persisted in Northern Ireland would benefit from some simplifying model Ireland and the (ab)uses of history to aid understanding. Otherwise what choice is there other than either the Stephen Howe: Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies colonial model or the view that somehow people in (Northern) in Irish History and Culture (Oxford University Ireland are peculiar and different? Press, 2000) Howe is not the first to put the Michael Steed colonial model under scrutiny and to Reviewed by Michael Steed find that it fails to fit the facts. Revi- sionism has been a major growth industry among Irish historians in the read this book during the autumn as if everything begins with politics, last two decades, as they have grappled flowering of artificial red poppies, becomes mystique and ends as literary with a guilty feeling that they might Iwhich this year seemed to start theory’ (pp – ). have some responsibility for terrorist even earlier than usual amongst public The outcome is an academic’s violence. The case for such guilt is that figures on television. It was as if the book. More than a quarter of it allowing romantic nationalism to sight of young men giving up their consists of an extensive bibliography invent and propagate its version of lives to the cause of a fundamentalist and notes. Many of the best and most Ireland’s national history, especially in religion on th September had readable scholarly asides are buried in Catholic schools, has sustained recruit- reinforced our leaders’ need to con- these often lengthy notes which ment into the IRA and legitimised the form to the British national myth that makes it a pity that the publishers armed struggle - historians have a duty the young men brainwashed by have placed them at the end of the to expose such myths. But purely Irish patriotism into dying in the trenches book rather than as classic footnotes. history can only partially explain had been ‘giving their lives for their Even more it is largely an account, in Ireland’s particularity and anyway why country’. It put into perspective this university lecturer’s hand-out style, for should Ireland be peculiarly backward account by Stephen Howe of the role those who wish or need to know the or especially prone to violence? The of a myth in Irish history, and particu- literature on ‘Ireland as colony’ colonial model has many seductions larly the use of that myth to legitimise published in the last three decades or besides offering a world-wide frame- violence in Northern Ireland. so. To what end? work to explain away such puzzles. It Howe explores the myth that In his Introduction Howe sums up suits the modern mood of victimology. Ireland’s problems and especially the his achievement as ‘largely negative It identifies a convenient guilty party Northern Ireland troubles, are a judgements about the empirical, and echoes the real experience of so product of British/English colonial- theoretical, and political adequacy of much of the Third World. It is hardly ism. At least it is clear by the end of colonial and post-colonial frameworks surprising that it appeals as an intellec- the book that he regards it essentially for analysing contemporary Ireland’ (I tual belief system which regards as myth, although as he ploughs heartily concur) and goes on to claim scholars such as Howe as nit-picking. through the various authors who take that he ‘attempts to place such analysis It is a great pity that Howe does not this view, he attempts to deal with in a more appropriate European explore the literature on political them as if they were an academic context’ (p ). Unfortunately he seems development and nation building in school and he is maintaining a schol- to have run out of time, or space, to do Europe. This provides an analytical arly, detached stance. Yet, as time and the latter properly. model within which the nature of the again he exposes the lack of real He scatters throughout the book competing nationalisms in Northern historical evidence in so many ‘anti- tantalising references to a comparative Ireland makes more sense. However colonial’ accounts, one senses his European perspective (e.g. the preg- British history, as well as Irish, is mostly mounting frustration. Indeed, to adapt nant one sentence comparison be- told without the benefit of such a the colonial analogy, Howe is a tween Ireland and Bohemia made on p perspective. The paucity of a wider political scientist mounting a resist- ). Disappointingly, the relevant understanding of the European-ness of ance to the imperial attempt by penultimate chapter is one of the the British Isles has sustained the ‘Irish cultural theorists to annex the study shortest in the book and reads as a are peculiar’ attitude within Great of British - Irish relations. hurriedly compiled list of apparently Britain, and so the appeal of the As a fellow political scientist I share comparable cases around the world colonial model. In that sense those Howe’s irritation with the way that from New Brunswick to Mayotte. If British historians who have helped to cultural theorists can get away with Howe is to carry weight in the aca- perpetuate national myths about imagining their constructs rather then demic world this claim badly needs to Britain’s glorious history, and its naval/ having to grub around documents, be placed in an analytical framework. military island story, could also have facts and figures. As he writes, adapting Furthermore, anyone concerned with some responsibility for the historical Peguy, ‘In Ireland…it sometimes seems why apparently religious violence has ideology that has sustained IRA
