Recognizing the Durand Line

Home , Durand Line, Torkham

The EastWest Institute is an international, non-partisan, not-for-profit policy organization focused solely on confronting critical challenges that endanger peace. EWI was established in 1980 as a catalyst to build trust, develop leadership, and promote collaboration for positive change. The institute has offices in New York, Brus- sels, and Moscow. For more information about the EastWest Institute or this paper, please contact:

The EastWest Institute 11 East 26th Street, 20th Floor New York, NY 10010 U.S.A. 1-212-824-4100 [email protected], www.ewi.info Recognizing the Durand Line

A Way Forward for Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Brad L. Brasseur an d L ine r t h e Du og ni z in g EWI • Rec EWI

4 EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 5 u- u- u- D INTRODUCTION enry Mortimer Mortimer Henry urand Line as its official Line as its urand ecognition would not only would ecognition urand Line. urand urand Line should constitute the legal the legal Line should constitute urand urand Line must, however, be accompanied be accompanied however, Line must, urand urand Line remains of great concern not only concern great of Line remains urand century tools are mutually dependant. R mutually dependant. are tools century st han, and the British Foreign Secretary of India, Sir India, of Secretary Foreign British the and Khan, ahman urand Line was drawn up in 1893 as the border between Afghanistan and British Afghanistan between as the border up in 1893 drawn Line was urand R urand Line as Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. border Afghanistan’s Line as urand urand Line – debates that have further complicated the already difficult relationship relationship difficult already the complicated further have that debates Line – urand he D Ab - King Afghanistan, modern of the founder between negotiations intense India after dur rand, after whom the line was named. Since then, there have been endless debates on debates endless been have there then, Since named. whom the line was after rand, ecognition could be a major step toward sustainable trust building between Afghanistan and Afghanistan building between trust sustainable toward be a major step could ecognition - develop speed economic but also environment, secure a more of the establishment facilitate the D of on both sides who live tribes the Pashtun ment for the D of recognition that formal argues The paper and economic governance, security, much better to assure efforts Pakistani determined by in- the effort, this support To (FATA). Areas Tribal Administered Federally the in development in investment increased guaranteeing approach,” “carrot a should use community ternational is achieved. recognition border after region the border

every aspect of the 1893 agreement among politicians, intellectuals and media on both sides sides both on media and intellectuals politicians, among agreement 1893 the of aspect every the D of the D recognizes While Pakistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan between - acknowl to refused have far so governments Afghan consecutive Afghanistan, with border the D edge sensitive highly a constitute to continues issue recognition the that aware fully is author The is- on the recognition debate a constructive for the time has come feels the author Yet topic. on D the debate Obviously years. in coming will face the region the challenges sue in light of such debate but the author is convinced time and prudence, will require Line recognition rand should begin. the D of situation on both sides The security of withdrawal the upcoming With community. international the to also but countries both to to responsibility security of and the full handover in 2014 Afghanistan from forces coalition between stability sustainable for conditions creating Forces, National Security Afghanistan’s neighborliness good non-interference, of on the principles based and Pakistan Afghanistan importance. utmost is of and mutual respect that the D argues paper this this backdrop, Against the D outlines, as this paper In fact, both countries. by and as such be recognized border practice International law. international under border a considered be already can Line rand in this paper. as is explained recognition, de facto to amounts R that management and efficient border the border of recognition formal In addition, Pakistan. 21 of use good makes T Recognizing the Afghanistan’s handling of the border is- Durand Line sue has been contradictory: while not recognizing the Durand Line as the formal border Afghan Treaty).2 In addition, the Durand Line with Pakistan, Agreement of 1893 led to continued annual I. payments and shipments of weapons by the it has under- British to the Afghan King until the 1920’s, taken numer- After many years of difficult negotiations on which makes it difficult to follow any reason- his country’s eastern border with the British ing that the Durand Line was signed under ous steps that Empire, the Afghan King Abdur Rahman, ap- duress.3 amount to de peared quite satisfied with the result that was achieved. He noted in his diary: An argument put forward by some that the facto recogni- agreement of 1893 should have expired in tion. “At the time when I was occupied 1994 — exactly one hundred years after it in breaking down the feudal system was negotiated, like the British agreement on of Afghanistan and moulding the Hong Kong — does not take into account that country into a strong consolidated unlike the British–Chinese agreement on Kingdom, I was not unaware nor Hong Kong, no expiry date was ever written neglectful of the necessity of defin- on the official Durand Line treaty.4 ing my boundaries with the neigh- bouring countries. I well knew that The history of de facto recognition of the bor- it was necessary to mark out the der by Afghan leaders themselves puts into boundary lines between my domin- question the country’s formal stance against ions and those of my neighbours, recognition: an d L ine for the safety and protection of my Kingdom, and for purpose of putting • The government accepted annual a check on their advances and get- subsidy payments in exchange for

r t h e Du ting rid of misunderstandings and signing the original Durand agree- 1 disputes.” ment for over twenty years after it was signed. 5 The King’s remarks make it difficult to fol- • Afghanistan has continuously treat- low any reasoning of several generations

og ni z in g ed the border as the de facto inter- of Afghan leaders that the Durand Line was national boundary in terms of tran- forced upon the country by a colonial power. Moreover, Afghanistan has reconfirmed 2 Dr. Sultan-I-Rom, “The Durand Line the Durand Line Agreement after the death Agreement (1893): Its Pros and Con.” Valley Swat, Vol. 1, EWI • Rec EWI (2004), http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/ of King Abdur Rahman and his successors The_Durand_Line_Agreement.pdf. 11. three times: in 1905 (Anglo Afghan pact), 6 3 Ibid. 1919 (Treaty of Rawalpindi) and 1921 (Anglo 4 Afghan Mirror, “Facts on the Durand Line.” (2006), Accessed April 15th 2011, http://afghanmirror. tripod.com/id25.html. 5 Aga Amin. “Resolving the Afghan-Pakistan 1 S. Fida Yunas. “The Durand Line Border Border Question.” Afghanistan Study Centre Kabul.( Agreement: 1893.” University of Peshawar (November June-August 2004). Accessed April 15th,2011, http:// 2005): 4. www.scribd.com/doc/21715514/Durand-Line EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 7 urand Line urand Pakistan’s Pakistan’s claim that the D is an official is border by supported international and law practice. - - u- uti D abul.( http:// http:// K urand urand - T) up and thus that bind- ecember 20): 20): ecember ,2011, ,2011, 2011, 2011, urand Line, Line, urand th th - Com of House urand-Line

