HOW CANADA PLAYS RUSSIAN ROULETTE with the SECESSION of QUEBEC -- 08.06.2018 Word
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
HOW CANADA PLAYS RUSSIAN ROULETTE WITH THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC By William Johnson, on behalf of the Special Committee for Canadian Unity June 8, 2018 1 TABLE DES MATIÈRES Page I How the Chrétien Government Bungled the 1995 Referendum 3 II How the Chrétien Government Bungled the 1996-98 Reference 57 III The Clarity Act Undermined. The Right to a UDI Legislated 130 IV The Quebec Superior Court Bungles Its Decision on Bill 99 151 Conclusion The Rule of Law is Systematically Sidelined When Secession is the Issue 190 2 Chapter I: How tHe CHrétien Government Bungled the 1995 Referendum Since Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau stepped down in 1984, no prime minister of Canada has dared to grapple head-on with the issue of Quebec’s secession. Meanwhile, in Quebec, every premier, from Jean Lesage to Philippe Couillard, has assumed that Quebec has a right to secede if such is the expressed wish of its population. That consensus shows a grievous misunderstanding of the requirements of a true liberal democracy that recognizes the supremacy of the rule of law. The result has been that the people of Quebec have been constantly confused and misled about the true conditions required for a legal and therefore peaceful secession. And the April 2018 decision by Quebec Superior Court Justice Claude Dallaire in the case of Henderson c. Québec (Procureur general) only intensified the confusion. She declared as impeccably constitutional Lucien Bouchard’s Bill 991, the law that, on the face of it, grants Quebec the right to secede unilaterally based on a mere majority vote. And she condemned virulently the federal law 2, passed after the close call of the 1995 referendum, to spell out the conditions for the federal government to agree to negotiate on the secession of Quebec. Bill 99 was passed by a separatist Quebec government precisely to neutralize the intent of the Clarity Act. Canadians are now caught between two contradictory laws on the perilous issue of secession. The people of Canada have the right to know the law. History, notably that of the American Civil War and of the separation of Pakistan from India, attests to the fact that miscalculations over secession can have catastrophic consequences. Therefore, our federal government has a clear duty to promulgate the requirements of the constitutional order, especially when so many people are confused, and the stakes are so momentous. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, this is now your call. ********** This essay aims to document the history of deception, evasion, misrepresentation, failure of vision and outright cowardice that has characterized the treatment of secession in Canada, particularly since Premier Jacques Parizeau launched his program for unilateral secession on December 6, 1994. On that day, the premier introduced a draft bill3 in the National Assembly that announced the legislative structure of his proposed referendum on secession. It was titled Avant-projet de loi sur la souveraineté du Québec. In addition to proposing a future declaration of sovereignty if the referendum delivered a majority vote for independence, the draft bill included offering an invitation to the rest of Canada to conclude an economic association with 1 The Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Quebec people and the Quebec State. 2 The Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference. It is also designated as Bill C-20. 3 In English: Draft Bill, An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec. It was titled a draft bill rather than a bill because the text left a blank space for a preamble to be filled in later, after public meetings had been held across the province to discuss sovereignty. Presumably the citizens would be writing down their aspirations to be included as a preamble in the actual bill. 3 the future sovereign Quebec. This offer, though, would not be included in the proposed referendum question, unlike the question put in the referendum of 1980 on “sovereignty- association.” As a complement to the draft bill, Parizeau also unveiled an intricate plan to be carried out in the coming months, aimed at rallying the Québécois to the option of secession. The Premier described the plan as « astucieux »: crafty or cunning. It involved a large-scale populist mobilization, paid for by the public purse, the likes of which Quebec had never seen. He would set up 15 regional commissions, each presided by a minister of the government, to hold public hearings in different parts of the province, where the commissioners would receive suggestions from ordinary people as to what terms they wanted included in the preamble of the bill that would declare Quebec’s sovereignty. In addition to those 15 regional commissions, the premier would also create