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Website the School That Disappeared The School that Disappeared By Paul Croxson It was a simple enough request, ‘What did I know aBout the Intelligence schools and their numbering?’ ‘Not a lot,’ was the answer. The title ‘schools’ seemed designed to confuse the enemy. Their primary function was to direct the search for specific German signals. Not much more than this was recorded. To Be honest, I hadn’t looked at this suBject for a numBer of years during my Sigint searches and so just sent off some scrambled notes that I happened to have following some research for the late Alan Edwards. When I later read them, I realised that they were in somewhat of a mess and so spent some time sorting the various schools into some semBlance of numerical order. All the schools of intelligence I had details of, seemed to Be numBered. One thing was apparent though, I had not been able to trace where No. 1 Intelligence School was located and what went on there. I was well aware of the schools numbered 2 to 7 but no. 1 appeared to have evaded me. I decided to spend an hour or so trying to find the answer to the ‘missing’ School. I did find two un-numbered schools but these were cipher schools, one in Herne Hill, SE London and the other in Yorkshire. Not what I was looking for; they were mainly Royal Signals training establishments, it seemed! In my search for clues, I found myself, once again, Buried in what I consider to Be possibly one of the best-informed books on Enigma, The Hut Six Story written By Gordon Welchman, one of the foremost memBers of B.P and certainly without the approval of the authorities. In passing. I find it quite extraordinary that so much credit is given to Alan Turing for the breaking of Enigma and the development of the BomBes, whilst the major contriBution made By Gordon Welchman is virtually ignored. In my view, which is now Becoming the accepted view, Welchman’s contriBution to the solving of Enigma and the creation and development of the system of Huts 3, 6 and 8 was of paramount importance: equalling Turing. One might say that he ‘industrialised the extraction of Enigma intelligence’. In addition, it is impossiBle to put a value on his immense contriBution to the development of the Bombe which resulted in there being some disagreement between him and Turing – which is, again, often glossed over. The BomBes would have Been much weaker unless or until someone else had his flash of inspiration about the diagonal Board turning them into potent indispensaBle weapons in the fight against Enigma. As Peter Calvocoressi, who also worked at B.P, pointed out, in its pre-war incarnation the Government Code & Cipher School under the Foreign Office was exactly what its name implied and no more. ‘Intelligence’ played a very small part, it Being left to SIS, their neighBours in London. Welchman’s great contriBution was to ‘marry a scarcely formed intelligence process to code- breaking, forming a sophisticated system for Sigint exploitation’, which in parallel with WinterBotham’s contribution enabled the safe dissemination of the ‘product’, worldwide to all three Services and the SIS. 1 The three armed services had each Built up their own intercept networks; some, as early as the twenties, but separate and more secret still were those operated By the Foreign Office, MI5 and MI6 who were listening to the highest levels of German Secret Service communications. Fort Bridgewoods near Chatham was one of these, with its civilian staff of operators. When I first read Hut 6 some twenty-odd years ago I knew very little of the story of Bletchley Park and Enigma and so was delighted to be re-acquainted with the story, knowing, as I do, so much more now about what went on there; particularly reading GORDON WELCHMAN his accounts, sadly not very lengthy or detailed, of the work carried out at Fort Bridgewoods. I had heard of its existence But little of its role in the development of interception. Welchman mentions it several times and praises it – in particular the commanding officer, Commander Ellingworth - as Being an important tool in his search for the solution of Enigma. There are just tantalising glimpses. It was another piece that I could put in place in the puzzle. The Fort played several vital roles in the Enigma story, not least in the training of civilian intercept officers who, as civilians would form the backbone of the intercept service in the UK. (Could this be then the missing No. 1 School)? These operators were of a standard unmatched anywhere at the time. Since accuracy – particularly when recording the preamBles – was vital in the search for Enigma, their work was greatly prized. As the workload increased and they moved