can only work if the interpretative corollary is assumed to hold for deception draws its power from the assumption of sincerity, truth, and cooperation.

Opting Out. Opting out of a situation by withdrawing from the interaction occurs when one is unwilling or unable to be cooperative. This type of violation may occur both in uncooperative and cooperative situations. Uncooperatively, the use of ambiguity or circumlocution may be used to hide the fact that one is opting out. Avoidance or termination of

interaction may also function as "opting out." The classic detective show interrogation of a reluctant suspect who either refuses to give any answers or who answers inquiries 144 with expletives is illustrative of this. The interaction may also be terminated as a means of avoiding cooperative conversation. Cooperatively, cues such as "Well, I'm not at liberty to say," "that is classified information," or "I really don't know all the details," indicate that the interactant is unable or unwilling to be cooperative at one level, but feels the need not to appear uncooperative and thus provides an explanation for the seemingly uncooperative behavior.

Clashing. When one must make a choice between fulfilling the expectations of one maxim at the cost of another, a clash exists. For instance, if one is faced with a circumstance where being as informative as is required entails giving information for which evidence is lacking, there is a clash of the Quantity and Quality categories of maxims. Uncooperatively, the speaker may proceed to present the information as if s/he did have the evidence (as is all to often done); to do so, however, carries the inference that the speaker does, in face, have the evidence. On a more cooperative level, the speaker may employ disclaimers which directly address the clash and indicate limitations of experience or knowledge. Examples of such disclaimers might include "I might be mistaken, but..." or "I'm not really an expert, but...." Crediting or the presenting of sources is another common strategy if one must present information which is other than first hand. Other examples involve 145 clashes with the other categories of maxims besides the main four. Thus tact may exist as a result of dealing with a clash between presenting the truth and being polite and hinting may exist as a means of providing information covertly which may not be provided overtly.

Flouting. According to Grice, violations in which a maxim is blatantly violated with an intent for strategic or artful cooperation set the scene for conversational implicature. In other words, as a means for creating conversational implicature, an interactant may, in certain circumstances, choose to violate a maxim with an ultimate intent to fulfill it or the CP; If such exploitation or flouting is to be successful, however, the audience must be able to make educated guesses concerning the speaker's intention. This requires both a knowledge of the CP and its subsidiary maxims and a recognition of the cues given in the message and in the delivery of the message which qualify or clarify its interpretation. These cues sidestep the interpretation suggested by common expectation, signal the presence of a conversational implicature, and recast the utterance in a cooperative light for final abstraction of meaning. Without such clues, the process of conversation would be inhibited and the potential for misunderstanding increased. These cues or indicators act to "grant a license" for a violation of a maxim by pinpointing a supraordinate effort to meet the maxim or to meet the CP. Conversational 146 implicature, therefore, may be thought of as the result of the use of cues in our contributions to conversation which

"license" violations of the CP and its maxims by indicating a level of interpretation beyond the conventional.

Normally, then, the cue of a conversational implicature will exist in the overt flouting of a particular maxim, either in terms of "what is said" or in terms of how it is said. Looking at "what is said," many figures of speech which utilize exaggeration, understatement, metaphor, simile, and the like call for conversational implicatures.

On their own, the figures represent violations of Quality as they transgress expectations of truth and evidence and thus require reinterpretation in light of intended meaning in 66 order to make sense. A further example of an implicature based on Quantity may be found in the new advertisements for 67 "Panadol." In these, Americans are shown traveling in

Europe; when these people develop headaches, they are offered "Panadol"— a product which is purported to have been available in Europe for some years, but not in the United

States. The advertisement continues on to say that "Now

Panadol's made here in America, too." The implication is that this product is a drug not previously available here.

(This claim is aided by the recent media attention on the stringency of the Federal Drug Administration in certifying drugs for over-the-counter sale and the relative ease of gaining such certification in some foreign countries). While 147 it is true that "Panadol," as a brand name, has not been in the United States until recently, one vital piece of information is missing. What is Panadol? In its generic form, it is nothing but acetaminophen— the sole constituent of a product which has been in the United States for many years, "Tylenol." The typical viewers of these advertisements, however, build their interpretation on the assumption that the appropriate amount of information is given and thus are led to a false conclusion regarding the nature of the product.

In the opposite direction, S6 is an example of giving more information than is required.

S6; Florida orange juice is 100% pure natural orange juice.

In S6, the implication under the CP may be drawn that there is something special about Florida orange juice if the advertiser, the Florida Citrus Growers Association, takes all the trouble to point out that it is 100% pure and natural. The obvious implication is that other orange juice is not 100% pure and natural. This example, however, is a case of a violation to mislead as much as it is artful flouting; by law, any product labeled "orange juice" must be

100% pure, natural orange juice.

Violations of the maxim of Relevance may also result in conversational implicature. Again I will turn to advertisements for examples, although whether these implicatures are due to artful flouting of the maxims or to 148 an attempt to mislead seems to have become a matter for the 68 courts to decide. The recent "Coffee Achievers" advertisements, depend upon the assumption of Relevance for their effectiveness, much as do many pop advertisements which focus entirely on showing young, beautiful people having the time of their lives as they down their drinks. In the "Coffee Achievers" ads, the sponsors hope that the consumers will assume that there is a direct link between success and drinking coffee because such highly successful people as Cicely Tyson and Ken Anderson are shown as being 69 avid coffee drinkers.

An example of the flouting of the Quality maxims may also be found in advertisements, although the laws are stricter in this area. The most recent, and most glaring, example I have found is in the product, "Aspirin-Free

Arthritis Pain Relief Formula," (by the makers of Tylenol).

Present in the very name of this product is the implication that it is indeed effective for the purpose indicated on the label— the relief of arthritis pain. However, its primary ingredient is acetaminophen— a drug shown to have no efficacy in relieving the pain resulting from arthritis 70 whatsoever.

And, finally, the maxims of Manner may also be flouted in order to produce conversational implicatures. Products which are touted as "New" and/or "Improved," as with New

Lysol Spray, often depend upon the ambiguity of the word 149

"new" to imply to consumers that the produce is better, more effective, etc. at what it is supposed to do. This is not always the case, however, as with New Lysol Spray; the only thing new is the scent of the spray and the colour of the can which dispenses it. The maxims of Manner may also be flouted based on how something is said. Conversational implicatures may thus turn on that use of stress, pitch, and juncture which goes beyond what is strictly required for the conventional meaning of an utterance. This is especially important is such cases as irony and sarcasm where the tone of voice may be the only clue that the utterance is to be 71 taken for other than surface value. For example, take the following exchange:

S7: M: "Friday the Thirteenth" is on HBO tonight. Want to come down and watch it? S: Oh, sure. I'd like nothing better than to spend the evening watching people get hacked to death in living colour!

In this case, even though what S has said is "Yes," what S means is an emphatic "No." But the only way to really tell this is by listening to S say it— if the tonal changes which signal the meaning are clearly in contradiction to what is actually said, then the implication is "No." Another example of the use of delivery to create a conversational implication may be found in the radio program "Reds' Radio

Scrapbook," originating with WLW-AM in Cincinnati. On this show, brief flashbacks are presented of events important to the history of the Cincinnati Reds baseball team. The manner 150 in which these are presented, however, is in the manner which one would expect for a documentary, particularly one dealing with life or death situations. This leads one naturally to the assumption that these events in baseball history are as important for one to know about as are any of the critical events in our history, including such events as the Signing of the Declaration of Independence and Pearl

Harbor.

In addition to those cues given by overt flouting of a particular maxim in terms of the message itself, there are other cues which result from a lack of jibe between the conventional interpretation of "what is said" and the expectations generated by the context in which it is stated.

In these circumstances, the speaker utters x under the assumption that the listener will see that x is inadequate in terms merely "what is said," search for an inference based on the assumption that the CP and the maxims are being followed, and then use that inference to derive "what is 72 meant." The example given earlier of the reference letter, S5, illustrates a conversational implicature derived in part from a lack of adherence to the expectations of how much and what kind of information is appropriate given that context; clearly less information is given than for the accepted purpose of the letter and so an implicature based on Quantity in relation to the context is generated. So, for example, given S8, where somewhere in Dayton, Ohio, A walks 151 past B (who is in Ohio for the first time) standing beside a car stopped on the side of the street;

S8; A: I'm out of gas. Do you know where a gas station is nearby? B: There's a SOHIO right around the corner ((pointing in the.direction from which she just came)).

First of all, if B is to make the "proper" or desired response to A's inquiry, B must make a judgement regarding what information A wants. Although what A asks, as "what is said," calls for a yes or no answer, B interprets A to have implied a request for knowledge of the location of a station. To give less in the reply is for B to violate a

Quantity maxim. In addition, if B's contribution is to make any sense to A, it must be interpretable as Relevant to what

A has said/asked. This is particularly important since A, not being from Ohio, has likely never heard of SOHIO and must draw the implication that "a SOHIO" is a gas station of some kind. B's reply also carries with it an implication that the SOHIO station is open; otherwise, the reply would not be relevant (and in fact would appear to be deliberately misleading). All of the above is dependent, however, on A's being able to assume that B is operating under the Quality maxims which specify telling the truth and having evidence for what one says.

Particularized versus Generalized Implicatures

As with the other meaning types proposed by Grice, 152 conversational implicatures come in two varieties, particularized and generalized. The clearest case of conversational implicature is found in the particularized variety, being made up of those implicatures which are carried in the saying of an utterance "on a particular 74 occasion in virtue of special features of the context."

These would include implicatures where the implicature clearly is not a normal part of "what is said," as with the example of reference writing or with irony. The second variety, the generalized conversational implicature, is one which Grice readily admits to being controversial. The line between these and conventional implicatures is thin for these implicatures exist when "the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the ABSENCE of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or 75 type of implicature." These are then implicatures which would exist because of discourse or conversation conventions, not because of linguistic conventions. Grice offers the following as an example;

S9: X went into a house yesterday and found a tortoise inside the front door.

Logically, or linguistically, there is no reason to assume anything about the ownership of the house in S8. However, if the person to whom this was spoken were to find out later that the house was X's, s/he would probably feel misled.

Grice suggests this would also be the case if one were to say "X was out with a man last night," and the listener 153 would later find out that the man was X's husband and the speaker knew that it was X's husband. Grice suggests that the interpretation derived in both examples is due to a generalized conversational implicature, possibly explained under the maxim of Quantity which specifies, "Make your 77 contribution as informative as is required." A third example is suggested to Grice by Peter Strawson; 78 SIO: X took off his trousers and went to bed.

In formal, and thus semantic, logic, the use of "and" does not carry with it implications of temporal ordering. But, there certainly is a difference between SIO and "He went to bed and took off his trousers." And, Grice would have it that this difference is due to an agreed upon feature of normal discourse in which "and" does act as a device of temporal ordering and thus provides for the implication to be drawn in SIO that, first, X took off his trousers and, then, got into bed, rather than taking his trousers off after he had gotten into bed.

In addition, Levinson argues that Grice actually presents a third variety, termed standardized implicatures, which result from an observing of the maxims within a particular social context rather than from the flouting of 79 the maxims. These implicatures occur at the point of intersection for the particularized and the generalized implicatures; they depend upon the context at hand, but are also derived from knowledge of social conventions, including 154 80 those governing appropriate use of discourse. The example given in SB is one such implicature as the context of "being out of gas" is key to the interpretation of "There's a SOHIO station right around the corner," as a valuable contribution to the interaction. Yet the implicature is not based on a flouting of a maxim for strategic purposes. Many of the advertisement examples given are of this variety since they present a facade of cooperation (whereas particularized implicatures present a facade of uncooperativeness). This variety then represents an intersection of the particularized and generalized variety and provides a way of clarifying the true range of conversational implicatures.

Tests of Implicatures

At this point, generalized conversational implicatures are still controversial, but Grice does provide a means for testing implicatures to determine whether they are, in fact, conversational or are, instead, merely conventional. These tests are equally applicable to particularized as they are too generalized, but only one of these (the fourth of those

I will discuss) is to be regarded as the "final test" for conversational implicatures; the rest are to be regarded merely as indications of implicatures not as divining 81 rods.

Truth Values. The first test is one which was mentioned above in distinguishing between conventional and 155 nonconventional implications in general: Is the truth of the

implication a necessary condition of the original statement 82 being true or false? If it follows that the truth of the

implication is a necessary condition for the original

statement being true or false, then the implication is of the conventional sort and not of the conversational. This test explains the famous example, "The King of France is bald," as a conventional implicature; the truth of the

implication, "there is a King of France," is a condition on the truth of "the King of France is bald." This is a particularly important test since in a conventional

implicature if the implicatum is false, the original statement must be false. However, it is entirely possible that the implicatum in a conversational implicature may be 83 false while the statement itself is completely true. For example, the implication in S9 is that the house X entered was not her/his own; this is not necessarily true and certainly if it were not, it would not invalidate the truth of S9.

Nondetachability. The second test is that of nondetachability. According to Grice, an implicature "is nondetachable in so far as it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing (or approximately the 84 same thing) which simply lacks the implicature. If rewordings of what was said still carries with them the

implicatures of the original statement, chances are that the 156 implicature is due to conversational rules and not to the 85 use of a particular word or words. Frankly, I do not find this test to be of much use in distinguishing between conventional and nonconventional implicature. In looking back to S3 ("Smith has stopped cutting classes") as a clear example of a conventional implicature, one quickly finds that this is nondetachable. To say such things as,"Smith has started coming to class regularly," or "Smith doesn't play hookey anymore," still carry the implication that Smith has not been coming to class regularly, and has been playing hookey, both of which are equivalent to cutting class. In looking at a clear case of a particularized conversational implicature, the same nondetachability occurs. Take, for example, S5: "X has beautiful handwriting and is never late to class." In rewording this, one might come up with "X is an excellent calligrapher and is prompt in attending class," yet this still maintains the implication of incompetence.

The only place that this test is of any use is in eliminating certain types of conventional implications from consideration, as for example with S2; "Bill is a philosopher and he is, therefore, brave." One may easily reword this to read, "Bill is a brave philosopher," or

"Bill, the philosopher, is brave," and eliminate the implication that Bill's bravery is due to his being a philosopher.

Cancellability. The third test fares a little better 157 than the second. It is the test of cancellability. What this means is that any conversational implicature may be explicitly cancelled through the use of a qualifier or disclaimer which directly addresses the implication and eliminates it as a meaning alternative, or it may be contextually cancelled if "one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry 86 the implicature." An example of explicit cancellation may be found in a variation of SB:

Sll: A: My car just ran out of gas. Where's

the nearest gas station?

B: There's a SOHIO station around the

corner, but it's closed.

The first implication in this example is that A is interested in an open gas station. Why else would s/he ask for a gas station in this situation? In response, the first part of B's reply carries the implication that was found in

S7— the SOHIO station around the corner is open. This would be misleading, at the least, to leave it at that and so B, in dealing with the clash between truth (the SOHIO is the nearest station) and relevance (A needs an open station), follows the first clause up with a qualifier to cancel the implication that the station is open. In contrast, the conventional implication in S3 is not cancellable. To say,

"Smith has stopped cutting class, although I don't mean to imply that she has been cutting them," makes no sense; this 158 implication is not cancellable without cancelling the 87 original statement.

An example of contextual cancellation may be found in looking at a variation of S4:

S12: The last item is either in the kitchen or the

garage, said by Y, the "social director" of an indoor treasure hunt when all but one item has been found. In this case, the implication is not at all one of Y not knowing; Y knows but is giving a hint to the participants. Again, Grice suggests that this may not be an airtight test, but that it should provide a strong indication of conversational implications.

The Derivation of the Implicature. The fourth test which Grice suggests for conversational implicature is that of "a derivation of it. One has to produce an account of how 88 it could have arisen and why it is there." It is this test which is the "final" test in Grice's eyes for it is through the working out of an implicature that listeners derive its meaning and thus it must, in the end, be in the working out of the implicature that its nature as conversational or conventional must be determined. Five pieces of information are used in working out any implication:

1. the conventional meaning of the words used.