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 43 followed were no worse in Ireland than living within the boundaries estab- in France, Germany or the Netherlands. lished by dynasty and conquest. Hence After of course England and Wales a common parliament was set up for were treated more mercifully, although the whole British Isles (except the Isle the memory of Mary I’s rule led to the of Man and the Channel Islands). But deep-rooted anti-Catholic sentiments George III and the ruling Tories that in turn affected popular British refused to accept the Catholic emanci- attitudes to Irish Catholics for another pation that followed logically. Alsatians couple of centuries. Once again, the and Roussillonais were treated as fully peculiarity is why memories of the French citizens, and came to think of Catholic massacre of Protestants or themselves as such, despite history and the dark stain of Drogheda on language. Irish Catholics within the Cromwell’s reputation have lasted so new wider British polity were not, and much longer and have been so exagger- did not. The circumstances of did ated by modern nationalists. French, not favour a fresh, secular start in the German or Dutch national conscious- British Isles. ness had turned its back on similar Furthermore the lightning of contemporary events by the early struck Ireland differently. Initially in terrorism, as could those British nineteenth century. the uprising it seemed to spark a politicians whose current rhetoric still By then the whole of Europe had modern Irish nationalism that em- echoes such myths. been struck by the political lightening braced both Catholic and Protestant Ireland’s history is certainly part and of , from which came the power denominations. But as, in the ensuing parcel of Europe’s history. Unlike Great of the new secular doctrines of nation- three decades, an impressively effective Britain it escaped the original, direct alism and democracy. France, made in Irish popular movement was built up impact of the Roman empire but so did a purely Catholic kingdom, under the leadership of Daniel a large northern zone of the continent. became a secular republic (where it is O’Connell (a highly innovative Soon afterwards it became part of easier for a Protestant such as Lionel political organiser and moderniser), it Western, Roman Christendom which Jospin to become prime minister and came fatally to confuse Catholic framed its identity and politico- perhaps President than for a British grievances with the task of creating the religious belief system for , years. Catholic to become prime minister or new national sentiment. Just as most During that period it also experienced monarch). French nationality success- European nationalisms were discover- the European history of movements of fully embraced the German-speaking ing a new language-based sense of peoples, or of elites and dynastic Alsatians and Catalan-speaking identity and/or were being endowed conquest within that common frame- Roussillonais, both of whom had only with other invented traditions, nascent work. The oddity of mediaeval Irish been annexed to France after Irish nationalism was resurrecting the history is not that a gang of Anglo- Cromwell was dead. Reformation division of Europe. Norman robber-barons under The Germans, who suffered a Meanwhile British nationalism did Strongbow invaded in , owing particularly murderous war for a succeed in incorporating a minority of feudal allegiance to a culturally French thirty-year period spanning the the inhabitants of Ireland, mainly Plantagenet king. It is the way that this massacre, learned to forget the Catho- clustered in the north-east. incursion, one of the everyday violent lic/Protestant killings of their war and In due course Great Britain aban- adventures of the European Middle developed a language-based common doned the ideal that its Britishness Ages, has become mythologised by identity which failed to incorporate embraced the whole British Isles modern nationalism into uniquely an Germans speakers in Switzerland or leaving the bereft Ulster unionists with English colonial act. If a colonial model Alsace. The Dutch created a new a confused identity and without a helps to explain this bit of history then political system embracing Catholics modern terminology in which to every part of Europe has from time to despite the fact that the sixteenth express their fears and aspirations. By time been a colony of another part and century Dutch war of independence then Irish nationalism had belatedly we are all victims of one another. had essentially been a Protestant war added Gladstone to its armoury of Nor when we turn to the crucial against the Catholic emperor. In most symbols but too late to avoid the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that of Europe the new sense of democratic indelible association with Rome. The are so well remembered in Ireland today nationhood was built either on exist- result is two completing nationalisms, was Irish history outside the European ing state boundaries or, a la Herder, on both identified with religion, one not mainstream. Like much of the rest of language. So why was it different in wanting to be a nationalism and the Europe it was rent asunder by the Ireland and in Britain? other not wanting its religious identity. Reformation, or one could say that the British nationalism followed, half- This is unusual but not unique in British Isles were so rent asunder. The heartedly, the French course of seeking Europe. Several other nationalisms religious atrocities and wars that to incorporate as part of the polity all have, despite their leaders’ wishes,
