The Economics of Kenneth J. Arrow: a Selective Review
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A Study of Paul A. Samuelson's Economics
Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. A Study of Paul A. Samuelson's Econol11ics: Making Economics Accessible to Students A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics at Massey University Palmerston North, New Zealand. Leanne Marie Smith July 2000 Abstract Paul A. Samuelson is the founder of the modem introductory economics textbook. His textbook Economics has become a classic, and the yardstick of introductory economics textbooks. What is said to distinguish economics from the other social sciences is the development of a textbook tradition. The textbook presents the fundamental paradigms of the discipline, these gradually evolve over time as puzzles emerge, and solutions are found or suggested. The textbook is central to the dissemination of the principles of a discipline. Economics has, and does contribute to the education of students, and advances economic literacy and understanding in society. It provided a common economic language for students. Systematic analysis and research into introductory textbooks is relatively recent. The contribution that textbooks play in portraying a discipline and its evolution has been undervalued and under-researched. Specifically, applying bibliographical and textual analysis to textbook writing in economics, examining a single introductory economics textbook and its successive editions through time is new. When it is considered that an economics textbook is more than a disseminator of information, but a physical object with specific content, presented in a particular way, it changes the way a researcher looks at that textbook. -
A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J
This chapter will appear in: Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest . Influence and How to Limit it. Edited by Daniel Carpenter and David Moss. Copyright © 2013 The Tobin Project. Reproduced with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Please note that the final chapter from the Cambridge University Press volume may differ slightly from this text. A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J. NOVAK A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J. NOVAK PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SCHOOL OF LAW The idea of regulatory capture has controlled discussions of economic regulation and regulatory reform for more than two generations. Originating soon after World War II, the so-called “capture thesis” was an early harbinger of the more general critique of the American regulatory state that dominated the closing decades of the 20th century. The political ramifications of that broad critique of government continue to be felt today both in the resilient influence of neoliberal policies like deregulation and privatization as well as in the rise of more virulent and populist forms of anti-statism. Indeed, the capture thesis has so pervaded recent assessments of regulation that it has assumed something of the status of a ground norm – a taken-for-granted term of art and an all-purpose social-scientific explanation – that itself frequently escapes critical scrutiny or serious scholarly interrogation. This essay attempts to challenge this state of affairs by taking a critical look at the emergence of regulatory capture theory from the perspective of history. After introducing a brief account of the diverse intellectual roots of the capture idea, this essay makes three interpretive moves. -
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DEBATE TOPIC 1964-65 WHAT POLICY FOR CONTROL Of \WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD BEST INSURE THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD PEACE? PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE g_g;-J��,�� 1012 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C., 20005 EXECUTIVE 3·8205 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, established in 1943, is o nonpartisan research and educational organization which studies notional policy problems. Institute publications toke two major forms: 1. LEGISLATIVE AND SPECIAL ANALYSES - factual analyses of current legislative proposals and other public policy issues before the Congress prepared with the help of recognized experts in the academic world and in the fields of low and government. A typical analysis features: (1) pertinent background, (2) o digest of significant elements, and (3) o discussion, pro and con, of the issues. The reports reflect no policy position in favor of or against specific proposals. 