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Notes and References Documents held at the Public Record Office, , are crown copyright and are reproduced by permission of the Controller ofHM Stationery Office.

I NTRODUCTION Christopher Andrew and David Dilks I. David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries rifSir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945 (Lon­ don , (971) , p. 21. 2. Interview with Professor Hinsley in Part 3 of the BBC Radio 4 documentary series 'T he Profession of Intelligence', written and presented by Christopher Andrew (producer Peter Everett); first broadcast 16 Aug 1981. 3. F. H. Hinsleyet al., British Intelligencein the Second World War (London, 1979-). The first two chapters of volume I contain a useful retrospect on the pre-war development of the intelligence community. Curiously, despite the publication of Professor Hinsley's volumes, the government has decided not to release the official histories commissioned by it on wartime counter-espionage and deception. The forthcoming (non-official) collection of essays edited by Ernest R. May, Knowing One's Enemies: IntelligenceAssessment before the Two World Wars (Princeton) promises to add significantly to our knowledge of the role of intelligence on the eve of the world wars. 4. House of Commons Education, Science and Arts Committee (Session 1982-83) , Public Records: Minutes ofEvidence, pp . 76-7. 5. Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery (London, 1981). Nigel West, A Matter of Trust: MI51945-72 (London, 1982). Both volumes contain ample evidence of extensive 'inside information'. 6. Nigel West , MI5: British Security Operations /90/-/945 (London, 1981), pp . 41, 49, 58. One of the most interesting studies of British peacetime intelligence which depends on a substantial amount of inside information is Antony Verrier's history of post-war British foreign policy , Through the Looking Glass (London, 1983) . Though Mr Verrier's references are inevitably far from complete, they are generally suffi­ cient to indicate at what points he depends on unattributable evidence. Nigel West , MI6: British SecretIntelligence Operations /909-/945 (London, 1983) was published after this volume went to press. 7. German Spies in was first published on 17 Feb 1915; the sixth edition appeared on 6 Mar 1915. Le Queux's career is examined in chapter 2 of Christ­ opher Andrew's forthcoming history ofthe British intelligence community. 8. Thames Television advertisements in most of the Sunday press, 4 Sept 1983. 9. Sunday Times, 4 Sept 1983. A rather different but by no means uncontroversial version of Reilly's life appears in Michael Kettle, Sidney Reilly: The True Story (London, 1983) . The TV Times Special produced to accompany the Reilly series contains an 'exclusive extra episode ' by the scriptwriter Troy Kennedy Martin which describes a dramatic encounter between Reillv and Sir Mansfield Cum­ ming , head of SIS , in 1924. This episode aptly illustrat~s som e of the limitations of Mr Martin's research. Cumming (whose name Mr Martin consistently misspells) died in 1923. 10. H. Montgomery Hyde, Cynthia, Ballantyne Books edition (New York, 1979): a more valuable work than the publisher's sensational pres entation suggests. II . See, for example,T 162/76 , E 7483/ I on the Passport Control Officers ; and FO 366/800 on the Government Code and Cypher School. 250 NOTES TO INTROD U CTION 251

12. See, for exa mple, House of Co mmons, Public Records, cited in note 4. 13. FO to Sir R. Ca mpbell, 20 Feb 1939, FO 371/22944, C 2190/42 1/62. 14. Sir P. Loraine to Sir L. O lipha nt (FO ), 17June 1932, enclos ing minute by N. Mayers; and FO minutes by P. .1 . Dixon and W. .1. Childs. FO 371/16009 E 3389/56/65 . 15. We are inde bted to Ian Nish for information on J ap anese usage. 16. See below, p. 205. 17. Ewan Butler, Mason-Mac (London, 1972), p. 75. Int erestin gly, it was decided not to atte mpt Hitl er's assassinat ion during the war. 18. C hristopher Andrew, ' France and the German Menace', forthcomin g in Ern est May, Knowing One's Enemies, and 'The Mobil ization of British Int elligence for the Two World War s', in N. F. Dreisziger (ed.) , Mobilieationfor Total War (Waterloo, Ontari o, 1981). 19. R. C . Elwood , RomanMalinoosky (London, 1977). 20. W. C . Beaver, 'The Developm ent of the Intelligen ce Division and Its Role in Aspects oflmperial Policymaking 1854-1 90 1' (Oxford D. Phil disserti on, 1976). 21. Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, A Guardsman's Memories (Londo n, 1932), p. 325. 22. Lieut enant-General Sir (later Baron ) Robert Baden-Powell, My Adventures as a Spy (London, 1915), pp . 11-1 2, 159. 23. And rew, ' Mobilization of British Int elligence', p. 93. 24. See below, pp . 35-8. 25. And rew, ' Mobilization of British Intelligence', pp . 94-7 . 26. GC& CS was, however, initi all y suspicious of mathemat ician s, believing that 'the right kind of brain to do th is work' was 'not mathemat ical but classical'. Christopher Andrew, ' Govern ments and Secret Services: A Historical Perspective' , Internationaljournal , XXXI V, no. 2 (1979 ), 167. 27. Hu gh T revor- Roper, The Philby Affair (London, 1968), p. 47. 28. 'J ohn Whitwell' (Leslie Nicholson), British Agent (London, 1966), chapter I. 29. The most recent stu dy of the Na tiona l Security Agency an d Anglo-Am erican cooperat ion in communications intelligence is J ames Bam ford, The Puzzle Palace (Boston, Mass., 1982). 30. Christo pher Andrew, ', Washington and the In telligence Services', International Affairs (july 1977), 396-7. 31. Lord Va nsitta rt, The M ist Procession (London, 1958), p. 597. 32. Andre w, 'Whitehall, Wash ington and the Intelligence Services', p. 395. 33. Cmnd. 8787 (1983 ), p. 85. 34. Michael Handel , 'A voiding Politi cal and T echn ological Surprise in the 1980s'; David S. Sulli van , ' Evalua ting Int elligence Estima tes' ; R. Pipes, ' Recruitment, Trainin g and In centi ves for Beller Analysis, Part 2', all in R. Godson (ed.), Intelligence Requirementsfor the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates (Washington, 1980). 35. Angelo Codevilla, 'Com parati ve Histori cal Experience of Doctrine and Organi zati on', ibid., pp . 15-1 6. 36. Cmnd. 8787 (1983), p. 86. 37. William Colby, interviewed by Christopher Andrew in Part 5 of 'T he Profession oflntelligence', first broad cast on BBC Radio 4 on 30 Aug 1981. 38. Sir Harold Wilson , The Governance ofBritain (London, 1976), cha pter 9. 39. Hous e of Comm ons, Parliamentary Debates, 28July 1977, col. 1223. 40. Cha pman Pinch er, Inside Story (London, 1978) pp . 15-21 , 32- 40. 41. David Ow en, Alan Beith , Roy Hatt ersley, Robin Cook and J onathan Aitken, interviewed by Christopher Andrew in ' File on Four', BBC Radio 4, 4 and II Aug 1982 (Prod ucer Peter Everett ), 252 THE MISSI NG DIMENSION

42. House of Co mmons, Parliamentary Debates, 15 Dec 1924, col. 674. 43. DO (48)5, 5J uly 1947, CAB 21/2554 .

I. J A PANES E INT E LI.I GE NCE AN D T HE APPROACH OF T HE RUSSO-J APANESE W AR Ian Nish

N .B . J apan ese nam es are shown in this essay with surna mes preceding given names, according to normal J apan ese convention.

I. Thanks are du e for help in the preparation of this pap er to Mr S. Boehn cke, Mr M. Falku s, Dr J . Ost erh ammel and Dr S. Sugiyama. 2. See G. Kerst, J acob Meckel: sein Leben, sein Wirken in Deutschland und Japan (Gottingen, 1970). 3. T. T akakura, Tanaka Giichi denki, 3 vols (Tokyo, 1958), vol. I, pp. 108-9. 4. Mutsu to Kurino, 15 Dec 1894, qu oted in G. M. Berger (ed.), Kenkenroku: A diplom atic recordiftheSino-Japanesewar, /894-5 (Mutsu) (To kyo, 1982), p. 271. 5. For the use made of Siebold by the promin ent diplomat, Aoki Shiizo, see I. H. Nish,Japaneseforeign policy, 1869-/942 (London, 1977), pp . 45 and 270-2. 6. Tokut omi Iichiro, Kiishaku Yamagata Aritomoden , 3 vols (Tokyo, 1933),vol. III , pp. 98-109. 7. Yamagata-den, III , 100-1. 8. Tanaka-denki; I, 110. 9. Shimada Ki nji, Roshiya ni okeru Hirose Takeo, 2 vols (To kyo, 1976). 10. Tanaka-denki, J, p. 113. I I. Tanaka-d enki; I, pp . 115-16. 12. Tanaka-denki , I, pp. 165-74. 13. Tanaka-denki, I, pp. 174-80 . 14. Tanaka-denki, I, p. 115; Komura gaikoshi (To kyo, 1953), vol. I, pp . 148-9. 15. Tanaka-denki, I, p. 181. 16. T his is a precis oforiginal ma ter ials taken from T an aka's diary and memorand a to be foun d in Tanaka-denki, I, pp. 185-214. 17. Tanaka-denki, J, pp . 260-2. 18. Ol avi Falt , 'Collaboration between J ap an ese intelligence and the Finnish und erground during the Russo-Japan ese war ', in Asian Profile, Iv/2 (1976) and 'J apan in Finnish und erground newspapers during the Russo-Japanese war' in 1. H. Nish and C. J. Dunn (eds ), European Studies onJapan (Tenterden, 1979), pp . 130-1. 19. Michael Fut rell, 'Colonel Akash i and J ap an ese contacts with Russian revolut ionaries in 1904-5', in St Antony's Papers, No.2: Far Eastern Affairs (1967), pp . 17-18. 20. Tanaka-denki, I, p. 181. 21. K uro bane Shigeru , Nichi-Ro sense to Akashi kiisaku (To kyo, 1976), pp . 73- 4. 22. Ku roban e, p. 74. 23. A. Hir at suka, Shishaku Kurino Shinichirii den (To kyo, 1942). 24. Ku rob ane, pp. 86--7. 25. Rakka ryiisui is reproduced in Ku rob ane, pp. 99--157. Akashi's exploits are dealt with in detail by Futrell, op. cit. andJ. A. Whit e, The Diplomacy of theRusso-Japanese war (Princeton, 1964), pp. 140-1. 26. Fu trell, op. cit., p. 22; Ku robane, pp . 64-6. An important contribution is made in J erzy J. Lerski, 'A Polish cha pte r of the Russo-Japan ese war' in Transactions iif the Asiatic Society of J apan, VII (Tokyo, 1959), 69--97. 27. Yam ab e Kentaro , 'Gaiko bunsho to ango' in Berger, Kenkenroku, p. 264. Also NOTES TOCHAPTER 1 253

Foreign Office (Public Record O ffice, Lond on ) 800/ 134, Ma cDon ald to Lan sdown e, 30 June 1903. 28. Nihongaiko bunsho; vol. 37/1, no. 53, Kurino to Komura, 15 J an 1904; and G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley (cds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 , vol. 1I (London, 1927), no. 281. 29. On Koku ryiikai , see M . B. J an sen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). For one of the 'C hina adventure rs', see Mi yazaki T oren, My 33 Years Dream (transla ted by S. Eto and M . B../ansen, Princeton , 1982). 30. Ishimitsu recounts his experie nces in a four-part work of which Kaya no hana is one. See Hashik awa Bun zo, Nis-Shin Nichi-Ro no seneki (Tokyo, 1970), pp . 108-35. 31. E.g. Nihongaik» bunsho; vol. 34 (Tokyo, 1956), no. 533. 32. G. A. Lensen (ed.), Koreaand Manchuria between Russia andJapan (T okyo, 1966), pp . 246-7. 33. Morri son to Moberley Bell, 24 Nov 1903 in Lo Hui-min (cd .), The Correspondence ofG. E. Morrison, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1976), vol. I, p. 239. My ita lics. The most detailed account of coopera tion betw een Co lonel Aoki and Yuan against Russian railways, telegraphs etc. is in Tani T oshio, Kimitsu Nichi-Ro senshi (T okyo, 1966). 34. Pap ers of SirJohnJordan (Public Record Office, London ), vol. I1I ,Jordan to F. A.Campbell (Foreign Office), II J an 1904. 35. J ordan papers I1I ,Jord an to Campbell, 16June, 1903. 36. J ordan pap ers I1I ,Jord an to Campbell, 15 Feb 1904. 37. Shimada, op. cit.; T ani , op. cit., Kimitsu Nichi-Ro senshi, und erscores army-navy quarrels. 38. Tani, op. cit., suggests th at betw een the two responsible comma nders, Ge nerals Matsukawa and Fukushima, ther e was rivalr y ove r int elligence which led to mutual antago nism. 39. Shimada, op. cit.; F. S. G. Piggott , Broken thread (Aldershot, 1950), p. 46.

2. CO DEBR EA KERS A ND FOREI GN O FFIC ES: T H E FR ES CH , BRITISH A ND A MERICA N' EX PE RIENCE Christopher Andrew

I. R. de Billy, unpublished souve nirs, pp . 15 ff, Archi ves du Min istere des Affaires Etran geres, de Billy MSS 3. 2. M. Paleologue,Joumal de I'affaire Dreyfus 1894-1899 (Pa ris, 1955), p. 266. Cf. Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette (1871- 1914) (, 1922-7), vol. XIII, no. 3633. 3. O . Homberg, Les coulisses de l'histoire (, 1938), p. 38. 4. M. Paleologue, Au Quaid'Orsay ala oeille de la tourmente.Toumal 1913-1914 (Paris, 1947), p. 35. 5. Homberg, Its coulisses, pp . 38-9. 6. C. M . Andrew, 'Dechiffrernent et dipl om ati e: Ie cabinet noir du Qu ai d'Orsay sous la Troisierne Republique', Relations Intemationales (1976), no. 5, 44 ff. 7. Ibid.; H. Guill emin, ' L'affaire Dr eyfus. Le telegramrne du 2 novembre' , Mercure de France, CCC XXXIX (1960 ). B. C.M. Andrew, Thiophile Delcassi and the Making ofthe Entente Cordiale (London, 1968), pp . 98-100, also 'Dechiffrernent et dipl om at ie', pp . 48-9. 9. Homberg, Its coulisses, pp . 38-9. 10. Haverna,'Note sur I'orga nisa tion et Ie fonctionnement d u servi ce cryptographi­ qu e de la Surete Generale', 7 Sept 1917, Archi ves Nation ales , F' 14,605. II. R. Poin car e, 'Notes joumalieres' , 16Jan 1914, Bibliothequ e Nation ale ca binet des manuscri ts (hereafter BN), n.a. fr. 16026. 12. A. Ferry, Its carnets secrets 1914-1918 (Pa ris, 1957), p. 21. 254 TH E MI S SI NG DIME N SION

13. And rew, Delcassi ; cha pter 14. 14. Havern a, 'Note' ; Andrew, 'Dechiffrernent et dipl omati e', pp. 51-3. 15. And rew, 'Dechiffrement et diplomat ie', pp. 53-5;J. -C. Allain,Joseph Caillaux: le difi oictorieux 1863-1914 (Paris, 1978), pp . 391-6. 16. Andrew, 'Dechiffremenr et dipl omat ie', p. 54. 17. J . Chastenet, Histoire de la TroisiemeRepublique, vol. IV (Paris, 1955), p. 94. 18. Havern a, 'Note' . 19. Poincare, ' Notes journa lieres', 28 May 1914, BN n.a.fr. 16027. 20. Poincare, 'Notes jo urna lieres', 14-1 6Jan , 28 May 1914, BN n.a.fr. 16026-7. 21. And rew, ' Dechiffrement et dipl omat ie', p. 57. 22. Poincare, ' Notes journalieres', 28 May, 23-25 J une 1914, BN n.a.fr. 16027. 23. Poincare, 'Notesjoumalieres' , 19-29 J uly 1914, ibid . 24. Rayner Hepp enstall, A Little PatternofFrench Crime (London, 1969), pp. 149-50. 25. Poincar e, 'Notes journalieres', 22 J uly 1914, BN n.a.fr. 16027. 26. Ferr y, Carnets secrets, p. 21. 27. Havern a, 'Note'; Andrew, ' Dechiffrernent et diplomati e', pp. 57- 8. 28. A. Ramm (ed.), The Political Correspondence of Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886, vol. II (Oxford, 1962), pp. 33-5. Monson to Lan sdowne, 21 Feb 1902, PRO Fa 800/124 . 29. 1'.0 . to Treasu ry, 8 and 18 Dec 1911, PRO T Il l 1357/22713. The changes mad e brought only a limit ed improvement. See below, pp. 106ff. 30. C. M. Andrew, 'The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relat ions in the I920s. Part I', HistoricalJournal, xx (1977), 678-9. 31. T he best study of naval codebrea king is in Patrick Beesly, (London, 1982). O n the broader context see C. M. Andrew, 'The mobilizat ion of British Int elligence for the T wo World War s', in N. F. Dreisziger (ed.), Mobilizationfo r Total War (Waterloo, O ntario, 1981). 32. A. G. Denn iston, MS memoir on Room 40, n.d., Churchi ll College Archives Centre, Cambridge, Denn iston MSS. Oli ver to Adm iralty, 7 March 1919; O liver, 'Notes About Room 40 and Sir in the 1914-1 8 War ', Na tional Maritim e Mu seum, O liver MSS O LV/8 . 33. F. H. Hin sley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. , (London, 1979), pp . 9-10. On the Zimm erm ann telegram see below, p. 141. 34. Denniston, MS memoir on Room 40. 35. Denni ston, TS memoir on GC &CS, 2 Dec 1944. Denni ston MSS. W. F. Clarke, 'T he Year s Between', Ch urchill College Archive Centre, Clarke MSS CLKE 3. 36. And rew, 'T he British Secret Service . . . Part I', pp. 683-7. 37. Ibid., pp. 692-5. 38. C. M. Andrew, 'British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia In 1927', HistoricalJournal, xxv, no. 4 (1982). 39. Ibid., p. 964. 40. Christopher Morris, Fellow of Kin g's College, Cambridge, interviewed by Christopher Andrew on "Timcwatch', BBC2, 15 Dec 1982. 41. And rew, 'T he Brit ish Secret Service . . . Part r', p. 686. 42. Herbert Yardl ey, The American Black Chamber (New York , 1931), p. 21. 43. It was indeed 'Neptune'. David Kahn , The Codebreakers (New York , 1968), p. 351. R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life andLetters (New York , 1928-39), vol. v, pp . 204!f, 307,317- 18; vol. VI, pp. 51- 2, I43ff. 44. Kahn, Codebreakers, pp . 370ff. ' Historical Backgro und of the Signal Security Agency', vol. II, chapter r, Washington National Archives, RG 457-77-1. 45. ' Historical Background of the Signal Secur ity Agency', vol. Ill, pp. 39-55. Yardley refers to the breaking of British diplom atic codes in TheAmericanBlack Chamber. He also claims various successes during the I920s with some of the codes and cyphers of NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 255

Argentina, Brazil, China , Costa Rica, C uba , Dom inica, France, Liheria, Mexico, Nicaragua,Panama, Peru , Russia, EI Salvado r and Spain. 46. 'Historical Background of the Signal Security Agency", vol. lIt, pp . 69-118. 47. W. F. Friedman, 'A Brief Hist or y of the Signal Intelligen ce Service', pp. 9-10, 29J une 1942, National Archives RG 457-SRH- 029. 48. R. Lewin , The OtherUltra (Londo n, 1982), p. 33. 49. J . Bamford, The Purrle Palace (Boston, Ma ss., 1982), pp . 18-26. 50. Friedman, 'Brief History ', p. 12. 51. ' Historical Backgroun d of the Signal Security Agency', vol. lIt, pp. 169-70. Lewin, OtherUltra, p. 38. The SIS began work in 1930. 52. Lewin , Other , p. 25. 53. ' Historical Background of the Signa l Security Agency', vol. III, pp. 288-9. 54. Ibid ., p. 308. 55. Friedman, 'Brief History', pp . 13-14. 56. 'Historical Background of the Signa l Security Agency', vol. lIt, p. 323. 57. Lewin , Other Ultra, p. 41. 58. Friedman, 'Bri ef History', p. 14. 59. Bamford , Puzzle Palace, p. 40.

3. BRt TI SH tNT ELI.lGENCE t x IR ELAND, 1914-1 921 Eunan O'Halpin

I. Memorandum by Lon g, 19 May 1916, India Office Library, Curzon pap ers, MSS Eur. F 112/176. For inform ati on concerning Major Price I am very grat eful to Mr Norman Stewart Price C MG aBE. For their comments on an earlier draft of this article I would like to thank Dr Leon O 'B roin , Emm et O 'Connor, Dr C. S. Andrews and Colonel Dan Bryan. 2. Report by Basil T homson on the organisation of intelligence in Irel and , September 1916, cited hereafter as 'T homson report', p. 2. With Thomson to French , 8 May 19181[mperial] W[ar] Ml useurn] , French papers, 75/46/12. 3. Plublic] Rlecord] Olffice], CO 904/157/ 1- 2 contain the intelli gence officers' report s from 1916to 1918. 4. Kellto Hardi nge, 13 May 1916, Cambridge University Library, Hardinge MSS 42/12&-7. 5. Harrel had been dismissed from the DMP following the Bachelor's Walk shootings in 1914. Robert Brennan, Allegiance (, 1950), pp . 41-2, describes how he was approac hed by Harrel when a reporter in Wexford to act as an agent. Brenn an was a known Sinn Feiner, and was struck by Harrel's ignoran ce ofthis . On p. 45 he ment ions that Harrel's correspondence was routinely int ercepted and read by Michael Collins's men in 1917 and 1918. 6. PRO, CO 904/2 3/4 has mat erial on the polit ical affiliations of dock yard employees. 'Thomson report ', p. 3. 7. Admi ral Sir Lewis Bayly, the senio r naval officer in th roughout the war , wrote a memoir, Pull Together (London, 1939), in which he gives an acco unt of the navy 's activities. 8. The ar my did prepare a list of suspects for deportation and detention in October 1915. If ac ted on 'there would not have been a rebellion & the consequ ent executions for all the lead ers were included in these recommend ati ons', wrot e Gen eral Maxwell to Lord French, 7 Sept 1916, French pap ers, 75/46/11. 9. Sltate] P[apers] O[ffice, Dublinl, CSO RP 1918, 18746. 10. Long to Gwynne, 19 Nov 1914, Bodleian Library , Gwynn e MS 20. II. Gwynn e to Bonar Law, 28 Dec 1914, enclosing notes by.J. D. Irvine dated 19 Dec 1914. H[ouse] ofL[ords] R[ecords] O[fficel, Bonar Law papers, 36/5/59. The 256 T HE MI S SI NG DIM EN SIO N disaster referred to was the sinking in October of the battl eship Audacious, which struc k a mine off the Donegal coas t. 12. SPO , C rimes Bran ch Special carton no. 23, file on Casement. 13. Admi ral Sir WilliamJam es, TheEyes ofthe Navy: a BiographicalStudyofAdmiral Sir (London, 1955), pp . 45-53. 14. Draft of a chapter by Hall on 'T he cruise of the Sayonara', Churc hill College, Cambridge, Hall pap ers, 3/3. See Long to Bonar Law, 16Jan 1917, on Lord Sligo, H LRO , Bonar Law papers, 8 1/2/16. 15. J am es, Eyes ofthe Navy, pp. 110-15. Hall circulated extrac ts from Casement's diari es during the latt er's trial in 1916, in order to discredit him by proving him a homosexual. James, op. cit., pp. 112-1 5, and B. L. Reid, The Lives ofRoger Casement (New Haven, Conn., 1976), pp. 382-4. Some writers maintain ed that the diari es were forgeries, but the evidence sugges ts that they were genui ne. 16. PRO , CO 904/120/1-2 contain nu merous police report s on the movements of suspects. Most of the leaders of the 1916 rebellion had been und er observation for some years. 17. Royal commission on the rebellion in Ireland, P[ariiament ary] P [apers] (1916) xi, p. 20 1. Unsigned note, 14 Apr 1916, PRO , CO 904/23/3 part 2. 18. 'Thom son report', p. 3; ' Royal commission' , p. 199. For a sympathetic account of the Und er-Secretary, Sir Mathew Nath an, see Leon O 'Broin, and the /9/6 Rising (Dublin, 1966). It is worth notin g that Nath an was not entirely inexperienced in intelligence matt ers: he gave evide nce in 1902 to a secret committee on ' permanent establishment of the mobi lisat ion and intelligence division'. PRO, T I 10966/617. I have located figures showing expend iture by the Irish governmen t from the secret service vote, 1885-6 to 1921- 2. T hey should be treated with ca utio n: althoug h accurate in themselves, they reflect only a proportion ofexpenditure on politica l intelligence in those years. The RIC and DMP eviden tly had some funds of thei r own for such work, and ofcou rse their staffcosts would be met from the ordinary votes. Furtherm ore, naval intelligence and military intelligence had money for secret intelligence work othe r tha n that from the secret service vote.

Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount 1885-6 17,487 II I I 1899-00 2, 139 106 1913-4 869 6 2 188&-7 7,936 10 2 1900-1 1,945 06 1914-5 995 10 0 1887- 8 4,248 18 4 1901-2 1,347 146 1915-6 981 00 1888-9 4,484 12 3 1902-3 1,962 I I 9 191&-7 932 12 0 1889-90 4,423 172 1903-4 1,549 15 6 1917-8 1,803 50 1890- 1 4,031 12 0 1904-5 1,502 7 7 1918-9 1,412 95 1891-2 4,505 18 9 1905-6 2,634 55 1919-20 8,499 40 1892- 3 2,457 9 5 190&-7 837 63 1920-1 63,602 4 9 1893-4 1,3031 4 3 1907-8 997 17 6 1921- 2 36,308 10 4 1894-5 1,505 12 7 1908-9 813 1 0 1895-6 1,536 18 4 1909-10 9 16 140 189&-7 1,639 4 4 1910-11 984 42 1897- 8 1,758 17 7 1911-12 904 00 1898-9 1,240 17 I 1912-1 3 807 00

Source: PRO, T I 11689/25138 and T1 65/46 and 48.

19. See Mau reen Wall, 'The backgro und to the Rising' in K. B. Nowlan (ed.), The Making of /9 /6: Studiesin the History ofthe Rising (Dublin, 1969), pp. 157- 97. 20. ' Royal commission', p. 222. NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 257

21. Ibid. 22. Bayly, Pull together, p. 206. The seq uence of events outlined here is given in some detail in O 'B roin, Dublin Castle, passim. 23. James, Eyes ofthe Navy, p. 112. 24. Brian In glis, RogerCasement (Londo n, 1973), pp . 317- 18. O 'Broin , op. cit., p. 83. 25. Leon O 'Broin, MichaelCollins (Dublin, 1980), p. 15. 26. O 'Broin, Dublin Castle, p. 83. 27. Ib id., p. 10. For his action in opening fire on the rebels, thereby causing them to retreat from the Castl e, and for his general cond uct during the Rising , Major Price was awarded the DSO. Inform at ion from Norm an Stewart Price. 28. 'Royal commission', p. 250. 29. Ibid ., p. 22. For Birrell's career, see Leon O'Broin, The Chief Secretary: Augustine Birrell and Ireland, 1907-1916 (London, 1968) . Birrell was somewhat unfort unate to be saddl ed with all the blam e, given the vacillations of the ca binet on Ir ish policy, but he undoubtedly allowed his ad ministra tion to become rather slack in its observat ion and treatment of separatist groups. After years of listen ing to nation alist hyperbole, he found it difficult to take the various extremist groups seriously. The same attitude ap pears to have pervad ed the detective unit of the DMP. 30. See note 20 abov e. 31. In The Scene Changes (London, 1939), Thomson q uotes from a diary he kept during the war. His gr and son knows of no papers of any conseq uence that have survived. 32. 'T homson report', pp . 1,4 and 5. 33. Thomson to French, 8 May 1918, IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/1 2. See note 94 below. 34. Eun an O' Ha lpin, ' H. E. Duk e and the Irish ad ministration, 1916--1 8', Irish Historical Studies, XXII , no. 88 (September 1981), 364; Maxwell to French, 7 Sept 1916, IWM, French papers, 75/46/1 1. 35. MacDonogh (Director of Military Int elligence) to Genera l Officer Command- ing in Chief, Irel and , 2 Sept 1916, PRO, WO 35/69/8. 36. Ibid . Docum ent s relative to the Sinn Fein movement , PP ( 1921) XXI X, 444-51. 37. Minute by Price, 4 Sept 1916, as in note 35 above. 38. MI 5D to GHQ, Irish comma nd, 25 Sept 1916, ibid . 39. As in note 36 abov e. Sean Cronin, The McGarritypapers (T ralee, 1972), pp . 64-5. 40. ' Documents', pp. 454-6. 41. O'Halpin, ' H. E. Duke', p. 366. 42. T he Belfast man was R..J . Lynn , MP, edi tor of the Northern Whig. See Strachey to Lynn , 9J uly 1918, HLRO, Strac hey papers , S21/2/5. See also Carson to Lloyd George, 30 Oc t 1917, enclosing material from Lynn warning of 'a repetition of 1641' in Ulster, with Sinn Fein using 'fire, poison and sword' in a new rebellion. HLRO, Lloyd George papers, F/6/ 2/18. 43. Unsigned [Thomson ] to Strac hey, 29 June 1918, HLRO, Strachey pap ers, S/2I /2/5. 44. Strachey to Lynn , 9J uly 1918, ibid . Strachey to Headl am, 17 Oct 1917, HLRO, Strachey pap ers, S/21/2/6 . O 'Halpin, ' H. E. Duk e', p. 366. 45. Lon g had his own source of secret inform at ion on Irish affairs, as he was constantly in touch with the permanent head of the Ir ish local government board, Sir Henry Robinson , who produced ca pa ble reports from a strongly un ion ist perspective. They were conce rned not with tales of mysterious foreigners and subma rine landi ngs, but with political condi tions. Robinson occas iona lly sought confiden tial accounts of the state of the country from his subordina tes sta tioned th roughout Ir eland . IWM, French papers, 75/46/12 . 46. 'Documents', pp . 463-4. It tran spired that the man in que stion , Robert 258 THE MISSING DIMENSION

Monteith, was already back in Ireland. This slender evidence formed the hasis for the claim that 'before the end ' of 1917 'a secret headquarters had been set up in South America whence agents were sen t to Ireland'. Draft memorandum on ' the story of the active links between the Sinn Fein movement and Germany', IWM, French papers, 74/46/12. 47. ' Documents', p. 467, says that on 2 Dec 1917a man arrested in Mayo was found to be in possession of ' two pamphlets printed in Germany'. From this it was inferred that these had been sent by submarine. The Germans were notably reluctant to send even arms by those means , which makes it all the more unlikely that they would risk a U-boat simply to provide publicity material for Sinn Fein. 48. PRO, CO 904/92-114 contain the inspector general's monthly reports. 49. See note 3 above . 50. PRO, CO 904/23/5 contains papers on arms smuggling, 1916--17. Dissatisfac­ tion with the intelligence agencies' failure to penetrate Sinn Fein and to find evidence of collusion with Germany was sometimes expressed in cabinet. See WC 186(I), 14July 1917, PRO, Cab. 23/3. 51. WC 372(11), 25 Mar 1918, PRO, Cab. 23/5. 52. ' Documents', pp. 468-9. ' Precis of information re German help to Sinn Fein rebels' by Major Price, with Samuels to Lloyd George , Bonar Law and Long, undated, c. 13 May; telegram [from Hall?] on his interrogation of Dowling , with Mahon to French, 21 Apr 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/12. 53. Precis by Major Price, as in note 52 above . 54. H. C. Hoy, 40 OBor How the Warwas Won (London, 1932), pp. 147-8. He claims that at the appointed time a handkerchiefwas waved in the prescribed manner, causing a submarine to surface and approach the shore : '.. . when she was close in two aeroplanes promptly appeared on the scene, and bombs, I am informed, put an end to that mission '. This is scarc ely credible: from R. H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, TheGerman Submarine War (London, 1932), it appears that no submarines were sunk off the Irish coast between 25 Apr and IOJuly 1918, and none were destroyed by aircraft during the entire year. 55. Hoy, 40 OB, p. 147. 56. French diary, 21 Apr 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/3. 57. Ibid., 19 and 25 Apr 1918. 58. Ibid ., 5 May 1918. 59. Precis by Major Price, as in note 52 above . See also ' Documents', p. 469. The Cotters were keen sailors, and this probably explains the incident. Information from Dr C.S. Andrews, 8 June 1982. Richard Coller was a brother-in-law of Mrs Eamon de Valera. 60. See ' Notes on the position in Ireland in the years 1917, 1918 and 1919', University College Dublin, Mulcahy papers, P7/D/35. 61. Precis by Major Price, and telegram [by Hall?], as in note 52 above. 62. French diary, 24 Apr 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/3. 63. Report from Irish command, 2 May; report from MI5D, 3 May 1918, conveying the substance of an Admiralty communication. IWM, French papers, 75/46/12. This report was cited in 'Documents', p. 472, but the date given was 4 May, and Copenhagen was not mentioned as its origin . No arms appear to have reached Ireland, and it is unlikely that any were sent. From Dowling's admissions it seemed that no German landing could take place before mid-June. 64. French diary, 2 May 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/3. 65. Bonar Law to Carson, 25 Apr 1918, HLRO, Bonar Law papers, 84/7/25. WC 4D8(11), 10 May 1918, PRO, Cab. 23/6. 66. French diary, 8 and 12 May 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/3. NO TES TO CHAP TE R 3 259

67. T he proclam at ion also called for an increase in voluntary recruitment , warning that consc ription would otherw ise be enforced . 68. WC 4D8/N2, 10 May 1918, PRO, Cab. 23/ 14. 69. French to Sta mfordha m, 18 May 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/ 3. 70. Leon O'Broin, Michael Collins (Dublin, 1980), pp . 30-1. 71. Long to Reading (ambassa dor in Washin gton ), and Reading's reply, 17 and 20 May 1918, British Library, Balfour pap ers, MS 49741/178-9 and 186--8. I am grateful to Dr J . R. Fann ing for this reference. See T homson's message to Long, 20 May 1918, that 'i t is only possible . . . to give a rechauffe' of post- material in order to avoid 'giving away sources of information '. W[iltshire] R[ecord] O[ffice], Long papers, 947/373. Long to French, 20 May 1918, WRO , 947/701 ; unsigned memorandum by Long on secre t service organisa tion, unda ted, au tumn 1918, WRO , Long papers, 947/672. 72. S. W. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets (London, 1970-4), I, 554, diary of21 May 1918. O ne draft of the proclam at ion asserted that 'an important feature in every plan for rebellion' was 'the estab lishment of subma rine bases in Ireland to menace the shipping of all nations' . Draft memorandum, as in note 46 above. 73. WC 414/A, 22 May 1918, PRO, Cab. 23/ 14. 74. Charles a Court Repin gton , The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), II, 311, diary for 29 May 1918. He later described it as 'a myth ' to Donal O 'Sulli van , author of The Irish Free Stateand its Senate (London, 194D), p. 42. 75. Sir Henry Robinson to French, 30 May 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/12, says the arrests took Sinn Fein supporters by surprise, but that if convincing evidence was forthcomi ng the sepa ratist movement would never recover. 76. See A. W. Samuels to Lloyd George, 15 Dec 1920, PRO , PREM 117 , in connection with the pu blishing of the ' Documents' White Pap er. He had been Irish attorney gene ral in 1918, an d remained convinced that 'da ngers' had then ' threatened not merely Ir eland an d the British Emp ire but the whole allied cause'. Samuels to French, 25 Ap r 1921, IWM , French pap ers, 75/46/1 I. 77. J ames, Eyes iftheNavy, passim. 78. Un fortuna tely there is nothing in Hall's pa pers in Churchill College, Ca m­ bridge, to thro w fresh light on the 'Germ an plot' affair. 79. French to Lloyd Geo rge, 19 May 1918, IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/1 I. 80. Minut es of viceroy's execu tive council, I July 1918, IWM, French papers, 75/46/13. See also Saun derson to Long, 12 Sept 1918, on military complaints tha t secre t service information from Lond on was never given in full. WRO, Long papers, 947/347. 81. Minu tes of viceroy's executive council, 12 July 1918, as in note 80 above . 82. Inspector genera l's monthly reports, June 1918-0 ct 1919. PRO , CO 904/ 106--10. 83. Uns igned memorandu m by Long, as in note 71 above. 84. Hoy, Room 40, p. 268. 85. For the sequel to his remova l, see Eunan O 'Ha lpin, 'Sir Warren Fisher and the coalition, 1919-1 922', HistoricalJ ournal, XX IV, 4( 1981), 917-25. 86. The best account of events in Irel and from 1919 to 1921 is Cha rles Townshend , The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921 (Ox ford, 1975). 87. Minut es of viceroy's executive coun cil, 18Jan , and French to Macpherson , 31 J an 1919, IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/13 . Major Price becam e county inspector in Cavan and Ferm an agh, but he was freq uent ly called to Dublin to advise on the situat ion generally. In O ctober 1920 he was appoi nted assistant inspector general, and returned to work full time in Dub lin Castle. In 1922 he received a warning that he was abo ut to be shot, and was advised to walk out of his office·and go st raight to England 'leavi ng his hat on the door', so that the I RA would not realise he had left for good . This he did. He died there in 1931. In formation from Norman Stewart Price. 260 TH E MISSIN G DIM EN SI ON

88. Townshend, British Campaign, pp . 21-2. See French to Long, 5 J une 1919, in which he complains that the navy no longer pat rolled to preven t arms smuggling. IWM, Fr ench pap ers, 75/49/1 3. However, some form of naval inte lligence seems to have continued: see A. W. Co pe and B. G . Har wood to Sir War ren Fisher, 12 May 1920, HLRO , Lloyd George Pap ers, F/3I/1 /32. 89. O ' Broin, Michael Collins, pp. 49-50. 90. Minutes of viceroy's executive council, 25 May, 2 an d 10 J une 1919, IW M, French pap ers, 75/46/ 13. On 10 Apr French had sought the services of Co lonel Kell, ' the best man ' to advise on how to set up 'a proper criminal inves tigati on department' . Letter to Churchill, IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/1 1. This was symptomat ic of the confusion which prevailed within the ad ministration: Kell was head of M l5, which was an intelligence agency rather than a detective unit of the police. 9 1. Fr ench to Ma cph erson , 4 Nov 1919, IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/13. 92. Saunderson to Long, 19 Dec 1919, WRO , Long pap ers, 947/348. 93. T aylor was effectively head of the Ir ish administra tion, as his nominal superio r had been cut out of all important decis ion-ma king by French . 94. Report of the committee of inq uiry into the detective organisation of the Irish police forces, dated 7 Dec 1919. IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/1 2. In fact the copy cited was typed . 95. Ibid. 96. See French to Ma cph erson , S Mar 1920, IWM, French pap ers, 75/46/ 13. For the effects of th e cha nges mad e on the RIC, widel y seen within the force as sectarian and political in nature, seeJ . A. Ga ugha n, Memoirsof Constablefer emiah. Mee , R.l. G. (Dublin, 1975), pp . 77-9 ,259. 97. Sa underson to Long, 17 Dec 1919, WRO, Long pap ers, 947/348. 98. Bell's report to French, unda ted,Jan 1920, PRO, CO 904/1 88/ 1. 99. T ownshend , British Campaign, p. 91. Co llins to William O ' Brien, 6 J uly 1921, National Librar y of Ireland, O'Brien pap ers, MS 15687. I am grateful to Emmet O'Connor for this reference. 100. Bell to French, as in note 98 above. 101. T ownshend , British Campaign, p. 65. 102. T his assum ption is based on Bell's report and notebook in the PRO , CO 904/188/1. O n the inside cover of the notebook is wri tte n in Bell' s han dwrit ing, 'The Director of In telligence, Scot land House, London SWI '. T he di rector of intelligence was Sir Basil T homson. For exam ples of Bell's activities, see the entries for 15 an d 17 Feb 1920. He had 'j ust got in touc h with a party in a prom inent position in the Dublin Dockyard and am in hopes that some useful informa tion may be ob tained as I believe it is a happy hunting gro und for S.F.' , was 'on the track of one of the S.F. who escaped from M'J oy [M ountjoy Prison], and had noted an offer of informat ion on the Ashtow n ambush from a Mr Qu igley, who un fort unately ' left phone box before any further inform ation could be obtained'. 103. Townshend, British Campaign, p. 82. 104. M acread y to And erson , 8 Ap r 1921, PRO, CO 904/188/2. 105. Townshend, British Campaign, p. 9 1. 106. Sturgis diar y, 26 Sept 1920 and 13 Feb 1921, PRO, PRO 30/59/1-4. 107. See Mont agu to Lloyd George, 29 June 1920, discussing the possible loan of agents from the Indian police to Iri sh command. HLRO, Lloyd George pap ers , F/40/3/11. 108. Sturgis diar y, 26 Sept 1920, as in note 106 above. 109. One of Collins's informers, , published an inte resting but somewha t unreliable memoir, The Spy in the Castle (London, 1968). He and another agent , Eamon Broy, were well rewarded for their services , becoming senior police officers in the Ir ish free sta te. NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 261

110. Detective Ho ey, for exa mple, who was sho t in 1919, had been bod yguard to H . E. Duk e, the chief secretary from 1916 to 1918. III . Tom Bowd en, The Breakdown ofPublic Security: the Case ofIreland 1916-1921, and Palestine 1936-1939 (Londo n, 1977), p. 308. This book is confused, ina ccurate and repetitious where Irel and is conce rne d. 112. This was Frank T eeling, who as an officer in th e Free Stat e a rmy in 1923 ' miscond ucted hims elf in such a way . . . as to run the dan ger of bringing serious discredit on us', as the army comma nder complained to the head of the government on 5 Feb 1923. The cabinet agreed to pay Teeling £250 to ena ble him to emigra te to Australia, but although the mon ey was issu ed from a secret service fund it was not spent , as T eeling was detained after shooting a man dead in Dublin 's Theatre Royal. SPO, S 2166 . 113. Sturgis di ar y, 7 Dec 1920, as in note 106 a bove. 114. Collins was killed in an ambush in County Cork during the civil war which followed the treat y with Brit ain . Althou gh th e evide nce seems straigh tforward enough, there has always been a slight air of mystery a bout his death. In The Shoo ting ofMichael Collins: Murderor Accident? (Dublin, 1981), pp . 90-4, J ohn M . Feehan put forward the bizarre theory that Collins was killed by on e ofhis closest comra des, who was in reality an agent of'the British secret servi ce', a 'world wide body ' with 'millions of pounds of public money at th eir d isposal'. This is sca rcely credible. In the autumn of 1922 one of the lead ing Republicans, Ernie O 'Malley, got copies of int elligen ce do cuments, evide ntly sent to him ' by one of his age nts from British General He adquarters'. These were apprecia tions ofth e situa tion rather than evide nce of ac tive intelligen ce opera tions, but th e publicat ion of extrac ts in a Republican newssheet grea tly angered th e Free Stat e government , as they spoke of the murder by government forces of Repu blican pri soners. SPO, S 1784. 115. For th e experiences ofon e a rmy officer on int elligence duty in Ireland , see Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top (London, 1968), pp . 1-5. He had £5 per month with whi ch to pay informants, whom he would travel to meet disguised 'usua lly as the own er of a sma ll donk ey cart'. His sources were peopl e such as railway workers and barmen who were well pla ced to noti ce any stra ngers or unusua l occurrences in their d istricts. These were the sort of people , and this was the sort of intelligence, th at would normally he the concern of the local police. 116. Neligan, Spy in the Castle, p. 78. 117. Nigel West, M.l. 5: BritishSecurityService Operations, 1909-1945 (Londo n, 1981), p. 46, says all thos e killed were agen ts of the secret int elligen ce service (SIS) . As alr ead y indicat ed in not e 105 a bove, it is extre mely doubtful wheth er all the victims were intelligence officers. Furthermore, it seems unlik ely tha t they were SI S men , in that it was supposed to op erat e on ly outside the empire ; with in was the pro vince ofMI5. West is wrong also in dating in 1919, and in usin g the term ' Fenians' to describe IRA suspects detained in England in 1922. The book is not very authoritative on the ea rly history of MI 5, and it con tains a good number of errors offact. 118. See not e 114 ab ove. The wom an concerne d in Cork was engaged to Florence O'Donoughue, a leading IRA man in the a rea. Information from Dr C. S. Andrews, 8 June 1982. 119. See not e 5 above.

