SPECIAL ANALYSIS

NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DEBATE TOPIC 1964-65

WHAT POLICY FOR CONTROL Of \WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD BEST INSURE THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD PEACE?

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ADVISORY BOARD

Poul W. McCracken, Chairman Professor, School of Business Administration, University of Mi chi gon

Kori Brandt Stanley Parry Director Professor, Deportment Food Research Institute of Politicol Science Stanford University University of Notre Dome

Milton Friedman Roscoe Pound Poul S. Russell Distinguished Professor Emeritus Service Professor of Economics Harvard University University of Chicago E. Blythe Stoson Gottfried Hoberler Deon Emeritus, Low School Golen L. Stone Professor University of Michigan of International Trade Ha rvard University George E. Taylor Director, For Eastern & Felix Morley Russian lnstitutJ! Editor and Author University of Woshi ngton

OFFICERS

Chairman Corl N. Jacobs

Vice Chairmen Wolter C. Beckjord Henry T. Bodman H. C. Lumb

President Treasurer William J·: Baroody Henry T. Bodman

Thomas F. Johnson Joseph G. Butts Director of Research Di rector of Legi sl otive Analysis

Earl H. Voss Director of International Studies WHAT POLICY FOR alNTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOUJ..D BEST INSURE THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD PEACE?

INTRODUCTION In the nuclear age, when the problems of controlling weapons systems have become more acute than ever before, the leaders of the world are seeking the answer to this question: "What policy for control of weapons systems would best insure the prospects for world peace?" Many answers are offered, but basically the responses break down into two categories: there are those who believe that the arms race has become so dangerous that it must be stopped before "something goes off" -- as they are certain it inevitably will -- and the Northern Hemisphere as we know it disappears in mushroom clouds. On the other hand, others fear that the greater risk would come if the United States were to stop racing or slow down, thus allowing the Soviet Union to overtake us and eventually conquer us as barbarians conquered lazy civilizations in the past. Disarmers say that war has become so dangerous the arms race must be stopped. Armers say that the only way to prevent war is to race, to maintain United States superiority over the nation which has shown time and again its capacity for treachery and its fundamental intention to subjugate all free nations to communism. In many ways the problem boils down to a question of how much the Soviet Union can be trusted. Those who take greater comfort in arming than in disarming are less willing to trust the Soviet Union than the disarmers, who are willing to take more risks and trust the Soviet Union, to a certain extent at least, if this will mean a slowing of the arms race, or even its reversal. If this were a baseball game between the Soviet Union and the United States played in a stadium for all to see, we could know definitely where we stand. With an opponent whose techniques of secrecy are highly developed, however, we neither know the score nor how many men the Soviet Union has on base, nor the strength of the pinch hitters on the bench. This problem of finding out what the Soviet Union's strengths and weaknesses are in weapons and military power complicates the debate of any problem like arms control. It would be bad enough if men who differ about the meaning of facts were at least able to start with a set of agreed facts. In this case, however, so much is obscure, so much conjecture, that participants in the argument seldom speak from the same premises.

- 1 - Even judgments of history differ. There are those who believe history shows that an imbalance of armed strength leads to war (by tempting the more powerful to devour the weak); others believe that an imbalance prolongs the peace; sti11 others believe a balance of power is.more conducive to war because it tempts ambitious leaders to over­ estimate their prospects for victory at acceptable cost. Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, presidential science adviser, commented in 1960:

...most people do not quite believe in disarmament. In fact, some people view with suspicion any attempt to impose restrictions on military activities, and many more are skeptical of the possibility of actually achieving a mean­ ingful agreement on arms control. Such cynicism is strongly supported by historical precedents. On the other hand, history also indicates that until now wars have occurred with distressing regularity, and that in recent times each successive major war has been larger and more destructive than the previous one. There is every historical reason to conclude that if we drift along as we are now doing, another major war will certainly occur. We can only avoid that disaster if the nations of the world regard war itself as a cononon enemy and make a truly consunonate effort to work together in resolving the important issues that are involved. 1/ It is not new that scientists and philosophers are searching for peace and have perceived the need to concentrate the disciplines of science in an effort to prevent the destruction of the world. William James, the philosopher, wrote in 1910, for instance: When whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction lies in intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant ambitions will have to be replaced by reasonable claims, and nations must make common cause against them. :?J At the same time, Mr. James looked on earlier wars as some­ thing of a necessity: "History is a bath of blood," he said, and war is "the gory nurse that trains society to cohesiveness" and gives the "moral spur" toward such virtues as "intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interests, obedience to command ... the rocks upon which states are built." ll Daedalus, Fall 1960, p. 679. :?J William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," first published in 1910, then reprinted in "Essays on Faith and Morals," (Longmans, Green & Company, 1953), pp. 322-23.

- 2 - Max Born, the German physicist, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1954, believes the advent of nuclear weapons has made it im­ perative that mankind renounce the use of force in settling disputes: What is there left to hope for? Can one hope that the insight of mankind into the atomic danger will bring salvation? The only thing that can save us is an old dream of the human race: world peace and world organization. These were regarded as unattainable, as Utopian.· It was believed that human nature is unchangeable and since there had always been war there would always be war. Today one cannot accept this any longer. World peace in a world that has become smaller is no longer Utopian, but a necessity, a condition for the survival of the human race. The opinion that this is so spreads farther and farther. The immediate result is a paraly­ sis of politics, because a convincing method of achiev­ ing political goals without a threat of force, with war as a last resort, has not yet been discovered.. .. But for the one question, the most important by far: "Can political, economical, ideological disputes only be decided through force and war?" the theorem of the un­ changeability of human nature is to be accepted, "since it has always been like this, it will always be like this.·• To me, this seems absurd even when it is preached by great politicians and philosopers. Without giving up this axiom the human race is condemned to destruc­ tion. Our hope is based on the union of two spiritual powers: the moral awareness of the unacceptability of a war degenerated to mass murder of the defenseless and the rational knowledge of the incompatibility of techno­ logical warfare with the survival of the human race. The only question is whether we have enough time to let these realizations become effective. Dr. Born quotes another Nobel Prize winner, Gerhard Domagk, who asks: What is really important in this world? That we individuals get along with each other, try to under­ stand and help each other as best we can. For us physicians that is natural. Why shouldn't it be possible for all other people? Don't tell me this be Utopia! Every discovery was considered Utopian. Why should we first wait for another measuring of powers --

- 3 - we really did suffer enough to have become wise. But it is comfortable to cling to old customs; more comfortable to follow violent rulers, cholerics, paranoiacs, and other mentally disturbed individuals instead of thinking for oneself and looking for new ways of reconciliation instead of mutual destruction. Dr. Born continues:

It depends on us, on each individual citizen of every country of the world, for a stop to be put to the existing nonsense. Today, it is no longer the cholera or plague bacillus that threatens us, but the traditional, cynical reasoning of poli­ ticians, the indifference of the masses, and the physicists' and other scientists' evasion of re­ sponsibility. That which they have done, as I tried to explain, cannot be undone: knowledge cannot be extinguished and technology has its own laws. But scientists could and should use the re­ spect they gain through their knowledge and ability to show the politicians the way back to reasonable­ ness and humanity . All of us must fight against official lies and encroachments; against the assertions that there is protection from nuclear weapons through shelters and emergency regulations; against the suppression of

those who enlighten the public about11 it; against narrow-minded nationalism, ''gloire, passion for great power; and we must especially fight against those ideologies which pronounce the indelibility of their doctrines and thus separate the world into irreconcil­ able camps. ll Since the early postwar refusal of the Soviet Union to emulate unilateral American moves to dismantle its war-making potential, United States Presidents have pursued two lines of military policy. Advanced weaponry has been injected into the armed forces at a pace to maintain superiority over the United States' principal rival, the Soviet Union. At the same time American diplomats, scientists and scholars have sought (with little success) to persuade the Soviet Union to join in a program of safeguarded arms control which would minimize the destruc­ tion in case of war. Scientists like Max Born, clergymen, and scholars have raised questions about the morality of the first of these policies. Their ques­ tions and the answers proffered by men of different opinion need examina­ tion before going on to study the American and Soviet positions on arms control in more detail. ll Max Born, "What is Left to Hope For?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April, 1964).

- 4 - WAR, PACIFISM AND MORALITY

The debate begins with an age-old moral question. When is it moral to kill? Some pacifists say never. Others have special codes under which they believe killing can be morally justified. There are those who say it is no more immoral to kill a man with a bow and arrow than with a nuclear weapon, or to kill a division with bows and arrows than a division with a nuclear weapon, Others believe civilization's destruction is a greater immorality than destruction of part of it. Many of these questions were examined in a recent debate be­ tween two university professors at Stanford University,

Heretic and Parasite .. • Professor Willmoore Kendall, of Yale University, an opponent of pacifism, regards pacifists as those who "demand the principled re­ jection of force, violence, or the recourse to arms, even by legally constituted states attempting to defend their just interests, including survival itself." 1/ From all pacifists, Professor Kendall suggests, "we may .. confidently expect the principled rejection of force -- not merely by legally-constituted states, but by western civilization itself in its current struggle with Communist barbarism." 2/ Here are other excerpts from Professor Kendall's lecture against pacifism: Pacifism is alien to the tradition of western civilization because that tradition is above all a Christian tradition and because pacifism is alien to the Christian tradition .... Though it appeals to the Christian doctrine of love, (pacifism) is the very negation of that love, that is, a manifestation of a kind of self-love that is hostile to the very meaning and heart of Christianity .... Though it insinuates itself into the body politic as a higher expression of Christian selflessness, (pacifism) is marked throughout by irresponsibility and callous indifference towards the wants and needs and rights of the pacifists' fellow men .... So-called Christian pacifism ... though ll Wi llmo.ore Kendall, "Force: Christian or Unchristian, Moral or Immoral," in a debate at Stanford University with Professor Mulford Q. Sibley, of the University of Minnesota, May 2, 1959. 2:,/ Ibid.

- 5 - often no doubt motivated by a good will whose roots are indeed to be found in the Christian tradition, is in fact a Christian heresy and, by that very token, a sign of barbarism in our midst.

The stigmata by which (a pacifist ) is to be recognized are the various forms of the wish to live off our civilization and benefit from the commitments that it imposes upon others, but not within them •••• He is a double threat to civilization; he consumes the produce of fields that he does not help to till -­ that are, indeed, tilled by his enemies; he draws his strength from that which he rejects; and society is the weaker both because of that which he consumes and because of that which he should have nurtured but did not nurture. The heretic is a parasite. Heretic: barbarian: parasite. That is the profane trinity that sums up the pacifist • The Christian pacifist .. • seizes upon Christ's injunction to bear evil for His sake, and forgets or ignores or cannot comprehend the massive truth that Christ himself used violence when He sc ourged the money changers out of the temple. And that He was fond of the company of Roman soldiers. And that He paid one of His highest compliments to a centurion. On the traditional Christian doctrine concerning the just war, Professor Kendall sums up as follows: The state is a natural society; being that it possesses under natural law the right to use the means necessary for its preservation and proper functioning. In certain conditions, moreover, the only means by which it.£.!!!! preserve itself, or perfect or recover its lawful rights, is war -- that is, the recourse to arms. And, given those conditions, it possesses under the natural law the right and the duty to wage war. Pacifism, Professor Kendall says, would not have been disre­ garded so regularly if it were "merely an opponent of militarism, of the use of aggressive war as an instrument of imperialistic expan- sion .•.•But the pacifist contents himself with nothing so modest or sensible: he condemns all war, even defensive war, and in doing so logically plunges himself into anarchism -- an anarchism which implicitly, and often explicitly, wills the nothingness of civil society." This is a "nihilism," especially dangerous because "it masks itself under the cloak of the very Christian responsibility that it denies," the professor declares.

- 6 - War, says the common tradition of western civilization, is not only not intrinsically wrong; it is very often intrinsically right, intrinsically moral. This also emerges from the doctrine of the just war the conditions for which, under natural law, are as follows: 1. The just or legitimate war must be declared by a lawful authority. (Killing, the doctrine teaches, is clearly wrong when the killer is an individual act­ ing in a private capacity, though no longer wrong when the killer kills in self defense against private aggression. As for the soldier, he has a clear right to kill when he acts as the legal and publicly-desig­ nated agent of his country in the prosecution of a just war; and even public designation is not necessary if the war is a purely defensive one.) 2. Resort to force is permitted only on behalf of a just cause, for we must confess at once that the definition of just cause has given rise to very consider­ able differences of opinion, though not so many as to prevent our pointing to certain just causes about which there has been general agreement, namely: that of the state that is fighting for its very existence; that of the state which moves to recover that which is right­ fully its own; and that of the state whose honor has been wounded so grievously that inaction would plead it guilty of cowardice in the eyes of the world,

3. The use of force is permitted only as a last resort. Before a nation launches its just war, that is to say, it must have exhausted every peaceful means consistent with its dignity: negotiations; mediation; arbitration; diplomatic pressure; economic sanctions; ultimata -- in a word, every means short of war known to enlightened statesmanship. Otherwise, the doctrine holds, there exists no clear proof that the war is unavoidable, and that there is a proper relation be­ tween the good hoped for from the war and the means of achieving that good. 4. The state resorting to war must have a fair hope of success. Here again, however, the doctrine is not entirely clear, since it recognizes that there are times when men are so pressed -- or oppressed -- that resistance, even hopeless resistance, is the only means by which men can preserve their common dignity. By signing history with their heroism, as the Hungarians did yesterday and the Tibetans are doing today, noble

- 7 - men not only go to God, but remind other men every­ where of what it means to be a man, To die on the streets of Budapest, a machine gun in hand, is not only to save one's dignity and therefore one's soul; it is to offer an example to a timid and even cowardly world, and such a death, the tradition recognizes, may express a love that passes all under­ standing, "greater love hath no man," it says, than "that he lay down his life for his friend ...." 5. Even a punitive war, a war undertaken to punish a guilty nation, may be a just war. Right, order, and the future peace of the world may well demand, for example, that gangster nations not be permitted to commit mass murder with impunity -- that, rather they be taught a lesson in morals here and now. (There is, however, no blanket authorization in this regard: the right to wage a punitive war may well be balanced by other considerations -- the remitting of punishment, for instance, which is an act of mercy, might in certain circumstances be the higher duty.) What about the Christian doctrine of "turning the other cheek"? Professor Kendall quotes Thomas Aquinas, not as a Catholic but as a spokesman for western civilization, who answers: "Only the man upon whom no higher responsibility falls; only the man who owes no other duty, in justice or in charity, to a friend or a wife or a child or a society that would be adversely affected by aggression" has the right to turn the other cheek. "Only if his act of submitting to the aggressor will, or possibly could, deter the aggressor from his evil act; only if his act of bearing injustice for the sake of Christ may become a symbol of righteousness that might sign itself within the conscience of the aggressor. And then only," says Aquinas, "ought the Christian to refrain from resistance." If non-resistance clearly cannot effect this end, as who but the pacifist supposes it could against a Hitler, or against the disciplined hordes of world communism -- if non-resistance cannot effect this end, then resistance becomes the duty -- not primarily as a means by which the man unjustly attacked may save himself, but as a means of preventing the aggressor from carrying out his act and, by striking back, teach the bully a lesson. What is the answer to the charge that war today will bring total destruction -- the whole planet and human existence may be destroyed? According to Professor Kendall, that is God's affair, not ours:

- 8 - He has made it our business not to make policy for the universe but to protect justice and law and liberty, and this out of love for�ur neighbor . Even if I knew infallibly, Aquinas· argues, even if I knew by a Revelation of God that my efforts to save my dying father were doomed to failure, that God Himself had willed my father's death, it would not affect my obligation to try to keep him alive. In a word: God's will for me would remain what it was before the Revelation, namely, that I live up to my obligations. God may have willed the destruction of the planet in an atomic Gotterdamerung; ••• but we are still obligated to use the means at our disposal in order to preserve justice in the situa­ tions in which "we" are involved, to fulfi11 our duties in all their concreteness and detail. That preserving, that fulfilling, is God's will for us, and whatever else he may have willed as a conse­ quence of what we do is, I repeat, God's business and not ours .. , • The temptation to give way to the pacifists -­ who have now added to their other skills a mastery of what let's call the art of nuclear weapons blackmail is very great •.. it will become greater as time passes; it will be at its greatest on the future day when the Soviet Union delivers to.!!.§. the ultimatum that, back in 1946, we should have &elivered to it. The thought of surrender on that day -- not, I repeat, on Christian pacifist grounds, but out of sheer funk -- is indeed present in the atmosphere, is already sapping our will to resist the Communist enemy, is already pushing further and further into the future the moment when we shall discover, not too late, I hope,that our duty to strike down the Soviet aggressor, our duty to prevent him from doing the wrong he is doing, is not different from but identical to the duty we shouldered a few years ago with respect to the Nazis; and not less urgent but infinitely more urgent .

. • • or Christian and Moral? Professor Mulford Q. Sibley, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, defends the pacifist posi­ tion:

- 9 - I hold that violence is to be distinguished from non-violent force, that war is both immoral and inexpedient; that violence cannot preserve or protect democracy, peace and freedom; that the United States should, if it accepted these prin­ ciples, disarm immediately and develop realistic methods of defense; that while the so-called Christian tradition as a whole is somewhat muddy and confused on these questions, the spirit of the gospels is essentially a pacifist one; and that, entirely apart from formal religion, one ought as a civilized human being, to be a pacifist. Professor Sibley differentiates between various uses of force, some of which he approves, others of which he disapproves. '�Thus when I rescue my irrational little boy by force from the path of an onrushing automobile, I am using 'physical force' and I am also employing 'physical force' when I wipe out Moscow through the use of two or three hydrogen bombs. Surely our moral judgment of the two acts must in part depend upon such contextual factors as the probable controllability of the force for the ends we are pursuing; the likelihood or unlikelihood that the force used will set in motion consequences which we would not will "If we conceive of force in the way suggested here, there is a continuum from non-violent or relatively non-injurious types of force at one end to increasingly violent, injurious kinds at the other. On the first side, one would find the 'force' of reason, of right, of personal example, of Jl)ajority rule, of mild punishment, of discriminating physical force, of the strike, and, often, of civil disobedience. Rather we should assert that it is more capable, on the basis of our experience, of being used without destruction of human life (a prime value in my scheme of values) and less likely under most circumstances to lead to consequences antagonistic to such basic ends as the achievement of political freedom, the preservation and enhancement of human life, and the maintenance of moral sensitivity •., .. uAt the other end of the continuum will be those types of force which I shall designate as 'violent' -- capital punishment, for example, and torture, and propaganda, which uses deliberate deception, and the institutional practices which we sum up under the word 'war.' " War and preparation for war, Professor Sibley declares, is "both immoral and powerless to achieve good ends." He adds, "It is a delusion in the 1ight of past experience to believe that we can prepare for war in the present context without getting war." War is immoral, he says, "because it involves organized and deliberate -- and not primarily accidental -- killing of human beings; and the prohibition of killing would seem to be as close as we can come to the moral 'absolute' in this sub-angelic world." Professor Sibley continues:

- 10 - Moreover, war seldom achieves good ends. It is largely powerless to achieve good ends, except rather incidentally. Sometimes it does not even achieve very limited ends: thus Britain entered the war in 1939 avowedly, as Chamberlain told the House of Commons, "to preserve the integrity of Poland." This slogan began to have a hollow sound almost as soon as it was uttered -- and the sound is even more hollow today. Even when war does achieve good objectives -- as in the elimination of "national socialist" power -- it achieves them at a cost and with such enormously evil byproducts that its positive attainments are far more than counterbalanced by its evil, World War II un­ doubtedly facilitated the spread of tyrannical communism. War and the threat to use it are like producing roast pig through burning down houses, as in Lamb's famous essay: the pig is undoubtedly delicious (if one is not a vegetarian) but un­ fortunately it is bought at the cost of freezing to death the following night. Nor do I think that the distinction between "aggressive" and "defensive" is a valid one in terms of judging either morality or efficacy or expediency. In the first place, I know of no adequate method of distinguishing aggression from defense. In the second place, even if we could distinguish between aggressive and defensive war, the methods would be essentially the same as the methods which are morally monstrous are practically ineffective and unrealistic.

The pacifist state, in Professor Sibley's judgment, would disarm unilaterally, failing multilateral agreement, and rely solely on non-violent force for its defense. Pacifist states would "place their central reliance on programs of education, cooperative economic action, organized non-violent resistance, and, if necessary, a will­ ingness to sacrifice standards of living in order that the under­ developed areas of mankind might be assisted to live at more than a minimum level of existence. They would transform their military and naval academies into training for non-violent resistance leaders. They would spend at least as much for education and cultural development as they now spend for war. They would abolish espionage and counter­ espionage systems. Above all, they would transform their fundamental attitude: they would agree with Socrates that, 'if worst came to worst, it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it.'" Continuing, Sibley writes:

- 11 - I do not find that a policy of this kind will afford any certainty that a people will not be enslaved, for it would be difficult to counteract past reliance on violence with a new faith in non­ violent force. On the other hand, those who rely on violence and threats of violence cannot, on the basis of experience, have any great assurance either .•.. Over the course of centuries nations are "defeated" as frequently as they are "victorious." .••I hold that a consistent policy of non­ violence would set in motion forces of constructive change which would probably lead to competitive disarmament and certainly to a radically different temper in the world's politics. Somehow we must break through the cycle of violence and counter­ violence. If the United States should become non­ violent, for example, its real power for good would be far greater than it is now -- for it would at long last be adapting its means to its avowed ends; and nothing is more powerful than a psychologically and spiritually integrated nation or person. Even if a hostile military force occupied a disarmed and non-violent nation, the situation would still be preferable, both morally and in terms of so-called expediency, to a war. Here I agree thoroughly with Bertrand Russell. lf A large part of mankind, if bad became worse, would probably survive at some level; and, as Russell argues persuasively, tyrannies do not last forever. Opportunities to struggle for freedom would still remain -- as the experience of East Germany and Poland would seem to illustrate. But a war would almost certainly result in such de­ struction of life and disintegration of society that the few human beings who remained would be forced for a precarious survival to turn to government by tyrants. A policy of violence, in other words, will result in the probable destruction of the bulk of mankind and in the establishment and extension of tyranny among those who remain. A policy of complete reliance on non-violent resistance and non-violence may result in the destruction of tyranny where it lf Lord Russell is credited as the author of the expression, "Better Red than dead."

- 12 - exists now and at worst would lead to establish­ ment of foreign tyranny among free peoples, with relatively little loss of human life and with the possibility of resisting the tyranny in the future. The implications of all this for the individual seem to me clear: he will insist on international policies which lead to either multilateral or uni­ lateral disarmaments; he will proclaim his conviction that reliance on missiles and bombs for defense is a misplaced faith; he will be loyal to the idea of the state as an embodiment of order and therefore dis­ loyal to the war-making historical state as the engine of disorder; he will seek to undermine the faith of men and women in preparation for war as a means of so-called defense; he will refuse personally to support military efforts; he will decline to make munitions of war; he will engage with men in other nations in an "open conspiracy" against war-making governments everywhere; he will encourage women to give their moral support to men who take this stand; he will insist that tyrannies (including the un­ doubted Communist tyrannies) can be effectively opposed only by methods radically different from those which the tyrants used -- methods which under­ mine the willingness of the agents of tyranny to obey their masters; he will seek to build an economic order which is not dependent on war preparation for its "success"; he will agitate among the young and teach them to revolt against a fatal tendency to accept shopworn and unrealistic violence of their elders. As for the Christian attitude toward wars, Professor Sibley points out that for the first 150 years of the Christian epoch, Christians abhorred war and renounced it absolutely.

By 314 A. D . however, the church council of Arles decreed that "they who throw away their weapons in time of peace shall be excommuni­ cated." This was regarded as a complete reversal of the previous church attitude. The Christian crusades, of course, were a further development of the Christian attitude, including the development of the concepts of "just" and "unjust" wars. In August 1958, the Special Commission of the World Council of Churches decided that a Christian could agree to the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war, but should not agree to all-out use of nuclear weapons. If an all-out nuclear war were to break out, the Special Commission decided,

- 13 - Christians should urge a cease-fire and, if necessary, on the enemy's terms. Then, however, resort to non-violent resistance against the conqueror would be approved.!/ Professor Sibley believes that Christianity is at root a pacifist philosophy. "The central ethic of Jesus is love," he says, "that love implies non-killing, either of body or spirit; and that while it may not always be too clear what this ethic means in concrete cases, it would appear to be clearly incompatible with war and especially with war today . . . . "

1 In answer to Professor Kendall's attack on pacifism, Dr. Sibley says' Christian pacifists repudiate war and violent force not because they are irresponsible or parasites but in large part precisely because these means (war) do not protect the values they hold dear." As for the Kendall accusation that pacifists are "parasites," Professor Sibley presumes this to mean that pacifists accept the benefits of war without being willing to undergo its responsibilities. "What benefits?" Professor Sibley asks. Instead of being a parasite, he claims, the pacifist is seeking to puncture the illusion that war defends civilization against barbarians. A pacifist, he says, is like the little child watching the parade who exclaimed, "But the emperor has nothing onl" Pacifists also value order, Professor Sibley says, and believe that resort to violence or war always increases disorder. He rejects the idea that past wars necessarily all produced benefits for mankind or even for western civilization. In the eighth century Battle of Tours, Professor Sibley suggests that: It is not at all improbable that had the Moslems triumphed the civilization of Western Europe would have reached a higher level more rapidly than it did under the Christians. Moslems were at least as civilized as the Christians were at that period and it is an under­ statement to say that they were more tolerant in religious matters. We often fail to remember that it was Moslem culture which gave great impetus to the re­ vival of Greek learning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries .. • • This stimulus to western culture might have come earlier had Christians not pushed back the Moslems at Tours. A Moslem Europe, moreover, would probably have saved the world from the Inquisition which cast its pall over men's minds and bodies for so many years.

!/ The New York Times, August 23, 1958.

- 14 - The Duke of Marlborogh's victory at Blenheim, Professor Sibley suggests, accomplished little except to kill thousands of men and prevent other thousands from being born. I would only say in conclusion that at least as good an argument can be made that men should not have fought in the vast majority of historic wars as that they were right in fighting -- solely in terms of probable long-run results and aside from the question as to whether it is ever right to engage in acts which inevitably result in the taking of human life. !/ Professor Sibley summarized his philosophy in these words: Having repudiated war as a method of resisting tyranny, we must find efficacious and moral means of defense. Besides greater reliance on full development of international agencies, those means are to be dis­ covered in techniques of non-violent resistance; in large-scale acts of positive economic development, even to the extent of national sacrifice; in unilateral dis­ armament, if multilateral disarmament cannot be achieved soon; and in personal repudiation by individuals of the act of war and preparation for war. 11 No United States administration has pursued a pacifist policy, although many individuals in this country have been convinced of its validity. Two other judgments, defending the morality of warfare, past and present, are presented here -- one from an unusual source, a Catholic priest, the other from an official at the policymaking level in the Defense Department.

Catholic Priest's Views The Reverend Stanley Parry, C.S.C., a professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, defends the right and the moral duty of a nation to use force in its own defense and if necessary to kill in that defense, and, in the last tragic extreme, to engage in a nuclear war. Three issues are involved, he says: the value of life, the rationality of action, and the nature of nuclear war. Some pacifists hold that individual life is the greatest good, he points out. "It follows therefore that death is the greatest evil. And

!/ Professor Sibley, "War and Western Civilization," a rejoinder to Pro­ fessor Kendall, transcript of Stanford University debate on "War and the Use of Force, Moral or Immoral, Christian or Unchristian," 1959. 1/ Ibid.

- 15 - so we conclude: 'Better Red than dead.' " This logic obviously rates the value of life higher than such things as honor, integrity, fellow-men, justice. Other pacifists, Professor Parry acknowledges, place great spiritual values higher on their priorities list than life itself. "In other words there are a number of things they are willing to die for. Note carefully, not fight for with violence, but to die for. They would prefer to die rather than violate their principles." He poses for the pacifist this question: "What do you do when someone else wants precisely your life. If your life is the greatest good, should you not kill to protect it? If justice and honor can be sacrificed for it, why cavil at a little killing in the same cause?" "If you are willing to give up your own life, for certain goods, why would you be unwilling to give up (i.e., take) the life of someone else in their defense? Is your life so much inferior to that of another's? Especially if the other is actually threatening the values?" He concludes that the thorough-going pacifist "simply doesn't want to die." The moderate pacifist, on the other hand, does not object to dying but does object to killing. What should a man be willing to kill for? The answer, says Pro­ fessor Parry,ulies less in the establishment of a priority list of great goods in life, than in the role of reason or rationality.·• Is violence rational or irrational? "There is, of course, a rather obvious sense in which force is the antithesis of reason," Professor Parry writes, "where the appeal to it represents a breakdown in the reasonable process of problem-solving. And I can easily visualize the possibility that most wars have their root in some such breakdown. This is why the moralists of the West have always agreed that only a defensive war can be just, i.e. that force can be used only to repel the unjust (i.e. irrational) use of force." Force is frequently used to repel force. Professor Parry finds "it is a rational thing to do. Sweet reason is never going to protect honor from the rapist, or wealth from the thief, or freedom from the tyrant. Forcible defense is a necessary means to protect these goods." Those who refuse to use force do so not because force is evil, Professor Parry suggests, but because non-violence is considered a greater good. He believes that a society must use force against domestic evil­ doers and against external aggressors. "This is a condition for its existence as a society." !low should qne rate the value of life? Professor Parry suggests that "the issue is not whether I am going to die, but rather when. We are all going to go .•.. The real issue is whether the conditions set for the remaining years of life are such as to justify the living of them." Hungarian students who revolted in the fall of 1956 may have been motivated, he suggested, by the thought that they would "die as men before their bodies

- 16 - died." They concluded it was "far better to go down fighting for a meaningful and reasonable life than to whimper it out in a meaning­ less slavery." Professor Parry accuses the pacifists of irrationality: To have reason, to exercise it, to strive for an ever greater reasonableness, is one thing, he declares. But to capitulate before the irrational in the name of reason is itself a major act of irrationality. Men are not disembodied spirits. Physical power -- force -- is a permanent infection. Human reason must operate within this pattern of reality, not some other pattern that never existed ..•• You simply don't begin by defining all force as irrational •... Force irrationally used is a nega­ tion of reason, force rationally used is a defense of it. War has been justified in the West out of a con­ fidence that irrationality can be dealt with effec­ tively, that men do not need to live as the victim of baser fellows' appetites. We take no fatalistic attitude toward the tyrant, the corrupt oppressor of peoples, the aggressive inter­ national bully. Pacifism is simply the product of a sense of helplessnes� and the fact of a rising tide of irrationality in our day. It is rooted in weakness of spirit, and a sense of irresponsibility to all that is good in life. And if we look at its history in recent years, from Munich to Yalta, to Berlin, we find that the spirit of pacifism has callously sold millions of human beings down the river -- in the name of peace. Hitler killed six million Jews, Professor Parry recalls; twelve million Kulaks died in the Soviet Union when Stalin communized the country; Ukranians, Poles, and Chinese have died by the millions at the hands of irrationality, the Notre Dame professor says.