from Chatham, they would go on to train army personnel at Both Chicksands and Beaumanor. What again was interesting and worthy of further investigation was the Battle for control of the intercept sets Between Ellingwworth and Welchman and Colonel (Arcedekne) Butler, Head of MI8. MI8 had retained responsiBility for what is often called the ‘steering’ of the intercept, despite efforts by the growing GC & CS to take it over. In correspondence from Welchman to Travis, the then Deputy Head at GC & CS he specifically refers to this problem, pointing out that ‘ his view there was no need for ‘another intelligence school’! (I had been diverted from my search for No. 1 Intelligence School but was this a clue to lead me Back to the straight and narrow?) What new school Been proposed and by whom? Welchman had Built up what was a very good and fruitful working relationship with Ellingworth and his intercept team. This, however, did not apply to Butler, the head of MI8: far from it! On 1 April 1941, Welchman wrote what is By any standards a highly critical and inflammatory letter to Commander E Travis, at the time deputy director of B.P. regarding the Head of MI8. He wrote, Unfortunately, Col. Butler has continually tried to take away the work of the Chatham Intelligence School and to interfere with our (GC & CS) close co-operation with Cdr Ellingsworth. He has founded unnecessary organisations in London and elsewhere which he attempts to place between us and the (intercept) stations. We and Cdr Ellingsworth have had to waste a consideraBle amount of energy in fighting changes which we knew to Be against the national interest. The latest danger lies in the formation of Intelligence School No, VI under a new colonel who knows nothing about ‘E’ traffic from the cryptological or from the wireless point of view. We are to Be deprived of the greater part of the valuaBle intelligence work that has Been done under Ellsworth and instead we are asked to accept 2 intelligence from another party whose reliability we do not trust’. ‘the clash is between Cdr Ellingsworth’s intelligence school (so, it was an Intelligence School at Chatham) and Col. Butler’s intelligence School. We say without hesitation that the former is essential to us chiefly owing to the experience of Cdr Ellingsworth himself and that Col. Butler’s school is not only unnecessary But a nuisance. The work that has been done by Col. Butler’s party could have been done better under Ellingsworth at GC & CS. And this was at what was possibly one of the most dangerous periods in our history! This was extremely strong – almost venomous – criticism of the man who headed up MI8 and a serious comment on the units he was responsiBle for, not least 6 I.S., which went on to perform a vital role finally forming the BackBone of what would Become known as ‘SIXTA’ at B.P. At this point Welchman’s patience with Butler seems to Be exhausted to the extent that his dissatisfaction was recorded in writing at the highest level! It is important to appreciate that these disputes were not always about the same proBlem which in retrospect is almost unBelievaBle at such a critical time in the war. Although he, Welchman, had clearly lost patience and trust with Arcedeckne-Butler he certainly was very much in favour of what could Be achieved within his MI8 organisation. Gordon Welchman undouBtedly was one of the greatest contriButors to the success of ULTRA intelligence, having first estaBlished contact with it in DecemBer 1940. Farsightedly, he certainly saw the presence of the log-readers in the future lay at B.P. rather than Beaumanor or London as he made very clear in Hut Six.1 On 17 July 1941 6 I.S. moved from London to Beaumanor. Shortly after this, on june 16 1941, Colonel Arcedeckne-Butler left MI8 and was succeeded By Colonel Nicholls (later Brigadier F W Nicholls), Royal Signals. Although nothing is said in the records, no doubt there was proBaBly an almost universal sigh of relief at his departure. To make matters worse, there were still proBlems; the quarrels Between GC & CS and MI8 which had precipitated the inquiry in the winter of 1940/1941 still had not died down despite the departure of Butler. These quarrels erupted again, mainly centred on the fact that, while MI8 was responsiBle for intercepting German Army and GAF traffic and for suBjecting it to traffic analysis, GC & CS controlled Cryptanalysis separately and independently from intelligence. It was this dichotomy that would always Be a cause for discussion and dissent, until resolved when it later Became an accepted fact that cryptanalysis and traffic analysis are inseparable, or at least, not easily separated: but this was in the future.
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