ran’s Growing Strategic Foothold in the Golan Heights Mere Saber Rattling or Portent of I Things to Come? Executive Summary Introduction A Corridor of Iranian Influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean The Hezbollah Model: Blueprint for Iran’s Strategy in the Golan Heights? Russia and Iran in Southwest Syria All Roads Lead to Moscow? Mapping ’s Deterrence Doctrine Outlook

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© KFCRIS, 2018

ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 36 - 29/5/2018 L.D. No: 1439/8472

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hat happened in the Dahiyah quarter of Beirut in “W2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force and cause great damage and destruction there.”

—, chief of General Staff of the (IDF)

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Executive Summary

Tehran’s rekindled, yet dangerously more assertive role in Syria is testament to its efforts to expand strategic depth, ranging from Iraq, over the Shia-offshoot Alawite-dominated heartland in Syria, to the Mediterranean shores in both Syria and Lebanon. In that context, asserting leverage in the Golan Heights represents a vital element in the larger struggle to connect the dots of an Iranian-controlled arc of influence across the Levant. In doing so, Iran will likely draw from lessons learned in its substantial, for the most part successful, and well-documented tool of statecraft, namely, the support of proxy forces. Propping up its Lebanese ally Hezbollah and pitching it against Israel serves as a prime example, as a result of which Hezbollah has become, from Tehran’s perspective, an indispensable, well-entrenched, and to some degree independent player in both Lebanon and Syria. With a heightened engagement in southwestern Syria, including in the Golan Heights, Tehran is simultaneously vying for its own, more autonomous role as viable and potent actor on Syrian turf in the not-too-distant future. As a countermeasure, Israel attempts to navigate through an increasingly worrisome threat landscape along its northern borders with Syria and Lebanon. For now, it seems determined to adhere to what it considers the rules of the game: carrying out a proactive containment policy against Iranian and Iranian-linked proxy elements by resorting to retaliatory pinpoint strikes to maintain the credibility of its deterrence posture. There is also a larger element to this interaction. The modus operandi of the Israeli-Iranian rivalry in Syria has tangible repercussions for their respective protégés and allies, too. With the latest American- British-French strikes in retaliation for the chemical weapons use in Douma allegedly perpetrated by the Assad regime, thus acknowledging the role of Russia—for some a tacit culprit by overlooking Iranian overtures in Syria while for others a force able to rein in Tehran and a vital channel that heeds Israeli security concerns—will be key in preventing any escalatory pattern in Syria.

Introduction

At a time of evolving and fast-paced developments military on April 13 revealed that the drone was of the security dynamics in the Middle East, one reportedly weaponized and “tasked to attack.”1 As recent event stood out: on February 10, 2018, an soon became clear, the incident would trigger a Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) entered chain of events that called into question a peculiar, Israeli airspace over the Golan Heights on an yet pervasive, deterrence equation that has tacitly alleged reconnaissance mission. After “extensive been cultivated and largely respected by all intelligence-based investigations,” the Israeli involved parties since the .2

(1) AP, “Israel Says Iran Drone Downed in Feb was on Attack Mission,” Washington Post, April 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/middle_east/israel-iran-drone-intercepted-in-feb-was-on-attack-mission/2018/04/13/4e8ba21e-3f41-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story. html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.31a62d726d04. (2) Rory Jones, “Tension Rises between Israel and Iran after Syria Clash,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ israel-vows-more-aggression-to-stop-iranian-military-expansion-in-syria-1518358488.