9 . Although the United Although the United . urand Line Agreement, Agreement, Line urand esolving the Afghan-Pakistan esolving the Afghan-Pakistan

uti possidetis juris 10 uti possidetis juris urand Line is its international international Line is its urand R (VCSS Treaties of espect ing bilateral agreements are handed handed are agreements ing bilateral Therefore states. successor to down - estab was though Pakistan even after decades several 1947, in lished D the original that agreement. to party it is still Nations has not made any formal formal Nations has not made any about the D statement this principle implies of approval its that particular for an acceptance border. Line, has no effect to the contrary, contrary, to the has no effect Line, be must boundary changes because made bilaterally. any binding bilateral agreement agreement bilateral binding any powers colonial with or between independent to down” “passed are dec- unilateral A states. successor Af as such one party, by laration the D of disavowal ghanistan’s In 1949, the British In 1949, their reconfirmed officially mons the on 1893 of position original the United of The secretary-general of Nations is the official depository - on Succes Convention Vienna the proclaims that States of sion on R universally have courts International upheld holds possidetis juris rand Line as the legal border be- border Line as the legal rand In and Pakistan. Afghanistan tween - subse England of the Queen 1950, is, that Pakistan quently recognized the law, international to according of and duties the rights of inheritor India and that of the old Government the D border. western Aga Amin. “R Amin. Aga Naheed S. Mazhar, Muhammad Saleem United Nations. “Vienna Convention on Convention “Vienna Nations. United • • •

D www.scribd.com/doc/21715514/ With regard to international practice, Pak to international practice, regard With can claim that: istan untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ conventions/3_2_1978.pdf 9 Centre Study Afghanistan Question.” Border April 15 Accessed 2004). June-August 10 Afghanistan.” & Pakistan Between Issue “Border Goraya. D (July- No.2, 24, vol Studies. Asian South 204-220. 8 1978.” Treaties of in respect States of Succession 18 May Accessed (1946), Series, Treaty

- - ) 6 u- u- O uti http:// egional rganization rganization 2011, 2011, th The Vienna The Vienna O 7 egional Cooperation egional Cooperation urand Line as the urand rganization (WT rganization O - Vi enshrined in the For this position, Pak this position, For - Line as an interna urand ) international requirements. ) international O

DF/ http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/Press/P eneral of Economic Affairs Ministry of Ministry Affairs Economic of General Convention on Succession of States States of on Succession Convention The international law principle law The international Economic Cooperation Conference Conference Cooperation Economic meeting (RECCA) Afghanistan on to agreed leaders Afghan in 2009, integrated, on an efficient, work management and modern border security promote mechanism to leaders Afghan and development. up- would that they announced also conform to law their customs date Trade World to R Third in the recently, More possidetis juris sit, trade and visas for international international for and visas trade sit, travelers. enna Convention, states that newly that newly states enna Convention, should states sovereign formed that they borders the same have thus Pakistan states; had as colonial a formal conclude to not need does keep to Afghanistan with agreement territory. the disputed and World Customs Customs World and (WC United Nations. “Vienna Convention on Convention “Vienna Nations. United ECCA II. “Centre for R for “Centre II. RECCA

• • , 2011, ,

th II. In sum, Afghanistan’s handling of the border the border handling of Afghanistan’s In sum, the least: say to contradictory appears issue the D While not recognizing undertak has it Pakistan, with border formal de facto that amount to steps en numerous the D of recognition tional border. RECCA_09.pdf May_2009/ untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ conventions/3_2_1978.pdf 7 1978.” Treaties of in respect States of Succession 18 May Accessed (1946), Series, Treaty 6 rand Line is the legal border between the two the two between border Line is the legal rand was that Pakistan the fact despite countries, after country sovereign as a only established D the after 54 years India, of the partition rand Line Agreement. Directorate Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.”Accessed January Afghanistan.”Accessed of Affairs Foreign 29 Pakistani governments, on the other hand, on the other hand, governments, Pakistani that the D maintained continuously have istan has the legal argument on her side: argument has the legal istan • The United States, a country outside • Today Pashtuns are not only clus- the region with important strategic tered around the Durand Line. They interests in Pakistan and Afghani- are possibly the largest tribal soci- stan, has treated the Durand Line as ety in the world, with a population Recognition a de facto border, notably because of more than 42 million people in the U.S. Army has ordered its forces several countries, comprised of an of the Durand not to cross the Durand Line during estimated 60 distinct tribes with ap- Line should not operations against the Taliban.11 proximately 400 sub-clans.13 Even the Pashtuns that live along the be simply Durand Line are organized in many a decision by Despite the many very legitimate questions separate tribes and clans, and are about Pakistan not exercising authority and not as closely knit as often stated. A the central good governance in the FATA, the Pakistani prominent example is the Turi tribe, governments. state’s deficiency in governing the territories a Shiite Pashtun tribe in the FATA. does not take away from the legality of its The Turis represent an island of Shi- The Pashtun claim. ite Pashtuns surrounded by Sunni tribes and Pashtuns. The Turis have been con- In sum, Pakistan’s claim that the Durand tinuously fighting the majority Sunni clans that live Line is an official border is supported by Pashtun Taliban members in Kurram along the Du- international law and practice. There is no Agency for many years.14 formal legal need to re-negotiate any further • Throughout Pashtun history, power rand Line must agreements on the Durand Line, and Afghan and influence have always resided develop own- leaders’ objections to the Durand Line do not with a select few wealthy tribes, find legitimate support under international while other tribes have been margin- ership of the law and practice. alized both in Pakistan and Afghani- recognition. stan. • The Durand Line in reality has only split some Pashtun tribes, notably the Mohmand, Wazir, Shinwari, and Gurbaz tribes.15 In this context, it is III. worth noting that many members of the Mohmand tribe live far from the The heart of the Durand Line controversy is Durand Line in Pakistani cities such 16 not a legal issue but the fact that Pashtun as Quetta, Karachi, and Lahore. tribes live on both sides of this boundary. Other prominent Pashtun tribes Pashtun elites argue that the line splits up scattered throughout Pakistan in- their tribes and that 21st century border clude the Lodis and Yusufais. management would threaten their way of • In fact, the largest concentration of an d L ine life. During Partition, Pashtuns were given Pashtuns (according to official -fig a limited choice: to join either Pakistan or ures) is quite far from the Durand India.12 As a result, time and time again, Line, in Karachi, Sindh Province. The number of Pashtuns there is official- r t h e Du Pashtun leaders have cited the violation of 17 the “right to self-determination” of Pashtuns ly estimated to be around 7 million. on both sides to argue against the line’s Unofficial counts are much higher. legitimacy. This argument deserves careful Robert Nichols, “A History of Pashtun og ni z in g examination: 13 Migration.1775 - 2006.” Oxford University Press, Pakistan, (2008). 14 BBC News, “The Pakistani tribe that is taking on the Taliban.”October 2010, Accessed May