2. LONG-RANGE STUDIES - basic studies of major notional problems of significance for public policy. The Institute, with the counsel of its Advisory Boord, utilizes the services of competent scholars, but the opinions expressed ore those of the authors and represent no policy position on the port of the Institute. ADVISORY BOARD Poul W. McCracken, Chairman Professor, School of Business Administration, University of Mi chi gon Kori Brandt Stanley Parry Director Professor, Deportment Food Research Institute of Politicol Science Stanford University University of Notre Dome Milton Friedman Roscoe Pound Poul S. Russell Distinguished Professor Emeritus Service Professor of Economics Harvard University University of Chicago E. Blythe Stoson Gottfried Hoberler Deon Emeritus, Low School Golen L. -
TECHNOLOGY and GROWTH: an OVERVIEW Jeffrey C
Y Proceedings GY Conference Series No. 40 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer Jane Sneddon Little Editors CONTENTS TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE NETWORKED BANK 33 Robert M. Howe TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY Dale W. Jorgenson Discussion 78 Susanto Basu Gene M. Grossman UNCERTAINTY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 91 Nathan Rosenberg Discussion 111 Joel Mokyr Luc L.G. Soete CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES," THE ROLE OF aTECHNOLOGYtr 127 J. Bradford De Long~ Discussion 151 Jeffrey A. Frankel Adam B. Jaffe ADDRESS: JOB ~NSECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY173 Alan Greenspan MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 183 Edwin Mansfield Discnssion 201 Samuel S. Kortum Joshua Lerner TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION IN U.S. MANUFACTURING: THE GEOGRAPHIC DIMENSION 215 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triest Discussion 260 John C. Haltiwanger George N. Hatsopoulos PANEL DISCUSSION 269 Trends in Productivity Growth 269 Martin Neil Baily Inherent Conflict in International Trade 279 Ralph E. Gomory Implications of Growth Theory for Macro-Policy: What Have We Learned? 286 Abel M. Mateus The Role of Macroeconomic Policy 298 Robert M. Solow About the Authors Conference Participants 309 TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little* During the 1990s, the Federal Reserve has pursued its twin goals of price stability and steady employment growth with considerable success. But despite--or perhaps because of--this success, concerns about the pace of economic and productivity growth have attracted renewed attention. Many observers ruefully note that the average pace of GDP growth has remained below rates achieved in the 1960s and that a period of rapid investment in computers and other capital equipment has had disappointingly little impact on the productivity numbers. -
Why Is There No Milton Friedman Today? · Econ Journal Watch
Discuss this article at Journaltalk: http://journaltalk.net/articles/5808 ECON JOURNAL WATCH 10(2) May 2013: 210-213 Why Is There No Milton Friedman Today? Richard A. Posner1 LINK TO ABSTRACT The short answer to the question posed by Econ Journal Watch is that Milton Friedman combined, with enormous success both within the economics pro- fession and in the society at large, three distinct roles. He was an analyst, using conventional analytical methods, of technical issues in macroeconomics, such as business cycle economics (with emphasis on the role of money), inflation and deflation, international exchange rates, and the consumption function. He was an advocate on economic grounds of specific public policies, such as an end to conscription, a negative income tax (of which the Earned Income Tax Credit is a variant, adding a work requirement surprisingly absent from Friedman’s proposal), and school vouchers. And he was a public intellectual/guru/philosopher, ad- vocating in books, magazines, op-ed pages, and electronic media a politically controversial return to libertarian (equivalently, free-market, laissez-faire, classical- liberal) economic policy. Friedman also made an influential contribution to economic methodology in arguing that an economic theory should be tested by its predictive accuracy alone, without regard to the realism or unrealism of its assumptions (Friedman 1953). The argument is questionable because, owing to the difficulty of assessing such consequences (reliable experiments concerning economic behavior are very difficult to conduct), economists have tended to rely heavily—certainly Friedman did—on assumptions, often assumptions based on priors rooted in ideology, personality, or other subjective factors. -
Strength in Numbers: the Rising of Academic Statistics Departments In