2. the CP and its maxims.

3. the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the

utterance 159

4. other background knowledge

5. information in 1-4 is available to both parties and 89 both parties know that it is available to both.

Grice then takes these items, brings them together and proposes a general pattern to be used in working out a conversational implicature. Given that £ is "what is said," and g is the implicature:

X has said that g; there is no reason to suppose that X is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP ; X could not be doing this unless X thought that g; X knows (and knows that I know X knows) that I can see that the supposition that X thinks that g is required; X has done nothing to stop me thinking that g; X intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think,«that g; and so X has implicated that g.

If, indeed, this natural logic guides the interpretation of the utterance, Grice would claim that herein lies the definitive test for the presence of a conversational implicature and the key to the understanding of at least this type of occasion meaning. GRICEAN PRAGMATICS; A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY

CHAPTER SIX

H. Paul Grice's Cooperative Principle of Conversation and the theory of implicature which it presupposes is one of the most influential contributions to modern pragmatics extant. It is not, however, generally treated as having any connection with his theory of meaning despite the fact that this connection is critical to a complete understanding of 1 Grice's contribution to pragmatic theory. Only in his development of nonnatural meaning as it exists in juxtaposition to natural meaning may a basic theory of communication be established; implicature builds upon this base to suggest a way of accounting for just how it is that people then use nonnatural meaning, especially language, to communicate. But how exactly does Grice represent the nature of pragmatics? And how well do the specifics of his theory fit the criteria of the metatheory set out in Chapter Four?

It is the purpose of this chapter to answer these questions.

To do so, I will first look at Grice's theory in light of the assumptions considered basic to pragmatic analysis. From there, I will carry out a point by point comparison of his theory with my proposed metatheoretical criteria.

160 161

A COMPARISON OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Another way of asking how Grice's theory represents the nature of pragmatics is to ask what assumptions lie at the base of his formulations and, specifically, whether these assumptions conform to those which I proposed above. Does

Gricean pragmatics, therefore, assume the three key bases of pragmatic theory, namely:

1. Communication is action-dominated, being

intentional, value-laden, and descriptive, yet it is

grounded in motion.

2. Communication occurs in a social context, being

both influenced by and influencing social behavior.

3. Communication is manifested through joint action

and thus is rule-governed to facilitate coorientation.

If Grice's perspective does parallel these assumptions, one may proceed to look more closely at the specifics of his theory, assured at least of an appropriate theoretical grounding as a starting point.

Action-Motion

The first question which must be addressed, since it is the most critical in delineating the realm of pragmatics, is whether or not Grice bases the development of his theory of meaning on an Action-Motion contrast. The affirmative to this question lies in his initial distinction between 162 natural and nonnatural meaning. Natural meaning, for Grice, is found in the symptomatic derivation of meaning wherein what is meant is integrally related to the sign through which it is conveyed. For example, if one blushes conveying embarassment, this meaning is derived from knowledge of blushing as a sheerly physiological indication of emotion.

The blush is causally related to embarrassment and its meaning is derived through an awareness of this cause-effect relation. The meaning is neither governed by the intent of a communicator nor dependent upon the recognition of intent to be understood. And, while natural meaning may actually coincide with what the communicator intends to convey, its source of meaning lies not in the recognition of the intent, but in the recognition of the natural connection between the symptom/ signal and its referent. Obviously the possibility for misinterpretation is present, as with the blush being incorrectly interpreted as anger rather than embarrassment; in such cases, the meaning may be invalid, being based on an ignorance of the causal factors involved.

Natural meaning, then, grounded in motion and is behaviorally oriented; to complete the contrast between motion and action, Grice introduces nonnatural meaning as the purposive, agent-based use of signs. And, in defining nonnatural meaning as the use of utterances to communicate, he makes explicit the necessary motion (behavior)— action 2 (communication) contrast. In his definition of nonnatural 163 meaning, of course, circularity exists between it and a def inition of communication as the use of nonnatural meaning, but Grice uses this circularity to make an important point.

On the one hand, communication as agent-based action sets the scene which brings nonnatural meaning into existence; concomitantly, nonnatural meaning provides the means through which communication is achieved— it is central to "any human institution, the function of which is to provide arti- 3 ficial substitutes for natural signs." Unlike natural meaning then, the derivation of meaning is not due to the recognition of the appropriate cause-effect relationship, but rather is the result of an active interpretation of intent toward hypothesizing the symbol-referent link intended by the speaker. At the most basic level, the intention is focused on audience recognition of the prepositional attitude held by the speaker in making the utterance. Of course, the indirect or secondary intentions remain the "ultimate objective of the speaker," for they represent the uses of utterances to change beliefs or stimulate action, but they still depend upon the primary effect of recognition of the proposition in order to be 4 brought about.

From the above discussion, it is clear that Grice's theory assumes intention as central to action-oriented communication. What of the other aspects of communication as action, though? Does he also consider the valuative and 164 referential aspects of action? Again, the answer, "yes." For

Grice, the referential aspects of pragmatics are closely linked to intentional. He contends that an understanding of reference, critical to an understanding of prepositional attitude, is derived from an understanding of intention; the creation of utterances begins with an intention which then guides the selection of symbols to convey the desired intent; the interpretation begins with the input of symbols and determines their referent on a specific occasion through postulating the intent which guided their selection. His treatment of the valuative aspect is not so obvious. This aspect is not directly addressed by Grice, yet it is implied in his hint at maxims "aesthetic, social, and moral in 5 character." Most importantly, though, evidence of this assumption may be found in arguments which Grice puts forth in justifying the formulation of the CP. He presents the cooperative theory as an attempt to characterize the uses 6 and misuses of utterances in "doing conversation." The CP and its maxims set forth a system which, when adhered to, produce suitable conversational moves while violations of it, unless they are in the context of a higher level of adherence, are unsuitable, leading to misunderstanding and/or misrepresentation. It is Grice's contention then that the CP outlines the normative base for interaction; being normative, however, adherence to it, while standard, is not absolute. But, also, being normative, adherence carries with 165 it a positive social sanction while violation is subject to varying degrees of social censure. Thus each utterance carries with it, in the degree of adherence to the tenets of cooperative interaction, an indication of its speaker's attitudes and values. Attribution of intent in interpreting the utterance will then include a derivation of social

(moral, ethical) orientation based on the perceived degree of cooperation as well as a derivation of prepositional attitude. It may thereby be concluded that Grice does indeed hold the valuative aspect of action to be basic to an understanding of the uses of utterances to communicate.

Social Context

Given that Grice does ground his meaning theory in the action-motion contrast, the next question to be answered is whether or not the theory is also integrated with the broader social system; does Grice center meaning in a social context? The answer to this is an unqualified, "Yes." From his 1957 essay forward, Grice highlights the critical role of context, be it linguistic or otherwise, in narrowing the 7 range of alternative meanings for a given utterance. The notion of context dominates his distinctions between occasion meaning, applied timeless meaning, and timeless meaning and it takes center stage in his characterization of particularized conversational implicatures as dependent upon 8 a specialized context. Furthermore, when Grice sets out to 166 list those factors required for the working out of a conversational implicature, context and background knowledge 9 figure prominently. Most importantly toward identifying

Grice's theory as integrated with social context, though, is his "avowed aim . . . to see talking as a special case or 10 variety of purposive, indeed, rational behavior." This is first manifested in his use of utterance in a nonrestricted 11 sense to refer to any candidate for nonnatural meaning. It is furthered in his close paralleling of the natures of linguistic and nonlinguistic intentions and in his assertion that in language, no less than in nonlinguistic action, "we are presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions," and must be capable of providing justification if 12 we do not. This trend culminates in his conceptualization of the CP as extending beyond talk to have a general behavioral analog such that all rational action is governed by its precepts. Taken together, then, Grice's continued focus on the importance of context to the derivation of nonnatural meaning and the expanded application of his pragmatic theory beyond the usual linguistic boundaries to include any action or intention-dominated behavior provides sufficient evidence that his view of pragmatics does indeed meet the requirement that it assume an interactive relationship between social behavior and communication. 167

Jointf Rule-governed Action.

With the first two questions answered in the affirmativer it remains to be seen whether or not Gricean pragmatics is grounded in joint, rule-governed action. First of all, does Gricean pragmatics assume communication to be a cooperative venture, requiring the coorientation of participants? Quite obviously, it does. The CP holds such coorientation as a primary tenet; any rational action, according to Grice, must be characterized by common purpose and mutual dependence if it is to be successful. Even abuses of coorientation, such as mistakes, deceptions, floutings, etc., derive their meaning in relation to the presumption of cooperation. Each participant in an interaction must orient toward the other(s) involved in order to select the appropriate strategies to convey or to interpret a given utterance as intended. Thus, Grice's entire system of conveyed intent is based on this interactive coorientation.

And what of the requirement for a rules base? According to Grice, cooperation and coorientation is made possible through adherence to a system of rules which lend predicta bility and stability to joint action. In research, these rules first appear as attempts to describe action or language use we accepted these rules and consciously 13 followed them." Grice insists, however, that "we want to say that this [ the rule structure 1 is not just an interesting fact about our linguistic practice, but an 168 explanation of it; this leads us on to suppose that 'in some 14 sense,' 'implicitly,' we ^ accept these rules." The development of the CP, in particular, reflects Grice's dedi cation to uncovering these rules and therein to providing an explanatory, predictable base toward achieving a full understanding of nonnatural meaning in all of its aspects.

Thus Grice takes communication beyond the strict logical limitations of grammatical rules, adding, as an integral part of pragmatic theory, a rules base which is predictable enough to account for attribution of intent while being flexible enough to allow for the infinite variability of interaction in response to the infinite variety of contexts in which communication can and does occur.

A COMPARISON OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS

In comparing Grice's theory of meaning with the three assumptions which I believe to be critical to the development of an adequate pragmatics, it may be concluded that his theory does provide an appropriate philosophical base upon which to build the specifics of a pragmatic theory. The next step in verifying his theory is to determine whether or not the key components outlined in my metatheory are addressed in Gricean pragmatics and, if so, to what depth. I will proceed with this analysis by looking at each of the five key components in turn. 169

The Structure of Communicative Acts

The first component which must be accounted for in an adequate pragmatic theory is that of structure. Does Grice include a specification of the patterning of the communicative acts? And, if so, does he provide for the linguistic structure, the structure of discourse, the rhetorical structure, and the media structure? In terms of the linguistic structure, I have specified that one must provide for an interface between pragmatic theory and the phonological, semantic, and syntactical aspects of an act of communication so as to account for literal and direct meaning. Clearly Grice has done this. The key distinction that he makes between "what is said," as derived from the timeless meaning of an utterance, and "what is meant," as derived from the occasion meaning of an utterance, is based on distinguishing between linguistic input to meaning and that input attributable to other factors. His development of sentence-meaning and word-meaning as they relate to the meaning of "what is said" falls completely in the realm of linguistic structure, specifically in terms of semantics and syntactics. Thus what Grice does is to incorporate the existing theories of linguistics into his pragmatic system in order to account for this component within the total meaning complex. And, although he does not address the phonological aspect of the utterance directly, indirectly it 170 is included in its normally specified interface with semantics and syntactics. This lack of specificity in regard to phonology, however, is not especially surprising since

Grice indicates that, in his role as language philosopher, he may accept much of the linguistic structure, including I 15 presume the phonological aspect, as given. Grice's category of conventionalized implicature also falls within the domain of traditional linguistics since it represents a type of inference logically derived from the semantic truth conditionals of an utterance and provides for the existence of entailment and presupposition. Thus in establishing the meaning categories of timeless meaning and conventional implicature Grice has provided a means to characterize the interface between pragmatics and linguistic structure. (I should note that it is at this level that Grice is the most controversial; it is here that reductionist theorists who would either eliminate or greatly restrict the range of pragmatics focus their attack. The work of Ziff, Searle,

Sadock, G. Lakoff, Wilson, and Sperber are representative of 16 this trend. Countering this, however, is the work of other theorists, including Kempson, Atlas, and Van Der Auwera, demonstrating the superiority of a dual-base for meaning—

Gricean pragmatics and truth-conditional semantics— and 17 this base is exactly what Grice himself has proposed. )

What though of the next level of structure? Does Grice also provide for an accounting for the structure of 171 discourse? Yes, he does. In 1961, he first attempted to formulate a "general principle governing the use of language" to explain the means by which we make sense out of 18 utterances. In 1975, he finally returns to this topic, observing that "our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be 19 rational if they did." Using this observation as a starting point, Grice proceeds to formulate his famous

Cooperative Principle as an attempt to explain the apparent coherence. The CP represents his view of how we interpret any given utterance as a conversational move. The CP and its maxims, thus, provide for coorientation between participants and thereby a means by which such phenomena as sequencing, coherence, and topicality can be accounted for. The maxim of

Relation, in particular, is important in specifying the direction of coherent interaction, although the maxims of

Manner, in specifying the orderly presentation of material and in allowing for the use of prosody to highlight material of central focus make a key contribution to the sensical 20 progression of communication, also.

The third level of structure which must be accounted for is that of rhetorical events or episodes, or in other words, the structuring of acts of communication within various genre. Again, the answer will be "yes;" Grice does provide for a level of event structuring, although there are some qualifications. The genre of primary consideration in 172

Grice's work is clearly that of conversation and, indeed, he provides little more than hints of application beyond this.

But is this a serious drawback to the usefulness of his theory? I think not. If one accepts Fillmore's argument that

"the language of face-to-face conversation is the basic and primary use of language, all others being best described in terms of their manner of deviation from that base," then

Grice has provided a jumping off point for the study of 21 other genre. Fillmore continues his argument for a conversational base, claiming

that the most straightforward principles of pragmatics or contextualisation are to be found in the nature of conversational language, the language of people who are looking at each other or who are otherwise sharing some current experience and in which the hearer processes instantaneously what the speaker says. I believe that once the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of these basic types of discourse have been mastered, other types of discourse can be usefully described in terms of their deviation from such a base. Heuristically, I believe that many facts about the nature of the basic pragmatic conditions can be discovered by examining deviating types of discourse and paying close attention to those of their prop erties that stand out. The study of literary conventions can thus lead to greater under-.? standing of the basic workings of language.

Following this argument, Grice lays the groundwork for the extension of the CP and its maxims beyond face-to-face conversation to other such genre as poetry, advertisements, political campaigns, stories, parables, and songs, among others. These shifts in genre would, of necessity, be accompanied with shifts of purpose away from the informa- 173 tional and influential typically assumed of conversation, but I doubt that any purpose could be found which did not manifest itself in some way in conversation, whether it be cathartic, expressive, aesthetic, or whatever. This would, in turn, provide for a renewed perspective on conversation toward furthering the study of the master genre. Now, I do not wish to imply that Grice makes no mention of other genre. His extension beyond the realm of linguistic interaction to other types of intentional action is strong evidence of his broad application of the principles of cooperativeness. In addition, the attention paid to such literary devices as metaphor, meiosis, hyperbole, and irony indicate at least considerations of the literary aspects of conversation as does his use of William Blake's poetry, reference writing, and military communiques as examples of 23 strategic violations of various maxims. Thus I will conclude that while Grice does not explicitly extend the application of his theory beyond conversation, implicitly this extension is made and so he may be counted as meeting the third structural requirement.

One final structural requirement remains to be met.

Does Grice provide for the variant effects in the channeling of the message? In his use of utterance in a nonrestrictive manner, he opens up the doorway for consideration of nonverbal and verbal, nonoral messages as well as those which are verbal, oral. He specifically cites as examples of 174 nonnatural meaning the use of hand signals by police officers to stop cars, performing an action (such as handing the speaker sugar upon request) in lieu of an oral response, the ringing of bells by the conductor on a bus to signal that it is full, and cutting someone by way of issuing an 24 insult. Beyond this, however, he says little about the range of media which might be considered or of any differences in impact due to the shifts in media. This then is an area which needs bolstering if Grice's theory is to be fully useful.