4. BRITISH MILITARY AND EC ONO MIC INTELLIGENCE : ASSESSMENT S OF NA ZI GER MA NY BEF ORE T HE SECOND WORLD WA R Weslry K. Wark

I. See W. K. Wark, ' British Intelligence on the German Air For ce and Aircraft Industr y 1933-1 939' , The HistoricalJournal, xx v, 3 (1982), 627- 48. 262 TH E MI SSI NG DIM EN SI ON

2. T he first maj or pieces ofintelligence a rrived in May and November 1934: AI4 note, 22 May 1934, AIR 9/24; and air attache, Par is, despatch 15 Nov 1934, C7802/ 31/18 , FO 371/1 7713. For some insigh t into SI S ac tivit ies in th is period , see F. W. Win terbo tha m, The Nazi Connection (London, 1978). O n th e Fren ch Deu xierne Bureau , see Georges Castellan , Le Rearmament Clandestin du Reich /930-/935 (Paris, 1954), pp. 174-5. 3. Wark , ' Britis h Intelligen ce on the German Air Force', p. 631. 4. ern 1216-B, 4 Mar 1936, CA B 4/24 . 5. Richar d O very, 'T he Germ an Pre-W ar Aircraft Production Plan s: November 1936--Apr il 1939', The English Historical Review (Oct. 1975), 77&-97; Wilhelm Deist, The and German Rearmament (London, 1981), cha pter 4. 6. R. O very, 'Hi tler an d Air Strategy' ,Journal ofContemporaryHistory, xv , 3 (1980), 409. 7. cm 1265-B, 6 O ct 1936, CA B 4/25 . 8. Air sta ff merno., 23 O ct 1936, AIR 9/24; D.P .(P)7, ' Prog ress of Germa n Air Rearmam ent ', 6 J uly 1937, C AB 16/182; AI3 (b) est., 27 O ct 1938, AIR 40/2043 . 9. Air sta ff to F.O ., II Sept 1936, C6429/3925/18, FO 371/19946. 10. Sir Cha rles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany /939-/945 (London, 1961), I, pp. 9 1-6 . II . AI 3 'Estima te of German Air Force Bombing Potential', 24 Aug 1938, AIR 9/90. 12. Ib id. 13. Karlheinz Kens and Heinz Nowarra , Die Deutschen Flugzeuge /933-/945 (Mun­ chen, 1968). 14. ARP cas ua lty estima tes, see T . H . O ' Brien, Civil Defence (London, 1955), pp. 15-16, 96,1 44,1 72- 15. See note 14 above. The file AI R 9/90, consisting of plan s divisions' notes on the crisis, contains much valuab le material. 16. Newall to Kingsley Wood , 10 Sept 1938, AI R 8/248 . 17. Mor eover, there was some contradictory inte lligence . MI5 repo rted from its Ge rma n sources the wa rn ing that if Britain decla red war, th e Luftwaffe would launch an immediate attack on Lond on: Hinsley, British Intelligence, I, 82. O n the air power deb ate, see Ba rry Powers, Strategy Without Slide Rule: British Air Strategy /914-/939 (London, 1976). 18. SirJ ohn Siessor, The CentralBlue (London, 1956), p. 230. Siessor's memory was not qu ite accurate. The DCOS repo rt was ac tually prep ared by the Joint Planning Co mmittee, of whi ch he was a senior mem ber . 19. Air attache, Berlin , despat ch , 6 Apr 1939, C5 176/1 1/18, FO 371/22956. 20. Berlin embassy to FO , 27 July 1939, C 10519/15/18, FO 37 1/22975. 21. O n th e British understanding of German ai r doctrine see Wark , ' British Int elligence on the GAF ', 64 1- 3. 22. C ID 1182-B, 'T he Ge rman Army: Its Present Str ength and Possible Rat e of Expansion in Peace and War', 2July 1935, CAB 4/23 . 23. WO 190/263, 18July 1934. (WO 190-the MI3 file ofa pprec iation papers on the Germa n army 1922-39 is an invalu abl e source for th e stud y ofmilitary int elligence in the int erw ar yea rs); C P 205(34), DRC report, secret append ix, 31 J uly 1934, CAB 16/110. 24. MI3, 30 Mar 1935, WO 190/315. 25. Ibid .; WO 190/324, 27 Apr 1935; WO 190/329,9 Ma y 1935. 26. Berlin embas sy despat ch, 9 Oc t 1935, C69 17/5023/18 , FO 371/18883. 27. Militar y attache, Berlin, despat ch, 9 Feb 1938, C978/62/18, FO 371/18883; by July 1938 th e MA was less certain of the a rmy 's a utono mo us power: C7648/1941/18, FO 371/21729. 28. ern 1182-B, 2July 1935, C AB 4/2 3. NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 263

29. ern 1449-B, [july 1938], closed in file CAB 4/28, summarised in em 1507-B, 19Jan 1939, CAB 4/29 . 30. WO 190/230, II Nov 1933. 31. WO 190/342, 23July 1935; WO 190/344, 25July 1935; CIGS pap er, 16June 1936, CAB 64/14; COS 698(revise) 28 Mar 1938, CAB 53/37; WO 190/644, n.d. [Aug 1938]; WO to F.O ., 5 Sept 1938, C9306/65/18, FO 371/21668; WO to FO, 9Sept 1938, C9451/65/18, FO 371/21668. 32. The exception was a WO study sent to the MA, Berlin, WO 106/5421. The lack of attention paid to the Czech army is confirmed by the memoirs of Brigadier H.C.T . Stronge (MA, Prague 1936-38), P226, The Imperial War Museum, London. 33. B. Bond (ed.), Chiefof Staff: The DiariesofLt. Gen. Sir Henry Pownall (London, 1972), I, Appendix II, p. 383. 34. Gort to Lady Marjorie, quoted in J . R. Colville , Man of Valour: The Life ofField Marshalthe Viscount Gort(London, 1972), p. 118; Diary entry for 22 Sept 1938 in Col. R. Macleod and D. Kelly (eds.), The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940 (London, 1962), p. 62; Ismay memo., 20 Sept 1938, CAB 21/544. 35. WO and IIC estimates in em 1507-B, 19Jan 1939, CAB 4/29; and em 1571-B, 24 July 1939, CAB 4/30. 36. COS 8710P), 28 Mar 1939, CAB 53/47. 37. WO 190/751,22 Feb 1939. 38. WO 190/752,23 Feb 1939. 39. MI3(b) to FO 27 Feb 1939, C2501/32/18, FO 371/23001. 40. Military attache, Berlin , telegram, 29 Mar 1939, C4399/13/18, FO 371/22958 . See Ewan Butler, Mason-Mac. The Life ifLt. Gen . Sir Noel Mason-Macfarlane (London, 1972). 41. The accounts by Sidney Aster, 1939: The Makingof theSecond WorldWar (London, 1972), chapter 4, pp. 107-12 and N. H. Gibbs, GrandStrategy (London, 1976), I, pp. 698-701 are somewhat misleading. In his reports to the COS and CID secretary, both of which were made available to the Cabinet, the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence emphasised that the German threat was one of military blackmail or, at most, a limited coup against Danzig. See: COS 286 Mtg., 30 Mar 1939,CAB 53/10; and DDMI to Ismay (this report went to Wilson and the PM ), 'Germany's intentions regarding Danzig', 30 Mar 1939, PREM 1/33IA. 42. Military attache, Berlin, despatch, 23 Mar 1939, C3954/13/18, FO 371/22958 . 43. David Dilks (ed.) , TheDiariesifSir Alexander Cadogan 1938-45 (London, 1971),26 Mar 1939, pp. 163-4. 44. Military attache, Berlin , despatch, 29 Mar 1939, C4760/13/18, FO 371/22958; Cadogan min., 31 Mar 1939, ibid . 45. Group Captain Goddard to FO, 24 Apr 1939, AIR 40/1487 . 46. Geyr von Schweppenburg, The Critical Years (London, 1952), p. 81. 47. The MI3 collation file on Germany (WO 190) includes 36 reports on mechanisation and motorisation in the German army between 1933-9. This evidence flatly contradicts Hinsley's statement that the War Office paid no attention to the matter, British Intelligence, t, p. 76. On the study of German military doctrine, see WO 190/640, 15 July 1938; WO 216/189, 16 Mar 1938; and military attache, Berlin, despatch, 12 Oct 1937, C 7105/136/18, FO 371/20732. 48. WO 190/675, 23 Sept 1938; WO to FO , 24 Sept 1938, ClI000/65/18, FO 371/21670. 49. Bond (ed.) ChiefofStaff, r, 221. 50. See W. K. Wark, ' Baltic Myths and Submarine Bogeys: British Naval Intelligence and 1933-1939', TheJournal ifStrategic Studies, VI , no. I (1983). 51. See the works by Patrick Beesly: Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18 264 THE MI S SIN G DIME NSIO N

(London, 1982); Very Special Admiral: The Life ofAdmiral). H. Godfrey (London, 1980); Very Special Intelligence (London, 1977). Also Donald McLachlan , Room 39 (London, 1968) and Anthony Wells, ' Nava l Intelligence and Decision-M aking in an era of Techn ical Cha nge', in B. Ranft (ed .) Technical Changeand British Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London, 1977). 52. Major General Sir Kenneth Stron g, Intelligenceat the Top (London, 1968), p. 18. 53. Wark, ' Baltic Myths', pp. 64-70. 54. Q uoted in Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I, p. 166. 55. Wark, ' Baltic Myths', pp . 66-7. 56. C ID 1252-B, 'German Naval Constru ction', 22J uly 1936, CA B 4/24; ' Estimate of Germa n Naval Forces 1939 and 1942', 9 Jan 1935, ADM 116/3373 and minute, 21 Dec 1934, ibid. 57. Fa minute, 30 Nov 1933, C I0777/ 404/18, Fa 371/16730; Naval atta che, Berlin, despat ch, 27 Nov 1934, C8066/2134/18, Fa 371/1 7765. 58. This was the ' Baltic myth '. See Wark , ' Baltic Myths', pp. 65,72- 3. 59. The 35 per cent rati o only offered some hope to the Brit ish of securing a two-power standard pro vided theJap an ese fleet did not exceed the Washin gton T reaty limits of 1922 (in effect a fleet 60 per cent the size of the ). However ,Jap an had already indicated her decision to termina te her adherence to the Washington Naval Treaty. See Gib bs, Grand Strategy, I, pp . 155-6. 60. For example, Ch atfield memo., 22 Dec 1936, ADM 116/ 3378. 61. Adiniral J . H. Godfre y, Naval Memoirs, typescript, privat ely pr inted, copy in Imp erial War Mu seum , London, Vol. v, 251. 62. Hin sley, British Intelligence, I, pp. 52-5. See also the papers of code breakers Clarke and Denniston , Churchill College Archives, Ca mbridge. 63. Wark, ' Baltic Myths', pp. 73-5. 64. ' Revised draft of naval intelligence report - Section 2 - Strategy and Tactics', 29 Aug 1936, ADM 178/137. 65. O n the Admira lty's interwar neglect of trad e defence matt ers, see Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Betweenthe Wars (London, 1976), II, pp . 226-9. 66. H. Rosinski, The Development ofNaval Thought (Newport, 1977), essays rep rinted from Brassey's Naval Annual, pp. 53-101. 67. Naval attache to DNI , 15 May 1939, ADM 1/9956. 68. DNI minut e, 30 May 1939, ibid. 69. See War k, 'Baltic Myths', pp . 75-6 . 70. G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932-1939 (, 1979), esp. pp. 160-7. 71. C ID 1090-B, 6 May 1932, CA B 4/21. (For unfath omabl e reasons, the record s of the II C remain mostly und er extended closur e in CAB 48.) 72. Hinsley, British Intelligence, I, p. 33. 73. For a discussion of these, see ibid., chapter I. 74. Ibid . Hin sley's discussion of the II C's reporting is seriously marred by the author's supposition that the Germ an economy was being gear ed for a ' Blitzkreig'. See note 88 below. 75. These are not discussed in H insley, British Intelligence, I, chapter 2. C ID 1134-B, 'Germany's Industrial Measur es for Rearm am ent and for Aircraft Production ', 22 Mar 1934, CAB 4/22; CID 1426-B, 'Germa ny: Export of Armament s' , 2 May 1938, CAB 4127. 76. ern 1134-B, 22 Mar 1934, CAB 4/22. 77. 'Ge rmany and Indust rial Mobilisat ion', 9 June 1935, C4687/4687/18, Fa 371/18882. 78. ICF/322, 'Germany: Theory of Industrial Mobili sation ', 18 May 1937, NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 265

C3792/78/18, Fa 371/20727 (extrac ts); ICF/ 322 (full ), 15 Sept 1937, C6702/78/1 8, Fa 371/20729 . 79. CP 316(37), 15 Dec 1937, CAB 24/2 73. For an extended discussion see Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I, pp. 282-9 5. 80. Fa to Morton, 14 Feb 1938, C5 42/65/18, Fa 371/21666. 81. Morton prelimin ary notes to Fa, 25.Jan 1939, C542/65/18, Fa 371/21666; cm 1426-B, 2 May 1938, CAB 4/27. 82. Nicholls minute, Apr 1938, CI 801/65/1 8, Fa 371/21666; Halifax to Inskip, 27 Apr 1938, ibid. 83. CAB. CONS. 24(38), 18 May 1938, CAB 23/93. 84. Chamberlain comments, ibid . 85. cm 330 Mt g, 21July 1938, CAB 2/7. The II C pap er was qu ietly shelved after a discussion in this committee . 86. Morton contemptuously dismissed an Air Min istry suggestion that the German economy might not be mobilising for total war, Morton to Webb , 19July 1938, CAB 104/35. 87. Berlin emba ssy minute, 31 Dec 1935, C61/4/18, Fa 371/19883. 88. On German war preparations see the revisionistic essay, arguing against the notion of economic 'blitzkrieg' planning, by Richard Overy, 'Hitler's War and the Germ an Economy: A Reint erpretation', The Economic History Review , xxxv , 2 (May 1982), 272-91. 89. For intelligence on the comparison of Germ an and British aircraft production figures in 1939, see Morton to Fa, I Feb 1939, C2382/1I/18, Fa 371/22956. An example of the num erous reports on declining qu ality in Germ an arms manufacture is cm 1571-B, 24July 1939, CAB 4/30. 90. The series consists of: COS 401UP ), 2 O ct 1935, CAB 53/25; COS 513(JP), 26 Oc t 1936, CAB 53/29; COS 747 (jP), 15July 1938, CAB 53/40; and COS 831 OP), 26 J an 1939, CAB 53/44. 91. The O ct 1936 appreciation was censored by Sir Maurice Hankey as Chai rma n of the DCOS in the winter of 1936--7:see DCOS 8, 9, II , 12 Mtgs, Nov 1936, CAB 54/1 and DCOS 24, Dec 1936, CAB 54/3. The.J uly 1938 paper was stopped by Hankey and Chatfield in the COS committee , principally because it was based on the supposition of British involvem ent in a war over Czec hoslovakia: COS 245 Mtg , 25 July 1938, CAB 53/9. 92. The COS conside red the.IPC draft, COS 831UP ) at thre e meetin gs in Feb 1939: COS 274-276 Mtgs, CAB 53/ 10. The COS final version was circulated as CO S 843, 'Euro pean Appreciat ion 1939-40',20 Feb 1939, CAB 53/45 . It went to the Ca binet as D.P.(P)44, 20 Feb 1939, CAB 16/183. 93. D. Dilks (ed .), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 9 Feb 1939; Neville Chamberlain to Hilda, 5 Feb 1939, Neville Chamberlain pap ers, Birmingham Un iversit y Libr ary . 94. COS support for an Eastern front was indi cated in COS 285 Mtg, 28 Mar 1939, CAB 53/ 10 and in COS 872, ' Military Impli cat ions ofan Anglo-Germ an Gu ar ant ee of and Roum ania', 3 Apr 1939, CAB 53/47. On the staff talks see COS 927, 'Anglo-Polish Staff Conversations, 1939', 15 June 1939, CAB 53/50 and COS 914, 'Staff Conversations with the French', 25 May 1939, CAB 53/49. 95. See Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I, chapte r XIX . 96. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, 235. 266 THE MI SSIN G DIMENSI ON

5. FLAS HES OF INT E LLIGENCE: THE FOR EIGNOFFICE, T H E SIS AND SEC UR ITY BE FO RE THE SECOND W OR LD W A R David Dilks

I. To the committee under the late Sir Dun can Wilson investigating the working of the Public Records Acts of 1958 and 1967; it reported in 1981. 2. D. N. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir AlexanderCadogan (London, 1971), p. 155. 3. O. G. Sargent to B. C. Newton, 16 Nov 1931 and SIS to C. j. Norton, 29 Oct 1931, C8074/8074/62, FO 371/15208, PRO (all furth er references to official pap ers are from PRO files); for the supply of SIS reports to Kabul , see minute by H. J. Seymour, 13 Oct 1930, N6980/6980, FO 371/14801. 4. Minut es by Sargent and Sir R. Vans ittart , 10 july 1933, C5997/245/18, FO 371/16707. 5. D. Dilks, 'Appeasement and " Intelligence" " in Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power, vol. I (Londo n, 1981), p. 149; D. Kahn , Hitler's Spies (New York, 1978), p. 183; E. L. Woodw ard and R. d'O. Butler (eds.), Documentson BritishForeign Policy, 3rd ser., vol. v, pp. 489-90; minute by Sir A. Cadogan , 16 Aug 1939, R6472/6472/22 , FO 371/23827; Cadogan to Sir P. Lorain e, 19 Aug, and reply 23 Aug 1939, Loraine pap ers. I am indebted to Mr Gordon Waterfield for this last reference. 6. Minute by Sir R. Vansittart, 27 j an 1931, VI 57/ 3/750, FO 627/29. 7. SIS to N. Bland , FO , 10 Aug 1927, E3581/6/ 34, FO 371/12282. 8. See, for example, a minute by C. Howard Smith, 26 May 1926, C6024/6024/12, F0 371/112 33. 9. Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), p. 516. 10. M. Toscano, Designsin Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1970) pp. 412-1 3, and TheHistory if Treaties and International Politics (Baltimore, 1966) pp. 29-30. II . I am indebted for this inform at ion to the late Major-G eneral R. F. K. Belchem , who served in Egypt and Palestine from 1936; cf. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in theSecondWorld War (London, 1979), vol. I, pp . 52-3, 199, and Foreign Relations ifthe United States, /937, vol. I, pp . 393-4. 12. Th e report of 20 Feb 1937, with Vansittart's marginal comments, is Y775/ 775/650, FO 850/2. 13. R. B. Howorth to Sir M. P. A. Hank ey, 20 Feb 1936, FNH/1 3, CAB 21/421. 14. Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, pp. 412-1 3. 15. R. B. Howorth to Sir M. P. A. Hankey, 20 Feb 1936, FNH/1 3, CAB 21/421; W. N. Medlicott, D. Dakin and M. E. Lambert (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd ser., vol. xv, p. 688. 16. C. Ca mpbell (Ma nagi ng Director of the Marconi Company in Egypt ) to Sir M. Lampson, 9 Dec 1936; Lampson to the Secreta ry of State (Eden), 21 Dec 1936; FO minutes on these papers, especially those by R. I. Ca mpbell and H. E. Eastwood, 6 and 7j an 1937,j49/49/16, FO 371/20897. 17. See note 12 above. 18. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd ser., vol. xv, p. 693. 19. Y 832/7/5/650, dated 22.Jul y 1937, FO 850/2. 20. Sir R. H. Ca mpbell to Eden, 10 Mar 1937, R. 1687/224/92, FO 371/21198. 21. Minute by Sir O . Sarge nt, 25Jan 1937 and memorandum by Eden, 23Jan 1937, R650/224/92, FO 371/21197; Eden to Sir R. H. Campbell (Belgrade), despa tch, 4 Feb 1937, R889/224/92, ibid. 22. See note 20 above. 23. Sir R. H. Ca mpbell to Eden, II Mar 1937, RI688/224/92, FO 371/21198. 24. Minutes by O. O'Malley, Sir O. Sargent , Sir A. Cadogan, II Mar 1937, on RI687 /224/92, FO 371/21198. 25. Minu tes by O. O'Malley and C. J. Norton, 19 and 24 Mar 1937, ibid. NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 267

26. Minute by C.J. Norton, 16 Mar 1937, ibid . 27. Minute by C.J. Norton, 12 Apr 1937, and Eden to Sir R. H. Campbell, 12 Mar 1937, ibid. 28. M. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano 'sDiary /937-/938 (London, 1952), pp . 31,44,49,63. 29. M. Muggeridge (ed .), Ciano 's Diary, /939-/943 (London, 1947), pp . 101-2 . 30. J . B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis /934-/94/ (New York , 1962), p. 125; Sir R. H. Campbell to Lord Halifax, and to Sir A. Cad ogan , 21 Jan 1939, RI080/111/67, FO 371/23738. 31. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, p. 125. 32. M. Mug gerid ge (ed.), Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p. 46; H. McG . Smyth, Secrets of theFascist Era (Illinois, 1975), p. 19. 33. K. von Schuschnigg, AustrianRequiem (London, 1947), pp. 111-13. 34. Hansard, HC , 5th Ser.: vol. 445, cols. 758-9 . 35. M. Toscano , Origins of the PactofSteel (Baltimore, 1967), p. 143. 36. CI4471/42/18, Flag G, FO 371/21659 ; for a reference to this memorandum see Cadogan's minute of 9 Nov 1938 in the sam e file. I refrain from dealing here with intelligence about Germany's militar y strength, treated in detail in chapter 4 of this volume by Dr Wark . 37. Hinsleyet al., British Intelligence , p. 56. 38. See the record of a conservation with Goerdeler in Switzerland on 4 Dec 1938, C938/15/18, and a memorandum by F. K. Roberts, 21 Jan 1939, C864/1 5/18, FO 371/22961 ; Sir I. Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle (London, 1959), pp . 137-9; memoran­ da by G. J. J ebb , 19 J an 1939, CAB 27/627 , and 6 J an 1939, C939/15/18, FO 371/22961. 39. His identity is clear from documents in the Christie papers at Churchill College, Cambridge; 'Knight', being a translation of 'Ritter', would have deceived the serious investigator little longer than President Wilson's 'Neptune' and ' Mars' . 40. For examples, see a report by Vansittart to Halifax , 6 Jan 1939, Christie to Van sittart, 20Jan 1939, and a memorandum by Vansittart 25Jan 1939, in Christie pap ers 180/1129. 41. Hinsleyet al., British Intelligence , p. 42; Christie to Vansittart , 20 Jan 1939, Christie papers 180/1/29 . 42. Cadogan to Henderson, 28 Feb 1939, 39/9, FO 800/270 . 43. Minute by Cadogan, 14 Feb 1939, W7931793/50, FO 371/23994. 44. Minute by Col. S. G. Menzies, 14 Dec 1938, ibid . 45. Sir L. Oliphant to Brig-Gen. F. G. Beaumont-Nesbit , 15 Feb 1939, ibid.