Agresti · Meng Agresti Eds. Alan Agresti · Xiao-Li Meng Editors Strength in Numbers: The Rising of Academic Statistics DepartmentsStatistics in the U.S. Rising of Academic The in Numbers: Strength Statistics Departments in the U.S. Strength in Numbers: The Rising of Academic Statistics Departments in the U.S. Alan Agresti • Xiao-Li Meng Editors Strength in Numbers: The Rising of Academic Statistics Departments in the U.S. 123 Editors Alan Agresti Xiao-Li Meng Department of Statistics Department of Statistics University of Florida Harvard University Gainesville, FL Cambridge, MA USA USA ISBN 978-1-4614-3648-5 ISBN 978-1-4614-3649-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-3649-2 Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London Library of Congress Control Number: 2012942702 Ó Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. -
Kenneth J. Arrow [Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates] Daniel B
Kenneth J. Arrow [Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates] Daniel B. Klein Econ Journal Watch 10(3), September 2013: 268-281 Abstract Kenneth J. Arrow is among the 71 individuals who were awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel between 1969 and 2012. This ideological profile is part of the project called “The Ideological Migration of the Economics Laureates,” which fills the September 2013 issue of Econ Journal Watch. Keywords Classical liberalism, economists, Nobel Prize in economics, ideology, ideological migration, intellectual biography. JEL classification A11, A13, B2, B3 Link to this document http://econjwatch.org/file_download/715/ArrowIPEL.pdf ECON JOURNAL WATCH Kenneth J. Arrow by Daniel B. Klein Ross Starr begins his article on Kenneth Arrow (1921–) in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics by saying that he “is a legendary figure, with an enormous range of contributions to 20th-century economics…. His impact is suggested by the number of major ideas that bear his name: Arrow’s Theorem, the Arrow- Debreu model, the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, and Arrow securities” (Starr 2008). Besides the four areas alluded to in the quotation from Starr, Arrow has been a leader in the economics of information. In 1972, at the age of 51 (still the youngest ever), Arrow shared the Nobel Prize in economics with John Hicks for their contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory. But if the Nobel economics prize were given for specific accomplishments, and an individual could win repeatedly, Arrow would surely have several. It has been shown that Arrow is the economics laureate who has been most cited within the Nobel award lectures of the economics laureates (Skarbek 2009). -
Date: To: September 22, 1 997 Mr Ian Johnston©
22-SEP-1997 16:36 NOBELSTIFTELSEN 4& 8 6603847 SID 01 NOBELSTIFTELSEN The Nobel Foundation TELEFAX Date: September 22, 1 997 To: Mr Ian Johnston© Company: Executive Office of the Secretary-General Fax no: 0091-2129633511 From: The Nobel Foundation Total number of pages: olO MESSAGE DearMrJohnstone, With reference to your fax and to our telephone conversation, I am enclosing the address list of all Nobel Prize laureates. Yours sincerely, Ingr BergstrSm Mailing address: Bos StU S-102 45 Stockholm. Sweden Strat itddrtSMi Suircfatan 14 Teleptelrtts: (-MB S) 663 » 20 Fsuc (*-«>!) «W Jg 47 22-SEP-1997 16:36 NOBELSTIFTELSEN 46 B S603847 SID 02 22-SEP-1997 16:35 NOBELSTIFTELSEN 46 8 6603847 SID 03 Professor Willis E, Lamb Jr Prof. Aleksandre M. Prokhorov Dr. Leo EsaJki 848 North Norris Avenue Russian Academy of Sciences University of Tsukuba TUCSON, AZ 857 19 Leninskii Prospect 14 Tsukuba USA MSOCOWV71 Ibaraki Ru s s I a 305 Japan 59* c>io Dr. Tsung Dao Lee Professor Hans A. Bethe Professor Antony Hewlsh Department of Physics Cornell University Cavendish Laboratory Columbia University ITHACA, NY 14853 University of Cambridge 538 West I20th Street USA CAMBRIDGE CB3 OHE NEW YORK, NY 10027 England USA S96 014 S ' Dr. Chen Ning Yang Professor Murray Gell-Mann ^ Professor Aage Bohr The Institute for Department of Physics Niels Bohr Institutet Theoretical Physics California Institute of Technology Blegdamsvej 17 State University of New York PASADENA, CA91125 DK-2100 KOPENHAMN 0 STONY BROOK, NY 11794 USA D anni ark USA 595 600 613 Professor Owen Chamberlain Professor Louis Neel ' Professor Ben Mottelson 6068 Margarldo Drive Membre de rinstitute Nordita OAKLAND, CA 946 IS 15 Rue Marcel-Allegot Blegdamsvej 17 USA F-92190 MEUDON-BELLEVUE DK-2100 KOPENHAMN 0 Frankrike D an m ar k 599 615 Professor Donald A. -
The Death of Welfare Economics: History of a Controversy