In sum, Grice's theory provides for all four of the structural requirements set out in the metatheory, although to varying extents. The linguistic structure is a key component for Gricean pragmatics, providing the basis both for timeless meaning and conventional implication. Providing for the structure of discourse was a primary impetus for the development of the cooperative theory of conversation and thus it is accounted for in the operation of the CP and its maxims. The genre structure of Gricean pragmatics is mainly centered in conversation, although as this is considered as the primary genre from which all others are derived, the lack of development into other genre is not considered to be a major weakness. The grounding for development is, after all, fully provided for. And, finally, the media structure is provided for in Grice's nonrestrictive use of "utterance" to apply to both linguistic and nonlinguistic candidates for 175 nonnatural meaning. This, however, is the weakest structural aspect of Gricean pragmatics; little consideration of the range of media and no consideration of the effects of media on nonnatural meaning is found. So far, though, Grice's theory of meaning is at least potentially capable of meeting the minimal requirements of an adequate pragmatics.

An Interface with Social Structure

In asking whether or not Gricean pragmatics meets the criteria of interface with social structure, one must recall that one of the basic assumptions dealt with above was in regard to the relation of communication and social context.

From this earlier comparison, it is clear that Grice is concerned with the interactive relationship between pragmatics and society. He is adamant that talk or language use is only a special case of the broader context of social action, reflected in his extended use of "utterance," and appears fully aware of the impact of a particularized context on the interpretation of an utterance. In addition, he includes both context of situation and background knowledge (about the world and how it operates, the partici pants in the situation, how humans behave, etc.) as critical 25 elements to working out of conversational implicatures. In addition he suggests the need for other maxims concerned with the speech act as a social act as well as as a communi cative act. These possibilities are not specifically worked 176 out by him, but they appear to be of a different sort than the earlier maxims, being nonconventional, yet not conversational. These maxims of general social behavior may provide the context for many of the violations of the CP not accounted for in the four primary maxims. So for example, if faced with a clash between "tell the truth" and "be tactful;" one of the injunctions is conversational, the other social, although with conversational implications.

These are important, therefore, not for their addition to the CP itself, but rather for providing a social context within which the CP may operate. To study the use of the CP and the conversational implicatures generated in various situations differing in regard to the politeness required should prove insightful to the understanding of the nature of the interface between language and society.

What Grice does not develop to any extent, however, is the breadth of the impact of context on utterances and the use of utterances to alter contexts. No attempt is made to examine the "sociolinguistic" factors of a speech situation to determine the influences of predictable contexts on the styles of utterances, either in terms of formality or in terms of the differences which result from status, class, gender, or other social factors. Certainly, given Grice's orientation as a philosopher, one could not expect this particular aspect of the society-pragmatics interface to be well developed, but if Gricean pragmatics is to provide the 177 theoretical framework around which a complete pragmatics is built, this is one area which must be given attention.

Therefore a supplement to this aspect of Gricean pragmatics must be provided which will fill in the outlines already sketched into Grice's theory.

The Purposes of Communicative Acts

The third component which must be included as a key to a pragmatic theory is that of intention. Does Grice provide for an understanding of intention, both in regard to the illocutionary purposes of achieving uptake of the utterance and in regard to the perlocutionary purposes which relate an illocution to the ends intended and/or achieved? The answer is definitely "Yes." One of the greatest strengths of

Gricean pragmatics is in the specification of the system linking utterance meaning, occasion meaning, and intent.

I will look first to the illocutionary system which must specify the means through which utterance (or sentence) meaning is related to speaker meaning. For Grice, this system is outlined in the relationship between timeless meaning and occasion meaning. Philosophically, he sees occasion meaning as derived from the intent of the speaker and timeless meaning being derived from occasion meaning

(and thus ultimately from speaker intent also). From the perspective of the interpreter in a communicative situation, however, the pattern of relation is specified differently. 178

The interpreter must begin with the symbols themselves to derive the applied timeless meaning of the utterance. In other words, the locutionary force or the direct, literal meaning of the utterance is obtained. The interpreter must then evaluate whether or not this conventional meaning makes sense given the current context. If it does, the timeless and occasion meaning overlap. If it does not, the interpret er must derive the implicatures required of the utterance in its context and thus arrive at the occasion meaning. This process is assisted by cues in the context of the situation and in the text of the utterance, including wording, stress, and intonation, as well as a common understanding of the workings of conversation. The CP provides for the interact ion of the necessary pieces of information and thus is irreplaceable as a tool for deriving illocutionary force.

The interpreter then is enabled to make an attribution of speaker intent and thus acquire an understanding of the utterance's nonnatural meaning. The requirement for such attribution of intent, however, is often misunderstood as either issuing a call for mind reading the speaker or as a specification of a perlocutionary effect; in actuality it involves no more than the uptake of the illocutionary force 26 as specified by Austin.

Closely related to those intents relevant to under standing speaker meaning are perlocutionary intents, i.e. those intents relevant to achieving things as a result of an 179 utterance being understood. Grice distinguishes between these two intents by referring to them, respectively, as primary and secondary intents (later called direct and 27 indirect intents). The primary intent is the carrier of illocutionary force and is the only intention which is 28 relevant to the nonnatural meaning of an utterance. It is through the recognition of this intention that the inter preter arrives as the occasion meaning of an utterance; the desired effect of this intention is thus not that the interpreter believe X (the prepositional attitude) but that 29 s/he thinks that the speaker believes or desires X. As

Grice puts it, though, "action is the ultimate objective of the speaker," and thus with the secondary intent, the speaker intends the interpreter to either share the belief 30 of the speaker or to perform the action desired. Of course, even though the primary intent is fulfilled and the interpreter understands the occasion meaning, s/he still has the option of choosing how to respond; the choice may match that desired by the speaker, but it may also include a range of other responses, including refusal to respond as the speaker desires and intentional "misunderstanding," among 31 others. The secondary intent, then, is not necessarily fulfilled just because the primary intent is and the perlocutionary effect may or may not be what the speaker had in mind in making the utterance.

The philosophical grounding for Grice's theoretical 180 approach to the intentional nature of communication, to this point, appears to be quite strong, yet in order to fulfill the requirement that a pragmatic theory must relate any communicative act to the purposes for which it is intended, it does need development in one particular area. It is weak in the detailing of illocutionary form and of the range of perlocutionary intents. In regard to the illocutionary form,

Grice briefly mentions the need for a consideration of speech acts in linking "what is said" with "what is meant" as a part of his five stage program to the understanding of nonnatural meaning (although he takes issue with Strawson's

1949 formulation of direct speech acts— a formulation which

Strawson held in common with Austin and Searle), but he has 32 never returned to expand upon this stage of his program.

What is needed to develop the illocutionary aspect is a union with a strong theory of speech acts. In the case of the perlocutionary range, Grice allows that purposes beyond the "maximally effective exchange of information" are rele vant to conversational interaction, but, other than making the suggestion to include persuasion, he fails to develop 33 what these might be. What is called for in this case is a union with a strong theory of rhetoric which schematizes the various purposes to which communication may be adapted, including but not limited to information exchange, persuasion, aesthetics/literature, and entertainment. 181

The System of Rules

The fourth requirement for a full pragmatic theory is that the theory outline a system of regulative and constitutive rules to relate structure, contexts, and purposes and, in so doing, describe both the underlying rational principles governing cooperative exchanges and the norms of appropriate communication actions. This component, thus, exists in the specification of the interaction of the first three components. It is from here that the true understanding arises of such things as the impact of purpose on wording choice, the relation between context and genre, or the strategies of topic maintenance. Does Grice provide for this rules system? Yes, although, as with parts of the components discussed above, it is more in terms of providing an outline of a system which is to be filled in by other theorists than it is in providing the details himself.

As was indicated in the analysis of Grice's basic assumptions for a pragmatic theory, Grice is strongly committed to achieving an understanding of the factors which allow for joint action and thereby to ultimately specifying the principles or rules which guide such action; only through these factors can nonnatural meaning be completely accounted for. The CP is his way of beginning this work. In it, he presents what he hopes to be the guiding force of interaction; a natural logic built on a knowledge of action, situation, and purpose which derives its validity from its 182 users and not from its structure or form. Thus, he reintro duces enthymematic reasoning to pragmatics as the rational base for producing, interpreting, and responding to coopera tive exchanges. In the maxims lie his first formalizations of the rules of cooperative behavior. With them, one can describe how one does act and make sense out of the action of others, and, in addition, how one is supposed to act. The maxims then outline what is normatively appropriate and what is not (under the assumption that coorientation requires at least a face conformity to the "general practice of the 34 group" in which one is interacting). As Grice puts it, these maxims provide a way of accounting not only for the

"usual or unusual use" of utterances, but also for the

"correct and incorrect use," according to the practices of 35 the group in question. Beyond the bounds of the CP and the maxims, however, Grice has yet to venture. One brief extension to the maxims of Manner is made to account for more specific phenomena, i.e. "Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply," but much more is called 36 for. What is lacking are specifications of the exact means by which these maxims are enacted. For example, what are the modes of highlighting the most important bits of information in an utterance so as to facilitate understanding and guide the framing of a response? How exactly do we go about con versing in an "orderly manner?" What typical devices allow us to indicate relevance of conversational contributions? 183

What differences do situational factors make in the choice of illocutionary form? These and other questions regarding the specific mechanisms of adhering to the CP must be addressed in the search for a full understanding of pragmatics.

Despite the lack of detail, the rules base is quite clearly a key element of Gricean pragmatics. But what of the constitutive — regulative distinction in the rules system?

At first glance, this distinction appears to be muddled in

Gricean pragmatics, although I believe that the problem lies more with a faulty conceptualization of these two rule types rather than with Grice's theory. According to Nofsinger,

"the cooperative principle and its maxims are clearly regulative rules....Maxims have a strong flavor of 'thou 37 shalt' or 'thou shalt not.' " Further, by definition, regulative rules are used to

regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior; for example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist independently of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate* they create or define new forms of behavior." The apparent problem arises in that the CP , if it is regulative (which in its action certainly appears to be so), should follow along, regulating antecedently existing behavior. This is fine if one considers social structure as the antecedently existing behavior. But what if one considers such things as rules for creating demand tickets, promises, etc. as the antecedent to the CP? A paradox 184 emergesf for how else can something become acceptable as an appropriate promise, warning, or whatever, unless it meets the criteria of being cooperative. The regulative rule now becomes logically prior as it establishes the criteria for an acceptable "counts as" formation and does not exist only to regulate these formations after they exist. Perhaps the way out is to say that rules are potentially both regulative and constitutive with the difference being one of 39 perspective rather than one of nature. This solution preserves the important aspects of the constitutive- regulative distinction without allowing it to become unnecessarily confining. Certainly, the CP serves in a dual capacity and with this solution, I can argue that Grice does, indeed, provide for a system of rules capable of accounting for the creation and regulation of cooperative behavior.

Psycholoqicallv Real Constructs

The final question to be asked regarding Grice's theory of meaning is whether or not it reflects constructs which are possible within the physiological and psychological constraints of the human system. Of the five components required of a pragmatic theory, this is the only one which cannot be answered just by looking into Grice's own work. I feel it is necessary here to look beyond Grice to studies which have been done to test the validity of his theoretical 185 constructs. Before I do this, however, the question should be asked as to whether Grice includes such a requirement as a test of the validity of his own theory. The answer appears to be in the affirmative. In only one instance does he directly address the psychological nature of language, yet this instance is highly revealing of his position in regard to this requirement. It occurs as part of a defense of his claim that "intensionality [sic]" is "embedded in the 40 very foundations of the theory of language." In this defense, he offers a description of "the psychological concepts which, in [ his 1 view, are needed for the formulation of an adequate theory of language," suggesting that they "may not be among the most primitive or fundamental psychological concepts (like those which apply not only to human beings but to quite lowly animals as well)," and thus may present problems in discovery because 41 of their subtlety. By this statement, one may conclude that Grice does see the need for a psychological base for pragmatics, reinforcing again his commitment to the interactive relation between motion and action. Less explicitly, Grice presents many examples to demonstrate his claims and thus provide preliminary evidence of real world correlates for his theoretical constructs. But these examples are not sufficient to make a definitive claim for psychological reality and so I will look briefly at a sampling of research which provides evidence for validity 186 claims.

The range of methods which have been utilized to investigate the psychological reality of discourse constructs is quite broad, including, according to Jacobs,

analysis of recall patterns, chronometric studies of comprehension, elicitation of informant judgements, documentation of strate gic control over rules, search for repair of violations, comparison of the occurrence of discourse features across socially or struc turally defined environments, and experimental manipulation of behavior."

Important to note is that this variety demonstrates that psychological reality is not just a "mentalistic concept," as seems to be assumed by Beach and Coulter, but is closely 43 tied to the phenomenological display of discourse as well.

In other words, "it is assumed that ordinary discourse is itself an organized reflection of how interactants interpret, reason, make sense, monitor and otherwise use 44 their knowledge to structure everyday interactions." And, thus, both descriptive and experimental research contributes to the judgements of psychological reality.

In looking at the research related to Gricean pragmatics, most of it centers on the nature of inferences.

This research, summarized by Harris, suggests that inferences serve two key functions; to integrate new information with the old in memory and to fill in missing information, particularly in regard to "incorporating implicit causal, temporal, and motivational information," 45 into the derived meaning. These functions are precisely 187 those which Grice has proposed for conventional and nonconventional implicatures. Fillenbaum suggests that these inferential abilities, in their capacity to "permit passage beyond literal understanding," are crucial aspects of human 46 cognitive functioning. In going beyond the surface or literal information, several interesting phenomena occur.

First of all, Fillenbaum indicates that distortion of the 47 literal information may occur. In a 1978 study, he asked subjects to paraphrase selected sentences out of a narrative. With normal sentences (completely sensical in relation to the context) distortion occurred only 1% of the time; with abnormal sentences (manipulated to various degrees of contextual "wildness"), distortion averaged

62.7%. This pragmatic normalization, which occurred with over 40% of the sample not even realizing it had occurred, seems to be enacted when what is described in ongoing discourse is nonsensical given the normal order of events.

Hornby reports similar findings, although he indicates also that the degree of normalization decreases with age and 48 increased sophistication of language use. Other studies focus in more specifically on the integration of inferences into memory; they suggest that the 40% rate in Fillenbaum's sample for not remembering an inference had been made is not unusual. In general, evidence indicates that within even a few seconds following exposure to a stimulus (linguistic or otherwise), inferences are integrated into memory and become 188 49 indistinguishable from the actual input. Harris also provides evidence of selective interpretation in that, of the many inferences possible for each utterance, "only those inferences that are important and relevant to the progress of the discourse, i.e., that establish information necessary 50 to understand what happened and why," are made. These findings are particularly important as support for an

"implicative" theory of pragmatics. As Fillenbaum puts it;

if, in processing information, one is responsive not only to what is directly and explicitly provided but also to what can be assumed if the directly provided information is to be coherent and employed in a normally communicatiove way, then a concern with the functions of presuppositional knowledge and conversational implicatures become escapable.

Another slant on researching the phenomena characteris tic of Gricean pragmatics is that by Clark and Haviland who focus attention on modeling the "given-new strategy"— a strategy, parallel to and compatible with the CP, using thematic structure to signal the intentions of the speaker 52 and thus to keep the discourse on track. This approach is similar to Halliday's frame-insert approach to coherence and depends heavily on the context to make clear information 53 which is assumed as given rather than stated. Evidence for this conversational strategy comes from various sources. It is supported by reaction time measurements which show increased comprehension times for indirect (inferential) versus direct sentences; these results were duplicated when 54 comparing metaphoric and direct sentences. It is also 189 supported by evidence indicating one stage interpretation for literal meaning and two stage for conveyed meaning

(unless the conveyed is preceded by a long context establishing its dominance, in which case the conveyed may 55 actually be interpreted more quickly). Further evidence supportive of Grice may be found in Hornby's findings that sentences structured uncooperatively in terms of given-new

information are clearly more difficult to judge as true or false than are those which present the relevant information 56 in a cooperative manner. Other evidence is found in the speech act research which links illocutionary force of

indirect speech acts, which depend upon inferences to achieve meaningfulness, to the felicity conditions upon the 57 use of speech acts.

