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Daraa/Daraa District/Daraa Governorate Imagery Analysis: 7 February and 6 January 2017 | Published 3 July 2017 | Version 1.0 CE20130604SYR

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Daraa/Daraa District/Daraa Governorate Imagery Analysis: 7 February and 6 January 2017 | Published 3 July 2017 | Version 1.0 CE20130604SYR I Complex SYRIA Æ Emergency Daraa/Daraa District/Daraa Governorate Imagery analysis: 7 February and 6 January 2017 | Published 3 July 2017 | Version 1.0 CE20130604SYR 36°4'30"E 36°5'0"E 36°5'30"E 36°6'0"E 36°6'30"E 36°7'0"E 36°7'30"E 36°8'0"E TURKEY Daraa Damage Trend 781 531 467 498 32°39'30"N 354 384 224 32°39'30"N 173 196 173 110 119 130 SYRIA 33 36 September May 2014 June 2015 April 2016 February 2017 ¥¦¬ 2013 Damascus Destroyed Severely Damaged Moderately Damaged ¥¦¬ 32°39'0"N Map location IRAQ 32°39'0"N ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")")") ") ")")") ") ") Amman ") ¥¦¬ ¥¦¬ ") ") JORDAN ") ") ") SAUDI ARABIA ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") 32°38'30"N ") Damage assessment of Daraa, 32°38'30"N Daraa Governorate, Syria ") ") ") ") This map illustrates satellite-detected ") damage in the city of Daraa, Syrian Arab 32°38'0"N ") ") ") ") ") Republic. Using satellite imagery acquired 07 ") ") ") ")") 32°38'0"N ") ") ") February and 06 January 2017, 19 April ") ") ") 2016, 04 June 2015, 01 January 2014, and ") ") ") ") ") 07 September 2013, UNITAR - UNOSAT ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") identified a total of 1,503 affected structures ") ")") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") within the city. Approximately 224 of these ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") 32°37'30"N ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")")") ") ") were destroyed, 498 severely damaged, and ") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") 32°37'30"N ") ") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") 781 moderately damaged. While some of the ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")")")") ") ")")")") ")")") ") ") ") ") ")")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ")") ") ")") ") ")")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") city was damaged by 19 April 2016, 419 ") ") ")") ") ") ")")")") ")")")") ")") ") ") ") ") ")")")")")") ")") ")")")")")")")")")") ")")")") ") ")") ") ") ") ")")")")")") ") ") ")")")")") ") ")")")")") ")")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ")")") ")")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")")")")") ")")") ")") ")") See inset for close-up view of ") ") ") ")")") ")") ")")")")")")") ") ") structures were newly damaged and 7 ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")")")")") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ")") ")")")") ") ") ")") ") ")")") ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ")")") ")")")")")") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")") ")")")")")") ")")")") ")")") ") ") damaged & destroyed structures ")")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")")")")")")")") ")")")") ")")")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ")") ") ")")") ") ") ")") ") ") ")")")") structures experienced an increase in ")")")") ")") ")") ")") ")") ") ")") ")") ")") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")")") ") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") damage between that date and 07 February ") ") ")") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ")") ")") ")") ")") ") 32°37'0"N ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") 2017. This analysis does not include pre-war ") ")") ") ")") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") 32°37'0"N ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") military bases and facilities. This analysis ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ")")")") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")")") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")")")") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ")") was done as part of the REACH initiative for ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ")") ")") ") ") ")") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ")")")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ")") ") ") ")")") ") ") the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster ") ")")")")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ")")") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ")") ") ")") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ")") ")") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")")") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") Assistance. This is a preliminary analysis ")") ")") ")") ") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ")")") ") ") ") ")") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")")") ") ") ") ") ")")")")") ")") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ")")") ") ") ")") ") and has not yet been validated in the field. ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ")") ")")")") ") ")")") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") 32°36'30"N ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") Please send ground feedback to UNITAR - ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")")") ")") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") 32°36'30"N ") ") ") ") ")")") UNOSAT. ") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ")") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ")") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") ") 32°36'0"N ") ") ") ") Legend ") ") ") ") ") ") 32°36'0"N )" Destroyed )" Severe damage INSET: 19 April 2016 INSET: 7 February 2017 )" Moderate damage Primary road 32°35'30"N Secondary road 32°35'30"N Local road Destroyed structures Area of analysis 32°35'0"N 32°35'0"N Map Scale for A3: 1:10,000,000 32°34'30"N I! Meters 0 150 300 600 900 1,200 36°4'30"E 36°5'0"E 36°5'30"E 36°6'0"E 36°6'30"E 36°7'0"E 36°7'30"E 36°8'0"E 36°8'30"E Analysis conducted with ArcGIS v10.4.1 Satellite Data (1): WorldView-3 and WorldView-1 Satellite Data (2): Multiple previous images The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown here are not warranted Imagery Dates: 07 February and 06 January 2017 Road Data : OpenStreetMap to be error-free nor do they imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. UNOSAT is Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N Resolution: 30 and 50 cm Other Data: USGS, UNCS, NASA, NGA a program of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), providing satellite imagery Projection: Transverse Mercator Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc. Analysis : UNITAR - UNOSAT and related geographic information, research and analysis to UN humanitarian & development agencies Datum: WGS 1984 Source: Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, Production: UNITAR - UNOSAT & their implementing partners. This work by UNITAR-UNOSAT is licensed under a CC BY-NC 3.0. Units: Meter NextView License UNITAR - UNOSAT - Palais des Nations CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland - T: +41 22 767 4020 (UNOSAT Operations) - Hotline 24/7: +41 75 411 4998 - [email protected] - www.unitar.org/unosat.
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