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v~ I ,.. . .. ' June 27, 1978 .. '

Dear George:

The presence at the National GaJle~y of the Dresden exhibit has prompted several friends to ask me why the United States Air Force bombed Dresden near the end of ' ' the war. I was Chief of Operations Intelligence for Tooey Spaatz at that time. Day to day operations were "laid on" by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, as you will remember. But any change from target priori ties that been agreed upon, were cleared in advance with our '. headquarters. Although my intelligence section was not asked to express any views or take any part in the Dresden ..... operation, my distinct recollection is that Fred Anderson told me that the Soviet Union had requested it. At that time, the Soviet ground forces were moving rapidly from the east. I was told that the Germans were using the ,. marshaling yards at Dresden to assemble both troops and supplies. We had no target maps for Dresden, and this in .. itself confirms that there was no advance planning. On other occasions, I know that the Soviets requested - usually through Washington, as I understood it - that we attack certain targets. It was not until years after the war, that Soviet propaganda created the prevailing view that this was an atrocity for which the United States and Great Britian were solely responslble.

, ; .

...!, . i'.t~ 'l ~ j, 2. ~

I got in touch ~ith Tooey Spaatz about this a years before he died. He responded that he knew of no ''· r: records that clarified this question. I would have thought that certainly a most thorough investigation would , have been made in light of Soviet propaganda. I wonder whether you have any information on this subject, or could tell me where such information can be obtained.

General George S. Brown Quarters 6 Fort Meyer, Virginia 22211

bee: JU\. 11 1978

IRA C. EAKER 1612 K STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.O. 20006 881-1280 July 11, 1978

Dear Justice Powell:

General George Brown has asked me to respond to your letter to him of June 27, 1978, respecting the bombing of Dresden. In doing so, I believe George was mindful of the fact that I have written on this subject during past years on several occasions. Enclosed are two accounts or reactions to the Dresden bombing episode: One is my foreword prepared at General Nathan Twining's request, to David Irving's book, "The Destruction of Dresden." The second enclosure is a definitive researched article by Melden E. Smith, Jr. entitled: "Dresden Revisited: New Perspectives on a Lingering Controversy."

The facts, as I know them, can be summa­ rized as follows:

a. There is no question but that Russian leadership indicated on several occasions that it would be most helpful to their advance into Germany if Britis~ and American heavy bombers would hit Dresden. When I went to Russia on the first Shuttle Bombing Mission Marshal Novikoff, head of the Red Air Force, made this suggestion to me, in­ dicating that Dresden was the principal logistic and communication center supporting the German defense against Marshal Zukov's advance. Later, when General Fred Anderson led the second Shuttle Bombing raid from the UK landing at the same Poltava base I had used on the first mission, he was again asked if it would be possible to hit Dresden on the way home. Both Anderson and I communicated these requests to General Spaatz and they were passed on to the combined Chiefs of Staff. At Yalta, a senior Russian general on Stalin's staff made the request that Dresden be considered for early attack by the strategic bombers, since as a rail and supply center it was a vital part of the German defenses on the Eastern Front. ·"'

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. July 11, 1978 Page 2

b. Apparently, for propaganda purposes, post-war, Russia has denied any connection with the bombing of Dresden and even labeled it entirely as a British and American "atrocity."

c. Melden E. Smith, in his account, en­ closed, presented accurately the positions taken by all the senior Allied air commanders. My own statement in the preface to Irving's book, states my attitude clearly.

. ' It is regretable that British and American historians have too often joined the Russians in rewriting the history of the air campaigns in World War II.

If you have any further questions regard­ ing Dresden, I shall be happy to supply the answers in-so-far as I know them.

Sincerely,

(Ret.)

Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D. C. 20543 "Dresden Revisited: New Perspecti ves .. ~ on a Lingering Controversy" MELDEN E. SMITH, JR. presented before The 1978 Missouri Valley History Conference After thirty-three years, the bombing of Dresden in mid-February 1945 remains the most controversial air attack of the Second World War in Europe. Much has been written about Dresden's wartime fate and how it came about. The legend of Dresden has not only been sustained through serious historical accounts, but has also been perpetuated by novels and plays. Perhaps, most prominently, the bombing of Dresden has not only been invoked by many as a serious indictment of aerial bombing as a method of waging warfare, but also as an indictment of the most senior British and American air commanders responsible for the prosecution of the air campaign against Germany. As Forrest C. Pogue wrote recently, "In the years since, the city has become a symbol of Allied brutality and mindless destruction." What actually occurred? Briefly, during the night of 13/14 February 1945, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command attacked Dresden in two waves approximately three hours apart with 2J4 four-engined Lancaster bombers in the first wave and 5J8 of the same type of aircraft in the second wave. Just past noon on the 14th, Jll American Eighth Air Force B-17's appeared over the city to unload their bombs. Yet, by the time the second wave of RAF Lancasters_ , appeared over the city the previous night, Dresden was already in the grips of a firestorm. Not discriminating in their allegations regarding the motives of so many other nighttime or daytime bombing attacks over Germany, the German propaganda network immediately called the triple blow against Dresden a "terror attack." Because of the intense devastation caused by these attacks, especially the two-wave RAF assault, this allegation appeared to be credible. -2- After the passage of a third of a century, is this characterization either fair or valid? Further, why has the' bombing of Dresden been singled out from many other destructive bombing attacks during the course of the long bomber offensive against Germany? The reasons are complex but understandable. By this time additional evidence is available, but, in my opinion, it needs to be rearranged and re-examined and a new synthesis needs to be constructed placing this wartime episode more correctly in its context in the Second World War. First, the bombing of Dresden occurred during the final three months of the strategic bombing offensive against Europe. This part of the bombing campaign has been ·the most controversial period in the minds of historians of the Second World War and the period when the strategy and the motives of senior air commanders have come under severest questioning. David Macisaac has written that it was the period when, the American air forces drifted away from their intended precision attack, and came to meld their efforts with those of RAF Bomber Command in an effort to club Germany into surrender. , The earlier hopes of the summer and early fall of 1944 that ttie war in Europe might be over by the end of that year had faded in the West and, indeed, appeared to be shockingly reversed with the sudden, forceful German attack in the Ardennes. Frustrated on the ground, the Allied command now had the bombers the air commanders lacked throughout the earlier years of the bombing offensive. . 7 Obviously, there was great pressure from the highest political