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With the Iranian drone being promptly downed by deliberately crossed a red line by its infiltration an Apache helicopter, Israel launched a retaliatory of enemy airspace, thereby risking retaliation in strike against the drone’s launch pad at the Tiyas Syria and Lebanon alike. Tehran finely calculated (T4) military airbase, located in the eastern its latest move in order to test the nature of Israel’s countryside of Homs province near the Syrian city military responsiveness, thus learning valuable of Palmyra. However, for its part, the exertion of lessons about the latter’s behavior when put to Israeli air power in Syria triggered a response by the test. Syrian anti-aircraft missile fire, which hit one of Conversely, for Israel, an Iranian encroachment the attacking F-16, causing it ultimately to crash in western Syria would effectively hamper an in Israel. The Israeli Air Force then launched at times volatile, yet largely stable, deterrence another strike, this time aiming at various Syrian posture against its traditional rival, the Lebanese anti-aircraft missile batteries as well as stationary Hezbollah, which was gathering in its northern Iranian military positions dispersed on Syrian soil. theater. 3 At the same time, for Iran, opening The scale and pace of this alarming escalatory a second front by sticking to a two-pronged pattern between the archenemies Israel and Iran approach along the Israel-Syria-Lebanon triborder also marked the very first publicly acknowledged area, with the help of Hezbollah, appears the direct confrontation between military elements of method of choice to bind Israeli power projection both countries since the onset of the Syrian conflict in the slipstream of Iran’s otherwise growing role in 2011. Upon closer inspection, Iran likely in other parts of Syria.

A Corridor of Iranian Influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean

Iran’s strategy contains elements that carry As a countermeasure, Israel attempts to navigate ambitious, but risky, implications. Tehran’s through an increasingly troublesome landscape on objective revolves around its pursuit of slowly its northern front, and so for now it seems to be but surely establishing a logistical and military determined to adhere to a measured, but proactive foothold in the Golan Heights, and linking it containment policy against Iranian or Iranian-linked with the existing infrastructure and operational proxy elements in Syria. With such a strategy, Israel capabilities of Hezbollah. In terms of geography, cannot achieve complete interdiction of an Iranian control over a portion of the Golan on the military buildup, but it can actively delay it. As a Syrian side implies accessing safe passage to result, it would realistically take several years for the strategically vital Qalamoun mountain range Iran to establish an autonomous and permanent along the nearby Lebanese-Syrian border.4 The military foothold in close vicinity to Israel. rocky plateau in southwestern Syria provides (3) Emile El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy shelter, elevated retreat and tactical lookout from Relationship,” Washington Quarterly (Center for Strategic and International Studies and Massachusetts Institute of Technology), which to decimate remaining pockets of anti– 30, no. 2 (2007): 35. (4) Rhys Dubin, Hezbollah’s Diplomacy in Qalamoun, SyriaSource by Assad regime militiamen, thereby securing the the Atlantic Council, March 1, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil. capital Damascus from its weak western flank. org/blogs/syriasource/hezbollah-s-diplomacy-in-qalamoun.