EWI • Rec EWI 3rd, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south- asia-11486528 11 Report of Conference, “The Durand Line: 8 History, Consequences, and Future” American Institute 15 Syed Junaid Ahsan. “The Pathan tribes along of Afghanistan Studies and the Hollings Center, (2007). the Durand Line”(2009):22. Accessed March 15th 2011, http://www.bu.edu/aias/ 16 Ibid. reports/durand_conference.pdf 17 Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, “Pakistan: Karachi’s 12 Xinhua News Agency,” Karzai Opposes Invisible Enemy City potent refuge for Taliban fighters.” Pakistani Suggestion of Fencing Border.”( December 29, Public Broadcasting Service, (July 2009),Accessed 2006). Accessed April 2nd 2011, http://www.china.org. June 1st 2011, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/ cn/english/international/194349.htm rough/2009/07/karachis_invisi.html. EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 9 Tribal areas Tribal line Durand While it is understandable that Pashtuns a strong vested interest in maintaining the The Pashtuns living in the areas along the Durand Line are current situation. concerned that a secure border managed have been by 21st century tools and structures heavily in- might threaten the livelihood and general interconnectedness of their families, volved in Paki- economic research shows that proper border stani politics management contributes to economic IV. development in border regions through tax and business and tarrif revenues and increased security. Many Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns that throughout It leads to growth of the formal economy at the expense of the informal sector and live along the Durand Line believe that they the country’s smuggling. The Word Trade Organization should be together in “Pashtunistan,” a country to be made up of the Pakistani province history. Four (WTO) and International Labour Organization (ILO), among others, have outlined in several Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, the seven FATA terri- of the eleven studies that a strong informal economy tories, and certain Pashtun-dominated provinces in Afghanistan along the Durand Line. chiefs of the obstructs a country’s possibility to benefit from trade.18 The Pakistani government, However, Pashtuns should not fall victim to Pakistani army according to World Bank figures, supposedly this idea of “Pashtunistan,” as understandable as it might appear at first sight. were of Pash- lost over $35 billion in revenue from 2001- 2009 because of smuggling.19 One can tun descent assume that the Afghan state also loses Pakistan may be dominated by the Punjab ethnic group, which comprises almost 45 and two of significant income — funds that could be used to promote investment and sustainable percent of the total population and holds these army development in the border region. a great deal of the power in Islamabad, but it is important to realize that the Pashtuns chiefs eventu- The local people are understandably represent an ethnic group in Pakistan that is ally became concerned about their ability to move freely well enshrined in the country’s political, economic and cultural spheres.20 21 The majority President of between settlements on both sides of the Durand Line — mobility that is essential for of Pashtuns in the world — around 28 mil- 22 Pakistan. securing relations between family and friends. lion — actually reside in Pakistan, compared 23 But modern management of movement to around 12 million that live in Afghanistan across borders, for instance using special and 2 million in other countries. residence cards and selected crossing points, can effectively address such concerns. Still, The Pashtuns have been heavily involved in these concerns show that the local population Pakistani politics and business throughout 24 has to be included in the recognition process, the country’s history. Four of the eleven which must address such legitimate local chiefs of the Pakistani army were of Pashtun an d L ine concerns in a constructive manner to gain descent and two eventually became Presi- 25 acceptance. dent. In Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city and economic capital, Pashtuns play an impor- Recognition of the Durand Line should not be r t h e Du 20 Central Intelligence Agency, “Pakistan- simply a decision by the central governments. People.”, The World Fact Book, Accessed April 12th, 2011, The Pashtun tribes and clans that live along https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- the Durand Line must develop ownership factbook/geos/pk.html 21 The Pashtuns are not the only minority ethnic of the recognition. Tribes, clans, and their

og ni z in g groups that flourish in Pakistan as the Sindhs and Bal- leaders need to be involved in the border uch’s also play a important role in the country. recognition process from the beginning. 22 Central Intelligence Agency, “Pakistan- This is all the more relevant, as some tribal People.”, The World Fact Book, Accessed April 12th, 2011, representatives are profiting from and have https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- EWI • Rec EWI factbook/geos/pk.html 18 World Trade Organization. “Informal 23 Central Intelligence Agency, Afghanistan- 10 employment curbs trade benefits for developing People. Countries.”October 12, 2009. Accessed July 11th 2010, 24 Hassan Adams, “Musharraf Contends with http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/ the Pashtun Element in the Pakistani Army.” Jamestown pr574_e.htm. Foundation. (November 2006),Accessed June 1st 2011, 19 Khalid. “Smuggling Effects in Pakistan http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ Economy.” November 2010, All Pakistani News. ttnews[tt_news]=953&tx_ttnews[backPid]=239&no_ Accessed August 2011 from www.allpakistaninews.com/ cache=1 smuggling-effects-in-pakistan-econ 25 Ibid. EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 11 urand Line urand - The recogni the tion of D by a Pashtun a Pashtun by - Presi Afghan dent might concerns ease other eth- of nic groups about Pashtun dominance and contribute healthier, a to stable more en- domestic in vironment Afghanistan. - - - urand urand D century century st - a Pa Line by urand abul government to ignore ignore to abul government Ibid.

