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INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS )1( “Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS )1(“Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate Book Title: INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS (1) “Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate Researchers: Yousef Fakher Eddin & Homam Al- Khateeb Legal Revision by: Lawyer: Anwar Al-Bonni Translated by: Ruba Khadamaljamei First Edition: May 2020 ) 1( Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Researches - Democratic Republic Studies Center All rights reserved for Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Researches www.sl-center.org and Democratic Republic Studies Center www.drsc-sy.org (2( INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS )1( “Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate As we share with whom we thank the same concept that justice stands as the fine line separating between to be or not to be principle; therefore, our thankfulness is just an opportunity to assert this shared concept. We extend our thanks to who reviewed this study and added significant remarks and notes to clarify the objectivity as a base in it, who is the lawyer Anwar Al-Bonni and the researcher: “Haditha Amer”. Thanks to the journalist Rayan Marouf for cooperating with us, as our conversation with him was so useful. Thanks to all witnesses whose circumstances hinder them from telling their names openly, and for whoever helped us in this regard. Certainly, readership should keep in mind that the two scholars who authored this study are the only responsible ones for any error, mistake or shortcoming that might occur in it and they hope their study might be useful for anyone. Youssef Fakher Al-deen & Homam Al-Khateeb ) 3( Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Researches - Democratic Republic Studies Center CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................................................................... 5 1- Introduction .................................................................................. 15 1. Preface .......................................................................................... 15 2. Hypothesis ..................................................................................... 19 3. Temporal and Spatial Framework ..................................................... 21 4. Methodology ................................................................................. 21 5. Difficulties Faced by Researchers ...................................................... 22 6. Significance .................................................................................... 23 II. Background to understand the general context in Sweida Governorate prior to and during ISIS Advent ................................................................................................................. 24 1. Overview about the geography of this governorate and the demographic distribution there 24 2. The relationship between the Druze and the Bedouins living in this governorate 27 3. The relationship between two neighboring governorates (Daraa & Sweida) 29 4. Overview about revolutionary movement and the demands of Sweida Governorate 35 5. Dignity Clergymen Movement .......................................................... 43 6. Glimpse about living, services, security conditions in Sweida Governorate 47 III. The Advent of ISIS in Sweida Desert and a Map showing the territories held by ISIS ....... 51 IV: Most significant military offensives carried out by ISIS, and how Assad’s authorities have invested them ............................................................................................................ 64 1. The battles of “Al-Haqf” (19th May 2019) and “Shaqa” (3rd July 2015) . 65 2. Black Wednesday Invasion (Date: 25th July 2018) .................................................... 77 V. The Mechanism of the Relationship between ISIS and Assad’s Authorities .................. 106 VI. Samples for Documentations and Testimonies ........................................................ 126 1. Samples of Documentation ............................................................ 126 2. Documenting ISIS Fighters in the Invasion that took place on 25th July 2018 ............. 138 2. Samples of Testimonies ................................................................. 141 VII. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 152 VIII. Appendix ........................................................................................................... 155 (4( INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS )1( “Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate Executive Summary A book-like study entitled: “INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS (1) “Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate” has been issued by Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Researches and Democratic Republic Studies Center. It is authored by two researchers, Yousef Fakher Eddin & Homam Al-Khateeb, and legally revised by the lawyer Anwar Al-Bonni. The study contains seven chapters (total number of pages is 168). As the two researchers believe this study is so important so it should be read by large segments of people, and to introduce this study, this executive summary has been prepared to help the readers get acquainted with the key elements in this study, and to display an overview about the contents that might push those who are concerned to read the whole study (the book has been amended to include this executive summary). Chapter I (The Introduction) 1. Preface The study discusses how Assad’s authorities released the Jihadists and their leaders from Syrian prisons, a thing that shows clearly, from the very beginning, that their existence will be manipulated to spoil the revolution, terrorize the Syrians, and blackmail the whole world to push the international community to authorize such authorities for ruling Syria, as it is the least bad option. As time went by, Assad’s authorities explored a variety of ways to manipulate those jihadists, depending on the location, international or regional situations, as well as present military information in the field, and power balance map. Consequently, Assad’s authorities’ relationship with ISIS in Sweida district isn’t an exception within the framework of the conflict map in the Syrian territories. 2. Hypothesis The study hypothesizes that Assad’s authorities capitalized in ISIS at two levels: first, manipulating ISIS existence, as, most of the time, the hostilities between both parties weren’t urgent, as it is the case with other warring sides. Depending on the priorities of hostilities, both parties treated each other as if there is a postponed battle between them, unless they couldn’t avoid it. Basically, ISIS’ hatred towards US, and its allies is the essence of ISIS existence. Assad’s authorities thought, and their behaviors and actions showed, that ISIS is the last enemy that ) 5( Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Researches - Democratic Republic Studies Center might be attacked by them, as ISIS presence could be manipulated against other enemies, and to make ISIS look like the worst side, in place of Assad’s authorities. Such things made ISIS disapprove the emergence of any para-military entity that could represent the opposition within the territories held by ISIS. That’s why those para- military groups were asked either to merge within ISIS ranks, via vowing an oath of allegiance to ISIS, or to leave ISIS-held territories, or to be crushed by ISIS militants. As a result, ISIS became the worst possible option ever in the eyes of the Syrians and the international community within the Syrian war. The second level is manifested by how Assad’s authorities manipulated ISIS through coordinating activities with ISIS militants, this reflects all points that we have already discussed plus confirmed evidence about direct coordination between both parties. 3. Temporal & Spatial Framework This study covers the period as of March 2011 till May 2020, when this study has been finished. It als discusses the period starting from late 2014, when ISIS emerged in Sweida desert, till the time when this study has been completed. As for the spatial framework; this study covers Sweida district as a research milieu, with a focus on the eastern villages bordering ISIS- held territories in Sweida desert. It’s worth mentioning here that we have started preparing for this study since September 2019. 4. Methodology To prove the hypothesis; this study has adopted the descriptive approach, depending on observation, as an instrument, based on direct contact and living in research milieu. It also adopted deep interviewing technique with witnesses, as well as recording, collecting, and organizing the outcomes of observation and monitoring, along with documentation technique when documents and records are studied and researched. 5. Difficulties Faced by Researchers The study points out to the difficulties faced by the team working in Sweida district, including how it was hard to work within a milieu teeming with mafias and their security operators. 6. Significance (6( INVESTMENT IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS )1( “Assad’s Authorities” and “ISIS” in Sweida Governorate The study defined its significance as it serves as an unprecedented documentary material about ISIS crimes and abuses in Sweida district, and all relevant events and incidents. This study will be available for lawpersons, jurists, and human rights groups working on pursuing the perpetrators of war crimes
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