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To be sure, when it comes to the mounting tensions Syrian forces fired anti-aircraft missiles, one in the Golan Heights, the Israeli government has of which was intercepted by the apparent first been repeatedly cautioning against Iranian efforts operational use in combat of the Arrow missile to deepen its commitment near the Syrian side, defense system. adjacent to the UN-controlled demilitarized zone Throughout 2013, Israel carried out numerous along the Golan. As recently as April 15, 2018, in strikes targeting military transport vehicles in the aftermath of the American-led strikes against the outskirts of Damascus, which Israel claimed Syria, two Israeli cabinet members reiterated to be supplying Hezbollah. On January 12, their government’s “unwavering commitment to 2015, the Israeli Air Force reportedly struck a interdict a permanent Iranian military presence clandestine military convoy near the al-Amal in Syria.” 5 Farms in the Syrian district of Quneitra. Among This fear stems from what Israel perceives as the the confirmed victims was Imad Mughniyeh’s transformation of Syria from a hitherto transit son, Jihad, and general Mohammad Ali Allah country of Iranian-made weaponry destined to Dadi of Iran’s extraterritorial special units, the Lebanon into an additional staging ground for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds potential direct military activity. One of Israel’s Force.7 At the end of the same year, on December worst nightmares is the prospect of Iran and 19, Lebanese Druze and former Palestine Hezbollah achieving first-strike capabilities,6 a Liberation Organization (PLO) member Samir scenario that would turn any existing deterrence Kuntar vanished in an explosion in the outskirts posture upside down. Israel has therefore acted on of Damascus. After nearly 30 years spent in an multiple occasions in recent years to contend with Israeli prison he allegedly embarked as a top the bleak prospect of Iranian and Iranian proxy Hezbollah coordinator soon after his release in military infrastructure and missile factories being 2008 and spearheaded the group’s operations set up in Syria as well as to stem proliferation into and recruitment on the Syrian slopes of the Hezbollah-held territory. Golan Heights. Hezbollah’s response did not take In September 2017, Israel launched air strikes long after the Lebanese organization lived up to on military sites inside Syria, arguing that they expectations and retaliated by ambushing Israeli were harboring advanced missiles and facilities military vehicles, killing two and wounding seven for the production of chemical weapons. An event soldiers close to the Israeli-occupied Shebaa in March 2017 bears all the hallmarks of what Farms on the Golan Heights.8 Israel coins its legitimate preventive efforts to A similar pattern appeared on November 30, 2015, deprive its enemies of access to sophisticated when Israeli air strikes aimed at destroying what weapons. On that date, it targeted a military site it considered the proliferation of destabilizing near Palmyra, the Syrian military said, in what weaponry (advanced ground-to-surface missiles was then the deepest penetration of Israeli air forces inside Syrian territory thus far. In response, (7) Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Top Iranian General and Six Hezbollah Fighters Killed in Israeli Attack in Syria,” Guardian, January 19, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/top- (5) AFP, “Israeli Ministers Speak Out against Iranian Entrenchment iranian-general-hezbollah-fighters-killed-israel-attack-syria. in Syria,” YnetNews, April 15, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/ (8) Jodi Rudoren and Anne Barnard, “Hezbollah Kills 2 Israeli articles/0,7340,L-5230854,00.html. Soldiers Near Lebanon,” New York Times, January 28, 2015, (6) A. R Norton, “Hezbollah—A Short History” (Princeton, NJ: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/world/middleeast/israel- Princeton University Press, 2007), 133, 134. lebanon-hezbollah-missile-attack.html.

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and potentially weapons of mass destruction). entrenchment of Hezbollah in the Syrian Civil Iran considers it tantamount to maintaining a War, Tehran’s own rekindled, yet dangerously considerable flow of logistical support, weaponry, more assertive, role in Syria is testament to its and reinforcements from Syria to Hezbollah significant effort in expanding and solidifying strongholds over the Beqaa into south Lebanon,9 strategic depth ranging from Iraq, over the Shia- and vice versa. In early December 2016, several offshoot Alawite-dominated heartland in Syria, Israeli surface-to-surface missiles hit the Syrian to the Mediterranean shores in both Syria and Mezzeh military air base southwest of Damascus. Lebanon. Asserting leverage in the Golan Heights In April 2017, an Israeli attack on a Syrian camp appears, therefore, to be a vital element in the for progovernment National Defense Forces bigger struggle to connect the dots of an Iranian- killed three fighters near the Golan Heights and controlled arc of influence across the Levant. wounded two additional fighters near Quneitra in In doing so, Iran will draw from lessons learned southwestern Syria. in its decade-long and successful venture in Note that in the past, Iran’s armed forces deputy propping up its Lebanese ally and pitching it chief of staff, brigadier general Masoud Jazayeri, against Israel. With its engagement in Syria, has repeatedly mentioned that, upon the two Tehran simultaneously strives to secure its countries’ requests, Iran has been providing both own role as an undoubtedly overextended, but Syria and Iraq with vital military and intelligence nonetheless viable and potentially increasingly advisory assistance through its IRGC Quds autonomous actor on Syrian turf in the not-too- Force. In combination with the Iranian-backed distant future.