urand Line cannot be discussed with- be discussed Line cannot urand 31 - that po tribes Pashtun many of leaders ey V. Pashtun tribes that were marginalized in the marginalized that were tribes Pashtun both brothers” “Pashtun their own by past be to continue Afghanistan and in Pakistan the bor While keeping today. marginalized Pashtun of the some benefits open der issue Pashtun the benefit generally not it does elite, the of sides both along living people Line. Those tribes would be well advised to to advised well be would tribes Those Line. well-being social and economic their pursue 21 the of world globalized the in 31 The D relationship the close account out taking into are There and India. Afghanistan between and Afghanistan both that argue that those the recognition keep to motivated India are strategic maintain to means a as open issue Islamabad. over leverage - Afghani India and between The relationship the It was in history. is deeply rooted stan the great of descendant Babar, leader Mongol - his con after who, Timur, conqueror Mongol Af of parts large forms today what of quest K authority the monarch’s threatened tentially - Afghani of other parts to relocated also were stan. rather than a “Pashtunistan” myth that, in all that, myth “Pashtunistan” than a rather for them hold little benefit would likelihood, be realized. should it ever Afghanistan in hold on power The Pashtuns’ led the K has often other ethnic groups’ interests. Pashtuns have have Pashtuns interests. other ethnic groups’ in a Pashtun-dominat put their interest often an integrated of the vision of ahead ed state equal opportunity that gives nation and state ethnic groups. all to the D of The recognition concerns might ease President Afghan shtun domi- about Pashtun other ethnic groups of more a healthier, to and contribute nance Afghanistan. in environment domestic stable ethnic groups and all other Pashtuns Afghan which tribal build a nation in to should strive establishing role in of a less affiliations play - se socioeconomic safeguarding and identity curity.

- 30 The 2011, 2011, 28 rd ecember ecember The word The word 27 andahar”. (D andahar”.

http://www.guardian. 29 arzai and his family and his family arzai urrani, the founder of of the founder urrani, , 2011, 2011, , st ynamics.pdf. urranis, have held the Afghan Afghan held the have urranis, ctober 2009), Accessed March 3 March Accessed 2009), ctober awn News, “NWFP officially renamed as officially “NWFP News, awn Tribal Analysis Center, Pashtun Tribal Tribal Pashtun Analysis Center, Tribal O Tribal Analysis Center, “Pashtun Tribal Tribal “Pashtun Analysis Center, Tribal D uardian. “US embassy cables: President President cables: embassy “US The Guardian. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/

Ibid.

2010). Accessed June 1 Accessed 2010). 2011, ynamics. ynamics.”( arzai’s half-brother is ‘kingpin of K ‘kingpin of is half-brother arzai’s nd nd The role of Pashtuns in Pakistan’s political, political, in Pakistan’s Pashtuns of The role by the reflected was life economic and social, Frontier West the North of renaming recent - govern Pakistani the by (NWFP) Province Pukhtoonkhwa.” “Khyber to ment K 2 dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/ renaming-nwfp-730 When Ahmad Shah D When of the leader became Afghanistan, modern tribes, Pashtun of groups powerful the most the other Pashtun weakened he immediately For his hold on power. that threatened tribes mi- tribe to the Barakzai he ordered instance, Afghanistan. of regions separate to grate DF-TAC/ http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/P D Pashtun%20Tribal%20 co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/238320 hyber- Pakhtunkhwa.”(April 2010).Accessed March March 2010).Accessed Pakhtunkhwa.”(April Khyber- 2 30 D 29 28 26 27 D tant role. They dominate the city’s clothing clothing the city’s dominate They role. tant monopoly a near and have industry retail - Paki throughout business on the transport stan. - histori in Afghanistan influence Pashtun - Pash leading A been strong. has also cally the D tun tribe, centuries. two around for throne king’s owever, the name change seems to have have to seems the name change However, - highlight the rel the wish to by been driven - The re inside Pakistan. Pashtuns of evance nationalist a Pashtu had NWFP naming of aimed at more but seemed undercurrent, in Pakistan Pashtuns of underlining the role a of idea the promoting than towards rather “Pashtunistan.” “Pukhtoonkhwa” literally translates into “the into translates literally “Pukhtoonkhwa” name This Pashtu. in Pashtuns,” the of land on speculation has led to therefore change of establishment the of relevance current the commitment and Pakistan’s “Pashtunistan” cause. the Pashtun to power and wealth of certain Pashtun tribes is tribes Pashtun certain of and wealth power gov current Afghanistan’s in reflected also K with President ernment, - tradi which tribe, Popalzai the to belonging wealth on the tionally has had a firm grasp Afghanistan. in and power ghanistan, became the first Mughal emperor into account issues of development and eco- in India. After his victory over Ibrahim Shah nomic security. In these categories, all three Lodi, at the First Battle of Panipat in 1526, he countries would benefit from a stable and de- established the Mughal dynasty, which ruled veloped Afghanistan that has good neighbor- in India until the early 18th century. ly relations with Pakistan — relations that, as is the norm throughout the world, are charac- Today, Afghan leaders see India as an impor- terized by clarity on border issues. tant ally against Pakistani influence and inter- ventions in Afghanistan, the history of which An approach that considers security in concerns Afghan elites. These elites have had broader economic and developmental terms A relationship not only political but also close personal re- would take into account the potential that between lationships with India. For example, many good neighborly relations between Afghani- Afghan officials were educated and trained stan and Pakistan could open up new trade Afghanistan in Indian universities, including President corridors with energy-rich Central Asian and Pakistan, Karzai, who obtained his master’s degree in states essential for the growth of India and Shimla, a city in northern India. Pakistan’s rapidly expanding populations and clarified and economies. Pakistan and India would see the improved by In the nineties, India was a staunch ally of the benefits of major energy projects, such as Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the sworn the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Trade recognition enemy of the (mostly) Pashtun Taliban who, and Transmission Project (CASA 1000) and of the Durand in turn, were supported at the time by Paki- the TAPI pipeline that would carry natural gas stan’s military intelligence agency (ISI). ISI from Turkmenistan to India via Afghanistan Line, might supported insurgent groups in Kashmir to and Pakistan. well contribute promote Pakistani interests in its long-term territorial dispute with India. This contest At the same time, a relationship between to détente has led to two wars fought between India and Afghanistan and Pakistan, clarified and im- between India Pakistan and strained the two countries’ rela- proved by recognition of the Durand Line, tionship since Partition. It cannot come as a might well contribute to a stronger détente and Pakistan. surprise, given this history, that Afghan-India between India and Pakistan by easing Paki- relations post September 11, 2001, are very stani concerns about encirclement and the strong. India has spent more than $2 billion prospect of fighting a two-front war. in aid money for Afghanistan since 2001 and cooperates closely with the Afghan government on intelligence issues as well as the buildup of Afghan security forces.32 VI. For India, a close relationship with Afghani- stan, above all, reflects national security in- While the past years have seen several efforts an d L ine terests perceived as vital. This national se- to improve border management along the curity interest is essentially defined in terms Durand Line, the full potential of cross-border of military security, which is characteristic of cooperation can only be realized if there is the thinking on the entire sub-continent and a formal recognition of the Durand Line as a r t h e Du in wider Southwest Asia. This thinking is a border. Most importantly, recognition of the legacy of the colonial past and has hampered border would be a major confidence-building the development of the region’s stability and measure and would represent a large leap economy. A shift from this mindset focused forward in the bilateral relationship. Without og ni z in g on categories of classical military thinking a recognized border, neither Afghanistan nor can only take place gradually, but will be of Pakistan has the full incentive to engage in ef- fundamental importance for future stability fective border management. and development. EWI • Rec EWI Recognition of the border would legitimize India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan must come border management, in a much more sus- 12 to an understanding of their interests that tainable way, as it would be an impetus to goes beyond strictly military thinking, taking actually start managing the border with a long term and comprehensive perspective 32 Ramananda Sengupta, “Why Afghanistan of creating security and economic develop- is important to India.”Rediff Special. (August 2005). ment. Better border management would in Accessed April 4th, 2011, http://www.rediff.com/ news/2005/aug/30spec4.htm itself help build trust between Afghanistan EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 13 The overall The overall lack of harmonization between both sides on border and patrols in cooperation intelligence- sharing has contributed the to of resurgence the Taliban. - - - - , st , 2011, 2011, , th abul Sharing andahar. and andahar. adio Free Europe Europe adio Free abul frequently abul frequently .” R .” O K abul, Z 39 espite some small strides in polic - in strides small some espite abul in the abul in the Spencer Ackerman, “Ex-Pakistan Interior “Ex-Pakistan Spencer Ackerman, Militants south of K of south Militants D ejects Joint Border Patrols.” The Washington The Washington Joint ejects Border Patrols.” Martine van Bijlert, “ The Battle for Afghanistan: Afghanistan: The Battle for “ Bijlert, Martine van Ahto Lobjakas, “Afghanistan: K “Afghanistan: Lobjakas, Ahto urand Line. Line. urand 38 37 R http://washingtonindependent.com/13460/ex-