Research has been directed toward more specific aspects of Grice's theory also. The generalized conversational

implicature, especially, has received attention from the

linguists. Evidence resulting from the study of the

"given-new" strategy provides for empirical verification of this variety of implicature. Herbert Clark's research, with various associates, has resulted in a suggestion of at least three mechanisms for generalized implicatures; "bridging," 58 addition, or restructuring. These mechanisms are particularly useful in regard to the temporal ordering of events within an utterance and with linking utterances into a narrative, as for example with; "She walked into a room. 190

The chandeliers burned brightly."). In some of these studies, the grammatical information and pragmatic

information are shown to be entwined toward signifying the

intended meaning, indicating that variances of grammatical 59 structure occur for pragmatic purposes. The semantic and pragmatic meanings become entwined when certain words, such as "some," "if," and "and," among others, convey more than their strictly logical content and thus enter the realm of 60 the conversational. Other studies focus on the pragmatic

input of other word types, including scalars (such as may/must, knows/ believes, and possibly/necessarily), verbs of judging (such as criticized, chide, blame); these studies claim that the implicatures initiated by these words are not due to their specific meaning, but to their interaction within the context, hence making them generalized 61 conversational implicatures and not conventional ones.

Other aspects of Gricean pragmatics are also studied.

The development of pragmatic skills have been studied by

Dore wherein the illocutionary acts of preschoolers were coded as to the pragmatic strategy involved. Dore found that

in interpreting intent, a direct strategy (with speaker and utterance meaning overlapping) was the earliest perfected, with indirect, metaphorical, and polite strategies having to 62 await more sophisticated knowledge of the world. Bates came to a similar conclusion, although she used Piagetian operational periods to track the onset of pragmatic 191 63 strategies. Jackson followed up on this work, testing the ability of grade school children to deal with rule violations. Her findings indicated that the children

"cooperated in the creation of the meaning of messages by actively trying to compute implicatures," suggesting that they do "use apparent rule violations as a starting point 64 for computing conversational implicatures." Following up on Jackson's work, Vennemann has claimed that if conversation is to proceed smoothly, rule violations must be 65 noticed and resolved or sidestepped via qualification.

Mura has addressed this issue, demonstrating that communicators, when faced with a nonstrategic violation, will attempt to cancel or "license" maxim violations and 66 thus head-off potential misunderstandings. Although Urmson suggested a similar tact with the uses of parenthetical verbs, such as know, believe, deduce, rejoice, regret, conclude, suppose, etc., his work in this area has been largely ignored until recent interest in Gricean pragmatics 67 has once more brought it to the forefront. Beach and

Dunning have also made suggestions regarding the use of

"preindexing strategies" in the form of hints, teases, and 68 prompts of indirect speech acts for the same purpose.

At a more descriptive level, Keenan provides evidence for the universality of the CP and its accompanying 69 implicatures. Although her Madagascar study demonstrated a failure to adhere to the Quality maxims, exactly as defined 192 in American culture, it showed that the maxims were ultimately adhered to, but in a renegotiated form. Wolfson and Pearce, also, indicate that the CP provides a means to understand culturally different conversational logics, while

Rochester and Martin show variant negotiated uses of the CP 70 according to socio-economic class. Brown and Levinson, in their landmark sociolinguistic study, found that cultural 71 norms were insufficient to explain politeness phenomena.

However, when these were coupled with Gricean implicatures, a powerful, yet simple tool for analyzing social interaction resulted. In addition, Gumperz has found Grice's theory to be highly explanatory of conversational code- switching by 72 bilinguals and bidialecticals. His results include evidence not only for the verbal code, but also for prosody, an area Grice sees as critical for implicatures involving irony, sarcasm, and the like.

Other researchers using Grice's schema have begun to establish a data base of real-world examples for the purpose of formulating rule schemas supportive of Gricean explanations of such speech behavior as demand tickets, devious messages, indirect and transparent questions, and the relationships of these behaviors to the broader level of 73 social interaction and perception. Of course, all of this evidence is only preliminary. After all, it has only been eight years since "Logic and Conversation" was published.

The evidence is consistent enough, however, that I can at 193 least tentatively conclude that Grice's theory does indeed possess psychological reality. A more definite conclusion must await future research. GRICEAN PRAGMATICS: AN EVALUATION AND AN EXTENSION

CHAPTER SEVEN

In review of the critique just completed of the comparison of Gricean pragmatics to the metatheory proposed in chapter four, it is clear that Grice does not present a complete theory. There are weaknesses in the development of discourse structure, genre structure, media structure, and rules schemas. A lack of specification also occurs in regard to illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts, and the specification of the context-communication interaction.

However, despite the lack of detail in his consideration of certain components, he does account for each of the five critical elements: linguistic structure, social interface, intentionality, rules, and psychological reality. In addition, he provides indications of direction for the extension of the less we11-developed areas of his theory.

What it appears that his does present, then, is not a complete, detailed conceptualization of pragmatics and all of the ramifications thereof, but rather a viable framework for the development of a complete pragmatic theory. And much of the finishing work has been left for others.

Some of the finishing work is already being done as

194 195 part of on-going research into strategies, contexts, and genre of discourse. However, as this type of research entails no theoretical alteration of Gricean pragmatics and as much of it has already been discussed above, I will only note the general directions this research is taking. In the area of rules specification toward uncovering the strategies which guide communicative interaction and govern discourse structure, the works collected by Schenkein, by Gumperz and 1 Hymes, and by Craig and Tracy represent key contributions.

In these, the rules governing turn-taking, question and answer sequencing, side sequences, opening and closings of conversations, story telling, topic shifts, conversational alignment, and the giving and receiving of compliments, among others, find at least first formulations.

In the area of clarifying the relationship between context and communication, significant additions to the framing provided by Grice have been made. Grayshon, Goffman, and Halliday have provided general theories of the 2 interaction between social context and language use.

Bernstein, Hawkins, Gumperz, Thorne, Henley, Ervin-Tripp,

Mitchell-Keenan, and Labov have investigated the impact of social status on communication, including such variables as 3 social class, gender, race, age, and cultural community.

And, Goody, Brown, Levinson, and Lakoff present studies of 4 the relationship between politeness and communication.

Other areas which call for development include the 196 nature of perlocutionary intent, rhetorical genre, media structure, and practical reasoning. In terms of developing a schema for perlocutionary intent, the incorporation of the work of Frentz, Farrell, Jakobson, and Golden, as discussed 5 in chapter four, provides the necessary expansion. The specification of rhetorical structure as genre has begun also in the work of Farrell, Pratt, M. Johnson, Hoffman, 6 Honeck, Snyder, and Wallace. In these works, communication as conversation is further developed, as well as communication as metaphor, literature, and pedagogy. In addition, the work of many rhetoricians, beginning with the classical studies of the modes of oratory, focus on genre as widely varying as social movements, agitation, myth, and the 7 like. Research into the rational principles governing communication began with the classical notion of dialectical reasoning and with considerations of Aristotlean 8 enthymematic reasoning. It was continued by Campbell and currently work by Toulmin, by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and by Jacobs and Jackson bring the focus of practical 9 reasoning into rhetorical theory. Work by Lewis on the specification of practical reasoning in achieving and maintaining a coordination equilibrium is also illustrative 10 of development in this area. Further specifications of media structure may be found in the work of Hymes and in that of McLuhan, among others.

Only two areas are in need of more extensive 197 development; the specification of illocutionary intent and the clarification of the interaction of communication with the broader system of social action. In specifying the nature of illocutionary intent, the most reasonable source of expansion is speech act theory. Although some work within the field of rhetoric has examined the role of speech act theory in communication research, the majority of the contributions in the area have come from philosophy and 11 linguistics. The most useful of these for present purposes is Bach and Harnish's Linguistic Communication and Speech 12 Acts. It is preferable to the work of Austin, whose work is more indicative than it is explicative, and to the work of Searle, whose work though explicative is not 13 theoretically compatible with Gricean pragmatics. In this volume, Bach and Harnish's stated aim is to "present a conception of linguistic communication that integrates 14 philosophical, linguistic, and psychological issues."

They start with Austin's tri-level distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, then narrow their focus to an explication of the locutionary act as "what is said" and then to a systematization of the illocutionary act toward understanding "what is meant" by the utterance of X in context C. The resulting schématisation of the illocutionary act is tagged the

"speech act schema." This schema is built upon the Gricean assumption that successful communication exists in the 198 shared recognition of intent, what Levinson refers to as the 15 attainment of a "state of mutual knowledge." It is further developed under the assumption that the meaning of all illocutionary acts relies on the making of inferences since no utterance occurs acontextually and thus cannot be purely locutionary in nature. Each illocutionary act, then, according to Bach and Harnish, is the "expression of an attitude by means of saying something" with the intention that this attitude be recognized by the hearer through the drawing of inferences to link "what is said" to the context in which it occurs— what Burke might call the "dancing of an 16 attitude," in Burkeian terms. They provide a well developed taxonomy of illocutionary acts, including four categories which are communicative in nature and two which are conventional. The four which are communicative, depending upon inference, include constatives (expressing speaker belief), directives (expressing a desire for hearer action), commissives (obligating the speaker to future action), and acknowledgements (expressing feelings and/or 17 social expectations for feelings toward the hearer). Two categories of conventional illocutionary acts are also presented, the effectives and the verdictives. They differ from the communicative in that "whereas a communicative intention is fulfilled by means of recognition of that intention, a conventional intention is fulfilled by means of 18 satisfying a convention." These then exist in the context 199 of social institution with effectives bringing about changes in institutional states of affairs (as with resigning, bidding, or bequeathing) and verdictives proclaiming judgements which are of binding, social import (as with calling a pitch a strike or a ball, court rulings, or 19 disqualifying. For all five categories, they spell out the mutually assumed pattern of inference which the hearer must follow in determining the illocutionary force and which the speaker, in creating interpretable utterances, must assume will be followed by the hearer. Thus, Bach and Harnish provide an explicit and comprehensive accounting of the illocutionary act, and one which is fully compatible with

Gricean pragmatics (being formulated with such compatibility as one of its goals). In addition, they provide an entire chapter examining the psychological reality of the speech act schema. The goal of such an investigation is to show that "the cognitive and social aspects of communication are but special cases of much more general phenomena in 20 cognitive and social psychology." The evidence which they cite (including much of what I have cited in chapter six for a similar purpose) is strongly supportive of their contentions and thus reinforces their claims for construct 21 validity.

Once Bach and Harnish's theory of speech acts is incorporated into the rhetorico-pragmatic theory begun by

Grice, only one area remains which must be augmented before 200 claims for a complete theoretical framework may be made. The nature of the interaction of communication with the broader system of social action must be clarified. Two of the theories which have been discussed above, Frentz and

Farrell's bi-level system of social context and Hymes' model for ethnographic analysis, reflect attempts at such 22 clarification. In Frentz and Farrell's system, context is categorized at a generalized and at a particularized level.

At the generalized level, which they refer to as "forms of life," is included the shared or common knowledge which comes from being a part of a given social group or system, the normative patterning through which expectations are created and/or fulfilled, and the institutionalization of procedures or forms in enacting relationships according to role. The particularized level, known as "encounters," represents here-and-now points of contact between individuals. Each encounter may be defined in terms of the episode or socially defined situation which is enacted by the communicators and the symbolic acts which are used to communicate within the situation. Hymes takes the same range of contextual phenomena down even further in his attempt to provide a "general theory and body of knowledge within which diversity of speech, repertoires, ways of speaking, and 23 choosing among them find a natural place." He specifies six hierarchically related social units with which this theory must deal: speech community, speech situation, speech 201 event, speech acts, speech styles, components of speech. A seventh unit is added in the form of rules of speaking which act to link the other six levels. While both of these approaches provide a means to explicate the interacting

levels of a communicative intention, a recent proposal by

Pearce and Cronen also needs to be considered in determining the most appropriate means of handling the interaction of 24 speech with broader social action.

As any theory must be which would be compatible with the rhetorica-pragmatic metatheory which I have outlined,

Pearce and Cronen's theory is grounded in the assumption that communication is social, rational, action-dominated behavior which is realized through the coordination of communicators. Their specific point of focus is in describing "the reciprocal relationship between particular

individuals and larger social entities," in such a way that the system used is sufficiently abstract enough to account for the variant logics of different cultures, yet is still

"specific enough to orient inquiry within any given 25 situation." The major step which they take toward achieving this end is in specifying a six-level structural schema to account for what they see as a hierarchical network of meanings and relations among meanings; content, 26 speech act, contract, episode, life-script, and archetype.

The most basic level, that of content, deals with the world as it is sensed, filtered, and interpreted as a 202 perceptual level. Moving up a level, one finds speech acts which are concerned with the symbolic uses of communication to do things; this level finds its focus primarily in the illocutionary aspect of Austin's speech act theory. The third level, known as the contract level, is concerned with the formalization of the relationships between individuals.

Meaning and rules at this level are relationship specific and act to specify the boundaries of the relationship, the array of appropriate behaviors within them, the relative value of them, and degree of involvement. Next is the level of episodes which are

communicative routines which the participants view as distinctive wholes, separate from other types of discourse, characterized by special rules of speech and nonverbal behavior and often distinguished by clearlx_recognizable opening or closing sequences.

These exist at a socially defined and recognizable level.

Differences in episodes have an effect on the interpretation of symbolic acts, as with the variant meaning of "What were you doing last night?! in a "chat" episode as opposed to an

"interrogation" episode. In addition, episodes allow for the elimination of redundant information; any information which the hearer can be assumed to figure out given the episode may be left out of the utterance. Thus the context for inferences is established. The fifth structural level is that of life-scripts. This is made up of the range of episodes and symbolic acts a given individual identifies with him/herself ; one might refer to this as the 203 self-concept, in the Meadian sense of s dynamic, reflective self. A life-script is evolved through interaction with others toward a gradual identification of "me" and "not me" behavior from the total social repertoire. Finally, the sixth level is that of the archetype. It is this level which is the broadest and which arises from the commonality of human experience in encountering such things as "birth, 28 maturation, death, joy and agony, hope and despair." One level which appears to be missing from this schema is the speech community which Hymes specifies. However, in an argument which parallels Mead's conception of social interaction, Pearce and Cronen contend that we do not experience this level directly, but experience it as 29 mediated through individual experience. Contrary to argument against this view, this approach does not eliminate predictability from interaction, it merely shifts the fount of predictability from a socially governed normativity to an individually experienced, though socially mediated, normativity.

As presented thus far, Pearce and Cronen only provide a slightly different way of dividing up the same phenomenon discussed by Hymes and by Frentz and Farrell. And, in fact, their schema would benefit from the inclusion within episode of Hymes' speech situation and speech event. In addition, the inclusion of speech style and components of speech is needed somewhere in this schema so as to allow for 204 consideration of the raw materials of speech as contained in

Hymes' levels of speech style and speech components; the speech act level seems most amenable to this addition in light of the inclusion of locutionary acts into this category by other theorists. With these additions, a comprehensive schema to account for the components of social context is provided. But the real strength of Pearce and

Cronen's coordinated management of meaning theory lies in its extensions beyond the structural level to the specifications of the nature of the interaction between the levels. Although Hymes accounts for this interaction in part with his category of rules, the Pearce and Cronen theory is augmented not only by the defining of the key aspects of rule structure, but also by a specification of modes for monitoring oneself and others in the system, a schema for defining levels of competence in the use of the system, and a means to characterize variant manifestations of the system based on differing interactional logics.