Pacifism has let the bullies of the world grow in power until they are able to threaten the world. Pacifism has preferred to fight the world war, instead of the local preventive intervention. By postponing decisions, by

- 17 - turning resolut.ory action into inconclusive vacil­ lation, by talking away early advantages, by let.ting our power leak away, pacifism has bet rayed the western civilization. Professor Parry suggests that "the amount of force normally permissible is proportionate to the kind and degree of evil to be eradi­ cated."

Pentagon Official's Judgment Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Ueputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, acknowledges that Americans "must.confront the questions of the reason­ ableness and the morality of the defense policies that shape our choices of military forces and weapons systems." lie asks: "ls it right or wrong for us to be buying hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles, fighter-bomber aircraft, and equip­ ment for many army divisions'? Can we justify weapons systems and war plans that would enable us, if a nuclear war were thrust upon us, to fight back even though doing so might lead to the deaths of many millions of people·� .•, According to traditional Christian doctrine, Ur. Enthoven begins, the use of force to repress evil can be justifiable under certain conditions including the following: First, the use of force must have a reasonable chance of success. Second, if successful, it must offer a better situation than the one that would prevail in the absence of the use of force. Third, the force that is used must. be proportional to the objectives being sought (or the evil being repressed). For this to be satisfied, peaceful means of redress must have failed. Fourth, the force must be used with the in­ tention of sparing non-combatants and with a reasonable prospect of actually doing so. ll Ur. Enthoven continues: It is interesting to observe that the potentially catastrophic character of thermonuclear war has forced practic•l decision-makers, reasoning in a secular con­ text, to adopt a set of criteria very much like those of the traditional Christian doctrine and Lo apply them to the desiiJn of the military posture of the United States. Now, much more than in the recent past, our use of force is beinu carefully proportioned to the objective being sought, and the objectives are being carefully limited to those which at the same time are necessary for our security and which do not pose the kind of unlimited threat to our opponents in the cold ll These closely parallel Professor Kendall's requirements. See pp. 7-8.

- 10 - war that would drive them to unleash nuclear war. In the past, before nuclear weapons, deliberate limitations in the use of force did not present much of a practical problem because of the limited destructive power of non-nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have now given such constraints great prac­ tlical importance . . During the past fifteen years, a number of commentators, theologians and others, have taken the position that although in fonmer times the traditional doctrine was valid and, under appro­ priate conditions the use of armed force could be justified, now, in the atomic age, there can be no justifiable war. The argument has been made that nuclear war does not and cannot offer a reasonable chance of bringing about a better situation than that which would have prevailed in the absence of the use of force; that thermonuclear force, being essentially unlimited in its destructive effects, can not be proportioned to reasonable objectives; and that with it non-combatants can not be spared. Therefore, many argue that the traditional doctrine is obsolete and that a new doctrine must be found. Some argue that the only morally acceptable course is to renounce nuclear weapons; others believe that we must renounce the use of force altogether. I would not want to suggest that this line of thought is not based on good and compelling reasons even though I have not found it convincing myself. It may prove to be the case that the danger of escalation is so great that future limited, non­ nuclear wars will bring with them an intolerable risk of massive thermonuclear destruction. However, experience in the past fifteen years has shown that non-nuclear wars can be kept limited and that free­ dom can be defended from Communist aggression with­ out massive destruction. A question to consider in one's critical thought on this problem is whether the view that the traditional doctrine is obsolete is based on an over-emphasis on unlimited nuclear war, perhaps an identification of all armed conflict with it. An unlimited nuclear war is an extreme on a broad spectrum of possible armed conflicts. Of course, it is a very important extreme because of its disastrous consequences. But it is not the whole spectrum. In fact, it is only one among many possible kirrls of thermonuclear war. It

- 19 - can be a mistake to apply reasoning based on this extreme to all kinds of armed resistance to aggression and injustice. I think it is important to recognize this, for if our thinking is unclear on this point, and if we identify any use of armed force with unlimited destruction, we are likely unnecessarily to disarm ourselves and leave our­ selves victims of Communist aggression. It is clear that we have elected to retain the threat of use of nuclear weapons in our own defense and that of our allies. We thereby con­ sciously accept the risk that we will have to use them. Some people believe that we should reject the use of nuclear weapons. Before accepting such a judgment, one should consider carefully the full implications of such a decision. We do have world-wide responsibility. Many millions of people depend for their lives and freedom on our military strength. In this respect, the United States is in a very different position from any other country in the free world. The question I would like to leave with you .. is whether current U.S. defense policy, which empha­ sizes deterrence, control, and the use of the appro­ priately limited amount of force, represents a good reconciliation of the traditional doctrine with the facts of life in the nuclear age? We have achieved some success with the controlled use of force. We are still alive and free today, and the missiles are out of Cuba. We are running great risks, to be sure, but would the risks be ameliorated by laying down our arms? It is tragic that nations must at times resort to armed force to resolve their differences. War is destructive and it has evil consequences. But our defense posture is being designed to make war less likely and less destructive. I am not suggesting that we can make war and violence desirable. The question is whether we have a better alternative. I have defended our policies on the ground that they make sense. Can they also be defended on the grounds that they are moral? Viewed with perspective, the two should be the same. ll ll Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). Speech before the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Loyola University, Los Angeles, California, ''U.S. Defense Policy for the 1960's," February 10, 1963.

- 20 - In a discussion of moral guidelines for American military strategy, Robert Dickson Crane sees a need to steer a middle course between preventing present-day conflicts from destroying too much of what we value and protecting Western values from Communist expansion. 1/ "The advocates of unilateral disarmament are just as immoral as are the advocates of preventive war," in the opinion of Mr. Crane: Perhaps the greatest immorality of all is to totalize the threat of modern war, so that we are faced with a choice between surrender and Armageddon, because this fear of Armageddon can only paralyze the mind and make impossible any attempts at basing our national policies on moral principles. It is precisely this great exaggeration of the likelihood of total war in a modern age which has produced a moral vacuum in the field of strategic planning and has caused commen­ tators either to ignore the moral criteria for the use of force or else to ignore the problems of the respon� sible policy-maker who must plan for the use of force in an imperfect world •... We must recognize that the vast spectrum of force which ranges from so-called "paramilitary activities" either on earth or in space to what Herman Kahn calls spasm eruption of central war. Mr. Crane urged strategists to recognize the distinction be­ tween the use of force and the threat of force. By threat and blackmail, he says, the Soviet Union tries to control American strategies -- "by emphasizing the dangers of automatic escalation from any firm American response to Communist expansionist moves." This "strategy of demoralization," as he calls it, "could result in unilateral disarmament of the United States through our failure to modernize our weapons also." "Force itself and the threat of force are morally neutral and derive more significance only from the goals which they are to serve and from the prudence with which they are used ....The means we use must be proportionate to the ends we seek • . " In the nuclear age it is easy to forget the broad spectrum of possibilities for the use of force to settle international disputes. Beside unlimited nuclear war, limited nuclear war, general war, and limited war, there are these additional possibilities for the use of force, as outlined by Paul A. Linebarger: ll Robert Dickson Crane, "Moral Guidelines for the American Strategy Debate," Summer Meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Los Angeles, June 18, 1963.

- 21 - Force in peace (as in President Eisenhower's dispatch of troops to Lebanon); detached regular forces (like Indonesian army units in Malaysia); reorganized regulars (like Merrill's marauders); assim­ ilated regulars (taken from an attacked population and incorporated into the intruding or dominating force); trained volunteers; semi-trained bands; bandits, political (''whenever any political-military situation becomes de-structured and fragmented, there is a tendency for bandits to take on a political coloration so as to avoid opprobrium for their crimes"); bandits, ordinary, with political coloration; soldatesca (small bands of unpaid, unfed, leaderless soldiers who often appear after a devastating war); renamed regular forces (like Red China's "People's Volunteer Force" in Korea); legal private armies (like the Cao Dai in Viet Nam); plain clothes troops (regular troops in civilian clothing); the conspiratorial net (usually existing for a single opera­ tion like a coup d'etat); revolutionary armed conspirators (usually using murder and sabotage and rumors against constituted authority, the OAS in mainland France is a recent example); underground armies (as in Algeria); regulars in enemy uniform (like the Brandenburg unit of Hitler's Wehrmacht); and foreign mercenaries (like the Belgian and English settlers or men of fortune in Katanga). "It must be argued that the antagonists of peace will see many opportunities for cheap and triumphant adventure by lowering the force levels and strengths of aggressors," Mr. Linebarger writes: The lower part of the spectrum of war may become a politically decisive one in many places, if the great democratic powers fail to develop peace-keeping doctrine with which to meet it. Escalation remains the danger to peace which it has been for some years, the bidding upward of force elements until full nuclear exchange comes into play. De-escalation, the preventing of the formal and potentially rapid process of auction in strategy, remains a decideradum in the foreign policies of all those governments which can properly be called civil­ ized. But descalation, as here presented, is the cheapening and worsening of war itself; it may prove to be one of the most continuous threats to peace in the 1960's and the 1970's. Countermeasures include definition of descalated, so that the governments involved can inform their own peoples and their neighbors of what is happening. Re­ prisal in kind is one form of operation. Surely, how­ ever, the fertile imaginations of intelligent and honorable men will eventually find ways of meeting this new threat of small, filthy, harmless-looking

- 22 - wars which can inflict all the tyranny and terror of which a larger war is capable. The subject is certainly not one to be overlooked by the peace movement. !/ There is a moral obligation to prepare defenses against these lesser threats as well, some scholars maintain. "Morality ... equally requires statesmen to avoid provoca­ tion by a policy of weakness and vacillation in the face of an aggressive opponent," according to Georgetown University's Robert D. Crane. "Until the international Communist movement is clearly no longer offensive in nature, the security of the free world may depend in large measure upon adequate recognition by our leaders that the most dangerous of all forms of provocation is the failure to make it very clear, by actions as well as words, that the offensive policies of the adversary cannot possibly succeed and these policies, furthermore, will result only in the loss of what the adversary has already gained." Y What are the goals we seek and the menaces we fear which justify our $50 billion a year program of arms? Our goals are frequently stated and are largely bipartisan. Republican and Democratic Administrations both have articulated them. The menaces are focused mainly in the in­ tentions of the Soviet Union, as our opening study has already made clear.

!/ Paul A. Linebarger, "Descalation in Peace," World Affairs (Winter, 1963-1964), p. 230 ff. 1:/ Crane, loc. cit.

- 23 - THE ADI AND THE MENACE

Secretary of State Rusk has observed that the Number One objective of United States foreign policy is stated in the preamble to the United States Constitution, to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

To keep this nation safe for living our lives and our chil­ dren's lives in liberty, the world environment must be safe. This, of course, extends, in the missile age, beyond the earth's atmosphere into space as far out as man can go and still affect life here on this planet.

Secretary Rusk has stated that "the abiding goal of American foreign policy ... is the kind of world described in the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations -- ratified by a great national and bipartisan vote of 89 to 2 in our Senate, at the end of a great war which had purged us of much of our parochial thinking and caused us to think long and deeply about what we are after in our relations with the rest of the world."

Here are the preamble and first two articles of the United Nations Charter:

We the peoples of the United Nations deter­ mined: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neigh­ bors and, to unite our strength to maintain in­ ternational peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institu­ tion of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims ....

- 24 - Purposes and Principles Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. 2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter. 3. All Members shall settle their in­ ternational disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

- 25 - 4. All Members shall refrain in their in­ ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giv­ ing assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. 6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under-Chapter VII. Secretary Rusk provides this picture of the kind of world the United States seeks to achieve:

-- a world free of aggression aggression by whatever means -- committed to the simplest possible prescription for peace, namely, "leave your neighbor alone"; a world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage; -- a world of economic and social advance for all peoples; -- a world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and which moves steadily toward a rule of law; -- a world in which the powers Qf the state over the individual are limited by law and custom, in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure;

- 26 - -- a world free of hate and discrimination based on race, or nationality, or color, or economic or social status;

-- and a world of equal rights and equal opportunities for the entire human race.

Our basic national policies, bipartisan in character, are designed to move us and the rest of mankind toward that kind of world. To that end we seek ever-closer ties with other economically advanced and friendly countries -- with Western Europe, and Canada, and Japan, and Australia, and New Zealand, and many others -- in order that our enormous strength can be combined to get this job done.

To that end we support the independence and the economic and social progress of the developing nations.

To that end we seek continually to improve and strengthen the institutions which enable nations to work together more effectively -- regional institu­ tions, functional institutions, and, most compre­ hensive of all, the United Nations.

And to that end we maintain armaments of un­ imaginable power. Their primary purpose is to preserve peace by deterring aggression.

But the world will remain extremely dangerous until the Communists abandon their ambitions for their kind of world revolution and until critical political problems are solved, such as the division of Germany and Berlin, the aggression against South Viet-Nam, and the use of Cuba as a base for under­ mining the independent nations of Latin America.

And the world will remain extremely dangerous until armaments, especially the superweapons, are brought under control. 1/ ll Secretary of State Rusk, "Education for Citizenship in the Modern World," Speech before the American Association of School Adminis­ trators, Atlantic City, N.J., February 16, 1964.

- 27 - At the heart of the world struggle for the blessings of liberty, Mr. Rusk says, is a central issue: coercion versus free choice, tyranny versus freedom. ll The Secretary frequently emphasizes the State Department's awareness of the coercive threat international communism poses. In a Salt Lake City speech, for instance, he said: ... We, in this Administration, and in this country, are under no illusions as to the designs of the Commu­ nists against us and the entire Free World. No one needs to tell us that the Communist menace is deadly serious, that the Communists seek their goals through varied means, that deception is a standard element in their tactics, that they move easily from the direct attack to the indirect, or to combinations of the two, To know what the Communists are up to, and to understand their varied techniques, is a major order of business with us in the State Department and other branches of the government. It is an order of business we do not neglect. We are fully aware that Moscow, as well as Peiping, remains committed to the Communist world revolution. Chairman Khrushchev tells us bluntly that coexistence cannot extend to the ideological sphere, that between him and us there will be continued competition and con­ flict. We hope this will not always be so. But as long as Mr.Khrushchev says it .is, and acts accordingly, we must believe him, and act accordingly ourselves. The first objective of our policy toward the Communist states must be, and is, to play our part in checking Communist imperialism. This Administration will vigorously oppose the expansion of the Communist domain, whoever the Communists in question may be, by force or the threat of force, whether directly or in­ directly applied. To that end we maintain a nuclear deterrent of almost unimaginable power. To that end, we have in­ creased our conventional military forces and made them more mobile -- and have encouraged and assisted other free nations on the front lines of the Free World to strengthen their conventional forces.

ll Secretary Rusk, "The Toilsome Path to Peace," Address before a joint meeting of the Western Political Science Association and the International Studies Association, Hotel Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, March 19, 1964.

- 28 - Given the catastrophe that a nuclear engage­ ment would be for the entire world, we do not in­ tend to fall into a position where we may have to choose instantly between a nuclear reaction and the loss of one or another outposts of freedom. We are resolved to maintain, and to persuade other Free World nations to maintain, the capability to repel partial or limited attacks. But it is not enough to "contain" communism and to try to negotiate specific agreements to re­ duce the danger of a great war. The conflict between the Communists and the Free World is as fundamental as any conflict can be. Their pro­ claimed objectives and our conception of a decent world order just do not and cannot fit together. We view communism as a system incapable of satisfying basic human needs, as a system which will ultimately be totally discredited in the minds of men everywhere. We believe that the peoples who have been brought under Communi�t rule aspire to a better life -- of peace, economic opportunity, and a chance to pursue happiness. This, indeed, has always been so. But in recent years an important new trend has been percept­ ible: some of the Communist governments have become responsive, in varying degrees, if not directly to the aspirations of their subjects, at least to kindred aspirations of their own. The Communist world is no longer a single flock of sheep following blindly behind one leader. The Soviet Union and Communist China are engaged in a deep and comprehensive quarrel involving ideology (how best to promote the Communist world revolution), a struggle for influence in other countries and other Commu­ nist parties, conflicting national interests, and personal rivalries. The dispute between Moscow and Peiping has spread through the world Communist movement and, in many countries, has divided the local parties. The Chinese Communists have demanded that the Russians risk their national interests, and even their national survival, to promote the world revolution, as that cause is defined by Peiping. The rulers of the Soviet Union have rejected this doctrine. They appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world communism by force and the needs and interests of the Soviet state and people.

- 29 - Our capacity to influence events and trends within the Communist world is very limited. But it is our policy to do what we can to encourage evolution in the Communist world toward national independence and open societies. We favor more contacts between the peoples behind the Iron Curtain and our own peoples. We should like to see more Soviet citizens visit the United States. We would be glad to join in cooperative enterprises to further mankind's progress against disease, poverty and ignorance. We applaud the interest of the Soviet leader­ ship in improving the lot of the Soviet people. Thus our policy toward international communism has three objectives: (1) To prevent the Communists from extending their domain; and to make it increasingly costly, dangerous, and futile for them to try to do so; (2) To achieve agreements or understandings which reduce the danger of a devastating war; (3) To encourage evolution within the commu­ nist world toward national independence, peaceful cooperation and open societies. !/ The State Department describes Communist aims in this way: Communist doctrine asserts that the eventual triumph of communism throughout the world is inevitable -- and Communist leaders are doing their utmost to bring this about. They preach of "peaceful coexistence" with non-Communist countries, but in practice they attack the free world with every weapon, economic, psychological, political, and even military -- short of all-out war .... In this global struggle we mean to win, and the victory we seek is not of one nation over another but a world­ wide victory of freedom. ll The United States program in the Kennedy-Johnson Administra­ tion involves five main lines of action: 1. Security through strength -- "to deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerrilla tactics."

!/ Department of State Press Release No. 83, February 25, 1964. ll "Department of State, 1963." Reissued December 1963.

- 30 - 2. Progress through partnership -- "to bring about a closer association of the more industrialized democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Asia -- specifically Japan -- in promoting the pros­ perity and security of the entire free world." 3. Revolution of freedom -- "to help the less developed areas of the world carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence or their pursuit of democracy." 4. Community under law -- "to assist in the gradual emer­ gence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions." 5. Through perseverance, peace -- "to strive tirelessly to end the arms race and reduce the risk of war, to narrow the areas of conflict with the Communist bloc, and to continue to spin the infinity of threads that bind the peace together," ll The State Department presents this discussion of its pursuit for peace: Can we bring an end to the precarious cold war in which we have lived so dangerously since the end of World War II? The answer to this vital question lies, of course, in our relations with the Communist world. The hard fact is that we cannot by ourselves absolutely assure our peace and security. That can be achieved only through changes that must take place on the other side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, changes which we must encourage by every means at our command. Communist objectives have never been in doubt. The leaders of the Communist conspiracy have been open, at least, about their ultimate intentions -­ the destruction of the independence of free nations and of individual freedoms and the substitution of a global Communist empire. This is their goal and they pursue it relentlessly, using subversion, manipulation of trade and aid, and psychological, political and military pressures. The United States is fundamentally opposed to this Communist objective and our government and the nation as a whole are working day and night to insure its defeat in the ways already described. Despite this, there are certain areas in which we and the Communist world have interests in common. All sane men, for example, recognize the futility

- 31 - of a thermonuclear war -- a disaster from which neither side would recover for many generations. All nations, therefore, have a vital interest in steps to reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war. This is the most significant of the areas of mutual interest between the free world and the Communist bloc -- the field of arms control and eventual disarmament. In a patient effort to reach at least a measure of East-West agreement on reduction of armaments, the United States has made the most comprehensive, serious, and equitable arms con­ trol and disarmament proposals ever offered for negotiation by any government. While long nego­ tiations have not produced even a limited practical agreement, they seem to have narrowed the gap be­ tween Soviet and Western positions. There is no realistic alternative to continuing this difficult search for an agreement which has to be reached if we are ever to live lives unshadowed by the threat of nuclear war. 1/ A high State Department official gives this indication of major American commitments around the world in support of its foreign policies: We now have mutual security arrangements of one kind or another with 42 of the 114 nations with whom we maintain diplomatic relations. We have U.S. troops and military installations in close to 30 foreign countries or territories. However, these two figures do not represent the full scope of U.S. international concerns and obligations. For example, we have had no security commitment to the Congo dur­ ing the past few years, yet our concerns and the effort we have expended are obvious. ll This government program for peace through strength does not meet with universal approval in the United States, at least as a per­ manent solution. Walter Millis, the journalist and writer on foreign and mili­ tary policy, lists0 these as traditional positions of the liberal on defense policy: Support for disarmament and collective security, in­ sistence upon minimal armament expenditures, upon 'civilian supremacy,' and the reduction of military influence on foreign policy and domestic, economic, and social planning."�/

1/ Ibid. 11 U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Speech at Hanover College, Hanover, Indiana, February 17, 1964, �/ Walter Millis, The Liberal Papers, James Roosevelt, ed. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 97,

- 32 - Mr. Millis contends that "abolition of the war system" is the minimum demand of the liberals for whom he speaks: As long as great nation-states -- the demo­ cratic no less than the totalitarian, our own no less than the Russian or the Chinese -- found their external relations upon the institution of war, they are bound to reap the results, in the form of internal militarization, of fear, of aggression, and of instability, which the war system in the supertechnical age imposes. It is difficult to see how a liberal statesmanship in the modern era can take as its ultimate goal anything less than the abolition of the war sys­ tem itself. The abolitio n of war appears to demand, as its minimum requirement (and its minimum consequence) a universal and total dis­ armament, down to police-force levels, by all the nations of the world. In all its dealings with current issues of military policy, appropriations, organization, national "strategy," this must be consciously held as the final objective of liber­ alism in this field. Unfortunately it is as yet a very remote objective. Policy may often be illumined and strengthened by a vision of the future; but it has to deal with the present, and it is as dangerous to sacrifice the present to an ideal future as it is to sacrifice the future to the traditions of the past. It would scarcely be reasonable or practicable to present universal disarmament as the sole guide to a liberal military policy in the present context. Assumimg this to be the only rational liberal goal, the liberal must still face hard questions as to why this goal now seems un­ attainable, as to how the obstacles may in fact be removed, and as to the way in which specific military and defense policies may or may not con­ duct to its achievement. Liberals challenge the policy of deterrence: . . . Does "deterrence" mean the prevention of nuclear war, or only its discouragement up to that point (sooner or later inevitable) at which it must take place? Does the retention of freedom of mili­ tary action in "situations of less than general war" authorize us to take military action in any situation

- 33 - which appears adversely to affect our national interest, or does it impose limits on which we can expect to defend by military means? Present policy answers neither question. !I A military policy of mass-destruction de­ terrence is actually no more nor less than a form of gigantic blackmail, and as with other forms of blackmail its threats are valueless if they ever have to be made good. Unless mass­ destruction deterrence succeeds absolutely in its only rational purpose -- to prevent alto­ gether -- it is a total failure; and what might happen thereafter, how the subsequent war would be waged or who would win or how many would survive, becomes an almost academic question. The appalling nature of the weaponry considered necessary to guarantee that deterrence will succeed -- including multimegaton thermo­ nuclear bombs capable of destroying scores of millions of innocent "enemy" lives in a space of hours -- can ensure only that if deterrence does not succeed the consequences will be intolerable under any rational social policy. 'l:_I Liberals seem to feel uncomfortable in the presence of a strategy of superiority. "The best it can promise in the long run is a continued, competitive build-up of two colossal time bombs, bound to set each other off sooner or later, already capable of destroying civilization between them. Meanwhile, although it is almost certainly true that no authoritative statesman anywhere is either desirous of, planning, or intending to set off the explosion, we must live in the shadow of the likelihood that it will come sooner, rather than later, through sheer accident or, more probably, through miscalculation." ;ii How has deterrence worked? Take Berlin. President Eisen­ hower once announced at a news conference during a particularly critical time in Berlin, that the West would not budge a single inch from West Berlin. He also indicated he understood clearly the dangers of nuclear war. The Soviet Union made no serious challenge of Western troops in West Berlin. Deterrence worked.

!I Ibid., pp. 100-01. 'l:.I Ibid., p. 102. ;ii Ibid., p. 105.

- 34 - TABLE OF CONTENTS \

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 WAR, PACIFISM AND MORALITY . 5 Heretic and Parasite ... 5 ...or Christian and Moral? . 9 Catholic Priest's Views ... 15 Pentagon Official's Judgment 18 TIIE AIM AND nIE MENACE 24 HISTORY 37 Early French-English Attempts 38 World War I Aftermath .. 40 Renunciation of War ... 41 Enter Nuclear Disarmament . 44 The Test Ban ...... 45 Kennedy's Test Ban Report 48 Teller's Dissent 50 TODAY'S SITUATION 57 CURRENT DISARMAMENT PLANS 63 Soviet Proposals 64 Step-by-Step Measures 67 American Proposals 70 Strategic Vehicle Freeze 80 Verification Procedure 82 Bomber Bonfire 83 Cutoff ..... 84 Hosmer's Dissent 86 Phoenix Study ... 91 GCD: Fading Concept? . 95 Proliferation Problem 98 INSPECTION: HOW MUCH AND WHEN? . . . . 101 Progressive Zonal Inspection 102 TIIE FUTURE 115 I> Open Ci ties? 119 Six Small Steps . 120 Armchair Strategists .. . . . 122 ! Political Settlements First? 123

i TABLE OF APPENDIXES ...... iii APPENDIX I -- JOINT STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ...... 125 APPENDIX II · -- UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ...... 128 APPENDIX III -- OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WOOLD 131 APPENDIX IV -- MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN llIE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TIIE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING TIIE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK SIGNED ON JUNE 20, 1963 AT GENEVA, SWIT'ZERLAND ...... 162 APPENDIX V -- TREATY BANNING NOCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN llIE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER . . . . . 166 APPENDIX VI -- A STEP TOWARD PEACE REPORT TO TIIE PEOPLE ON llIE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY ...... 169 APPENDIX VII -- U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN OUTER SPACE ...... 176 APPENDIX VIII -- QUESTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA­ MENT: REPORT OF TIIE CONFERENCE OF TIIE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT ...... 177 APPENDIX IX -- UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS -­ Additions and amendments to the Soviet draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.l) in conformity with the proposal for the retention by the USSR and the USA until the end of the third stage of an agreed number of missiles together with the warheads pertain- ing thereto ...... 205 APPENDIX X -- UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS -­ Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension 207 SELECTED BIBLICXiRAPHY ...... 212

ii The national high school debate topic for the 1964-65 school year selected in a referendum conducted by the Committee on Discussion and Debate of the National University Extension Association is as follows: What Policy for Control of Weapons Systems Would Best Insure the Prospects for World Peace? This document has been prepared to provide background and bibliographical ma­ terial on this subject. It should not be construed as reflecting any policy position on the part of the American Enterprise Institute.

June 1964 Price: $1.00 Concurrently, the West does not seem to have taken any overt action to help East Germans obtain an opportunity to choose their own leaders in free elections. On June 17, 1953, the West did not come to the aid of rioting East Germans in East Berlin, who apparently hoped for Western support. In this case Soviet power has deterred the West. Millis points out: It is quite clear that there exists today a tacit Soviet-American understanding that there will not be a nuclear exchange over West Berlin; yet to reduce to a firm statement, even more to determine what measure of force can·be applied to the West Berlin situation, seems presently impossible. A rational approach to defense policy can only insist that the more clearly all sides recognize the basic principle that the great weapons exist only to prevent th�ir use, the more avenues will in practice open up through which they can be made to serve that end. !/ William C. Foster, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.expects deterrence to remain indefinitely as both major powers' principal defense, unless some universal arms-control pro­ gram can be worked out: The problem of maintaining military security for our free society, at the present time, centers around the dilenma of defense in a thermonuclear environment. The basic difficulty is that nuclear weapons have become so powerful, and the means of delivering them have become_!!!. effective, that developnent of an adequate defense, at present, does not appear feasible. There are, of course, designs for ballistic missile defense systems and the technical analysis shows that these systems should operate effectively against small numbers of unsophisticated ICBM warheads. But the essential point is this: Every such defense system that has been studied has been very expensive and none has been designed that could offer an adequate over-all defense against a massive coordinated missile attack using penetration aids that are within the present state of the art. Even providing a theoretically effective defense against an intelligent opponent is essentially prohibitive. Best estimates indicate the cost to the defense runs anywhere from ten to one hundred times what it would cost the offense to override the defense system .. . .

!/ Ibid., pp. 111-12.

- 35 - The present technical infeasibility of a real defense has led us to rely on a strategy of de­ terrence. Thus, for the first time in our history, we are not relying on the oceans to serve as an effective defense barrier. And for the first time in our history the vast power of the U.S. military establishment is not in a position to provide an entirely effective physical defense. Rather, with a strategy of deterrence our security is assured by the threat of retaliation. Thus in the last analysis (so long as we must rely on deterrence) the security of this nation will depend in large measure on the restraint, the moderation, and the rationality exercised by our potential opponents. 1/ What can history teach us about the success of deterrence? About the relative safety in military superiority or in military parity as between rival nations? This is the problem to be examined in the next chapter.

ll William C. Foster, Speech before the Southwest Conference on Arms Control, University of Oklahoma, October 31, 1963.

- 36 - HISTORY Dr. Edward Teller, the nuclear physicist, challenges the point made by Professor Wiesner that history proves that arms races lead to war: Historically it would appear that the relation be­ tween arms control and peace is dubious. Most people believe that World War I was brought about by an arms race. They have good evidence to support this view. On the other hand there can be little doubt that World War II was caused by an uncontrolled race for disarma­ ment. Peace-lovtng nations disarmed; thereby they gave one lawless govetnment (Nazi German� a chance to bid for world domination. Historical analogies are not---conclu­ sive but it seems to me that it is more valid to compare the present situation with the history of the 1930's than with the history of the early years of our century. !/ Actually, historical precedents can be found for almost any point of view. One of the first known general treaties of disarmament was im­ posed by a confederation .of Yellow River states in China against an ag­ gressive Yangtze state in the 6th century B. C. 'l:.I The confederation of states first defeated the Yangtze state in war, then incorporated it in­ to a league, made a general treaty of disarmament and kept the peace for about one hundred years. This was an early case where a preponderance of strength could be said to have achieved peace and where imposed dis­ armament kept the peace. Various European writers touched on the subject of disarmament and other international plans for keeping the peace from the 16th to the 19th centuries A.O. Among these were Bodin (1577), William Penn (1694), John Bellers (1710), Abbe de Saint Pierre (1713), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1761), Immanuel Kant (1795), and Jeremy Bentham (1843). Elements of disarmament -- more properly, arms control -- started appearing in peace treaties in the mid-17th century. The Peace of West­ phalia, for instance, included one treaty stipulating that all fortifi­ cations were to be demolished and that no new ones were to be built. �his treaty, however, was never observed. Wars among the European powers continued unabated. In the Treaty of Utrecht between England and France in 1713, the French agreed to destroy fortifications at Dunkirk. Two years later, England and Spain agreed to demolish the fortification of Liege.