urand Line as the officially recognized bor recognized Line as the officially urand adio Liberty. (January 2011), Accessed April 13 Accessed 2011), (January adio Liberty. abul and Uruzgan.” New American Foundation, Foundation, American New abul and Uruzgan.” ing the border, police on both sides have been been have sides both on police border, the ing evident particularly This is ineffective. mostly K of south cross the border illegally due in large part to to part due in large illegally the border cross and intelligence- communication the lack of on both sides troops border sharing between the D of per to representatives U.S. by attempts Past joint border conduct to suade both countries - Paki trust. a lack of due to failed have patrols has been the major factor reluctance stani the gov launch joint patrols; to in the failure larger much a wants Islamabad in ernment before leaders Afghan from commitment be might exercises such that acknowledging in Islamabad leaders In particular, a success. joint discuss to unwilling are they said have - es to closer come Afghans until the patrols bor the of side on their posts more tablishing on posts border 100 are there Currently der. on the with 1,000 compared side, Afghan the side. Pakistani Minister Minister June 1 Accessed 2008). (November Independent. 2011, 2011, pakistan-interior-minister-rejects-joint-border-patrols R 38 Z www.newamerica.net/publications/ 2010), (September . policy/the_battle_for_afghanistan_zabul_and_uruzgan 39 Border recognition would make it easier for for it easier make would recognition Border together work to and Pakistan Afghanistan and Afghanistan patrols. border on strategic incentive different a very have would Pakistan and exercises on joint training collaborate to the of The finalization sharing. intelligence D on policing, cooperation increase der could intelligence border the sharing of encourage - se overall the region’s and improve reports, curity. the increase also could recognition Border between military operations of harmonization military, and the Pakistani ANSF, the the ISAF, 37 NAT Pakistan, With Intelligence Taliban. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074260.html elmand provinces that border the FATA the FATA that border provinces Helmand The insurgents Baluchistan. and Pakistani - tremen benefitted have provinces in these - in Paki networks the support of dously from border effective any fear not need that stan control.