In looking briefly at these extensions, the first one of major importance is the specification of rule structure.

In the context of the coordinated management of meaning,

Pearce and Cronen specify four aspects of rule structure which determine the character of the logical force of the interaction; temporal extension, complexity, prefigurative 30 force, and practical force. The aspect of temporal extension is concerned with whether or not one's 205 perlocutionary intents are to be realized immediately or whether the ultimate goal is to be achieved at some future date as a result of present action. In other words, this focuses on the ability of the interactant to "plan ahead;" just as in chess, the one who can operate at the greatest temporal extension has the greater control over the situation. In regard to complexity, the focus is on the ability to see relationships between past and future conditions in determining one's present action. Pearce and

Cronen suggest that this sensitivity to the context is key to achieving an understanding of the logical relationships between causes and consequences. Prefigurative force deals with the notion that present actions are responses to past events; the rule structuring at this level is linked to the constraints put on the present by antecedent episodes, contracts, life-scripts, and archetypes. Such force may be determined empirically through the use of such calls for 31 explanation of behavior as "I did that because of. ..."

In contrast, practical force is representative of the link between a present act and the subsequent consequences of it.

It is this force which captures the purposive nature of action and allows for specifications of perlocutionary intent. It may be empirically studied through the use of 32 such statements as "I did that in order to. ..."

These types of forces typify the " 'action-chains' that are created by the formation of an interpersonal rule system.' 206 33 " These chains both facilitate interaction by allowing for reasonable predictability and stability and constrain interaction by establishing expectations of behavior and consequences; this allows for more complex activity than would be possible if each interaction had to be freshly negotiated while at the same time may call up actions which are enacted out of obligation rather than out of desire. The relationship between these two types of force is important in that imbalances may lead to compulsive behavior or to behavior without regard to consequences. Pearce and Cronen's analysis of action is based in part on the estimation of the relative logical forces linking the various structural levels.

Other areas of development for the coordinated management of meaning theory include the monitoring or processing of the system and competence within the system.

In terms of monitoring, Pearce and Cronen specify three critical aspects: coherence, control, and valence. These aspects allow for an understanding of, respectively, "What are we doing and does it make sense?" "Who is controlling 34 what we are doing?" and "Do I like what we are doing?" The interpretation of these levels may vary for each participant; to discover the varying perspectives is to understand the potential for conflict and contradiction in a given system as well as for coorientation.

In terms of competence, particularly in regard to 207 communication competence, Pearce and Cronen present a tri-level system in which any individual in a given context may be classified; minimal competence, satisfactory 35 competence, and optimal competence. The classification of an individual varies with the context, since one may be highly competent in one arena and incompetent in another.

Minimal competence is defined as occurring when the individual interacts outside the logic of the system; this may be due to unfamiliarity of the situation (as with intercultural situations) or due to social or mental retardation. In any case, the individual who is minimally competent is "depicted as being less complex than the social 36 system." Satisfactory competence is defined as existing when the individual can produce coherent episodes. Such a competence involves the ability to interpret in context, to align meanings and actions, to take the perspective of others, and to feel pressure to adapt socially. This is typified by an interaction within the system, whether through maintaining the group norm or through a creative exploitation of the system. The final type of competence is that of optimal competence. Individuals who are optimally competent are aware of their enmeshment within a system and choose whether to conform or not.

Finally, Pearce and Cronen characterize three general forms of interpersonal systems based on the logic which dominates them and on the perceived competence of those 208 37 within the system; closed, random, and open. In the closed system, the practical logic guiding the system is static, one might even say reified. The system is seen as the source of what is "right" and "wrong," with all deviations seen as error or as subversive to the system. The primary focus in this sort of system is on obligation. The open system is one in which the inevitability of change is recognized and mechanisms for inducing change toward bettering the system are sought and utilized. And, the random system is one in which the logic "produces incoherent sequences rather than 38 patterns." This system reveals the rare instance of interaction without predictability of sequence or of actor; it tolls the "deathknell of coordination" and thus acts as a limiting case for the defining of communication.

In the specification of this system with its structural levels, logical forces, modes of monitoring, and levels of competency, Pearce and Cronen present a powerful means of understanding the interactional forces which guide our actions and the actions of others, the implications of our

"variable enmeshment in multiple systems, each with its own logic of meaning and order," and the nature of interactional 39 competence. In addition, they have provided for at least preliminary judgements of psychological validity through the empirical studies which they and their associates have conducted in attempts to verify and clarify the constructs 40 hypothesized. As an outgrowth of the insight gained 209 through such study, the potential for diagnosis and strategic intervention into dysfunctional systems is also established. In sum, then, Pearce and Cronen provide a sophisticated accounting of the broader realm of social action, and one which is amenable to empirical verification; such a theory is exactly what is needed to augment the consideration of social action and social context in Gricean pragmatics.

With the addition of Bach and Harnish's speech act schema to account for illocutionary acts and Pearce and

Cronen's coordinated management of meaning to provide a bridge to the broader realm of social action, the major gaps in Gricean pragmatics are filled. Although much work remains to be done filling in the details of rule schemas, testing the potential of each genre, further examining the relationship between purpose and structure, and the like, the result of this union of perspectives is a comprehensive theory of pragmatics. Given this favourable conclusion, then, one final question which must be addressed to complete the evaluation of Gricean pragmatics: what is the potential of the theory for providing a heuristically useful approach to the study of language in communication? I believe the answer to this must be in the affirmative. Gricean pragmatics provides a framework which integrates all of the critical elements necessary for pragmatics into an interactive whole; it is grounded in a philosophical base 210 which places it squarely in the field of rhetoric; and, once separated from the jargon of philosophy which "so wonderfully obstructs the understanding," it is at once a simple yet elegant characterization of the most basic human 41 phenomenon, symbolic communication. A THEORY FOR MODERN RHETORIC

CHAPTER EIGHT

In chapter one, I argued the need for a modern view of style, entailing the inclusion of discourse analysis or, more properly, pragmatics in modern rhetoric. I built a case to demonstrate that such an analysis is, by nature, rhetorical. To ignore it is to sacrifice a key element of rhetorical theory and to surrender yet another canon to outside fields of inquiry. This does not mean, however, that the development of the modern view of style, or even any other aspects of rhetoric, must take place in ignorance of research and theory-building in other fields. Indeed, the interaction with philosophy, English, linguistics, and psychology is critical to the complete development of theory; communication, of course, is affected by each of the factors studied in these fields. But, if the analysis of style is to benefit by such expansion, it must occur under the auspices of a theory which organizes these factors into a comprehensive, communication-centered whole— to wit, rhetorical theory.

I noted that one theory in particular, H. Paul Grice's theory of conversational implicature, was being used already

211 212 in this capacity, although its appropriateness for such use was as yet untested. Unfortunately, no ready criteria had been established as a metatheortical measure. Therefore, I surveyed past theoretical approaches to pragmatics, examined them toward deriving both general and specific criteria for a pragmatic theory, and then proposed a metatheory for a rhetorical-based pragmatics. I proceeded then to a detailed examination of Grice's theory, overviewing its central precepts and comparing them against the metatheory. What has emerged is that not only is Grice's theory a viable candidate for organizing the study of style, it is a suitable theory to organize the study of rhetoric as a whole. It provides for all of the elements which I established as critical to pragmatic investigation (and which are, de facto, critical to rhetorical investigation) while adhering to those assumptions which I stated as central to rhetorical theory. As a general theory, it describes the components of the rhetorico-pragmatic system and indicates the relationships which exist between them. It meets the criteria of generality in that it provides for the understanding of events as representative of regular classes of events, thus allowing for predictability and interpretation. It also meets the criteria for necessity, being an exemplum of practical necessity in which rational behavior within the system is defined normatively (as opposed to causally or logically). Finally, it demonstrates 213 both parsimony, in that the specification of variables and the relationships between them center on a few key theoretical constructs, and heuristicity, in that it can

(and in fact already has) stimulated thought about the phenomenon of communication. Of course, the theory is not complete as it stands. Many of the details are left unspecified, but this does not diminish the importance of the contribution which Grice has made in presenting a theory which can potentially account for the total range of variables which must be considered if one is to arrive at a complete analysis of human symbolic interaction.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has focused primarily on a critical analysis of one particular theory of pragmatics, H. Paul Grice's theory of meaning. My primary conclusion then is that

Grice's theory does meet the criteria established and is a suitable theory upon which to base investigations in the field. In the carrying out of the analysis, however, several other contributions have emerged. First, I have provided an overview of the nature and origins of pragmatics. Disputing the claim by many that pragmatics belongs to the field of linguistics (and as a minor portion of linguistics, at that), I have demonstrated that the very nature of pragmatics is centered in the field of rhetoric, being 214 vitally concerned with the use of symbols for coherent, purposeful interaction.

Secondly, I have provided a metatheory which may be used as a measure of the completeness of not only a pragmatic theory, but also should serve as the measure of any rhetorical-communication theory. Derived from an examination of pragmatic and rhetorical theory, I proposed a set of assumptions in which any such theory must be grounded, namely that communication is action-dominated, though constrained by motion, jointly achieved, and socially regulated. In addition, I proposed a list of five critical elements derived from these assumptions such that a complete theory must provide an accounting for the structure of communication, its context, its purpose, the rules which both create and regulate it, and the psychological validity of the constructs used to describe it. This metatheory then provides a test by which a proposed theory may be judged. In addition, and I think more importantly, it indicates that the "new" rhetoric need not be built on a single theory, but that it will be achieved through the consolidation of the varying perspectives provided by the like of Burke,

Perelman, and Toulmin. Indeed, it demands that we as investigators of communicative interaction shed our blinders which we use to focus on only one or maybe a few of the critical elements and consider how these individual contributions might profitably fit into the whole. In 215 additionf the metatheory calls for the consideration of theory development outside our field. When other specialists are more capable of shedding light on a particular area than are our own theorists, we must examine their contributions in a spirit of true scholarship, embracing those which would add to our theoretical development. And, it calls for the reuniting of rhetoric and communication theory under a single rubric aimed at the total understanding of communication phenomenon in all of its facets.

I. A. Richards is quoted as having said that "the study of the modes of language becomes, as it attempts to be thorough, the most fundamental and extensive of all 1 inquiries." It is a study therefore which is pertinent to many fields, but it is first and foremost a study which is centered in the field of rhetoric. We in the field should not take this responsibility lightly. ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1 Karl R. Wallace, Understanding Discourse; (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1970), p.vi. 2 Wallace, Understanding Discourse, p.5. 3 Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1975), p.69. 4 George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934). 5 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1967). 6 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Boston: Charles Ewer, 1823), exerptea in The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately, eds. James L. Golden and Edward P. Corbett (1968; rpt. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980), p. 260. 7 James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 3d ed (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), p. Ill; W. Ross Winterowd, Rhetoric: A Synthesis (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968),p.15. 8 Campbell, Philosophy, p. 145. 9 Campbell, Philosophy, p.174. 10 Charles W. Morris, "Foundations of the theory of signs," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 1, No.2 (1938), p.6. 11 Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1965); F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. W. Baskin (1916; trans. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

216 217 12 Robert T. Craig, "The Move Toward Discourse: A Research Editorial," Spectra, 19, No. 2 (February 1983), p.2. 13 Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," Philosophy & Rhetoric, 1 (Summer 1968), pp. 131-44; rpt. in Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, pp. 25-33. 14 Ehninger, pp. 26-30. 15 C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 8th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923); I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1936); Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, (1966; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968); Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969); Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 16 Isocrates, "Antidosis," trans. George Norlin (354 B.C.; trans. 1929, rpt. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956), II, pp.327-29), as quoted in Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, p.73; Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Friench Simpson (1528; trans. New York: Ungar Publishing Co., 1959); Giovanni Della Casa, The Art's of Grandeur and Submission, trans. Henry Stubbe (London: William Lee, 1665); Thomas DeQuincey, Letters to a Young Man, and Other Letters (Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields, 1854. 17 Donald P. Cushman and G.C. Whiting, "An Approach to Communication Theory: Toward consensus on Rules," The Journal of Communication, 22 (1972), pp. 217-38. 18 W. Barnett Pearce, "Consensual Rules in Interpersonal Communication: A Reply to Cushman and Whiting," The Journal of Communication, 23 (1973), pp. 160-68; Robert E. Nofsinger, "The Demand Ticket: A Conversational Device for Getting the Floor," Speech Monographs, 42 (1975), pp. 1-9; E.L. Stech, "Sequential Structures in Human Communication," Human Communication Research, 1 (1975), pp. 158-70; Robert E. Nofsinger, "On Answering Questions Indirectly: Some Rules in the Grammar," Human Communication Research, 2 (1976), pp. 172-80; John Waite Bowers, Norman D. Elliott, and R.J. Desmond, "Exploiting Pragmatic Rules: Devious Messages," Human Communication Research, 3 (1977), pp. 235-42; Donald P. Cushman and W. Barnett Pearce, "Generality and Necessity in Three Types of Theory about Human Communication," Human Communication Research, 3 (1977), pp. 344-53; William A. Donohue, Donald P. Cushman, and Robert E. Nofsinger, "Creating and Confronting Social Order: A Comparison of Rules Perspectives," Western Journal of Speech, 44 (1980), pp. 5-19; William Donohue, "Development of a Model of Rules 218

Use in Negotiated Interaction," Communication Monographs, 48 (1981), pp. 106-21; Sally Jackson, "Conversational Implicature in Children's Comprehension of Reference," Communication Monographs, 48 (1981), pp. 237-49; Donald P. Cushman, "Rules Theory; Ten Years Later," presented at Central States Speech Communication Association convention, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 16, 1982. 19 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., eds. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (1962; rpt. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978); John R. Searle, Speech Acts (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969); H. Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation," Syntax and Semantics 2% Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 41-58. 20 Grice, "Logic and Conversation." 21 Social Sciences Citation Index, 1961-1982.