44 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 found their appeal delimited by Ireland need never have been parti- The choice of analytical framework religious allegiance. Although in most tioned. One needs no analytical is also highly relevant to assessment of Catholic countries nationalism was framework, and only to read a little of the current peace process in Northern essentially secular, Polish nationalism - Ulster’s history, to realise that this view Ireland. Howe argues that seeking a due to circumstances not dissimilar to is unsustainable. But could the settlement by recognising two distinct those of the Irish - acquired a close Gladstonian Liberal solution of a communities or traditions in Northern identity with Catholicism. Serb united Ireland within a United King- Ireland offers little hope (pp –). nationalism, with its memory of an dom have worked? I, for one, have Yet if one acknowledges that both Irish Islamic oppressor, the Turk, similarly sometimes argued that it could, insofar Republican and Ulster Unionist claimed the historically Serb, and as Ulster Unionism dug its deep traditions can be seen as victims of the Serbo-Croat speaking, Bosnia as populist roots only after . Could a way that their story played out in the Serbian, but saw its local majority, the common ‘Irish-within-British’ identity aftermath of , then such a bi- Bosnian Muslims, rather as Irish have grown up around a devolved Irish communitarian approach to enabling nationalists see Ulster Protestants - Parliament? Northern Ireland to move forward in traitorous allies of the enemy. The The comparative European frame- peace makes a lot of sense. It builds on a partition of Yugoslavia is a more work however throws some doubt on better understanding of Northern complex story than the partition of that optimistic view. It pinpoints the Ireland’s history than either the colonial Ireland but still remarkably compara- critical juncture as the formative stage model or Howe’s more empirical ble. It is the product of the contin- of nationhood and suggests that what approach. It also suggests that Northern gency of nationhood in a part of was happening around and in the Ireland could benefit from a more Europe like Ireland with a much more ensuing decades was determinative of European Union than the British/Irish subtle and uncertain history of nation later identities. This was a period of constitutional framework. That said, it building than nationalism likes to repressive Tory misrule throughout the fits my own civic liberalism no better admit. And wherever in Europe British Isles. The conflict over Catholic than Howe’s social democratic view- nationalism has become entwined with emancipation and electoral reform point or our common humanism. religious identity it is less understand- separated profoundly different Whig Whatever one’s outlook, however, ing of other nationalisms and more and Tory views of what the new Stephen Howe has provided an erudite prone to violence. century’s British citizenship was to and thorough demolition text on the Obviously I find such a framework mean. The longevity of the mad king colonial model that still underpins the of political development and of critical and other short-term circumstances thinking of many who seek, unwit- junctures in history more useful for meant that the more inclusive Whig tingly or not, to prolong the Northern analysing European history than the view only triumphed over Tory Ireland conflict. colonial model, but then I am a obscurantism later, when nationalist political scientist with a historical bent. identities had become more set. Who Michael Steed is an honorary lecturer of the I am not sure where Howe really can tell whether, if the Whigs had University of Kent at Canterbury and a places himself. In the concluding presided over British government in former President of the Liberal Party. paragraph of the book he finally lets these critical years, a collective, pluralist slip his own very contemporary identity for the unified but in due 1A Celtic term for all of these islands that was European social democratic perspec- course decentralised British Isles widely used well before the creation of the British state, something I learnt from Howe, tive. I discern in him an instinctive would have developed? endnote p. 245 dislike of the traditional nationalisms (not just Irish) which have kept violent conflicts going. That might be cheered on by many British Liberal Democrats as well as by most other civilised post- Forgotten hero national modern people. However I doubt that this rationalist lack of empathy with the romance of nation- Gordon Gillespie: Albert H. McElroy: The Radical alism enables him better to explain or Minister (Albert McElroy Memorial Fund, 1985) understand its persistence. Reviewed by Bob Bell Such a framework is much more interesting for the light it throws on British political history, and especially n less than fifty pages Gordon Liberalism and twentieth century the role of the Liberal party in rela- Gillespie manages to provide a full Ireland. The truth is, however, that tionship to Ireland. The colonial model and lively portrait of someone Albert McElroy is now largely forgot- tends to support the superficial view I who should be celebrated as one of the ten except by the remaining handful of that if Asquith had been more resolute, great heroes of twentieth century followers who were touched by his or Lloyd George less devious, then
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 33 Winter 2001–02 45