and military levels upon this assembled bo~ber armada and its commanders to redress the frustrating military situation confronting the ground forces. In this light, it would have been unthinkable not to use this tremendous air power whenever possible. As General Carl Spaatz, the senior American airman in Europe, wrote to his chief in Washington, General H. H. Arnold, in October 1944, "It may still be possible to beat up the insides of Germany enough by air action to cause her to collapse next spring, particularly if the Russians continue pressure against the eastern area." At this same time, anyone familiar with the weather patterns over Western Europe from October through March would realize that conditions for more precise visual bombing attacks would be very bad. Yet, and I think this was easily justifiable, the pressure of the air offensive should not have slackened even if less precise pathfinder or radar bombing methods had to be employed. Actually, under these operational conditions, there seemed to be little difference to those on the ground between British and American methods of bombing. Yet, by early April, the strategic situation had changed completely. The Rhine had been crossed and German resistance on the ground ha? , essentially collapsed and the bombing offensive was terminated. Because Dresden received such a concentrated attack so late in the war, so close to this sudden German military collapse, it has naturally caused many to question its necessity. Both political and military appreciations were changing dramatically by the middle of March as the Third Reich disintegrated. -~- Not until May 8th, the day of Germany's unconditional surrender, did Dresden fall to the Russian forces. Dresden was in the Soviet sector of occupation and was not available for inspection by Allied Bombing Survey investigators. Soon, in the context of the Cold War, Dresden became a Communist showpiece for anti-Western propaganda, singled out as a monument to Allied terror and destructiveness. Unlike other rubbled German cities gutted by bombing, Dresden's ruins were not torn down and the process of reconstruction, with a few exceptions, was retarded as long as it served the purpose of the Communist authorities. Not until the early sixties did the process of rebuilding really get underway. By this time, apparently, the spectacle of a ruined Dresden haq outlived its usefulness. Essentially well into the mid-sixties, as had been Joseph Goebbel's judgement immediately after the attack on Dresden, it was useful to the Communist authorities to encourage greatly exaggerated accounts of the bombing abroad while minimizing certain other aspects of the bombing within the country such as the actual death-toll occasioned by the bombing. David Irving, whose widely read The Destruction of Dresden first appeared in 1963 in Britain, wrote a little noticed letter of - ' correction to the London Times which appeared on July 7, 1966. In this letter he corrected the most probable estimate of the fatalities caused by the bombing that had appeared in his own book downward from 135,000 to 35,000. Irving noted: The bombing of Dresden in 1945 has, in recent years been adduced by some people as evidence that conventional bombing can be more devastating than nuclear attacks, and others have sought to draw false lessons from this. My own share of the blame for this is large: .•• Irving added: The east German authorities (who had originally declined to provide me with the documents) have now supplied to me a copy of the 11-page "final report" written by the area police chief about one month after the Dresden raids, and there is no doubt as to the documents' authenticity. Shortly after Irving's letter appeared, Mr. L. A. Jackets, Chief Historian at the Air Ministry commented in a memo: "It is practically impossible to kill a myth of this kind once it has become widespread

.. ~ and perhaps reprinted in other books all over the world." Also, close on the heels of the publication of Irving's book, a third edition of a book about the Dresden bombing appeared in East Germany written by Walter Weidauer who had been Dresden's Deputy Mayor for twenty years after the war. In this, he wrote that the total death figure was ·35,000.. He stated that 32,000 persons had been interred following the bombing and another J,OOO had been found in the ruins subsequently. The author stated that the Police Report

J , cited and even illustrated in his book had only been made available to him in 1964 from a private source. To o"ne privy to what actually occurred, this is a fascinating tale in itself and the insight thereby gained goes a long way in understanding the persistence of the controversy over Dresden. Subsequent research had revealed some additional flaws in the Irving book. For example, in describing the third American Eighth Air Force attack on Dresden shortly after noontime on February 14th following the RAF's two wave assault of the previous night, Irving describes how American P-51 fighters which were escorting the bombers swooped low over the city strafing civilians once the bombers turned away from the city. Irving wrote that One 'A' Group P-51 of the · 55th Fighter Squadron flew so low that it crashed into a wagon and exploded." Queried in 1972, the leader of this particular flight responded, "I can repeat one thing, we were not at any time instructed to strafe Dresden. We were asked to hit the deck on the way home and strafe any military installations on our return home." The pilot of the P-51 who crashed into a wagon presumably strafing Dresden was identified and is buried near where he crashed in Buchdorf near Donauworth situated in present day West Germany and approximately 180 nautical air miles southwest of Dresden. The bombing of Dresden is now revealed as not unique by virtue of the deaths caused. 42,000 persons were killed in the RAF attacks on Hamburg in the summer of 194J. 25,000 deaths resulted from a single concentrated American attack on Berlin as late as February~. • 1945. The most destructive conventional bombing of any city during the entire Second World War occurred on the night of March 9, 1945 when almost 84,000 Japanese were killed by an American incendiary attack on Tokyo. This was considerably in excess of the death toll resulting from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima subsequently on August 6, 1945. But, the most significant moral indictment remains. The

Communist East German account of the bombi~g of Dresden by Weidauer referred to earlier and which appeared shortly after the publication of Irving's book, stated that the bombing of Dresden represented the execution of Operation Thunderclap which had originally called for Dresden to be slated for an atomic attack if the "bomb" had been ready for use before the war ended in Europe. This assertion must be dismissed as purely speculative propaganda. However, the connection between Thunderclap and Dresden deserves more serious consideration, for upon this connection rests the motives of the senior Allied air commanders during the closing months of the war.

Notable and honored reputations are at ~ stake in an examination of this issue. Furthermore, here is an instance wherein fine nuances of historical objectivity and the writing of history become very critical. First, let's review chronologically some highlights of what was written about Dresden in the context of the bombing offensive's final three months. In 1961 Sir Charles Webster's and Noble Frankland's three volume official history, The Strategic Air Offensive Against GermaHy, 1939-1945 was published. In their third volume, the authors, who had had full access to all relevant sources, dealt with the final year of the war, and gave a concise description of Operation Thunderclap which was presented to the British Chiefs of Staff by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Portal·, on August 1, 1944. This memorandum was prompted earlier on July 5th by a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff when it was suggested, "that the time might well come in the not too distant future when an all-out attack by every means at our disposal on German civilian morale might be decisive" and recommended to the Prime Minister "that the method by which such air attack would be carried out should be examined and all possible preparation made." Air Chief Marshal Portal's memorandum of August 1st was the response, Operation Thunderclap was submitted by the Chief of the Air Staff after consultation with the British Foreign Office, the Political Warfare Executive and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Succinctly, the proposed plan called for an intense, sustained

.. ~ bombing of Berlin for a period of four days and three nights by the combined bomber forces of RAF Bomber Command and the American Eighth Air Force. It was proposed to drop 20,000 tons of bombs within a two and one half square mile circle of the center of Berlin. This operation was envisioned for execution at a precisely determined moment when both the German High Command and the German civilian population were on the verge of deciding between either an organized surrender or resorting to some sort of fanatical last ditch stand. Thunderclap, in short, was to stun them into an organized surrender. This proposal, though predicating conventional bombing, was strikingly similar to the rationale for the atomic bombing of Japan subsequently. -'j-

The official British history by Webster and Frankland quoted one passage from the Portal memorandum- but not in its entirety. It quoted the following passagea Immense devastation could be produced if the entire attack was concentrated on a single big town other than Berlin and the effect would be especially great if the town was one hitherto relatively undamaged. Not quoted, but this passage continued, "The political effect would however be less than that of a comparable devastation of Berlin." Other towns such as Cologne, Frankfurt and Munich were mentioned specifically in this context - but not Dresden. Yet, the authors of the official history - and here nuances are

important - after quoting this passage ~ncompletely, suggested to their readers, it is now necessary to grasp the full implication of this Air Staff memorandum which may be regarded, if only indirectly, as the title deed of that controversial operation. LQresderi7 David Irving selected this passage and assumed the bombing of Dresden was the fulfillment of the proposed Thunderclap plan. He entitled the chapter in which he dealt with how the decision was made to bomb Dresden "Thunderclap." Subsequent writers, too numerous to mention, have assume~, therefore, that Dresden was indeed Thunderclapped. Reading the subsequent correspondence of the senior air commanders, I have come to the conclusion that Thunderclap meant Berlin and had

,. \ -10- nothing directly to do with the bombing of Dresden almost seven months later in February 1945 when Germany appeared more full of fight than was forecast in late July or early August 1944. Dresden and other cities in eastern Germany were attacked in an entirely different strategic situation. On the eve of the bombing of Dresden, oil targets were still the primary objective of the Anglo-American bomber forces, with German communications centers as the secondary objective to be attacked when weather conditions precluded the more precise oil objectives. Dresden, as a transportation nexus fell into the latter category after Berlin and Leipzig. The SHAEF signal to Bomber

~ Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces dated January Jl, 1945 specifically stated its intent with respect to the secondary communications objectives: "Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and associated cities where heavy attack will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the East and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts." In short, whereas Thunderclap's intent was psychological, the order which came down to attack Dresden and associated cities in east Germany was essentially intended to hamper enemy logistics.