CHAPTER TWO 1 Charles S. Peirce, "What Pragmatism Is," The Monist, 15 (April 1905), pp. 161-81; rpt. in Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, ed. Philip E. Weiner (New York: Dover, 1958), p. 183. 2 Peirce, "What Pragmatism Is," p. 196. 3 Peirce, "Issues of Pragmatism," The Monist, 15 (October 1905), pp. 481-99; rpt. in Charles S. Peirce, p. 204. 4 Philip E. Weiner, ed. Charles S. Peirce, p. 181. 5 Weiner, o. 181. 6 Weiner, p. 180; Morris, "Foundations", p. 30. 7 Mead, Mind, Self, and Societv. 8 Morris, "Foundations." 9 John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), I, p. 35; Charles W. Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Halil 1946J; Morris, Signification and Significance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964). 10 Morris, "Foundations," pp.3-5; Signification, pp. 219

1-3. 11 Morris, "Foundations," pp. 6-10. 12I Morris, "Foundations," p. 6. 13 Morris, Signs, p. 219. 14I Morris, "Foundations," p. 6. 15 Morris, Signs, p. 218. 16 Jerrold J. Katz, The Underlying Reality of Language and Its Philosophical Importance (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp.50-105; Hans Kamp, "Semantics yersus Pragmatics," in Formal Semantics and Pragmatics for Natural Languages, eds. Franz Guenthner and S. J. Schmidt (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1979), pp. 255-87; Jerry L. Morgan, "Some Interactions of Syntax and Pragmatics," in Cole and Morgan, pp. 289-303; Petr Sgall, "Conditions of the Use of Sentences and a Semantic Representation of Topic and Focus," in Formal Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Edward L. Keenan (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Uniy. Press, 1975), pp. 300-03. 17 Gerald Gazdar, Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form (New York: Academic Press, 1979); Ruth M. Kempson, Semantic Theory (New York: Cambridge Uniy. Press, 1977); Ruth M. Kempson, Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics (1975; rpt. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 1-53; Robert C. Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," Synthèse, 22 (197Ô), pp. 272-89: rpt. in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. D. Davidson and Gilbert H. Harman (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1972), II. 18 Adrian Akmajian, Richard Demers, and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), pp. 228-66; Kempson, Semantic Theory, pp. 25-46; Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), pp. 138-48. 19 Lyons, Semantics, I, p. 4. 20 Morris, "Foundations," p. 6; Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 1934. 21 Morris, Signs, p. 218. 22 Morris, "Foundations," pp. 30-42; Morris, Signification". 23 Morris, Signification. 220

24 Morrisr "Foundationsr" p. 39. 25 Morris, "Foundations," p. 32; Signification, p.3. 26 Morris, "Foundations," p. 30. 27 Morris, "Foundations," p. 5; Were Morris familiar with what Golden, Berquist, & Coleman categorize as the modern approaches to rhetoric, i.e. rhetoric as value, meaning, epistemology, and motive, he might be forced to reevaluate his stance on rhetoric in order to extend the relation between rhetoric and pragmatics and recognize that rhetoric in the fullness of its development may have become one with pragmatics. 28 Morris, "Foundations," pp. 8-10. 29 Morris, "Foundations," p. 9. 30 Cushman, "Rules Theory," p. 15. 31 Austin, Things with Words. 32 Austin, Things with Words, p. vi. In the preface to the first edition of Austin's lectures, he notes that the ideas behind them first appeared publically in "Other Minds," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Societv, Supplementary volume 20 (1946), pp. 173 ff. 33 Austin, Things with Words, p. 1. 34 Austin, Things with Words, pp. 94-103. 35 Austin, Things with Words, pp. 94-120. Although Austin speaks here of speech only, he did not intend to exclude writing or other verbal systems of communication; he even discusses the possibilities of including certain nonverbal actions as part of his schema. 36 Austin, Things with Words, p. 100. 37 Austin, Things with Words, p. 95. 38 Austin, Things with Words, p. 95. 39 Richard P. Honeck, "Historical Notes on Figurative Language," in Cognition and Figurative Language, eds. Richard P. Honeck and Robert R. Hoffman (Hillsdale, NJ; Erlbaum, 1980), p. 34. 40 Bach & Harnish, p. xi; Austin, Words, p. 149. 221

41 Akmajian, Demers, & Harnish, p. 267-304. 42 Akmajian, Demers, & Harnish, p. 271. 43 Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Speech Act Structure in Conversation; Rational Aspects of Pragmatic Coherence," Conversational Coherence, eds. Robert T. Craig and Karen Tracy (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1983), pp. 51-59. 44 Austin, Words, p. 148. 45 Peter Cole, ed.. Radical Pragmatics (New York: Academic Press, 1981), p. xi. 46 Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," p. 273. 47 Sgall, pp. 302-03; Betty Hart, "Pragmatics and Language Development," in Advances in Clinical Child Psychology, III, eds. Benjamin B. Lahey and Alan E. Kazdin (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 335-38; Elizabeth Bates, Language and Context (New York: Academic Press, 1976), pp. 1-34. 48 Rudolf Carnap, "Foundations of logic and mathmatics," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 1, No.3 (1938), 139-214. 49 Stalnaker, "Pragmatics;" Teun A. van Dijk and Walter Kintsch, Strategies of Discourse Comprehension (New York: Academic Press, 1983), p.7; Bach & Harnish, pp. xiii-xvii; Roland Hausser & Dietmar Zaefferer, "Questions and Answers in a Context-dependent Montague Grammar," in Guenthner and Schmidt, p. 357; Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, pp. 267-304. 50 Robert Montague, "Pragmatics and Intensional Logic," Synthèse, 22 (1970), pp. 68-95. 51 Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," pp. 275-277; Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions," Mind, 63 (1954), pp. 359-379. 52 Gazdar, Pragmatics, pp. 2-3; Leo Apostel, "Further Remarks on the Pragmatics of Natural Languages," in Prag matics of Natural Language, ed. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (Boston: Reidel, 1971), pp. 1-12; Hausser & Zaefferner, p. 339. 53 Morgan, "Syntax and Pragmatics," p. 289. 54 Gazdar, Pragmatics, o. 2. 55 Chomsky, Theory of Syntax, p. 7. 222

56 Chomsky, Theory of Syntax, p.4. 57 Jerrold M. Sadock, Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts (New York; Academic Press, 1974); Sadock, "The Soft, Interpretive Underbelly of Generative Semantics," in Cole and Morgan, pp. 383-96; George Lakoff, "Pragmatics in Natural Logic," in Keenan, pp. 253-86; David Gordon & George Lakoff, "Conversational Postulates," Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, eds. D. Adams et al. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Department of Linguistics, 1971), pp. 63-84; rpt. in Cole and Morgan, pp. 83-106. 58 Sadock, Toward a Linguistic Theory, pp. 1-19. 59 Sadock, Toward a Linguistic Theory, p. 154. 60 G. Lakoff, "Pragmatics in Natural Logic," pp. 253-86. 61 G. Lakoff, "Pragmatics in Natural Logic," p. 258. 62 Kempson, Semantic Theory, pp. 47-63. 63 Kempson, Semantic Theory, pp. 60-63.

CHAPTER THREE 1 Bates, Language and Context. 2 Bach & Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. xi. 3 Dell Hymes, Foundations in Sociolinguistics (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1974), p. 3; Cushman, "Rules Theory." 4 Golden, Berquist, & Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought. 5 Morris, "Foundations." 6 Aristotle, De Interpretation, trans. E. M. Edghill, in Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 1-7. 7 Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960). 8 Samuel L. Becker, "Toward an Appropriate Theory for Contemporary Speech-Communication," in What Rhetoric 223

(Communication Theory) is Appropriate for Contemporary Speech Communication, ed. Dayid Smith, Proc. of the Uniy. of Minnesota Spring Symposium in Speech Communication, May 4, 1968, p. lOi 9 Dell Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies of Communication," in Language and Social Context, ed. Pier Paolo Giglioli (New York: Penguin, 1972), pp. 21-44. 10 Cushman & Pearce, "Generality and Necessity." 11 Esa Itkonen, Grammatical Theory and Metascience (Amsterdam: Benjamin, 1978), p. 20. This source is a reyised edition of Itkonen's Linguistics and Metascience, Studia Philosophica Turkuensia, Ease. 2. (Komemaki, 1974). 12 Paul Hanly Furfey, "The Sociological Implicaitons of Substandard English," American Catholic Sociological Review, 5, No. 1 (1944), 3-9. 13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3d ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958. 14 J.R. Firth, Papers in Linguistics: 1934-1951 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), p. 25. 15 Gazdar, Pragmatics, p. 7. 16 Morris, "Foundation." 17 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: World, 1962); Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 7 (1968), p. 445; Burke, Language ; Wallace, Understanding Discourse; Hymes, "Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Life" in Directions in Sociolinguistics : The Ethographv of Communication, eds. John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972) pp.35-71; Hymes, Foundations in Socioliguistics. 18 Burke, Motives. 19 Kenneth Burke, "(Nonsymbolic) Motion/ (Symbolic) Action," Critical Inquiry (Summer 1978), 809-38. 20 Burke, "Dramatism," p. 445. 21 Mead, Mind, Self, and Society; Richards, 1959. 22 Burke, "Dramatism," p.446; Kenneth Burke, "Words as Deeds," rev. of How to Do Things with Words, by John L. Austin, Centrum, 3, No. 2 (Fall 1975), 147-68. 224

23 Marie Hochmuth, "Burkeian Criticism," Western Speech (Spring 1957), 21, 89-95. 24 Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 25 Wallace, Understanding Discourse, p. 5. 26 Wallace, Understanding Discourse, p. 21. 27 Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 28 Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (Winter 1968), 1-15; rpt. in Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought, pp. 17-24. 29 Austin, Things with Words. 30 Hymes, "Models;" Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies;" Foundations In Sociolinguistics. 31 Hymes, "Models," p. 40. 32 Hymes, "Models," p. 53. 33 Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies." 34 Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 35 Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies," p. 57. 36 Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies," p. 57. 37 Robert F. Nofsinger, "Tactical Coherence in Courtroom Conversation," in Craig and Tracy, Conversational Coherence, pp. 243-58; John M. Conley, William M. O'Barr, and E. Allan Lind, "The Power of Language; Presentational Style in the Courtroom," Duke Law Journal, 6 (1978), 1375-99; Susan Swan Mura, "An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Gender and Relative Status on the Uses of Deferential Language Style," M.A. Thesis Ohio State Univ. 1981; Jo Liska, Elizabeth Walker Mechling, and Susan Strathas, "Differences in Subjects' Perceptions of Gender and Believability between Users of Deferential and Nondeferential Language," Communication Quarterly, 29, No. 1 (Winter 1981), 40-48; Elinor Ochs and Bambi B. Schieffelin, eds.. Developmental Pragmatics (New York: Academic Press, 1979). 38 Hymes, "Models," p. 63. 225 39 Hymes, "Models," p. 65. 40 Hymes, "Models," p. 65. 41 Hymes, "Models," p. 66. 42 Michael Argyle, "The Analysis of Social Situations," in The Structure of Action, ed. Michael Brenner (Oxford, Eng: Blackwell, T 9 8 0 ), pp. 66-107. 43 Jens Allwood, "A Critical Look at Speech Act Theory," in Logic, Pragmatics and Grammar, ed. Osten Dahl (Goteborg, Sweden: Univ. of Goteborg Press, 1977), pp. 53-69. 44 Jens Allwood, "Negation and the Strength of Presuppositions," in Logic, Pragmatics, and Grammar, ed. Osten Dahl (Goteborg, Sweden: Univ. of Goteborg Press, 1977), pp. 11-52. 45 Richard A. Wright, "Meaning-nn and Conversational Implicature," in Cole and Morgan, Syntax and Semantics 3, pp. 363-82. 46 Honeck, "Historical Notes;" Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Theorv of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977); Robert R. Hoffman and Richard P. Honeck, "A Peacock Looks at its Legs: Cognitive Science and Figurative Language," in Honeck and Hoffman, Cognition and Figurative Language, pp. 3-24; Ogden & Richards, The Meaning of Meaning ; Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric. 47 Per Linell, Psychological Reality in Phonology (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979). 48 Linell, Psychological Reality, p. 32. 49 Georgia M. Green and Jerry L. Morgan, "Pragmatics, Grammar, and Discourse," in Cole, Radical Pragmatics, pp. 167-81. 50 Green and Morgan, "Pragmatics, Grammar, and Discourse," p. 174. 51 Green and Morgan, "Pragmatics, Grammar, and Discourse," p. 178-80. 52 Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, Linguistics, p. 262. 53 Itkonen, Grammatical Theory, p. 101. 54 John Dore, "Children's Illocutionary Acts," in Discourse Production and Comprehension, ed. Roy 0. Freedle 226

(Norwood, NJ; Ablex, 1977), pp. 227-44. 55 Dore, "Children's Illocutionary Acts," p. 228. 56 Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, Linguistics. 57 Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, Linguistics, p. 279. 58 Jerrold Katz, Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force (New York: Crowell, 1977). 59 Katz, Propositional Structure, p. 6. 60 Katz, Propositional Structure, p. 16. 61 Katz, Propositional Structure, p. xiii. 62 Richard Hurtig, "Toward a Functional Theory of Discourse," in Discourse Production and Comprehension, ed. Roy 0. Freedle (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1977), pp. 89-106. 63 Hurtig, "Toward a Functional Theory," p. 101.

CHAPTER FOUR 1 Cushman & Pearce, "Generality and Necessity;" Burke, "Dramatism;" Burke, "Motion/Action;" Jens Allwood, "An Analysis of Communicative Action," in The Structure of Action, ed. Michael Brenner (Oxford, Eng: Blackwell, 1980); Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1969). 2 Burke, "Motion/Action." 3 Morris, "Foundations;" Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (South Bend, IN: Gateway, 1953); Allwood, "Negation;" Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. 4 B. Aubrey Fisher, Thomas W. Glover, and Donald G. Ellis, "The Nature of Complex Communication Systems," Communication Monographs, 44 (August 1977), pp. 231. 5 Herbert Blumer, "The Nature of Symbolic Interactionism,"in Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 2-21; rpt. in Mortensen, Basic Readings, pp. 102-20. 6 Morris, "Foundations;" Erving Goffman, "The Neglected Situation," in Giglioli, Language and Social Context, pp. 61-66; Hymes, "Models.". 227 7 Goffman, "The Neglected Situation." 8 Mead, Mind Self, and Societv. 9 E. Tory Higgins, "The 'Communication Game'," in Social Cognition, eds. E. Tory Higgings, C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981), o. 346. 10 Michael Brenner, ed., "The Structure of Action: Introduction," in The Structure of Action (Oxford, Eng.: Blackwell, 1980), p. 3. 11 Burke, Motives ; Burke, "Dramatism;" 12 Brenner, "Introduction," p. 19. 13 Pratt, Literarv Discourse; Dean C. Barnlund, "Toward a Meaning-Centered Philosophy of Communication," Journal of Communication, 12 (December 1962), 197-211; Dore, "Children's Ilocutionary Acts." 14 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. 15 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. 16 Burke, Language, p. 31. 17 Wayne E. Brockreide, "Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetori," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 51 (1968), 1-12; rpt. in Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric, ed. Richard L. Johannesen (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 311-326. 18 Brockreide, "Dimensions." 19 Akmajian, Demers, & Harnish, Linguistics. 20 Cushman, "Rules Theory." 21 The distinction here is a critical one since the distinctions between entailments, presupposiitons, and implications establish the dividing line between purely structural semantics and a pragmatics which takes additional rules of discourse into account. 22 Lindsey Churchill, Questioning Strategies, in Sociolinguistics (Rowley, MA: Newbury, 1981); Gail Jefferson and Jim Schenkein, "Some Sequential Negotiations in Conversation," in Studies in the Organtization of Conversational Interaction, ed. Jim Schenkein (New York: Academic Press, 1978); Gail Jefferson, "Side Sequences," in Studies in Social Interaction, ed. David Sudnow (New York: Free Press, 1972); Harvey Sacks, Emanual A. Schegloff, and 228

Gail Jefferson, "A Simplest Systematics for the Organtization of Turn Taking for Conversation," Language, 50 (1974), 696-735; Emanual A. Schegloff, "Sequencing in Conversational Openings," American Anthropologist, 70 (1968), 1075-95; J. M. Sinclair and R.M. Coulthard, Towards an Analysis of Discourse (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975.) 23 Pratt, Literarv Discourse; Charles J. Fillmore, "Pragmatics and the Description of Discourse," in Pragmatik II, ed. Siegfried Schmidt (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1976), rot. in Cole, Radical Pragmatics, pp. 143-66. 24 H. Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1962); H. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). 25 H. Marshall McLuhan & Quentin Fio ., The Medium Is the Message (New York: Random House, 1967). 26 Hymes, "Models;" Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies." 27 Pratt, Literarv Discourse. 28 Thomas S.Frentz and Thomas B. Farrell, "Language-Action: A Paradigm for Communication," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 , No. 4 (December 1976), p.337. 29 Brockreide, "Dimensions," p. 324. 30 Fillmore, "Description of Discourse;" Sgall, "Conditions;" Stalnaker, "Pragmatics;" Hart, "Language Development;" Lyons, Semantics. 31 Lyons, Semantics. 32 Katz, Propositional Structure. 33 Katz, Propositional Structure. 34 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought.