6. ENIG MA, THE FRENCH , THE POLES AND THE BRITISH, 1931-1940 Jean Stengers

1. P. Paillole, 'France: Ie contre-espionnage s'est heurte au scepticisme du Commandement', Le Crapou illot, new series, 52 (Autumn 1979),55. 2. The precise figure, calculated by Colonel Tad eusz Lisicki, is 5,172,165,503,971, 832,752,302,775,832,450,732,6 75,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, 000,000,000,000 ,000,000,000: see J . Garlinski, Intercept . The Enigma War (London, 1979), p. 23. The fullest descriptions of the Enigma will be found in Garlinski, pp. 192 If. (Appendix by T . Lisicki ) and in Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York, 1982), pp . 38 If. Photo graphs of the machine are in J . Rohwer and E. Jackel (eds.), Die Funkaujkliirung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 36,56; Garlinski, Intercept , plate 23; Francis Russell, The Secret War (Alexandria, Va, 19IH ), p. 92. On e of the best preserved Enigmas is on exhibition at the Mus eum of the Polish Army (Muzeum Wojska Polskiego) at . Anoth er 268 TH E MI S SI NG DIMENSIO N

Enigma belo ngs to the collections of the General Sikors ki Histor ical In stitu te in London; th ere are numerous photographs of this machine, e.g. in Brian J ohn son , The Secret War (London, 1978), pp . 311, 318; Ga rlinski , Intercept, plat e 5; Dictionnaire de la SecondeGuerreMondiale, vol. II, (Pa ris, 1980), p. 1833; Peter Calvocoressi, TopSecret Ultra (London, 1980), pp. 54 ff. But this is not a Ge rman Enigma; it is a Polish or French reconstr uction of unknow n or igin. T he two ma in differences betwe en the Ge rma n mach ine and the replica a re th at in th e origina l mac hine, th e plu gboard is in front and th e keyboard is arranged as tha t ofa German typewrit er (Q W ER.. . .), whereas in the replica th e plu gboard is in the rear and the keyboard is arranged alphahetically. 3. Co lonel Gw ido Lan ger, Repor t (in Polish ) wri tte n prob a bly at the end of 1940; propert y ofCo lonel Lisicki, London (extracts kindl y communica ted by Colonel Lisicki to the a uthor ). 4. Gu stave Bert rand, Enigma ou la plus grande migme de la guerre 1939-1 975 (Pa ris, 1973), 298 pp. 5. T hey are now in the hands of the genera l's widow, at Theoul e-sur-Mer , in the south of Fran ce; we wish to th ank Mad am e Bertrand very respectfull y. 6. A few yea rs before however , Co lonel Michel Garder had devoted to th e subject two or three pages which gave a completely erroneous and twisted version (M. Gard er, La Guerre Secrete des Services Speciauxfr ancais (1935-1945) (Pa ris, 1967), pp. 77-9). Gard er 's source was what General Navarre had told him in a short conversa tion and th at he had distort ed (my int erview with Gener al Na varre, 1979). From Ga rde r, this version has passed to Anthon y Cave Brown iBodyguard of Lies (London, 1976), pp. 16--1 7, based upon Garder but with out referen ce to his book ). Co lonel Carde r's erro rs had a t least one happy conseq uence: th ey so infuria ted Bertrand th at he decided to break silence so as to put thin gs right (Bertrand, Enigma, pp . 13-1 4, 265-71 ). 7. The boo k was not reviewed in any impo rta nt periodi cal and it sold very badly. By the beginning of 1975, th e pu blisher , the Libr airie Pion , had already sold a part of the stock at bargain pri ces (Bertrand Papers). The well-known French historian Max Gallo told me tha t in 1976, when he published in a collectio n ofwhich he was the editor a French tran slation of Win ter botham , he had no idea of the existe nce of Bert rand's book. The Fren ch inte llect ual paper Le Men de, when commen ting in 1977 upon the Ultra qu estion, d id not mention it either; it referred only to Winter both a m's versio n (Le Mo nde, 20 Oc t 1977). However , Bertran d found better echoes a mong the limit ed number ofspecialists in Poland and in Britain. 8. In a strange way, for ins tance, a man freq uently ment ioned under the nam e of Rex is sudde nly called Lemoine (pp. 250-3), witho ut any wa rni ng as to the change of nam e. 9. P. Paillole, Services Spiciaux, /935-1 945 (Pa ris, 1975); H. Navarre, Le Service de Renseignements, 1871-1944 (Pa ris, 1978). 10. Oc tober 1932 in Ber trand, Enigma, pp . 21, 23. This is eithe r a typographical erro r or a slip of the pen. 11. Interview given to Nice- Malin, 16 Aug 1973. 12. The identifi cation ofAsche as Han s-T hilo Schmidt was revealed for th e first time by David Kahn in his review of Wint er botha m in the New York Times of29 Dec 1974; it was confirmed by Paillole (Services Speiiaux, p. 63) . The source of the identifi cati on was Bertrand him self, who had been int ervi ewed by Kahn. On Asche-Schmidt, see Bertrand, pp . 23 ff., 250-2; Paill ole, pp . 33,63-4; Navarre, Servicede Renseignements, pp . 54-6,69-73, 8 1; H. Navarre,LetempsdesviTilis(Pa ris, 1979), pp . 57-8, 69. Aschewas the best paid and most important 'agent' of th e Fren ch Intelligence Servi ce. He was so bold that he still went to meet Na varre nea r Lugan o a t the beginning of 1940 (Navarre, Le temps des veriles, p. 69; my int erview with General Navarre, 1979). In 1943, he was exposed, convicted and exec uted. O n his bro the r, Ge nera l Rud olf Schm idt , who seems to have been the source - the invo luntary source certa inly - of some of th e most NO TES TO CHAPTER 6 269

mean ingful information he communicated to th e Fren ch, see a sho rt notice in the Bulletin trimestriel de l'Association des Amis de l'Ecole Supirieure de Guerre, No. 81 (1979), 65-6. 13. Bert rand Papers. 14. Ibid. 15. The assertion of Colonel Garde r (La Guerre Secrete, p. 79), followed by Cave Brown (Bodyguard ofLies, p. 16), that the French had succeeded in reco nstructing an Enigma, is complete nonsense. Paill ole is also wrong in what he write s in his book on th at subjec t (Services Spiciaux , p. 64 ). 16. Bertrand, Enigma, p. 37, fully confirmed by th e data ofth e Bertrand Pap ers. The d ate of thi s mission lat er becam e a source oftot al con fusion. Mar ian Rejewski, in his cor respo nde nce with Gen eral Bertrand, observed that Bertrand could not have come to Warsaw wit h Aschi docum ent s in Dec 1931 if, as he had stat ed in his boo k, Aschi 's tr eason dat ed from O ctober 1932 (Rejewski to Bertrand, 24 July 1974; Bert rand Papers). Bertrand , in his answer, mad e the wrong correction; instead of confirming Dec 1931 and correc ting O ct 1932 to O ct 1931, he correc ted Dec 1931 to Dec 1932, in contradic tion with the p recise dat a of his own pap ers, whi ch he overlooked at th e time (Bertrand to Rejewski, 5 Aug 1974; copy ibid .). From then on, Rejewski dissemin ated the wrong dat e of Dec 1932, which is found in many publicati ons. 17. Bertrand Pap ers. 18. Bert rand, Enigma, p. 38. 19. Bertrand, Enigma, p. 38; F. H. Hin sley, with E. E. Thom as, C. F. G. Ransom and R. C. Knight, British Intelligencein the Second World War, vol. J (London, 1979), p. 488. 20. The legend ca n be traced to Brian J ohn son , The Secret War, pp . 311- 12, who qu oted th e testimon y ofCo lonel Lisicki. From th ere, it passed to publica tions as serious as Ronald Lewin, Ultra goes to War: The Secret Story (London, 1978), p. 30, or Jiirgen Rohwer , ' De r Einfluss der alliierten Funkaufkl arung auf den Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges', Vieneljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, XXV II (1979 ), 335. J ohn son had mis­ und erstood Lisicki, who had spo ken ofacommercial Enigma (a uthor's conve rsation with Colonel Lisicki). For Lisicki's own source of inform ation, see Gariinski,lntercept , pp . 2-3. 21. F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London, 1974), pp . 10-11. 22. These were often only shor t hints. ProfessorJ ack Good , who work ed in Hut Ba t from May 1941 to O ct 1943, wrote: ' My first boss, th e fam ou s mathemati cian A.M. Turing, only on ce men tion ed th e Poles, and that evasiv ely' (review of Go rdo n Welch man , New Scientist, 7 O ct 1982, p. 42). 23. J on es was told th at the Poles 'had stolen the wheels of an act ua l machine' (R. V. Jones, MostSecretWar (London, 1978), p. 63). For brevity's sa ke, we do not mention the story told in William Stevenson 's A Man calledIntrepid (London, 1976) about an amb ush organ ised by the Poles to ga in hold of an Enigma . Like almos t everyt hing else concern ing Enigma in the book, it is pure ru bbish (see th e dev asta ting reviews of Stevenson by H. R. Trevor-Roper in the New YorkReview ofBooks, 13 May 1976, and by Da vid Hunt in the Times LiterarySupplement, 28 May 1976; also S. Freem an in the Sunday Times, 20 Sept 1981). It mu st be observed th at Gord on Welchman still believ es on ra tiona l gro unds that the Poles must have obtain ed the most elab or at e vers ion of the Ge rma n Enigma 'by capture or some other nefarious means ' (The Hut Six Story, p. 16). For a refutation of his reasoning, see the review in Cryptologia, VI , 2 (April 1982), 164-5. 24. T. Rakusa-Su szczewski.. ' Ma rian Rejewski' (in Polish ), W. T. K. Tygodnik Katolikow (Wa rsaw), 6July 1980; C hristopher Kaspar ek and Richard A. Woytak, ' In mem oriam Mari an Rejewski' , Cryptologia VI, I (jan 1982), I!t-25. 25. The revelati on of his achieve ments appeared for th e first time in an interview given by Co lonel Wladyslaw Kozaczuk , a Polish milita ry historian , to th e Express 270 THE MISSING DIMENSION

Wiec<;or'!)' (of Warsaw) on 20 Dec 1973. Kozaczuk had read Bertrand's book and had established a link between his data and those ofa memorandum which Rejewski had written some years before and had deposited in the archives of the Military Historical Institute. This was actually the first time the name ofRejewski was mentioned publicly. 26. Quoted as ' Rejewski, Report'. The text was found in England after the war and sent to Rejewski in Warsaw;I obtained a copy from Rejewski. After my discussion with him, there can be no doubt about the date of the document. 27. (a) 'An application of the theory of permutations in breaking the Enigma Cipher', Zastosowania Matematyki - Applicationes Mathematicae (Warsaw), XVI , 4 (1980), 543-59; published in Polish as an appendix to W. Kozaczuk, W KreguEnigmy (Warsaw, 1979), pp. 369-93; English translation of this Polish version by C. Kasparek in Cryptologia, VI , 1 (jan 1982), 1-18; (b) 'J ak matematycy polscy rozszyfrowali Enigrne', Annales Societatis Mathematicae Polonae, 2nd series, Wiadomosci Matematycme , XXIII, I (1980), 1-28; English translation, ' How Polish Mathematicians deciphered the Enigma', Annals ofthe History ofComputing , III, 3 (july 1981),213-34; (c) although it is not really an article, I count also Rejewski's remarks on Hinsley's British Intelligence in the Second World War, dating from 1979; the original Polish text was very kindly communicated to me by Colonel Lisicki; English translation in Cryptologia , VI, I (jan 1982),75-83. 28. Ajournalist of the East Berlin weekly Horizont in 1975 iHorieont, VIII (1975) No. 49); the BBC researcher Susan Bennett in 1976 (see Brian Johnson, The Secret War, pp. 312,351 );Jean Stengers during a full week in Warsaw inJune 1978 (see] . Stengers, 'La guerre des messages codes, 1930-1945', L'Histoire, No. 31 (Feb 1981), 19-31, with supplements in No. 33 (April 1981), 100-1); Richard Woytak in July 1978 ('A Conversation with ' , Cryptologia , VI, I (jan 1982),50-57). There were cert ainly many other interviews. 29. He was a great help in Poland to Colonel Wladyslaw Kozaczuk (sec his series of articles on 'Enigma' in the Polish weekly Stolica, xxx (1975) Nos. 1-27, partly translated into German in Horiront, VIII (1975), Nos. 41-48; 'The war of wits' in Poland (1975), Nos. 6 and 7, and the French version in La Pologne (1975), Nos. 6 and 7; and his books ZlamanyS::;yfr (Broken Cypher) (Warsaw, 1976) and W KrrguEnigmy (Around the Enigma) (Warsaw, 1979) and to Stanislaw Strumph Wojtkiewicz, Sekret Enigmy (Warsaw, 1978). Marian Rejewski definitely told me however that he was far from approving all that these two authors had written, often with too much enthusiasm or imagination. Rejewski also had a very active correspondence with his friend Colonel Lisicki in London (Lisicki was his former superior in the Polish army in Britain); see Lisicki's contribution to Rohwer and Jiickel (cds), Die Funkaufkldrung ; pp. 66-86, and above all his heip and collaboration in the book by J . Garlinski. 30. Interview ofMr C. Gaca, a former Polish cryptologist, now living in France, who took part in the operation. 'We buried six bombas and more than seventy Enigmas ', Mr Gaca recalls ; 'it was an extremely hard task.' 31. As we have said before, the origin of the Enigma preserved at the Sikorski Historical Institute in London cannot be traced with certainly (see note 2). 32. A sketch ofa drawn by Rejewski himselfin 1976 is in Brian johnson, The Secret War, p. 316; drawings of the and of the perforated sheets are in the articles quoted above , note 27. 33. He entered the service in Warsaw on I Sept 1932. Before that date, while a teaching assistant at the University of Poznan, he had already worked for some time in a branch office ofthe Cypher Bureau in Poznan; this was only a part-time job. 34. Rejewski repeatedly said : on 8 Dec 1932. But I am afraid that precise date was only a deduction. He deduced it from the fact (which was not a fact, as we have seen) that Bertrand had arrived for the first time in Warsaw with the Asche documents on 7 Dec 1932 (sec note 16). NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 271

35. Rejewski, Report (see note 26). Later on, Rejewski gave the dat e of the keys as 1932 instead of 1931. But this was again a deduction based upon his false ass umptions as regards Bertrand 's first arriva l in Warsaw . We hav e every reaso n to stick to the dates of his first report . 36. There is a widespre ad version according to which the initia l success was not du e to Rejewski alone, but to the Rejewski-Rozycki-Zygalski team , which we will find at work immedia tely after wards. This is cont radicted by Rejewski's very firm sta tements, which seem to be un imp eachabl e. ' Le chiffre Enigma fut rompu par moi seul en decembre 1932', he wrote to Bertrand in 1975 (lett er of 19 Mar 1975, Bertrand Papers ). See also the a rticle (b) quoted in note 27. It was also one of the main objects of my qu estions when I met him. 37. 'Sans eux, la solution aurait ete differee pou r longtemps , ou merne, qui Ie sait, pourjam ais' (Rejewski to Madame Bert rand , 8 Aug 1976; Bertrand Papers). He had written in 1941-2: 'Without these docum ent s, the decyph erment of the En igma would have been delayed by several years' (Rejewski, Repor t). 38. Both Rozycki and Zyga lski were, like Rejewski, young mathematicians who had studied at the Un iversity of Poznan. Rozycki (born 1909) died accident ally inJan 1942; see a lett er about him by Rejewski of Nov 1979 qu oted in Cryptologia, VI, I (Jan 1982), 59. Zygalski (born 1907) du ring the war had the sam e destin y as Rejewski; he went first to Bruno, then to the south of Fran ce and finally to England. But he remained in Britain after the war and becam e a lecturer in 'mathematics at the Polish Un iversity Co llege (incorpora ted into the Battersea Coll ege of T echnology). At the end of his life, he was an invalid, so he was unable to prov ide any useful information on Enigma. He died on 30 Aug 1978. No obituary appea red in The Times. 39. On the AVA factory, see .1 . Garlinski, Intercept , pp. 20 II, and Maria Danil ewicz-Zielinska, ' Zanim doszlo du rozszyfro wania Enigmy' (Before one suc­ ceeded in decyph ering En igma), Orzel Bialy (London ) Dec 1974. 4D. This was one of the strongest assertions by Rejewski during our meetings with him in June 1978: he never received any other Asche docum ents than those he got in Dec 1932. Bertrand went on bringing new Aschemat erial to Wars aw, but this materi al was no longer essential for the work of the Polish cryptologists. 41. Rejewski, Report. This is confirmed by Co lonel , the form er chiefof military intelligence, who recalls: ' In J an uar y 1938, a two-week test was cond ucted regarding the decyph erin g of the intercepted En igm a material. About 75 per cent of this material was then decyph ered . T o check this, one day I myselfselected rad iogram s from the intercepted materi al and ordered them to be decyph ered in my presence. T he result was perfect' (Mayer, memoran d um of 1974 quoted by Richard A. Woytak, On theBorderofWarandPeace.Polish Intelligenceand Diplomacyin 1937-1939 and theoriginsof the Ultra Secret (Boulder, 1979, p. 9). Hinsley's dou bts as to the value of this test (British Intelligence, p. 490) are dispelled by Rejewski's rema rks on Hin sley (see Cryptologia, VI , I (Jan 1982), 79; also M. Rejewski, ' How Polish Mathematician s . . .', p. 225) . 42. Rejewski's remark s on Hinsley, in Cryptologia, note 41 above, p. 78. 43. Ma yer to Bertrand , 9 May 1976; Bert rand Pap ers. Gen eral Bertrand was at that time near the end of his life and he was not able to read this lett er. He died on 23 May 1976. On Mayer, see his obituary in The Times of I April 1981. 44. Both Bertrand and Rejewski said with a smile tha t Braqu enie was not in his field a first-class man (' II n'etait pas tres fort ' ). 45. See on him Penel ope Fitzgerald , The Knox Brothers (London , 1977). 46. This 'third man ' has given rise to much spec ulation. He had been introduced in Wars aw as a ' Mr (or Professor) Sandwich'. Co lonel Mayer claims that he was actually Stewart Menzies; he met Menzies six years lat er, he says , and he recognised him as the 'Sandwich' of July 1939 (Ga rlinski, Intercept, p. 46, n. 30). T his ident ificat ion has generally been accepted (BrianJ ohnson, TheSecret War, p. 319, with some reservati ons; 272 TH E MI SSI NG DIM E NSION

R. Lewin, Ultragoes to War, p. 43; F. Russell, The Secret War, p. 71; Basil Co llier, Hidden Weapons. Allied Secretor Undercover Services in World War II (Londo n, 1982), p. 51). But General Bert rand wrote with indignation that it was all nonsen se: the 'third man ' was simply Commander Sand with, of the Admiralty. 'Le Commander Sandwith qu i est venu a Varsovie et qu i etait Ic Chcf d u Service d'Interception de l'Amirau te, m'et ait connu avant de venir a Pyry (the out-sta tion where theJuly 1939 meetin g took place) et n'avait aucune possibilite de ressemblan ce avec Menzies, q ue jc conna issais encore mieux' (letter to Rejewski, 10 Mar 1976; copy in the Ber trand Papers). This is a decisive statement for the Bert rand Pap ers show that Bertrand met both Menzies and Co mma nder Sand with in Lond on on 16-1 7 Aug 1939,just one month after the Warsaw session. Mr s Caroline Ol iver, who was attac hed to the GC &CS before the war (she entered it in 1937) rememb ers tha t Co mma nder San dwith was a frequ ent visitor to the offices of the 'School'. Contrary to what BrianJohn son says (TheSecret War, p. 324- but see a different view p. 319), Alan T uring was certai nly not a member oft hc British gro up. Marian Rcjewski clear ly remembers meeting him for thc first - and also last - timc at Bruno (Kozaczuc, IV Kreg»Enigmy, p. 357; my conver sations with Rejewski). 47. Bertrand , Enigma, pp . 60-1. 48. Malcolm Mu ggeridge, "The Lucy Spy Myster y', The Observer, 8]an 1967. After that came short allusions by David Kahn in The Codebreakers (Ncw York, 1967), p. 484, by Hu gh Trevor-Roper in The PhilbyAffair (London, 1968), pp . 73-4, by Page, Leitch and Kn ightley in the ir Philby (Londo n, 1968; 2nd cd., 1969), see pap erb ack edi tion, 1977, pp . 182-5; by Richard Deacon in his Historyof the British Secret Service (London, 1969), pp . 363-4); by Ladislas Far ago in his Gameof the Foxes in 1972 (see pa per back edition, 1973, pp . 226-9, 319, 57 1) and aga in by Malcolm Mu ggeridge in 1973 (Chronicles ifWasted Time vol. II , The InfernalGrove (London), pp . 127- 32, 150, 162, 176, 187, 188,201 , 204). 49. Cal vocorcssi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 14. 50. Some believe th at Winterbotham 'braved the Official Secrets Act' (Ian McEwan , ' ', New Statesman, 19 May 1978, p. 675). He d utifully obeyed in fact all the rules (see thc ' Londoner's Diary ' in the EveningStandard of22 Nov 1976). 51. Rep rint ed in N. Metropolis,]. Howl ett and Gian- Carl o Rota (eds), A Historyof Computingin the Twentieth Cen tury. A collectionof essays (Ne w York, 1980), pp . 31-45. Also with slight cha nges in Annals ifthe Historyof Computing, I, I (1uly 1979), 38-48, and in Cryptologia, III , 2 (April 1979), 65-77. See also I.]. Good , 'Studies in the History of Probabil ity an d Statistics. XX X VII . A. M. Turing's statistical work in World War II ', Biometrika, LX VI, 2 (1979) , 393-6. 52. Hansard, vol. 94 1 no. 36; scc also H insley, British Intelligence, vol. I, pp vii-viii, and vol, II (London, 1981 ), p. x. 53. Welchm an , The Hut Six Story. 54. See note 19. Mar ian Rejewski knew- most probably thro ugh Bertrand - tha t the British Cypher Bureau had had some essentia l Asche document s at its disposal (Rejewski, Report ). So, he remarked , the initial conditions of the French, the British and the Poles, as regards the decyph erm ent , were not dissimil ar. 55. H insley, British Intelligence, vol. I, pp . 54, 49 1. 56. 'Ci inclu s des petits bato ns' (Knox to Rejewski, I Aug 1939; reproduction in Kozaczu k, W Kregu Enigmy, plate between pp . 128 and 129). Rejewski explained to me what it meant. 57. Hin sley, British Intelligence, vol. I, p. 54. 58. Letter from Dr Peter Twi nn to the author of 15 Dec 1981. 59. Hin sley, British Intelligence, vol. I, p. 54. 60. Wclchm an , The Hut Six Story, p. 89. 61. Rejewski, Report. NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 273

62. Welchman , The Hut Six Story, pp . 71, 76, 87, 89. The Briti sh, Rejewski notes, adopted our methods. 'T he only di fTeren ce was tha t we used millim eter-rul ed pap er and they used pap er divided into inches, th at our pap er was whit e and theirs was crea mcolored, that we cut the holes out toilsomely with razor blad es and the y used a perforator' (Rejewski's remarks on Hin sley, in Cryptologia, note 41 above, p. 82) . 63. Lang er report ofthe end of 1940 (sec note 3); Hin sley, British Intelligence, vol. I, p. 493; 1'. Lisicki, ' Pogromcy Enigrnv we Fran cji' (T he conq uerors of the Enigma in Fran ce), Oreel Bialy (Sept 1975). The key broken on I7.Jan 1940was that of28 O ct 1939. This has led to a confusion by Bertrand, who write s that the breaking itself occ urred on 28 Oct 1939 (Enigma, p. 76) . From Bertrand the error has spread to oth er publications (e.g. P. Paillole , VO Ultra in Dictionnairede la Seconde GuerreMondiale, vol. II (Paris, 1980), p. 1833). 64. Lan ger Report (see not e 3 above). 65. Welchman , The Hut Six Story, pp . 98--101, 104-10, 165. This is one of the most important revelations of Welchman 's book. 66. Exactly on 21 May 1940 accord ing to th e Langer Repor t. 67. Welchman , The Hut Six Story, pp . 77- 82, 295 fT. Welchman does not rem ember when exac tly the first was put into use. He places it a round Sep t 1940 (sec pp . 101, 119). This is approximat ely consiste nt with the month ofAugu st given by Hin sley for the int roduction of ' the first of th e machines developed for finding the Enigma settings' (British Intelligence, vol. I, p. 184). But it is in contrad iction with Hinsley's d ate for the first bombe, whi ch is the end of May 1940 (p. 494). The whol e story told by Welchman cannot be reconciled with this last d at e. 68. R. Lewin , Ultra goes to War, pp . 129-33; B. Randell, 'Colossus: god father of the ', New Scientist, 10 Feb 1977, pp. 346--8; the same author's, 'T he Colossus', in Metrop olis, Howlett and Gian -Carlo Rota (eds), A History of Computing, pp . 47-92. 69. The Profession ofl ntelligence', pr esented by C hristophe r Andrew, BBC, Radio 4, 16 Aug 1981; BBC trans cript. 70. Bertrand, Enigma, p. 256. 7\. Lett er to the author, 15 Dec 198\. 72. Welchman , The Hut Six Story, p. 164-5. 73. 'We were lucky': thi s is also Welchman 's opinion (p. 169). But he refers to another aspect of that luck. A very sma ll cha nge to the construction of the Enigma, he remarks , would have made it pr acticall y impregn abl e. Luckily, th e Germans did not have the idea (sec pp . 168--9).