!/ Edward Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openness," Daedalus,(Fall 1960), p. 781. 'l:_/ Reference Documents on Disarmament Matters, The White House, Back­ ground Series, D-1- D-42.

- 37 - In 1766, while the disgruntled American colonies were moving toward revolution against England, Austria's Chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, made the first official proposal of modern times for limiting national armaments. He suggested to Frederick the Great of Prussia that they re­ duce their armed forces by 75 percent on a reciprocal basis. Frederick the Great rejected the proposal. Three years later Austria renewed the offer but Prussia once again spurned it. The peace arranged between Russia and Turkey in 1714 provided for the abolition of fortifications in Turkey's Crimean Peninsula. Early French-English Attempts In 1787, England and France reached an agreement providing a ceiling of six launches of war vessels on the ocean. The navies were to be reduced to a peacetime footing. Both nations also agreed to dis­ continue military preparations. Eleven years later the two nations were at war again in Egypt and Syria. On October 21, 1805 Lord Nelson of England won his great naval victory over the combined French and Span­ ish fleets. The Peace of Belgrade in 1739 forced the Russians to agree not to build ships on the Black Sea. Russian trade was to be carried exelu­ sively in Turkish vessels, according to the treaty. By 1768 Catherine the Great of Russia launched a new war against Turkey. Russian and Turkish fleets clashed on the Black Sea in 1770. Peace societies began appearing simultaneously in the United States and Britain in 1815-16. Other peace societies appeared on the continent. Their aim was to persuade governments to use arbitration as a means of preventing war. Disarmament was regarded as a secondary issue. There were some suggestions for gradual, mutual, and simultaneous limi­ tations on armaments. The peace societies held congresses in the decade 1843-53 and passed disarmament resolutions. Thereafter, however, the societies faded from the scene, not to reappear until the world-wide peace movement was established later in the 1800s. The Russian Czar sent a letter to Lord Castlereagh in 1816 proposing that Russia and Britain reduce armed forces of every category. Lord Castlereagh, however, answered with skepticism and emphasized the difficulties in arranging the reduction. A year later Czar Alexander's proposal bore its only fruit. Those states maintaining occupation armies in Franca signed a convention to diminish their contingents by one-fifth.

- 38 - In the same year, the United States and England agreed to limit naval forces on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain in the Rush-Bagot agreement. This was the beginning of the end of British-American dis­ putes along the border with eastern Canada. At a Paris conference called by Louis Phillippe in 1831, dele­ gates from France, England, Austria, Russia and Prussia affixed their signatures to a protocol declaring that "good harmony... among the powers ...rendered possible the adoption... of the general disarmament." As frequently happened with disarmament proclamations, however, none of the five powers followed up on the protocol. The first disarmament resolution introduced in a European parliament was advanced by Richard Cobden in the British House of Commons in 1851. His resolution called for a reduction of armaments, and promo­ tion of a mutual reduction of armaments with France. The Treaty of Paris in 1856, which ended the Crimean War, com­ mitted Russia and Turkey to limit vessels on the Black Sea so as to neu­ tralize the area. Privateers and explosive bullets over 400 grams were prohibited. Russia denounced the Treaty in 1870, fourteen years after the Treaty of Paris came into force. Napoleon III tried on three occasions, in 1863, 1867, and 1870, to organize a general European disarmament conference. England was the principal resister. France unilaterally reduced its armed forces from 100,000 to 90,000. The major European powers declared the Grand Duchy of Luxem­ burg a neutral territory in 1867. The fortress in Luxemburg was disman­ tled and Prussian troops there were withdrawn. In 1870, Great Britain proposed a disarmament agreement in an attempt to reduce the chances of war between France and Prussia. The proposal failed, however, and the Franco-German War began July 19, 1870. The use of poison or poisoned weapons was forbidden in Article 13 of the "International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War" written at the Conference of Brussels in 1874. Bulgarian fortifications on the Danube were dismantled after the Convention of Berlin was signed in 1878. According to the Convention, no war vessels were to be maintained on the neutralized part of the Dan­ ube. This remained more or less in effect until World War II. The first international conference called to consider a reduc­ tion in armaments was held at The Hague in 1899. The conference achieved no reduction of armament but did lay down regulations for the conduct of war and established the principle of voluntary arbitration of disputes. A court of international justice was established at The Hague.

- 39 - Argentina and Chile brought Latin America into the disarmament field in 1902 by signing a five-year agreement on reduction of their na­ vies. The agreement was not renewed, however.. Sweden and Norway joined in treaties in 1905 which neutralized and disarmed their common boundary. The main purpose of the treaty was to sanction the separation of Sweden and Norway. Disarmament by reciprocal example was achieved as early as 1906, when France first cut expenditures for its Alpine fortifications along the Italian border. Italy then followed suit. Up to this ptint, it will be noted, disarmament meant arms limitation only. There was no move toward "general and complete disarmament." What agreements were made were either completely ineffective or observed for only a few years. World War I Aftermath President Woodrow Wilson projected the first major attempt at disarmament in the 20th century in his famous Fourteen Points to end World War I, presented to Congress January 8, 1918. Point 4 proposed "adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Again the goal was arms limitation, not complete disarmament. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which ended World War I, re­ quired Germany to disarm "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." The League of Nations Covenant of 1919 also dealt with disarmament in Article 8: "The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Norway was awarded sovereignty over Spitsbergen in a 1920 treaty which prohibited establishment of military installations on the island. The United States, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Holland, Den­ mark, Norway, Sweden, and later Russia, joined in the treaty. This wa.s a new approach to disarmament, in effect a quarantine of an already­ disarmed area to prevent its militarization at some time in the future. The first successful attempt to restrict and reduce armaments in modern times was the Washington conference in 1921-22. A five-power treaty between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy provided for a 10-year holiday on building capital ships; a limitation of total tonnage and fire-power of existing capital ships and aircraft carriers. Great Britain and the United States were allowed 525,000 tons each; Japan 315,000 tons; France and Italy 175,000 tons each (the so­ called 5-5-3-1.67-1.67 formula). Limitations were also placed on the extent of fortifications on Pacific islands held by or assigned to the treaty powers.

- 40 - (A further agreement restricting naval construction was signed in 1930 but denounced by Japan in 1934, as reported later in this chro­ nology.) In 1923, five Central American nations agreed on a disarmament convention limiting their armed forces, military aircraft, and war ves­ sels. The use of poison gas was also prohibited. The five nations were Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Since then, of course, there have been frequent sallies across Central American bor­ ders but poison gas is not known to have been used. The League of Nations failed to obtain acceptance from enough nations to put into effect its first "Treaty of Mutual Guarantee" of 1923. The general plan of the treaty was to bring about disarmament indirectly. International machinery was to be established which would insure assistance by League members to any victim of aggression. A year later the League assembly recommended a second approach to disarmament: It sought to establish the so-called Geneva Protocol and the principle of compulsory arbitration. Again the Protocol failed to get the approval of enough nations to take effect, partly because of the comprehensive system of sanctions prescribed. In the Locarno Treaty of 1925, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland declared "their firm convic­ tion that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant" of the League of Nations. In 1927, the United States President Calvin Coolidge sought to extend the success of the 1921 Washington conference in a three-power naval conference at Geneva. The intention was to apply the naval ratio of 1922 for battleships to cruisers of the United States, Britain, and Japan. The United States and Britain, however, disagreed over the for­ mula and the conference broke down.

Renunciation of War The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, negotiated in Paris, renounced war as an instrument of national policy except in self-defense, and called for peaceful settlements of all disputes. Ultimately 62 nations ratified the Pact of Paris but no method was provided for enforcing the treaty. It was to become a dead issue within five years when Japan moved against China and Italy against Ethiopia. At the London Naval Conference of 1930, the ratio principle was extended to all classes of war vessels of the United States, Britain, and Japan. Certain warships were to be scrapped by 1933.

- 41 - France and Italy participated in the London Naval Conference but did not accept all the clauses. An "escalator clause" provided that signatories might expand their naval tonnage if another power's naval construction was considered to affect adversely their national security. The escalator clause provided that expansion of naval tonnage could be undertaken only after due warning. President Hoover proposed in 1932 that all existing armaments and armed forces be reduced by about one-third. The World Disarmament Conference was then meeting in Geneva but took no direct action on the Hoover proposal. Neither Britain nor France supported the suggestion. France explained she wanted guarantees of security as a condition for disarmament. The World Disarmament Conference continued until 1934. Not only League of Nations members but the United States and the Soviet Union as well participated. The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference had been working for about five years to obtain agreement on a draft convention. France's opposition to the draft convention brought about a deadlock in the conference. The French continued to insist on security first through an international police force and control by the League of Nations of weapons of aggression. The Soviet delegation became active in a full-fledged disarm­ ament conference for the first time at the 1934 meeting. First it pro­ posed a plan for complete disarmament, later for limited disarmament. The same proposals had been made earlier before the preparatory commission in 1928. Germany, meanwhile, was recovering from the effects of World War I and raising its voice increasingly in world councils. The Berlin government demanded the right to rearm if the rest of the world did not disarm down to Germany's level. Adolf Hitler's government came into power in 1933 and Germany's role at the Disarmament Conference became increasingly disruptive. Germany withdrew not only from the World Disarmament Conference but from the League of Nations as well in October 1933, and Hitler em­ barked on a program of rearmament. This rise of Hitler to power dashed hopes of achieving a major agreement on disarmament at the world conference. But the aura of disarmament thinking, including such hopeful manifestations as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, inhibited other European powers' rearmament to offset the German buildup. At �nother London Naval Conference in 1935, Japan demanded parity with the United States and Great Britain. When her demands were rejected Japan withdrew. The Tokyo government had been emboldened by

- 42 - its successes in China and the failure of the big powers to interject countervailing force either in Asia, Africa or Europe where Italy and Germany pursued expansionist policies without big-power reprisal. Italy also refused to sign the agreement drawn up at the London Naval Conference because of sanctions voted by the League of Nations against Italy for her subjugation of Ethiopia. The London Naval Treaty of 1936 was the outgrowth of the 1935 London Naval Conference. British Commonwealth countries, the United States and France agreed on an annual exchange of information on naval building plans; on restrictions as to size and gun caliber for several classes of navy vessels; on a six-year holiday for building cruisers; on prohibitions against "hybrid vessels" which might not fall within the disarmament classifications drawn between cruisers and capital ships; and on escape clauses which would release the signatories from provisions of the disarmament treaty if a non-signatory exceeded the armaments levels provided in the treaty. This was to be the progenitor of other arms­ limitation treaties with other powers. In 1937, Britain negotiated treaties with Germany and the Soviet Union limiting battleships to 35,000 tons, their guns to 16 inches, and aircraft carriers to 23,000 tons. Bringing Germany into this sort of pact in the midst of Hitler's rearmament program was considered a re­ markable success. But that was the last major .move in the direction of disarmament before the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Many historians believe that Hitler's rearmament and subsequent expansionist policies in Europe were encouraged by the repeated attempts at achieving disarmament agreements in the 1920's and 1930'1. They say that it was the preponderance of strength which an aggressive Germany was allowed to build which encouraged Nazi aggression. As the enumeration down through history of sporadic attempts at arms limitation shows, all past attempts at limiting weaponry or out­ lawing wars between states have succeeded, if at all, only for a short period of time. Opponents of disarmament say that it is impossible to change man's combative nature; therefore the safest method of maintaining the peace is to arrange for developing a preponderance of power in the hands of the "most moral" nation. At the very least, they say, aggressive powers must be prevented from amassing a preponderance of strength against non-aggressive nations. This has been the situation in the relatively peaceful years immediately following World War II. The United States, first with a complete monopoly and then a near-complete monopoly of nuclear weapons, had a preponderance of the world power and no major wars broke out. (An early attempt to trigger Soviet demobilization by unilateral American reduction of its World War II fighting force failed.)

- 43 - When the Soviet Union achieved its own diversified stockpile of nuclear weapons in the late 1950's, however, the picture changed to one of a "balance of terror." The Soviet launching of its Sputnik sat­ ellite in October 1957 gave the world what was probably a premature image of Soviet equality with the United States in nuclear power. The continuing arms race, in which both sides now turn to de­ veloping defenses against the nuclear weapons they have built, has not been viewed with equanimity by any known world statesman.

Enter Nuclear Disarmament With the explosion of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world had immediately recognized that disarmament had taken on a new dimension. A few days after Hiroshima, President Tru­ man declared: The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world. That is why Great Britain and the United States , who have the secret of its production, do not in­ tend to reveal the secret until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction ....We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force to prevent its misuse and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind. !/ The newly-formed United Nations established an Atomic Energy Commission and the United States and Britain had offered to place the control of atomic energy, from uranium and plutonium mines to finished weapons, in the hands of the United Nations. From 1946 until 1948, the American proposal was debated. The Soviet Union finally rejected the idea in 1948, presumably because the Communists could not accept the extent of inspection necessary to assure the world that secret building of nuclear weapons was not under way. The Soviet Union may also have been far enough along in its own program for building nuclear weapons (with the help of information from spies) to choose the peace-through-strength route rather than disarmament. From 1948 to 1951 was a period of lull in disarmament efforts on both sides. The art of nuclear weaponry took another quantum jump in 1951-52 with the American testing of the hydrogen bomb, thousands of times more powerful than weapons previously produced. The Soviet Union joined the H-bomb club late the next year. Until 1950 what disarmament activity there was had used a two­ part approach , separating the nuclear disarmament question from conven­ tional disarmament.

!/ U.S. Department of State, "The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy." Publication 2702 (1946), p. 108.

- 44 - As the result of American initiative in 1950, however, United Nations efforts at disarmament were consolidated by General Assembly resolution under one over-all Disarmament Co.mmission whose aim was to draft a treaty calling for a reduction in all armaments, "elimination" of weapons of mass destruction, effective international control, and other safeguards. The new Disarmament Commission did not meet until March 1952. There followed a period of painstaking negotiation marked by extreme caution on the United States' side to insure that inspection procedures would be effective against any Soviet attempt at cheating. In 1955, however, it became clear to both sides that nuclear weapons had become small enough so that they could be hidden in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union and the United States without serious risk of being found. Enough H-bombs could be secreted, it was said, to dev­ astate any nation or combination of nations. International inspectors using the most advanced instrumentation would not notice hidden bombs if they passed within a few feet of them, according to the best scien­ tific advice available to official Washington. The Soviet Union took official notice of this situation in May 1955. In August, the United States placed a "reservation'' on all its previous disarmament positions, mainly because of this finding. In July 1955, a month before the "reservation" was announced, President Eisenhower had launched his dramatic plea for "open skies" inspection -- reciprocal aerial reconnaissance missions over leading military powers' territory. But he drew a negative response from the Soviet Union, still extremely sensitive to any attempts to penetrate its secret society. Interest turned significantly then from the comprehensive approach to the step-by-step approach to disarmament. People round the world took an interest in a new phenomenon -- radioactive fallout from nuclear tests. There were debates among scientists on the health hazards to all mankind from nuclear test fallout.

The Test Ban

The Soviet Union opened an intense campaign for a test ban but the same old problem -- inspection -- held up progress. At first the Soviet Union would accept no inspection on its own territory and demanded mere declarations of a ban by both sides.

In the 1956 election campaign in this country, Democratic can­ didate Adlai Stevenson pressed President Eisenhower to work actively for a test ban. After his re-election, Mr. Eisenhower asked the Soviet Union to join in a scientific examination of prospects for effective inspection

- 45 - of a nuclear test ban. A conferMce was held in July-August 1958 and agreement was reached that inspection would be feasible within certain limits. Diplomatic negotiations for a test ban were set for the end of October 1958. President Eisenhower promised that the United States would not resume testing for one year if negotiations for a ban were kept open. The negotiations were preceded by a series of frantic tests by both the United States and the Soviet Union, seeking to prove out as much theory and laboratory experimentation as possible before both of them went into the negotiations at Geneva for a nuclear test ban. The Soviet Union tested a few weapons in the early days of the negotiations, in November 1958, but then its weapons-testing sites also fell silent. There followed a thirty-four month period of first intensive, then sporadic negotiation for a test ban. The Soviet Union sought con­ sistently to whittle down the amount of inspection to be permitted on its own territory while American negotiators worked hard to preserve enough inspection to insure that the Soviet Union could not cheat -- thus advancing its own nuclear technology while the United States stood still. When President Kennedy came into office in January 1961 he sent a new team of negotiators to Geneva with new zeal for a test ban. On September 1, 1961, however, the Soviet Union suddenly broke the un­ declared moratorium with a series of nuclear shots dwarfing all previous tests on either side. One test was estimated at above 50 megatons. 1/ The largest American test was in the 15 to 20 megaton range. President Kennedy reluctantly ordered resumption of underground American testing on September 15. The following April the United States resumed atmospheric testing. Negotiations for a test ban continued but were interrupted by the October 1962 missile crisis in Cuba. In the aftermath of this close call with nuclear holocaust, both sides renewed the search for a nuclear test ban -- then the widely accepted "first step" toward arms control and disarmament. Over the years both sides had made concessions toward a "middle ground" for inspection of the test ban. Whereas the Soviet Union at first would accept no on-site inspection, it gradually moved, with faltering steps, toward the acceptance of the principle. Later the Kremlin agreed to allow two or three on-site inspections per year. The United States at first required some 20 on-site inspections per year and estab}.xshment of 20-odd permanent listening stations inside the Soviet Union. President Kennedy was also able to reduce these demands gradually. On-site inspections required were reduced to 8 to 10. And the requirement for 20-odd listening stations inside the Soviet Union was dropped completely; the Administration decided it could rely on a completely American network, installed on the periphery of the Soviet land mass. y A megaton is the equivaJ!ent in explosive power of one million tons of 'INT.

- 46 - Attempts to reach a compromise on the on-site inspection prob­ lem -- to guard mainly against sneak underground testing, were broken off, however, early in 1963, just as they appeared on the verge of success. On June 10, 1963, President Kennedy made a last-ditch plea to the Soviet Union for some movement toward disarmament or arms control in a speech at American University. As a token of American good faith he promised the United States would not test in the atmosphere unless another power did. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union suddenly accepted the United States' long-standing offer to institute a partial ban on testing in the three environments most easily inspected -- space, the atmosphere, and under water. This would permit continued testing underground. In major substance this was an offer that had been made first by President Eisenhower in 1959 and renewed periodically since, both by President Eisenhower and President Kennedy. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman was named to lead the negotiating team which drafted the treaty with British and Soviet representatives in Moscow in July 1963. Secretary of State Dean Rusk went to Moscow to sign it August 5. After a thorough debate in the Senate, the treaty was ratified according to constitutional processes, 80 to 19. One hundred six nations eventually adhered to the treaty -as of January 1, 1964. There were lingering doubts among the minority in this country who disapproved the treaty, however, tbat the inspection system -- now to be operated independently by the United States rather than under in­ ternational auspices -- would be sufficiently effective to prevent Soviet technological advances by secret testing in the three forbidden environmentt. Three ambiguous signals which might have been nuclear shots were picked up in June 1963 while the final negotiations were being prepared, one before President Kennedy's American University speech and two after. The evidence was inconclusive, however, -and did not gain wide­ spread attention inside the Administration or outside. On August 3, 1963, two days before Secretary Rusk initialed the partial nuclear-test ban treaty in Moscow, the American detection network picked up what might have been a 500 kiloton explosion!/ in the region of the Antarctic. Again the evidence was inconclusive and little was made of the incident. Those who suspected the Soviet Union would try to use the par­ tial test ban as a cloak for secret military advance continued to have misgivings, however, about the same old bugaboo which had bedeviled all disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union since the end of World War II: inspection and verification.

!/ A kiloton is the equivalent in explosive power of 1,000 tons of INT.

- 47 - By 1964, the world disarmament quest had returned again to the two-pronged effort, one aimed at general and complete disarmament, the other at step-by-step arrangements to reduce tensions and eventually arms in the bands of the leading-military powers. But the American emphasis was on small, realistic steps.

Kennedy's Test Ban Report President Kennedy, in his test ban report to the nation on July 26, 1963, said that "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the search for disarmament, but et the same time he acknowledged that the partial nuclear test ban treaty had limitations. The treaty permitted continued underground testingi it required no control posts, no on-site inspection, no international body. Any signatory nation could withdraw. No nation's right of self-defense would be impaired. The threat of nu­ clear war would not be ended. Nuclear stockpiles would not be reduced. Nuclear weapons production would not be halted. No restrictions were placed on the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. "Nevertheless," he added, "this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and all others who sign it from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankindi and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope." Mr.· Kennedy listed these advantages for the partial test ban treaty: First, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The Mos­ cow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrangement across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests every­ where and our ultimate hope for general and complete dis­ armament. The Soviet Government, however, is unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require. No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if any, can be built on the founda­ tions of this one. They could include controls on pre­ parations for surprise attack or on numbers and types of armaments. There could be further limitation on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.

- 48 - But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this step ..· Second, this treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fall- out Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now pos­ sessing them. During the next several years, in addi­ tion to the four current nuclear powers, a �mall but significant number of nations will have the intellec­ tual, physical and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have ei­ ther this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today. I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, s..cattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for any­ one, no stability, flO real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the in­ creased chance of accidental war and an increased ne­ cessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts .... Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the nu­ clear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing.!/ (He referred to the theory that the United States most probably had hit the ceiling in breakthroughs in nuclear weaponry and that few opportunities for further advances were available. The longer unlimited testing continued, he reasoned, the better the chances for the Soviet Union to catch up.) President Kennedy claimed that his Administration had not over­ looked the risk of secret violations of the partial nuclear test ban treaty: There is at present a possibility that deep in outer space, hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth, illegal tests might go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a

1/ President Kennedy, "A Step Toward Peace," report to the people on the nuclear test ban treaty, radio-television address on July 26, 1963.

- 49 - system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessar­ ily be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower at­ mosphere. Any violation, moreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and world­ wide consequences for the violator. Secret violations are possible and secret prepara­ tions for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we re­ main ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal test­ ing are obviQusly slight compared to their cost and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty -- and such risks in this treaty are small -- the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new nuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war. 1/ After exhaustive debate in the Senate, the partial nuclear test ban treaty was ratified, 80 to 19.

Teller's Dissent Dr. Edward Teller, one of the leading scienti$ts who developed the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb, was among the minority who dissented from the President's decision to accept the partial nuclear test ban. Here are excerpts from a paper he later wrote for "The Conservative Papers," 'l:./ a collection of commentaries on major issues of United States policy, gathered under the direction of Representative Melvin R. Laird of Wis­ consin: We have stated that nuclear reactors unfortunately have not yet found their widespread economic usefulness. On the other hand, one may say that most fortunately nu­ clear bombs have not yet been widely used in wartime. ll Ibid. 11 Dr. Edward Teller� The Conservative Papers, Melvin R. Laird, ed. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964). - 50 - This has not been due to the fact that development of nu­ clear explosives has lagged. The opposite is true. Since Hiroshima, the yields of nuclear weapons have increased a thousandfold, and the rat�o of yield to weight has also increased by a comparable factor. The reason why nuclear weapons have not been used is the simple fact that they are much too effective. It is a belief which is widely held and which I share that the main purpose of the existence of our nuclear weap­ ons is to prevent their use by our opponents. Many have drawn from this correct statement the conclusion, which I consider a dangerous fallacy, that the time has come to eliminate nuclear weapons or at any rate to restrict their further development. We shall be able to prevent the use of nuclear bombs that are in Russian hands only if we keep up with the Russians in this rapidly developing field. During the negotiations for an end to nuclear testing, it was claimed that such an agreement could be effectively policed. Simple and universally accepted facts do not jus­ tify such a claim to a sufficient extent. No objective method has been found to detect and iden­ tify small nuclear explosions. Secret atmospheric testing can be carried out by nuclear devices of under one kiloton (one thousand tons of 'INT equivalent). Application of clean nuclear devices -- that is, devices producing greatly re­ duced amounts of radioactivity -- may make it possible to raise the limit to a few kilotons. The limit below which secret underground explosions are possible is higher still. Here it is very likely that tests under ten kilotons may be hidden and bigger explosions can be carried out in secrecy if care is taken to reduce the seismic signal. Tests in distant interplanetary space can be carried out in a manner useful for military development up to the megaton (million tons of 'INT equivalent) range without serious danger of detection. The possibility of space testing has been discounted. The reason for this is probably that we have not as yet carried out any tests in distant space. As long as a mode of testing is not actually executed by the United States, it appears extremely difficult to obtain agreement that such types of tests might be effectively practiced now or in the future by the Soviet Union. In such cases the wishful thinking that prefers our imagined safety to our actual danger has prevailed for years in the minds of our policymakers. This situation is the more remarkable be­ cause of the fact that the possibility of big secret tests

- 51 - in space has been discussed in detail by American, Brit­ ish, and Russian experts in June and July of 1959 in Ge­ neva. We have explained to the Russians how such type of testing could be effectively executed and hidden, and they have agreed that this can be done. We have also proposed as the only cheap and effective method of checking such explosions to inspect every outgoing space rocket. This indeed would be a practicable control, since the firing of big rockets can be detected with a reasonable assur­ ance. The Russians have refused to consider the inspec­ tion of outgoing space vehicles and we have not pressed the point. Therefore any system of policing nuclear tests is at present wide open, and violations could be carried out up to the biggest explosions. The main argument that has been advanced in favor of test cessation is the alleged circumstance that we have enough nuclear explosives and that further testing is in fact superfluous. This argument is closely connected with the general important question of the aims of further de­ velopment in the field of nuclear explosives. Starting from the discussions connected with the test ban we shall now give a general survey of the aims of such weapon de­ velopments. During the discussion of a test moratorium from 1958 until 1961 proponents of a test ban laid great emphasis on the useless nature of two developments. They contended that big explosives can no longer be effectively improved and they completely discounted the need for nuclear test­ ing in the development of missile defense. It is signi­ ficant that by claims and actual execution the Russians have drawn our attention in 1961 to precisely these two fields. What our internal discussions could not settle, the Soviet test series and the boasts of Khrushchev have actually settled for us. We are faced with the real dan­ ger that the Russians may develop an effective missile defense while we lack such a defense. This would be as bad as if the Russians had the means of a strategic nu­ clear attack while we lacked such means. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that today the Russians seem to be clearly ahead of us in big nuclear explosives.

Correspondingly, we are now belatedly giving some attention to big nuclear explosions and to missile de­ fense. Our efforts are impeded by continued attempts at arriving at test ban agreements. To test big bombs or to practice the art of missile defense atmospheric tests are needed. Our only atmospheric test series since 1958 was carried out with short preparation and in a hurried manner. These limitations were due to political rather than to technical reasons.

- 52 - The all-important question of missile defense has been the subject of much work and even more discussion. The results of this discussion are inconclusive. In the end experience alone can decide. One must hope that mock experience will be sufficient and that we shall never be faced with the overwhelming danger of the situation where nuclear defenses must be tried out in earnest. While the upshot and the details are complex and classified, the general results of the discussion can be stated in rea­ sonably simple terms. It is obviously difficult to hit an incoming missile which is moving considerably faster than a bullet. The only real hope of an effective defense lies in the appli­ cation of defensive nuclear explosives that can destroy the incoming missile even when the misdistance is sizable. At the same time the yield of the defensive missile and the altitude of its explosion can be so arranged as to produce no harmful effect on the defended territory which lies below. Unfortunately such nuclear defenses can be countered in several ways. Of these, the ample application of de­ coys is the most effective. The result is a most intri­ cate problem whereby decoys and other penetration aids have to be matched against radar detection, methods of discrimination, and eventually an ample and readily a­ vailable supply of rockets carrying defensive nuclear warheads. It has been correctly stated that the problem of missile defense has many components besides the devel­ opment of defensive explosions and the observations of the effects of these defensive explosions. At the same time one must remember that in this intricate question all factors interact. It has been claimed that the problem of our nuclear defenses is mostly connected with the development of radar and that tests are not needed to make progress toward missile defense. This sounds to me almost as absurd as if someone claimed that good fenc­ ing requites only excellent eyesight and that actual training in the wielding of the foils is not a necessity. One must remember that in the match between an incoming nuclear explosive and a defensive nuclear explosive the properties of the explosive used are of decisive impor­ tance and that the relatively unexplored field of the effects of nuclear explosives at high altitude can pro­ duce surprises and can provide solutions to problems which arise from the continued change in our detection and discrimination techniques.

