An Analysis of the Results by Michael Steed
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APPENDIX AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS BY MICHAEL STEED PRESs comment on the results of the 1966 election focused on the ap parent uniformity of behaviour throughout the country; the 1959 and 1964 contests had led people to expect that there would again be spectacular exceptions to the national pattern. But a detailed analysis of the figures reveals conflicting currents beneath the surface. The first part of this Appendix explores the three main movements and how they were interrelated. The next part explores points peculiar to each of these movements - the swing, the drop in Liberal support, and the increase in abstentions. Following this, factors underlying the variations in the results are examined - principally how far different types of constituency, region or tactical situation show differences in voting behaviour. This arrangement of the material means there is no complete discussion of for example, swing on its own: there is a short section on the variation of swing but it is also discussed wherever it is relevant to other points. The minor parties and voting in Northern Ireland are covered separately and the Appendix ends with a section on the work ing of the electoral system. The changes between 1964 and 1966 can be expressed in different ways. Here are three statements of the overall result in the United Kingdom.1 % of registered %of total % of two-party electorate votes cast vote Conservative 31•7 -1•7 41"9 -~·s 46•7 -z·9 Labour 36·6 +z·3 47•9 +3·8 53.3 +z·9 Liberal 6·s -z·I S·s -z·7 Others I·3 +o·3 1•7 +o·4 Non-voters Z4·z +I·3 ' Swing' to Labour z·o z·7 z·9 These global figures, however, shed no light on how far the swing was due to direct switching between the two main parties or how far it was affected by the other changes. Using the global figures it could be argued 1 These figures are for the United Kingdom; all other figures quoted in this Appendix, unless otherwise stated, refer only to the 617 constituencies in Great Britain excluding the Speaker's seat (ltchen). 271 272 THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1966 that Labour's gain came almost wholly from the former Liberals while the former Conservatives moved to non-voting. In fact the reverse is true: the direct movement from Conservative to Labour was sub stantially greater than the overall swing figures suggest. This is reflected in the difference between the average of the two party swing 1 in individual constituencies (3·5%) 2 and the overall swing in the national vote (2·9%). The main reason for this discrepancy is to be found in the continued decline in turnout in safe Labour seats. The following table shows how far turnout is now lower in Labour-held seats: Con. Lab. Lib. Total U.K. Turnout seats seats seats total Below 6o% I 23 0 24 zS 6o-6s% 5 I7 0 22 24 65-7o% IO 3S I 49 52 70--'75% 49 So 2 I3I I32 7s-So% I06 I2S I 235 236 Above So% 7I 77 s IS6 ISS Total. 242 363 I2 617 630 The average turnout in Labour seats was 2·7% lower than in Con servative ones. This is a striking contrast with the position fifteen years ago; in I950 the turnout was I% higher in Labour than in Conservative seats and the highest turnout was in the safest Labour seats.3 The con sequence of this change is that the national totals of votes now under estimate Labour's potential strength and render comparisons with national totals in the past somewhat misleading. If with identical party percentages in each constituency the I966 turnout had been at the I950 level, the Labour share of the national vote would have been about I% higher than it was. While turnout trends are so uneven, it is misleading to use measures of overall swing that are based on the national totals of votes cast; both for prediction and as a yardstick for the movement between the main parties, the average of the individual constituency swings is more accurate. 1 In this Appendix swing is defined on the basis of the two-party vote. For the difference between this and the more conventional method of averaging the Conservative and Labour percentage change see The British General Election of I964, pp. 337-S. For the predictive value of the two methods see below, p. 293n. A striking instance of the advantage of the two-party swing occurred in I966 in Barnsley where the Conservative vote rose by 3,039 and the Labour vote by only 1,494. This is measured as a swing to Labour of o·7% by averaging, but as a swing of 4"I% to Conservative on the two-party basis. 