7. CO DE BREAKING IN W ORLD WARS I A:oID II : T ilE MAJ OR SUCCESSES A ND FA ILU RES, THEIRCAUSES AND TIlEIR E FF ECTS David Kahn

Thispap er was origin ally del ivered as the op en ing speech at a conferenc e of the Arhe itskreis fiir Weh rforschung, join ed by the Clausewitz-Ges ellschaft and the Deut sche Gesellschaft fiir Wehrtechnik, on ' Modern technology and its conseq uences for the cond uct of wa r: th e example ofrad io int elligence' , in Bonn , 15 Nov 1978. Since th e publicati on of an ea rlier version of th is a rticle in the HistoricalJournal in 1980, I have made a few changes in the text to include new inform ation an d correct erro rs, and have updated the notes. A few passages on subjects discussed a t grea ter length elsewh ere in this volume have been deleted by the ed itor s. \. Georges Dossin , 'Signa ux lumineu x a u pays de Mari' , Revue d'Assyriologie et d'Archeologie Orientale, xx xv (1938), 174-86. 2. Livy XXV II, xliii, 1-8 . 3. (1851). 4. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: the story of secretwriting (New York , 1967 ),passim. 274 THE MISSI NG DIME NSIO N

5. Ib id., pp . 298-9. 6. C hristopher Andrew, 'Dechiffrernent et diplomat ie: Ie cabinet noir du Qu ai d'Orsay sous la T roisieme Rep ubliqu e', Relations Internationales, III (1976), 37- 64; Marcel Givierge, ' Etude historique sur la Section du Chiffre', Epoq ues 1-4, N.A.F. 2453, Departernent des Manu scrits, Bibliothequc Nationale, Paris. See above, pp. 34ff. 7. Francois Ca rtier, 'Le service d'ecout e pend ant la guerre', Radio-Electriciti; IV (1923), 453---60,491-8 at p. 498. 8. Maximilian Rong e, Kriegs- und Industrie-spionage (Zuric h, 1930), pp. 58-60; August von Urba nski, 'Wie unsere Chiffren-Gruppe entstand' (O ktober (924), Nachlass B-58, Kri egsarchiv, Vienn a. See also Harald Hu bat schke, 'Die amtliche Organisation der geheimen BriefUberwachung und des diplomatischen Chiffrendiens­ tes in O sterreich', Mitteilungen des Institutsfiir Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung; LXXXIII (1975), 352-41 3 at pp . 412-13. 9. Russia (1923-, USSR ), Komm issia po izdan iu dokum ent ov epokhi imp erializma, Die InternationalenBeziehungenim Zeitalterdes Imperialismus: Dokumenteaus den Archiven der Zarischenund der ProoisorischenRegierung , ed . M. N. Pokrowski, Germ an ed. Otto Hoetzsch (Berlin , 1931-42).passim, shows that Russia int ercepted and solved diplomati c messages of England , Fran ce, Germ an y, Austria, Italy, Bulgari a, T urkey, Persia, and Greece before World Wa r 1. For police codebrea king, RichardJ.Johnson, 'Zagranichaia Agentura : the tsarist political police in Europe', Journal !if Contemporary History,VII (1972), 221- 42; Kahn , The Codebreakers, pp . 618-21. 10. Erich Lud endorff, Ludendotff's own story (New York, 1919), I, 57-8. II . Major [Kunibert] Rand ewig, 'Die deutsche Funkaufklarun g in der Schla cht bei T ann enberg' , F-Flagge (magazine of Germa n ar my signa l troops) (1936), pp . 135--8, 154-7 at p. 135. 12. Arthur Schu etz (pseud. Tristan Busch ), SecretServiceUnmasked, tran s. Anthony V. Ireland (London, [1948]), p. 58; Nicholas N. Golovine, TheRussian Campaign of/914, trans . A. G. S. Mu ntz (Fort Leavenworth, 1933), pp . 171-2 ; Germ an y, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg: 1914 bis 19/8, II (Berlin, 1925), p. 351. 13. Max Hoffmann , War Diariesand otherPapers, trans . Er ic Sutton (London, 1929), II,267. 14. Ibid., I, 41, 18. 15. Ronge ,passim;Yves Gylden, ThecontributionoftheCryptographicBureaux in the World War, trans . Military Intelligence Division (Was hing ton, 1935), pp . 60-77. 16. Max Hoffman n, The War !ifLost Opportunities (London, 1924), p. 132. 17. Odoardo Marchetti , It sennr io informaeionedell 'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (Roma, 1937), p. 181. 18. Intercept s dated 14,21 , and 27 Dec 1916, 5 N 83, Service Historiqu e, Etat-rnajor de l'Arrn ee de terre, Chateau de Vincenn es; Givierge, ' Etude historique sur la Section du Chiffre', Epoque 15, pp. 98-9; Sam Wagenaar , Mata Hari , adapta tion de J acqu es Haubart (Paris, 1965), pp . 198-203. 19. 'Co nference de M. Georges J ean Painvin', Bulletin de l'A.R.C. (Amicale des Reseroistesdu Chiffre), new series, VIII (1961),5--47 , at pp . 17-45; Kahn, The Codebreakers, pp . 339-47. 20. Henri Morin , Service secret: a l'icoute devant Verdun, ed. Pierr e Andrieu (Paris, 1959), passim; Hermann Cron , Die Organisation des deutschen Heeres im Weltkrieg; Forschungen und Dar stellun gen aus dem Reichsarchiv , V (Berlin, 1923), 112; Albert Praun, Soldat in der Telegraphen-undNachrichtentruppe (Wurzb urg, [c. 1965]), pp . 18-20, 26; Ma ximilian Ronge, 'Der T elephon-Abhorchdienst', pp . 670-729, and Beilagen , Nac hlass B/126: F.2, Kr eigsarchiv. 21. R. E. Priestley, The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 19/8 (France) ([London?], 1921), p. 106. 22. Sir Alfred Ewing, 'Some special war work', in R. V.Jones, 'Alfred Ewing and NOTE S TO CHAPTER 7 275

" Room 4{)" ', Notes and Records ofthe Royal Society of London, XXXIV (july 1979), 65-90; Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York , 1923), I, 503-4; Adm iral Sir William J am es, The Eyes of the Na oy: a biographical study of Admiral Sir William Hall (London, 1956). pass im. 23. Barbara Tuchm an , The Z immermann Telegram (New York , 1958); William F. Friedm an and Charl esJ. Mend elsohn, The Z immermann Telegram ofJanuary 16, 1917 and its Cryptographic Background ( 1938, repr inted Lagun a H ills, Ca lif. 1977); Kahn , The Codebreakers, pp . 282-97. Pat rick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18 (London, 1982 ). 24. David Kahn, Hitler 's Spies: German military intelligencein World War 1/ (New York, 1978), pp . 185, 190-91, 214; F. H . Hin sley with E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ran som and R. C. Knight, Br itish Intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations (London, 1979-). I, 20; Christoph er Andrew, 'The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet relations in the 1920s. Part I: From the trade negotiati ons to the Zinoviev lett er', Hist oricalJournal, xx (1977), 673-706 at p. 680; Herb er t O . Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indiana polis, 1931), pp . 239-40. 25. Kahn , The Codebreakers, pp . 394-426. 26. U .S. Patent 1,657,411; Siegfried Turkel, Chiffrieren mit Gerdten und Maschinen (Gr az, 1927), pp . 71-94 and plates M-P; Handbu ch der Deutsihen Aktien-Gesellschoften (Berlin, 1935), v, 6610. 27. [M arian Rejewski) , ' Enigma 1930-1 940; Metodi i historia rozwiazani a niemiec­ kiego szyfru maszynowego (w zar ysie)' (unpublished; in private collection). p. I; j iirgen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943: the battlefor HX. 229/SCI22 , trans. Derek Masters (Londo n, 1977), p. 23 1. 28. Kahn, The Codebreakers, pp. 426-7; memor andum, Y 7 8 5 8/4 :~ 7 / G / :~ 9 , signed E.N.T. (Edwar d N. Travis), 21.July 1939, FO 850/4 / X.J3968, Puhli c Record Office, London , menti ons the Royal Air f orce's Ty pex machine. 29. Memorandum of 29 Nov 1937 in OKW: Wi/lf 5.2150, Bund esarchiv/ Militiirarchiv, Freiburg-im-Breisgau ; Thomas H. Dyer (U.S. Navy cry ptana lyst), inte rview, 12 Dec 1963. 30. Willi J ensen , 'Hil fsgerate der Krypt ographie', Dissert ation (withdrawn) , fl ensburg, 1955; Brian Ran dall, The Colossus, Technical Report Series. no. 90, Computing Lab oratory, Univers ity of Newcastle-u pon-T yne (Newcastle, 1976); Brian J ohn son, The Secret War (London, 1978), pp . 327- 49. 31. Among the better known are those recounted in Yardley, The A merican Black Chamber, pp . 289-317, and Richard H. Ullma n, The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton, 1973), pp . 267-310. 32. H insley et al ., Br itish Intelligence, 11, 65, tells of the acq uisitions of Enigma machin es by the Soviet Un ion but sta tes that during the war Britain remain ed 'uncertain of the extent oftheir Sigint [signal intelligence) achievements' and could not determine 'whet her and, ifso , from what dat es the y succeeded in reading Enigma keys'. 33. Shiro T akagi, ' Nippon No Black Cha mber', All Yomimono (Showa 27, Juichigatsu (November 1952)),1 57-75 (unpublished translation , 'The Black Cha mber ofJ ap an ', by flo Morikam i); Int errogation of Lt-Gen. Seizo Arisue (chief of Arm y intelligence), United States Strategic Bombing Survey, interrogation no. 238, p. 10, Record Group 43, National Archiv es, Washington. 34. Kurt Vetterlein (engin eer in cha rge of the intercept post ), interview, 1 Sept 1967; transcripts of intercept s in Inl and II gehei m, Vol. 477 f, Politisches Archiv, Auswartiges Amt , Bonn ; German y, Oberkommand o der Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht­ fiihrun gsstab , Kriegstagebuch ... /940-/945, ed. Percy Ern st Schramm (f rankfurt, 1961-9), III, 854; Walt er Schellenb erg, The Labyrinth : memoirs of Walter Schellenberg, tran s. Louis Hagen (New York , 1956), p. 366. 35. [Kunibert] Randewig, 'Taktische funkpeiling', Wehrtechnische Heft e, 52 (1955) , 276 TH E MISSING DIMENSIO N

pp . 104-10; Rand ewig, ' Verfahre n der Funkaufkl arung-Empfang s- und Peildi enst­ Auswer tun g', in Albert Prau n (ed.) , 'Eine U ntersuchung iiber den Funkdienst des russischen, britischen und ameri kanisc hen Heeres im zweiten Weltkrieg vom deuts­ chen Stan dpunkt aus, unt er besonderer Beriicksicht igung ihrer Sicherh eit', 18 Feb 1950 (unpublished; in private collection) ; reports of radi o reconn aissan ce unit s in Heeresgruppe Nord , 74130/28, Bundesarchiv/Militiirarchiv; Herbert Schm idt (radio di rection finder ), interview, 30 Jan 1970; Fritz Nee b (operating head of Arm y Group Centre rad io intelligence), inter view, 30 Dec 1972. 36. Report of 14 Mar 1942, Armeeo berkomma ndo II , 22279/3, Bund esarchiv/ Militara rchiv; report of 19 J an 1942, 24. Infanterie Division, 22006/11, Bundesarchiv/ Mili tararchiv; report of 25 Feb 1944, III . Pan zer Korps, 53975/5 , Bundesarchiv/ Mili tiirarchiv. 37. Repor t of I Mar 1944, p. 9, Heeresgruppe Nord, 75130/31, Bundesarchiv/ Milit ararchiv, 38. Report s at pp . 107 and 110, Heeresgruppe D, 85459, Bundesarchiv/Militarar­ chiv; United States, War Department, Mili tar y Intelligence Division, German Opera­ tionalIntelligence: a study ofGerman operational intelligence, produced at German Military Docum ents Section by a combined British, Ca na dia n, and US Staff, (n.p., April, 1946), pp . 8-:9, 24. 39. Kahn, Th~ Codebreakers, p. 472, errs in say ing that the Germ an s obtained the code from the Italians, who had stolen it from the Ameri can embassy in Rome and were reading Feller's messages thems elves (General Cesare Arne, Guerra segreta in Italia 1940--43 [Rome, 1954], pp . 96-8). Th e Germans solved it themselves. 40. Wilhelm F. Flicke, WarSecrets in theEther, tran s. Ray W. Pett engill (Was hington, 1953, reprinted with emendations, Laguna Hills , Ca lif., 1977), II, 192-8; Herb ert Schaedel (arc hivist for the Chiffrierabteilung of the O berkomma ndo der Weh rmacht ), interview, 29 July 1969; Ant on Staubwasser (British specialist in the Germ an army high comma nd's Foreign Armi es West), interview, 9 Mar 1970. 41. Hans -Otto Behrendt (assista nt intell igence officer to Rommel at the time) , interview, 18 Nov 1978. Hans- Otto Behrendt, Rommels Kenntn is vom Feindim Afrikafeld­ zug: Ein Bericht iiber die Feindnachrichtenarbeit, insbesondere die Funkaufkldrung (Freiburg , 1980), pp . 175-8, 188-204. 42. [Adolf Hitl er], Hitlers Tischgesprdche im Fiihrerhauptquartier 1941-1942, ed . Henry Picker, new ed. Percy Ernst Schram m (Stuttgart, 1963), transcript for 29,June 1942. 43. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether, p. 197. 44. Ulrich Liss, 'Der ent scheidend e Wert richtiger Feind beurteilung - I: Beispiele aus der neueren Kriegsgeschichte' , Wehrkunde, VIII (Nov. 1959), 584-92 at p. 585; Reinhard Gehlen et al. 'The Germa n G-2 Service in the Russian Ca mpaign (Ic-Dienst Ost }', lst Special Int elligence Int er rogation Report, Int errogat ion Ce nter United States Forces Eu ropean Theater (22 ,July 1945), p. 16. 45. Karl Donitz, letter, 27 ,Jan 1970. 46. Heinz Bonat z, Die deutsche Marine-Funkaufkldrung 1914-1945 (Beitrage zu r Weh rforschung, XX/XXI (Da rmstad t, 1970), p. 138; Jurgen Rohw er, ' La Radiotele­ graphic: Auxiliare du comma ndement dans la guerre sous-marin', Revued'histoire de la deuxiemeguerremondiale, XVIII (j an 1968),41-66 at p. 52. 47. B-D ienst war diar y, p. 78, III M 1006/6, Bundesa rchiv/M ilitararchiv; Wilhelm Tranow (technica l head of the B-Dienst), interview, l j uly 1970. 48. Rohw er, The Critical Convtry Battles ofMarch 1943, pp . 240, 5 1, 6 1. See also Heinz Bonatz, Seekriegim Ather (He rford, 1981). 49. B-D ienst wa r diary, p. 169, III M 1006/6 , Bundesarchiv/Militiirarchiv. 50. Walther Seifert (hea d of evaluation for the Forschungsamt, Goring's code brea king and wiretapping agency), interview, 19 Aug 1970; 'D ie Vern ehmung von Generaloberst J odi du rch die Sowjets', tran s. Wilhelm Arenz, Wehrwissenschaftliche NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 277

Rundschau, II (Sept 1961), 534--42 at p. 539. Hinsley et al. , British Intelligence, II, 640--2. 51. Report of 10 O ct 1944, p. I, in Heeresgruppe C, 75138/3 1, Bund esarchiv/ Militiirarchiv. 52. Dyer interview; Wesley A. Wright (na vy cryptana lyst in Pearl Harbor), interview, 12 Dec 1963. Additional first-person material in W.j. Holmes, Double-edged Secrets: U.S. navalintelligenceoperationsin thePacificduring WorldWarll (Annapolis, 1979), and Edward Van Der Rhoer, Deadly Magic: a personal accountofcommunications intelligence in World War II in the Pacific (New York , 1978). 53. Dyer interview. 54. Chester W. Nimit z and E. B. Pott er (eds), The Great Sea War: the story ofnaval actionin World War II (Englewood Cliffs, NJ , 1960), p. 245. 55. Letter to presidential candida te Thom as E. Dewey, 27 Sept 1944, in United State s, Congr ess, J oint Co mmittee on the Inv estig ation of the Pearl Harbor Attac k, PearlHarbor Attack, Hearings, 79th Congress , Ist and 2nd Sessions (Was hington, 1946), part 3, pp . 1132-3 at p. 1132. 56. Ch arles A. Lockwood (comma nde r of US submarines in the Pacific), lett er, 25 Nov 1964. See also United States, Navy, Chi ef of Na val Operations, OP-20-G-7 , 'The role of communications intelligence in subma rine warfare in the Pacific (janua ry 1943-0ctober, 1943)' , 19 Nov 1945, SRH-01I , Record Gro up 457, National Archives, Washington . D.C. and Clay Blair,Jr., Silent Victory:The U.S. submarinewar againstjapan (Philadelphia, 1975). 57. Cited in Nimitz and Pott er, The GreatSea War, pp . 422-3. 58. Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto (New York, 1969); Ho lmes, Double-edgedSecrets, pp . 135--6. 59. Various sources. Kahn , The Codebreakers, p. 19, errs in impl ying that the Purple machin e used rotors. The sugges tion that Purple was similar cryptogra phically to the Enigma and thu s owed its solution to the Enigma solution has been ed uced from this Kahn error and is itselffalse. The solutio ns were entirely independent of one another. 60. PearlHarbor Attack, part 36, p. 312, part 34, p. 84. 6 1. United States, War Department , Office of Assistan t Chief of Staff, G-2, ' Mag ic Summaries', 20 Mar to 31 Dec 1942, NC3 -457-78-4, and ' Magic Diplomatic Summaries', 1943, NC 3-457-78-7, both Record Group 457, National Archives. These have been published on microfilm by Univers ity Publi cations of America, acco m­ pan ied by A Subject and NameIndex tothe Magic Documents: Summaries and Transcripts ofthe Top-Secret Diplomatic Communications of J apan, 1938-/945, ed . Paul Kesaris, index compiled by David Wall ace (Frederick, Mar yland, 1982). Ronald Lewin , The American Magic: Codes, Ciphersand the Defeat of.Japan (New York , 1982), cha pte r I I. 62. ' ''Magic'' Summary ', no. 562 of 9 Oct 1943 in ' Magic Dipl omatic Summaries'. This meeting, incidentally , is not includ ed in Andreas Hillgruber (ed.),Staatsmiinnerund Diplomaten bei Hitler; Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungm iiber Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes, 2. T eil, 1942-1 944 (Frankfurt, 1970). T he intercept s thu s cons titute a useful new source for the history of Hitler's Reich . 63. '''Magic'' Summary ' of 17 Dec 1943, in ' Magic Diplomati c Summaries'. 64. Pearl HarborAttack, part 3, p. 1132. 65. See the account by J ean Stengers, above, cha pte r 6. 66. Penelope Fitzgerald , The Knox Brothers (New York, 1977), passim. 67. Ronald Lewin , Ultra Goes to War (New York , 1978), pp. 112-1 3 and Wlad yslaw Kozaczuk , Enigma (Frederick, Maryland, 1984), chapters 1-4, 5, appendices C, D, E. Gordon Welch man , The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York, 1982), pp . 77-81, 295-307; Peter Ca lvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra (London, 1980), pp . 10-1 3; I..J. Good , ' Early work on computers at Bletchl ey', Cryptologia, III (April, 1979),65--77; Andrew Hod ges, : The Enigma (Ne w York , 1983), especia lly chapter 4. 68. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I. 178-9. 278 THE MISSING DIMENSION

69. Ibid ., pp. 528-48; N. E. Evans, 'Air intelligence and the Coventry raid ', Royal UnitedServices Institution Journal (Sept 1976), 66-73. 70. H. R. Trevor-Roper (a solver with E. W. B. Gill of the hand cyphers), interview, 1972; Werner Trautman (head of radio station in Hamburg), interview, 20 Aug 1970; Kim Phil by, My Private War (New York, 1968), p. 65; Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I, p. 120. 71. John Masterman, The Double-cross System in the Ward 1939to 1945 (New Haven, 1972),passim ; Kahn, Hitler's Spies, ch. 26. 72. Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles d March 1943, p. 238; Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence (London, 1977), pp . 70-1 ; Hinsley et al., British Intelligence , I, 336-7. 73. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, II, 229, 667. The original version of this paper followed Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp . 110-11, in saying that the change to the four-rotor Enigma took place on 8 March 1943 and that Bletchley solved it in a few days . This is wrong . Beesly was apparently thinking of a new U-boat code for short-signal weather reports put into use on 10 March 1943 that Bletchley at first feared would be 'fatal' to its work but that it in fact recovered in nine days (Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, II, 750). 74. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp . 64--5;Jiirgen Rohwer, diagram 'Development of German cipher-circles for Funkschliissel M (naval Enigma)', in Newsletter d the American Committee onthe History ofthe Second World War, no. 17 (May 1977), 5. 75. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence , II, 229--30, 547-67, 747-52. 76. Ibid " 572; Beesly, Very Special Intelligence , pp. 200-1 ;Jiirgen Rohwer, 'Die alliierte Funkaufkliirung und de r Verlaufdes Zweiten Wcltkrieges', Vierteljahrshefte jilr Zeitge­ schichte , XXVII (1979),325-69 at 356-62; Giinter Boddeker, Die Boote im Net; (Bergische Gladbach, 1981), passim; Alberto Santoni, II Vero Traditore : II ruolo documentato di Ultra nellaguerra delMediterraneo (Milano, 1981). For a more detailed analysis of the Battle of the Atlantic see chapter 8 in this volume by Jiirgen Rohwer. 77. United States, Army , 6824 Detailed Interrogation Center, (MIS)M. 1121, 'Information on German Secret Teletypewriters', Record Group 165, National Archives ; U.S. Patent No. 1,912,983; , 'Chiffrierverfahren der neusten Zeit', Archiederelektnschen Ubertragung, 2 (Dec 1948),362-9 at § 13. 78. Randall, The Colossus . 79. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, pp . 325-6; [United States, Army], Memorandum for Colonel [Telford] Taylor, ' Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army', 12 May 1945, SRH-022, Record Group 457, National Archives; US Army Air Force , Ultra and the History ofthe UnitedStatesStrategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force (written 1945; published Frederick, Md ., 1980). 80. Memorandum for Colonel Taylor, 'Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army', p. 2, Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, II, chapter 19. 81. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, pp . 336-40. Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West (London, 1979), pp. 112-24. 82. According to records in the Berlin Document Center, the technical heads of the OKW Chiffrierabteilung (Wilhelm Fenner) and oftheB-Dienst (Wilhelm Tranow) were not party members; Tranow wrested this post from an old party member (Lothar Franke, membership no. 19,852). The Foreign Office codebreaking unit's administra­ tive head (Kurt Selchow) joined after the start ofthe war (I Jan 1940, membership no. 7,910,928); of his three main assistants, two were party members, one early (Adolf Paschke, I May 1933, 2,649,870) , and one late (Rudolf Schauiller, I Jan 1942, 8,743,951), and one was not (Werner Kunze). The leading officials of the Forschungsamt, Goring's wiretapping and code breaking agency, were all Nazis . 83. Seifert, interview. NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 279