The Hezbollah Model: Blueprint for Iran’s Strategy in the Golan Heights?

It was in May 2014 that Hossein Hamedani, a help advance Iranian power projection at a time top military commander of Iran’s IRGC, who a where the survival of the Assad regime was hardly year later vanished at the hands of Islamic State in guaranteed. Aleppo, stated that Iran had already implemented Among the most prominent groups is the steps in the creation of “a second Hezbollah” Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA), at the time operating in Syria.10 However, Iran’s efforts in a key proregime Shia brigade in Syria. LAFA terms of recruitment and deployment go as far successfully drew from Iraqi Shia refugees who as back as 2012. Since then, Tehran has largely settled in Sayyeda Zainab, about 10 kilometers focused on drawing from Iraqi and Lebanese Shia south of Damascus. Reflective of Tehran’s method militias in order to create an operationally loose, of cross-border mobilization, LAFA further but ideologically firm, network of offshoots that morphed into incorporating regime-loyalist elements of Syrian Shia militias as well, while its (9) ASaad Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 112, 113. battle-hardened Iraqi counterparts handled most (10) Adam Chandler, “An Iranian General Is Killed in Syria,” Atlantic, of the military command duties. While Iran’s links October 9, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2015/10/an-iranian-general-killed-in-syria/409963/. to recruiting militias from Pakistani and Afghan

Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 8 origin are well documented, as evidenced by their it bluntly, “the whole operation was orchestrated overt deployment in Iraq in recent years—sizable by Suleimani. It was a great victory for him.”12 contingents of Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Shia Ironically, soon after the operation, Iran released fighters operate in Syria, too—Tehran’s playbook an official statement “congratulating the Syrian for the Syrian theater resorted to more measured people for their victory.”13 and concealed tactics in order to obfuscate direct The battle proved crucial, as the hinterland between accountability during the early stages of the the city and the Lebanese border embodies a Syrian conflict. In doing so, Iranian interference number of delicate geopolitical sticking points: in Syria fell largely into the realms of intelligence the area is home to both the vast majority of advisory services, but it soon started to transition Syria’s small non-Alawite Shia community and into more comprehensive and direct military clans from the adjacent Lebanese Hermel region. command and control assistance,11 with the latter Strengthening local support there by creating a being justified by alleged official requests from buffer zone significantly amplified Hezbollah’s its ally in Damascus. military momentum in the border region and Now, rather than size and scope, it is the nature and marked an achievement that resonates to date. For the associated geography of Tehran’s operational the Syrian government and Hezbollah, the capture military activities that provide valuable lessons of al-Qusayr helped the Syrian government for a more nuanced understanding of what Iran connect the capital of Damascus with Homs and is doing in the Golan Heights as of late. In 2013 gave the Syrian army access to the Alawite-ruled and 2015, Iran provided the paramilitary training Mediterranean coastal governorates of Latakia and intelligence for its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, and Tartous. In connection with the Hezbollah- which led to the routing of insurgents from strategic led and Iran-supported liberation of Al-Zabadani positions around al-Qusayr as of April 2013, and in 2015, both operations provided essentially to the ultimately successful siege of the Syrian free passage for Iranian elements to govern and town of Zabadani in July 2015. Both towns are to extend their operational reach further south, strategically crucial, as they serve as gatekeepers as both cities served as the IRGC’s primary hubs along the Syrian-Lebanese border. As for Qusayr, for funneling supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon. there have been a number of clues suggesting that Although they were ultimately deemed successful, IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani both operations came at a high price. Hundreds of was the mastermind behind the operation, or to put coffins of Hezbollah martyrs add to the dark figure of unreported cases, which has likely mounting

