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Ran's Growing Strategic Foothold in the Golan Heights ran’s Growing Strategic Foothold in the Golan Heights Mere Saber Rattling or Portent of I Things to Come? Executive Summary Introduction A Corridor of Iranian Influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean The Hezbollah Model: Blueprint for Iran’s Strategy in the Golan Heights? Russia and Iran in Southwest Syria All Roads Lead to Moscow? Mapping Israel’s Deterrence Doctrine Outlook Rajab - Sha'ban 1439 36 March - April 2018 2 © KFCRIS, 2018 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 36 - 29/5/2018 L.D. No: 1439/8472 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 3 hat happened in the Dahiyah quarter of Beirut in “W2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force and cause great damage and destruction there.” —Gadi Eizenkot, chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 4 Executive Summary Tehran’s rekindled, yet dangerously more assertive role in Syria is testament to its efforts to expand strategic depth, ranging from Iraq, over the Shia-offshoot Alawite-dominated heartland in Syria, to the Mediterranean shores in both Syria and Lebanon. In that context, asserting leverage in the Golan Heights represents a vital element in the larger struggle to connect the dots of an Iranian-controlled arc of influence across the Levant. In doing so, Iran will likely draw from lessons learned in its substantial, for the most part successful, and well-documented tool of statecraft, namely, the support of proxy forces. Propping up its Lebanese ally Hezbollah and pitching it against Israel serves as a prime example, as a result of which Hezbollah has become, from Tehran’s perspective, an indispensable, well-entrenched, and to some degree independent player in both Lebanon and Syria. With a heightened engagement in southwestern Syria, including in the Golan Heights, Tehran is simultaneously vying for its own, more autonomous role as viable and potent actor on Syrian turf in the not-too-distant future. As a countermeasure, Israel attempts to navigate through an increasingly worrisome threat landscape along its northern borders with Syria and Lebanon. For now, it seems determined to adhere to what it considers the rules of the game: carrying out a proactive containment policy against Iranian and Iranian-linked proxy elements by resorting to retaliatory pinpoint strikes to maintain the credibility of its deterrence posture. There is also a larger element to this interaction. The modus operandi of the Israeli-Iranian rivalry in Syria has tangible repercussions for their respective protégés and allies, too. With the latest American- British-French strikes in retaliation for the chemical weapons use in Douma allegedly perpetrated by the Assad regime, thus acknowledging the role of Russia—for some a tacit culprit by overlooking Iranian overtures in Syria while for others a force able to rein in Tehran and a vital channel that heeds Israeli security concerns—will be key in preventing any escalatory pattern in Syria. Introduction At a time of evolving and fast-paced developments military on April 13 revealed that the drone was of the security dynamics in the Middle East, one reportedly weaponized and “tasked to attack.”1 As recent event stood out: on February 10, 2018, an soon became clear, the incident would trigger a Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) entered chain of events that called into question a peculiar, Israeli airspace over the Golan Heights on an yet pervasive, deterrence equation that has tacitly alleged reconnaissance mission. After “extensive been cultivated and largely respected by all intelligence-based investigations,” the Israeli involved parties since the 2006 Lebanon War.2 (1) AP, “Israel Says Iran Drone Downed in Feb was on Attack Mission,” Washington Post, April 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/middle_east/israel-iran-drone-intercepted-in-feb-was-on-attack-mission/2018/04/13/4e8ba21e-3f41-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story. html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.31a62d726d04. (2) Rory Jones, “Tension Rises between Israel and Iran after Syria Clash,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ israel-vows-more-aggression-to-stop-iranian-military-expansion-in-syria-1518358488. Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 5 With the Iranian drone being promptly downed by deliberately crossed a red line by its infiltration an Apache helicopter, Israel launched a retaliatory of enemy airspace, thereby risking retaliation in strike against the drone’s launch pad at the Tiyas Syria and Lebanon alike. Tehran finely calculated (T4) military airbase, located in the eastern its latest move in order to test the nature of Israel’s countryside of Homs province near the Syrian city military responsiveness, thus learning valuable of Palmyra. However, for its part, the exertion of lessons about the latter’s behavior when put to Israeli air power in Syria triggered a response by the test. Syrian anti-aircraft missile fire, which hit one of Conversely, for Israel, an Iranian encroachment the attacking F-16, causing it ultimately to crash in western Syria would effectively hamper an in Israel. The Israeli Air Force then launched at times volatile, yet largely stable, deterrence another strike, this time aiming at various Syrian posture against its traditional rival, the Lebanese anti-aircraft missile batteries as well as stationary Hezbollah, which was gathering in its northern Iranian military positions dispersed on Syrian soil. theater. 3 At the same time, for Iran, opening The scale and pace of this alarming escalatory a second front by sticking to a two-pronged pattern between the archenemies Israel and Iran approach along the Israel-Syria-Lebanon triborder also marked the very first publicly acknowledged area, with the help of Hezbollah, appears the direct confrontation between military elements of method of choice to bind Israeli power projection both countries since the onset of the Syrian conflict in the slipstream of Iran’s otherwise growing role in 2011. Upon closer inspection, Iran likely in other parts of Syria. A Corridor of Iranian Influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean Iran’s strategy contains elements that carry As a countermeasure, Israel attempts to navigate ambitious, but risky, implications. Tehran’s through an increasingly troublesome landscape on objective revolves around its pursuit of slowly its northern front, and so for now it seems to be but surely establishing a logistical and military determined to adhere to a measured, but proactive foothold in the Golan Heights, and linking it containment policy against Iranian or Iranian-linked with the existing infrastructure and operational proxy elements in Syria. With such a strategy, Israel capabilities of Hezbollah. In terms of geography, cannot achieve complete interdiction of an Iranian control over a portion of the Golan on the military buildup, but it can actively delay it. As a Syrian side implies accessing safe passage to result, it would realistically take several years for the strategically vital Qalamoun mountain range Iran to establish an autonomous and permanent along the nearby Lebanese-Syrian border.4 The military foothold in close vicinity to Israel. rocky plateau in southwestern Syria provides (3) Emile El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy shelter, elevated retreat and tactical lookout from Relationship,” Washington Quarterly (Center for Strategic and International Studies and Massachusetts Institute of Technology), which to decimate remaining pockets of anti– 30, no. 2 (2007): 35. (4) Rhys Dubin, Hezbollah’s Diplomacy in Qalamoun, SyriaSource by Assad regime militiamen, thereby securing the the Atlantic Council, March 1, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil. capital Damascus from its weak western flank. org/blogs/syriasource/hezbollah-s-diplomacy-in-qalamoun. Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 Rajab - Sha'ban , 1439 - March - April 2018 6 To be sure, when it comes to the mounting tensions Syrian forces fired anti-aircraft missiles, one in the Golan Heights, the Israeli government has of which was intercepted by the apparent first been repeatedly cautioning against Iranian efforts operational use in combat of the Arrow missile to deepen its commitment near the Syrian side, defense system. adjacent to the UN-controlled demilitarized zone Throughout 2013, Israel carried out numerous along the Golan. As recently as April 15, 2018, in strikes targeting military transport vehicles in the aftermath of the American-led strikes against the outskirts of Damascus, which Israel claimed Syria, two Israeli cabinet members reiterated to be supplying Hezbollah. On January 12, their government’s “unwavering commitment to 2015, the Israeli Air Force reportedly struck a interdict a permanent Iranian military presence clandestine military convoy near the al-Amal in Syria.” 5 Farms in the Syrian district of Quneitra. Among This fear stems from what Israel perceives as the the confirmed victims was Imad Mughniyeh’s transformation of Syria from a hitherto transit son, Jihad, and general Mohammad Ali Allah country of Iranian-made weaponry destined to Dadi of Iran’s extraterritorial special units, the Lebanon into an additional staging ground for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds potential direct military activity. One of Israel’s Force.7 At the end of the same year, on December worst nightmares is the
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