November 2019 MLM
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VOLUME XI, ISSUE 11, NOVEMBER 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION The Commander Abu Zainab al- ARRESTED: of Hezbollah’s Lami—The Bringing Down Islamic State’s Second Front Mastermind the West: Kémi Maldivian Mole Threatening Behind the Séba and the Bloody Mohamad Israel—Hajj BRIEF Pan-Africanist Crackdown in Ameen Hashem Revolution Iraq ANDREW ANDREW SUNGUTA WEST RAFID JABOORI ANIMESH ROUL DEVEREUX MCGREGOR VOLUME X, ISSUE 11 | NOVEMBER 2019 Al-Shabaab Recruiter and DustitD2 the Westlands area were also killed (Tuko News, Attack Planner Fawaz Ahmed Hamdun October 1). Hamdun is believed to have facilitated the re- Sunguta West entry into Kenya of Mahir Khalid Riziki, the suicide bomber who blew himself up at the As security experts maintain their watch over entrance of the complex. East African football fields because of youth recruitment into terrorism, the figure of Fawaz Like Hamdun, Riziki had been on the Kenyan Ahmed Hamdun has become the object of police’s list of most wanted terrorist suspects particular focus. since 2014. His face had been emblazoned on “wanted dead or alive” billboards. The young On September 28, a multi-security agency team suicide bomber sneaked out of Kenya in 2014, smoked the youthful terrorist suspect out of his when he was barely 20, and sneaked back in hideout in Majengo, a low-income majority early in 2019 to participate in the DusitD2 Muslim settlement in Mombasa. He was terrorist attack. detained by police in the coastal city (Daily Nation, October 1). Riziki lived in the Majengo area—like Hamdun —and attended prayers at the Masjid Musa Before his arrest, security agencies had listed Mosque. The two were allegedly influenced by Hamdun as one of Kenya’s most wanted two radical imams at the mosque, Shaykh Aboud terrorists. He is believed to have played a key role Rogo and Shaykh Abubakar Sharif, a.k.a. in the planning and execution of Nairobi’s Makaburi. The two shaykhs, who were shot dead DusitD2 office complex terrorist attack over in 2012 and 2014 respectively, were suspected of January 15-16 of this year. being ideologues who directed al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Nairobi and Mombasa. affiliate in East Africa, took responsibility for the The shaykhs’ followers in the coastal region went attack, which killed at least 21 people. The five underground after their death, later emerging as terrorists who stormed the upmarket complex in Jaysh al-Ayman, a Kenyan al-Shabaab cell active !1 VOLUME XI, ISSUE 11, NOVEMBER 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION in Lamu County’s Boni forest (Standard Digital, Kenya, especially the coastal region of January 21). Mombasa. The trio was accused of luring youth into the group using promises of huge cash In the lead up to the security agencies’ raid in amounts and non-existent scholarships, police 2014, the mosque, at the direction of the two reported in 2015. The three were said to exert imams, had become a hotbed of extremism. The immense influence on the coastal youth. government also said the mosque had turned (Standard Digital, August 18, 2015). into a breeding ground for young terrorists like Hamdun who were being funneled into Somalia Hamdun’s arrest followed the killing of three (Daily Nation, October 1; Citizen Digital, other terrorist suspects, who were planning to January 19). carry out an attack in the coastal region. According to the police, seven terrorists had been In September, Hamdun was blamed for the sent by al-Shabaab to strike the Kenya Ports disappearance of a youth known as Salim Fariz Authority, Moi International Airport, and the Hadin who, it is believed, had traveled to new Standard Gauge Railway terminus. All Somalia to join the ranks of al-Shabaab. Before these sites are in Mombasa and are government Hadin’s disappearance, he was seen walking the installations. streets of Mombasa with Hamdun. His family made reports to human rights organizations and Hamdun’s arrest sheds light on a new crop of circulated posters of their missing family terrorists in Kenya and East Africa. While al- member on September 29. Shabaab is seeking to widen its pool of terrorist recruits and attacks in more nations, it is Before turning into a lethal terrorist and targeting young people. This gives the militant recruiter, Hamdun was renowned for his exploits group confidence in the future of its insurgency. as a star footballer in the coastal region. Between 2008 and 2012, as a student at Kikoan Despite al-Shabaab’s recent focus, increased Primary school, he helped his team win many border surveillance and timely intelligence football trophies. He then played for Korea FC sharing could disrupt and curtail this new threat. and lived in old Mombasa town. After becoming famous, he dropped out of school to play football Sunguta West is an independent journalist based in full