- - st 35 34 , 2011, 2011, , st s) at key key at s) O 33 rganizations/ , 2011, , O st angerous Place.” Place.” angerous rugs and Crime, and Crime, rugs urand Line. Instead, Instead, Line. urand ffice of D Office ubai Process; ubai 2011). Accessed June 1 Accessed 2011). th urand Line management Line management urand 36 ffices (BL Offices Liaison Border policing community of Introduction hu- small-scale including methods, by delivered manitarian assistance (ABP). Police Border Afghanistan The introduction of a visa regime; a visa of The introduction border at the Chaman Biometrics crossing; Afghanistan-Pakistan Increased as issues, dialogue on management the D of part sites between Afghanistan and its and its Afghanistan between sites neighbors; Shuja Nawaz, “Fata- A Most D Most A “Fata- Shuja Nawaz, United Nations United Tehreek-e-Taliban “About Andhra News, overnment of Canada, “Afghanistan- “Afghanistan- Canada, of Government • • • • • http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/ priorities-priorites/border-frontiere.aspx?lang=eng 36 35 34 June 1 Accessed Management.”(2011). Control “Border http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/border- 2011, , . control-management.html June 1 Accessed (2010). (TTP).” Pakistan (January Studies. & International Strategic for Center http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_ 2009), nawaz_fata_web.pdf. 33 Pakistan Border.” (April 7 Border.” Pakistan The overall lack of harmonization on border on border harmonization lack of The overall in intelligence-shar and cooperation patrols hyber in Khyber has expanded network TTP The mili- local many and includes Pukhtoonkhwa region border the disputed throughout tants Pakistan. of the of the resurgence to ing has contributed In Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban or Tehreek- or Taliban the Pakistani In Pakistan, profited have (TTP) e-Taliban-e-Pakistan used have groups Those the situation. from in the Waziristan South of confines the safe their presence. expand to years four last both have “ceded” control to militants and or and militants to control “ceded” both have crime. ganized Still, overall results have been limited because because limited been have results overall Still, management border of one vital precondition Neither — is absent. border — a recognized of control has substantive currently country D the around the territory The last decade has shown improvements improvements has shown decade The last D to with regards and Pakistan. Formal recognition and border border and recognition Formal Pakistan. and reinforcing. mutually are management be acknowledged: that should http://www.andhranews.net/Features/ Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan.asp which would help decrease cross-border sup- extreme poverty in the FATA has led about port for the insurgency in Afghanistan. half of the population to live outside of the territories as migrant laborers or displaced persons.42 The people that stay in the FATA (usually not by choice) have limited political rights and are isolated from Pakistani society. VII. They are thus easy prey for radical militant Pakistan must groups and gangsterism. The administrative status, lack of governance, deliver a huge- and generally dismal situation in the tribal Despite the infiltration of extremist groups, a ly expanded territories of Pakistan is a legitimate and seri- public opinion poll conducted in the FATA in ous concern for Afghanistan. It must aim for September 2010 by the New America Foun- governance better security and governance in the FATA. dation demonstrated that local tribal people and economic Clear steps towards reforms in the FATA are are as open for change as they are frustrated an important element to be addressed in the over their current conditions. The poll found effort in FATA context of a recognition process. that around 75 percent of residents do not and provide support Al Qaeda’s presence in their terri- Islamabad has not taken ownership of the tory, while around 60 percent contested the an alternative controversial territories along the Durand Pakistan Taliban (TTP) and the Afghan Tali- to the prevail- Line. That is, while international law holds ban.43 More significantly, residents strongly that the tribal territories belong to Pakistan, supported Pakistani military intervention in ing war econo- Islamabad has not demonstrated that it can the FATA, and firmly stated that aid packages my by building deliver even the most basic governance in the for health care and education (even from the FATA and thus take adequate care of its own United States) would be strongly welcomed.44 up education, territory. In that regard, border recognition health care should bring the tribal territories closer to the Clearing the tribal territories of extremist and center of Pakistan and finally lead Pakistan’s terrorist safe havens should be the first step and infrastruc- government to take responsibility for the sev- toward reform, but true success also depends ture. en FATA territories. on implementing a comprehensive economic development plan. Pakistan must deliver a Recognition should pave the way to reform hugely expanded governance and economic the status of the FATA. The old administrative effort in the FATA and provide an alternative tribal structures put in place by the British to the prevailing war economy by building up Empire are no longer sufficient and cannot education, health care, and infrastructure. A prevent the growth of extremism or contrib- similar development effort must also be ex- ute to sustainable development in the border panded on the Afghan side of the border with region. In a recognition process, Islamabad Pakistan, and improved security conditions must be encouraged to provide much better on its side of the border are also necessary to an d L ine governance to the frontier area. It must incor- make that possible. porate the FATA in a sustainable way into the federation of Pakistan. Such reforms would allow for the protection of the local population r t h e Du by allowing them to be governed under regu- lar Pakistani law and judicial institutions.40

It is no coincidence that one of the highest og ni z in g poverty rates in all of South Asia is found in the FATA territories. Currently the FATA’s ap- proximate per capita income is a mere $250 annually, and approximately 60% of FATA’s EWI • Rec EWI population lives below the poverty line.41 The 42 Shuja Nawaz, “Fata- A Most Dangerous 14 40 Anita Joshua, “ FATA a human right black Place.”Center for Strategic & International Studies. hole: Amnesty.” The Hindu. (June 2010),Accessed (January 2009). http://csis.org/files/media/csis/ June 1st, 2011, www.thehindu.com/news/international/ pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf. article452578.ece 43 Peter Bergen & Patrick C. Doherty, “Public 41 Christine Fair et al “Pakistan: Can the United Opinions in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions.” New American States Secure an Insecure State?” Rand Corporation . Foundation. (September 28th, 2010). www.newamerica. (2010). http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/ net/publications/policy/ RAND_MG910.pdf. pp.66 44 Ibid. EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 15 HMIR KAS PUNJAB Federally Administered Tribal Areas Areas (FATA) Tribal Administered Federally Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa GHANISTAN

AF OCHI- STAN BAL challenge the effectiveness of aid money.45 46 Border recognition followed by intensified co- VIII. operation on border control would show the international community that it can safely The establishment of the Durand Line as the invest additional resources in the border re- officially recognized border between Afghani- gion. stan and Pakistan will require substantial international assistance. The international In 2010, the G8 Foreign Ministers an- community should actively promote border nounced plans to partner with the World The interna- recognition, and international actors would Bank and the Asian Development Bank on benefit from a recognized border between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region tional com- Afghanistan and Pakistan. Currently, foreign Prosperity Initiative, which aims to increase munity should assistance is focused on individual border ini- infrastructure projects on the border. In Jan- tiatives that may have their benefits but can- uary 2010, the World Bank agreed to admin- use a “carrot not substantially improve the border situa- ister a Multi-Donor Trust Fund, supported by approach,” tion. The international community should use more than ten Western donor countries and a “carrot approach,” guaranteeing increased the European Union and aimed at restoring guarantee- investment in the border region after border infrastructure and vital services in the FATA, ing increased recognition is achieved and offer additional Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and parts of Baluch- aid money as an incentive for the establish- istan.47 48 The Canadian government has also investment in ment of an official legalized border. The in- committed to investing in improving the Af- the border re- ternational community should also set clear ghanistan-Pakistan border as a major priority guidelines on intelligence sharing practices. 49 gion after bor- until 2011. der recognition Piecemeal border management support has Despite the lack of action or results to date failed to address the substantive issue. Re- (notably with the G8-led initiative), these bor- is achieved cent border management initiatives have fall- der initiatives show a true commitment by en short on facilitating a framework that ad- the international community to increase aid dresses grievances and distrust on both sides money in the border areas — especially if Af- relating to the legitimacy of the Durand Line. ghanistan and Pakistan can work together on One of the most prominent border manage- stabilizing the border. ment initiatives, the Canadian-led Dubai Pro- cess, may have produced better cooperation at the administrative level on border movement, but it has not addressed the root of the border problems. The Dubai Process has made strides in increasing legal border crossings by implementing 21st century biometric