84. Leo Hepp, 'Das Grosste Geheimnis des Zweiten Weltkrieges?', Wehrkunde (1976), pp. 86-9 at 88-9; Dr Erich Hiittenhain (in charg e ofGerman ciph er systems in OKW Chiffrierabteilung ), letter, 15 Feb 1979. 85. This section, especially the part dealing with the technical reasons, owes a great deal to Dr C. A. Deavours, professor of mathematics at Kean College of New Jersey, who has thoroughly investigated the cryptology ofthe Enigma. I am deeply grateful to him for his help. The section has also benefited from the following people, who read it in draft and commented upon it: Dr I.J. Good, one of the team who worked with Newman at Bletchley on the electronic cryptanalytical machines and is now University Distinguished Professor of Statistics at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Dr Karl-Heinz Ludwig, professor at the University of Bremen and author of Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Dusseldorf, 1974); Dr Henry A. Turner, professor of history at Yale University specialising in twentieth-century German economics; Dr Andreas Hillgruber, professor of history at Cologne University and a leading World War II historian ; Heinz Bonatz, retired Kapitan zur See, head of the B-Dienst from 1934 to 1936 and from 1942 to 1944; Dr Erich Hiittenhain, and Dr Alan Beyerchen , professor of history at the Ohio State University and author of Scientists under Hitler: politicsand thephysicscommuniry in the Third Reich (New Haven, 1977). 86. Hinsl ey et al., British Intelligence , II , 631,639. Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-45(Berkeley , 1977), pp . 169-193 , discusses similar problems in a broader context. 87. Tadeusz Lisicki, 'Die Leistung des polni schen Entzilferungdiensten bei der Losung des Verfahrens der deutscher "Enigma" - Funkschliisselmaschine', in J iirgen Rohwer and EberhardJ ackel (eds), Die Funkaufkldrung undihreRolleim Zioeiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979), pp . 71-5; Koza czuk, Enigma, pp . 48-9, 53--4, 251-4, 26~9 , 274-5 . 88. Another general reason might seem to be that the Allies' larger population would have given them more, and probably better, people for codebreaking. But it is not known how many of the approximately 10,000 people at Bletchley were solving cyphers other than German at any particular time or how many in the German agencies were solving Soviet, Italian, Japanese, Turkish, Swedish, and other non-US and non-U'K systems at the same time. Moreover, the contributions of other governments - Canadian, Free French, Dutch, Italian,Japanese, Hungarian - to their respective allies cannot readily be measured in terms of manpower. Finally , the number of persons in field units, both Allied and German, is not known with precision . I myselfhave the feeling that more people in the West attacked German cyph ers than worked in Germ any on Allied cyphers and so I think that greater Allied population probably did contribute to greater success . But , lacking the figures that would prove or disprove this conjecture, I do not advance it. A corollary to this would be that the Allies' greater industri al capacity enabled them to help both their codebreakers and their codemakers more . But this help would have been so small in relation to eith er the Allied or the Axis warelfort as to be insign ificant. So this cannot be adduced as a factor , either. 89. Kahn, Hitler's Spies, pp . 172-222 , esp. p. 176. 90. Ibid. , pp. 534-6. 91. This is developed in more detail in ibid ., pp . 528-31. 92. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), book VI , chapter I. 93. Ibid., book VII, chapter 2. 94. Georges Castellan, Le riarmament clandestin du Reich, 1930-1935, vuparle2' bureau de l'itat-majorfraru;ais (Paris, 1954); Bonatz, Die deutsche Marine-Funkaufkldrung ; p. 93; David Kahn, Kahnon Codes (New York, 1984), pp . 76-88. Cf above, pp. I27lf. 95. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I, 12-13, 36-43; Kahn, Hitler's spies, pp . 54, 387-8, 393--8. 280 TH E MISSIN G DIM E NSION

96. Solomon Kullback, teleph on e interview, 2 O ct 1978. 97. Tran ow, int erviews. The book was Roger Baudouin 's Elements de cryptographie (Pa ris, 1939). 98. W. Preston Co rderma n (a first stude nt in thi s schoo l, lat er wartime head ofthe US Army codebreaking age ncy), int erview, 2 Nov 1976; W. F. Friedm an , Military (Washington, 1938-42). 99. U nited Stat es, War Department, T echnical Manual 11- 380, ConverterM-209 (27 Apr 1942), § 5 b. 100. See, for exa mple, German y, O berkommando de r Wehrmacht , Heeresdienst­ vorschrift geheim 7 (also Marinedienstvorschrift 534, LuftwatTedienstvorschrift gehei m 7), Allgemeine Schiisselregeln f iir die Wehrmacht, I Apr 1944, and' Ger man y, [Reichswehrministerium]' Heeresdi ens tvor schrift geheim 13 (also Luftw atTedienst­ vorsc hri ft gehei m 13), Gebrauschsanleitungfii r die Chiffnermaschine Enigma, 12.1an 1937). 101. Beyerchen, lett er, 13 Apr 1979, says that urgen cy stimula ted the Allies to break down the barrier betw een theoretical a nd applied mathem ati cian s and scie nt ists an d th at the lack of urgen cy in Germ an y 'left their peacetime barrier intact'. 102. T . H . Flowers, lett er , 13 Feb 1979. I a m deepl y gra teful to Mr Flowers for this lett er and one of 18 Apr 1979, whi ch explain how the British advanced from electromechani cal to electronic machines. 103. Ibid.; 1. .1. Good , ' Early work on compute rs a t Bletchley', Cryptologia, 3 (April, 1979),65-77 at p. 73; Hodges, Turing, pp . 225-7, 267-8. 104. Kon rad Zuse (German comp uter pion eer ), lett ers, 22 Nov 1976 and 5J an 1977. 105 Bonat z, int ervi ew, 15 Nov 1978. 106. See, for example, Max Pinl and Lux Furtrnuller, ' Ma themat icians under Hitler' , Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XVIII (London, 1973), 129--82. 107. An atte mpt to trace the roots of Germ an a rroga nce in Kahn, Hitler's Spies, pp . 525-8. 108. Beesly, VerySpecial Intelligence, pp . 57-8;Kahn, Hitler's Spies, p. 533. 109. Kullback, int erview. 110. Harold Deut sch, talk a t colloq uium on 'Wha t role did rad io in telligence play in th e course of the Second World Wa r?', St uttga rt, 17 Nov 1978. III. See also David Kahn, 'T he Ultra conference ' , Cryptologia, 3 (j anuary, 1979), 1-8 at pp . 5-6. 112. Preface to Praun, ' Eine Untersuchung . . . '. 113. Eisenh ower to Menzies, 12 July 1945, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kan sas. 114. Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, p. 1133.

8. RADIO INTEL LIGENCE AN D IT S RO LE II'; T HE BAT T LE OF T HE A TLAN T IC Jiirgen Rohwer

I. T he most important sources about radio-intelligence in the Battl e of the Atla ntic ar e as follows. Na tiona l Archives, Washin gton: SRS-548: B-Beri cht e and xB-Bericht e, 18 Sept 1939--23 Ma y 1945 (excluding 23 April 1944-6Ja n 1945). Original Germ an Naval Intelligence Summaries, 18 vols, 11861 pp . SRS-1166: TICOM-B-Bericht e, Vol. 19 (5 May 1944-20 Aug 1944), vol. 20 (20 Aug 1944-24 Dec 1944). German Nav al In telligen ce Summari es (re pro d uctions of origina ls held by the British ), 1457 pp . Publi c Record Office, London - Kew: ADM 223: War of 1939--1945: Naval Intelli­ gence Papers. DEFE 3: Intelligence from Enemy Rad io Co mmunications 1939--1 945. Vol. 1-4, 20-34, 66--82, 705-44. 2. This reconstruction is based mainl y on th e Reports of Pro ceedin gs with Co nvoys by the Convoy Commodores and the Seni or Officer s Escort, to be found in th e PRO NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 281

Series ADM 199 and in the Director ate of History, Dep t. of Defence in Ottawa and in the Convoy Folders for HX-, SC-, O N- and O NS-Convoys in the Op erational Archives, US Navy Yard, Washington. In addition I have used the Dail y Operation Map s of the US Atlantic Fleet, O .A., Navy Yard, Washington. 3. H insley F. H . with Thomas, E. E., Ransom , C. F. G. and Knight , R. C., British Intelligencein theSecond World War, Its InfluenceonStrategy and Operations. Vol. II (London 1981). App endix I: British Cypher Security During the War , PI'. 631-42. 4. Inform ation from the weekly xB-Berichte-Series, See note I above, SRS-548. Also Bonatz , Heinz, Seekrieg im Ather, Die Leistungen der Marine-Funkaufkl arung 1 9 3~1 94 5 (He rford, Mittler, 1981). 5. Main source: Kriegstagebu ch des Befehlshab ers der U-Boote 1 9 3 ~1 9 4 5 . (O rigina l in the Bundesar chiv-Mil itararchiv, Freiburg.) Also, Donitz, Karl , 10Jahre und 20 Tage, 7.Aull. (Miinchen, 1980). Mi t einem Nac hwort iiber die Schlacht im Atlant ik in der historischen Forschung 1980. Rohwer,Jiirgen , The CriticalConvoyBattles of March 1943: The Battle HX.229 and SC.122 (London, Ian Allan , 1977); Douglas, W. A. B. and Rohw er,]., 'T he Most T hankless Task Revisited: Convoys, Escort s and Radio Int elligence in the Western Atlantic 1941-1 943', in The RCN in Retrospect (ed. J am es Boutilier, Vancouver, Univ. of British Co lumb ia Press, 1982) PI'. 175-234. 6. Roskill, Stephen W., The Secret Capture (Londo n, 1959); Beesly, Patr ick, Very Special Intelligence: The Story rifthe Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945 (Londo n, Hamish Ham ilton , 1977); Hinsley et al., 01'. cit., Vol. 1 (London, HMSO, (979), PI'. 115-36,330--46, app. 12., Vol. II , 1'1'.163-234, 525-72, app. 8, 9, to and 19. 7. Rohw er, Jiirgen, 'L a rad iotelegraphic, auxiliaire du comma ndement da ns la guerr e sousmarine', in Revued'Histoirede la Deuxieme GuerreMondiale (I 966), PI'. 42-66. 8. Personal informat ion from the British , American and Can ad ian experts P. Beesly, E. E. T homas , P. Ca lvocoress i, Sir H . Marchan t, M. Pain, K. Knowl es and P. McDiarmid. Also, Rohwer,.J. and J ackel, E., Die Rolle der Funkaufkldrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttga rt, Motorbuch, 1979). 9. Rohw er and J ackel, 01'. cit., PI'. 388. 10. Rohw er, Jiirgen, 'Special Intelligence und die Geleitzugsteuerung im Herbst 1941', in M anne-Rundschau 76 (1978), 711- 19; Rohwer, J iirgen, ' Die USA und die Schlacht im Atlantik', in Kriegswende Dezember 1941 , Roh wer, J iirgcn and J ackel, Eberh ard (cds) (Koblenz, Bernard & Graefe, (983). II . Beesly, Pat rick, Rohwer, Jii rgen and Knowl es, Kenn eth , 'Special Intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic. The British, the Germ an , the American View', in Changing Interpretations and New Sourcesin Naval History, Papers from the T hird Nava l Acade my Histor y Symposium, Robert W. Love (cd .) (New York , Ga rla nd 1980), PI'. 413-49. 12. Hin sley, 01'. cit., Vol. II, appendix 19, 'The Breakin g of the U- boat Enigma (Shark)', PI'. 747-52. 13. Bonatz, 01'. cit., PI'. 245-57. 14. Gretton , Sir Peter, Crisis Convrry. The Storyofthe Atlantic ConvoyHX.231 (London, Davies, 1974). 15. Roskill, Stephen W., The War at Sea, 1939-1945, vol. II. (Londo n, HMSO , 1956), 1'1'. 367- 9; Rohw er, The Critical Convoy Battles, 01'. cit., PI'. 195-200; Hin sley, 01'. cit., Vol. II, PI'. 525-72; The RCN in Retrospect, 01'. cit., PI'. 221-34.

9. T HE CA M BR IDGE COMINTERN Robert Cecil

The writer claim s good autho rity for all unqualified statements; he has not in all cases been able to disclose what it is. He wishes to express his thanks to all those, named and 282 THE MISSING DIMENSION unnamed, who have helped him in verifying a series of events, some of which necessarily remain shrouded in darkness.

1. Kim Philby , My Silent War (London, 1968), p. xix. 2. P. Seale and M. McConville, Philby: The Long Roadto Moscow (London, 1978), pp.66-8. 3. M. Straight, After Long Silence (London 1983). 4. Ibid ., p. 144. 5. G. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents (London, 1972), p. 149. 6. Ibid ., p. 118. 7. Philby , My Silent War, p. 74. 8. The author is indebted to Mr John Reed for this account. 9. A more detailed account will be found in B. Page, D. Leiich and P. Knightley in Philby: TheSpy Who Betrayed a Generation (London, 1977), pp . 211-15. 10. F. Giles, From Russiawith Love, Sunday Times WeeklY Review , 6Jan 80. 11. Rees, A Chapter II!Accidents, p. 187. 12. Hansard, 7 Nov. 55, col. 1495. 13. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, p. 191. 14. Philby, My Silent War, p. 127. 15. Lord Greenhill, The Times, 7 Sept 77. 16. Straight, After Long Silence, p. 251. 17. A. Boyle, The Climate of Treason (London, 1979), p. 383. 18. D. D. Maclean, British Foreign Policy Since Sue; (London, 1970). 19. Z. K. Brzezinski, Ideology andPower in Soviet Politics (London 1962), p. 5. 20. L. Frank, Der Mensch ist Gut (Zurich 1917).

10. SECRET INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1947-1982: THE CIA'S SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY HarryHowe Ransom

1. Harry Howe Ransom, 'Don't Make the CIA a KGB ', TheNew York Times,Op-Ed page, 24 Dec 1981, p. A23. 2. Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York, 1977), p. 17. 3. US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence. FinalReport BookIV, 'History of the Central Intelligence Agency', by Anne Karalekas. Senate Report No. 94-755. 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington DC, 1976), pp. 1-102. In 1949 the covert operations budget was $4.7 million; in 1952, $82 million. The number of CIA foreign stations in 1949 was seven; by 1952 it was forty-seven . 4. For coverage of the founding years of the CIA, see, among others: Ray Cline , Secrets, Spies andScholars (Washington, DC, 1976); William R. Corson, The Armies II! Ignorance (New York, 1977); Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); and Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA (Washington, DC, 1982). 5. Quoted in US Senate Select Committee, Book IV , p. 42. 6. For detailed accounts ofthese episodes, see Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup : The Struggle for the Control II!Iran (New York, 1979); Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (Austin , Texas, 1982); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: theUntold Story oftheAmerican Coup in Guatemala (Garden City , New York, 1982). 7. Quoted in US Select Committee, Book IV , pp . 52-53. 8. Ibid ., p. 63. 9. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (London, 1975). 10. 'Text of Reagan Statement on Order', The New York Times , 5 Dec 1981, p. 11. 11. In another essay covering this same historical period , I have analysed the NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 283 interaction of domestic and international politics as they affected intelligence policy. See: 'Strategic Intelligence and Intermestic Politics ', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Whittkopf (eds) , Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings (New York, 1983), pp . 299-319.

Bibliographical Note

A burgeoning bibliography confronts those seeking to understand the evolution of the modern United States intelligence system. No other nation has seen its intelligence secrets bared in such abundant detail. Published items fall into five categories: bibliographies; government documents; subjective memoirs by, or biographies of, intelligence professionals; 'whistle-blowing' polemics; and scholarly works by his­ torians and social scientists. A growing number of bibliographies are available, including Paul W. Blackstock and Frank 1. Schaf,Jr.Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, andCovert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources (Detroit, Michigan, 1978); George C. Constantinides, Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography (Boulder, Colorado, 1983); MyronJ. Smith,J r, The Secret Wars, Vol. Il (1945-1980) (Santa Barbara, California, 1981). With the creation of permanent, select committees in the US House of Representa­ tives and Senate, a large flow ofpublic hearings and reports on intelligence activities began . Undergirding these are the numerous hearings, studies and reports published by the select investigative committees in the House (Otis Pike, chairman) and the Senate (Frank Church, chairman) in 1975-6. In June 1975 the Report to thePresident of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Nelson A. Rockefeller, chairman) was published (Washington DC) . Also useful is Volume 7 of the Appendices, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Robert D. Murphy, chairman) (Washington, DC,June 1975). A very useful selection of the most significant sections from the above-listed sources can be found in Tyrus G. Fain (ed.), The Intelligence Communi!>,: History, Organization and Issues (New York and London, 1977). In the memoir-biography category, the most revealing work is Thomas Powers, The Man Who Keptthe Secrets: RichardHelms and the CIA (New York, 1979). Also providing insights are David D. Martin, Wilderness !if Mirrors (New York, 1980); William E. Colby, Honorable Men, My Life in theCIA (New York, 1978); and Ray S. Cline, The CIA Under Reagan , Bush and Casey (Washington, 1981). Among the most notable polemical works are : Philip Agee, Inside the Company , CIA Diary (New York, 1975); Morton H. Halperin, et al., The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies (New York, 1976); Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York, 1974); John Stockwell, In Search !ifEnemies (New York, 1978); and Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End (New York, 1977). Representative scholarly works include Roy Godson (ed.), Intelligence Requirementsfor theI980s, 5 volumes (Washington, DC, 1979-82); Harry Howe Ransom, TheIntelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass ., 1970); Richard E. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence, Monitoring Dissent in America (Austin, Texas, 1980); Stafford T. Thomas, The U.S. Intelligence Communi!>, (Lanham, Md. , 1983); Robert 1. Pfaltzgraff,Jr., Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg (eds), Intelligence Policy and National Security (Hamden, Conn., 1981); and Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence andtheSoviet Strategic Threat (Boulder, Colo, 1977). 284 THE MISSING D IMENSION

II. THE HISTORY OF THE D-NOTlCE COMMITTEE Alasdair Palmer

• My thanks are du e to Peter Hennessy and Christopher Andrew, both of whom provided a great deal of help , knowledge and encouragement. Without Peter Hennessy, the chapter would never have been started . With out Christopher Andrew, it would never have been finished - or published. Duncan Campbell, Admiral Ash, and Sir Frank Cooper shared their views of the syst em with me, for which I am also very grateful. Unfortunately, virtually all of the committee's records since 1918 hav e gone 'missing'. I. WO 32/638 1. All numbered referenc es, unless otherwise stated, are to the PRO papers at Kew . 2. Ibid. 3. See Philip M. Towle, 'T he Debate on Wartime Censorship in Britain', in B. Bond and I. Roy (eds), War andSociety , vol. I (London, 1975). 4. Cab 4/1, ern Paper 39B. 5. Cab 17/9 1. 6. Cab 17/91 . For the Guardian , such 'power in the hands of government would be a dangerou s weap on', while The Times claimed that 'the natural attitude of every government is to try and ma ke out that every thing is being well done, and to conceal its faults as much as possible' and viewed 'with apprehension any system which mad e penal the publication of all military and naval news except as authorised by the government'. 7. Cab 17/91. The qu otations from Leng and Robbins also come from this file. S. Cab 17/91. 9. The quotations ar e from one he published - anonymously - in the Fortnightly, March 1906. 10. ADM 116/1058. The Admiralt y reactio n to the offending article in the Daily Express is also to be found here , as is my quotation from The Times. II. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Cab 4/5 . 14. See David French, 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900-1915'. The HistoricalJournal, XXI, (1978) and Christopher Andrew, 'T he Mobili zation of British Intelligence for the Two World War s', in Mobilization for Total War, ed . N. F. Drei sziger (Waterloo, Ontario, 1981). 15. Cab 3/2, Paper 47B. 16. Quoted in Towle, 'The Debat e on Wartime Censorship'. 17. Cab 17/91. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Cab 4/5 . 21. Ibid. 22. Appendix to Pap er 167B, Cab 5/3. 23. Suppressing, amongst oth er items, the trials of HMS Edinburgh, 'acceleration of certain works in government and private dockyards', and embarkation practice for a putative expeditionary force. 24. Cab 4/5 . 25. Q uot ation in Co lin Lovelace, ' British Press Censorship during the First World War' in Newspaper Historyfromthe17th Century to thePresentDay, G. Boyle,]. Curran and P. Wing ate (eds) (London, 1978). 26. Cab 24/5 . 27. Quoted in Lovelace, ' British Press Censorship'. 28. Cab 14/15. NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 285

29. For the full details of how the For eign Office did this, see Philip M. T aylor, The Projectionof Britain: British OverseasPropaganda 1918-1939 (Ca mbridge, 1980). 30. Ca b 4/8 . 31. ADM 116/4082 . 32. At 169th meeting of the CID, 20 Feb 1923 - see Cab 4/8 . 33. ADM 116/4082. 34. ADM 116/4082 . Rob bins maintained that 'if an editor has . .. Communistic sympa thies, he would keep them in check when his journalistic career and reputation were at stake'. 35. See Christopher Andrew's chapter in this volum e. 36. A policy exactly opposite to that adv an ced by the American s, who went out of their way to feed thc public appetite for information on the terrify ing new discovery . For examples of the ludi crou s length s the Brit ish government was prepared to go to try to ensure atomic research was shrouded in secrecy, see M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence (London, 1974), Vol. 2: PolicyExecution, pp . 126--37. It is worth noting that once aga in, the comic fastidiousness was a total flop: the Russia ns got mu ch more secret inform ation from the spies Klaus Fuchs and Don ald MacLean . Gowin g notes that 'the men in cha rge of the proj ect - Port al and then Mor gan as contro llers, Cockcroft, Hinton, Penn ey and Perrin .. . believed the extreme security surrounding the project was irrationa l and counter productive' (p. 134). 37. G. M. Thomson, The Blue PencilAdmiral (London, 1947), p. 30. 38. Ibid., p. 136. 39. ADM 1120905. 40. An example of this is a reply in 1951 by the Deputy Editor of the DairyTelegraph ­ then Malcolm Mu ggeridge - to a complaint from the Chairman of the committee tha t an article on Augu st 1had mentioned a bomb test in Australia, contra vening a D-notice ban . Mu ggeridge was 'most distressed ... you may be sur e the lapse was unintentional and that all requisite steps will be taken to avoid any furth er repetition of the offence'. Quoted in Gowing , Independenceand Deterrence, Vol 2, p. 137. 41. Cha pman Pincher's fascina ting evidence to the 1980 Select Committee on Defence HC773 pro vides much of the basis for this and subseq uent remark s. 42. Aitken's book docum enting his experiences is Officially Secret (Londo n, 1971). 43. See his submission to the 1980 Select Co mmittee, HC 773, reiterated in conversation in December 1982. 44. Press evidence, HC 773. 45. Official docum ents explaining the system stress this. 46. The details are from Cha pma n Pinch er's book , InsideStory (London, 1978) and the relevant govern ment pu blicati ons, Cmnd 330d and 3312. 47. Nigel West, A Matter of Trust: MIS, 1945-72 (London, 1932). 48. Pincher, in InsideStory, p. 69, alleges that M 15 put the nam e on a D-notice, which was then communicated by the Press Associat ion's teleprinter, to punish the Telegraph , on the assumption th at the rest of the press, on seeing it there, would think that anything MI 5 thought safeenough to share with journa lists was safeenough to publ ish. 49. HC773, p. In. 50. See the submissions of the editors of such pap ers as the Guardian and the Financial Times, and programmes such as 'World in Action', in HC773. 51. Both the Assistant Dir ector-G eneral at the BBC (Alan Protheroe) and the Deputy Editor at ITN (Don Horobin) sit on the D-notice committee . Both are basically in favour of the system, though both agree that it does not play much ofa role in the ir lives - and that there may be a causa l connection between those two evaluations. 52. See A. Protheroe's article in the Listener, May 1982. Robert Harris, Gotcha! The Media, the Press and the Falklands Crisis (Londo n, 1983) docum ent s the shortening tempers and growing suspicions of mauvaisefoi in detail. List of Contributors

CHRISTOPHER M. ANDREW is Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College , Cambridge and editor of the HistoricalJournal . He has written and broadcast widely on modem history and international relations. H is most recent book, written jointiy with A. S. Kan ya-Forstner, is France Overseas (1981). His next book, Secret Service: TheMaking of theBritish Intelligence Communi!)! , will be publ ished in 1985.