Brockreide, "Dimensions," p. 324, Note 26. 36 Brockreide, "Dimensions," p. 319. 37 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought. 38 Robert L. Scott, "Communication as an Intentional, Social System," Human Communication Research, 3, No. 3 (Spring 1977), 258-68; Mead, Mind, Self, and Societv; Martin 229

Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," The Knowledge of Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York; Harper & Row, 1965); rpt. in Basic Readings in Communication Theorv, ed. C. David Mortensen (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 364-78; R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson, and A. R. Lee, "Interaction and Interexperience in Dyads," in Interpersonal Perception (New York: Springer), pp. 9-34; rpt. in Mortensen, Basic Readings, pp. 345-57; Dean C. Barnlund, "A Trasactional Model of Communication," in Language Behavior, eds. Johnnye Akin et al. (The Hague: Mouton, 1970); rpt. in Mortensen, Basic Readings, pp. 47-57; Burke, "Motion/Action." 39 Book et al.. Human Communication (New York: St. Martin's, 1980). 40 Carnap, "Foundations." 41 Sadock, Toward a Linguistic Theorv, p. 276. 42 Lyons, Semantics ; Martin Joos, The Five Clocks (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967); exerpted in "The Styles of the Five Clocks," in Language: Introductorv Readings, 2nd ed, eds. Virginia P. Clark, Paul A. Eschholz, and Alfred F. Rosa (New York: St. Martin's, 1977), pp. 408-15. 43 Katz, Propositional Structure ; Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric ; Argyle, "Social Situations;" Hymes, "ModeIs ; Goffman, "The Neglected Situation." 44 Lyons, Semantics. 45 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action." 46 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 333. 47 Kenneth L. Pike, Language in Relation to a Unified Theorv of the Structure of Human Behavior, 3 vols. (Santa Ana, CA: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1954). 48 Stephen Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Behavior," in Human Action, ed. Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1969), pp. 71-104; Stephen Toulmin, "Rules and Their Relevance for Understanding Human Behavior," in Understanding Other Persons, ed. Theodore Mischel (Oxford, Eng.: Blackwell, 1974), pp. 85-215; Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 334. 49 Hart, "Language Development," p. 414. 50 Jack E. Douglas, "The Collective Image," presented to at the annual meeting of the Central States Speech Assoc., 230

Chicago, April 1978. 51 Allwood, "Negation;" Allwood, "Communicative Action." 52 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 335. 53 Hymes, "Toward Ethnographies;" John Gumperz, "The Speech Community," in Giglioli, Language and Social Context, pp. 219-31. 54 Allwood, "Speech Act Theory," p. 53. 55 Morris, "Foundations." 56 Pike, A Unified Theorv, p. 2. 57 Goffman, "The Neglected Situation;" 1972; Aaron V. Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1974. 58 Itkonen, Grammatical Theorv, p. 101. 59 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 336. 60 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 336; Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959). 61 Hymes, "Models." 62 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 336; Morris, Signification ; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric; Weaver, Ethics ; Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology. 63 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action," p. 336; Burke, Motives. 64 Honeck, "Historical Notes." 65 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric ; Katz, Propositional Structure. 66 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, Remark 337, p. 108. 67 Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 68 Burke, "Motion/Action." 69 Scott, "Communication as Intentional;" Allwood, "Speech Act Theory;" Allwood, "Communicative Action;" Brenner, "Introduction;" Dennis R. Smith and Lawrence Kearney, "Organismic Concepts in the Unification of Rhetoric 231 and Communication," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (February 1973), 30-39; Linell, Psychological Reality. 70 Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, & Don D. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication (New York; Norton, 1967); Barnlund, "A Meaning-Centered Philosophy." 71 Itkonen, Grammatical Theory, o. 101. 72 Scott, "Communication as Intentional;"1977; Stephen Isard, "Changing the Context," in Keenan, Formal Semantics, pp. 287-96; Brenner, "Introduction." 73 Scott, "Communication as Intentional," p. 263. 74 Searle, Speech Acts ; John Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" in Giglioli, Language and Social Context, pp. 136-154; Stalnaker, "Pragmatics;" vanDijk & Kintsch, Strategies ; Bach & Harnish, "Linguistic Communication;" Hausser & Zaefferer, "Questions and Answers;" Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, Linguistics. 75 Austin, Things with Words. 76 In all fairness, I must note that while these flaws are characteristic of most speech act approaches to pragmatics, they are not characteristic of that developed by Bach and Harnish who clearly state that meaning involves three key factors: content, context, and communicative intent; Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication. 77 Searle, Speech Acts ; Searle, "What is a Speech Act?"; Gordon & Lakoff, "Converstional Postulates." 78 Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, Linguistics, p. 271. 79 Wright, "Meaning-nn." 80 Aristotle, The Rhetoric; Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought ; Lawrence W. Rosenfield ("A Game Model of Human Communication," in What Rhetoric (Communication Theory) is Appropriate for Contemporary Speech Communication, ed. David Smith, Proc. of the Univ. of Minnesota Spring Symposium in Speech Communication, May 4, 1968, pp. 26-41) suggests that these three functions are prototypical of three important communication "games" in Athenian public life and thus that the functions relevant to a particular society may well act as mirrors into the salient problems of contemporary life. 81 Brockreide, "Dimensions," p. 322. 232 82 Brockreidef "Dimensions," p. 322. 83 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric Western Thought ; St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (orig. written 427 A.D.; rpt. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958). 84 Edwin Newman, A Civil Tongue (New York: Warner Books, 1975) (although note that Newman's commitment to perspicuity is exaggerated into a perceived campaign against change in the English language. By his own statement (p.14), this is not true, yet he still stands in the public eye as the chief proponent of this position); William Labov, "The Study of Nonstandard English," (National Council of Teachers of English in cooperation with the Center for Applied Linguistics, 1975); Thomas B. Farrell ("Aspects of Coherence in Conversation and Rhetoric," in Craig and Tracy, Conversational Coherence, pp. 259-84) also points out this disparagement of rhetoric, hypothesizing that the roots of the controversy lie in the classical split between dialectic as a truth-seeking tool and rhetoric as a strategic art. 85 Burke, Motives, p. 567. 86 Allan R. Broadhurst & Donald K. Darnell, "Introduction to Cybernetics and Information Theory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 51 (December 1965), 442-53; Leonard C. Hawes, "Elements of a Model for Communication Processes," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (February 1973), 1-10. 87 Barnlund, "Meaning-Centered Philosophy;" Barnlund, "A Transactional Model." 88 Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 89 Ogden & Richards, Meaning of Meaning; Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric. 90 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. 91 Toulmin, "Concepts and Behavior;" Toulmin, "Rules and Their Relevance." 92 Winterowd, Rhetoric: A Synthesis. 93 J. Parry, The Psychology of Human Communication (London: Univ. of London Press,~l967), pi éÔ as quoted by Pearce, "Consensual Rules," p. 163. 94 John Condon, Semantics and Communication, 2d ed (New York: Macmillan, 1975). 233

95 Dore, "Children's Illocutionary Acts." 96 Bronislaw Malinowski, "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages," in Ogden and Richards, Meaning of Meaning, p. 296. 97 Frentz & Farrell, "Language-Action;" Roman Jakobson, "Closing Statement; Linguistics and Poetics," in Style in Language, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 190), pp. 350-377. 98 Hymes, "Models." 99 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought. 100 James L. Golden, lecture notes (Communication 816, "Major Modern Theorists," Ohio State Univ., Summer 1981). 101 Hymes, "Models." 102 It is not my purpose here to provide a complete theoretical justification for rules theory in communicaiton ; the reader with an interest in a more in-depth treatment of this important issue is referred to a series of articles by Donald Cushman and his associates (Cushman & Whiting, "Consensus on Rules;" Pearce, "Consensual Rules;" Cushman & Pearce, "Generality and Necessity;" Cushman, "Rules Theory") and to a work by Susan Schimanoff (Communication Rules: Theorv and Research (1980; rpt. Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1982). 103 Itkonen, Grammatical Theorv; Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology. 104 Brockreide, "Dimensions," p. 323, Note 25. 105 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought. 106 Cushman & Whiting, "Consensus on Rules," p. 218. 107 Cushman & Whiting, "Consensus on Rules," p. 218. 108 Rosenfield, "A Game Model." 109 Giglioli, Language and Social Context. 110 Searle, Speech Acts ; Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" Ill Cushman & Whiting, "Consensus on Rules;" Cushman, "Rules Theory." 234

112 Rosenfield, "A Game Model," p. 39, Note 5. 113 Rosenfield, "A Game Model," p. 35. 114 Jacobs & Jackson, "Speech Act Structure," p. 47. 115 Pearce, "Consensual Rules," p. 166. 116 Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish, Linguistics, p. 279. 117 Bach & Harnish, Linguistic Communication. 118 Cushman & Whiting, "Consensus on Rules." 119 Cushman & Pearce, "Generality and Necessity." 120 Linell, Psychological Reality.

B. F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957). 122 Stanley Deetz, ed., "Introduction: Phenomenology and Speech Communication," in Phenomenology in Rhetoric and Communication (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and the Univ. Press of America, 1981), p. 1. 123 Deetz, "Phenomenology," p. 1. 124 Louis Hjelmslev, "Memoir 7," International Journal of American Linguistics, Supplement to 19, No. 1 (1953), p. 2; trans. by Francis J. Whitfield. 125 Paul Garvin, rev. of Prolegomena to a Theorv of Language, by Louis Hjelmslev, Language, 30 (1954), p. 71. 126 Chomsky, Theorv of Syntax; Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1975); Katz, Underlying Reality of Language. 127 Linell, Psychological Reality, p. xiii. 128 Gilbert H. Harman, "Psychological Aspects of the Theory of Syntax," Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967), 75-87. 129 Katz, Underlying Reality of Language » p. 128. 130 Chomsky, Theory of Syntax, p. 3. 131 Zenon W. Plyshyn, "Competence and Psychological Reality," American Psychologist, 27, No. 6 (June 1972), 235 p. 551. 132 Victoria Fromkin, "When does a test test a hypothesis, or, what counts as evidence?" in Testing Linguistic Hypotheses, ed. D. Cohen and J. Wirth (New York; Wiley, 1974), p. 47. 133 Itkonen, Psychological Reality. 134 E. W. Roberts, "Speech errors as evidence for the reality of phonological units," Lingua, 35 (1975), p. 266. 135 Linell, Psychological Reality; Wolfgang Dressier, "For a socio-psycho-linguistic theory of phonological variation," in Salzburger Beitrage zur Linguistik, ed. Gaberell Drachman (Tubingen, W. Ger.: Verlag Gunter Narr., 1975), pp. 13-23. 136 Linell, Psychological Reality, p. 8. 137 J. A. Fodor, T. G. Sever, and M. F. Garrett, The Psychology of Language (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974). 138 Linell, Psychological Reality. 139 Edward Sapir, "The Psychological Reality of Phonemes," Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality, ed. David G. Mandelbaum (Berkely: Uniy. of California Press, 1949), pp. 46-60; David McNeill & Karen Lindig, "The Perceptual Reality of Phenomemes, Syllables, Words, and Sentences," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 12 (1973), 419-30; Donald J. Foss and David A. Swinney, "On the Psychological Reality of the Phoneme," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 12 (1973), 246-57; H. B. Savin & T. G. Sever, "The Nonperceptual Reality of the Phonome," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9 (1970), 295-302; Roberts, "Speech errors;" Lyle Campbell, "The Psychological and Sociological Reality of Finnish Vowel Harmony," in Issues in Vowel Harmony, ed. Robert M. Vago (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1980), pp. 245-70; Fodor, Sever, & Garrett, The Psychology of Language. 140 George A. Miller and Stephen Isard, "Some Perceptual Consequences of Linguistic Rules," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2 (1963), 217-228; Lawrence Marks and George A. Miller, "The Role of Semantic and Syntactic Constraints in the Memorization of English Sentences," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 3 (1964), 1-5; Miller, McKean, & Slovin, in George A. Miller, "Some Psychological Studies of Grammar," American 236

Psychologist, 17 (1962), 748-62; W. Epstein, "The Influence of Syntactical Structure on Learning," American Journal of Psychology, 74 (1961), 80-85; Neal F. Johnson, "The Psychological Reality of Phrase Structure Rules," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5 (1965), 469-75; Neal F. Johnson, "On the Relationship between Sentence Structure and the Latency in Generating the Sentence," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5 (1966), 375-80; George J. Suci, Paul Ammon, and Peter Gamlin, "The Validity of the Probe-latency Technique for Assessing Structure in Language," Language and Speech, 10 (1967), 69-80; J. A. Fodor & T. G. Bever, "The Psychological Reality of Linguistic Segments," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 4 (1965), 414-20; W. J. M. Levelt, "Hierarchical Chunking in Sentence Processing," Perception and Psychophysics, 8 (1970), 99-102; J. D. Bransford & J. J. Franks, "The Abstraction of Linguistic Ideas," Cognitive Psychology, 2 (1971), 331-50. 141 Fodor, Bever, & Garrett, The Psychology of Language. 142 Savin & Bever, "Nonperceptual reality," p. 295. Other researchers providing support for this claim include D. S. Boomer & J. D. M. Laver, "Slips of the Tongue," British Journal of Disorders of Communication, 3 (1968), 1-12; Vera Fromkin, "The Non-anomalous Nature of Anomalous Utterances," Language, 47 (1971), 27-52; Roberts, "Speech errors." See also the collections of research edited by Victoria Fromkin on this issue; Speech Errors as Linguistic Evidence (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); Errors in Linguistic Performance (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 143 Linell, Psychological Reality, p. 7. 144 Cushman, "Rules Theory," p. 10. 145 Cushman, "Rules Theory," p. 10.

CHAPTER FIVE

1 Grice, "Logic and Conversation." Jerry L. Morgan, "Some Interactions of Syntax and Pragmatics," in Cole and Morgan, Syntax and Semantics 3, p. 289. 2 Allwood, "Negation," p.47; Gazdar, Pragmatics, p.7. 3 Peter Cole, ed., Radical Pragmatics (New York: Academic Press, 1981), p. xii. 237 4 Social Sciences Citation Index. 5 Grice, "Logic and Conversation." 6 H.P. Grice, "Meaning," The Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), 377-88; "The Causal Theory of Perception," The Aristotelian Societv, Supplementary, 35 (1961), 121-52; "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," Foundations of Language, 4 (1968), 225-42; "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," The Philosophical Review, 78 (1969), 147-77; "Logic and Conversation;" "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation," in Syntax and Semantics Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole, 113-27; "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature," in Cole, Radical Pragmatics, pp. 183-98. 7 Although Stephen C. Levinson (Pragmatics (Cambridge, Eng.; Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983, p. 131) presents a similar diagram. Figure 1, as I present it, was sketched out before I was aware of his. Mine is a little more complete than his, including natural as well as nonnatural meaning, and I have also added his notion of standardized implicature to it as representative of Grice's actual approach to conversational implicature. 8 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 147. 9 Austin, Things with Words ; Searle, Speech Acts. 10 Austin, Things with Words. 11 Grice, "Meaning." 12 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 177. 13 Grice, "Meaning," p. 378. 14 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 231. 15 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 151. 16 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning." 17 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 225. 18 Grice, "Logic and Conversation." 19 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 225. 20 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 149. 21 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 226. 238

22 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning." 23 Grice "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 147. 24 Grice "Meaning," p. 385. 25 Grice "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 149. 26 Grice "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions,” p. 148. 27 Grice "Meaning," p. 385. 28 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 226. 29 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 227. 30 Grice "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions." 31 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 233. 32 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 234. 33 Grice "Meaning," p. 387. 34 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 226. 35 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 227. 36 Grice "Meaning." 37 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 227. 38 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 228. 39 Grice "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning.” 40 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, o. 166. 41 Grice "Causal Theory," p.127. 42 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, o. 166. 43 Grice "Logic and Conversation," p. 45. 44 Grice "Logic and Conversation," p. 47. 45 Grice "Causal Theory." 46 This example assumes (or carries the implication of "common" knowledge) that the reader knows that The Ohio State University's colours are scarlet and grey and that 239 these colours are dominant on a "Block 0" flag— a flag displaying a scarlet block letter 0 (for Ohio) centered on a field of grey. 47 Grice, "Causal Theory," p. 125. 48 Example adapted from Grice, "Causal 129. 49 Grice, "Causal Theory," pp. 129-132 50 Grice, "Causal Theory," p. 130. 51 Grice, "Causal Theory," p. 132. 52 Grice, "Causal Theory," p. 132. 53 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 54 In a statement which prefigured "Logic and Conversation" by almost two hundred years, yet which captures the very essence of Grice's labours, David Hume commented on the coherence of conversation as follows: Were even the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person, who broke the thread of discourse, might still inform you, that there has secretly revolved in his [sic] mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him [sic] from the subject of conversation. He further went on to assert that this show of coherence was "a certain proof that the simple ideas comprehended in the compound ones were bound together by some universal principle which had an equal influence on all mankind [sic]. ^ Enguirv Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (1777; rpt. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), p. 14. 55 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 47. 56 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 47. 57 Grice, "Log ic and Conversation," p. 45. 58 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 47. 59 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," pp. 46-47. 60 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," pp. 47-48. 61 Nofsinger, "The Demand Ticket," p. 7 62 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 49. 240