an d L ine technology into a traditional tribal society, 45 Dawn News, “Fata development: US group but in reality the process only focuses on the opposes funding through military.” (April 2010). several hundred meters of the Chaman and Accessed March 1st, 2011, Torkham crossings while ignoring thousands http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn- r t h e Du of miles along the rest of the line. content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/local/peshawar/ fata-development-us-group-opposes-funding-through- military An official recognition on the Afghanistan- 46 MSNBC, “U.S. aid under fire in Pakistan border Pakistan border leading to increased security area.”(February 2009). Accessed March 1st, 2011,

og ni z in g can increase the effectiveness of aid in the http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29415610/ns/world_ border region. A recent report by Refugee news-south_and_central_asia/ International, “Pakistan: Short-Sighted Poli- 47 Countries that support the Multi Donor Trust Fund on the border includes Australia, Denmark, cies Hindering U.S. Goals,” emphasizes the the European Union, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, EWI • Rec EWI reluctance of development agencies such as Turkey, Finland, United Kingdom and the United States. USAID to invest additional resources in the 48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Multi 16 FATA because uncertain security conditions donor Trust Fund.” (March 2011). Accessed April 29th, 2011, http://www.ambislamabad.um.dk/en/menu/ Development+Cooperation/PARTNERS/MultiDonor- TrustFundForNWFPFATAAreasOfBalochistan/ 49 Government of Canada, “Afghanistan- Pakistan Border.” Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan. (2001). www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/ priorities-priorites/border-frontiere.as EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 17 -

urand Line. urand urand Line, led to a resurgence of tensions between between tensions of a resurgence led to Line, urand Conclusion ghanistan in 2014, and the constant need for stable relations between the twocountries show show the twocountries between relations stable for need and the constant in 2014, ghanistan on the D a final agreement reaching of the value Border skirmishes in July 2011, in which Pakistani rockets meant for militants killed innocent innocent killed militants for meant rockets in which Pakistani 2011, July in skirmishes Border the D side of Afghan people on the tribal The bilateral relationship has taken many steps forward in past years. The improvement in The improvement years. in past forward steps many has taken relationship The bilateral Af from withdrawal troop an international of the prospect relations, Afghanistan-Pakistan Afghanistan and Pakistan, highlighting the importance of the recognition issue. the recognition of importance highlighting the and Pakistan, Afghanistan EWI Board of Directors

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMaN

Francis Finlay (U.K.) Ross Perot, Jr. (U.S.) Armen Sarkissian (Armenia) EWI Co-Chairman EWI Co-Chairman EWI Vice-Chairman Former Chairman, Chairman, Hillwood Development Eurasia House International Clay Finlay LLC Company, LLC; Former Prime Minister of Armenia Member of Board of Directors, Dell, Inc.

OFFICErs

John Edwin Mroz (U.S.) Mark Maletz (U.S.) R. William Ide III (U.S.) Leo Schenker (U.S.) President and CEO Chair of the Executive Counsel and Secretary EWI Treasurer EastWest Institute Committee of EWI Partner, McKenna Senior Executive Board of Directors Long & Aldridge LLP Vice President, Central Senior Fellow, Harvard National-Gottesmann, Inc. Business School

MEMBERS an d L ine

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Maria Livanos Cattaui Craig Cogut (U.S.) Former President of Finland (Switzerland) Founder & Co-Managing Partner

r t h e Du Former Secretary-General Pegasus Capital Advisors Tewodros Ashenafi (Ethiopia) International Chamber of Commerce Chairman & CEO David Cohen (U.K.) Southwest Energy (HK) Ltd. Mark Chandler (U.S.) Chairman

og ni z in g Chairman and CEO F&C REIT Property Management Jerald T. Baldridge (U.S.) Biophysical Chairman Joel Cowan (U.S.) Republic Energy Inc. Angela Chen (U.S.) Professor