(11) “Mounting reports of Iranian casualties also served as an indicator mounted more than a thousand, have since then of the ongoing shift from senior-level IRGC advisement to direct IRGC field command over pro-regime forces. Rebel forces killed been returned to the Dahiyah district in southern and beheaded IRGC-GF Brigadier General Abdollah Eskandari on May 28, 2014 near the town of Morek in northern Hama Province Beirut, a traditional Hezbollah stronghold. Such . . . the presence of these senior Iranian officers in such close stark symbolic imagery not only jeopardizes the proximity to active frontlines suggests that IRGC commanders have directly embedded with pro-regimes forces on the battlefield.” desperately needed recruitment of new fighters, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), “The Regime’s Strategic Objectives,” May 21, 2015, adapted from the ISW report, “‘An but also risks undermining the group’s balancing Army in All Corners’: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria,” April 2015, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2015/05/. (12) Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, September (13) Martin Chulov, “Syrian Town of Qusair Falls to Hezbollah in 30, 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the- Breakthrough for Assad,” Guardian, June 5, 2013, https://www. shadow-commander. theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/05/syria-army-seizes-qusair.

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act of grandstanding as a political party in to irregular forces and proxy guerrilla squads that Lebanon. can operate covertly and set up a vast array of Considering the rising domestic discontent of camouflaged of command posts that may blend large elements of Iran’s society with the costs they in with the hilly and densely wooded landscape perceive as associated with Iranian adventurism in parts of the Golan. in Syria and beyond, Tehran will likely act As of spring 2018, there are almost a dozen of cautiously, but certainly not stop, in extending Iranian or Iranian-linked positions scattered its footprint further south in the Golan Heights. across the southwestern Syrian governorate of Instead of a direct military buildup—and thereby Quneitra. Furthermore, Iran has driven a wedge risking that coffins will be sent home to Tehran— of additional positions further south in immediate Iran has reason to reflect on what happened in vicinity to the city of Daraa along the Jordanian Al-Qusayr and Zabadani. That includes sticking border.14

Institute for the Study of War, “Russia and Iran in Southwest Syria” (map), April 12, 2018.

(14) Institute for the Study of War, “Russia and Iran in Southwest Syria” (map), April 12, 2018. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ Map%20-%20Russia%20Iran%20in%20SW%20Syria_0.png.

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Russia and Iran in Southwest Syria

In doing so, Iran may make strides to secure avoid risking any diversion or overextension another geographical pivot. By creating a the overstretching of its currently deployed widespread system of sophisticated, agile capabilities. Recent events, including the pockets of defense, Iran strives to exert tactical recurring bombardment of the T4 airbase on oversight in the Golan Heights, from which April 9, 2018, allegedly carried out by Israeli to pull the strings along large swaths of the forces from Lebanese airspace, have yet again Lebanese-Syrian and potentially Syrian- taken a direct toll, with two reported dead Israeli border region. Such tactics are eerily Iranians and damage to Iranian facilities on reminiscent of the tactics of Iran’s foremost the ground. Consequently, as long as Israel regional proxy, Hezbollah’s experience in low- maintains room for maneuver in order to level, but consistent, insurgency, which brought retaliate in pinpoint fashion, Tehran will be about the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces wary about the scope and vigorousness of future from South Lebanon in 2000. operational steps in the Golan. As it stands, Iran Now, despite its growing influence in the region and its proxy forces are neither inclined to, nor and strategic and tactical steps in exerting capable of, independently gage a new round of assertiveness in the Golan outlined here, it is retaliation that would not sufficiently disrupt questionable whether Iran has an interest in the balance of deterrence. Until then, a tit-for- risking further escalation. Instead, a steady tat approach rather than all-out confrontation and covert buildup is much more likely to will likely shape any confrontational dynamic.

All Roads Lead to Moscow?