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Igersheim, Herrade Working Paper The death of welfare economics: History of a controversy CHOPE Working Paper, No. 2017-03 Provided in Cooperation with: Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University Suggested Citation: Igersheim, Herrade (2017) : The death of welfare economics: History of a controversy, CHOPE Working Paper, No. 2017-03, Duke University, Center for the History of Political Economy (CHOPE), Durham, NC This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155466 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu The death of welfare economics: History of a controversy by Herrade Igersheim CHOPE Working Paper No. 2017-03 January 2017 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2901574 The death of welfare economics: history of a controversy Herrade Igersheim December 15, 2016 Abstract. -
Chapter 11 Eric S. Maskin
Chapter 11 Eric S. Maskin BIOGRAPHY ERIC S. MASKIN, USA ECONOMICS, 2007 When seeking a solution to a problem it is possible, particularly in a non-specific field such as economics, to come up with several plausible answers. One may stand out as the most likely candi- date, but it may also be worth pursuing other options – indeed, this is a central strand of John Nash’s game theory, romantically illustrated in the film A Beautiful Mind. R. M. Solow et al. (eds.), Economics for the Curious © Foundation Lindau Nobelprizewinners Meeting at Lake Constance 2014 160 ERIC S. MASKIN Eric Maskin, along with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, was awarded the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics for their related work on mechanism design theory, a mathematical system for analyzing the best way to align incentives between parties. This not only helps when designing contracts between individuals but also when planning effective government regulation. Maskin’s contribution was the development of implementa- tion theory for achieving particular social or economic goals by encouraging conditions under which all equilibria are opti- mal. Maskin came up with his theory early in his career, after his PhD advisor, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, introduced him to Leonid Hurwicz. Maskin explains: ‘I got caught up in a problem inspired by the work of Leo Hurwicz: under what cir- cumstance is it possible to design a mechanism (that is, a pro- cedure or game) that implements a given social goal, or social choice rule? I finally realized that monotonicity (now sometimes called ‘Maskin monotonicity’) was the key: if a social choice rule doesn't satisfy monotonicity, then it is not implementable; and if it does satisfy this property it is implementable provided no veto power, a weak requirement, also holds. -
GEORGE J. STIGLER Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58Th Street, Chicago, Ill
THE PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF ECONOMICS Nobel Memorial Lecture, 8 December, 1982 by GEORGE J. STIGLER Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60637, USA In the work on the economics of information which I began twenty some years ago, I started with an example: how does one find the seller of automobiles who is offering a given model at the lowest price? Does it pay to search more, the more frequently one purchases an automobile, and does it ever pay to search out a large number of potential sellers? The study of the search for trading partners and prices and qualities has now been deepened and widened by the work of scores of skilled economic theorists. I propose on this occasion to address the same kinds of questions to an entirely different market: the market for new ideas in economic science. Most economists enter this market in new ideas, let me emphasize, in order to obtain ideas and methods for the applications they are making of economics to the thousand problems with which they are occupied: these economists are not the suppliers of new ideas but only demanders. Their problem is comparable to that of the automobile buyer: to find a reliable vehicle. Indeed, they usually end up by buying a used, and therefore tested, idea. Those economists who seek to engage in research on the new ideas of the science - to refute or confirm or develop or displace them - are in a sense both buyers and sellers of new ideas. They seek to develop new ideas and persuade the science to accept them, but they also are following clues and promises and explorations in the current or preceding ideas of the science. -
Excerpted from James Gustav Speth, America, Rising to Its Dream (Forthcoming, Yale U.P., Fall 2012) * How Can We Gauge What
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