- / Further, when Thunderclap had earlier been referred to United States Strategic Air Forces Headquarters, it was rejected. General Spaatz expressed his opposition to his Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower in a letter dated August 24, 1944, stating that such an operation was contrary to American bombing policy. Nevertheless, four days later, on the 28th, General Eisenhower responded to Spaatz with the following indorsement: The operation under discussion is one that is to take place only under a very special set of circumstances. While I have always insisted that U. S. Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets, I am always prepared to take part in anything that gives real promise to ending the war quickly. The policies under which you are now operating will be unchanged unless in my opinion an opportunity arises where a sudden and devastating blow may have an incalculable result. Please bring this paper to me for discussion when you return from the Mediterranean. When Eisenhower made this response Spaatz was at Mediterranean

Allie~ Air Forces Headquarters in Cas~rta, Italy conferring with . . . General Ira Eaker. Not waiting for Eisenhower's response, Spaatz composed a joint letter dated August 27th from himself and Eaker to General Arnold in Washington in which he wrote, I have been subject to some pressure on the part of the Air Minist ry to join hands with them in morale bombing. I discussed this matter previously with Lovett .[Robert A. Lovett was then Undersecretary of tnlar for Aiil when he was here and have maintained a firm position that our bombing will continue to be precision bombing against military objectives. So far my stand has been supported by Eisenhower. I feel that a case may be made on the highest levels for bombing of the city of Berlin. I personally believe that any deviation from our present policy, even for an exceptional case, will be unfortunate. There is doubt in my mind that the RAF want very much to have the U. S. Air Forces tarred with the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific. Yet on September 9, 1944, both General Spaatz and Air Chief Marshal Harris were ordered by General Eisenhower to prepare to launch Thunderclap on short notice. Air Marshal Harris in a personal letter to me explains what followed: Re Thunderclap: Jimmy Doolittle at the last mement told me (rightly) that he could not guarantee fighter protection for my ill armed Lancasters by day to Berlin. So Thunderclap, for me, was off. However our night raids had already destroyed 6,000 acres of Berlin and as I had a lot to do elsewhere at SHAEF's behest and on the oil and transport Directives I concluded that Thunderclap was off and that Berlin had had enough for the present. Dresden was LSiil nothing to do with Thunderclap as such - tho it turned out to be one! .

~ Other operations were proposed during the final year of the war to impress or stun the Germans into submission - none of which had anything to do with Dresden, I might add. One of them was code­ named Clarion. Shortly after this proposal, which called for dispersed, widespread smaller attacks on smaller towns throughout Germany to demonstrate both Allied air supremacy and its magnitude, General Eaker wrote General Spaatz, I find this is the plan which I discussed with you briefly ..• I think you can count on the fingers of one hand all the times in our long service when I have disagreed with your ideas on Air Force doctrine or technique. In fact, I cannot now think of a single case. I am not sure that this Clarion Plan is one of them for I am not certain how strongly you are committed to it. -13-

Then after detailing his tactical objec~ions to the Clarion

proposal Eaker concluded,

I personally however have become completely convinced that you and Bob Lovett are right and we should never allow the history of this war to convict us of throwing the strategic bomber at the man in the street .•• Operation Clarion, however, was not implemented until February 22nd. In a letter to me of 1974, Dr. Noble Frankland stated this: As to Thunderclap I think it is undoubtedly the case that officially the plan was for Berlin and Berlin alone. My view was howev~r that the plan indicated the frame of mind which in fact resulted in the attacks on Dresden, Chemnitz, etc. Their correspondence reveals that Arnold, Portal, Spaatz and Harris all understood Thunderclap to mean Berlin and Berlin alone. All of these senior airmen had been presented with a multitude of proposals for special air operations during the last year of the war, most of which were rejected. The senior American air commanders Spaatz and Eaker were dead set against morale bombing

as such and as the war drew to a close they were resolute in the~r , determination to avoid American participation in such bombing. The bombing of Dresden did not deviate from RAF Bomber Command's by then routine method of urban attack. The American Eighth Air Force attack on Dresden on the 14th of February did not deviate from their usual procedure for such an attack when the use of radar for bomb aiming through clQud was necessary. Little wonder in the years after the war these American officers resented being accused of terror bombing against Dresden. -14- The one factor which made the bombing of Dresden unique was a series of operational circumstances s~ch as a clear band of weather over the target, and Dresden's surprising lack of air defenses which enabled RAF's Bomber Command to lay down a concentrated and devastating attack. Otherwise, the bombing of Dresden, when compared with other attacks against German cities, would not have been unique at all.

.J · ' FOREt~ORD by Ira C. Eaker, Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret.) (VIII Bom'ber Commander in England, February to October 1942J Connnanding General, Eighth Air Force in England, October 1942 to January 1944$ Commanding Genera1 Mediterranean Allied Air Forcea, January 194 4 to May 1945.)

I apprecinte tho opportunity tThich General Nathan F. T1dning,

USAF (Ret.), and his .fel~ow of:ficers of Holt a.nd Company, Publishers,

· have given me to ~Tito a foreword to the American edition of the D.:1v:td Irving book, uT11e .Destr-u.ction of Dvcaden." !t may not be inappropr-iate that I under-take this tae;k since I '

1942 until JanuBry 1944. In these capacitiea I worked clo5ely ~nth the pr•incipa.l Br1 tiBh and U.s. Corrnnandors, \'lho directed and carried out the

bomb ing raids on Oennan targets, including Dresden. I remembe1~ clearly tho tclrcet lin to and the bombing policies.

There ia a pcr·c.onal and especial r·eaaon 1·;hy I \'telcome this oppor-

tu.nity to cornzne nt on this book. Ytr. Irving 1 on page 150 of the English

edition, oaya, "On lat Jnnuary 1945, General Eaker had advioed h~ (Gcneral Spaatz, the Supreme U.S. Air Commander in Europe) ugainat eend­ irJ.8 heavy bombera to attack transpor·tation targets in small German towns,

ror there would be many civilian caaualties 1 and the German people might be convinced that the Americans were barbarians, juot all National Social- 1st propaganda chax>ged." I am then quoted as saying, "vJe should never allou the hiatory of this war to convict us of throwing the strategic bomber at the w..an in the otreet."

NOlf, 20 y~ars later, a reader may well draw the conclusion from

-1- this paosace that my milittU'Y' seniora, including General Harsh~.11,

General Eisenhoi·rcr1 General Arnold, and General Spaatz lmre advocating air attacks on civil population3, or that I was pointing an accusing finger at British bombing polioy. r-re:tther ltould have any validity. No American senior comnumder ever advocated a terror raid aga1n3t civil populations.

The bombing policy, like all rnct jora military decisions, ?~ere agreed

upon by the hoadll o:f the Allied governm~~ nts, Prenident Roos;&vclt, Prime

Miniater Churchill, and r~rahal Stalin, upon the advice of their Chiefs or Staffa. \lfuen I f'ix-et nM"'ived in Englnncl in 1942 to com.r;tand oul? bombel"' groups noon to orrive, and to organize., in oloae cooperati

state and Combin c~d Chiefs of Starr 1:ero, by agreement, chnr..nt:led through

Air Chief Ha1.. ahr:l Port~l , Chief of f>ir• Staff of tho Roy ~'. l /1"1.1'"' Fo1•ce. It

WP.U :ru..1ly undc!'"'Jtood r..nd agreed by all hands that the n:.. rtir. h night bomb­

ing effort, approved t-1l'1d then in progl"'C.CD, \'W.S thorc,u.rtcr to be supple­ tlonted by United Ste.tea daylight bombing agairu;t important Ch(;lny muni­ t.ione targets, bUbrnt,.rine pen!,'S, airplano and tank :t"E:.ctoriea_. e.nd later, pc·tr•oleum production and trancportation. Th:1c combined U.S.-Br.itich bombi.ng o.f'i'ensi"!e \'rould mnlce it ncces­ a!.u.. y fol"' 0Cl"''1lan defen.ncs to be groatly nugm.ented, to etand tmtch around the clock.. Th1a effort would keep thoucnnds of workers from the muni­

tion.a labor force,. nnd. sreatly rcdu.cc th~ number of d1v1t;:1.otW which the

G.::•rman

Our Fortresnee and L:tbei""Stors had been designed tor day bombing.