63 R. Stokes and J. P. Hewitt, "Aligning Actions," American Sociological Review, 41 (1976), p. 843. 64 Grice's labeling of the first of these categories is different than what I have used. For him, this category is referred to as a violation. I have opted to use violation as a general category label for "failures to fulfill" the CP or its maxims with mislead used for the particular type of failure which has an intent to mislead. This use reflects a common trend in discussions of Grice's work. It also allows for the use of "violation" in its common denotation; such use should prove to be less confusing than Grice's use of it in a new and specialized way and thus should be an aid to enhanced understanding of his theory. 65 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 49. 66 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 53. 67 Panadol, NBC, 9:55 p.m., 1-20-84. 68 Michael L. Geis, The Language of Television Advertising (New York: Adademic Press, 1982); The Medicine Show: Consumers Union's Practical Guide to Some Evervdav Health Problems and Health Products (Mount Vernon, NY: Consumers Union, 1980), pp. 15-33. 69 Coffee Achievers advertisement, NBC, 9:30 p.m., 1-29-84, sponsored by National Coffee Asociation. 70 The Medicine Show, p. 27. 71 Grice, "Further Notes," pp. 121-25. 72 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 50. 73 Example adapted from Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 59. 74 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," P- 56. 75 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," P- 56. 76 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," P- 56. 77 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 45. 78 Grice, "Presupposition," p. 186 (as suggested to by Peter Strawson) 79 Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 104. 241

80 ]Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 104. 81 CGrice, "Presupposition," p. 187. 821 Grice,C "Causal Theory," p. 127. 83 CGrice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 58. 84 CGrice, "Further Notes," p. 115. 85 CGrice, "Presupposition," pp. 186-87. 86 CGrice, "Further Notes," pp. 115-16. 87 CGrice, "Causal Theory," pp. 128- 29. 88 CGrice, "Presupposition," p. 187. 89 CGrice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 50. 90 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," P- 50.

CHAPTER SIX 1 Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 101. 2 Grice, "Meaning," p.380. 3 Grice, "Utterer's Meanings and Intentions," p. 177. 4 Grice, "Utterer's Meanings and Intentions," p. 166. 5 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 47. 6 Nofsinger, "On Answering Questions Indirectly," p. 172.

Grice, "Meaning," p. 388. 8 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 130.

Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 50. 10 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," . 47. 11 Grice, "Meaning." 12 Grice, "Meaning," p. 388. 242 13 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 241. 14 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 241. 15 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 236. 16 Paul Ziff, "On H.P. Grice's Account of Meaning," Analysis, 28 (1967), 1-8; rpt. in Semantics, ed. Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (Cambridge, Eng. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 60-65; Searle, Speech Acts; Searle, "What is a Speech Act?"; Lakoff, "Pragmatics in Natural Logic;" Dierdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, "Ordered Entailments," in Syntax and Semantics lit Presupposition, ed. Choon-Kyu Oh and David A. Dinneen (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 299-323. 17 Kempson, Presuppos ition ; Kempson, Semantic Theory; Jay David Atlas, "How Linguistics Matters to Philosophy," in Oh and Dinneen, Syntax and Semantics 11, pp. 265-281; Johan Van Der Auwera, "Pragmatic Presupposition," in Oh and Dinneen, Syntax and Semantics 11, pp. 249-264. 18 Grice, "Causal Theory," p. 132. 19 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 45. 20 Grice, "Further Notes," pp. 121-25; Grice, "Presupposition," pp. 189-90. Wilson, Sperber, and Apostel claim that Relevance is the key to understanding coherent discourse. Shatz and Gelman, however, argue that it is the context which provides the guidelines as to which maxim is most relevant to a given situation for successful communication. I believe this latter view is the most reasonable; to focus on relevance as the sole vehicle of coherence is to lose much of the richness suggested by Grice's multiple maxim approach. Dierdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, "On Grice's Theory of Conversation," in Conversation and Discourse, ed. Paul Werth (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 155-78; Apostel, "Further Remarks;" Marilyn Shatz and Rochel Gelmen, "Beyond Syntax," in Talking to Children, ed. Catherine E. Snow and Charles A. Ferguson (Cambridge, Eng.; Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 189-98. 21 Fillmore, "Description of Discourse," p. 143 22 Fillmore, "Description of Discourse," p. 165. 23 Grice, "Logic and Conversation." 24 Grice, "Meaning;" Grice, "Logic and Conversation;" 25 Grice, "Logic and Conversation." 243

26 Chomsky, Reflections on Language ; Searle, Speech Acts ; Austin, Things with Words. 27 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions." 28 Grice, "Meaning," p. 358. 29 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 230; Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," pp. 166-71. 30 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 166. 31 Allen D. Grimshaw, "Mishearings, Misunderstandings, and Other Nonsuccesses in Talk," Sociological Inquiry, 50, Nos. 3 and 4 (1980), pp. 31-74. 32 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 229; Grice, "Further Notes," p. 125; Peter Strawson, "Truth," Analysis, 9, No. 6 (1949). 33 Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 47. 34 Grice, "Logic and Conversation;" Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 233. 35 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 233. 36 Grice, "Presupposition," p. 189. 37 Nofsinger, "The Demand Ticket," p. 6. 38 Searle, Speech Acts. 39 William Brown, personal correspondence, June 1982. 40 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 242. 41 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning," p. 242. 42 Scott Jacobs, "Recent Advances in Discourse Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66, No.4 (December 1980), p. 451. 43 Wayne Beach, "Background Understandings and the Situated Accomplishments of Conversational Telling-Expansions," in Craig and Tracy, Conversational Coherence, pp. 196-221; J. Coulter, The Social Construction of Mind (Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980). 44 Beach, "Background Understandings," p. 197. 244 45 Richard J. Harris, "Inferences in Information Processing," in Psychology of Learning and Motivation 15, ed. Gordon H. Bower (New York: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 83-85; P.W. Thorndyke, "The Role of Inference in Discourse Comprehension," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 15 (1976), p. 444. 46 Samuel Fillenbaum, "How to Do Some Things with IF," in Semantic Factors in Cognition, eds. J.W. Cotton and Roberta Klatzky (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978), p. 185. 47 r Fillenbaum, "Things with IF," p. 190. 48 P.A. Hornby, "Surface Structure and Presupposition," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13 (1974), 530-38. 49 J.D. Bransford and J.J. Franks, "Linguistic Ideas ;" J.D. Bransford, J.R. Barclay, and J.J. Franks, "Sentence Memory," Cognitive Psychology, 3 (1972), 193-209; M.K. Johnson, J.D. Bransford, and S. Solomon, "Memory for Tacit Implications of Sentences," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 98 (1973), 203-05; Elizabeth F. Loftus, "Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report," Cognitive Psychology, 7 (1975), 560-72; Thorndyke, "The Role of Inference." 50 Harris, "Inferences in Information Processing," p. 85. 51 Fillenbaum, "Things with IF," p. 191. 52 Herbert H. Clark, "Inferences in Comprehension," in Basic Processes in Reading, eds. D. LaBerge and S.J. Samuels (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1977); Herbert H. Clark and Eve V. Clark, Psychology and Language (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977); Herbert H. Clark and Susan E. Haviland, "Comprehension and the Given-New Contract," in Discourse Production and Comprehension, ed. Roy 0. Freedle (Norwood, N J : Ablex, 1977), pp. 1-40; Susan E. Haviland and Herbert H. Clark, "What's New? Acquiring New Information as a Process in Comprehension," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13 (1974), 512-21. 53 Michael A.K. Halliday and R. Hasan, Cohesion in English (London: Longman, 1976); Karl E. Scheibe, "Progressions of Conversations and Conversational Actions," The Clever Hans Phenomenon, eds. Thomas A. Sebeok and Robert Rosenthal (New York: New York Academy of Science, 1981), pp. 160-68; Marga Kreckel, "A Framework for the Analysis of Natural Discourse," in Brenner, Structure of Action, pp. 192-210. 245 54 Clark and Haviland, "Comprehension;" A.J. Sanford and S. Garrod, " Memory and Attention in Text Comprehension," in Attention and Performance VIII, ed. Raymond S. Nickerson (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980), pp. 459-44. 55 Herbert H. Clark and Peter Lucy, "Understanding What is Meant From What Is Said," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14 (1975), 56-72; Herbert H. Clark and W.G. Chase, "On the Process of Comparing Sentences Against Pictures," Cognitive Psvchology, 3 (1972), 472-517; Andrew Ortony, "Some Psycholinguistic Aspects of Metaphor," in Honeck and Hoffman, Cognitive and Figurative Language, pp. 69-83; Andrew Ortony, D.L. Schallert, R.E. Reynolds, and S.J. Antos, "Interpreting Metaphors and Idioms," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17 (1978), 465-77; Tony Marcel, "Conscious and Preconscious Recognition of Polyse- mous Words," in Attention and Performance VIII, ed. Raymond S. Nickerson (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980), pp. 435-57. 56 Hornby, "Surface Structure." 57 John R. Searle, "Indirect Speech Acts," in Cole and Morgan, Syntax and Semantics 3, pp. 59-82; Katz, Prepositional Structure; Dennis W. Stampe, "Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts," in Cole and Morgan, pp. 1-39; Gordon and Lakoff, "Conversational Postulates." 58 Clark and Clark, Psychology and Language. 59 Gordon and Lakoff, "Conversational Postulates." 60 Lance J. Rips, "Quantification and Semantic Memory," Cognitive Psychology, 7 (1975), 307-340; Gerald Gazdar, "A Solution to the Projection Problem," in Oh and Dinneen, Syntax and Semantics 11, p. 57-89. 61 Gazdar, "Projection Problem;" Charles J. Fillmore, "Verbs of Judging," in Studies in Linguistic Semantics, ed. Fillmore and D.T. Langendoen (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), pp. 273-296; Lauri Karttunen and Stanley Peters, "Conventional Implicature," in Oh and Dinneen, Syntax and Semantics 11, pp. 1-56. 62 Dore, "Children's Illocutionary Acts." 63 Bates, Language and Context. 64 Jackson, "Conversational Implicature." 65 Theo Vennemann, "Topics, Sentence Accent, Ellipsis," in Keenan, Formal Semantics, pp. 313-28. 246 66 Susan Swan Mura, "Licensing Violations," in Craig and Tracy, Conversational Coherence, pp. 101-15. 67 J.O. Urmson, "Parenthetical Verbs," Mind, 61 (1952), 480-96. 68 Wayne A. Beach and David G. Dunning, "Pre-Indexing and Conversational Organization," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68 (1982), 170-85. 69 Elinor Ochs Keenan," The Universality of Conversational Implicatures," in Studies in Language Variation, eds. Ralph W. Fasold and Roger W. Shuy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 255-66. 70 Kim Wolfson and W. Barnett Pearce, "A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Implications of Self-Disclosure on Conversational Logics," Communication Quarterly, 31, No.3 (Summer 1983), pp. 249-56; S.R. Rochester and J.R. Martin, "The Art of Referring," in Discourse Production and Comprehension, ed. Roy 0. Freedle (Norwood, NJ; Ablex, 1977), pp. 245-69. 71 Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, "Universels in Language Usage," in Questions and Politeness, ed. Esther N. Goody (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 56-289. 72 John J. Gumperz, Discourse Strategies (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982).

CHAPTER SEVEN 1 Jim Schenkein, ed. Organization of Conversational Interaction; Gumperz and Hymes, Directions in Sociolinguistics ; Craig and Tracy, Conversational Coherence. 2 Matthew C. Grayshon, Toward a Social Grammar of Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1977); Goffman. Presentation of Self ; Michael A.K. Halliday, Languge as a Social Semiotic (Baltimore: Univ. Park Press, 1978). 3 Basil Bernstein, "Elaborated and Restricted Codes," American Anthropologist, 6 (Special issue, 1966), Part II, pp. 55-69; Peter R. Hawkins, Social Class, the Nominal Group, and Verbal Strategies (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1977); Gumç)erz, Discourse Strategies (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); Barrie Thorne and Nancy Henley, Language and Sex (Rowley, MA: Newbury, 1975); Susan Ervin-Tripp and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, eds.. Child 247

Discourse (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Labov, Nonstandard English; William Labov, The Social Stratification of English in New York City (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1966). 4 Esther N. Goody, ed. Questions and Politeness (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978); Brown and Levinson, "Universels in Language Usage;" Robin Tolmach Lakoff, "Stylistic Strategies within a Grammar of Style," in Language, Sex and Gender, eds. Judith Orasanu, Mariam K. Slater, and Leonore Loeb Adler (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1979), Vol. 327, pp. 53-78. 5 Frentz and Farrell, "Language-Action;" Pratt, Toward A Speech Act Theory; Jakobson, "Closing Statement;" Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought. 6 Farrell, "Aspects of Coherence;" Mary Canice Johnson, Discussion Dynamics (Rowley, MA: Newbury, 1979); Honeck and Hoffman, Cognition and Figurative Language ; Lee Snyder, "Beyond Implications: Another Look at Grice's Maxims," presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Assoc., Louisville, KY, November 1982; Wallace, Understanding Discourse. 7 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought. 8 Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, Rhetoric of Western Thought ; Aristotle, The Rhetoric ; Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric," in Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics. 9 Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric; Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958); Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric ; Jacobs and Jackson, "Speech Act Structure." 10 David K. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969). 11 The following papers composed a symposium of speech act theory presented in Communication Quarterly, 29, No. 3 (Summer 1981): Donald Cushman and Elizabeth N. Kunimoto, "A Symposium on 'Speech Act Theory in Mainstream Communication Research': An Introduction," 196-201; John R. Lyne, "Speech Acts in a Semiotic Frame," 202-08; Robert E. Sanders, "The Interpretation of Discourse," 209-18; Richard A. Cherwitz, "Charles Morris' Conception of Semiotic," 218-27; Robert Hopper, "How to Do Things Without Words," 228-36. 12 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication. 248 13 Austin, Things with Words ; Searle, Speech Acts ; Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" 14 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. xii. 15 Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 16. 16 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. xv; Burke, "Words as Deeds," p. 153. 17 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. 41. 18 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. 108. 19 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. 110-11. 20 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. 92. 21 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication, p. 234-66. 22 Frentz and Farrell, "Language-Action;" Hymes, "Models." 23 Hymes, "Models," p. 40. 24 W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning (New York: Praeger, 1980). 25 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, pp. 124 and 86. 26 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 130-38. 27 Gumperz and Hymes, Directions in Sociolinguistics, p. 17. 28 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 138. 29 Mead, Mind, Self, and Society. 30 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 161-64. 31 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 164. 32 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and 249

Meaning, p. 164. 33 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 158. 34 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 169. 35 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 196-211; the authors note that this section of their theory is based on the work of one of their students, Linda Harris, "Communication Competence," Diss. Univ. of Massachusetts 1979. 36 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 200. 37 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, pp. 213-16. 38 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 213. 39 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 308. 40 Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, p. 231. 41 Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric.

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