1 The mean swing was 3·4S% and the median 3"49%· The standard deviation from the mean was 2"I% (I964 3"I%). 8 See The British General Election of I9SO, p. 339· APPENDIX 273 The Swing: in relation to changes in turnout, in Liberal candidatures• and in the Liberal vote Swing I964-66 To Lab. Total Mean swing To seats Con. Up to 2"<>- 3"5- s·o- Over 1"9% 3"4% 4"9% 6·9% 7'0% - -------------- A. Increase in Turnout . IO IJ SI SI 30 IO I63 -3"7% B. Decrease in Turnout up to 2·9%. IO 57 I04 74 63 I6 324 -J·s% c. Decrease in T~out over 3·o% I2 20 29 40 23 IJO -J•I% --------4 ------ D. No Liberal candidate I964 or I966 . I 36 70 6A 42 II 223 -3"7% E. Liberal intervention 2 0 8 9 4 JI -4'7% F. Liberal withdrawal . II I4 26 I6 II 6 84 -2"7% G. Increase in Liberal vote 4 9 6 I 3 2 25 -2"4% H. Decrease in Liberal vote up to 4·9% . 7 29 63 62 28 2 I9I -J"I% I. Decrease in Liberal vote over s·o% 2 IS 22 6o -4"3% 7 ----9 ----5 ------ J. All seats 32 90 I84 I6S II6 30 6I7 -J·s% Effect of Liberal candidatures• on turnout Change in turnout I964-66 Total Mean -o·o% -I·s% seats change Increase to to Over -I"4% ----2"9% -J·o% K. Liberal intervention . I9 8 4 0 JI +o·7% L. Increase in Liberal vote . II 7 7 0 25 -o·oo/o M. Decrease in Liberal vote 89 9I 53 I9 2SI -o·s% N. No Liberal candidate I964 or I966 . 35 4I 73 74 223 -I·9% 0. Liberal withdrawal IS 22 84 -z·6% 7 --- 37 P. All seats I6I 167 159 130 6I7 -1·2% • Three seats complicated by Independent Liberal candidates are omitted from the breakdown by Liberal candidatures. We are deeply indebted to Honeywell Data Control for providing the raw material for this table and other parts of the Appendix. In particular we would like to thank L. R. Price for permission to use Honeywell equipment in the preparation of these tables, and also Allan Fletcher, Arthur Tulip and Jini Wheatley for their assistance. The relationship between the swing, the changes in turnout and the Lweral vote. The table above shows how far the swing was affected by the decrease in turnout and the changes in the Liberal vote. It is plain from lines A to C that the swing was higher where turnout in creased. The extent of this relationship is masked in two ways: by the link between turnout and the Liberal vote and because in the large cities both the swing and the drop in turnout were high. But though 274 THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1966 measurement is thus difficult, Labour clearly suffered more than the Conservatives from abstention.1 The effect of the Liberal vote on the swing is more complex. The difference in the swing of z·o% between seats where Liberals inter vened (E) and seats where they withdrew (F) suggests very strongly that the Liberal vote was more pro-Conservative at this election. In fact this partially reflects that fact that these changes in Liberal can didatures were concentrated in Labour-held seats, where a Liberal candidate took proportionately more votes from the Conservatives. Nevertheless, in more marginal seats Liberal intervention was as sociated with an average swing of 4·o% and withdrawal with one of 3·1%. This suggests that, in 1966, a Liberal withdrawal was worth a swing of about o·s% to the Conservatives.2 In seats with Liberal candidates at both elections, the effect of the drop in the Liberal vote appears fairly complex. Lines G to I of the table suggest that where Liberals managed to improve their vote against the national tide it tended to be at Labour's expense and that Labour benefited more than the Conservatives from a marked drop in the Liberal vote. This seems to fit the theory, advanced before the election, that the Liberal party would suffer and the Labour party benefit from a squeeze on the votes of third place radical candidates. 3 Yet if this was so, the swing should have been high wherever the Liberal vote dropped; in fact it was below average in seats where the Liberal vote was de creasing by a normal amount (line H). The explanation which most easily fits the figures in the table is: (i) that, despite many local variations, the other two parties gained very equally from a normal drop in the Liberal vote of 3·1%, (ii) that where the Liberal vote held it was the more pro-Labour Liberal voters who remained, and (iii) that where the Liberal vote was squeezed most heavily the more pro-Conservative Liberal voters were likeliest to stay Liberal.