distinct commissions for senior citizens and for youths. Also, a bus cavalcade of « femmes pour la souveraineté ». would tour the province. Finally, to cap all the commissions, a “national commission” would synthesize and formulate all the suggestions that came from the public through all the previous commissions. Eventually, too, the draft bill would be mailed to every household in Quebec. What the draft bill proposed was clearly a unilateral secession, that is, that Quebec would become sovereign exclusively through a declaration by the National Assembly. The negotiations proposed with the rest of Canada would deal with the hypothetical economic association and various practical matters, but not with Quebec’s secession or sovereignty or independence. No amendment to the Constitution of Canada was envisaged as the key to Quebec’s independence. Parizeau proposed, as he explained in the National Assembly, to have the draft bill adopted before the anticipated referendum on sovereignty, but the bill would actually be promulgated only after a referendum that received more than 50 per cent of the votes in favour of sovereignty. The draft bill stated: Le parlement du Québec décrète ce qui suit : De la souveraineté 1. Le Québec est un pays souverain. Section 16 of the draft bill then explained when the sovereignty of Quebec would come into effect: 16. La présente loi entre en vigueur un an après son approbation par référendum, à moins que l’Assemblée nationale ne fixe une date antérieure. Section 17 described the entire process that would lead to Quebec’s independence: 17. La présente loi est soumise à la consultation populaire. 4 Elle ne peut entrer en vigueur que si une majorité des voix exprimées par les électeurs lors d’un référendum tenu conformément à la Loi sur la consultation populaire s’est prononcée en faveur de la question suivante: « Êtes-vous en faveur de la loi adoptée par l’Assemblée nationale déclarant la souveraineté du Québec? OUI ou NON ». The entire process of achieving sovereignty was to take place within Quebec’s legal structure. True, Section 2 of the draft bill anticipated offering Canada an economic association with Quebec, but this was simply an offer, not a condition for sovereignty, as it had been in René Lévesque’s 1980 referendum on “sovereignty-association.” 2. Le gouvernement est autorisé à conclure avec le gouvernement du Canada un accord consacrant le maintien d’une association économique entre le Québec et le Canada. Un tel accord doit, avant d’être ratifié, être approuvé par l’Assemblée nationale. This was clearly a proposal for revolution. But Premier Parizeau, in his speech that introduced the draft bill, taunted the Liberal opposition with the fact that, in 1991, the Liberal government had introduced and adopted Bill 1504, that proposed precisely holding a referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec. That sovereignty, according to that Liberal bill, would supposedly come into effect one year after a successful referendum. The language then, Parizeau pointed out, was almost identical to the language he was now proposing in his draft bill. M. Parizeau: M. le Président, la loi que nos amis d’en face ont passée et à laquelle je référais tout à l’heure, la loi 150, définissait la souveraineté. La définition de la souveraineté qu’il y a dans cet avant-projet de loi, c’est la leur, M. le Président. C’est la même, M. le Président. Des voix: Ha, ha, ha! Des voix: Bravo! M. Parizeau: Leur projet de loi, M. le Président, prévoyait un référendum sur la souveraineté, et on y disait même: « Et, si le résultat est favorable à la souveraineté, le Québec deviendra un État souverain un an jour pour jour après le référendum, le jour du référendum. » C’était leur législation, M. le Président. Ici, vous voyez, dans cet avant- projet de loi, on dit: « La présente loi entre en vigueur un an après son approbation par référendum, à moins que l’Assemblée nationale ne fixe une date antérieure. » Si nos amis d’en face peuvent revenir sur leur loi 150, dire peut-être qu’elle avait un certain mérite, mais alors pourquoi eux et nous ne travaillerions-nous pas ensemble la main dans la main à élaborer une loi de la souveraineté du Québec qui fasse l’affaire de tout le monde? Parizeau’s proposal for secession was fundamentally different from what René Lévesque had proposed in 1980. Then, Premier Lévesque had set aside the official program of the Parti 4 An Act respecting the process for determining the political and constitutional future of Québec. 5 Québécois. He did not hold a referendum on sovereignty, Yes or No, but rather on a process of beginning negotiations for such a referendum with the rest of Canada. He asked for “a mandate to negotiate” sovereignty-association. And he promised that the link between sovereignty and association would be indissoluble, that is, that if the rest of Canada refused his proposed association, Lévesque promised that there would be no sovereignty.