time. Nairobi. But a turning point came in 2012, when he went off the grid after moving from Mombasa’s old town to the Majengo slums. It is believed that, while living in Majongo, Hamdun was radicalized at the Masjid Musa Mosque and began recruiting for al-Shabaab. After that, he recruited for al-Shabaab through the Ramadan Kufungwa terrorist network. The network is named and associated with an al- Shabaab diehard named Ramadan Hamisi Kufungwa (K24news, October 6). Kufungwa, together with Abdifatah Abubakar Ahmed and the late Ahmed Iman Ali, were in 2015 identified as key al-Shabaab recruiters in !2 VOLUME XI, ISSUE 11, NOVEMBER 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Abu Zainab al-Lami—The believed that al-Lami is responsible for the security details of Soleimani whenever he visits Mastermind Behind the Iraq (Aliraqnet, October 8). Bloody Crackdown in Iraq Abu Zainab al-Lami’s real name is Hussein Rafid Jaboori Faleh. He is a member of the militia Kata’ib Hizballah in Iraq (KHI), led by Jamal Jafar al- The ongoing protests in Baghdad and in the Ibrahim (better known by his nickname Abu predominantly Shia areas of southern Iraq are Mahdi al-Muhandis). KHI and al-Muhandis unprecedented in both their scale and the degree were designated as threats to coalition forces and of violence they were confronted with by the stability in Iraq by the U.S. Treasury in 2009 authorities. The Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia (U.S. Treasury Department, July 2, 2009). militias and its umbrella organization, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), have been Yet when the PMU was formed in 2014, al- accused of spearheading the crackdown and Muhandis became its deputy commander of the killing hundreds of protesters and injuring PMU and al-Lami its head of security. Until the thousands. Abu Zainab al-Lami—the head of recent protest crisis, al-Lami’s name was rarely the PMU security department—is accused of mentioned in the media. Unlike other leaders of playing a key role in the campaign to repress the the PMU groups who publicize their activities, protests. Although the vast majority of the give interviews, and frequently make fiery protesters are Shia, the demonstrations were seen statements, al-Lami avoided the media like any by Tehran and its allies in Iraq as being a part of typical intelligence professional. a grand conspiracy against Iran and its allies in the Middle East (Arabi21, October 30). The government of the Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi has not accepted The Iraqi authorities have responded to the responsibility for the killing of the protesters. protests with heavy handed policies since the first The PMU also denied any involvement in the days of the demonstrations. In order not to killing of the protesters, but its leaders warned surrender key areas in central Baghdad, snipers that they were ready to crush what they saw as a were deployed on top of buildings and masked conspiracy. Al-Lami is reported to be in charge men were seen operating within the ranks of the of this mission. Soleimani himself came to security forces. Both groups were believed to be Baghdad as soon as the protests broke out to lead militiamen who received orders from al-Lami the efforts to repress them. His tools to do that (Independent Arabia, October 17). were the Shia militias and his confidant al-Lami, who has power and influence over the Al-Lami’s role was reportedly bigger than the commanders of those militias (Al-Arabiya, direct involvement of his men in clashes with October 31). protesters. In his capacity as head of security in the PMU, he has the power to supervise the On the tactical level as a member of the KHI, activities of powerful militia leaders. This al-Lami is an expert in forming and authority has made him into one of the most commanding small groups that operate powerful person within the PMU. His power also separately to achieve certain objectives in various comes from his direct link to the Iranian Islamic locations, a tactic the militia used against the Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) U.S.-led coalition forces during the Iraq war. The commander general Qassim Soleimani. It is same tactic has been used during the ongoing !3 VOLUME XI, ISSUE 11, NOVEMBER 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION protests, but this time it is being used against formation of prime minister Abdul-Mahdi’s protesters instead of organized militaries. It has government last year, but political turmoil meant not been as effective in stopping the protests and that his appointment had to wait (24.ae, October has still resulted in significant casualties. 17). In addition to the snipers and killing squads As long as he maintains and consolidates his links operating in Baghdad and the southern to Soleimani and influential parties in Iran, he provinces, al-Lami’s men also launched a will be in a good position.