-2-

.',>: They carried rnany 50 caliber machine guns for defense. Theyflel-r in clooe fonnation for support, and the bombardiers could find and hit vital targets like munitions factories. It soon became clear, however; that the tveather often. obact1J7Sd targets. Radar was then developed and employed for tal''get identification tht"<>ugh cloud cover. Thi!J method never produced the accuracy or visual bombing. When we were forced to bomb through clouda, it is understandable why the Germans nomet1mes charged uo with 1ndiocrimdnate, area bombing. Also; vital enemy targets were often located in and near centers of' popu1atlon. It l'Tas clear to all of us that many c1v111a11..a would be killed or rendtn... ed homelees when Euch targets were attacked. vle never p~rmitted this factor to spare a vital ta~get. I did not believe then, and I do not believe no~r, that - ~ factory. turning ouf planes, bombs, tankn, submarinos, or gU11.0 should be spared to prevent hazard to enemy civil populations, particularly civ:tliana working in those planto, turn­

;tng out munitions l ater to be hurled at our gallant soldiers, t;ailors, and airmen. A skilled \"lorkel... in a GcrrrJ.3n factory was contributing to our caoualtien juat ae certainly as enemies in uniform. It HaG our directive and our duty to bring the war to successful conclusion aa quickly as possible. The enemy would be defeated when he , ; had loot the uill to fight; ou1.. bombing ~mo directed toward that end.

The heada of the Allied governments, their Chiefs of Starr~ and tho oen;tor military commanders in the field ware not fiends Qr barbar­ ians who reliohed the taking of human live3. I knel'l theBe men well. I admired and respected their habits, characters, and their complete dedication to their military assignments and their patriotic endeavor$ for their countrie:J and their peoples.

-3- I :rind it difi'il)ult to understand EneliBhm~·~n or .Americans:; who licep obout enemy c1v1liens ·uho were l\:1llcd, but uho have not ahed a tear for our galla.nt creW$ loat in combat with a cruel enemy. I thinlc it \1ould have boen \'lell for trw. Irving to hnvc remembered, t~'hen he t!UO dral'ring the frightful pict~~ of the civilians killed at Dr~odcn, that V-l's and V-2's wera et thnt very time fallins on EP~land, killing ¢1v111an men, women and children 1nd1acriminctely, na they we1~ donigned and ln.unched to do. It r:ctr;ht be \'Tell to !'0l'1Ctlbel" Buchcm,tald end Coventry1 too.

I have road every liOrd of David Irvins 1 a book, "Th.c D... s truction of

Dl"~nden. n I . J:'ou.nd it un absorbing recital o:r the deadlie,;;t air attack of the- laat war.. 'l'hio book is a valuable contribution to the hiotory ot.. the air cffo:~:t in the Second Wor·ld t

End :t~fer~..;nce bC:'I!t: for· all 11brarie:J for nll time.

Pl"'Opor· military tr.x·gct.. That same .art;\..mtent, EJtr~n.c;ely cnouc;h ... ia r·c­ cur•:r•t;:nt no~-:. Om-- n:tr leaders today ndvoe~te a "countc:r-rorco 11 air r;tl"'atcc;y. All r..ilito.ry airmen generally believe thnt our• l·~caporw nhould ' " b • d~aicncd ::lnd r,ro:~uccd in sufficient qtulntity to do1.1troy the cnemY'B

11 r rnalr..ing potcn.t:tel 1 not h1n cit!ec.. Othero advocate thnt \;r: need only nu.rtioient nuclear tm~pona to destroy the enemy•a e1"'cnt ccnttu•s of popu­ lut:1on. By a strarJ.Zc coincidence, tho::c liho no't'r lcau in conc\:.r.ming the borlbing of' c1vil1amJ in the laat t::-ar, ~pp.:Jr:.tr to be the "f·u11 cafe" crowd, n.nd the hand l-lrineinc pacifiato 't·;ho l;ould noH give Ufl on.ly enough weapons in a f"uture cmcrt:;ency i'or the dcstr·nction o:r enemy c1tie3.

-4-

'. A great contr1.bution made by David Irv1ng' a book, in my judgment, tms the .foreword by Air f.'larohal Sir Robert Saundby to the Britiah edi­

tion. I con~end hi$ sensible conclunions to the consideration or every reader, particularly thisc "Let us hope that the horrors of Dresden and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Hamburg, may drive home to the mole human race the rutile savagery and utter usele$sness of modern warfare. We must not m.ake the fatal mis.talte,. however, or believing that war can be avoided by unilateral dioarmament, by reeort to pac1fiem, or by striv­ ing for an unattainable neutrality.n

..~

-5- JUL 17 ~78

12 July 1978

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D. C. 20543 Dear Lewis I have your letter of the 27th and while we understand your not being able to come to Blair House for dinner, we did nevertheless miss you and Jo and we also missed you at the retirement review on the 30th. Nevertheless , we understand and know how important your work is, We are very proud of your recent work and proud to count you among our friends . I took the liberty of sending your letter concerning the bombing of Dresden on to General Ira Eaker who told me he had some factual material which he would send to you promptly. I trust you will find it helpful. Skip joins in fond regards to you and Jo. Sincerely July 25, 1978

Dear General Eaker: Thank you for your letter of July 11th, with its enclosures. It was good of you to respond so fully to my request to George Brown for information on the ...' bombing of Dresden.

The people who oppose strategic bombing (both as ..~ ineffective and "immoral" --and they are legion), there­ visionist historians, and indeed the literate public gen­ erally, tend to accept Soviet propaganda that the Dresden attack was wanton and militarily unjustifiable warfare by ··-.. the Allied air forces against defenseless civilians. Irving's book on Dresden is frequently cited as confirming the Soviet line. Other books and articles have been to the same effect. I have been dismayed by the absence of any authoritative reply (of which I have knowledge) by the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or indeed by American military historians. Your letter is of special interest to me because your summary of the Russian role confirms what Fred Anderson said to me at the time. My recollection is that, responding to the question "Why?", he said the soviets had requested it; .•'.. that Dresden, and particularly its marshalling yards, were > being used extensively as an assembly and distribution point for supplies and troops for the eastern front -- at a critical time in the Soviet westward drive. I understood Fred as saying this was a specific request, communicated through Washington -- as we had received such requests in the past. Your summary confirms that at least there had been general .. target requests, several times repeated, and that these in­ cluded Dresden. The Yalta Conference was, as I recall, in mid-January. Dresden was attacked 13/14 February. !'red Anderson, as you will remember, represented General Spaatz and the u.s. Air Force at Yalta. I found your introduction to Irving's book and Melden Smith's "Dresden Revisited" excellent and interesting. ·,

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Both are quite persuasive as to military justification, ·-. especially viewed in the context of the general situation at the time. Your introduction makes clear that the bombing policy was agreed to by the Allied governments, including Stalin. Would it not now be desirable, in the interest of historical accuracy, and alao as a refutation of soviet per­ sistent misrepresentation, for you to write for publication . ' an article that focuses on the extent to which the Soviets participated in strategic bombing policy and indeed in spe­ cific requests. As we both k.now (sadly), no shuttle mission -- requiring our planoa to land at Poltava -- could be under­ taken without the prior, expreaa approval of the Soviets. '• It may be that the story baa been told authorita­ tively before. aut it baa never come to my attention. More­ over, you are perhaps the most authoritative American source still living. You are the only senior American officer who had strategic command responsibility throughout our partici­ pation in the European war, and discharged this responsibility with great distinction. · Perhaps General Doolittle, who commanded the 8th ,: Air Force at the time, would have supporting recollections.