EWI • Rec EWI Founder and Managing Director Georgia Institute of Technology Sir Peter Bonfield (U.K.) Global Alliance Associates Chairman Addison Fischer (U.S.) 18 Partner, Epoch Fund NXP Semiconductors Chairman and Co-Founder Michael Chertoff (U.S.) Planet Heritage Foundation Peter Castenfelt (U.K.) Co-founder and Managing Principal Chairman Chertoff Group Archipelago Enterprises, Ltd. EWI • Recognizing the Durand Line 19 epublic of epublic of ussell 20-20 evelopment evelopment rganization, Inc. rganization, Chairman Chairman JSC Uralkali JSC Ambassador O Corporation, S.A. Corporation, oD Director, Federal eloitte Services LLP Services eloitte Secretary-General Chairman Emeritus Boao Forum for Asia for Forum Boao Sanbar D Sanbar D D Government Services Kanwal Sibal (India) Sibal Kanwal Chief Executive Officer Founder, R Henry J. Smith (U.S.) J. Henry Charles F. Wald (U.S.) Wald F. Charles roup; Group; Investment ussell Pierre Vimont Vimont (France) Pierre Ramzi H. Sanbar (U.K.) Sanbar H. Ramzi R Zhou Wenzhong (China) Zhou Wenzhong Ikram Sehgal (Pakistan) Sehgal Ikram France in the United States in the United France Embassy of the R of Embassy Bud Smith O George F. Russell, Jr. (U.S.) Jr. Russell, F. George Alexander Voloshin (Russia) Voloshin Alexander Former Foreign Secretary of India Chairman of the Board of Directors Security and Management Services and Management Security .C. efense Council efense evelopment Principal oldings Asia Holdings President President Chairman Chairman Co-Founder Ambassador Pivotal Group Pivotal esources D esources for D A. Owens (U.S.) Owens A. China Institute of of China Institute AEA AEA Managing Director The Water Initiative The Water Corporate Services Fidelity Invesments Invesments Fidelity Sarah Perot (U.S.) Perot Sarah John Rogers (U.S.) John Rogers International Studies International oldman Sachs & Co. Goldman Sachs Director and Co-Chair Former Vice Chairman Chief Executive Officer Admiral William Admiral (ret) Ma Zhengang (China) Ma Zhengang Asset Management and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff of Joint Chiefs U.S. F. Francis Najafi (U.S.) Francis F. University of St Andrews St of University Kevin McGovern (U.S.) McGovern Kevin John R. Robinson (U.S.) Robinson John R. Louise Richardson (U.S.) Richardson Louise Yousef Al Otaiba (U.A.E.) Al Otaiba Yousef Ronald P. O’Hanley (U.S.) O’Hanley P. Ronald Embassy of the United Arab Arab the United of Embassy Emirates in Washington D Washington in Emirates allas Center for Performing Arts Arts Performing for allas Center D Natural R Natural ong O TAS O CE Founder ONEK President President Chairman Chairman C Logomotion Kurt Enterprises Managing Partner Chairman and CE John Hurley (U.S.) John Hurley Anurag Jain Anurag (India) Former Acting Senior Former United States Zuhal Kurt (Turkey) Zuhal Kurt Chief Executive Officer ockefeller Brothers Fund Brothers ockefeller James L. Jones (U.S.) Jones L. James Founder & Chairperson Christine Loh (China) Loh Christine Director for Cyberspace Laurus Edutech Pvt. Ltd. Pvt. Laurus Edutech Haifa Al Kaylani (U.K.) Al Kaylani Haifa Adel Ghazzawi (U.A.E.) Ghazzawi Adel National Advisor Security R Melissa Hathaway (U.S.) Hathaway Melissa Stephen B. Heintz (U.S.) Stephen B. Civic Exchange, Hong K Civic Exchange, Cavalry Asset Asset Management Cavalry Munich Security Conference Munich Security U.S. National Security Council National Security U.S. lobal Strategies, LLC; LLC; Strategies, Global Hathaway Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Ischinger Wolfgang Emil Hubinak (Slovak Republic) (Slovak Hubinak Emil Arab International Women’s Forum Forum Women’s International Arab NON-BOARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Laurent Roux (U.S.) Hilton Smith, Jr. (U.S.) Founder President & CEO Gallatin Wealth Management, LLC East Bay Co., LTD

CHAIRMEN EMERITI

Berthold Beitz (Germany) Hans-Dietrich Genscher Whitney MacMillan (U.S.) President (Germany) Former Chairman & CEO Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Former Vice Chancellor Cargill, Inc. Halbach-Stiftung and Minister of Foreign Ira D. Wallach* (U.S.) Affairs of Germany Ivan T. Berend (Hungary) EWI Co-Founder Professor Donald M. Kendall (U.S.) University of California Former Chairman & CEO at Los Angeles PepsiCo., Inc.

DIRECTORS EMERITI

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Maria-Pia Kothbauer Mitchell I. Sonkin (U.S.) Chief Executive Officer (Liechtenstein) Managing Director Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. Ambassador MBIA Insurance Corporation Former Prime Minister of Poland Embassy of Liechtenstein Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway) to Austria, the OSCE and the Emil Constantinescu (Romania) Former Minister of Foreign an d L ine United Nations in Vienna Institute for Regional Cooperation Affairs of Norway and Conflict Prevention William E. Murray* (U.S.) Liener Temerlin (U.S.) Former President of Romania Chairman

r t h e Du Chairman The Samuel Freeman Trust William D. Dearstyne (U.S.) Temerlin Consulting Former Company Group Chairman John J. Roberts (U.S.) John C. Whitehead (U.S.) Johnson & Johnson Senior Advisor

og ni z in g Former Co-Chairman of American International John W. Kluge* (U.S.) Goldman Sachs Group (AIG) Chairman of the Board Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Metromedia International Group Daniel Rose (U.S.)

EWI • Rec EWI Chairman Rose Associates, Inc. 20

* Deceased

About the Author

Brad L. Brasseur has worked at the EastWest Institute in Brussels since September 2009 on the Afghanistan–Pakistan Regional Security program. His work has mainly focused on a series of meetings called the Abu Dhabi Process between a select group of senior Afghan and Pakistani politicians and officials aimed at complementing existing channels of communication between the two countries. Brad has a master’s degree in In- ternational Political Economics from the University of Kent in Brussels, where he focused all his studies on Afghanistan and Pakistan, including his dissertation on the Durand Line. He completed his bachelor’s degree in Geography/Anthropology at Thompson Rivers University in his home city of Kamloops, Canada.

Founded in 1980, the EastWest Institute is a global, action-oriented, think-and-do tank. EWI tackles the toughest international problems by:

Convening for discreet conversations representatives of institutions and nations that do not normally cooperate. EWI serves as a trusted global hub for back-channel “Track 2” diplomacy, and also organizes public forums to address peace and security issues.

Reframing issues to look for win-win solutions. Based on our special relations with Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and other powers, EWI brings together dis- parate viewpoints to promote collaboration for positive change.

Mobilizing networks of key individuals from both the public and private sectors. EWI leverages its access to intellectual entrepreneurs and business and policy leaders around the world to defuse current conflicts and prevent future flare-ups.

The EastWest Institute is a non-partisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit organization with offices in New York, Brussels and Moscow. Our fiercely-guarded independence is en- sured by the diversity of our international board of directors and our supporters.

EWI Brussels Center EWI Moscow Center EWI New York Center Rue de Trèves, 59-61 Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street 11 East 26th Street Brussels 1040 7/5, Building 1, 6th Floor 20th Floor Belgium Moscow, 125009 New York, NY 10010 32-2-743-4610 Russia, +7-495-2347797 U.S.A. 1-212-824-4100