- 53 - It would be a mistake, however, to believe that mis­ sile defense is the only important field in which further tests are essential. An example of another field is the development of clean and cheap explosives for tactical purposes. By underground explosions we have made in recent years considerable progress toward the development of clean nuclear devices. Cleanliness is in fact of great importance in tactical applications. Great harm may be done to noncombatants, and even the safety of our own troops would be jeopardized by the fallout from our own explosives. On the other hand, if small, clean explo­ sives become easily available, the effect of this fire­ power is the same as that of conventional artillery of an extreme mobility. One can apply one's nuclear ex­ plosions for the purpose of destroying concentrated armed forces of the enemy and one can deprive any Soviet aggressor of the use of his massive manpower equipped with conventional means of combat. To pursue this aim it would be necessary to decrease the cost of nuclear explosives and to produce plenty of the best nuclear explosive, which is plutonium. We have pursued the first aim to a limited extent and we have been remiss in the plentiful production of plutonium. In the bal­ ance of power as applied to limited nuclear conflicts, this omission may have fatal consequences in the coming years. There exists the undeniable danger that a limited nuclear conflict may escalat�. One must realize of course that a conventional conflict may also escalate. It is somewhat doubtful that the danger of escalation justifies our neglect of serious preparation for a limited nuclear conflict and is sufficient reason for our expensive alternative plan of preparation for con­ ventional battle. A recently published Soviet book on military strategy edited by Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky contains no assurance that the Soviets will refrain from using nuclear weapons in a limited war, and it also fails to state that use of nuclear weapons on the battle­ field of a limited conflict by our side will make esca­ lation more likely. Neither limited conventional war nor a limited nu­ clear conflict can be eliminated from our planning. In dispersed guerrilla-type activity as is now going on in Vietnam, there is no reason to use nuclear explosives. On the other hand, in case of a massive confrontation our conventional forces would have to be concentrated, which would make us particularly vulnerable to the nu­ clear weapons of the other side. If we have not prepared

- 54 - for limited nuclear war, the use of Russian tactical weapons would place us before the desperate choice of ac­ cepting massive defeat or initiating all-out interconti­ nental war by our own action. It is my conclusion that the development of the means of tactical war gives us one of the essential tools by which we can counter enemy action in an appropriate manner without escalation. An­ other equally essential tool is an ample stockpile of plutonium. It has been stated above that the Russians are ahead of us in the development of the biggest nuclear explosives. They also claim to be ahead in missile defense. It should be added that it is in general hardly possible to compare the status of American and.Russian development. No one on our side possesses adequate knowledge of the state of nuclear art in Russia. But there is one general argument which indicates that the Russians are probably ahead in a much more general and dangerous manner than is commonly realized. Our methods of observation have been good enough to find out at what time the Russians conducted their first nuclear explosion and their first thermonuclear explosion. The speed with which they developed the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb gives a clear indication of their tech­ nical competence. They have performed these difficult tasks rapidly and with little testing. In recent years they have tested in the atmosphere with greater frequency than we have. Assuming that they have not lost their technical competence we are led to the almost unavoidable conclusion that these tests, or rather experiments, must have told them many of the things that we wish to know. The Russian tests may in fact have opened up some problems connected with nuclear explosives which are not even sus­ pected by our side. Development of explosives for missile defense and for tactical nuclear warfare have been used to illustrate the importance of making further progress in nuclear weap­ ons. There is a general reason of even greater importance why this development must not come to a standstill. Nuclear explosives have developed rapidly, and the problems connected with them have changed radically every few years. Further research and development will open up unknown and unimagined possibilities. This may be con­ nected with inflicting damage. It may also be connected with defense against damage. One-thing seems virtually certain. If we stand still we are going to make no prog­ ress. On the Russian side even a moratorium will permit

- 55 - further progress because no one has claimed that small nuclear explosions can be policed. The claim that ex­ plosions under a few kilotons or under one kiloton will not lead to essential progress is completely unsupported. Such applications have led to the development of our clean weapons. Small and undetectable explosions in the atmos­ phere can be most powerful tools in developing missile de­ fense, and small explosions can even be used as models on the basis of which big explosives can be designed. We know that we will be effectively bound by the test ban. On the other hand, we must assume that the Russians will exploit the loopholes which certainly exist for small kiloton explosions and which also exist in the field of space testing. Within a few years during a test ban we are likely to find ourselves at a fatal disadvantage vis­ a-vis the Soviet Union. It has been claimed that the recently negotiated test ban is essential to prevent proliferation of nuclear ex­ plosives. It is past experience that every nation that has come into possession of the raw materials for nuclear explosions did detonate a bomb within a few months. I do not believe that progress in this important field can be effectively limited. I rather believe that these difficult international problems have to be faced. The test ban will only serve to drive the problem underground and will give rise to a lawless situation as did the unenforceable law of prohibition in the United States. In case of a test ban lawlessness will become rampant in the international the­ ater. Our overriding need is international co-operation and peace. In a lawless world we should find only chaos and catastrophe.

- 56 - TODAY'S SITUATION A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nu­ clear exchange, lasting less than sixty minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, "the survivors would envy the dead." For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poisons and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world from war. !/ The armed forces of the Communist bloc now outnumber those of the Western allies 9.3 million to 8.6 million, according to a recent un­ official estimate. £1 In nuclear missiles the Soviet Union has an estimated maximum of 170 with intercontinental range, 700 intermediate range ballistic missiles, aimed mainly against the heavily-populated West European area of NATO. The United States, by comparison, has more than 750 intercon­ tinental ballistic missiles and 192 missiles in Polaris submarines cruis­ ing waters .near the Sino-Soviet land mass.�/ President Johnson reported the United States had the capacity to hit the Soviet Union with more than 1,000 nuclear missiles. �/ The maximum Soviet capacity to hit the United States was only 170, unless some of the 700 intermediate range missiles could be placed on the periphery of this country, as was unsuccessfully attempted in Cuba in 1962. It has been a fundamental of Western defense strategy, however, that the destruction of Western Europe.would be an unacceptable blow to United States security. Through its NATO commitments, the United States would meet any IRBM attack on Europe by the 700 Soviet nuclear missiles with nuclear counterattack. Beside its missile advantage, the United States was also said to have a large superiority in bomber striking power. The United States Strategic Air Command had some 700 heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons in mid-1964. The Soviet Union, by comparison, was estimated to have 100 to 170 heavy bombers. In medium bomber capacity the United States had some 600 planes capable of air refueling compared with 600 to 900 Soviet planes, only a small number of them equipped for air refueling. �/ In the first stages of a nuclear war the United States would seek to confine its attack to military targets as much as possible in the hope that both sides would avoid a "city-busting" strategy and

1/ President John F. Kennedy, July 26, 1963. 71./ Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, April 26, 1964, p. E3. 3/ Ibid. 1/ Address to U.S. Coast Guard graduating class, New London, Conn., June 3, 1964. �/ Baldwin, loc. cit.

- 57 - protect civilian life as much as possible. This is the so-called coun­ terforce strategy. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has testified repeatedly before Congressional committees that he approves of disarmament measures only if they maintain United States superiority. This is counter to the spirit if not the letter of the joint statement of principles agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials do not take the McNamara view. They believe that a "tolerable balance" in military strength must be struck if any disarmament is to be achieved. A "tolerable balance" means that the pre­ sumed Soviet advantage in conventional forces would be balanced against the United States superiority in nuclear striking power as both sides made percentage cuts in their nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Some unofficial observers believe that the tempo of the arms race has been slowed only slightly, if at all, since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the subsequent strenuous efforts in both Moscow and Washington to reach limited agreements in the arms control and disarmament field. Due in major part to three factors -- economic strain, the political effect of the Moscow-Peking rift and the unilateral tapering off of some defense projects in various countries -- the last few years have witnessed a slight slowdown in the tempo of the arms race and a seeming plateau has been reached in the numbers of men in uniform. But there has been no reduction in the over­ all destructive power of nuclear arms or in their numbers, and the technological competition to produce new weapons of greater speed, power or combat effectiveness -- such as the United States A-11, the F-111 (TFX), the Soviet 100 megaton bomb -- has been slowed only slightly if at all. !/ Nuclear weapons are now becoming so sophisticated that they can be reduced in explosive power to the point that there is a virtual con­ tinuum from conventional high explosives to nuclear weapons. In addition, the size of nuclear weapons has been greatly reduced. A warhead may now be the size of a teacup, as small as five inches in diameter. There continues to be a debate, however, about the value of maintaining the so-called "firebreak," or the clear distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear explosives. President Eisenhower once endorsed the theory that nuclear weapons should be used "like bullets," that is, to fit whatever job was at hand. The Kennedy-Johnson Administration, however, wishes to make a clear distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in the hope of making escalation to general nuclear war more improbable.

!/ Ibid.

- 58 - There are two types of "firebreaks," One is geographical. That is, the battle or war can be confined geographically. The other is the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. Those who oppose using nuclear weapons "like bullets" say even the smallest nuclear weapons should not be used because the opponent would be tempted to use larger ones and the dreaded escalation would be under way. Soviet objectives in a general war, analysts find, are four: 1. The conquest of Western Europe. "Massive armies," equipped with nuclear missiles and trained for nuclear "blitzkrieg" are said to be prepared for this objective. 2. Destruction or neutralization of the United States' mil­ itary power. The Soviet Union first acquired the ICBMs with sufficient range to strike directly at the United States in the 1960's. The attempt to place missiles in Cuba was a further extension of the objective to destroy or neutralize American military power. 3. Defense of Soviet territory and the Soviet war potential. Air defense forces have been established in the Soviet Union but so far an anti-missile defense appears to be unaccomplished. 4. Destruction of the American Navy and isolation of the United States from the European war theater.!/ As for instances where local wars might be fought with small nuclear weapons, the Soviet strategists are ambiguous.'!:./ Writing in the book Military Strategy, Soviet military leaders indicate, however, that they believe small nuclear wars are likely to escalate into general nuclear war: It is possible that in the course of a local war the belligerents will make use of operational and tactical nuclear weapons, refraining however from the use of stra­ tegic nuclear weapons. This would radically alter the methods of military operations which would assume a more dynamic and decisive character. It is doubtful, however, that war would be waged for a long time only with opera­ tional and tactical nuclear weapons. Once nuclear weapons are used, the belligerents will be compelled to employ their whole nuclear power, and a local war will escalate into a world nuclear war.�/

!/ Wlodzimierz Onacewicz, "Soviet Materials on Military Strategy," study for Georgetown University's Center for Strategic Studies. 2:./ Onacewicz and Irwin P. Halpern, Ibid. �/ Mi�itary Strategy (2d ed.), pp. 374-5, as quoted in Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies' study of "Soviet Materials on Military Strategy."

- 59 - Soviet Premier Khrushchev is heavily committed, in public at least, to avoiding nuclear war, of course, and Kremlin military leaders' preparations are based on the assumption that Western "imperialist" en­ emies will precipitate the fighting. Although Soviet Premier Khrushchev has warned: "We will bury you," the specific means for achieving it are frequently difficult to discern. !/ What Soviet leaders .!!I are their intentions and what they actually are may be quite different. In a significant speech on Decem­ ber 13, 1963, for instance, Premier Khrushchev declared his intention to reduce the Soviet armed forces, cut the 1964 military budget, and invest 42 billion rubles in the chemical industry during 1964-70and to mod­ ernize Soviet industry and agriculture. Some scholars in Soviet affairs believe the Soviet Union ac­ tually is maintaining a constant expenditure in defense despite claims that the proportion of its national income spent on the military has been declining. Timothy Sosnovy concludes, for instance, that the Soviet military budget is about twice that of the United States, when expressed as a percentage of the gross national product. Official Soviet budget figures grossly understate defense ex­ penditures, in his opinion, because other spending of benefit to the military forces is listed in other parts of the budget. Defense industry, strategic defense materials and food reserves, atomic research, war vet­ erans payments -- all these are concealed in other sections of the state budget, according to Sosnovy. £1 He believes that the portion of Soviet spendi�g on defense has remained 29 percent over the last two decades, despite claims by Premier Khrushchev that defense spending has been de­ clining. This view that the Soviet budget is a tricky yardstick for Soviet defense spending takes on special significance when suggestions are heard that the United States and the Soviet Union undertake disarm­ ament by "reciprocal example." As Secretary of State Rusk points out, methods for "inspecting" the Soviet budget or verifying reductions in defense-spending are difficult to arrange. The Soviet Premier said that he wanted to slow down the arms race, arrange further steps toward disarmament, and help "rebuff the aggressive militaristic circles" in the United States. It appeared probable in mid-1964 that the Soviet leadership had decided to seek a period of detente. But why? Georgetown University's Robert Dickson Crane suggests three possible strategies:

!/ It has been said that the Russian equivalent of the word "bury" was used by Khrushchev in a figurative sense and was not intended to be translated to mean physical burial. £1 Timothy Sosnovy, "The Military Budget," Foreign Affairs (April, 1964).

- 60 - 1. To turn the competition with the West from military to economic and political fields so as to defeat the United States without using monstrously-destructive modern weapons. 2. To attain strategic military equality with the United States. The ditente might slow down the West while the Soviet Union caught up. 3. To achieve Soviet strategic superiority over the United States by a "technological end run," that is, secret development of ad­ vanced and futuristic weapons. Again the United States would have to slow down if this were to be a reasonably possible Soviet objective. The d�tente would serve the purpose of slowing United States develop­ ment. 1/ According to some Western estimates, the Soviet Union has been devoting about 13 percent of its gross national product to armaments, compared to nine percent for the United States and seven percent for the United Kingdom. These calculations indicate that Soviet defense expenditures increased by about 43 percent from 1960 to 1964. It could be, of course, that the Kremlin is spending more simply to "stand still," or to keep from falling hopelessly behind the United States. Until recently the Soviet Union has, like the United States, based its military policy on the goal of achieving superiority over its principal rival. The reasoning, much the same in both Washington and Moscow, was that superiority would deter the other side from attack. Recently, however, the Soviet Union was seen to be increasingly uncertain whether it should continue to assert military superiority over the West if this merely spurred the West to greater defense activity. 1/ In the spring of 1963 the Soviet First Deputy Minister of De­ fense, Marshal Andrei Grachko, who commands the Warsaw Pact forces, said: The Communist Party and the Soviet Government base their military policy on the fact that as long as dis­ armament has not been implemented, the armed forces of the Socialist Commonwealth must always be superior to those of the imperialists. 'ti/ ll Robert Dickson Crane, "Soviet Materials on Military Strategy, In­ ventory and Analysis for 1963," edited by Wlodzimierz Onacewicz and Crane, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, January 1, 1964. 11 Thomas Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought," Foreign Affairs (April, 1964). ii Izvestia, May 9, 1963.

- 61 - Last December, however, experts on Soviet defense policy de­ tected a different note in Marshal Grachko's attitude. After noting Secretary Robert McNamara's recitation on American long-range missiles and bombers on air alert, the Soviet marshal explained these United States actions were "meant to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union." He made no statement comparable to the one in lay that Soviet forces were then superior. In addition, the Soviet Marshal said the Soviet Union "has sufficient means to restrain any aggressor no matter what kind of nuclear power he may po11e11." He added that the Soviet Union is not "in the least interested in an armaments race," but merely intends to maintain its defense "at the level necessary to assure peace." !/

ii Red Star, December 22, 1963, as quoted by 'lbomas Wolfe in the Foreign Affairs article, +!£· ill·

- 62 - CURRENT DISARMAMENI PLANS

Since World War II there have been two general approaches to the problem of arms control and disarmament. Some take the long-range view, giving more emphasis to changing the world's social order itself. Others take the shorter view, seeking practical steps that can be taken in today's world. It is as if we stand on one edge of th� Grand Canyon. Some have telescopes and enjoy viewing and describing the opposite rim without paying too much attention to the canyon that separates us from it. Others seem to concentrate on how to take the first step over the edge. What we need is a description of the route all the way down to the bottom and up the other side and some arrangements for getting the trip under way.!/ In the recent past the Soviet Union has been stressing the long-range view while still paying some attention to the short-range view and even agreeing to the "first step" partial n-uclear test ban treaty. The United States, on the other hand, has gone along only grudg­ ingly with the Soviet propaganda offensive for "general and complete dis­ armament," against the judgment of some experts who believe it is bad propaganda to embrace unrealistic goals. By and large, disarmament experts in both the Soviet and Western worlds accept as a final goal a world disarmed except for internal security forces with some international peace force, based on a world rule of law, to deal with any transgressors of the peace. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, latest in a long line of negotiating groups since 1945, began its deliberations on March 14, 1962, in Geneva. It had been authorized by the General Assembly of the United Nations the previous year. In addition to five Western and five Soviet-bloc nations, eight additional countries were invited to the talks. The five Western nations were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy. The five Soviet-bloc nations were the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The other eight nations were Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic.

!/ Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament panel of the Strategy for Peace Conference, February 29, 1964, under the chairmanship of Dr. Albert Hibbs, chief, Arms Control Study Group, Jet Propulsion Labora­ tory, California Institute of Technology; with rapporteur Tom C. O'Sullivan, manager, System Requirement Division, Raytheon Company.

- 63 - France, dissatisfied with its Western colleagues' policy for a halt to testing before she herself became a full-fledged nuclear power, did not attend the meeting officially but sent an observer. The conference still was knowL as the 18-nation conference. The conference di scuss-ed both general disarmament and first­ step measures.

Soviet Proposals Soviet Premier Khrushchev first introduced the concept of "general and complete disarmament" in a widely publicized speech before the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1959. The proposal was first greeted with great skepticism in the Eisenhower Administration because of the conclusion reached in 1955, still considered valid, that complete disarmament would be an unreal­ istic goal since inspection techniques were not effective enough to ferret out highly-lethal nuclear weapons secreted in the vastnesses of the Soviet-Eurasian land mass or the continent-girdling United States. In the last months of the Eisenhower Administration, however, tentative approval to "GCD" was given as a long-range goal. When the Kennedy Administration came to power greater emphasis was placed on acceptance of the general and complete disarmament formula, mainly as a device to disarm the Soviet Union which had been using it as an important propaganda weapon in the rest of the world. At first the Soviet Union sought to establish its program for "general and complete disarmament" in four years. The United States insisted this would be too short a time to make any balanced cuts in the widely-diversified arsenals of the Communist and free-world nations. In bilateral discussions, the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed on a set of principles which were to guide general disarmament negotiations. Although eight principles were agreed upon, the issue of inspection remained in dispute. The Soviet Union said it would allow inspection only of items consigned to the scrap heap, not to items still in its arsenal. The United States claimed no meaning­ ful inspection would be possible under such an arrangement, since items scrapped could be replaced with more modern equipnent without the knowl­ edge of the other disarming powers, The eight agreed principles, proclaimed as "the basis_ for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament," were announced at the United Nations on September 20, 1961. (See text in Appendix I.)

- 64 - In the letter accompanying the joint statement of principles, the American negotiator, John J. McCloy, wrote Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin of his disappointment that the inspection prob­ lem had not been completely resolved. The Soviet Union had refused to incorporate in the statement of principles the following clause: Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed levels at any stage. Mr. McCloy referred to this as "a key element in the United States position" to which the United States "continues to adhere." In his reply Mr. Zorin complained that Soviet acceptance of the United States clause "would represent agreement with the concept of establishing control over armament instead of control over disarma­ ment ....The Soviet Union advocates the most thorough, the most strict international control over measures of general and complete disarmament. While being for effective control over disarmament and desiring to facilitate as much as possible the reaching of agreeme�t on such control, the Soviet Union at the same time resolutely opposes establishment of control over armaments." Establishing control over armed forces and armaments retained by the disarming states "would become an international system of legal­ ized espionage," Mr. Zorin declared, and this "cann.ot be accepted by any state which is interested in its security and in the maintenance of world peace."!/ The latest Soviet proposal for general and complete disarma­ ment submitted by the Soviet Union was introduced at the United Nations General Assembly session of 1962 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. (For the full text see Appendix VIII and IX.) By that time the Soviet Union had extended its estimate of the time period for general and complete disarmament from four to five years. It had advanced, to the first stage of that period, the requirement for eliminating "all means of delivering nuclear weapons," all foreign military bases, all troops on foreign soil, and to reduce armed forces, their conventional armaments, and military expenditures. The first stage was to be initiated six months after the treaty came into force and to be completed within eighteen months. In the next three months the transition from the first to the second stage would be arranged.

!/ Exchange of letters by Mr. McCloy (September 20, 1961) and Mr. Zorin (September 21, 1961), as quoted in "Report of Activities, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, year ending December 1961."

- 65 - In the second stage, all nuclear weapons and others capable of mass destruction would be completely eliminated. All military rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons would be destroyed and further reductions would be made in conventional arms and armed forces. Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons would also be eliminated in this second stage. Production of ehemical, biological, and radio­ logical weapons would be ended and the plants producing these weapons would be destroyed or converted to peaceful production. By the end of the second stage both the Soviet Union and the United States should reduce their armed forces to one million men, in­ cluding not only enlisted men, but also officers and civilian employees. With a bow toward the United States' insistence that United Nations forces be built up to keep the peace during the disarmament process, the Soviet draft provided for placing at the disposal of the United Nations armed forces of the states participating in the dis­ armament program. The second stage should be completed in two years and another three-months transition stage was envisaged for movement into the third stage, in which parties to the treaty would undertake "fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of states." All military production would end, military establishments would be disbanded, conscription and military training would be ended, budget appropriations for military purposes would be prohibited. Only police or militia would be allowed to'be retained by individual states. They would be equipped with light firearms to main­ tain internal order and to safeguard frontiers. Firearms manufacture would be strictly limited and inspected by the International Disarmament Organization. Police or militia units could also be made available to the Security Council in case of a threat to the peace. The key word was "could." Western negotiators had a wealth of experience with Soviet half-promises. The Soviet plan was greeted with a classic skepticism in the Department of Defense and other Washington circles. Once disarmament was an accomplished fact, the Soviet treaty provided in Article 38, inspectors would be allowed to visit "at any time to any point within the territory of each state party to the treaty." Once complete disarmament had been achieved, the draft treaty added, aerial photography by the International Disarmament Organization could also be permitted.

- 66 - It was proposed that the third stage be completed in one year, thus filling out the five-year cycle for "general and complete disarma­ ment." Western negotiators still considered the timetable for the Soviet Union's GCD to be highly unrealistic. Experience in the past showed that negotiating for a tolerable balance -- as prescribed in the set of principles -- would be prolonged. Since bath the Soviet and United States military establishments were designed for different missions, it was impossible to match disarmament measures, bomber for bomber. At some point a balance would have to be struck between the Soviet superiority in conventional forces and theWestern superiority in nuclear forces. Not only the negotiating process would take time, the actual dismantling procedure would also take much longer, according to Wash­ ington estimates, than the Soviet Union's projection.

Step-by-Step Measures Until the first-step nuclear test ban was negotiated in 1963, the Soviet Union continued to place maximum stress on its program for general disarmament in four to five years. Early in 1964, however, the Soviet Union appeared to be switching tactics to resume the quest for a step-by-step disarmament plan. On January 28, 1964, Soviet representative Semyon K. Tsarapkin presented to the 18 nations then discuss.ing disarmament at Geneva, a memorandum suggesting "collateral measures ..• to relax the arms race and to ease international tension." This proposal was made against the background of three Soviet­ American agreements, rated as minor by the United States, but still worthy of note as efforts to decrease tensions in the feverish arms race. Beside the partial nuclear test ban, the Soviet Union and the United States had also agreed to establish a "hot line" between Soviet Premier Khrushchev in the Kremlin and the American President in the White House. A direct teletype line was installed and messages were to be sent in code. Except for tests, the line had not been used up to the time this manuscript was written. The third event rated in Washington as a tension-reducer was the United Nations General Assembly resolution, approved by both the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Again no inspection procedures were provided to verify this ban. On the other hand, the form of the agree­ ment -- a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly -- was less secure than a full treaty between the major participating powers.

- 67 - In its memorandum of January 28, 1964, Jj the Soviet Union suggested nine additional "implementing measures toward easing the arms race and further relaxing international tensions": I. Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories. This was a long standing Soviet demand that the United States withdraw troops stationed in NATO countries and in other allied states. The Soviet Union claimed that withdrawal of foreign troops would not damage either side because "overall balance of power in the states be­ longing to both groups -- NATO and Warsaw Pact" would not be upset. Reports that Western officials had revised their estimates of relative force strength between NATO and Warsaw Pact powers indicate that NATO forces were "not smaller but even greater'' than the number of troops in the Warsaw Pact countries. As a first step toward complete with­ drawal of all foreign troops, the Soviet Union suggested preliminary withdrawal of troops from foreign territories "on the basis of re­ ciprocity ..• step by step." The Soviet Union said it was "pre­ pared to begin such a reduction of forces on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European states if the Western powers begin cutting their troops in the German Federal Republic and in other countries." 2. Reduction of total armed forces. The Soviet Union "has now set about further reducing the numeri­ cal strength of its armed forces," Mr. Tsarapkin's memorandum stated. "The Soviet Government is prepared to make still further reductions of its armed forces provided the governments of the Western powers express their willingness to take similar steps." This was an area where the Soviet Union was attempting to put into practice the plan frequently mentioned in 1963-64 in Washington and Moscow for disarmament by "re­ ciprocal example" or by "mutual example," i.e. without inspection. 3. Reduction in military budgets. The Soviet Union unilaterally cut its 1964 military budget by 600 million rubles, Mr. Tsarapkin claimed. "It is known that the United States Government also is undertaking measures for a certain curtailment of its military expenditures," he continued. "Thus, there are now favorable prerequisites for agreement on a further mutual curtailment of

!/ Text of Soviet Memorandum on Measures to Relax the Arms Race and to Ease International Tensions, January 28, 1964, tabled at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva by Soviet Representative Tsarapkin, as translated by the United States Arms Control and Dis­ armament Agency in its Disarmament Documents Series, Ref. No. 353, January 30, 1964. See Appendix X.

- 68 - military budgets. The Soviet Government proposes to reach agreement on a cutting down of the military budgets of the states by 10 to 15 percent." Again, the Soviet Government was seeking unilateral reciprocal cuts without verification or intrusion into the Soviet secret society. 4. Non-aggression pact between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Paet. At the end of the partial nuclear test ban treaty negotiations in Moscow on July 25, 1963, the United States and Britain agreed to discuss with their NATO allies the possibility of a NATO-Warsaw Paet non-aggression treaty. In its January 1964 memorandum, the Soviet Union said such a non-aggression treaty "is required of us also by the commit­ ments recorded in the joint co!!lllunique of the U.S.S.R. the United States, and Britain of 25 July, 1963." Washington and London officials made it clear repeatedly that they did not consider their promise to discuss a non-aggression pact with their NATO allies as any coomitment to conclude such a pact. 5. Establishment of atom free zones. The Soviet Union said it was especially interested in establish­ ing denuclearized zones in regions "where the danger of nuclear conflict is especially great, and primarily in Central Europe.'" The Soviet Union also would be ready to participate in the inspection of the denuclearized zones, according to the memorandum. This was an application of the long­ standing Soviet willingness to participate in international inspection so long as it did not include Soviet territory. 6. Preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. This agreement against the so-called "proliferation" of weapons should include, the Soviet Union said, along with the prohibition of direct handing over of this weapon and information about its manufacture to some other states, provisions which would guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be transferred in some indirect way, through military blocs, for instance, through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force. This was a repetition of the Soviet charge that the NATO plan for establishing a mixed-manned surface fleet armed with nuclear missiles (but with the United States still in control of nuclear warheads for sea­ borne missiles) should be abandoned. 7. Prevention of surprise attack. The Soviet Government recalled it s proposals for establishing ground observation posts in Europe and reducing foreign troops on terri­ tories of European states, as well as for removing nuclear weapons from East and West Germany. Establishing ground observation posts alone would not be a sufficient measure, the Soviet Union said.

- 69 - 8. Destruction of bomber aircraft. "The Soviet Government is ready to study this question," the memorandum stated. According to the proposal, bombers becoming obsolete in the United States, British, and Soviet arsenals, in particular, would be scrapped in order to prevent their trickling into "minor league" wars or arms races. This was a proposal which fit perfectly the Soviet con­ cept for inspection -- of disarmament, not armament. The rate at which new bombers might be introduced into the arsenals of the major powers would not be inspected, only the rate at which old bombers were destroyed. 9. Prohibition of underground nuclear tests. "Life has fully confirmed that the detection of underground nuclear weapon tests, as well as tests in the atmosphere, outer space. and under water, does not require the organization of a special inter­ national control," the Soviet memorandum stated. This was an attempt to reinforce the long-standing Soviet claim that no international inspec­ tion was necessary to police a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

American Proposals The United States has talked disarmament in more than 70 in­ ternational conferences and meetings since 1945. Until 1960, the United States policy on disarmament was made by ad hoc c0111111ittees composed of officials in the Defense Department. the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other interested agencies. For a time in the mid-1950'� President Eisenhower tried to lift disarmament priorities by establishing a special White House office to deal with disarmament. The office was headed by Harold E. Stassen. After several years, however, this operation was absorbed into the Department of State, �here it stayed until 1960. At that time a new State Department unit was set up, called the United States Disarmament Administration. After the election of President Kennedy, a separate agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was established under legisla­ tion approved by Congress. The head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports to the Secretary of State and the President. The Act establishing M;DA defines "arms control" and "disarm­ ament" to mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace. !/ lf First Annual Report, ACDA, January 29, 1962.

- 70 - In the years preceding the establishment of the new agency, arms control became the term to describe step-by-step disarmament. It implied that the disarmament process would stop at some point short of complete disarmament, leaving a level or balance between the protagonists of the world, which would assure the national security of all partici­ pating states but reduce the potential for destruction in case a dispute broke into conflict. Disarmament was generally to mean reduction of armed forces and equipment down to the level of independent police forces to protect internal security only. On April 18, 1962, the United States presented at the Geneva conference its "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." Except for a few minor amend­ ments this outline has remained the principal United States -- and West­ ern -- counterpart to the Soviet Union's program for long-range, general disarmament. (For amended text, see Appendix III.) The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency issued the following summary of the basic treaty provisions: DIGEST OF U.S. OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD The objectives stated in the U.S. Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarma­ ment in a Peaceful World are to ensure that war is elim­ inated; that the world is disarmed except for forces nec­ essary to maintain internal order and to establish U.N. Peace Force and that procedures are established for the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the U.N. Charter. Among the guiding principles to achieve these ob­ jectives are: (1) Disarmament should be balanced so that no state can gain a military advantage. (2) Compliance with disarmament obligations, in­ cluding the maintenance of agreed levels of armaments and armed forces, should be effectively verified. (3) The United Nations should be progressively strengthened for the preservation of international secu­ rity and the peaceful settlement of differences. Disarmament would proceed in three stages. Stage I would begin when the United States, the USSR and such other states as might be agreed have ratified the treaty; Stage II

- 71 - when all militarily significant states had become parties; Stage III when all armed states had become parties. Transi­ tion from stage to stage would take place when the Control Council of the IDO determined all undertakings in a prior stage had been carried out and all arrangements for the subsequent stage had been made. In the event of disagree­ ment, the matter would be referred to the Security Council of the U.N.

Stage I Stage I would consist of three one-year steps. Major categories of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conven­ tional armaments of specified parties to the Treaty would be reduced by 30 percent of the inventory at an agreed date. The parties would declare inventories of all types of armaments within the agreed categories. For example, the United States would declare as types of armaments the B-52 aircraft, Atlas missile, Titan missile, etc. Fixed launching pads would be reduced with their related missiles. In the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated would be placed in depots under the IDO. During the second part, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The IDO would verify that armaments were destroyed and that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels, Production of armaments would be limited to agreed allowances but there would be compensating destruction of armaments in the same category to assure that the reductions would not be impaired. Force levels of the United States and the USSR would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other parties to be specified, to levels not exceeding 2.1 million. Other parties would, with agreed exceptions, reduce force levels to 100,000 or 1 percent of their population, whichever were higher; but no party would exceed present levels. Fissionable material production for nuclear weapons would be halted and agreed quantities of weapons-grade U-235 would be transferred by the United States and USSR from stocks to non-weapons purposes. The nuclear powers would agree not to transfer to any non-nuclear state con­ trol over nuclear weapons nor give to such a state aid in manufacturing nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear states would agree not to seek control over nuclear weapons or to manufacture them. Nuclear weapons tests would be halted under effective international control if this had not already been done.