I would think popular as well as professional publications would welcome an article.

I would be happy to have lunch with you sometime, ..•' perhaps with Harris Hull -- wbo is a friend. ~,; With my thanks and best wishes. ~_. ' -~

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Dear General Eaker: Thank you for your letter of July 11th, with its enclosures. It was good of you to respond so fully to my request to George Brown for information on the bombing of Dresden. The people who oppose strategic bombing (both as ineffective and "immoral" --and they are l egion), there­ visionist llistorians, and indeed the literate public gen­ erally, tend to accept Soviet propaganda that the Dresden attack was wanton and militarily unjustifiable warfare by the Allied air forces against defenseless civilians. Irving's book on Dresden is frequently cited as confirming the Soviet line. Other books and articles have been to the same effect. I have been dismayed by the absence of any authoritative reply (of which I have knowledge) by the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or indeed by American military historians. Your letter is of special interest to me because your s~~ary of the Russian role confi~s what Fred Anderson said to me at the time. My recollection is that, responding to the question "Why?", he said the Soviets had requested it; that Dresden, and particularly its marshalling yards, were being used extensively as an assentbly and distribution point " for supplies and troops for the eastern front -- at a critical time in the Soviet westward drive. I understood E'red as saying this was a specific request, conltmmicated through Washington -- as we had received such requeets in the past. Your surr~ary confirms that at least there had been general target requests, several times repeated, and that these in- cluded Dresden. The Yalta Conference wasg as I recall, in mid-January. Dresden was attacked 13/14 February. F!:ed Andersen, as you will remember, represented General Spaatz and the u.s. Air Force at Yalta. I found your introduction 'to Irving 1 s book and Melden Smith 1 s "Dresden Revisited" excellent and lntt~resti.ng. 2.

Both are quite persuasive as to military justification, especially viewed in the context of the general situation at tbe time. Your introduction makes clear that the bombing policy was agreed to by the Allied governments; including Stalin. Would it not now be desirable, in the interest of historical accuracy, and also as a refutation of Soviet per­ sistent misrepresentation, for you to write for publication an article that focuses on the extent to which the Soviets participated in strategic bombing policy and indeed in spe­ cific requests. As we both know (sadly), no shuttle ndasion -- requiring our planes to l~~d at Poltava -- could be under­ taken without the prior, express approval of the Sovi.ets. It may be that the story has been told authorita­ tively before. But it has never come to my attention. More­ over, you are perhaps the most authoritative American source still living. You are the only senior l~erican officer who had strategic command responsibility throughout our partici­ pation in the European war, and discharged this responsibility with great distinction.

Ferhaps General Doolittle, who commanded the Sth Air Force at the tilne, would have supporting recollections. I would think popular as well as professional pl.lblications trould welcome an article. I would be happy to have lunch with you sometime, perhaps with Harris Hull-- who is· a friend. With my thanks and best wishes. Sincerely,

General Ira c. Enker 1612 K Street, N.w. \

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

August 8, 1978

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker USAF (Retired) 1612 K Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Ira:

Thank you very much for your good letter of August 3rd with its enclosures regarding Justice Powell's concern over the currently manufactured attacks on the Dresden bombing raids.

While I had no personal contact in any of the discussions concerning the raids at the time they were made, I have a very clear recollection o~ two factors which seem to support the theory that this current outcry is the resul~ of a contrived plan of harassment instigated by the Russians in their efforts to besmirch the United States around the world hoping to distract worldwide attention from their present treatment of their political prisoners.

First of all, I have a clear recollection of being told on several occasions that the Russians were very anxious to accel­ erate their drive on Thuringia in southeast Germany and were aiming for Dresden and Leipzig. They apparently were worried about their ability to break through as long as Dresden's very capable rail­ road yards were still in tact. As I recall it, this drive was part of the hope to keep the Germans from establishing a "central redoubt". In the second place, knowing Secretary Stimson's abhor­ rence of any unnecessary destruction of cultural or historical centers (witness his vetoing the second A-bomb target in Japan and requiring the substitution of an alternative), I am sure the top ; ' policy council would not have acted on U. S. initiative alone. I feel sure there must have been strong suggestions of opening up the equivalent of a southern invasion route for the Russians.

It does not surprise me to see the Russians use their efficient fifth column in this country to start and fan these rumors of U. S. "atrocities" but I must say it gets kind of tire­ some and I have wondered why the War Department's historical section has not countered this attack. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker August 8, 1978

- 2 -

I notice that you have been given some freedom of action. For heaven's sake don't overdo it. Take it easy for a bit -- at least until cool weather comes

With best regards as always, I am

Yours ever, IRA C. EAKER 1612 K STREET, N,W. WASBINGTON,D.C.20006 881-1280 August 10, 1978

Dear Justice Powell:

In connection with the questions concern­ ing the Dresden bombing raids raised by your letter, I wrote to The Honorable Robert A. Lovett, who was the Assistant Secretary of War for Air during that period and sent him our exchange of correspondence. Enclosed is a reply I have had from him today, which seems to me to be very pertinent to this subject.

I am furnishing a copy of Mr. Lovett's letter to General George Brown also, since I believe that he or General Dave Jones, his successor, will be able to bring Mr. Lovett's suggestion to the attention of the proper persons that the Defense Department take proper notice of the Soviet anti­ U.S. propaganda and make a suitable response.

Regarding your excellent suggestion that I, as one of the few participants now living who has personal knowledge of the affair, give it publicity, I am making a talk at a History Symposium at the Air Force Academy on October 19th, on the subject of Air Power and Warfare. I intend to cover this Dresden matter in that talk. In addition, I am writing a foreword for a book soon to be published on strategic bombing and shall again state the facts as I know them and emphasize the Russian's duplicity.

(Ret.)

Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D. C. 20543 .:iu:ptttttt (!j:ourl of tJr.t ~ttit.t~ .;itzthg jlta:~Jrin:gtc:n. ~. (!j:. Zll,?'-1~

CHAMBERS OF JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. August 16, 1978

Dear General Eaker: Your letter of August 10 was forwarded to me here in Richmond, where Mrs. Powell and I keep a home and spend a few weeks in the summer. I am delighted that you will address the Dresden issue when you speak at the Air Force Academy. I would be most grateful if you would send me a copy of your address, and also let me know the name of the book on strategic bombing so that I may purchase a copy. As I spent nearly three years in the European and African theaters with bombers (from the squadron and group level to Tooey Spaatz's staff), I have more than a little interest in what I think was the most decisive operation of World War II. I have always admired your major role in that operation. With my thanks, also, for writing to Secretary Lovett. I am glad to have a copy of his letter. Sincerely,

Lt. Gen. Ira c. Eaker, USAF (Ret.) 1612 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 August 16, 1978

Dear General Eaker: Your letter of August 10 was forwarded to me here in Richmond, where Mrs. Powell and I keep a home and spend a few weeks in the summer. I am delighted that you will address the Dresden issue when you speak at the Air Force Academy. I would be most grateful if you would send me a copy of your address, and also let me know the name of the book on strategic bombing so that I may purchase a copy. As I spent nearly three years in the European and African theaters with bombers (from the squadron and group level to Tooey Spaatz's staff), I have more than a little interest in what I think was the most decisive operation of World War II. I have always admired your major role in that operation. With my thanks, also, for writing to Secretary Lovett. I am glad to have a copy of his letter. Sincerely,

Lt. Gen. Ira c. Eaker, USAF 1612 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 August 16, 1978

Dear Mr. Lovett: General Eaker was good enough to share with me a copy of your letter to him of August 8th. It is good to know that your own recollection of the situation supports my understanding at the time that the attack on Dresden was Russian in its genesis. We had no target maps on Dresden, it was not included in our strategic plans, and the marshalling yards there were far too remote to have been of primary military importance to the Western Allies. It is good that Ira Eaker, who is one of the few leading participants still living, will address this subject. The Soviet leaders have made worldwide propaganda capital out of this Allied effort to aid the Russian armies. I recall meeting you during the War, I believe in General Spaatz's headquarters either at Bushy Park or in France. In any event, I have admired your career of distinguished public service to our country. With best wishes. Sincerely,

Mr. Robert A. Lovett ..t'., 59 Wall Street New York, New York 10005

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Dear Mr. Lovett:

General Eaker was good enough to share with me a copy of your letter to him of August 8th.