ROBERT CECIL, CMG, served for over thirty years in the British diplomatic service before becoming Reader in Contemporary German History at the University of Reading. His books include The Myth ifthe Master Race (1972) and Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia (I 975).

DAVID N. DILKS is Professor ofInternational History, University of Leeds and author of Curzon in India (2 vols, 1969, 1970); editor of the Diaries ofSir Alexander Cadogan (1971) and Retreat from Power (2 vols, 1981). The first volume of his Life ifNeville Chamberlain will be pu blished in 1984.

DAVID KAH N is the author of The Codebreakers, Hitler's Spies and Kahn on Codes and of numerous articles on cryptology and military intelligence and is editor of Cryptologia magazine . He is assistant Viewpoints editor at Newsday,the Long Island daily, and has a D.Phil. in modern history from Oxford Un iversity.

IAN NISH is Professor of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science . He is the authorof TheAnglo-japaneseAlliance (1966);Alliance in Decline (1972) and Japanese Foreign Policy (/869-1942) (I977).

EUNAN O'HALPIN is Lecturer in Publi c Administration, National Institute for Higher Education, Dublin. He is the author of articles published in the HistoricalJournal and Irish Historical Studies and of British Government in Ireland /89/-/922 (forthcoming from Gill and Macmillan).

ALASDAIR PALMER is research student at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, working on liberal political theory. He has written articles for The Times and The Economist.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM is Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. He has taught at Princeton and Harvard Universities and at the University of Leeds. He is the author of TheIntelligenceEstablishment (1970) Can American Democracy survive Cold War? (1963) and num erous articles and essays.

J UR GEN ROHWER is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Stuttgart.

JEAN STENGERS is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Brussels and a Member of the Belgian Royal Academy. He has written extensively on Leopold II and the Congo, Belgian history and intern ational relations. His most recent book is Leopold III et le Gouuemment: les deux politiques belges de /940 (1980).

WESLEY K. WARK is Lecturer in European History , University of Calgary. He is the author ofa forthcoming book on British intelligence and Nazi Germany in the 1930s and of articles for the Historical Journal and theJournalifStrategic Studies. 286 Index

Abwehr, 149 Arcos (All-Russian Cooperative Abyssinia, 106--8, 113, 120 Society), 46-7 Adcock, (Sir) Frank, 9 Arm y Sign al Corps (USA), 50 Adm iralty (British): First World Arnold-Forster, Chris, 179 War cry pta nalys is, 43; and Asche see Schmidt, H an s-Thi10 GC &CS, 44; and Irish Asdic, 91 intelligence, 55-6, 6 1, 65, 70, 76; Ash, Admiral William Noel, 248--9 and Nazi naval strength, 89-93, Asquith, H erb ert Hen ry (later 1st 98--9; Operational Intelligence Earl ),233 Centre, 155; and convoy system, Atlantic, Battle of the, 159-68; 160; code books, 162; and U-bo at convoy system, 160-2 war , 164-5; and contro l of pr ess, Attlee, C lement (later 1st Earl ), 231- 2, 234-6,239,242 190,192 Afghani stan , 219 Aud (Ge rman arms ship), 59-60 (1911), 37-40, 233 Austri a-Hungary, 138, 140 Air Min ist ry (and Stall): and Naz i AVA factory, Warsaw, 131 air strengt h, 79-84, 94-5, 98; and Avranches, 151 Press Co mmittee, 239-40 Aitken , J onathan , 243-4 B-Dienst iBeobachtungs-Dienst, Akashi Motojiro, General, 24-7, 31 Funkbeobachtungsdienst' [, 144-5, Ald crmaston, 240 150, 155-6, 161; see also Alekseyev, Admiral Eugene I., 32 xB-Dienst Alexandra, Queen, 238 ' B-Team' (USA), 13 Allen, (Sir) Denis , 196 Bacon , Francis, 49 Allend e, Salvador, 215 Baden-Powell , Robert (later 1st Alph ab etical T ypewrit er see Baron), 7-8 ' Purple' Baldwin, Stanl ey (later 1st Earl ), Am torg Trading Corporat ion , New 46-8 York (Russian ), 52 Balfou r of In chrye, H. H . Balfour, And erson , J ohn , 221 1st Baron , 247 Andrew, Christopher, 27 Ball, Sir J oseph, 173 Andropov, Yuri , 12 Balti c Sea, 90-1 Anglo-Am erican Combined Policy Barkl ey, Alben, 208 Committee, 187 Bay of Pigs (Cuba), 207, 210, 213 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Bayly , Admiral Sir Lewis, 59, 65 1935 (AG NA), 90-1, 93 Bazeri es, Comm andant Etienne, Ankara, 118, 181 34-7 Anstie, W. H., 44 Beaumont-Nesbi tt, Brig-General Aoki Nobozumi, Major, 29, 31 F. G ., 124 Arbenz Gu zman , Colonel J acobo , Beesly, Patrick, 2 206 Bell, Alan , 71-3, 75 287 288 IND EX Berlin : British embassy secur ity, 53; Russian trad e agreemen ts 105, 108, 11 2 with, 45-6; and pr e-war Nazi Bernstorff, Co unt Albrecht , 62 military strengt h, 78-1 00; Berthou , Louis, 39 agreements with It aly, 113, 118, Bertrand, General Gu stave, 122; SIS 's policy assessments, 127-33, 136 105, 118-20, 122- 3; and Enigm a, Bevin , Ern est, 190 126--7, 129, 132, 133-6, 154; in Bezobrazov, General Alexander First World War, 140-1 ; codes in M. , 27 Second World War, 145; cypher Bienvenu-Martin,j.-B.,41 machin es, 152- 3; runs down Birch , Fr ank , 9 intelligence serv ices, 197; and Birrell, Augu stine, 60 control of press, 228-36, 240-1 Bismarck (German warship), 164 Briti sh Intelligence Co rps, 7 Black Cha mber (USA) see Cy pher Brooks, Sydn ey, 229, 231, 233-4 Bur eau Brunosee Gretz-Arrnainvilliers Blake, George , 189,246 Brzezinski, Z. K., 196 , Buckingham shi re: Burgess, Guy: background and recruitment to, 9, 155; career, 169, 171-3, 175-6, 180, concentrates on German y, 10; 188-90; hom osexualit y and and Enigma decyph erm ent, 126, behaviour, 172, 188-90, 193; 129--30, 133-7, 149--50, 154; and flight from Britain , 174, 176, 182, techn ology, 156; and U-b oat war , 184, 194, 196; finan ces, 174; and 162- 3, 165-7; see also Nazi-Soviet pact, 175; spying Government Code and Cy pher activities, 176, 192; and Blunt, School 177; and Soviet defectors, 182; in Bloody Sunday, Irel and (21 Nov, Washington , 190; and 1920),74-6 uncovering of Maclean , 193-5; Blunt, Anthony: uncovered , 14; and death, 195; anti-Americanism, Cambridge recruitment to 196; and political climate, 198 Russia, 169, 173, 197; and Burnett , Air Vice-M arshal (Sir) Co min tern , 170; background, Cha rles Stu art, 240 170-1; esta te, 174; Bush, George, 12, 218 homosexu ality, 172; KGB Byrn e, General Sir J oseph Aloysius, connec tions, 173-4; and MI 5, 69--70, 72 174,1 77,180-1 ,194; spying, 176, 181; career, 176--8; and Burgess, cabinets noirs (France), 33-8, 40, 42 177, 194; KGB advises to flee, Cad ogan, Sir Alexander, 88, 103-4, 195; an d Philby, 195; death, 195; 114, 123, 179, 181-2 and politi cal clim ate, 198 Ca illaux, Henriett e, 39--41 Bohemia , 118 Ca illaux, Joseph, 37-41 Boxer rebellion (China), 23 Ca irnc ross, john, 173 Brad e, Sir Reginald , 234-6, 238-9, Ca iro: Maclean in, 187-8 241 'Cairo gan g' (Dublin, 1920),74 Bradl ey, General Omar, 151 Ca lme tte, Gaston , 39--40 Brequ ernie, Ca ptain, 132 Ca lvocoressi, Peter , 133 Brezhn ev, Leonid , II , 13 Ca mbon, Jules and Paul , 43 Britain : japanese views of, 20; Ca mbridge Uni versity: recruitment code-brea king services, 33, 42- 8, to Bletchley from , 9; and INDEX 289 communist syrnp athisers, 169-98 Chamberl ain , Neville, 97, 101, Campbell, Duncan, 5, 247 104-6, 122, 197 C ampbell, Sir Ron ald , 113-17, 188 Chanak crisis, 1922,238 Cannon, Clarence, 208 Chatfield, Admiral Alfred Ernie Caporetto, Battle of, 140 Montacute (later 1st Baron), 91 Cary-Foster , G. A., 182, 194 C hiefs of Staff (British), 78, 86, Carter,Jimmy, 217-20, 223 98-100 C asablanca conference, 1943, 167 Chile, 215 Case me nt, Sir Roger , 57-60, 65 C hina : rela tions with Japan, 18, 21, Casey, W illiam J, 222 29, 31; and Rus sia , 18,27; Cavard (director of th e Surete), 37 Japanese break codes , 27; US Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor (later relations with, 189-90; and Duke of Portland), 182 Korean War, 192; communism Cecil, Rob ert, 107 in, 202; hostility to USSR, Central Intelligence Agenc y (C IA): 214 covert and cla ndestine Chinese Eastern Railway, 18,23 ope ra tions, 6, II , 201-4, 206, Christie, Group Captain ~1. G., 208-9, 212- 15, 217,221- 2; role 123 and functions, II , 14, 200--4; Church , Fr ank , 216-1 7, 219 search for legitimacy, 199; Church ill, (Sir) Winston: and foundation and ea rly history , Ewing's cryptogra phy, 43; on 200--5; secrecy and freedom from Nazi strength, 90; on Bletchley's accounta bility, 201-2, 205-8, contributions to war, 136; on 217,219; and containment of Alamein, 144; read s enem y communism , 202-5; org anisat ion messages, 148; and bombing of and departmentalisation, 204; Coventry, 149; and U-boat war, under Dull es, 205-9, 210; 165,167; and SOE, 177; drug-testing, 206; and messages to Truman int ercept ed , policy-making, 207, 209; 186; and control of press, 233, Executive and Congress cont ro l 235 of, 207-9, 210--12, 215, 220, 224; Ci ano, Count Galeazzo, 104, 109, under Kennedy and J ohnson , 114-1 7 210--13; subsidy programme, 212; 'C icero' (Anka ra), 118, 181 and foreign policy consens us, Cit izen Army (I rela nd) , 58 213,224; under Nixon, 213-1 5; C lan na Gael, 62-3 Co ngressiona l reforms a nd Cl ark , General Mark , 207 recommendations, 216-18; Clarke, Sir George Sydenham (later charte r reforms under C arte r, 1st Baron Sydenham), 229-30 218-22; party dis agreemen ts Clausewitz, Carl von , 155 over , 221; and Reagan 's C lay, General Luciu s, 201 counter-reforms, 222-4; dom esti c Clem en ceau,Georges, 38 powers, 224; and US-Soviet Clem ent s, Willi am P., 12 relations , 224-6 codebreaking see cryptana lysis; Central Intelligen ce Bureau cryptology (Brita in; proposed ), 124 Codrington, Willi am , 181-2 'Chalk' (I rish source) , 59 Colby, Willi am , 14,218 Cha mbe rla in, (Sir) J Au sten , 15, Colossus (), 136, 150, 156 47 Collins, Mi chael, 67, 70, 72- 5 290 I NDEX Comintern (3rd Com munist post-Second World War histor y, Intern ational ), 47, 170 242-3,247-9; decline of Com mission on the O rgani zati on of effectiveness, 243, 247- 9; and the Execu tive Bran ch of the prosecu tions, 243--5; 1980 Government , 1954 (Hoove r inq uiry, 247 Co mmission), 207- 9 Dahleru s, Birger, 104 Commission on the Organ izati on of Daily Express, 231, 244 the Government for the Co nd uct Daily Herald, 45, 239 of Foreign Policy, 1975 (Mur phy Daily Telegraph, 239, 246-7 Commission ), 216 Dalton, Hugh (later 1st Baron), Committee of Free Alban ians, 185 177 Committee of Imperial Defence Dashwood, Sir John, 181 (C ID) , 80, 94-7; an d press Defence Committee (Britain), 247 censorship, 229, 232-4, 238-9 Defence of the Realm Act, 236 Constantini (employee at British Delcasse, Theoph ile, 35- 7, 39 embassy, Rome), 110, 11 3, 118 Denn ing, Sir Norma n, 243 convoys, 159-62, 164- 7; see also Denni ston , Ca ptain Alastair Go, U-boats 43-4, 47-8, 133 Cotte r (two men , Ireland, 1918), 66 Desart,H o.J. AoC uffe, 5th Ea rl, Cowgill, Felix, 177-9 230 Creedy, Sir Herb ert, 240 Deuxieme Bureau (France), 80 crypta nalysis, 8-9; in Fran ce, Diem, Ngo-dinh, 213 33-42, 138; in Britain , 33, 42-8, Dill, General (later Field-M arshal ) 53; in USA , 33, 48-53; in Sir J ohn, 84-5 Germ an y, 161-2, 167; in two Dillon, J oh n, 65 world wars, 138-58; Allied Dmowski, Roman, 26 supremacy in, 152-3; Dobb, Maurice, 171, 197 import an ce, 158; see also Dollfuss, Engelbert , 172 cryptology; Enigma; xll- Dienst Dolphin see Hydra cryptology, 142, 152-8 Donirz, Grand Admiral Karl , 144, Cuba , 210-11 , 213; see also Bay of 166-7 Pigs Doolittle Report, 1955, 209 Curzon , Geo rge Na tha niel, Dowling, Co rporal J oseph , 65-6 Marqu ess, 45-6 Dre yfus, Ca ptain Alfred, 34-5 Cyphe r Bureau , USA (' Black Drummond , Angela, Lad y, 107 Cha mber'), 49-51, 53 Drummond, Sir Eric (later 16th Czec hoslovakia: Germ an Earl of Perth), 106-8 occupation of, 85-6, 88-9, 99, Dubl in Met ropolitan Police 103, 118-19, 125; Ger ma n (DM P), 54-5, 58-9, 61, 68,70-2, inte rcepts of, 104; and Munich 74-5 agreement, 122; communist s Ducat , lA-Col. C oMo, 30 seize power, 20 1 Duke, Henry Edward (later Baron Merrivale), 63, 67 D-Day invasion, 149 Dulles, Allen, 6, II, 205- 10, 213 Dvnorices, 15; Committee formed, Dulles, John Foster, 205-6 235-6, 238; notices int roduced in Dum as, Alexandre, 4 First World War , 236-7; Dun bar, Melinda (Melinda non-militar y uses, 238; Maclean 's moth er ), 174 I NDEX 291 Eden , Anthony (later 1st Earl of 12&--9, 132, 134, 155; press Avon ), 108, 113, 117 freedom , 228 Egypt , 109 Frank , Leonhard , 197 Eisenh ower , Dwight D., 158, 205 Franks, Sir Oliver (later 1st Baron ), Ellington , Air Marshal Sir Edw ard 190 L., 80 Frank s Co mmittee (on Falklands Enigma: cyphers broken, 8, 149-50, conflict), I, 12-1 3, 15 154; French , Polish and Briti sh Freedom of Inform ation Act work on, 12&--37; developm ent (USA), 220, 222 and operation, 142, 152-4; French, General J ohn Dent on Germ an relian ce on, 157; naval, Pinkstone, Baron (later Earl of 163-4, 166; model s captured, Ypres), 61, 65-71,73 163-4, 166 Friedm an , William F., 49-50, 51-3, Evan s, H arold, 247 147 Ewing, Sir Alfred, 43-4, 141 Friedmann, ' Litzi' (later Mrs Kim Philby), 172, 185 Faby an, George , 48---9 Friend , Gen eral Lovick Bransby, Falklands war (1982 ), 249 59-60 Fashoda incident (1898 ), 35 Fuchs, Klaus, 169, 187 Federal Bur eau of Investigati on Fukush ima Yasum asa, Baron (FBI), 192-6,201 ,218 General , 19-21 ,24 Fellers, Co lonel Bonner , 144 Fushimi, Prin ce (Jap an ), 18 Ferry, Abel , 41 Fett erlein , E., 45 Geheimschreiber (German Figaro, u. 39-40 cryptographic teletypewriter ), Finl and , 24, 31, 175 150,152 Flowers, Thomas H., 150 Gehlen, General Richard, 144 Fond ere, H yacinthe, 37-8 Germ an y: J ap an ese officers in, 18; Ford , Gerald, 13, 21&--1 8, 223 French intercept and break Foreign Assistance Act , 1974 codes, 3&--40; intrigue in Ireland. (USA), 215--16 5&--9, 62-9, 76; Washington Foreign O ffice (later Foreign and cor respo ndence int ercept ed , 57; Commonwea lth Office): and USA breaks ofTrelations (19 17), codebrea king, 33, 42-4; control 63; Briti sh int er-war assess ment of SIS , 102-4, 123-4, 179, 182; of air strength, 79-84, 98---9; inter-wa r leakages and security of army strength, 84-9,98; naval document s, 105--1 5; and agent s' strength, 89-93, 98---9; discretion , 123-4; and proposed intelligen ce on industrial and Central Intelligen ce Bureau , 125; economic activity, 94-8; secur ity and infiltration, 180-2; Four-Year Plan , 95; 1939 Soviet News Department, 237 Pact, 100, 125, 175; Eden's 1936 Foreign Relations Committee (U S pap er on , 108; pr e-war politi cal Senate),211 objectives assessed, 118---23; as Fran ce: Japanese views of, 20; Axis pow er, 119-20; Enigm a and br eaks J ap an ese code, 28, 30, 36; war codes crac ked, 126, 132, 135, codebrea king services, 33-42, 142, 149-51; intercepti on and 138; alliance with Britain , 120, decypherm en' , 139; defeat s 122; and Enigma ma chin e, Russia in First World War, 292 I NDEX 139-40; Second World War Gulfof T onkin Resolu tion , 1964: int ercept s and code brea king , repeal (1970 ),214 143-5, 154; and J ap an ese in Second World War , 148; army Hald ane, Richard Burdon, cryptogra phy, 150; inferiorit y in Viscount, 233 Second World War cryptology, Hald er, Franz, 158 152-8; and Battle of Atla ntic, Halifax, Edw ard F. L. Wood , 161- 2; press control, 237 Viscount (later Ist Earl of) , 96, Giornaled'ltalia, 107 116, 122 Glads tone, William Ewart, 42, 48 Hall, Admiral Sir Regin ald 'Glassboro, Spirit or , 211 (' Blinker') : background, 8; as Gleichen, Lord Edward, 7 DNI , 43; and Iri sh intelligence, Godfrey, Admiral J ohn Henr y, 56-9, 63-4, 76-7; and Casement, 91-2 60; and 'Germa n plot ' (Ireland) , Goerdeler, Dr Carl Fri edri ch , 65-8, 76-7; reputati on , 90 122 Harbin, 18,23, 28-9 Goering, H erm ann, 80, 83, 104 Harrel, W. V., 55, 65, 70 Golitsyn, Anatoly, 246 Havern a, Commissaire, 36-8 Gort , General John S. S. P. Ha yden , Carl T. , 208 Vereker , 6th Viscount, 86 Helfand, Leon , 118 Gouzenko, Igor, 182 Helm, Kn ox, 184 Government Code and Cyphe r Helms, Richard, II School (GC &CS): as cover for Hend erson , Arthur, II SIS, 5; und er Sinclai r, 8; formed, Hend erson , Sir Nevile, 104 and opera tions, 44-8; int er-war Herbett e, Mau rice, 39 activities, 78; secrecy over, 102; Herivel, J ohn, 135-6 at Bletchley, 126; and Enigm a, H ind enburg, General (later 134-6; and Philby, 178; seealso Field-M arshal) Paul von, 139 Bletchley Park Hinsley, F. H arry, I, 134-5 Government Commun ications H irose T akeo, Lieut.-Comm and er , Headqu arters (GC HQ ), 16, 33, 21- 3,31-2 44, 248 Hitl er, Ado lf: and German Grand, Co lonel Lawrence, 177 rea rma ment, 80, 83, 85; and Grandi, Co unt Dino, 117 naval stra tegy, 92; and industr ial 'Granite' (Irish source ), 59 mobil isat ion, 97; and war on two Gra nville, Granvill e George fronts, 100; Cha mb erla in visits, Leveson-Gower, 2nd Earl, 42 105; Ciano shows Briti sh pap ers Gr aves, Sir Hub ert, 190 to, 109, 117; and pr e-war British Greenhill, Denis (later Ist Baron policy, 121-2; hostility to Britain , Greenhill of Harrow), 190, 122-3; cha rac ter and position , 193 123; seizes Prague, 125;J apan ese Gr etz-Armainvilliers, France reports on, 148; and Cherbourg (Bruno), 126, 129, 131, 133, defence, 151; and Norm andy 135 battle, 151; delegat es Gro upement des Con troles responsi bility, 154; avoids war Radi o-electriques (France), 33 with USA, 165; and Russian Guardian (newspaper) , 246 pact, 175, 197 Gua tema la, 206, 209 Hoar e, Sir Samuel, 107- 8 INDEX 293 Hoffmann, Colonel Max, 139-40 Irish Republican Brotherhood Hokoku-maru, 31 (IRB), 58, 60 Holland, 123 Irish Volunteers, 58-60, 64, 70 Hollis, Sir Roger, 3, 15 Ironside, General (later Holy See (Vatican): British Field-Marshal) William embassy security, 105, 112 Edmund, 1st Baron, 86 Homberg, Octave, 35 Ishii Kikujiro, 27 'Homer' (spy) , 186, 188, 192 Ishimitsu Makiyo, 28, 31 Hoover, Herbert, 50; see also Ismay, Colonel Hastings Lionel Commission on the Organization (later Baron), 86 of the Executive Branch of the ISOS (Abwehr messages), 178 Government Israel: 'T he Estimate', 13 Hoover,.J. Edgar, 194 Italo-Turkish War (1911) ,138-9 House, Colonel Edward M., 48 Italy: French intercept telegrams, House Intelligence Committee 38-9; usc of secret intelligence, (USA) , 221 104, 106-10, 114-17 ; and Hoxha, Enver, 185 Abyssinia, 107-8, 113, 120; Hugel, Max, 222 agre ements with Britain, 113, Hughes-Ryan Amendment (to 119-20, 122; in Spanish Civil Foreign Assistance Act), 215-16 War, 113; and Yugoslavia, Hydra (Dolphin: German naval 113-16; collaboration with cypher circuit) , 150, 164, 166 Russia, 118; as Axis power, 119-20; in First World War, 140; codebreaking in Second World Imperial Conference, 1930, 105 War, 142 India, 19 Ito, Marquis Major, 21, 27 Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC), 78-9, 84, 94-8 Industrietle Mobilmachung, 95 'J K' (Irish informant), 64 Information Research Department Japan: and 1904 Russian war , (Britain), 189 17-32 , 228; officers abroad Inskip defence review , 1938, 95 (ryiigakusei ), 18-19,21 ,29; Institute of Journalists (Britain), expenses on anti-Russian 23G-I subversion, 25, 27; codebreaking, intelligence: defined , 6; 27, 30; own code broken, 27-8, professionalisation, 6-9 36, 145-6; civilian spies , 28; US 'in telligence rides', 7, 17, 19 intercepts and decrypts, 49-51, Inverchapel, Archibald Clark Kerr, 53; as Axis power, I 19; pre-war 1st Baron, 186 British policy towards, 120; Iran, 206, 209, 219 unsuccessful Second World War Ireland: British intelligence in codebreaking, 143; Second World (1914-21),54-77; War codes broken, 145-6; (1916) ,59-62,77; separatists Midway defeat, 146-7 ; see also detained and deported, 61-3; ' Purple' First World War conscription, Jebb, Gladwyn (later Baron 65-7; ' ', 65-7, 76-7 Gladwyn), 103, 123 (IRA), Jeffreys, John, 135-6 7G-I , 73-6 Johnson, Lyndon B., 211-13 294 INDEX Joint Committee ofFed erations of , 23 Newspaper Owners, 234 Kurino Shin ichiro, 19, 25 Joint Congressional Oversight Kurubane Shigeru, 25 Committee (USA), 216 Joint Intelligence Committee Lancken, Oskar von der, 37-8 (Britain), 10, 13, 125, 155, 178 Langer, Colonel Gwido (Lue), 128 Joint Intelligence Organisation Lansdowne, Henry C.K. (Britain), 12, 15 Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess Joint Intelligence Staff (Britain) , 10 of, 42 Joint Planning Committee (JPC; Laos, 215 Britain), 99 Latzarus, Louis, 40 Jordan, (Sir) .1. N., 30 Lauenberg (German weather ship), Joynson-Hicks, William ('Jix': 1st 164 Viscount Brentford), 47 Law, Andrew Bonar, 45 Leng, Sir John, 229-30 Kahn, David, 2 Lenin, V. I., 7 Kanin, Prince (Japan), 22-3 Le Queux, William, 3-4 Karakhan, Lev M., 46 Lewin , Ronald, 2 Katzenbach, Nicholas, 212 Liddell, Guy, 177 Kawakami Soroku, General, 21 Lindsay, John, 211 Kell, Sir Vernon, 55, 240 Liss, Colonel Ulrich, 144 Kendrick, Captain Thomas, 9 Lloyd George, David (later 1st Kennedy, John F., 210-11, 213 Earl), 44, 67, 238 KGB: and Cambridge communists, Lofoten islands, 163 172-4,180-1,190,192,194; in Lohan, Colonel Leslie G., 244-5 USA , 222, 224 Long, Leo, 173, 181 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 210-11 Long, Walter (later lst Viscount), King,J. H ., 181 57,64,66-9, 77 Kirkpatrick, (Sir) Ivone, 122 Lonsdale, Sir John, 57 Kissinger, Henry, 216 Loraine, Sir Percy, 104 Kitchener, Field-Marshal Horatio Loxley, Peter, 179, 182 Herbert, 1st Earl, 35, 236 'Lt Col. Retd' (Irish informant), 64 Klotz, Louis-Lucien, 38 Ludendorff, General Erich, 139 Kluge, Field-Marshal Gunther von, Ludlow-Hewitt, Air Marshal Sir 151 Edgar Rainey, 80 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe Luftwaffe, 80-1 M.,181 MacArthur, General Douglas, 192 Knox, Dillwyn ('Dilly'), 9, 133-4, McCarthy, Eugene, 211 149 McCarthy, Joseph, 196 Kodama Gentaro, 25 McCone,John, 11,213 Kdgetsukai (Japanese organisation), Maclean, Donald, 169; background 24 and career, 171-2, 174-5, 191-2; Kokuryukai (Japanese organisation), political involvement, 172; 28 personality and behaviour, 172, Korea, 18, 30 175, 187-8, 191-2; flight from Korean War, 189, 192-3,203 Britain, 174, 182, 184, 194, 196; Kosygin, Aleksei , 211 marriage, 175; and Soviet Krivitsky, Walter, 174 defectors, 182; in Washington, INDEX 295 185-7, 191 ; children, 185, 188; in MI 5 (War Office): recruitment to, Cairo, 187-8 ; psychiatric 9; Wilson's suspicions of, 14; and treatment, 191 ; uncovered, Irish intelligence, 55, tJ I, 68; 192-4; death, 195; writes book relations with Foreign Office, (British Foreign Policy since Suez), 103; and Foreign Office leakages, 196; anti-Americanism, 196; and 115; Blunt and, 174, 177, 18D-1, political climate, 198 194; Philby and , 178; Burgess Maclean , Melinda (formerly and Maclean and F.B.I., 192, Marling), 174-5, 185, 187-8, 194, 196; run down , 197 191, 193-4 ; relations with Philby , MI6 see Secret Intelligence Service 195 MI8 (USA ), 49 McMahon Act (USA) , 187 M1l4,173 Ma cmillan, Harold (later 1st Earl of Midway, Battle of, 146-7 Stockton) , 191 , 195 Miln e, Tim, 177, 179 McNeil , Hector, 117-18, 180, Ministry of Information, 240 189-90 Mondale, Walter F., 217 MacNeill, Eoin, 59-60 Monson, Sir Edmund John, 35 Macready , General Sir Nevil, 73 Montgomery of Alam ein, Maffey, Sir John (later 1st Baron Field-Marshal Bernard, 1st Rugby) , 107-8, 117 Viscount, 144 Makino Nobuaki, Count, 19 Morning Post, 233 Makins, Sir Roger (later 1st Baron Moro ccan crises (1905, 1911), 36-9 Sherfield ), 186, 191, 193-4 Morrison, George Ernest, I7, 30 Malinowsky, Roman, 7 Morrison, Herbert (later Baron) , Manborgne, Major-General 193 Joseph, 53 Morton, Major Desmond, 93, 95-7 Manchuria, 18,27-30 Mossadegh, Mohammed, 206 Mansfield , Mike, 208 Moynihan, Patrick, 220 Marchand expedition (1898), 35 Muggeridge, Malcolm, 133 Marconi company, 109 Mukden, 29 Marshall, General George , 147-8, Miinchen (German weather ship), 158 164 Mason-Macfarlane, General Sir Munich crisis, 1938,86-7,89, 122 Noel, 6, 88 Murata, Colonel , 21 Mata Hari, 140 Murphy Commission see May, Alan Nunn, 169, 182 Commission on the Organization Mayer, Colonel Stefan, 132 of the Government for the Mayhew, Christopher, 189 Conduct of Foreign Policy Meckel, Major (later General) Murray, Sir Oswyn, 239-40 Jacob, 17 Mussolini, Benito, 106-8 , 113 Menzies, Colonel (later Mutsu Munemitsu, 19 Major-General Sir) Stewart G. ('C ') , 124, 133, 136, 179 Nakamura, Captain, 28 Mexico, 141 Nathan, Sir Mathew, 60 Midleton, W. StJohn F., 9th National Commitments Resolution, Viscount (later 1st Earl of), 67 1969 (USA) , 214 Mllb,44 National Security Act, 1947 (USA) , MI3(b},87 201,221 296 INDEX Na tiona l Security Agency (USA) , Paleologue, Maurice, 34 33 Palestin e, 120, 122 Nati onal Security Council (USA) , Pall Mall Gazette, 234 201-2, 207 Pani zzardi, Lieut .-Col. A., 34 Na tiona l Stud ents Associat ion Parke, Ern est, 231-2, 234 (USA), 212 Passport Control Offices, 5 Naval Intelligence Dir ectorate Paul , Prin ce Regent of Yugoslavia, (N ID , Britain ), 89-90, 92-3 113-1 7 Navarre, General H., 127 ' Pentagon Papers', 214 Na vy Code and Signal Section Periodical Publ ishers' Association (USA), 52 (Britain) , 241, 248 New Statesman, 247-8 Peter (Blunt's control), 174, 180, Newma n, Max H. A., 150 194-5 Newspap er Proprietors' Associati on Peterson , Sir Maurice, 183-4 (Brita in), 231, 241 Pfeiffer, Edouard, 175 Newspap er Society (Britain), 229, Philby, Aileen (nee Furse; Kim's 231, 234,241 second wife), 184-5, 189-90 Nicholson, Leslie, 9 Philby,H. Stjohn, 5, 171, 173 Nicholson, Reginald, 234 Phil by, ' Kim' (Harold Adrian Nimitz, Admiral Ch ester, 146--7 Russell), 5, 9, 169; background, Niu-ch' uang (Yingkow), 29 17l ; marriages, 172, 184-5; Nixon , Richard M. , 214 politi cal involvement , 172; Nobl e, Andrew Napier, III recruited into KGB , 172; Norm andy: invasion and battles, personalit y, 173; finan ces, 174; 149-51 career, 176--80; and Volkov, Northcliffe, Alfred C. W. 183-4; in Istanbul, 184; in Harmsworth , Viscount, 233, 237 Washington , 185, 188; relati ons Nort on, (Sir) Clifford, 103- 4 with Burg ess, 189-90, 194; an d 114-1 5 uncoverin g of Maclean , 192- 3; Norway , 92 dismissed from SIS, 195; in Moscow, 195; and politi cal Office ofSt rategic Serv ices (O SS, clima te, 198; Sunday Times story, USA), 200, 204 247; My Silent War, 172, 179-80, Official Secrets Act , 1911 (Britain), 196 15, 134; and D-notice system, Philby, 'Litzi' (Kim's first wife) see 230, 233, 235, 242-3, 246--7 Friedm ann, ' Litzi' Oliver, Admiral H . F., 43 Phipps, Sir Eric, 175 O'Malley, (Sir) Owen, 114-1 5 Pichon , Stephen, 38-9 Operati on al In telligence Ce ntre see Pike, Otis, 216--17 under Ad miralty Pilsudski, Josef, 22, 24, 26 O shima, Baron Hiroshi, 148 Pincher, Ch apman , 3, 244-5, 247 Ostasien ('1'6-A;J apanese journal ), Pipes, Richard, 13 19 Poincare, Raymond , 38-41, 46 Otto (Blunt's Soviet control), 173 Poland: and Russo-Jap an ese war, Owen, David , 15 24, 26, 31; and 1939 Germ an Page, Bru ce, 247 threat , 87- 8, 100; British Paget, Co lonel (Sir) Bern ard , 84 gua ra ntee to, 125; and Enigm a Paillole, Co lonel P., 127 mach ine, 126--7, 128-33, 135-7 INDEX 297