- 72 - Parties in this stage would examine ways to eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles, to reduce stocks of chemical and biological weapons, and to reduce military expenditures. Measures would be taken to reduce the risk of war and would include advance notice of, and observation posts to report on, military movements. The parties would examine other means of further diminishing the risk of war by ac­ cident, miscalculation or surprise attack. The parties would agree to cooperate in the peaceful use of outer space and not to place in orbit weapons of mass destruction. Production and tests of space vehicle boosters would be limited. The IDO would have adequate powers to verify disarma­ ment measures and would consist of a General Conference of all parties, a Control Council with major powers as permanent members and other parties on a rotating basis, and an Administrator. To strengthen peacekeeping arrangements, the parties would refrain from the threat or use of force contrary to the United Nations Charter and also from indirect aggres­ sion and subversion. They would utilize specified proc­ esses for peaceful settlement of all disputes and support a study to make such processes more effective. They would develop arrangements for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II and would also create a United Nations Peace Observation Corps. Stage II Stage II would be of three years' duration. Those parties reducing their armaments by thirty percent in Stage I would reduce their armaments to levels fifty per­ cent below those at the end of Stage I. Parties which had not been subject to reductions in Stage I would re­ duce their armaments to levels sixty-five percent below those at the beginning of Stage II. Additional cate­ gories of armaments would be subject to reduction by all parties. Production of armaments would be halted except for production of parts for maintenance. Armed forces of the United States and the USSR would be reduced to levels fifty percent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I. The forces of other states would be reduced by agreed percentages.

- 73 - Parties to the treaty would reduce remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels determined in the light of their exam­ ination of the means of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons stockpiles. Fissionable materials for use in weap­ ons would be reduced on the basis of agreed percentages by safeguarded transfers to non-weapons purposes, and non­ nuclear components of nuclear weapons from which fission­ able materials had been removed would be destroyed. To facilitate verification of the final reduction of nuclear weapon s in Stage III, nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be interna­ tionally registered at the end of Stage II. Agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located, would be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses, in an agreed sequence. The strengthening of peacekeeping arrangements begun in Stage I would continue. This process would include ac­ ceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna­ tional Court of Justice, the development of rules of con­ duct related to disarmament and methods for settling dis­ putes, and the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force. In addition, the International Di·sarmament Organ­ ization would be strengthened to ensure its capacity to verify measures in Stage II. Stage III Stage III, which would be of an agreed duration, would continue the disarmament process until states had at their disposal only those forces and agreed types of non-nuclear armaments required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens. The United Nations Peace Force would be progressively strengthened until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

How would the American three-stage plan work? Ambassador Arthur Dean, speaking before the 18-nation Geneva conference in 1962, envisioned this process in a comment on the provision for a 30 percent reduction of long and medium range nuclear striking forces by both the United States and the Soviet Union. "The United States would .. . have to apply this cut to its 8-52 aircraft, to its Titan missiles, to its Atlas missiles, to its submarine­ launched Polaris missiles, and to its Hound Dog missiles, and to any other type of delivery vehicle which, by the time the treaty is negotiated came into the category description .. ..

- 74 - "The Soviet Union ...would have to apply the 30 percent cut to its heavy four-turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev and known in the West as Bear; to its heavy four-jet bomber designed by Miasishchev and called in the West the Bison; to its intercontinental missiles fired to the Kamchatka Peninsula and into the Pacific; to its missiles on sub­ marines; and to its air-to-surface missiles displayed last year with the Bear bomber. "In the case of the United States Titan and Atlas missiles, as in the case of the Soviet missiles in this category, related fixed launching pads would be cut, along with the missiles. The same would be true with respect to fixed launching pads related to missiles which would be cut in other categories."!/ While the United States has continued to pay lip service to the idea of general and complete disarmament, it has conserved its major effort for the step-by-step approach. The first fruits of the gradual short-range approach appeared in 1963, as already noted. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed to set up the "hot line" teletype communication between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. This was the first move in an attempt to reduce the chance that either side would launch a war, nuclear or non-nuclear, because of a miscalculation. It was decided that availability of rapid communication -- not at hand during the tense Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 -- might reduce the chance of accidental war or miscalculation leading to war. The second move was the partial nuclear test ban treaty. The third action, in the fall of 1963, found both the United States and the Soviet Union supporting a United Nations General Assembly resolution banning the use of outer space for orbiting weapons of mass destruction. All three moves had one characteristic in common: no interna­ tional inspection was required. In the case of the partial nuclear test ban, national systems of inspection (intelligence networks) were to be relied upon completely to check that none of the nuclear powers resumed experiments in the atmosphere, under water, or in space. In the case of the United Nations resolution, both sides agreed to take the other's word on faith. Inspection to verify that weapons of mass destruction were not being placed in orbit would require monitoring launching of all satellites. This was viewed in Washington as an unre­ alistic goal. To differentiate between a verified agreement and what amounted to parallel declarations of intent without verification, Western officials arranged that the agreement be couched in the form of a United Nations resolution instead of a treaty. This left open the possibility that at some later time the Soviet Union and the United States, along with other nuclear missile powers, might agree to a treaty banning the use of mass­ destruction weapons in space orbit and providing for effective verification.

!/ 'Toward a World With out War," a summary of United States disarmament efforts -- past and present. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 10, General Series 6, released October 1962.

- 75 - Senator Richard Russell, Democrat of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was apprehensive about the willingness of the Administration to embark on arms control measures without on-site verification.

"My principal fears are generated by this apparent acceptance of Soviet good faith and compliance without the slightest agreement for any on-site inspection or confirmation of any kind> " the Senator said. " ...I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy than for the American people to be so deceived by Khrushchev's statement as to let down our guard and proceed to further disarmament without any inspection. Such a course is certain eventually to seal our doom."!/

Official Washington and official Moscow both tended to credit the sobering experience of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis for the small steps toward reducing tensions between East and West accomplished in 1963. After the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, President Johnson quickly picked up the quest for disarmament where the late President had left off. In his State of the Union Message, President Johnson said: For our ultimate goal is a world without war, a world made safe for diversity, in which all men, goods and ideas, can freely move across every border and boundary. We must advance this goal in 1964 in at least ten different ways: First, we must maintain -- and our reduced defense budget will maintain -- that margin of military safety and superiority obtained through three years of steadily increasing the quality and quantity of our strategic, conventional and anti-guerrilla forces. In 1964 we will be better prepared than ever before to defend the cause of freedom -- whether it is threatened by outright aggres­ sion or by the infiltration practiced by those in Hanoi and Havana who ship arms and men across international borders to foment insurrection. And we must continue to use that strength, as John Kennedy used it in the Cuba crisis and for the test ban treaty, to demonstrate both the futility of nuclear war and the possibilities of last­ ing peace. Second, we must take new steps -- and we shall make new proposals at Geneva -- toward the control and eventual

!/ Human Events, May 2, 1964, p. 4.

- 76 - abolition of arms. In the absence of agreement we must not stockpile arms beyond our needs or seek an excess of military power that could be provocative as well as waste­ ful. It is in this spirit that in this fiscal year we are cutting back our production of enriched uranium by 25 per­ cent, shutting down four plutonium piles and closing many non-essential military installations. And it is in this spirit that we call on our adversaries to do the same.

Tenth, and finally, we must develop with our allies new means of bridging the gap between East and West, fac­ ing danger boldly wherever danger exists -- but being equally bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all while violating the interests of none. In short, we must be constantly prepared for the worst and constantly acting for the best Strong enough to win a war and wise enough to pre­ vent one. We shall neither act as aggressors nor tolerate acts of aggression. We intend to bury no one -- and we do not intend to be buried. We can fight, if we must, as we have fought before but we pray we will never have to fight again. !/ On January 21, 1964 President Johnson announced in a nation­ wide television and radio address, from the Cabinet Room of the White House, a five-part proposal for a step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. "Today we return to the conference table at Geneva with a new momentum and a new hope," the President declared. " ...t he United States is asking the world to take further steps toward peace, enforceable steps which can endanger no one's safety and will enlarge everyone's security. " ...e ach one of these five proposals is important to peace. No one of them is impossible of agreement. The best way to begin dis­ arming is to begin, and we shall hear any plan, go any place, make any plea, and play any part that offers a realistic prospect for peace.

!/ President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Message, January 8, 1964.

- 77 - "Disarmament is not merely the government's business. It is your business. It is everyone's business. It is the concern, or should be, of every parent and teacher, every public servant, and every private citizen."!/ In his message to the 18-nation disarmament conference in Ge­ neva, President Johnson gave that group credit for leading the way to the 1963 measures for arms control. ''Your efforts and deliberations laid the groundwork for the nuclear test ban treaty -- for the connunications link between Washington and Moscow -- and for the UN General Assembly action against nuclear weap­ ons in space," the President told the seventeen delegations at the Geneva conference. He then made these five proposals in the name of the United States for "major types of potential agreement." 1) First, as Chair11an Khrushchev and I have observed, the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or country. In consulta­ tion with our allies, we will be prepared to discuss means of prohibiting the threat or use of force, directly or in­ directly -- whether by aggression, subversion, or the clan­ destine supply of arms -- to change boundaries or demarca­ tion lines; to interfere with access to territory, or to extend control or administration over territory by displac­ ing established authorities. 2) Second, while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective interna­ tional control, we must first endeavor to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and charac­ teristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the secu­ rity of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure pre­ venting the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels. 3) Third, in this same spirit of early action, the United States believes that a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use would be a major contribution to world peace. Moreover, while we seek agreement on this measure, the US is willing to achieve prompt reductions through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant by plant basis, with mutual inspection. We have started ii President Lyndon B. Johnson, remarks over nation-wide television and radio, January 21, 1964. - 78 - in this direction -- we hope the Soviet Union will do the same -- and we are prepared to accept appropriate interna­ tional verification of the reactor shut-down already sched­ uled in our country. 4) Fourth, we must further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. In consul­ tation with our allies, we will be prepared to discuss pro­ posals for creating a system of observation posts as a move in this direction. 5) Fifth, and finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree: (a) that nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safe­ guards; (b) that the major nuclear powers accept in an in­ creasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states; and (c) on the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control. !/ William C. Foster, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, elaborated on the philosophy behind the Johnson five-point proposal later in January. "This philosophy," he said, "is that a logical first step is to freeze things where they are and thereby remove future obstacles to disarmament. 'Ibis philosophy lay behind the Antarctic Treaty, which was easier to achieve because Antarctica was still free of armaments. It lay behind the resolution against nuclear weapons in orbit; which was easier to achieve because space was still free of weapons of mass destruction. "To a large degree this philosophy lay behind the test ban treaty also. That treaty imposes severe limits upon the testing and as a result, on the development of larger nuclear weapons .. "We felt that the easiest way to disarmament was to stop this part of the arms race and to turn around so that we could begin going back in the direction from whence we had come. In this sense, the treaty was clearly a 'freeze.'·." Just as the test ban treaty limited warhead size, Mr. Foster suggested, the new Johnson proposal for a cutoff of fissionable material

!/ President Johnson's message to the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, January 21, 1964.

- 79 - "would limit the amount of explosive materials available for warheads; the present proposal would limit numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles." Strategic Vehicle Freeze Mr. Foster had this additional explanation for the freeze on strategic delivery vehicles: "Firstly. the freeze should, we believe, include strategic missiles and aircraft. The categories of weapons affected should be defined along lines of range and weight. For this measure the categories suggested in Stage I of the United States outline of 18 April 1962 should be adjusted. we think, for several reasons. For instance. there have been changes in technologies since those earlier categories were proposed. Moreover. the freeze would include only strategic categories; and it could be implemented before agreement on general and complete disarmament. "Secondly, the United States believes the freeze should also include antiballistic missile systems. A freeze on strategic delivery systems without a freeze on antimissile systems would be destabilizing and therefore unacceptable. "Thirdly, the immediate objective of the freeze on numbers should be to maintain the quantity of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West at constant levels. As we see it, the agree­ ment should provide for a suitable number of missile tests without war� heads to insure that missile systems continue to be reliable over a period of time. For this and related purposes, it should also provide for pro­ duction of replacements on a one-for-one' basis; one missile produced for one destroyed. This should not, of course, permit any increase by either side in the constant level which it is the purpose of the agreement to maintain. "Fourthly, the objective of the freeze on characteristics should be, the United States believes, to prevent the development and deployment of strategic vehicles of a significantly new type. Like the freeze on numbers. this should apply to defensive as well as offensive vehicles. The significance of this provision might well be greater than that of the freeze on numbers. I.t would halt the race to produce better stra­ tegic vehicles to carry bigger warheads. It would mean an end to the qualitative. as well as to the quantitative, strategic arms race. "Fifthly, as I have already indicated, we have singled out strategic vehicles partly because we believe that the verification re­ quirements would be less onerous than for a production freeze on the entire range of major armaments included within our general and com­ plete disarmament plan. One possible means of verifying the freeze would be to monitor significant existing production and testing fa­ cilities which eack side would declare, and to provide for a specified number of spot checks to guard against possible undeclared facilities.

- 80 - "That is an example· of the kind of verification requirement we have in mind. "It would curb a key area of the arms race; it would inhibit development of costly, new, and more destructive weapons systems; it would be an accomplishment far beyond any 'confidence-building' measure in significance, yet one that could be achieved in a reasonable period of time; it would lay a firm basis for the achievement of balanced re­ ductions contemplated in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; it would tend to reduce any fears which may exist that either side could achieve a decisive first-strike capability; it would permit significant reductions of military expenditures; it would help to reduce tensions and accelerate the forward movement toward general disarmament." !/ In April, the United States gave additional details on the meaning of President Johnson's proposal for a strategic nuclear vehicle freeze. The following would be frozen: First, ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launching facilities; and sea-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launchers; Second, strategic bombers having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater; Third, ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of between 1,000 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with their associated launching facilities; Fourth, strategic bombers having an empty weight of between 25,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms, together with any associated air­ to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater; Fifth, strategic anti-missile missile systems, together with their associated launching facilities. In connection with this type of armament, further technical discussions will be required in order to formulate a workable and acceptable definition of "anti-missile missile systems." 'l:_I

(During the Senate debate on the partial nuclear test ban treaty Defense Department experts indicated the Soviet Union might have developed' �uge nuclear warheads up to 100 megatons and beyond, possibly for explosion 1n space to counter attacking missiles.) ll Statement of William C. Foster before the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) at Geneva on January 31, 1964, as reported in Department of State Bulletin, March 2, 1964, p. 350. �/ Adrian S. Fisher, Statement to the El\JDC, April 16, 1964.

- 81 - The American delegate said production of new or existing types of armaments within the five categories would be prohibited. Both sides would be allowed to replace, one for one, within agreed annual quo.tas, the vehicles or missiles used "for confidence and training firings" and those lost through accident. Production of replacements would be limited to an agreed an­ nual quota, the United States proposed, amounting to a small percentage of the inventory. "Verification of inventories would not be involved," the Ameri­ can delegate told the Geneva conference. "The agreed replacement numbers would be subject to periodic review." Testing of stratggic delivery vehicles would also be limited under the American program. "Confidence and training firings of existing effective missiles would be limited to an agreed annual number for each type of missile," the United States delegate said. "Tests of new missiles and aircraft systems would be permitted to continue, subject to verifi­ cation, as far as required for allowed space and civil air programs and for development of non-strategic types of weapons not affected by the freeze. Limitation on research and development testing would be subject to technical discussions."

Verification Procedure The United States outlined this procedure for verification of the fre'eze: First, complete declaration of all production and testing facilities. Second, monitoring of critical production steps, replacements and launchings. The verification system could include: 1. Continuing inspection of declared facilities; 2. A specified number of inspections per year to check undeclared locations for possible prohibited activity such as armament production or launching site construction; 3. The stationing of observers to verify all space launchings and all missile firings in order that stated requirements for replacement missiles could be verified and the launch­ ing of prohibited types of missiles detected; 4. Observation of the destruction of vehicles and iaunchers or confirmation of vehicles and launchers being replaced. !/

The freeze agreement would be written into a treaty to be signed and ratified by the United States, the Soviet Union "and such other states as might be agreed."

!/ Ibid.

- 82 - The .American delegate suggested that the treaty include a with­ drawal clause similar to that in the partial test ban treaty. This pro­ vided that any party to the treaty could withdraw if it found its vital security interests endangered.

Bomber Bonfire The American delegate also explained in more detail the United States plan for the destruction of Soviet and American bombers, one for one, in a statement to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva on March 19, 1964. "We propose that this destruction be carried out at the rate of 20 per month on each side, the bombers to be taken from the operational inventory. We are prepared to continue destruction of these bombers at this rate for a period of two years. In addition, we are prepared to increase the total number destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from bombers stored and preserved for emergency mobilization." 1/ Verification should be kept simple, he said, no more than ob­ servation of the destruction of the monthly quota at designated depots. He pointed out that the B-47 is "a truly formidable weapon" which can fly over 4,000 miles without refueling, intercontinental ranges with in­ flight refueling. It can carry a multimegaton bomb load -- greater in explosive yield than all the bombs dropped by all bombers in the second World War.�/ It was acknowledged that the United States already plans to phase out of its operational forces the B-47 bombers it proposed to de­ stroy in return for destruction of TU-16 Soviet bombers. "But the phasing out of aircraft does not mean destruction," he warned. "Bombers in storage can be flying again in short order. What the United States is now proposing is to negotiate a rate of destruction which, if immediately implemented, would be significantly faster(480 planes in two years) than its planned phase-out rate. Moreover, phase­ out plans are subject to reconsideration in the light of changing inter- national circumstances. That has happened in the past; it could happen again. The United States is now proposing the actual physical destruction of an equal number of bombers on each side. Once actual physical destruc­ tion has been accomplished, the aircraft can no longer be returned to operational status." 3/ Since the B-47 and TU-16 bombers possess roughly comparable characteristics and exist in roughly equal numbers, the American delegate pointed out that the balance in over-all force structure of the two sides would be maintained at a reduced level, thus conforming to the fifth principle in the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. (See Appendix I.)

1/ Adrian S. Fisher, Statement at ENDC, March l?, 1964. 2/ Ibid. j/ Ibid.

- 83 - Cutoff President Johnson and Soviet Premier Khrushchev carried the "mutual example" mode of arms limitation another step on April 20, 1964 when they both made independent statements on reducing production of fissionable materials for weapons production. President Johnson's announcement: I am taking two actions today which reflect both our desire to reduce tension and our unwillingness to risk weakness. I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our present production of enriched uranium to be carried out over a four year period. When added to previous re­ ductions, this will mean an over-all decrease in the pro­ duction of plutonium by 20 percent, and of enriched ura­ nium by 40 percent. Jj "This is not disarmament," the President cautioned. "This is not a declaration of peace. But it is a hopeful sign and it is a step forward which we welcome and which we can take in the hope that the world may yet one day live without the fear of war." Stockpiles of United States nuclear weapons had increased 50 percent from 1961 through 1963. The Atomic Energy Commission esti­ mated that the cutbacks in production of fissionable materials would cut total employment at major sites in five states by 2,900 workers, more than 10 percent. About 23,000 were working in the plants before the cuts. Two thousand of the workers laid off were to come from the Hanford Plutonium Production Works at Richland, Washington. Three of the eight reactors there were to be shut down. At the Savannah River site near Aiken, South Carolina, one of the five plutonium reactors would stop operations. At Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, gaseous diffusion plants producing enriched uranium would reduce production by 25 percent. The cutback would mean a saving of $50 million in the 1965 fiscal year. Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in his simultaneous statement of April 20, was less specific than President Johnson. He said the Soviet Government had taken the following decision: 1. To discontinue now the construction of two new big atomic reactors for the production of plutonium.

!/ President Johnson's address to the Associated Press, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, April 20, 1964. - 84 - 2. In the next several years to reduce substantially the production of uranium-235 for nuclear weapons. 3. Accordingly, to allocate more fissionable materials for peaceful uses -- in atomic power stations,in industry, in agriculture,in medicine,in the imple­ mentation of major scientific,technical projects, including the distillation of sea water.1/ After President Johnson announced the shutdown of four out of fourteen American plutonium-producing reactors,the United States offered at Geneva to submit one of the idle plants to international inspection. "This is to provide an example and precedent," ACDA Director William C. Foster told the 18-nation disarmament conference. "However, there is a limit to the extent to which the United States can go in this direction alone. We hope for a measure of reciprocity on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union can decide for itself the size of the step it wishes to take. We should welcome a shutdown of one Soviet plant, a few or all." The United States offered two approaches to the problem of stopping production of fissionable materials for weapons: either a com­ plete halt or "a reciprocal plant-by-plant shutdown." 'l:/ In its earlier proposals to complement its production cut-off with a transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses,the United States had suggested that both sides contribute equal amounts of weapon­ grade U-235. On August 14, 1963, however, the United States offered to transfer a larger amount than the Soviet Union. It suggested offering 60,000 kilograms of U-235 if the Soviet Union would agree to transfer 40,000 kilograms. The ratios remain flexible. The United States emphasized early in 1964 that its proposal "is not merely a gesture ...the approximate monetary value of 60,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 is $720 million."�/ This amount,completely fissioned in explosions,the American delegate pointed out,would release about 1,000 megatons,or "one-third of a ton of 'INT equivalent for every man,woman and child on earth." If the 60,000 kilograms were converted to electrical energy,however, it could provide 370 billion kilowatt hours,more than one-third of the entire United States production of electrical energy in 1963.i/

1/ TASS translation into English of Khrushchev's statement,April 20, 1964. ]/ William C.Foster, Statement at the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, February 13, 1964. �/ Ibid. !/ Ibid.

- 85 - Some members of Congr.ess raised their eyebrows at the proce­ dures involved in the proposed "mutual example " exchange of cutbacks in production of fissionable materials. According to one report, President Johnson wrote Soviet Premier Khrushchev privately after he had decided on the American cutback to in­ vite the Russians to make a similar reduction. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin reportedly brought word of the Khrushchev decision to follow Mr.Johnson's lead on Friday, April 17, the weekend before the near­ simultaneous announcements were made.!/ "Officials here tended to regard this informal method of nego­ tiation as more important than the agreement itself ...." 1:./

Hosmer's Dissent Critics in Congress and the Defense Department, as well as in other branches of the American Government have at times expressed their misgivings about disarmament policies of the Kennedy-Johnson Administra­ tion. One of the most vocal of these has been Republican Representative Craig Hosmer of California. He has accused the Administration of "fuzzy thinking relating to our role in the world military balance of power." Americans have been told, he said, "let the Soviet become equal with the United States in military might and the Soviet will no longer fear us or attack us." He attributed this "fallacious logic " to the "theoreticians and amateur military strategists of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency." He declared: "Today we are witnessing a unilateral approach to disarmament by this Administration which, if continued, will threaten the very security of our nation." II Early in March, Representative Hosmer recalled, the United States had announced at the Geneva disarmament conference that certain American nuclear reactors would be placed under international inspection. "The move was entirely unilateral on our part. No similar action by the Communists was demanded in return. The idea was to set a noble example to Soviet Rus­ sia which, it is hoped, will follow suit. All this might be logical if we were dealing with people who understand such things as good faith and noble examples. But the Reds do not. Such gestures merely prove that our dis­ armers fail totally to understand the nature of the Red enemy. At" no time have the Communists shown a sincere interest in any disarmament proposal which would provide for compulsory verification sys­ tems. They secretly arm as we publicly disarm and weaken ourselves.

1/ The New York Times, April 21, 1964, p. 1. 2/ Ibid. �/ Rep.Craig Hosmer, Congressional Record, March 10, 1964, p. 4720.

- 86 - "Until the Soviets show a real and sincere desire for disarm­ ament, we are just playing into the enemy's hands with our Geneva pro­ posals which serve only to lull the American people into a false sense of peace while the Soviets continue relentlessly on their slated path of world domination. Add to this the fact that there is a strong possi­ bility that the Soviets will make a serious miscalculation of American will to survive. Our apostles of appeasement have distorted the American image and today our nation appears, to those in Europe, Africa, and South America, to be a nation which is selling its birthright of courage and strength for the leaky umbrella of the fallacious 'peace in our times' theory . "There are other roads to peace and one of them is the road of national strength, both military and moral." He noted that the Kennedy-Johnson Administration has been cutting the amount of money budgeted for strategic retaliatory forces, bombers and missiles. In fiscal year 1962, he said, the sum was $9.1 billion. For fiscal year 1965, the sum was $5.3 billion, more than a 40 percent reduction. "By unilateral measures we are rapidly sapping our national stature as a military power," Representative Hosmer declared. ". . . we must act to put the disarmers on some kind of a reasonable leash and place a safety catch on the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's notorious tendency to lead us ever deeper into the fatal quicksands of do-it - ourself disarmament." He gave this inventory of unilateral Administration arms con­ trol measures: "The Administration has all but ki lied the RS-70 program ( for supersonic bombers). It has stopped production of the B-58 bomber. The 8-52 bombers are being retired two or three years ahead of schedule. All B-47s have been ordered junked by 1966. The Skybolt missile program was eliminated. The Jupiter and Thor missiles were removed from their sites in Turkey and Italy just seven months after they were installed. Our high-powered Atlas D and Titan I long-range missiles are �eaded for the scrap heap. By Executive Order the production of fissionable nuclear materials is to be cut drastically and nuclear reactors are to be shut down. The Administration now is considering a proposal of Soviet Russia to burn all bombers. Plans for additional nuclear aircraft carriers have been shelved and Nike Zeus missile killer production canceled. How un­ realistic can we get?" He demanded to know what evidence the Administration had that the Communists were responding to "our unilateral disarmament actions with disarmament actions of their own." He noted newspaper reports that United States intelligence has discovered new anti-missile efforts being established around Moscow.

- 87 - "Reports are heard," he said, "that the Soviets are now con-; structing a spy satellite system in Cuba which will make the·united States subject to continual surveillance." 1/ At the same time, Reoresentative Hosmer proposed changes in the functions and terms of reference of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He suggested dropping the word "Disarmament" from the agency's title; removing the agency from "Department of State planners"; 'l:./ making it responsible to Congress; giving agency reports and recommendations to the chairman and senior minority members of the key congressional commit­ tees, such as the House and Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; requiring the Presi­ dent to give 30 days' advance notice of his intention to reduce or elim­ inate armed services' strength; and spelling out agreements affecting national security which would require approval by bothHouses of Congress. Representative Hosmer complained that the Executive Branch was pursuing a program of unilateral disarmament without properly informing Congress in advance.

"So many times Congress learns 'after the fact', " Mr. Hosmer said, "rather than before." According to the California legislator, the difficult experi­ ence of obtaining Senate ratification for the partial nuclear test ban treaty persuaded the Kennedy-Johnson Administration to turn to other methods for achieving disarmament. "Resort has been made to a murky maze of tacit understanding," he charged. "... e xcept for show-window exercises at the United Nations and the 18-nation Geneva disarmament conference, traditional forms of open diplomatic negotiations toward public pacts subject to constitutional ratification procedures essentially have been put on ice. In their place have been substituted what amounts to secret negotiations between the heads of the American state and the Soviet state by means of letters which, from time to time, are evidenced circumstantially by strangely contemporaneous but seemingly independent, announcements of actions or intentions by the two."�/ The California Representative said the method employed was a 20th century adaptation of past practices by "absolute monarchs in their surreptitious dealings with each other." Monitoring adherence to the "interlocking unilateral" agreements, he said, "appears mostly to depend on the quality of one's intelligence network."

1/ Rep. Craig Hosmer, Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 4721, The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is housed in the State Department 11 building but reports both to the Secretary of State and to the President. �/. Representative Craig Hosmer, "Interlocking Unilateral Arms Control," Washington Report of the American Security Council, May 11, 1964.

- 88 - He used the example of'the simultaneous announcement in Moscow and Washington of cutbacks in production of fissionable materials. Premie1 Khrushchev's announcement was released for 1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on April 20; President Johnson's was for 2:00 p�m. Eastern Standard Time the same day. The Johnson-Khrushchev letters and understandings covered two types of fissionable products, the more ordinary plutonium and the more unusual enriched uranium, the fissionable'isotope extracted by highly secret processes at gaseous diffusion plants under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission. Plutonium --"Premier Khrushchev merely announced that the U.S.S.R. is not going to finish off two production reactors," Represen­ tative Hosmer noted. "He did not indicate whether other unfinished re­ actors, if any, would be completed. He made no reference to reactors in being and now supplying plutonium to nuclear weapons factories, the amount of their production, or how Soviet scientists might be planning to boost it to higher levels. Khrushchev not only promised no cutback whatever in plutonium production, he left entirely open the possibility that the Soviet Union might be increasing it considerably. "In contrast, President Johnson confirmed, on April 20, his order issued in January to shut down and mothball four plutonium proces­ sing reactors and slash the United States output by 20 percent." Enriched uranium -- "Premier Khrushchev announced -- but he did not promise -- what he termed a 'substantial' cutback in production to be accomplished 'over the next several years.' What did he mean by 'the next several years'? When does it start? When does it end? How big a slash in Soviet production of U-235 does he believe warrants the adjective 'substantial'?" President Johnson boosted his January promise of a 25 percent cutback in enriched uranium to 40 percent in the April speech. According to Representative Hosmer, the Johnson-Khrushchev "unwritten pact" amounted to: "A 20 percent cutback in U.S.A. plutonium production in return for a zero percent U.S.S.R. cutback -- with no limits on an actual increase by the latter. "A 40 percent cutback in U.S.A. enriched uranium production in return for what may be no more than a 15 percent U.S.S.R. cutback 'some­ time.' " !/

!/ Mr. Hosmer reasoned that President Johnson had described his 15 per- cent increase in the cut of enriched uranium production as "substantial," therefore one might anticipate a 15 percent Soviet cutback in production of enriched uranium, since Mr. Johnson had also described the promi-sed Soviet cut as "substantial."

- 89 - Shortly after he came to power, President Kennedy ordered a 17.5 percent reduction in enr.iched uranium, Representative Hosmer re­ called. From February 1961, then, the combined Kennedy-Johnson cuts amount to 50 percent, he concluded.

President Johnson had swapped "one rabbit for one horse," Representative Hosmer concluded, and "the wily Russians rode away on a steed." Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, has emphasized in appearances before Congress that American stocks of en­ riched uranium and plutonium exceed military requirements by a wide mar­ gin so that the cutbacks really amount to economy moves. Noting a $4 billion investment in production facilities, Rep­ presentative Hosmer asked if the Atomic Energy Commission had done its work "so shabbily" that it overestimated plutonium needs by 20 percent and enriched uranium needs by 50 percent? Or has the Department of Defense reduced its requirements for strategic and tactical warhead� the California lawmaker inquired? Or has the nature of the Soviet threat changed? The California Congressman's sharp criticisms were not widely reported. The Administration made no public reply.