It is good to know that your own recollection of the situation supports my understanding at the time that the attack on Dresden was Russian in its genesis. We had no target maps on Dresden, it was not included in our strategic plans, and the marshalling yards there were far too remote to have been of primary military importance to the Western Allies.

It is good that Ira Eaker, who is one of the .few leading participants still living, will address this subject. The Soviet leaders have made worldwide propaganda capital out of this Allied effort to aid the Russian armies.

I recall meeting you during the War, I believe in General Spaatz's headquarters either at Bushy Park or in France.· In any event, I have admired your career of distinguished public service to our country.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,_

Mr. Robert A. Lovett 59 Wall Street New York, New York 10005

-· . •:. November 16, 1978

Dear Georqe>:

Jn aoinq through my files, I came ~cross the corresponoencP concerning the Dresden bombing attacks.

You w~re aood enouqh to put me in touch with Ira Eaker last June. As a result, he qot in touch with former Under Secretary of War Robert A. Lovett, and the three of us have exchanqefl some correspondence. I thouqht the enc los eel copies of 1et.tPrs woulo be of i ntPrest to you. ·.. As you know, Bill and Rita Clements are in Virginia this week - after his astonishinq victory in Texas. Bill speaks of you with the warmPst admiration en~ affection, a view shared by everyone who has had the priviJeqe of knowing and workinq with you.

Colonial Williamsburg is hol~ina a small cottaaP. for the Brown fvmjly when your daughter graduates from William and Mary next May. You should receive confirmation of this reservation directly from Colonial Williamsburg. ...; I send you warw best ~ishe>s. Sinrerely,

,. •~ .... 4 •... ..• General George s. Brown .. 2337 Rolfe StrPet Arlington, Virqinia 22202 .. lfp/ss Enc. ,•

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~~~~ WASHINGTON, D.O. 20006 331-1280 1625 Eye Street, N. W. Suite 506 DEC 11 \97\l December 7, 1978

Dear Lewis:

Thanks very much for your letter of November 30th, and its enclosure, your letter to Edwin M. Yoder, Editor of The Washington Star. I am delighted at the information you gave him and I have no objection to your sending him a copy of my talk at the Air Force Academy.

Your suggestion that the Dresden bombing be made a matter of permanent record I agree with fully. I have done that in lectures at the Air University and at the Army War College. I will now follow up by taking the exchange of correspon­ dence with you and Bob Lovett when I go next Monday to make my next talk at the Air University.

It now appears that there is some hope that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and President Carter are having a slight change of heart on the B-1 bomber since our intelligence agencies have discovered that the Russians are now flying their test article of our B-1. Its characteristics are quite similar to our B-1. I understand a little money is contained in the 1979 - '80 defense budgets to begin the study of a new "penetrating bomber" for the U.S. I am told that it is ill-advised to refer to this new bomber as a revitalization of the B-1. Since Carter cancelled the B-1, it would be much wiser to call the new plane a "penetrating bomber."

Thanks for your mention of my brief eulogy of Tooey Spaatz. I understand that good progress is being made on a book entitled "Andrews, Arnold and Spaatz" which will probably be published in the Fall The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. December 7, 1978 Page 2

of next year. I have spent many hours with the author and I am encouraged that he possesses the biographical writing skill to do a proper book on the lives of these three great air leaders.

It is especially encouraging to me and my contemporaries and concerned friends to know that you are still interested and occupied in set­ ting the record of the air operations in World War II straight.

With admiration, appreciation and every good wish,

Sincerely,

--~Ira C. Eaker Lt. Gen., USAF (Ret.)

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D. C. 20543 IRA C. EAKER 1625 EYE STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 881-1280 4 APR 197g April 3, 1979

Dear Lewis: Your letter of March 27th, was deeply appreciated, as was your intercession with Mel Laird regarding Reader's Digest using a portion of my talk on airpower. Last October, I invited Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris and his wife to pay us a visit the last week in May. He told we t hat he would let me know shortly after he returned from South Africa (where he spends the winter) whether he was able to make the visit. I expect to hear from him shortly. If he does come, I plan to have those of us living in this area who served with the U.S. 8th Air Force and Strategic Air Force in World War II at a dinner and reception for him. You will certainly receive an invitation to this event as I know you will wish to see again that "old airpower advocate" who cooperated so thoroughly with us in our greatest war. If he is not able to make the visit, I shall certainly hope that we can meet for lunch prior to your Court adjournment on July 1st, or any other time convenient to you. Enclosed herewith are my last two columns discussing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. With admiration, appreciation and every ; good wish, Sincerely, baker Lt. Gen., USAF (Ret.)

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D. C. 20543

·. 1\11\SJt: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washmgton 0 C 20546 ' .

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' ' IRA C. EAKER 162:5 EYE STREET, N.W, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

381.1280 May 28, 1979

Dear Lewis: Enclosed is a recent book ULTRA GOES TO WAR and a copy of my review of it, v.Jritten at the request of the Air Force Historical Foundation. I believe you will find it of interest and significance. It quotes you many times and with especial admiration. I advise you to read Chapter Six first, but after you read it, I feel you will be "hooked" and will finish the entire book in time. The copy of the book I am sending you is the one furnished me by the editor of the AEROSPACE HISTORIAN and you will note that I have marked several passages in connection with my review. I hope that these do not interfere with your reading and evalua­ tion of Lewin's book. I am going to Europe on June 6th, for my annual visit and briefing at SHAPE. Shortly after I return on June 11th, I will hope to contact you by telephone in order to arrange for our luncheon prior to the adjournment of the Court and your departure from this area. \-lith great admiration and every good wish, as always, Sincerely,

Ira C. Eaker Lt. Gen., USAF (Ret.)

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D. C. 20543

'· ...

July 2, 1979

Dear Harris: I so much appreciate· your note of last April, and your thoughtfulness in lending me your American and English copies of David Irving's book called "The Destruction of Dresden". Although I did not read the entire book, I read enough of it to agree that it is both interesting and significant. t f the author's facts are right, the book corroborates, at least generally, my understanding at the time that the attack on Dresden was responsive to a request from the Soviet Union. This subject is discussed in Chapter II. On page 100 it is said: "Sir Robert Saundby (I believe he was Sir Arthur Harris' Chief of Staff) understood that the Russians had specifically asked for an attack on Dresden and assumed that this request had been made at Yalta.• But apparently no specific evidence documenting a specific request has been turned up. Tooey Spaatz told me this when I raised the question ten or twelve years ago when the Soviets were makinq~uch propaganda out of the assertion that the American Air Force and the RAF attacked Dresden wholly on their own volition, and for no military purpose whatever. As I have said to ~Eaker, my distinct recollection is that Fred Anderson, Deputy Commander to General Spaatz, told me at the time that the attack had been '• 2. requested by the Soviets. Fred hqd come in to ask me whether we had any tarqet information on Dresden, and - of course - we had none whatever at our headquarters. In any event, the Irving book is one worth having, and I am writinq the publisher to see if a copy is available. I send warm best wishes. ' .