Port Arthur, 18, 23, 28-9, 31- 2 Riverbank (C hicago, Illinois), 48-9 Pown all , Ge nera l (Sir) Henry Rivet , Colonel Loui s, 126 Royds, 86 Robbins, A. P., 230, 240 Press Advi sor y Council (Britain), Roberts, Brian , 243 232 Rockefeller Co mmission, 216 Press Bureau (Britain ), 233, 236 Rohm putsch , 1934,84 Press Co mmittee: form ed , 235-6, Rom e: British embassy security, 238; Murray as sec retary, 105-1 5, 117-1 8 239-40; between wars, 239-40; Rommel, General (later recon vened and post-S econd Field-Marshal ) Erwin, 144 World W ar ac tivities, 240-9; see Room 40 (Admiralty) , 8-9, 43--4, also D-noti ces 90, 141, 161; see also Ad mi ralty; Price, M ajor (I nspec tor) Ivon , 55, Nav al Intelligen ce Dir ector at e 59-62, 65-6, 68, 70, 73 Roosevelt , Franklin Dela no, 148, Prime, Geoffrey, 248 165-7 Pru ssia, 228 Rositzke, H arry, 202 Public Record Office (London): Rothschild, Victor,Baron, 177 int elligen ce records, 2, 5, 102-3, Rouvier , Maurice, 36-7, 39 106; war decrypts at, 134 Royal Air For ce, 79, 8 1, 93; see also Puj alet (director of the Sfirete), 39 Air Ministry ' Purple' (Japa nese code s), 8, 49, 53, Royal Irish Co nstabula ry (RIC ), 147, 153 54-5,59,61,64-6,68-72, 74-5 Royal Na vy, 90, 93, 99, 161-2; see 'Q' (Irish inform ant), 68 also Admiralt y; Nav al Int elligen ce Director at e Rad cliffe, C yril J ohn, 1st Ba ron , Rozycki, J erzy, 131, 133 244 Ru ssell, Rich ard B., 208 Radio Co m munica tions Acts Russia (and Soviet U nion): and (USA), 50 Japan ese intelligence in 1904 radio int elligen ce: and Battle of war, 17-32, 228; J ap an ese Atl antic, 159-68 officers in , 18-1 9, 21- 2, 25; Raeder , G rand-Admiral Erich, 9 1 breaks Japan ese codes, 27, 3 1; Ramparts magazine, 212 troop movement s to east, 29-30; Ram sden ,J. M ., 243, 248 intelligence weaknesses Raskolnikov, F., 46 compa red with J ap an ese, 30--1; Reagan , Ron ald , 216, 222-4 Britain decryp ts diplom atic ' Red' code (Japanese), 53 traffic, 45-8; rela tions with Redmond,J ohn, 65 Britain in 1920s, 45-6; 'one-time Redmond, Assistant Co m missione r pad ' , 47, 52; USA a ttempts W. C. F., 72-3 decrypts, 52; intelligence on Reed, J ohn, 183--4 industrial ac tivity, 94; 1939 Rees, Goronwy, 170, 176, 190, 192 German pa ct, 100, 125, 175; Reilly, Sir Patrick, 179 collaboration with Italy, 118; Reilly, Sidney, 4 pre-war British policy on, 121; Rejewski, Marian, 129-34, 137 codebreaking agencies, 139; in Richelieu , Arm and J ean Du Plessis, Fir st World War, 139-40; Second Ca rdi na l, 33 World War code breaking, 143; Ritt er , H an s (' Knight') , 123 own codes bro ken in Second 298 INDEX World War, 144; and world Senate Intelligence Co mmittee , communism, 170; defectors, 220-1 182-3; intern al security system, Shamir, Yitzhak, 12 197; relations with USA, 200-3, Siebold, Alexander von, 19 205, 207,209-11 ,214,219-20, Siemens & Halske, 150 222-6; atomic weapons, 202; Sigab a (US cypher machine), C IA ac tions ag-ainst, 202-4; and 152-3,157 communist China, 214; stra teg-ic Sigint (Sig- na ls Intellig-ence), 10, threat to USA, 219 44, 46 Signal Intelligence Serv ice (US army), 5 1-3 Salisbu ry, J am es Edwa rd Hubert Simon, Sir J ohn (later 1st Gascoyne-Cecil, 4th Marquess Viscount), 97 of, 239 Sinclair, Admiral Hugh Fran cis SALT agreements, 214, 220 Paget ('Q uex') , 8, 44, 48, 11 8, Salt onstall, Leverett , 208 124 Sandwith , Command er Sinn Fein, 62- 71,74, 77 (Admiralty) , 133 Siessor, Group Ca ptai n (later Air Sargen t, Sir Orme, 114, 183 Chief Marshal Sir ) J ohn , 82, sa tellites, spy, 8, 10 100 Sato Aimaro, 27 Sligo, George Ulick Browne, 6th Sayonara (yacht) , 58 Marquess of, 58 Scherbius, Arthur, 142 Smuts,Jan Christian, 67 'Schliissel M' (Germa n cyphe r Sorensen, T heodore, 218 mach ine), 164, 166 Spain, 11 3, 120-1 Schm idt , Hans-Thilo (Asche; HE), Spears, Sir Edward, 6 128-9 , 131, 134, 137 Specia l Operations Execu tive Schro eder, Georg, 152 (SOE), I77 Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 116-17 'Spies for Peace', 246 Scotsman (newspa per), 236 Stafford , General , 59 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS; Stalin, Josef, 170, 175-6, 184-5, MI6): covers, 5; und er Sinclair, 197; death, 207 8, 48; int er-war recruitment , 9; Starhemberg, Ernst Rud iger von , orga nisa tion, 78; and assess ment Prin ce, 172 of Nazi Germ an y, 80; und er State Departm ent (USA): Foreign Office control, 102-4, code brea king serv ices, 33, 48-53; 123-4, 179, 182; policy and CIA, 200, 207; intelligence recommend ati ons, 105, 118- 20, autonomy, 201 122; and proposed Central Stimson, Henry, II, 50, 53 Intelligence Bureau , 125; Section Strachey, St Loe, 63 D, 177; Section IX, 178, 180, Straight, Michael, 173, 175-6 , 193, 182; Phil by in, 178-80, 182; and 195 Volko v, 183-4; run down , 197 Strang, Sir William (later Baron), Secret Service Bureau (Britain), 8, 193 232 Stri ckland, General Sir Edward Secret Service Committee (of Peter, 76 British Cab inet), 44 Submarine Tracking Room Selves, Justin de, 37-8 (Admiralty) , 164-5 INDEX 299 Sunday Times, 231, 247 Ultra, 79, 149-51, 158, 165, 167-8; Surete (France) , 35-9, 42 see also Bletchley Park ; Enigm a Symin gton , Stua rt, 208 U nion of Soviet Socialist Republics (U SSR) see Russia T amura Iyozo, General , 23 United States of America: T an aka Giichi , Lt-Col. (later Prime codebrea king services, 33, 48-53; Minister of Japan), 21- 4, 26,31 Iri sh orga nisations in, 5~7 ; and T annenberg, Battle of, 140 Briti sh intelligence in Ireland, T aylor , A. J . P., I 6 \; breaks off relations with T aylor , Sir John, 71 Germ an y (1917), 63; and First That cher, Marg ar et, 15 World War, 141; Second World Thomson (Sir) Basil, 58-61,63- 4, War codes, 144; breaks Japan ese 67- 8, 74, 76 codes, ·145-7; cypher ma chin es, Thom son , Admiral Sir Georg e 152-3; cryptologica 1superiority, Pirie, 24 \-5 155, 157; and Atlan tic convoys, Thwaites, Major-General Sir 162, 165-6; Phil by in, \85 ; and William , 236 secret intelligence, 199-200; Times, The, 45,174,228-9,231,237 opposi tion to communism, 201, Tirpitz, Grand Adm iral Alfred von , 205-6; rela tions with USSR, 9 1-2 200-3, 207, 209-11, 214, 219-20, Tittoni, T omm aso, 38 222- 6; press freedom, 228; seealso T o-A see Ostasien Centra l Intelligence Agency To go H eihach iro, Admiral, 18 Usborn e, Admiral Cecil Vivian , Tojo Hideki, 147 239 T osca no, Mario, 106, 108, 113 Toynbee, Philip , 188 Vachell, Win g Comma nde r, 83 T rans-S iberian railway, 18, 20-4 Vansittart, Sir Robert (later Baron), Triton (Shark; U- boa t cypher 88, 103-7, 109, 113, 117, 123; The circuit), 150, 16~ 7 .'viist Procession, 106 Troubridge, Ca ptain (Sir) Thom as Vatican see Holy Sec Hope, 92 Vietn am War , 212- 13, 215 Truman , H arry S., 186, 192,201 , Vivian , Co lonel Valentin e, 177- 8, 203,211 180, 1 8~5 Turing, Alan , 136, 149, 156 Viviani, Rene, 40-1 Turkey, 120, 122 Volkov, Konstantin, 182-3 Turner, Admiral Stan sfield , 2 18-20 Twinn, Peter , 136 War Department (U SA), 51 Typex (British cypher machine), War Office (British) : cryptana lytic 152-3 unit, 44; and Irel and, 61-2; assessment of German army, U-2 (U S spy plan e), 213 8~9, 98, 104; and control of U-boats, 9 1- 3; successes, 145, 166; press inform at ion, 228, 23\-2, use of Enigmas, \50 ; Atlantic 2 3~40 operations and radio int elligence, War Powers Act, 1973 (U SA), 214 \59-67; indi vidual boat s: U-33, Warren Row, Berkshire, 246 163; u-n o, 164; U-559, 166 Washin gton , DC: Macl ean in, Uchida Ryohei, 28 185- 7,191; Philby in, 185, 188, Uchiyama, General , 21 190; Bur gess in, 190-1 300 IND EX Washington Na val Conference Wynn-Williams, C . E., 156 (1921), 49-50 Wat ergat e scandal, 213, 215 xB-Dienst, German cryptanalysis, Wegener, Adm iral Wol(~ang , 92 161-2 , 167 Welch , Richard , 217 Welchman , Gordon, 134-6, 149, Yamagat a Arit omo, General , 20 156 Yam amoto Gonnohyoe, Admiral, 18 ' West, Nigel' , 3 Yamamoto Isoroku, Admiral, Wh ite, Sir Dick Gold smith, 9 146-7 Whitefoord,Major Philip Geoffrey, Yardley, H erbert 0 ., 49, 51, 53 84 Yingkow see Niu- ch'uang Wilson, Sir Harold (later Baron), Yost , Evgeni, 186 14, 244-5 Younger, Kenneth, 190 Wilson, Woodrow, 48 Yuan Shih-k 'ai, 29 Winter, Brigad ier-General (Sir) Yugoslavia , 113-16 Ormond e de l'Epec ('0'), 73-4, 76 'Z' (Irish inform ant), 63-4 Winterbotham, Frederick : Ultra Zillia cus , Konrad (Konni), 24 Secret, 127, 129, 133 Zimmerm ann, Arthur: 1917 Witte, Sergei, 27 telegram, 44, 141, 147 Wood , Sir Evelyn , 228-9, 234 Zinovi ev letter, 47 Wood, Sir Kingsley, 82 Zog, King of Albani a , 116 Wright, (Sir) Michael, 186 Zygalski , Hcn ryk, 131-3, 135