- 90 - Phoenix Study One broad study of disarmament policy which caused some stir in official Washington was the so-called "Phoenix Study," prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis in the Capital in the summer of 1963. As an example of the input from non-government organizations which help ACDA shape its arms control and disarmament policies, it may throw some light on policy-making processes in the government. Here are the 22 recommen­ dations as quoted by U.S.A., a bi-weekly published in New York: 1. The United States should seek to use its resource superi­ ority to influence the Soviet Union to adopt as its objective a pattern of resources use more conducive to the control of conflict. This re­ quires that the Soviet goal of 'catching up,' which has hitherto been characterized by emphasis on levels of production, largely of heavy industry and military hardware, be redefined as a pattern of use com­ parable with the United States. 2(a). The United States should seek to develop a tacit under­ standing to reduce the level of military expenditures, based on the principle of maximization of power for each side at lower levels of force. This understanding is to be reached, not only for its own sake, but to foster agreement· on other areas of common action. The United States should seek to arrange for annual consultations on the national budgets, as a supplementary source of information in the event the above approach to arms reduction is adopted. (b) Arms reduction should be preceded and accompanied by a substantial increase in the direct exchange of scientists and experts be­ tween the states. 3. In the absence of disarmament agreements, the United States should encourage development of mutually invulnerable strategic weapons systems as a contribution to the stability of the military environment.

4. The United States should continue to search for step-by­ step measures which increase the stability of the military environment without unduly upsetting the political balance. 5. The United States should seek to expand the area of under­ standing between the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to mutual restraint of allies and neutrals so as to reduce the possibility of great power involvement in conflicts which do not serve their vital inter­ ests. 6. The United States should develop a code for the semi-violent, non-monopoly great power politics in the emerging areas as background for discussions and negotiations with the Soviet Union on specific issues.

- 91 - 7. The United States should undertake, and seek to encourage the Soviet Union to undertake as well, a review of military assistance programs in light of their mutual interest and the need for military stability. 8. The United States should recognize that the belief of both sides that "time is on our side" contributes to the control of con­ flict. It should foster this belief in the United States,and recognize that similar belief in the Soviet Union can be an asset to United St�tes security. 9. The United States should accept the need for a dual policy of collaboration and conflict as a significant improvement over unmitigated conflict. 10. A substantial increase in scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union should be sought for its own sake, as a means of providing an opening to other areas of common action, a.nd, indeed, as a means of advancing the U.S. security interests in the absence of agreement on disarmament or inspection. 11. The United States should allocate substantial research and development funds for the specific purpose of devising and designing future major space activities which could be accomplished more effectively by the United States and the Soviet Union together than by either alone. The United States should further continue to seek step-by-step expansion of cooperation in space with the Soviet Union on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. 12. The United States should seek to expand its programs for common action with the Soviet Union in the earth's atmosphere and in the ocean. 13. The possibility of U.S. assistance in the development of Soviet agriculture should be explored. 14. The United States should accept the spread of Western tech­ nology in the Soviet Union as being in the longer-run interests of the United States. Thus, the United States should gradually de-emphasize efforts to block the spread of technology and give increased attention to insuring that the two-way flow is more symmetrical and that the West to East flow is accompanied by the spread of knowledge of Western social structure. 15. The United States should be prepared to reduce its restric­ tions on trade with the Soviet Union. 16. Additional research should be undertaken, and increased emphasis given, to the over-all problem of communication and information flow between the Soviet and American societies.

- 92 - 17. Joint studies of the educational process in the two countries should be attempted. 18. Increased contact in fields of study such as cultural anthropology, psychiatry, social psychology, and comparative historical and political research should be fostered. 19. The United States should seek to expand inter-action with the Soviet people in areas such as art, games, and tourism. 20. U.S. efforts to assist the advance of modern technology in developing areas should seek to focus Soviet attention on practical problems and to expose Soviet citizens to a diversity of experience. 21. The United States should seek to draw the Soviet Union into greater participation and coordination by lateral and multilateral arrangements for assistance to developing areas. 22. The United States should significantly base research on the process of social and political development in emerging countries, both to clarify the effect of its own policies and to develop a better understanding of the consequences of alternative forms of competition with the Soviet Union. Republican Representative Lipscomb, of California, was critical of the Phoenix Study in a speech in the House of Representatives Febru­ ary 10, 1964. He said its list of recommendations was important because Administration policies seemed to have coincided with them "to a high degree ....Although it purports to be nothing more than its �uthor's opinions, it has turned out to be a handy advance guide book to Adminis­ tration actions." J/ Representative Glenard P. Lipscomb observed that five of the recommendations in the Phoenix Study had already found their way into United States official policy. The Administration had embarked on a· "mutual example" program for restricting military budgets; for coopera­ tive exploration of space, including a joint expedition to the moon; the United States was helping with fertilizer, insecticides, and wheat to build up Soviet agriculture; trade restrictions with the Soviet Union were being reduced; scientific cooperation was being expanded in the joint program for measuring cosmic-ray intensity and in the Echo II balloon satellite programs. Mr. Lipscomb, however, was one of only a few who took note of disarmament policy or its relation to other Ameri­ can policies toward the Soviet Union.

Jj Congressional Record, February 10, 1964, pp. 2720-24.

- 93 - One hypercritical element in the United States considers the American program for general and complete disarmament to be the prototype of a "treason treaty." This faction has charged, for instance, that the United States disarmament program, based on the Act setting up the Ar�s Control and Disarmament Agency and the policies subsequently developed, would place the United States under the authority �f a United Nations military dictatorship; that the United States would at some point be expected to agree to turning over effective control of a greatly strength­ ened United Nations to the Soviet Union and its satellites. The State Department has formally denied these charges. "The goal of the United States disarmament program is the establishment of a free, secure and peaceful world of independent nations adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law," the State Department says in a formal answer to a "treason treaty" circular. "Such a world is the basic goal of the United States foreign policy. The program clearly does not contemplate surrendering our national sovereignty to any world government or anyone else." The basis for the "treason treaty" criticism, apparently, was the provision in the American GCD plan for strengthening international peace-keeping machinery within the framework of the United Nations as progress toward disarmament was-made. The State Department rejected these charges in the following terms: 1. The program does provide for the establish­ ment of a United Nations Peace Force to assure that the security of nations would be protected. But such a force would not be established until all nations had agreed upon the details of its control, purpose, com­ position and strength. The United States would not agree to the creation of such a force unless and until it was certain that the provisions for its command and control were consistent with the security of the United States and with the proper use of.force for maintaining peace in a disarmed world. 2. There is nothing in the United States proposals that would establish a world government or detract from the authority of our Supreme Court. The Statute of the International Court of Justice itself precludes any such thing. Article 34 of the Court's Statute states that "Only states may be parties in cases before the court." In other words, the Court may only exercise its functions, under the provisions of the Statute, with respect to con­ tentious cases between governments, not between individuals.

- 94 - 3. Section 33 of the Arms Control and Dis­ armament Act contains the following specific pro­ visions: That no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless author­ ized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States. This means that the American people are assured that any general agreement on arms control or disarma­ ment which might be agreed to by the United States will, before going into. effect, be subject to the scrutiny and approval of their elected representatives. Any treaty concluded as a result of disarmament negotiations would require the approval of a two-thirds majority of the Senate. Any agreement in a form other than a treaty would require additional legislation passed by a majority of both Houses of the Congress for its execution. The United States recognizes that its disarmament program for complete, general and guaranteed disarma- · ment in a peaceful world is certainly not achievable in the near future. But the United States believes that it is in the interests of this Nation to maintain the in­ itiative in its efforts to achieve a peaceful world of free and independent nations. The disarmament effort is part of this initiative, and in keeping with the great heritage and.tradition of the Nation.

GCD: Fading Concept? Representative Hosmer has introduced a bill in the Second Session of the 88th Congress to change the name and the functions of the Arms Con­ tol and Disarmament Agency, eliminating its function of planning for complete disarmamentJ./He reasons that since complete disarmament is impossible to verify it is not a rational goal. Nuclear weapons could be hidden in the vast areas of the Soviet Union and the United States with little hope of detection. The best known detectors could pass within a few feet of con­ cealed nuclear weapons without noticing them. Since rigorous inspection is impossible and the Soviet Union is not to be trusted, Representative Hosmer reasons that disarmament is not a rational goal for United States policy.

!/ H.R. 10311, March 10, U64.

- 95 - Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko indicated at the United Nations General Assembly in 1962, and again in 1963, that his government was aware of the need to preserve some level of nuclear protection so long as this discovery problem remained unsolved. He made no special point of his suggestion for maintaining a "nuclear umbrella," however, probably because of its inconsistency with the Soviet Union's widely publicized calls for general and complete disarmament. Others were not so inhibited. The Pugwash Conference of scientists from 24 nations, held in India late in January 1964, produced an endorsement for the idea of a "minimum deterrent force" or the "nuclear umbrella," as Soviet Premier Khrushchev once called it. "We regard the possibility of agreement on the principles of a nuclear umbrella or a minimum deterrent force to offer one of the most hopeful avenues to reach agreement on comprehensive disarmament under effective controls," the Pugwash Conference said. !/ An Indian participant in the January Pugwash Conference, Professor Vikram A. Sarabhai, suggested that the "nuclear umbrella" be comprised of missile-carrying submarines, subject to inspection when they return to their bases. Soviet scientists joined the rest of the early 1964 Pugwash Con­ ference in agreeing that maintaining a minimum deterrent "is of major importance in providing the necessary guarantees against aggression by means of hidden weapons." 1/ Pugwash scientists also embraced the policy of arms control by "mutual example" without inspection. The conference's final statement said: We believe that the adoption, in particular by the nuclear powers, of balanced measures requiring no control, by way of the policy of mutual example, would make a valuable contribution to the restriction of the arms race and the improvement of the international atmosphere. Such measures could improve the further reduction of military budgets and of armed forces, withdrawals of troops on foreign soil and closings of foreign military bases.�/ The Soviet Union and the United States had the largest contingents of scientists at the conference.

!/ Pugwash Conferences have no official standing but frequently point the way to policies later embraced by governments.

11 Report of Working Group I, Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, January 27-February 1, 1964, Udaipur, India.

�/ Twelfth Annual Pugwash Conference, January 27-February l, 1964, Udaipur, India.

- 96 - A French participant in the January 27-February 1 Pugwash Conference in Udaipur, India, General P. Genevey, has suggested that disarmament has been approached from the wrong end. In the past, inspections for disarmament or controls have been tailored to disarma­ ment. He suggested that in the future the free world should accept the natural resistance to intrusions and."indiscretions" attendant on rigorous inspection, then tailor disarmament to controls rather than the other way round. The Pugwash Conference suggested the following measures for disarmament by mutual example: 1. Reduction of military budgets. 2. Reduction of armed forces. 3. Withdrawals or reductions of troops on foreign soil. 4. Closing of foreign military bases. The Pugwash scientists could not agree whether an end to pro­ duction and deployment of strategic weapons could be achieved by a policy of mutual example. They discussed possible renunciation unilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union (by mutual example) of the anti­ ballistic missile defense of cities. There was no agreement either on the possibility or the desirability of this step. The subject was to be taken up again at the September 1964 meeting of the Pugwash Conference in Czechoslovakia.

One group at the conference had an additional suggestion: We consider it desirable that the governments of nuclear powers, in .order to encourage the policy of mutual example, should seek to limit their nuclear arms race by refusing to accumulate further atomic bombs and nuclear warheads until the agreement on general and complete disarmament has been reached. ll The scientists also urged that steps be taken to admit Red China to the United Nations and to disarmament deliberations: In the long run we must realize that disarmament will be neither general nor complete unless all nations, including the People's Republic of China, adhere to the agreements. Wholehearted adherence of the People's Republic of China will be made more likely if she is

ll Report of Working Group II, Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, January 27-February 1, 1964, Udaipur, India.

- 97 - brought into the disarmament deliberations soon. In view of this, we urge that steps be taken which will make it possible for her to participate in the discussions and to take her place as a member of the United Nations family. lf

Proliferation Problem On February 6, 1964, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union that the two powers enter into private discussions to seek agree- ment on terms for an anti-proliferation declaration. Both powers, accord­ ing to the American suggestion in the Geneva Conference, would declare their intention to withhold nuclear weapons from the control of other states and demand statements of other nations that they would not attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. This would follow the pattern of a United Nations General Assembly resolution introduced by Ireland against dissemination of nuclear­ weapons control. Pugwash Conference scientists also expressed concern about the possibility that nuclear weapons will spread to other nations, despite the inhibiting influence of the nuclear test ban treaty. Working Group II of the Pugwash Conference of January 27-February l, 1964, held in Udaipur, India, devoted most of its report to the problem: Though we think it improbable today that a nation having agreed not to test, would nonetheless embark upon the elaborate and costly program necessary for atomic bomb production, we can conceive of circumstances where this might no longer be the case. A number of nations are at present moving from the research-reactor stage of development into the large-power-reactor stage. These nations will soon have fairly easy access to plutonium. If a nation is able to obtain, directly, or indirectly through the cooperation of experienced personnel, assis­ tance in the design of detonated mechanisms, it might take the step of providing itself with a nuclear arsenal. This type of development would be encouraged and made more significant if the same nations had previously been or were subsequently provided with effective means for the delivery of atomic weapons. In view, then, of the continuing dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, we believe the following measures to be necessary: (1) All nations presently possessing nuclear weapons should jointly undertake not to transfer these

- 98 - weapons or technical information relating to them to any other state or group of states. Many of the group view with concern the pro­ posed establishment of a European multi(ateral force. There exists a serious danger that such a force will make permanent the already undesirable dispersal of nuclear weapons in Europe. (2) The Government of each of the nuclear powers should take whatever measures may be open to it to discourage its nationals with experience in the field of nuclear-weapons technology from contributing to the development of the nuclear weapons capacity of any foreign power. (3) States which-abstain from manufacturing or acqu1r1ng nuclear weapons should have their territorial boundaries guaranteed by the United Nations. The United States and the USSR should recognize a special responsi­ bility for cooperation to make this guarantee effective. In individual cases, special measures may be necessary. It might, for example, be necessary, with the consent of the countries concerned, to station United Nations forces along disputed boundaries and perhaps also within the country or countries involved, in order to provide for an immediate response �o any violation. If a guarantee of this sort is to be acceptable to recipients as a substitute for the possession of nuclear forces under thei·r own command, the two great powers must have demonstrated that they have a strong common interest in avoiding threats to the peace. This they can do by refraining from competitive intervention by the supply of arms or by any other means with the intention of altering existing territorial or political situations anywhere in the world. (4) We consider it desirable that the Governments of nuclear powers, in order to encourage the policy of mutual example, should seek to limit the nuclear arms race by refusing to accumulate further atomic bombs and nuclear warheads until the agreement on general and complete disarmament has been reached. (5) The scientists of nations which do not possess nuclear weapons have the.possibility and responsibility of warning their Governments and their countrymen of the dangers arising from the further spread of nuclear weapons.

- 99 - (6) The possibility of controls over the transfer of offensive conventional weapons (par­ ticularly those designed for or adaptable to the delivery of nuclear weapons) was discussed. It was agreed that it would not be practicable to differentiate these weapons from defensive. ones. However, the possibility of a world-wide-agree­ ment to regulate all traffic in conventional weapons perhaps does merit careful re-examination in the light of the new relationship among states. Consideration should also be given to measures which might be adopted by Governments to di s·courage their nationals from contributing to the develop­ ment of advanced military capabilities of other countries. One Pugwash suggestion was new. It was that the two major nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, should recognize their "special responsibility" in helping the United Nations to guarantee the boundaries of states which abstain from manufacturing nuclear weapons.

- 100 - INSPECTION: HOW MUCH AND WHEN?

The failure of the West to persuade the Soviet Union to accept effective inspection has been the principal barrier to East-West agree­ ments on arms control, as has become clear in this study. The obverse of inspection is the Soviet penchant for secrecy. From the Kremlin's point of view, its policies of secrecy have real military advantages. Secrecy hides Soviet weaknesses and permits Soviet leaders to build up their own deterrent by boasting of military power that may or may not be there. Secrecy also compensates for c�mou­ flage, for hardening of missile sites, and for other costly precautions which might be needed to reduce the Soviet Union's military vulnerabil­ ity. Secrecy also gives the Soviet Union a possibility of making a technological "end run" around the United States, as the experts say. That is, Soviet scientists may strike upon some new ultimate "weapon" before the West discovers it, build it in secrecy, then spring it on the Western powers and press a temporary advantage until the West surrenders. The United States had a similar opportunity when it had a monopoly on the atomic bomb but purposely did not use its advantage. The Soviet Union will not give up lightly the military advan­ tages of maintaining a secret society. Given communism's respect for power, the prospects for persuading the Soviet Union to give up its military strength and the asset of secrecy to obtain a genuine disarma­ ment or arms-control agreement have been and will probably continue to be extremely difficult of achievement, many observers believe. Still the West has made some progress since World War II in penetrating the Soviet secrecy barrier. There have been exchanges of in­ formation and scientists, formal and meager, but significant nonetheless. In recent months the Soviet Union has suspended jamming of Western radio broadcasts. Direct censorship of foreign correspondents' dispatches from the Soviet Union has been eased. This sort of reduction of Soviet secrecy has been accomplished with the consent of the Soviet Government, after official agreement with Washington or by unilateral decision of the Soviet leadership. Soviet secrecy's effectiveness in the military area is being reduced by another significant development: technological advances like the U-2 aerial photographic snoopers of unusual capacity; and the so­ called "spy satellites," also equipped with marvelous photographic instrumentation. The so-called "intelligence gap," which only a few years ago was one of the United States' principal disadvantages and one of the Soviet Union's leading advantages, has narrowed substantially in recent years.

- 101 Defense Department strategists are now much more confident of their ability to judge the Soviet military strength in being. What the Soviet Union has on the drawing board --.in research and development phases -- so far has not been in an area where Western technology could penetrate, however. ll Since "Rand D" is the area where the Soviet Union might make its "technological end run," it has become an area of great curiosity among policymakers in Washington. Any thorough-going arms-control arrangement, it is widely agreed, still must have provisions for rigorous inspection. Until 1961, most United States programs for effective inspec­ tion of disarmament were based on the principle that the full inspection paraphernalia should be in place and operating before any disarmament at all could be undertaken. This was to assure, from the start, that there could be no cheating. As a result, arms control and disarmament could proceed in complete trust on both sides. In the 15-year period following World War II, however, the Soviet Union constantly resisted this concept on the ground that it was an espio­ nage plot by the West. What would happen, they asked, if the complete inspection paraphernalia were installed and then the West failed to go through with disarmament on some trumped-up excuse? What the West sought, Kremlin spokesmen charged, was inspection of armament instead of inspec­ tion of disarmament. In the late 1950's, many scholars and scientists sought methods to meet the Soviet objections. There evolved from this search the con­ cept that the amount of inspection should match, roughly, the amount of disarmament. Both would increase together.

Progressive Zonal Inspection In its treaty outline of April 18, 1962, the United States stated this new concept as a basic principle: the extent of inspection would be related to the amount of disarmament and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty. Several systems for progressive inspection could be devised which would conform to the principle, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has found. '];./ ll Walter F. Hahn, "The Mainsprings of Soviet Secrecy," Orbi s (Winter, 1963), p. 746.

11 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 13, January, 1963.

- 102 - ACDA went so far as to publish a pamphlet on "Progressive Zonal Inspection," which, it was said, should not be considered as a reflection of the United States position on inspection. To have balanced disarmament or arms limitation, verified both during and after it occurs, ACDA found six objects and activities would have to be watched: I. Destruction of armaments. 2. Conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. 3. Reduction of armed forces. 4. Halting or limiting of declared production, testing and other specific activities.

5. Agreed levels of armaments and armed forces. 6. Absence of undeclared production, testing and other specified activities which are subject to termination or limitation.!/ The first three points could be verified at agreed depots and other agreed locations, ACDA said. As for production and testing facilities, these would be de­ clared by nations participating in the disarmament plan and the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization would have access to the facilities to establish that activities had been halted or limited as promised. Verifying points 5 and 6, however, would require a great deal of access within the nations which would be parties to the treaty "if 100 percent verification were required," ACDA said. "The creation of the extensive disarmament organization re­ quired to fulfill such a commitment in this time scale [three years each for the first and second stages and an undetermined number of years for the third and last stage] could be achieved, but in terms of cost and effectiveness the effort approaches the impracticable," ACDA found. Y ACDA defined "balanced" disarmament to mean two things: 1. "No party can gain a military advantage." 2. "No party can suffer a loss of secutity." l/ Ibid. '];/ Ibid.

- 103 - "Full scale nation-wide inspection early in the disarmament schedule would not be in keeping" with these two principles, ACDA said. The progressive zonal inspection system would satisfy this principle of balance, ACDA found. "It assures that no nation is gaining a military advantage or suffering a loss of security relative to other nations, in a way which minimizes the amount of access to national terri­ tories during the early stages of disarmament." Two other principles related to verification during and after disarmament were also set forth in the United States plan:

1. "Extent of verification is to be related to the amount .of disarmament and the degree of risk involved." 2. "Verification of both arms reductions and arms levels is required." 1/ The progressive zonal inspection system "also satisfies the principle of verification," ACDA maintained, "in so far as the amount of verification is balanced with the amount of disarmament and the amount of verification is prog.ressively increased as disarmament increases." It "thus provides a realistic degree of assurance at each stage in the dis­ armament process, that the treaty measures are being honored," ACDA said. "Finally, it minimizes the size and cost of the disarmament organization." ACDA gave this explanation of progressive zonal inspection: Each nation is divided into a number of zones -­ for example, 25, 50, 100, or some other agreed number. After disarmament has started, one or more of the zones are selected to be inspected within an initial time period. After the inspection has occurred in the selected zone or zones d1,1ring the initial period, additional zones are selected for inspection within the next.time period. After each period, new zones are selected, and finally, after a designated number of periods, all zones will have been inspected. Once a zone is inspected, it is subject to inspection thereafter. The timing of progressive zonal inspection is arranged to correspond with the disarmament so that a nation is subject to complete inspection only when the final stage of disarmament has been com­ pleted. Thus, the degree of inspection increases in proportion to the degree of disarmament through­ out the process.

1/. -- Ibid.

- 104 - ENT DISARMAM STAGES Of SUCCESSIVE

ernment El'l1 0tl n Go• RMAM PEc11 ngto : f 01sA Al 11-1s (Washi ul-11 O iotl ,on 13 ""'o ESSIVE o •b l., cat " ll,OGR en

- 106 - Once the zones were drawn and agreed to by the treaty par­ ticipants, the United States would declare total levels of armaments, forces, and specified activity, subject to verification in each of the 50 zones. This information would be turned over to the International Disarmament Organization. The third step, selection of zones for inspection, could be accomplished in four ways, by the International Disarmament Organization; by the non-host (Western or Soviet bloc); by random choice; or by some combination of the other three. Once the zones were selected, each power to be inspected would declare the exact locations of armaments, forces, and other inspectable activities within the selected zone.

ACDA prepared the �he?retical example of a zone, shown on page 108, assumed to cover about one-fiftieth of the total area of the United States. The United States would then declare the exact locations of all sensitive activities inside the zone, in this theoretical case. (See sketch, page 109. The next step would be to provide assurance against undeclared movements of inspectable items to or from the zone. Ground inspection posts would meet this provision partially, if established at agreed locations including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases. ACDA assumed that the zone boundary-monitoring process involved establishment of posts as shown on the sketch on page 110. Once the boundaries of the zone were sealed and ground inspection posts were established inside, aerial and mobile ground inspection follow, "to verify the absence of prohibited stockpiles and activities," ACDA said. "In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned, aerial and mobile ground inspection units would have free and unimpeded access within the zone. Verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected. Once a zone had been inspected, it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to addi­ tional zones." According to the time schedule agreed upon for general and com­ plete disarmament, additional zones of the United States would be selected, one at a time, until by the end of the third stage all disarmament measures would have been completed and zonal inspection would have been extended throughout the United States. ACDA supplied the chart shown at page 111 to illustrate how the schedule for disarmament and inspection might be phased.

- 107 - c ...... 0 ....'° ...... (.) ...... Q c..=

"O (1) ...... c :::, .. (1) (.),.. 0= U')

. _ 100 ------.. --. --.UV�-- - �

I. Naval S hipyards, Naval bases and forces. 4. Army posts and forces. 2. Naval air stations and forces. 5. Fissionable material production plants. 3. SAC and TAC bases and forces -- aircraft 6. Key armaments production plants. and missiles, 7. Missile testing facilities. (Numbers 5, 6, and 7 would be subject to inspection as part of the disarmament measures proposed elsewhere in the U.S. treaty outline, independent of progressive zonal inspection requirements.) S ource: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 13, .Q.Q. cit. - -._- �,. f +- - ....

...... 0

Roads I I I I Railroads ...A.. Progressive zonal inspection bases Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 13, .Q.E. cit. RMAMENT NSPECTION ES Of DISA ZONAL I ON Of RAT OGRESSIVE COMPARIS AND PR

100%

3 'T" GE \\ 0 S lEP ' S "GE \ S'T i'MEl'l1 1ol'I nei< si'RM SPEc1 e fo< t H Of 01 t,1i'l 1t,1 arrang "'out VE zo es and " GRESSI e zon Of PRO •1 ect tb "'ou\'11 ak es to; " es it t • tim d •0 on, , e1ati� eas, an e th• on ar �- refl ct e<•att .21!· cu<••• nd obs ion 13, n th• ep0ts a blicat t•P• i to d encY pu ntal s eapons ent Ag horizo ansfer � sarmam (1b• , to tr and 01 spection control in e Afl'S stat s United source : "Progressive zonal inspection m1n1m1zes the amount of access required within national territories during the early stages of disarma­ ment when access is needed least, and maximizes assurance during the last stages, when assurance is needed most," ACDA claimed. "It is correspondingly efficient in terms of the size and cost of the International Disarmament Organization effort required to verify the levels of arms. Together with the other measures outiined in the United States treaty outline, it deserves consideration as a feasible and consistent way to move forward toward general and complete disarma­ ment in a peaceful world."!/ British Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler, in a speech before the Geneva Disarmament Conference on February 25, 1964, expressed his nation's views on the inspection problem in these words: We think that the problems of verification should be subjected to detailed study now by the conference ....We are agreed that with 100 per­ cent disarmament there should be 100 percent in­ spection. Similarly, we are agreed, apart from any agreement on a comprehensive test ban or on prelim­ inary measures, that with no disarmament there will be no inspection. We are agreed that disarmament shall take place in three stages. Can we not go forward from there, and agree that as disarmament advances the degree of inspection advances hand in hand with it? If, in addition to the preliminary measures I have been talking about, we could con­ centrate on the first full stage of disarmament, can we not acknowledge that whatever degree of dis­ armament we have in that stage, we have the same degree of inspection? If we agreed to this in principle we could then analyze how it could be put into practice. There are many possible ways of doing this, and it may be worth while to approach the problem of veri­ fication from new angles. For example, it might be worth examining what I might call a 'functional' rather than a regional approach. Studies might be made of how certain key categories of armaments, and certain key components of these armaments are pro­ duced and stored. These studies might lead in turn to fresh conclusions about the type of control needed perhaps some kind of spot or sample inspection -- to insure that permitted production was not being exceeded.

!/ Ibid.

- 112 - Similar checks might give enough information about armaments already in existence (both those permitted and those which might be hidden). Add­ ing the results of such studies together we might arrive at fresh conclusions about the problem of verification as a whole. 1/ The United States sought in many ways to provoke reciprocal Soviet moves in the disarmament and inspection fields by taking the lead in setting examples. Three reactors in the United States were under international inspection in the spring of 1964. Two were research reactors at Brook­ haven, New York, and the third was a 45,500 thermo kilowatt power reactor in Ohio. The United States' purpose in opening these reactors to inspec­ tion by the International Atomic Energy Agency was to develop the principle of safeguarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy (so that plutonium pro­ duced could not be diverted to military_ uses) and to gain practical experi­ ence in field-testing inspection techniques that might be useful in any disarmament agreement._ In explaining the program to the 18-nation disarmament committee in Geneva, the American delegate said: "The United States does not believe that the opening of these reactors to international inspection is a dero­ gation of its national sovereignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous. It involves record-keeping, reporting and inspection -- the same kind of controls as prudent management would naturally set up internally. For the purposes of a safeguard system, such controls must be checked and inspected by an external agency. "For the necessary external check, we prefer international to bi­ lateral safeguards. There is little reason for any country to doubt the objectivity of inspections conducted by an international inspectorate in which nationals of a variety of countries participate." 2/ These comments were intended to encourage the Soviet Union, chary of on-site inspection techniques of all kinds, to consider seriously open­ ing Soviet reactors to similar inspection. As a further incentive to the Soviet Union, the United States planned to invite International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to in­ stitute safeguards at a large power reactor, the Yankee installation, at

!/ R.A. Butler, speech before the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Febru­ ary 25, 1964, as quoted in Vital Speeches, March 15, 1964. 1:./ Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA, Statement before the Con­ ference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, March 5, 1964, extract from ENDC/PV 172.

- 113 - Rowe, Massachusetts, a privately-owned installation rated at 600,000 thermo kilowatts. It was one of the largest nuclear power reactors in operation in the United States, producing over one billion electrical kilowatt hours in 1963. "We urge the Soviet Union in particular to reciprocate," the American delegate said. He also claimed the safeguards program h�d special significance for slowing down the arms race. As atomic energy becomes an increasingly important resource for power, he noted, transfers of nuclear materials between states will multiply. Then it will be "of the utmost importance," he said, to insure that "these peaceful atomic energy activities are not diverted to military purposes .... If we do not, we shall find that in extending the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes we have not sown a field with choice seed which will ripen into a field of grain for the benefit of all mankind. We may find instead that we have sown the field with dragons' teeth and, when harvest comes, it will bristle with nuclear weapons. What the United States proposes are practical steps to keep that from happening." lf

lf Ibid.

- 114 - THE FUTURE

Secretary of State Rusk was still optimistic in 1964 that additional small steps in the disarmament and �rms control field could help to reduce tensions further. "One must take a fairly long look at these disarmament problems," Mr. Rusk said. "They have been discussed for more than 40 years with varying success at one time or another." The Secretary continued:

But we are going to stay with it because we cannot afford to do otherwise. It is important to continue the effort to find real steps in the disarmament field. I have been somewhat encour­ aged to see that there is some indication that the Soviet Uniori, the United States and others are not this next year simply lifting the scale of the arms race to new levels; that there is a temporary at least leveling off of that effort. It may be that this can open up some possibili­ ties. I think on such matters as the nondis­ semination of nuclear weapons it is very diffi­ cult to bring that to a formal agreement. Nevertheless, it is my impression that Moscow, Paris, London and Washington are not planning to disseminate nuclear weapons into other national hands. That parallel attitude, parallel policy, on the part of these four nuclear powers is itself a minor piece of encouragement in the disarmament field. ll

Arms limitation by mutual example thus remained very much on the mind of high Administrative officials.