Sincerely,

General H. B. Hull NASA - Code L-3 Washington, D. C. 20546 ~..

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,.' t .I ' P. S. I return herewith the two books you were good enough ~. " to lend me. ·:

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David R. Mets 334 Olde Post Road Niceville, FL, 32578

1 Jan 1983

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Supreme Court of the United States Washington, DC, 20543.

Dear Mr. Justice

I have just encountered something of interest to you in my Spaatz research and thought it would be well to pass it on.

I am working with a dissertation with a wide reputation for its definitive nature: Noel Francis ~arrish, "Behind the Sheltering Bomb: Military Indecision from Alamogordo to Korea," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1968. General Parrish is a retired Air Force officer with considerable renown among air power historians. His dissertation treats the Dresden Raid and the alleged American responsibility for the deaths there at some length, pp. 18-24. He draws his data from " ... a thorough and fully documented s~y by Joseph ~ 11 of the United States Air Force Historical Division, in January, 1959, which was never made public."

Eriefly, Parrish argued that we need not apologize for the American air leaders. Apparently Angell provided good documentation that the Russians did indeed ask for help at Yalta. General Anatov seems to have r equested air attacks on the German lines of communications leading up the the Russian front. Moreover, the propagandists seem to have linked the American and the British raids on Dresden more tightly than was actually the case. The British did attack the center of the town, but the American attacks, like many before them, were directed at the rail yards on the outskirts. Parrish is explicit in the assertion ~h at a -couple of German generals after the \'18r did a study for the US Army which grossly exaggerated the civilian casualties and that David Irving picked up on those figures---as did Raymond Fredette subsequently. The propagandists have had a field day with this, and, according to Parrish, the US has not seen fit to do a full refutation for fear of seeming to try to heap the blame on a trusted friend: the FAF. Further, the figures on casualties are altogether out of proportion with those suffered by similar sized cities under similar (and often much heavier) raids. If you want to pursue it further, I think that the Chief of Air Force Sistory, Dr. Richard Kohn, or his assistant, Colonel Jack Schlight, (Tel: 767-5764) would doubtless be glad to round up both documents and send them over to you. Incidentally, I am sure that Robin Higham, editor of Aerospace Historian, Eisenhower Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 66506, would be delighted to consider any commentary by you on setting the Dresden affair straight for publication in a magazine that reaches most airpower historians, at least.

Thanks for your attention and best wishes for the New Year. January 10, 1983

Dear Colonel Mets: It was most thoughtful of you to write. I am fascinated - as well as gratified - by what your research has turned up about the back-to-back Dresden attacks by our Air Force and the RAF. This is entirely con­ sistent with the recollection of both General Eaker and for­ mer Assistant Secretary of War, Robert Lovett. I think you saw the Eaker and Lovett letters in my file. The marshaling yards that we attacked were a legitimate target, but we had never planned to attack Ci. ~· Apart from my own conviction that we were comply­ ing with a request by the Soviets, I have thought that the subsequent estimates of casualties were greatly exaggerated. Unhappily, Soviet propaganda and disinformation - pervasive since World War II - has succeeded in damaging the United States in the minds of millions of people around the world, including - I am afraid - a good many Americans. The response of our government, and indeed of our press, to this sort of challenge has been pathetically inadequate. I am pleased that you now have General Parrish's testimony. I am confident it also would please Tooy Spaatz. Sincerely,

Lt. Col. David R. Mete 334 Olde Post Road Niceville, Florida 32578 lfp/ss 1983

PERSONAI~

Dear ,Jack: The story in Sunday's (April 17) wash­ ington Post entitled "Why Didn't We Bomb Auschwitz?•, prompts this letter. As seems customary with modern journal­ ism, the casting of blame on public officials seems to have been the primary objective of the story. Criticism by a free press, of course, is essential in a democracy. But since "investiga­ tive reporting" has proved so profi.table both to " the reporter and the publication or the network, criticism has assumed a new dimension. Often it seems that i.ts purpose is to undermi.ne confidence in the integrity as well as the comPetency of the people who make the sacr i. f ices to serve their country. Increasinqly, this deters the best qual­ ified people from serving. I can think of no legitimate purpose for going back almost 40 years to argue that if the responsible officials had been wiser we would have bombed Auschwitz, killed some Jews but perhaps saved many more. I was Chief of the Operational Intelligence Section of. Toov Spaatz's staff (U.S. Strategic Air' Forces in Europe) in 1944-45, and r. never heard the subject mentioned. I am confident we would have thought concentration camps were wholly lnappropriate military targets. Speaking of targets, Soviet propaQanda - accepted uncritically by many in our country and Great aritain - has blamed our air forces for the attacks on Dresden. Although I know of no docu­ mentation, my specific understanding at the time was that these attacks were made at the request of

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'· .." ...a:·.---..."i.<·-l-· " --·- .. '\ ~"···"-'· __ ,.,..,.. "-.•u ~--~~~-. '"-- ~,..,., •. ·- __ .... __ _...__, ·--·-< ... 2. the Soviet Union. In recent years, both Bob Lovett and Ira Eaker also have said in correspon­ ,, dence their understanding coincided with mine. I would be interested in your recollection. t<" The only thinq good in the Post story was the statement that you are •alert and vigor­ ous", though this merely confirms what I hear from others. I do not recall seeinq vou since we both participated in a program of the Business Council at Hot Springs a year or two before T came on the Court. I h.ave lonq admired your career and most distinguished service to America and indeed th~ West.

~ilith special best wishes. Sincerely,

Hon. John J. Mc("'loy . Milbank, Tweed, qadley & McClov 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza New. York, New York 10005 lfp/ss JOHN J. McCLOY

ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

April 27, 1983

Dear Mr. Justice Powell:

Thank you for writing me on the Auschwitz matter. I am afraid I should never have talked to anyone about it but the fact is President Roosevelt did not think the project was a sensible one. Harry Hopkins and Sam Rosenman asked me to write to the Jewish group that had importuned the President to order the bombing and convey to them the general reluctance of the Air Force to undertake it. I pointed out, at the time, that if the President wanted to bomb Auschwitz, all he had to do was order it. But, it was clear that neither he nor Mr. Churchill felt it was a viable or indeed a rational operation.

I find I cannot keep up with all of the charges I now see appearing in the public prints about me. I see that I was charged by someone who was writing a book about Marshall with having called General Wedemeyer a "bastard". I knew General Wedemeyer well and I thought I had very good relations with him. Certainly, I would never use that term in regard to him. It is not part of my vocabulary and to the best ~ my knowledge, I have never used it in regard to anyone.

As to Dresden, I have always had the idea that the Russians insisted on the Allies bombing Dresden. I do not have any documentation with me to prove it but certainly, it was the common understanding in the ~~ar Department that the Russians had insisted on it because of its importance as a communications center for troops and supplies moving to the Eastern front.

Thank you very much for writing me.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell 550 N Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20024 lfp/ss 09/17/84 Dresden Conversation with General Quesada: Pete Quesada {Lt. General), friend since World War II, was here for a couple of days and we had dinner with him on Thursday evening, September 13. In the course of doing some reminiscing, and re- sponding to a question from me, Pete stated emphatically that we attacked Dresden at the request of the Soviet Union. He agreed with me that Dresden had been off limits for the U.S. Air Force. -t. ~ 1-. {! L.F.P., Jr. ss 37 Pembroke Square, London, W8 6PE f •.-ll '"' 01-937 3772 ...., c:MI- (,;&._' ll'~ M/-\ . 1 s 199S 7'~ I {:.~ 0 • :,_ V 6!._ (.. ..j~~ ·. ... I... l~ ~ dM. e- ~A.. .w-.a. . .