When revisiting the aftermath of the February Moscow, but the move to public denouncement 10 drone incident in the Golan Heights, it was certainly constitutes a new dynamic. After all, in Russia’s diplomatic damage control that shielded recent years, Russia has not on a single occasion, the event from the possibly perilous effects of publicly denounced Israel for bombing convoys the outbreak of further developing rounds of destined for Hezbollah that were traveling fighting. In particular, since intervening in Syria through Syria. However, that does not suggest as of September 2015, Moscow aims to navigate that Russia will give Israel carte blanche in the balancing act of having pragmatic ties with exerting air power in Syria.15 both Israel and Iran over Syria. While the animosity between Israel and Iran To illustrate this point, it was only in the has grown over time, for Vladimir Putin’s aftermath of the April attack on the T4 airbase Russia, actively maintaining cooperation in that Moscow has, for the first time, proactively terms of credible deconfliction and intelligence raised its voice in attributing the air strikes to Israeli fighter jets. It is too early to tell if this (15) Adam Chandler, “What’s behind Israel’s Diplomatic Flare-Up with Russia,” Atlantic, March 24, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/ marks a significant policy shift on behalf of international/archive/2017/03/israel-russia-syria/520410/.

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mechanisms with Israel16 does not close the that it has helped Iran to gain ground in the door on its historical track record of supporting Levant, the Russian military also represents a both Assad’s Syria or Iran. On the contrary, the fairly pragmatic cordon sanitaire, able to rein in Kremlin’s foreign policy navigates and steers Tehran diplomatically as well as absorb nonstate through the current geopolitical challenges actors that might threaten to inflame the already without alienating any of its various interlocutors volatile situation along the Israeli-Syrian border in the Middle East. To illustrate this point, both even further. Nonetheless, continuous Russian- Tehran’s and Moscow’s stances assume that there Iranian rapprochement in regional crisis currently is no credible alternative to the Assad management, with Syria coming close to active regime capable of maintaining a minimal level of burden sharing, distresses the Israelis, who fear, governance in the war-torn country. not only the upgrade of existing Iranian missile After all, the peculiar Israeli-Russian bond stockpiles, in a worst-case scenario with potential demonstrates that Israel has somehow managed nuclear capabilities, but the already palpable to come to terms with the Russian presence in threat of Iranian-linked forces closing in in Syria: while it might be true in the short run southwestern Syria.

Mapping Israel’s Deterrence Doctrine

If Hezbollah’s entrenchment were to potentially At the time, both sides managed to seriously facilitate the proliferation of mid-range and long- damage each other, which explains the relative range weaponry of Iranian origin in the environs of quietude and restraint along the Israeli-Lebanese the disputed Golan Heights. alongside the Syria- border ever since. Israel’s calculus stems from Lebanon-Israel triborder area, it would seriously a pragmatic realization that only an escalatory threaten the currently existing deterrence equation. response can achieve a temporary absence of Iranian encroachment in the Golan would only violence along its borders. Hezbollah, for its further exacerbate the risk of military escalation, part, internalized the art of blending into civilian not only affecting Iranian elements in Syria, but areas and concealing its operating squads in order likely bring its proxy force in Lebanon into the to hide and disperse. While such tactics helped crosshairs. In such a scenario, Israel’s military decrease its own vulnerability, they raised the would raise the cost for Iranian adventurism by probability of Lebanese civilians coming into the resorting to a deliberate disproportionate response. firing line, a realization that Hezbollah fully and Valuable insight for assessing such an admittedly consciously accepted. bleak, yet not unlikely, scenario can thus be drawn The taxonomy of the events that lead to the from the armed encounter as experienced during outbreak of the war are not unlike what one can the Israel-Hezbollah War in summer 2006. observe when looking at Iran’s slowly but steadily growing footprint in the Golan Heights. From 2000 (16) Maria Tsvetkova, “Israel, Russia to Coordinate Military Action on Syria: Netanyahu,” Reuters World News, September 21, 2015, to 2006, Hezbollah rarely resorted to direct attacks, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-israel/ yet engaged in steady, low-level harassment that israel-russia-to-coordinate-military-action-on-syria-netanyahu- idUSKCN0RL10K20150921. distracted attention from a conventional force

Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 12 buildup. Hezbollah, for its part, tried to trigger to induce a calm built on fear, not on political and manipulate certain characteristics of response settlement. by Israel’s military. Israel, on the other hand, In that respect, the infamous remarks of Gadi relied on its superior conventional standing army Eizenkot, at the time a major general in the Israeli assuming, that its existence alone would reduce army and architect of the so-called Dahiyah the risk of escalation. However, as history would doctrine, resonate vividly to date and are likely have it, this was a fatal misperception. to reflect Israel’s stance if Iran breaks out in the Deterrence, as estimated by Israel’s political Golan Heights: “What happened in the Dahiya and military echelons, was at no single point quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every absolute. It took six years and Hezbollah crossing village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply numerous red lines to provoke Israel launch an disproportionate force and cause great damage unprecedentedly extensive and draconic military and destruction there.”18 campaign across Lebanon in response to the Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon in 2006 Hezbollah incursion that precipitated the start of rendered obsolete the Talion principle— the the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. principle that punishment should be equivalent. However, precisely because of the previous The campaign was in many ways deliberately military buildup and ongoing preparations to made excessive in order to serve as a credible act respond in the event of escalation, Hezbollah of revenge. “An eye for a tooth”19 is thus the more managed to endure the pounding by absorbing the appropriate description, a rationale that soon after damage, and continued it operational resistance. found entry into the Israeli academic discourse, Indeed, it even managed to drag Israel back into where it was coined “mowing the grass.”20 waging a ground incursion into South Lebanon, a Oftentimes, conventional wisdom in Western battlefield with negative connotations hard-wired strategic thought appears to persist in its own into Israel’s military history. To that end, Israel’s viewpoint, since it conceptually tries to identify firepower, and Hezbollah’s ability to exploit the values associated with political agreements. Israel’s “Lebanese mud-syndrome”17 cleared the By doing so, however, it turns a blind eye on the way for a realignment of their animosity. current politico-military realities in Syria. In the later stages of the hostilities, Israel tried In sharp contrast, Israel’s overarching security to alter the perception of Hezbollah at the concept is much less ambitious. It is pragmatic, receiving end by applying an iron fist policy of in the sense that it does not aim for a hypothetical massive retaliation. The Israeli Air Force applied long-lasting reconciliation, but rather for the saturation bombing across the southern outskirts achievement and perpetuation of the temporary of Beirut after having identified it as a Hezbollah stronghold. On July 22, 2006, the Israeli Air Force (18) Reuters Staff, “Israel Warns Hezbollah War Would Invite flattened the Shia Dahiya suburb. The draconic air Destruction,” Reuters World News, October 3, 2008, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-lebanon-hezbollah/ campaign was intended to be a disproportional israel-warns-hezbollah-war-would-invite-destruction- idUKTRE4923I020081003. punishment in order to restore credibility and (19) D. L. Byman, “An Eye for a Tooth: Israel’s Problem with Deterrence,” ForeignPolicy.com, July 24, 2014, http:// foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/24/an-eye-for-a-tooth/. (17) E. Lieberman, Reconceptualizing Deterrence: Nudging toward (20) Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “Mowing the Grass: Israel’s Rationality in Middle Eastern Rivalries (Abingdon, UK: Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict,” Journal of Strategic Routledge, 2013), 197. Studies, 37, no. 1 (2015): 65–90.