One of the most authoritative looks into the future of arms control and the arms race was taken by recently-resigned Roswell L. Gilpatric, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defense for the first three years of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration.

He noted that United States policy was moving in two direc­ tions, to continue to prepare for war while at the same time moving cautiously toward peace.

"But what about tomorrow?" he asked. "Will we be successful in holding to both lines of policy? Will we be able to decrease our ll Secretary Rusk at a news conference March 6, 1964, State Depart­ ment Press Release No. 96.

- 115 - defense effort, supposing a reduction is consistent with our national commitments and national interests, without relaxing our resolve to deter aggression and international lawlessness? Or, on the other hand, will we be able to move as freely as we should toward alleviating cold war tensions, while still maintaining adequate defenses?"!/ Democracies historically have found it difficult to find the middle path, Mr. Gilpatric wrote. "Too often the tendency has been toward an all-or-nothing approach; an approach which cannot reconcile the simultaneous existence of both danger and opportunity; an approach which leads nations to view wars as either unthinkable (and so dis­ couraging serious attention to defenses) or inevitable (and so requir­ ing a rigid stand against the enemy) -- or even as both unthinkable and inevitable, with the consequent breakdown of any semblance of policy." "Should a prolonged relaxation of tension become reality," Mr. Gilpatric wrote, "the United States would want neither to continue its armaments at unnecessarily high levels nor to cut them prematurely because both would bring dangers and instabilities." Therefore, Ameri­ cans should "start thinking now about 'after-the-cold-war' defense pol­ icies," he suggested. ];/ In view of what Soviet Premier Khrushchev calls the "policy of mutual example," Mr. Gilpatric noted, the United States and the Soviet Union both appeared to be cutting their budgets by about four percent in the 1964-65 period. How far could this process of arms limitation without formal agreement proceed, he asked. "To the extent that the Soviet cut reflects a genuine reduction in military forces, it reduces the level of the military threat which the West must be prepared to negate, and so allows for some reduction in that countervailing effort. Similarly, to the extent that the U.S. budget decline reflects, as it does, a tapering off in the growth of our strategic nuclear forces, that presumably makes possible a decision by prudent Soviet planners to slow down their own effort." �/ Assuming that through a policy of "mutual example," both the Soviet Union and the United States gradually reduced their military power, the United States would still have three requirements for armed strength, Mr. Gilpatric believes. Its purposes would be to deter or counter (1) Soviet forces; (2) Chinese Communist forces and their allies; and (3) forces of "subversive insurgency," not involving direct confrontation of the major powers.

!/ Roswell L. Gilpatric, "Our Defense Needs," Foreign Affairs (April, 1964), p. 367. ];/ Ibid. -3/ --Ibid. ' p. 371 .

- 116 - For those three broad missions, Mr. Gilpatric envisioned a combination of United States military forces organized by 1970 into four broad categories: Strategic retaliatory forces. A deterrent force, consisting only of hardened and dispersed land-based and mobile sea-based missiles, with all of the vulner­ able, earlier-generation missiles deactivated and all manned bombers retired from active deployment. Such a force, comprised of weapons systems invulnerable to surprise attack, would be capable of destroying the centers of Soviet and Chinese Communist society. Continental air and missile defense forces. Only warning systems, such as the big ballistic missile de­ tection and tracking radars in Alaska, Greenland and Scotland, and the current generation of surface-to-air missile systems for tactical deployment would be main­ tained. Manned interceptors with their ground-control counterparts and all other bomber defense and warning systems would be phased out unless the Soviets changed their presently indicated intention of concentrating their strategic power in missiles. There would be no production or deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems in the absence of Soviet moves to proceed be­ yond experimental installations of such systems. Reconnaissance forces. Both aircraft and satellite­ based reconnaissance systems would be retained and im­ proved to take full advantage of state-of-the-art devel­ opments, so as to provide the United States at all times with a world-wide capability for the collection of both strategic and tactical intelligence. General-purpose forces. No significant changes would take place in this category except for a reduc­ tion of Army divisions that might be withdrawn at some stage from Korea or from Europe (if a decline in the Soviet threat there allowed). The remaining Army ground forces and the existing Marine divisions, with presently planned air support and airlift (consisting of all the Tactical Air and Military Air Transport units, plus the Marine Air wings), would be needed to deter or counter threats of aggression not directly inspired or supported by the U.S.S.R. The bulk of the U.S. forces now assigned to the Pacific Command are there primarily to meet the threat from Communist China and her satellites, plus Indonesia. Hence, in the event of a detente with the Soviet Union .alone, it would not be safe to reduce U.S. force levels in the Pacific.

- 117 - It should also be possible to reduce the National Guard and Reserve forces, retaining -­ in the case of the Army -- only the high-priority divisions plus round-out units capable of quick call-up. Such a cutback force, i!made possible by a true detente between the United States and the Soviet Union should require an annual level of defense expenditure about 25 percent under the current (Fiscal Year '64) rate, and 10 percent or so below that at the end of the Eisenhower Adminis'tration. At the new reduced levels, force strengths would be little below those prior to the 1961 build-up. The main difference between the two sets of forces would be in their mix, those postulated for 1970 being better balanced with far less emphasis on nuclear-weapon com­ ponents. !/ High military officers in the Pentagon regarded the Gilpatric article as an important forecast of a bid to "top off" the arms race in collaboration with the Soviet Union -- collaboration achieved without formal agreement. His plan, Mr. Gilpatric wrote, "merely suggests the kind of program that might be adequate to meet our commitments and defend our interests, while at the same time contributing to general military stability, provided the present movement toward detente with the U.S.S.R. continues to progress in the years ahead. Under these conditions, the kind of restraint outlined here (although not necessarily the detail suggested) would be in our interest, provided· similar restraint were exercised by the Soviets. Greater reductions probably could not be achieved in the absence of explicit arms-control arrangements, includ­ ing a substantial degree of international inspection: ll Some military experts in Congress worried that the blueprint for "stabilizing" the East-West military confrontation could be used by the Soviet Union to whittle away or even reverse the American military lead. Air Force leaders and Senator Goldwater, for instance, strongly opposed the plan to "phase out" all bombers by the 1970's. Mr. Gilpatric emphasized he would proceed cautiously and judge carefully the degree of confidence that could be put in Western intelligence on what the Soviet Union was doing with its own bomber fleet. If the West were certain that ll Gilpatric, .Q.1!, cit. l/ Ibid., p. 376.

- 118 - the Soviet Union were also reducing its bomber fleet, he suggested, the United States would be free to go ahead. In air defense, Mr. Gilpatric suggested that manned inter­ ceptors could be phased out if the West had reliable information about Soviet bomber strength. The suggestion that missile defense be, in effect, frozen in its present state of development was particularly controversial. Critics thought it would be too big a risk to assume that the Soviet Union would not secretly develop improved air defense systems, perhaps significantly effective against incoming ballistic missiles and their decoys, to the point of "disarming" the Western intercontinental ballistic missile deterrent. Administration leaders.in the Defense Department, however, seemed confident that the United States could keep abreast of Soviet developments sufficiently to avoid this "technological end run." Besides keeping expenditures high for research and development to guard against such end runs, Mr. Gilpatric also proposed putting major efforts into improving command and control, reliability and flexi­ bility of strategic forces, and "exploratory development of some new systems." Conscious of the arms-control aim, however, Mr. Gilpatric added: But, assuming similar restraint on the other side, we could probably, without injury to our national security, exercise a good deal of restraint over the deployment of any major weapons systems beyond those already programmed.!/

Open Ci ties? The missile-defense freeze advanced by Mr. Gilpatric is also advocated by another alumnus of the Pentagon's recent civilian staff. Professor Jack Ruina of the Massachusetts Institute of Technol­ ogy, formerly chief of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency, has proposed to an international gathering of scientists that an international agreement be sought for "non-deployment of city defenses." 2/ This would be a modern-day equivalent of the "open dty" idea.

11 Twelfth Annual Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Jan­ uary 27 - February 1, 1964, in Udaipur, India.

- 119 - He believes the two major nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are approaching a situation of nuclear sta­ bility in the development of invulnerable offensive weapons. From this position it should be possible, Dr. Ruina suggests, to move toward balanced arms reductions. With such developments under way, he suggests that no real advantages are possible �rom instituting ex­ pensive and elaborate ballistic missile defenses against incoming nuclear missiles. Those who argue that ballistic missile defenses around cities would protect populations or shake an attacker's confidence in the effectiveness of his attack must assume that the offense would not also improve. Deployment of defensive missile sites would be difficult to conceal and quite likely would result in the attacking nation's in­ creasing its consignment of missiles for attack. Thus another boost to the arms race would result without any improvement in the security of the defender or the attacker. More probably, Dr. Ruina suggests, the prospective attacking nation might ovet-compensate for the defenses, leading to greater instability. Very little inspection would be required for a treaty banning ballistic-missile defenses for cities, Dr. Ruina suggested. He offered his plan for the serious consideration of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union while attending the Pugwash Conference in India early in 1964.

Six Small Steps The dialogue on disarmament at the 18-nation Geneva confer­ ence (where France's empty chair rotates around the conference table) made little progress in the first half of 1964. No sensational new developments were under discussion. The United States and Britain, however, were concentrating on these small steps to consolidate the process of reducing tensions set under way with the partial nuclear test ban treaty: 1. Establishment of ground observation posts in NATO and Warsaw Pact areas. 2. Extension of the nuclear test ban treaty to the under­ ground area, thus making the ban on nuclear testing comprehensive. 3. Negotiation of a treaty banning further dissemination of nuclear weapons or knowledge about them. 4. Expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 5. A freeze on construction of strategic delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.

- 120 - 6. Destruction of some conventional armaments, most probably medium bombers outmoded in the Soviet and American arsenals but still of considerable significance in so-called "second class wars" or "minor league" arms races. Outside the United States Government, the growing body of academic and industrial experts on disarmament were producing suggestions for future actions in the arms control and disarmament field: 1. Congress should establish a joint committee on arms control and disarmament. 2. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be given more authority and financing (or less, depending on the point of view). 3. Proposals for decreasing United States conventional forces should take into account the special American problem of reacting to covert military attempts to overthrow neutral governments. Perhaps the Soviet proposal for withdrawing foreign troops could be countered with a proposal to prohibit shipment of arms across borders under effective verification. 4. The United States should 'seek formally to link demands for support of its arms control position with aid to underdeveloped nations. 5. Joint Soviet-American evaluat�on of nuclear technologies to improve East-West estimates of the effects of the test ban. 6. Soviet-United States exchange of information on command and control policies and implementation. 7. International controls should be established on research which might have military significance. 8. The United States might provide its sophisticated command and control facilities to nations which develop nuclear weapons (like France or some day Red China) to protect this country from accidents. 9. The United States should provide nuclear weapons to the United Nations peace-keeping force. 10. The United States should prepare a declaration of its intention to protect countries against nuclear blackmail -- not only the United States but others -- by any newly-emerged nuclear power. 11. Withdrawal of American troops from West Germany, i.e. Europe, should be approached with extreme caution because it might en­ courage West Germany to develop its own nuclear deterrent. 1/

!/ Suggestions by individual participants in the Strategy for Peace Con­ ference, Airlee, Virginia, February 29, 1964.

- 121 - Many professional military men were concerned, however, that American moves toward a slowdown in the arms race would not be recip­ rocated and the United States would not find out about any "end runs" until the Soviet Union had them well under way. For this reason these men stressed "deterrence" through strength and constant vigilance, to keep fresh estimates of the intentions of all potential enemies clearly in mind.

Armchair Strategists Air Force Major General Dale 0. Smith believes that many of the scholars who have ventured into the military field are guilty of over­ simplification: An armchair strategist usually can be identified by the way he analyzes military advantage. If he measures it almost exclusively in terms of manpower and of megatons, one can guess with some confidence that he has never read a mi Iitary history or heard a shot fired in anger. If, on the other hand, he considers more subtle and elusive aspects such as hostile intentions, doc­ trine, training, and weapons capabilities, if he is concerned with intelligence of the enemy, interna­ tional politics, weapons development, enemy deploy­ ments and maneuvers; if he attempts to envisage from all this and more the enemy's next moves and, having some confidence in his own judgment, proposed friendly moves to counter, defeat, and prevail over these pre­ dicted enemy moves -- then one can pretty well surmise that such a man is no armchair strategist but a pro­ fessional military analyst. This is not to imply that manpower and fire­ power are a minor consideration in war. On the contrary, they are crucial. But because manpower and firepower are the most easily measured, the most clearly discerned and discussed aspects of war, they too often are believed to be the final criteria of success. Rather than using the raw criteria of power to judge a nation's military strength, General Smith suggests, one should look instead for "over-all mi Iitary ski11 and capabilities." !/ ll Major General Dale 0. Smith, Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The High Are the Mighty," Ordnance (January-February, 1964).

- 122 - Political Settlements First? Political issues like Berlin and Germany, Laos and Viet Nam, have always cast a long shadow across world arms-control efforts. Those who stress the importance of political settlements -- as do most of the students of the subject -- believe that arms races are effects not causes, and that unresolved political issues (as well as psychological and other frictions) cause arms races. Official Washington has taken the position that this is probably true, but that uncontrolled arms races can of themselves produce friction and increase international tension, particu­ larly today when the threat of instantaneous devastation overhangs the world. For this reason, attempts to limit and control armaments, it is held, are worthwhile whether or not progress is made in the solution of political prob­ lems. The opponents of this view hold, however, that such a course if adopted must be followed with great care, for any major arms reduction without a solution of political problems might open frontiers to the kind of exploitation by Communist infiltration and internal aggression that is occurring in Vietnam. None of the arms-control measures so far considered would, for instance, seriously hamper the Communists in pushing "wars of national liberation," yet arms limitation might hamper the nations of the West in defending themselves against such indirect aggression. The old question then of which comes first, the political problem or the arms control problem, is still under debate, with most observers inclined to believe that the political problems of the world must be resolved before any major progress in arms control can be expected. ll

SinceWorld War II most Western policymakers have tried to attack both problems: to settle political disputes while working to re­ duce armaments. If the world has lived in the shadow of fear since the dawn of the nuclear age, it nevertheless has lived. There have been conflicts in Kenya, the Congo, Cyprus, Korea, China, Indo-China, and India, as well as in the Middle East. But the raging nuclear inferno that many have expected to engulf the entire Northern Hemisphere has been held off. Not only has the worst not happened, it appears farther off in 1964 than it did in 1954 or in 1949, when the Soviet Union exploded its first known atomic weapon .

.!/ Baldwin, loc. cit.

- 123 - It may be that the tedious argumentation at Geneva is the safety valve necessary to prevent the holocaust. Instead of piling up frustrations. over the tediousness of the disarmament negotiations, per­ haps the world should accept the Geneva negotiations as a happy alterna­ tive to nuclear war.

- 124 - TABLE OF APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I -- JOINT STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLE.5 FOR DIS- ARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ...... • . 125 APPENDIX II -- UNITED STATES AR� CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ...... 128 APPENDIX III -- OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD. 131 APPENDIX IV -- MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATE.5 OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SO­ CIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK SIGNED ON JUNE 20, 1963 AT GENEVA, SWITZERLAND ...... 162 APPENDIX V -- TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TE.5TS IN THE AHDSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER . . . . 166 APPENDIX VI -- A STEP TOWARD PEACE REPORT TO THE PEOPLE ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY ...... 169 APPENDIX VII -- U.N. GENERAL ASSE�IBLY RESOLUTION ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN OUTER SPACE ...... 176 APPENDIX VIII -- QUESTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA­ MENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN- NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT . . ·...... 177 APPENDIX IX -- UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS -­ Additions and amendments to the Soviet draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.l) in conformity with the proposal for the retention by the USSR and the USA until the end of the third stage of an agreed number of missiles together with the warheads pertain- ing thereto ...... 205 APPENDIX X -- UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS -­ Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on meas­ ures for slowing down the armaments race and relax- ing international tension ...... 207

iii APPENDIX I JOINf STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES FOR DISARMAMENf NEGOTIATIONS!/

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on March 30, 1961, Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy bur­ den for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace, Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of November 20, 1959, Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general arid com­ plete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all dis­ putes by peaceful means, The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the fol­ lowing principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on dis­ armament and to call upon other States to cooperate in reaching early agree­ ment on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles. 1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 2. The program for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a UN peace force. 3. To this end, the program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military estab­ lishment of every nation, for: (a) Dispanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including)Jases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to

!/ From Report of Activities of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, year ending December 1961.

- 125 - peaceful uses; (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons; (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction; (d) Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions; (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures. 4. The disarmament program should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage car­ ried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implement­ ation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate. 5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is en­ sured equally for all. 6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would pro­ vide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its in­ spectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. 7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of inter­ national disputes by peaceful means; During and after the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the nec­ essary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with

- 126 - agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 8. States participating in the negotiation$· should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total program has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and· im­ plementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prej­ udicing progress on agreement on the total program and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that program.

September 20, 1961

- 127 - APPENDIX II UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

The President, on September 26, 1961, signed into law legislation (''Arms Control and Disarmament Act," Public Law 87-297) establishing the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to take over and augment the activities of the former Disarmament Administration in the State Deparment. AGENCY FUNCTIONS - In enacting this legislation, Congress recognized that the formulation and implementation of United States arms control and dis­ armament policy in a manner to promote the national security can best be accomplished by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility in this field. The Agency will have the capacity to provide the essential sci­ entific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technicological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based. The legislation describes the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's primary functions as follows: Conduct, support and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation; Preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and dis­ armament field; Dissemination and coordination of public information concern­ ing arms control and disarmament; and, Preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities. AGENCY ORGANIZATION The present staff will be expanded to handle the Agency's in­ creased responsibilities. It will consist primarily of specialists, familiar with foreign policy, the structure of international organizations, weapons and weapons detection technology,. military strategy, as well as the scien­ tific, political and economic aspects of disarmament. The following offices have been created, either by statute or under the authority of the Director, to carry out functions assigned to the Agency

- 128 - by the Congress. THE DIRECTOR - Direction of the Agency's personnel and activities; principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control and dis­ armament; and primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament activities. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR - Performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Director may prescribe: acts for, and exercises the power of, the Director during his absence or disability or during a vacancy in said office. GENERAL ADIVISORY COMMITTEE - With a membership of not more than fifteen dis­ tinguished citizens, meets at least twice a year to advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director on arms control, disarma­ ment, and world peace problems. GENERAL COUNSEL - As chief legal officer of the Agency, �esponsible for all legal matters arising in or referred to the Agency; provides legal representa­ tion of the Agency in matters involving the Congress, other departments and agencies of the Government; and supervises studies concerning international legal arrangements in connection with arms control and disarmament.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR - Plans and implements a public information program designed to keep public opinion accurately informed of United States disarma­ ment policies and objectives; and assists the frirector in guiding USIA's in­ formation programs abroad which concern United States arms control and dis­ armament activities. DISARMAMENI' ADVISORY STAFF - Based on the research and study of other offices, develops basic policy recommendations for the Director on all aspects of arms control and disarmament; maintains liaison with the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State and with other Government agencies concerned with disarmament in order to establish agreed arms control and disarmament posi­ tions; analyzes and formulates requirements for the Agency's research program; and meets with the General Advisory Committee during its consideration of disarmament policy proposals.

INI'ERNATIONAL RELATIONS OFFICE - Conducts a program of research in the poli­ tical aspects of disarmament; translates plans and position papers into in­ structions as a basis for negotiations with foreign government representa­ tives in order to advance basic United States policies and objectives in the area of arms control and disarmament; and supplies supporting personnel for international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field. ECONOMIC OFFICE - Conducts a program of economic research in response to the needs of negotiation and policy formulation and coordinates economic research related to arms control and disarmament.

- 129 - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OFFICE - Conducts a program of scientific research responsive to the needs of both negotiation and policy formulation, and coordinates scientific research related to arms control and disarmament. WEAPONS EVALUATION AND CONTROL OFFICE - Conducts research into the impact of proposed arms control and disarmament measures upon the stability of the military environment and advises on military weapons systems as they relate to arms control and disarmament.

EXECUTIVE STAFF - Provides the full range of administrative management assistance and services including organization, budget, personnel, security and general services for the Agency, utilizing the facilities of the De­ partment of State to the extent agreed upon by the Secretary and the Director. Provides central control and coordination for issuance of rules and regula­ tions, as well as delegations of authority within the Agency. SECRETARIAT - Assures fully coordinated staff work in support of the Agency's programs. Responsible for the orderly and prompt flow of official action and information documents. REFERENCE RESEARCH STAFF - Performs historical research and provides reference service in support of all offices, functions and activities of the Agency.

- 130 - APPENDIX III OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENI IN A PEACEFUL. WORLD (Presented to the 18�Nation Committee on Disarmament, April 18, 1962, Geneva, Switzerland, by the United States of America, as amended on August 6 and 8, 1962, and August 14, 1963.)

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the fol­ lowing outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The Preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline. A. Objectives 1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) gen-· eral and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for: (a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military estab­ lishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses; (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bio­ logical and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons; (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction; (d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions; (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures. 3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and complete disarmament, states would have at their disposal only those non­ nuclear armaments, forces� facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

- 131 - 4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of arma­ ments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms. 5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarma­ ment program would be honored and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have un­ restricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. B. Principles The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are: 1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time limits. 2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the im­ plementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all. 3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the dis­ armament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded. 4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure inter­ national security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind. 5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been im­ plemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

INTRODUCTION The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a per­ manent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such

- 132 - other states as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and pro­ portionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty. SIAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date. During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake: 1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below; 2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in.order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and 3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below. A,. ARMAMENTS 1. Reduction of Armaments a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty per cent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph b. below. Each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b. would be reduced by thirty per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date. b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative): (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine­ launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilo­ metres or greater. (Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: The B-52 aircraft: Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching

- 133 - pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.) (2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of be­ tween 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometres and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) (3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of be­ tween 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their arma­ ments by types within the category.) (4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 kilometres and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) (5) Anti-missile-missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) (6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile-missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) (7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) (8) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their arma�ents by types within the category.) (9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of lOOmm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) (10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.) 2. Method of Reduction a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the re­ duction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organi­ zation an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date. b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One.-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I

- 134 - would be carried out during each step. c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the arma­ ments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under super­ vision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed, or where appro­ priate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels. 3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments. b. The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional arament destroyed within that type to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent re­ duction in Stage I, would be achieved. c. The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited. d. The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited. e. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas. f. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations. 4. Additional Measures The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved ques­ tions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and

- 135 - biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. ARMED FORCES I. Reduction of Armed Forces Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, re­ duce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, which­ ever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty. 2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed person­ nel maintained by national governments in the following categories: a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other person­ nel servicing in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts. b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law. c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission. 3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner: a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the fore­ going reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date. b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I. c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would-verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

- 136 - 4. Additional Measures The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing re­ ductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military estab­ lishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations re­ specting force levels.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner: (1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of· pro­ ducing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date. (2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organi­ ation periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials·which were still being produced at each facility. (3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not con­ ducted at undeclared facilities. 2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other than Use in Nuclear Weapons a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons agreed quantities of weapons grade U-235 from past pro- duction. The United States of America would transfer kilograms, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would transfer kilograms of such weapons grade U-235. For this purpose, "weapons grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235. b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles

- 137 - or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification. 3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons. b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the crea­ tion of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that: a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would: (1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date; (2) Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons. b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would: (1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons· (2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons: 5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon s test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obli­ gations specified in the agreement. b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control

- 138 - would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 6. Additional Measures The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unre­ solved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examiniation, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. OUTER SPACE 1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction. 2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased inter­ national cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements. 3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles: a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launch­ ings to other Parties io the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre­ launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched. b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings. 4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

- 139 - E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1. Report on Expenditures The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Dis­ armament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reRorts would include an itemization of military expenditures. 2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In light of this ex­ amination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrange­ ments respecting military expenditures. F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures: 1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Maneuvers Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed. 2. Observation Posts Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be pro­ gressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. �ecific arra�ge­ ments relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed. 3. Additional Observation Arrangements The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observa­ tion arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I. 4. Exchange of Military Missions Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements

- 140 - respecting such exchanges would be agreed. 5. Communications between Heads of Government Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary-General. 6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Com- ·mission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations re­ garding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or sub­ sequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, mis­ calculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or.some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. THE INl'ERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION 1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the frame­ work of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty. 2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. 3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarma­ ment measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on veri­ fication: a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where

- 141 - appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations. b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the' International Disarma­ ment Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties. c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following: (1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below. (2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection. (3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I ac­ cording to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of arma­ ments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. Insofar as agreed measures being verified were concerned access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected. (4) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open

- 142 - for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones. (5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty. 4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization a. The International Disarmament Organization would have: (1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty; (2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis: and (3) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization. b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary. 5. Functions of the General Conference The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed: a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council; b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty; c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council; d. Approving agreements between the International Disarma­ ment Organization and the United Nations and other international organiza­ tions: e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization; f. Requesting and rece1v1ng reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council; g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations:

- 143 - h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council: i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give ad­ visory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or applica­ tion of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United �ations: j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratifica­ tion by the Parties to the Treaty; k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general. 6. Functions of the Control Council The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed: a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator: b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty: c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements, and the Administrator; d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements; e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements: f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization; g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory op1n1ons on legal questions concerning the interpretation or ap­ plication of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations; h. Reconmending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty; i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general. 1. Functions of the Administrator The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- 144 - a. Administering the installation and operation of the veri­ fication arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization: b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data pro­ duced by the verification arrangements: c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization: d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements. 8. Privileges and Immunities The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty. 9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations a. The International Disarmament Organization, being estab­ lished within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activi­ ties in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would con­ sult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest. b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organ­ ization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization. c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recom­ mendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would con­ sider them and report to the United Nations on action taken. NOTE: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

- 145 - H. MEASURES TO SI'RENGTHEN ARRANGEMEl\'l'S FOR KEEP!� THE PEACE 1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type--including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare--contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. 2. Rules of International Conduct a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a. would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggression or subversion. 3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, in­ cluding negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice. b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes con­ cerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement. c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective: and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed. 4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strength­ ening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

- 146 - 5. United Nations Peace Force The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations: a. Examination of t'IE experience of the United Nations lead­ ing to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace: b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter: c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its pur­ pose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments. 6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the Establish­ ment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investi­ gate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. TRANSITION 1. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I: a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out. b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and c. All militarily significant states had become parties to the treaty. 2. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the fore­ going circumstances existed.

- 147 - 3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of State I would, upon the request of such perma­ nent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing cir­ cumstances. 4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

SIAGE II Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date. During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake: 1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I; 2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below; 3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and 4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENIS 1. Reduction of Armaments a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty per cent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph l.b of Stage I by fifty per cent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I. b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration re­ specting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such

- 148 - armaments by sixty-five per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty per cent in Stage I. 2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph b. below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty per cent. b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative): (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types). (2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declara- tions by types). (3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometres (declarations by types). (4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types). (5) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types). (6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types). (7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declara- tions by types). (8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types). c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph l.b., and in subparagraph b. above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II. 3. Method of reduction The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to

- 149 - that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2. 4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for produc�ion, within agreed limits,of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments. b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II. c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and test­ ing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas. d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide as­ surance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations. 5. Additional Measures a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons: (l) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. <2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty per cent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II. <3) The dismantling �r conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained leve ls of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at un­ declared locations.

- 150 - B. ARMED FORCES 1. Reduction of Armed Forces a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

C. �1JCLEAR WEAPOt-;S 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the fol­ lowing manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in

- 151 - nuclear weapons: a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials. b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to mini­ mum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials be­ longed, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons. c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations. e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limita­ tions were not conducted at undeclared locations. 2. Registration of �uclear Weapons for Verification Purposes To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weap­ ons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

- 152 - 2. Method of Reduction a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or con­ verting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. REDUCTION OF THE RIS< OF WAR In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stage II.

F. THE INIERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures under­ taken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

G. MEASURES TO Sl'RENGTHEN ARRANGEMEN!S FOR KEEPING THE PFACE 1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such ad­ ditional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature. b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept with­ out reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes. 2. Rules of International Conduct a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament

- 153 - Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority �f the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III. b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and sub­ version conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and sub­ version. 3. United Nations Peace Force The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II. 4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangement for the ex­ pansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps. 5. National Legislation Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organi­ zations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

H. TRANSITION 1. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage II: a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out. b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made: and

- 154 - c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had be­ come parties to the treaty. 2. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage II, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the fore­ going circumstances existed. 3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances. 4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in para­ graph 2 above.

STAGE III Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible. During Stage III, the Parties.to the Treaty would undertake: 1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II; 2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below: 3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and 4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENI'S 1. Reduction of Armaments Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the

- 155 - personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II. 2. Method of Reduction a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. b. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that re­ tained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels. 3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied re­ search, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all other facilities for such purposes. b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at decs red locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not con­ ducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES 1. Reduction of Armed Forces To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed man­ power for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employ­ ment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

- 156 - 2. Method of Reduction a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through -arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. b. In accordance with arrangements which wou ld be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently estab­ lished were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force. 3. Other Limitations The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or milita�y service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the pro­ duction of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons. 2. Method of Reduction a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the dis­ posal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities.

- 157 - The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens. 2. Method of Reduction. a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or con­ verting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide as­ surance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENf OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE 1. Reporting Requirement The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III: a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance. b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appro­ priate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty. c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in ac­ cordance with subparagraph a. above. 2. International Cooperation The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international cooperation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to en­ gage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free inter-

- 158 - change of views among scientific and technical personnel. F. REOOCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR 1. Improved Measures In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Com­ mission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Cooanission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stage III. 2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces The Parties to the Treaty .would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage III. H. MEASURES TO SIRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENrS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE 1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional �teps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature. 2. Rules of International Conduct The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and pro­ gressive development of rules of international conduct related to dis­ armament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure. 3. United Nations Peace Force

- 159 - The Parties to the Treaty would progressively &trengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III 1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out. 2. This determination would be made by affirmative vote of two­ thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made, Stage III would be deemed completed. 3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such perma­ nent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted under­ takings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above. 4. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES 1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include pro­ vision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time. 2. Interim Agreement The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrange­ ments, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into fQrce of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and in­ formation on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. 3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into

- 160 - Force of the Treaty a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council. c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been rati- fied by ______states, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states:

d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peace­ ful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages. e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty. f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes. g. A Depositary Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depositary. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depositary. 4. Finance a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organizatiods expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of ap­ portionment approved by the General Conference. b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization. 5. Authentic Texts The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

- 161 - APPENDIX IV MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESfABLISHMENr OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK SIGNED ON JUNE 20, 1963 AT GENEVA, SWITZERIAND

For use in time of emergency, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct commu­ nications link between the two governments. Each government shall be responsible for the arrangements for the link on its own territory. Each government shall take the necessary steps to ensure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery to its head of government. of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party. Arrangements for establishing and operating the link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof. Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages at Geneva, Switzerland, this 20th day of June, 1963.

For the Government of the Union For the Government of the of Soviet Socialist Republics: United States of America:

SEMYON K. TSARAPKI N CHARLES STELLE Acting Representative of the Acting Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United States of America to the Eighteen Nation Committee to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament on Disarmament

- 162 - ANNEX TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

The direct communications link between Washington and Moscow established in accordance with the memorandum, and the operation of such link, shall be governed by the following provisions: 1. The direct communications link shall consist of: A. Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which communications shall be directly exchanged; B. One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages; C. One full-time duplex radio telegraph circuit, routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow, which shall be used for service commu­ nications and for coordination of operations between the two terminal points. If experience in operating the direct communications link should demonstrate that the establishment of an additional wire telegraph circuit is advisable, such circuit may be established by mutual agreement between authorized representatives of both governments. 2. In case of interruption of the wire circuit, transmission of messages shall be effected via the radio circuit, and for this purpose prov1s1on shall be made at the terminal points for the capability of prompt switching of all necessary equipment from one circuit to another. 3. The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the transmission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and from Washington to Moscow in the English language. In this connection, the USSR shall furnish the United States four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the Russian language. The United States shall furnish the Soviet Union four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the English language. The equipment described in this para­ graph shall be exchanged directly between the parties without any payment being required therefor.

- 163 - 4. The terminal points of the direct communications link shall be provided with encoding equipment. For the terminal point in the USSR, four sets of such equipment (each capable of simplex operation), with one year's supply of spare parts, with all necessary special tools, test equip­ ment, operating instructions and other technical literature, and with all necessary blank tape, shall be furnished by the United States to the USSR against payment of the cost thereof by the USSR. The USSR shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the United States for reception of messages from the USSR. The United States shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the USSR for reception of messages from the United States. Delivery of prepared keying tapes to the terminal points of the link shall be effected through the Embassy of the USSR in Washington (for the terminal of the link in the USSR) and through the Embassy of the United States in Moscow (for the terminal of the link in the United States). 5. The United States and the USSR shall designate the agencies responsible for the arrangements regarding the direct communications link, for its technical maintenance, continuity and reliability, and for the timely transmission of messages. Such agencies may, by mutual agreement, decide matters and develop instructions relating to the technical maintenance and operation of the direct communications link and effect arrangements to improve the operation of the link. 6. The technical parameters of the telegraph circuits of the link and of the terminal equipment, as well as the maintenance of such circuits and equipment, shall be in accordance with CCITT and CCIR re­ commendations. Transmission and reception of messages over the direct com­ munications link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recom­ mendations of international telegraph and radio communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions. 7. The costs of the direct communications link shall be borne as follows: A. The USSR shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Moscow to Helsinki and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Helsinki to London. The United States shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of telegraph circuit from Washington to London and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from London to Helsinki.

- 164 - B. Payment of the cost of leasing the radio telegraph circuit between Moscow and Washington shall be effected without any trans­ fer of payments between the parties. The USSR shall bear the ex­ penses relating to the transmission of messages from from Moscow to Washington. The United States shall bear-the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Washington to Moscow.

- 165 - APPENDIX V TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER!/

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties", Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achieve­ ment of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict inter­ national control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances, Have agreed as follows:

Article I 1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radio­ active debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve. 2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments descr'ibed, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article. !/ Signed July 25, 1963.

- 166 - Article II 1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments 01 ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties. Article III 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in ac­ cordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties--The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments,

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession, 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signa­ tory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

- 167 - Article IV This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. Done in triplicate at the city of Moscow, the��� dav of ������-• one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

- 168 - APPENDIX VI A STEP TOWARD PEACE REPORT TO THE PEOPLE ON THE J.I NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

I speak to you toni�ht in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension. In these years the United States and the Soviet Union have fre­ quently communicated suspicion and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Washington and in Moscow, in Geneva and at the United Nations. But too often these meetings have produced only darknes�. discord, or disillusion. Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agree­ ment has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control--a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the ·united Nations. That plan and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for under­ ground tests. This nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water. For such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern in­ struments can pick up.

LIMITATIONS OF TREATY The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection, no international body.

J.I Radio-television address made by President Kennedy on July 26, 1963,

- 169 - We should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right of self­ defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war. Nevertheless, this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who sign it from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed man­ kind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope. For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this nation from testing under­ ground, or from being ready to conduct atmospheric tests if the acts of others so require, it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear tests. This treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have made clear--most recently in Berlin and Cuba--our deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any form of aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race. In three administrations our soldiers and diplomats have worked together to this end, always supported by Great Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962. But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side-­ it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing. This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step--a step toward peace--a step toward reason--a step away from war. Here is what this step can mean to you and to your children and your neighbors.

AN OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE WORLD TENSION

First, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The Moscow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made it clear that any nonaggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies

- 170 - and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require. No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agree­ ments, if any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack or on numbers and type of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agree­ ments will go forward. But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol--if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another-­ if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peace- ful collaboration--then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace. Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all people may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot lead toward that end, but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction. I do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Connnunists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent. But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiraling arms race and a collision course toward war. Since the beginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and as peace-loving as our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the last two years and a half I have been required to report to you as President that this nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military confrontation--in Laos, in Berlin and in Cuba. A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors--as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, "The survivors would envy the dead." For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.

- 171 - FREEING WORLD FROM FEAR OF FALLOUT Second, this treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout. Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under corxiitions which restricted such fallout to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and the yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pol­ lution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe. Even then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard, and it is not a statis­ tical issue. The loss of even one human life or the malformation of even one baby--who may be born long after we are gone--should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent. Nor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. Tha� is why the con­ tinuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

PREVENTING SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today. I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through­ out the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the iricreased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts. If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War. - 172 - Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great obligation--all four nuclear powers have a great obligation--to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or pro­ duce such weapons. This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It pro­ vides that none of the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens the door for further agreements on the control of nuclear weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign; for it is in the interest of all nations, and already we have heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.

STRENGTHENING OUR NATION'S SECURITY Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing. For, in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase when its adversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to pene­ trate and destroy an aggressor's homeland. We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred-megaton bomb of which they spoke 2 years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.

RISK OF SECRET VIOLATIONS NOT OVERLOOKED It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adver­ saries. We have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that deep in outer space, hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth, illegal tests might go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations at­ tempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily be of such a magnitude that they would be of

- 173 - such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violation, moreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and the worldwide consequnces for the vio­ lator. Secret violations are possible and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of test­ ing if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight com­ pared to their cost and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unre­ stricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty--and such risks in this treaty are small--the far greater.risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear , arms race, the risk of new nuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war�

RESPO�SIBILITY OF ALL AMERICANS This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consultation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document which may mark an historic and con­ structive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate. It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is particularly for our children and -0ur grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve military, scientific, and political experts, but it must not be left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours. If we are to open new doorways to peace, if we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as we have been in their invention, then let us now show all the world on this side of the wall and the other that a strong America also stands for peace. There is no cause for complacency. We have learned in times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now that there are shortcuts on the road to peace. At many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentration of nuclear and conventional arms must still be deterred.

- 174 - The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict, are still there, in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance that we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been achieved and that our strength and unity were no longer required. But now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time has come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin. Ac­ cording to the ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step." My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, get back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is one thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step.

- 175 - APPENDIX VII U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUfION ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESIRUCTION IN �ER���

The General Assembly, Recalling General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) which expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind, Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, 1. Welcomes the expressions by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of their intention not to station any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space; 2. Solemnly calls upon all States: (A) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (B) To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities.

l./ Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1963, p. 754.

- 176 - APPENDIX VIII A/C.1/867 24 September 1962 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN Seventeenth session FIRSI COMMITIEE Agenda item 90

QUESIION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Letter dated 22 September 1962 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to transmit herewith a draft "Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control", submitted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the consid- eration of States Members of the United Nations. I should be glad if you would arrange for the early distribution of this draft Treaty as an official United Nations document.

(Signed) A. GROMYKO Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

- 177 - UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL (DRAFI' BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS)

P R E A M B L E The States of the world, Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples, Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the pre­ cipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society, Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war, Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth, Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values, Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world, Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

- 178 - PART I. GENERAL

Article 1 Disarmament Obligations The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake: 1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing: The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re­ establishment in any form whatsoever; The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons; The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of de­ livering weapons of mass destruction to their targets; The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the with­ drawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State; The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens: The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions: The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;

The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament; The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or by organizations or private individuals. 2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and com­ plete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the main­ tenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty. 3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in

- 179 - three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate. 4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.

Article 2 Control Obligations 1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. 2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure. 3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part V of the present Treaty. 4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world. This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces. 5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned. 6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarma­ ment, the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being and shall exercise supervision over the fulfillment by States of the obligations

- 180 - they have assumed so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

Article 3 Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security 1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament: (a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peace­ ful and friendly coexistence and co-operation: (b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any inter­ national disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter: (c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace �nd for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. 2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon com­ pletion of general and complete disarmament for any purpose other than the safeguarding of their internal security or the discharge of their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

PART II. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 4 First Stage Tasks The States Parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories and to reduce their armed forces, their conventional arma­ ments and production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.

- 181 - CHAPTER I Elimination of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Military Bases in Alien Territories, and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from those Territories. Control over such Measures A. Means of Delivery Article 5 Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons 1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti­ missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peace­ ful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained. All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those required for the missiles to be retained under the provisions of this article, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilot­ less aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished. 2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance re­ ferred to in paragraph I of this article shall be canpletley discontinued. All undertakings or workshops thereof engaged in their production shall be dis­ mantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed the premises of such under­ takings as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be con­ verted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. 4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to super­ vision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

- 182 - Article 6 Elimination of Military Aircraft Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons 1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such air­ craft shall be closed. 2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph l of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs l and 2 above.

Article 7 Elimination of All Surface Warships Capable of being Used as Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines 1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes or types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses. 2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in para­ graph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and sub­ marines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 8 Elimination of All Artillery Systems Capable of ,Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons 1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed.

- 183 - All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed. 2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraph I of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants or workshops thereof engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the pro­ duction of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their special­ ized equipment destroyed. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

B. Foreign Military Bases and Troops in Alien Territories Article 9 Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases 1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign terri­ tories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any types. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under article 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the Territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located. 2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

- 184 - All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to this end. 3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Article 10 Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories 1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and personnel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and which come under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed. 2. The measures set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory. Such persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State of which they are citizens, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to dispatch foreign troops, miJitary personnel or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations and the transfer of the premises referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. The International Disarmament Organization shall also have the right to exercise control over the recall of the civilians referred to in paragraph 2 of this

- 185 - article. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph_3 of article 9 of the present Treaty shall include provisions prohibiting citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving military purposes in foreign States.

CHAPTER II Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditure Control over such Measures Article 11 Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments 1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels: The United States of America - 1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - 1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.) 2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5-10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted ment being demobilized. 3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The re­ duced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities. 4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall

- 186 - exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 12 Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production 1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimina­ tion of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises, and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. 2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall ex­ ercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph I of this article.

Article 13 Reduction of Military Expenditure I. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduc­ tion of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5-12 of the present Treaty. The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty. 2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the im­ plementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces

- 187 - and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legis­ lative and executive bodies.

CHAPTER III Measures to Safeguard the Security of States Article 14 Restrictions of Displacements of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons 1. From the beginning of the first-stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited. 2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

Article 15 Control over Launchings of Rockets for Peaceful Purposes 1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes. 2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings of inspection teams, which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.

Article 16 Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake

- 188 - to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from trans­ mitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons. The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons under­ take to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

Article 17 Prohibition of Nuclear Tests The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into effect under other international agree­ ments by the time this Treaty is signed). Article 17a Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war 1. From the commencement of the first stage large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited. The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers. 2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them. 3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.

Article 18 Measures to Strengthen the Capacity of the United Nations to maintain International Peace and Security 1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty

- 189 - and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. 2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

CHAPTER IV Time-limits for First-Stage Measures Transition from the First to the Second Stage Article 19 Time-limits for First-Stage Measures 1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initi­ ated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with article 46), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up. 2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 18 months.

Article 20 Transition from the First to the Second Stage In the course of the last 3 months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

- 190 - PART III. SECOND Sl'AGE OF GENERAL Ai�D COMPLETE DISARMAMENT Article 21 Second Stage Tasks The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to conclude the destruction of all military rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons which were retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America after the implementation of the first stage, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, conventional armaments and produc­ tion of such armaments, and military expenditure.

CHAPTER V Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons. Control over such Measures Article 22 Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials ex­ tracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peace­ ful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed. All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished. (b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above­ mentioned special stocks. (c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to above in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, instal­ lations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production

- 191 - for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes. Cb) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub­ paragraph

Article 23 Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons 1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed. 2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes. 3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be im­ plemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

- 192 - CHAPTER V-A The Destruction of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons which were Retained after the First Stage Article 23a 1. All intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti­ aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under paragraph l of article 5 shall be destroyed, together with their launching installations and guidance systems. 2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph l above.

CHAPTER VI Further Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control over such Measures Article 24 Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments 1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels: The United States of America One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees: The Union of Soviet Socialist One million enlisted men, officers ...... Republics...... and civilian. .... employees......

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.) The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel previously manning the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

- 193 - 2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 35 from the original levels for each type of all categories of these arma­ ments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroy­ ed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of trans­ portation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 25

Further Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production 1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be re­ duced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. su·ch reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimina­ tion of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. 2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 26 Further Reduction of Military Expenditure 1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 22-25 of the present Treaty.

- 194 - The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty. 2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Dis­ armament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records con­ cerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

CHAPTER VII Measures to Safeguard the Security of States Article 27 Continued Strengthening of the Capacity of the United Nations to Maintain International Peace and Security The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

CHAPTER VIII Time-limits for Second-Stage Measures Transition from the Second to the Third Stage Article 28 Time-limits for Second-Stage Measures The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.

Article 29 Transition from the Second to the Third Stage In the course of the last three months of the second stage the Inter­ national Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage.

- 195 - Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage of gen­ eral and complete disarmament shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.

PART IV. THIRD SIAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLF:I'E DISARMAMENT Article 30 Third Stage Tasks The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States.

CHAPTER IX Completion of the Elimination of the Military Machinery of States Control over such Measures Article 31 Completion of the Elimination of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments 1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplish­ ment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished. 2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of arma­ ments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot-be con­ verted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall ex­ ercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peace­ ful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc. The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to docu­ ments pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

- 196 - Article 32 Complete Cessation of Military Production 1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantitites of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be con­ verted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the pro­ duction of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign gov­ ernment undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, mili­ tary equipmen� munitions and material shall be cancelled. 2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the mea;ures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 33 Abolition of Military Establishments 1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and para­ military organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall: (a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations: (b) abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organiza­ tion of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations; (c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobiliza­ tion and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war. 2. The entire process of the abolition of military and para-military institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

- 197 - Article 34 Abolition of Military Conscription and Military Training In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all mili­ tary training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of re­ cruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 35 Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for Military Purposes 1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies or private individuals and social organizations, shall be discontinued. The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty. 2. For the purpose of organ1z1ng control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

CHAPTER X Measures to Safeguard the Security of States and to Maintain International Peace Article 36 Contingents of Police (Militia) 1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including

- 198 - the safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter. The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows:

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantitites of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, the quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agree­ ment. 3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall ex­ ercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light fire­ arms. Article 37 Police (Militia) Units to be made available to the Security Council 1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police

Article 38 Control over the Prevention of the Re-establishment of Armed Forces 1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which shall

- 199 - verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police {militia). 2. For the purpose of ensuring that �rmed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarm�ment are not re-established, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty. 3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the· territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

CHAPTER XI

Time-limits for Third-Stage Measures Article 39 The third stage of general and complete disarmement shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART V. SfRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF·THE INI'EllNATIONAL DISARJIAIIENT ORGANIZATION Article 40 Functions and Main Bodies The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under article 2, paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council". The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, _shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

- 200 - Article 41 The Conference 1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions, which may be convened by decision of the Cruncil or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference. 2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority end on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure. 4. The Conference shall: (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council: (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council; (c) Approve the budget reconunended by the Council; (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations; (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty; (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Con­ ference for this purpose by the Council; (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

Article 42 The Control Council 1. The Council shall consist of: (a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;

- 201 - (b) ... (number) other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years. The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world. 2. The Council shall: (a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament: set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty; (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare; (c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty; (d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations; (e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government; (f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization; (g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work: (h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports; (i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty; (j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty. 3. Each memeber of the Coucnil shall have one vote. Decisions of the

- 202 Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority. 4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function con­ tinuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 43 Privileges and Immunities The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of inde­ pendent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 44 Finances 1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Coucnil and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4 (c), and article 42, paragraph 2 (f), of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale: .•...... (The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.)

Article 45 Preparatory Commission Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States repre­ sented in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee shall set up a Prepara­ tory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

- 203 - PART VI. FINAL CLAUSES Article 46 Ratification and Entry into Force The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by ..••...... (number) non-aligned States.

Article 47 Amendments Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 46 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

Article 48 Authentic Texts The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the Signatory States. In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty. Done at......

- 204 - APPENDIX IX ENDC/2/Rev.I/Add.l 4 CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE February 1964 ON DISARMAMENT ENGLISH Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Additions and amendments to the Soviet draft TJ:eaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control CENDC/2/Rey.l) in conformity with the proposal for the retention by the USSR and the USA until the end of the third stage of an agreed number of missiles together with the warheads pertaining thereto

I. In Article 5, paragraph 1, at the end of the first sentence replace the word "second" by the word "third". 2. In Article 21, delete the words: "to conclude the destruction of all military rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons which were re­ tained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America after the implementation of the first stage". 3. In Article 22, paragraph I (a), in the first sentence, after the words "types and capacities" add the words: "with the exception of the warheads pertaining to missiles temporarily retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic·s and the United States of America under Article 5, paragraph I of this Treaty". 4. In Article 22, paragraph I (a), in the second sentence, after the words "extracted from" delete the word "such". 5. Delete Chapter VA (Article 23A "The Destruction of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons which were Retained after the First Stage"). 6. In Article 30, add a new sentence: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America undertake to complete the total elimination of all the missiles and the nuclear warheads pertaining there­ to, which remained at their disposal under Article 5, paragraph I of this Treaty". 7. After Article 35 add a new Article 35A:

"Elimination o f Missiles and of Nuclear W arheads pertaining thereto. retained until the End of the Third Stage" "I. At the end of the third stage there shall be carried out the elimination of all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-air­ craft missiles in the ground-to-air category retained by the Union of

- 205 - Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1 of this Treaty, together with the nuclear warheads, launching devices and guiding systems." "2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraph l."

- 206 - APPENDIX X ENDC/123 CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE 28 January 1964 ON DISARMAMENT ENGLISH Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension

As a result of the joint efforts of all men of good will, it has been possible to achieve a certain relaxation of international tension; this has been reflected in the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and in an agreement not to place in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government considers that more favourable conditions have now been created for agreeing upon and carrying out other measures aimed at a further relaxation of international tension. If the efforts of all governments and peoples are united in the cause of peace, 1964 may be­ come a turning point towards an improvement in the whole int ernational situation. The Soviet Government, which considers that the main task of governments is to achieve the speediest possible agreement on general and complete disarmament, at the same time proposes that agreement be reached on the implementation of measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and further lessening international tension.

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the territories of other countries to within the boundaries to their national territories is now acquiring particular importance and urgency. The presence of foreign troops in the territories of other coun­ tries is one of the principal sources of international tension and gives rise to conflicts fraught with danger to the cause of the peace and the security of the peoples. As recent events in various parts of the world have shown, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries is becoming increasingly imperative and urgent. Of particularly important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States, where the troops and armaments of the NATO countries, on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the other, are concentrated in large numbers.

- 207 - Agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops would not cause detriment to either side, since this would not disrupt the general balance of forces between the States belonging to the two groups, namely NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. After all, the military leaders of the NATO countries themselves, to judge by their statements, take as their starting point the assumption that the total number of NATO forces is not less, but is even greater than the number of troops of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Soviet Union proposes the most radical way of solving this question, namely, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from all foreign territories and that not a single foreign soldier should. be left anywhere, in any part of the world. On its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to with­ draw all its troops from the territories of foreign States where they are now stationed, if the Western Powers will do likewise. If, however, the Western Powers are not as yet prepared for such a radical solution of this important question, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached imme­ diately that the number of armed forces in foreign territories should first be reduced on a basis of reciprocity, and afterwards it will be possible to lead up gradually, step by step, to their complete withdrawal to within the boundaries of their national territories. The Soviet Union is prepared to set about such a reduction of its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers begin to reduce the number of their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries. The implementation of these measures would undoubtedly lead to the normalization of the situation in Europe and would thereby contribute to the strengthening of universal peace.

2. Reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States

The Soviet Government has always declared itself in favour of the reduction of the armed forces of States, and the Soviet Union has on a number of occasions undertaken a considerable reduction of its army even unilater­ ally. At the present time, more favourable possibilities have come about for settling this important question on a reciprocal basis without waiting for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament to begin. As Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has stated, the Soviet Union has now set about further reducing the number of its armed forces. The Soviet Government is prepared to go in the direction of reducing the numbers of its armed forces still further, if the governments of the Western Powers show willingness to take similar measures.

- 208 3,. Reduction of military budgets

Being anxious to put an end to the unbridled growth of military expenditure which is a heavy burden 01 the shoulders of the peoples, the Soviet Government has on a number of occasions made proposals for the re­ duction of military budgets. As is well known, the Soviet Union has re­ cently shown initiative in solving this question by unilaterally reducing its military budget for 1964 by 600 million roubles. It is also known that the United States Government in its turn is taking measures for a certain reduction of its military expenditure. Thus there now exist favourable pre-conditions for agreement on a further reciprocal reduction of military budgets. The Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached to reduce the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per eent.

4, conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries

The Soviet Government considers it essential to agree to con­ clude a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO. The conclusion of such a pact would in no way disrupt the existing balance of forces between the two groups and, at the same time, would introduce into international relations the element of stability and calm which is so much needed. In the years which have elapsed since the Soviet Government first put forward a proposal for the conclusion of such a pact, this idea has met with the support of statesmen and public figures in many countries. The time has come to discuss this proposal in a businesslike way and to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. Moreover, this is called for by the commitments laid down in the joint communique of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of 25 July 1963. The Soviet Govern­ ment reaffirms its willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with the States members of NATO. With regard to the form that the non-aggression pact should take, the Soviet Government considers that this question can be solved without any particular difficulty.

5. Establishment of. denuclearized zones

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the establish­ ment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. This idea has met with universal response and approval during recent years. Proposals have been put forward for the establishment of denuclearized zones in Central and Northern Europe, in the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, in Africa and Latin America, as well as in other regions of the world.

- 209 - In supporting the plans for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, the Soviet Goveronent attaches special importance to the formation of such zones in those regions where the danger of nuclear conflict is greatest, and first and foremost in Central Europe. The Soviet Government, on its part, will be prepared to give an undertaking to respect the status of denuclearized zones wherever and when­ ever they are established.

6, Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

As the stocks of nuclear weapons increase, and the methods of manufacturing them are improved, and as ever new types of such weapons are being devised, the question of preventing their further dissemination be­ comes increasingly important. A widening of the circle of States pos­ sessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the prob­ lem of disarmament. The Soviet Government notes that at present there is an in­ creasing awareness throughout the world of the danger threatening mankind in connexion with the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the duty of all governments to make every effort to avert this danger before it is too late. It is particularly important from the point of view of the interests of peace to close all the channels, whether direct or indirect, through which nuclear weapons could come into the hands of those who twice during this century have caused the conflagration of a world war and who are now actively striving to obtain nuclear weapons. In order to shut off all possiblities for the spread of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that an agreement on this question should contain, besides the prohibition to transfer such weapons or to give information on their manufacture to any particular government, also provisions to guarantee that such a transfer of nuclear weapons or access to them shall not take place indirectly, through military bloc s, for example, through the so-called multilateral nuclear force of NATO.

7, Measures to prevent surprise attack

The Soviet Government has declared itself and continues to de­ clare itself in favour of taking active and effective measures to prevent surprise attack. As is well known, for this purpose the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the establishment of a network of observation posts in the territories of the countries belonging to the two opposing groups of States in conjunction with certain measures for lessening international tension such as a reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in the terri­ tories of European countries and an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. - 210 - The Soviet Government considers that, if unaccompanied by these concrete measures for the lessening of international tension and the limi­ tation of armaments, the establishment of observation posts could not lead to the achievement of the desired aim, namely, the growth of confidence be­ tween States, and thereby a lessening of the danger of war. On the con­ trary, it might ev�n lead to an increase of mutual suspicions and to the aggravation of international relations. The establishment of a system of observation posts may prove to be useful only in conjunction with concrete measures for reducing the threat of war. Practical steps for a real lessening of the possibility of an out­ break of military conflict in Europe and observation posts would in that case be two complementary aspects of a single process--the lessening of tension in the danger zones where the armed forces of the two opposing groups face each other.

a. Elimination of bomber aircraft

Bomber aircraft, though obsolete, still remain one of the power­ ful means of carrying on a war of aggression, used to deliver nuclear weap­ ons many thousands of kilometres from their bases in order to inflict mas­ sive blows in the territories of other States. The elimination of this type of armament would diminish the risk of war and help to strengthen the security of all peoples� The Soviet Government is prepared to examine this question.

9, Prohibition of underground nuclear tests

The Soviet Government declares its readiness, as before, to reach agreement on extending the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the at­ mosphere, in outer space and under water, to underground testing. Actual experience has fully confirmed that no special international control need be organized to detect underground tests any more than it is needed to detect tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. x x x

The Soviet Government assumes, of course, that in concluding agree-· ments providing for measures of actual disarmament, agreement must be achieved on appropriate, mutally acceptable forms of control over the implementation of these measures. In the op1n1on of the Soviet Government, the implementation of the measures enumerated in this Memorandum would lead to a further considerable lessening of international tension and would constitute an important step forward towards solving the main problem--general and complete disarmament.

- 211 - SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY*

Barker, Charles, coordinator. Problems of World Disarmament, a series of lectures delivered at the Johns Hopkins University on the disarmament problem. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963. Barnet, Richard J. Who Wants Disarmament? Boston: Beacon Press, 1960. Baruch, Bernard M. The Public Years. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Beaton, Leonard and Maddox, John. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. London: Chatto and Windus, 1962. Bechhoefer, Bernard G. Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control. Washing­ ton: Brookings Institution, 1961. Benoit, Emile and Boulding, Kenneth. Disarmament and the Economy. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Bethe Hans A. and Teller, Edward. The Future of Nuclear Tests. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1961. Biorklund, Adm. E. International Atomic Policy During a Uecade. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1956. Blackett, P. M. S. Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations. London: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Bowles, Chester. Ideas, People, and Peace. New York: Harper, 1958. Brennan, Donald G. Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1961. Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. Brown, Harrison and Real, James. Community of Fear. Santa Barbara, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960. Buchan, Alastair. NATO in the 1960's. New York! Praeger, 1960. Bull, Hedley. The Control of the Arms Race. New York: Praeger, 1961.

• This list does not include all of the publications cited in the foot­ notes to the text of the Analysis.

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Collart, Yves. _Di_ s_ ar�mam� e� �n�t�: ___AS t� =u_d=y..__;;Gu_ =i_d_e__ an _d;;o...,..B_ib_ l_ _i�og� -r_a�ph�y"-'o�n�t�h�ea...... ;;;E�f-f_o_rt�s of the UnitedNations. _ _ The_ Hague: N. Nijhoff, 1958. Cousins, Norman. In Place of Folly, New York: Harper, 1961.. Dallin, David J. Soviet Foreign Policy afterStalin. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961. Davis, Saville R. "Recent Policy Making in the UnitedStates Government," in Arms Control, Disarmament, andNational Security (ed. Donald G. Brennan.) New York: Braziller, 1961.

Dennett, Raymond and Johnson, Joseph E. (eds.). Negotiating with the Russians. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951. Department of State. Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance ofNuclear Weapon Tests, History and Analysis ofNegotiations. Department of State Publicat1on 7258, 1961. deSeversky, Alexander P. America: Too Young to Diel New York: McGraw­ Hi 11, 1961. Dinerstein, H.S. War and theSoviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1959.

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L'Atome pour ou contre L'Homme. Paris: Pax Christi, 1958. Larson, Arthur. A Warless World. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1962. Lee, Asher. The Soviet Air Force. New York: The John Day Company, 1962. Lefever, Ernest W. Ethics and United States Foreign Policy. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Lefever, Ernest (ed.). Arms and Arms Control. New York: Praeger, for the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1962. Levine. Robert A. The Arms Debate. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963. Lippmann, Walter. The Communist World and.Ours. Boston: Little Brown. 1959. Lippmann, Walter. The Coming Tests with Russia. Boston: Little Brown, 1961. McClelland, Charles A. (ed.). Nuclear Weapons, Missiles and Future War. San Francisco: Howard Chandler, 1960. Martin, Thomas L., Jr. and Latham, Donald C. Strategy for Survival. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1963. Melman, Seymour (ed.). Inspection for Disarmament. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. Melman, Seymour. The Peace Race. New York: Ballantine, 1961. Melman, Seymour. Disarmament, Its Politics and Economics. Boston: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962. Melman, Seymour (ed.). A Strategy for American Security: An Alternative to the 1964 Military Budget. New York: Lee Service, Inc., 1963.

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Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper, 3rd ed., 1950. Schwartz, Fred. The Communist Interpretation of Peace. Long Beach, Cali­ fornia: Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, n.d. Sherwood, Robert B. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. Sibley, Mulford. Unilateral Initiatives and Disarmament. Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1962.

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