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absence of violence. IDF Colonel Gabriel Siboni a retributive approach and harsh penalization describes the strategic calculus as intended to could serve as effective deterrent means, as “inflict damage and [mete] out punishment to long as its magnitude would be observable by an extent that will demand long and expensive the public. And indeed, the manner by which reconstruction processes. . . . Such a response Israeli strategic doctrine translated into actual will create a lasting memory among Syrian and military performance left very little doubt: as a Lebanese decision makers, thereby increasing reminiscence of the severity of Israel’s prompt Israeli deterrence and reducing the likelihood reaction to Hezbollah’s cross-border raid in of hostilities against Israel for an extended summer 2006, Dan Halutz, chief of staff of the period.”21 IDF at the time, set an appropriate rhetorical As the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War has shown, landmark when he described that Israel was well Israel resorts to disproportional retaliation as its determined to “turn back time in Lebanon by preferred military strategy. It argued that such 20 years.”22

Outlook

In sum, for the time being, Israel is likely to Iran’s steady, progressive, and patient buildup of continue to target Iranian infrastructure in Syria force in the slipstream and as part of the pro-Assad by its method of choice—limited, but precise, coalition. In addition, with Iran’s long history and air strikes. Intertwined with such an effort sophistication in masking direct involvement is the importance that Israel’s political and through proxy forces, the Golan Heights, and for military establishment attribute to the concept that matter, the Daraa governorate in southwestern of deterrence and how it translates into the Syria, are likely to see an increasing presence of containment of Iranian consolidation. In the militia forces in the near future. event of a continued Iranian encroachment in Furthermore, both Israel and Iran can be expected the Golan Heights, it cannot, however, be ruled to pay more heed to Russia’s role and diplomatic out that Israel will up the ante and start applying leverage over the Syrian theater. Moscow still disproportionate retaliation. The taxonomy of remains the single most important actor that the low-level Hezbollah-Israel feud from 2000 maintains diplomatic and intelligence channels to 2006, the outbreak of war in summer that year, to adversaries, rendering it an indispensable and the subsequent recalibration of deterrence player when it comes to cultivating and applying provides relevant insight and may well serve as restraining mechanisms, should escalation prevail a harbinger for the future of the Iranian-Israeli and deterrence fail. In the meantime, both Iran quarrel in Syria. and Israel are likely to increase their respective History will tell, but so far, the looming tension and efforts at interference in the Syrian-controlled a tit-for-tat engagement may well be referred to as Golan Heights.

(21) Gabi Siboni, “Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War,” INSS Insight no. 74, October (22) Chris McGreal, “Capture of Soldiers Was ‘Act of War’ Says 2, 2008, http://www.inss.org.il/publication/disproportionate-force- Israel,” The Guardian, July 13, 2006, https://www.theguardian. israels-concept-of-response-in-light-of-the-second-lebanon-war/. com/world/2006/jul/13/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon1.

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Such a trend will inevitably lower the threshold—on both sides—for red lines to be crossed and spur further division and temporary outbreaks of military responses. Although at this point it’s only a slight possibility, nonetheless is does not bode well for the slim margins that could lead to Syria’s future to be one of reconciliatory political settlement and postwar reconstruction.

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Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

The KFCRIS is an independent non-governmental institution based in Riyadh, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Center was founded in 1403/1983 by the King Faisal Foundation (KFF) to preserve the legacy of the late King Faisal and to continue his mission of transmitting knowledge between the Kingdom and the world. The Center serves as a platform for research and Islamic Studies, bringing together researchers and research institutions from the Kingdom and across the world through conferences, workshops, and lectures, and through the production and publication of scholarly works, as well as the preservation of Islamic manuscripts. The Center’s Research Department is home to a group of established and promising researchers who endeavor to produce in-depth analyses in various fields, ranging from Contemporary Political Thought, Political Economy, and Arabic Language to Saudi Studies, Maghreb Studies, and Asian Studies. The Center also hosts the Library which preserves invaluable Islamic manuscripts, the Al-Faisal Museum for Arab Islamic Art, the Al-Faisal Institute for Human Resources Development, the Darat Al-Faisal, and the Al-Faisal Cultural Press, which issues the Al-Faisal magazine and other key intellectual periodicals. For more information, please visit the Center’s website: www.kfcris.com/en

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