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March 22, 1985

Dear Jim: It was good to hear your "voice from the past". I have often intended writing you, but intentions of this kind usually are put off by the pressure of day-to-day commitments. It so happens, Jim, that I also have been particularly interested in the truth about Dresden, and have been dismayed by the extent to which Soviet propaganda has been "bought" by the media in this country and perhaps worldwide. I nevertheless agree with you that the bombing of Dresden - wherever the primary responsibility lies - was a dreadful mistake. My personal knowledge is relevant but limited. I am happy to share it with you. As you will recall, I was Chief of the Operational Intel­ ligence Section of Spaatz's staff in addition to being the Special Branch officer. Spaatz did not discuss Dresden with me at the time. Major Gener­ al Frederick Anderson Deputy Commander of our Strategic Air FOr'Ces,i was the senior operations _ , officer with whom I worked most closely. He told' me that a back-to-back operation against Dresden wa~ by an er1can Air Forces, and inquired whether we had any maps or target information on Dresden. He said the RAF would make its usual night attack, and that the American Air Force would make a day attack on the marshaling yards.

lGeneral Anderson, a dear friend, died before Dresden became a major propaganda issue. Incidentally, he represented the American Air Force at Yalta. Bill Haines and I wrote his briefing paper. 2. I responded that we had no material whatever on Dresden, and that I understood it was "off-limits" - as an historic city target of no military significance to us. Fred then responded that the attacks were being undertaken at the re­ quest of the Soviet Union. I did not doubt this, / and still believe it to be essentially true. You will recall that in the "bargaining" that led fi- nally to our having limited landing rights at Pol­ tava and one other Russian base, we agreed to con­ sider Soviet requests with respect to targets - particularly those that required use of their bases, and in that event to obtain prior approval. I do not recall seeing the particular ULTRA message you mentioned with respect to the route of the German p~nzer divisions being moved to the eastern front. Fred Anderson did say he understood that the Russians believed the marshal­ ing yards were being used by the Germans as an assembly point for troop reinforcements and sup­ plies, and that RAF Bomber Command had agreed to make the attack. I do not recall Fred referring to any particular panzer divisions. I believe Fred Anderson also expressed the view (not as a fact but as a belief) that the Dresden attack probably had been approved at the highest levels: Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in accord with understandings reached at Yalta. Years after the war when I became aware of the pervasiveness of Soviet propaganda about Dresden, and having in mind my discussion with Fred Anderson, I called Tooey Spaatz from Richmond and inquired as ~o nis recollect1on. He stated briefly that he understood the Soviets wan ed Dresden born e , a the Br1t1sh had agreed, and that the u.s. Air Force would never have attacked it otherwise. But Tooey stated that he could find no confirmation of a Soviet request in the Penta­ gon records. General Spaatz died a decade or more

2This type message may not have been sent to Air Force Commands. But I did know - probably from ULTRA - that Soviet advances had prompted the Germans to reinforce their eastern front. 3. ago, and I had no further discussions with him. I have discussed Dresden at length with General Ira Eaker (who then commanded the Fif­ teenth Air Force). He is unequivocal in his recol­ lection that Soviet pressure prompted the attacks on Dresden. General Eaker is now in a final ill­ Iness. I am sure he wOU!a not object to my sending you - for your personal information - a copy of his letter to me of July 11, 1978. He has repeat­ edly sta€ed to me that none of f he senior American air commanders viewed Dresden as a proper target. The decision was made at higher levels as a result of Soviet pressure. General Eaker's view as to the basic Soviet responsibility is also fully shared by Rob­ ert A. Lovett, with whom I have corresponded. Bob Lovett is a distinguished American who at the time was an Assistant Secretary of War for Air. I had met him at Spaatz's headquarters. John J. McCloy, whom you will identify, has written me that he "always had the idea that the Russians insisted on the Allies bombing Dresden", although he recalls no documentation to prove it. He further noted that it was the common understanding in the War Department that the Russians had insisted on it because of Dresden's "importance as a communica­ tions center for troops and supplies moving to the eastern front". Finally, Pete Quesada, 3who commanded one of our tactical air forces that also provided fighter support for bombing missions, is emphatic in his recollection that Dresden was attacked at the request of the Soviet Union. In sum, Jim, although the extent of my personal knowledge is stated above, it accords with the views of the senior American officials. I find it difficult to believe that we would have attacked this lovely city of little or no military importance (except to the Soviet Union) unless pressured to do so. I can add that the senior .I American officers with whom I dealt regularly, 3Jim Fellers was Quesada's ULTRA officer. 4. with occasional exceptions, were strongly opposed to bombing civilians or cities indiscriminately. Our primary targets almost invariably were mili­ tary ones. British Bomber Command, unable to con­ duct day operations, no doubt felt jusitifed in reciprocating the German indiscriminate bombing of British cities. I think it would be useful for you to write a letter to The Times, though you may want to consider noting the probability of Soviet pres­ sure. Working as closely as I did with senior American commanders, I am certain the u.s. Air Force would not have hit Dresden on its own ini­ tiative. There were too many other important tar­ gets in our strategic bombing plans. I cannot . I authorize you to use the names of Eaker, Lovett, McCloy or Quesada. I would appreciate your send­ ing me a copy of your letter in its final form. I I well recall the warmth of our friend­ I . ' ship and my admiration of you personally and as a super intelligence officer. I hope all goes well with you and your family, and send special best wishes. Sincerely,

Mr. James Rose 37 Pembroke Square London, W8 6PE, England lfp/ss Enc. ! '

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Dear Jim: Your second letter also is welcome. Perhaps you are prudent to defer your writing to The Times. A retired faculty member of the u.s. Air Force Academy, Col. David Mets, is writing the first and only bi­ ography of Tooey Spaatz. He was commissioned to do this, I believe, by the Air Force Association. Col. M~ts has inter­ viewed me a couple of times. tt occu~s to me that your let­ ters would be of interest and possibly assistance to Col. Mets, particularly your conversation with Spaatz.

Col. Mets has Spa?tz'a pap~rs. A~ my interviews with him focused on other aspects of mv service with Spaatz, it did not occur to me to ask if Dresden is mentioned in Spaatz's papers. Would you o~ject to my sending Col. Mets copies of your letters and of my l~tter to you, with the question as to what if anything relevant is in Spaatz•s papers? Returning to our happy relationship during the war, one of my fond recollections is the weekend we spent at the inn near Bletchley. I recommended you for the Legion of "'erit decoration, hut unhappily I do not believe - in the rush of events at the end of the war - it was ever awarded. You certainly deserved it and more. As ever,

Mr. James Rose 37 Pembroke Square London, WB 6PE England lfp/ss SEP 2 6 1985 37 PEMBROKE SQUARE LONDON W8

20 September 1985

Dear Lewis,

I have not had time to do any in-depth reading around the Dresden raid until August: hence the long delay in writing to you once again.

I have read various books about the Air War written from the British point of view. These were a Life of Portal, Tedder's own book, an apologia for Harris with a foreward by Saundby and one or two minor works. But the principal quarry has been the official 3-volume history by Sir Charles Webster and Dr. Noble Frankland which is of quite a different order from the others and seems to me outstandingly good. (The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany. H.M. Stationery Office 1961).

My basic conclusion is that responsibility for the Dresden raid rests with Churchill and Portal and the British Chiefs of Staff and that General Spaatz, who was not consulted until a later stage, went along with the plan, perhaps to some extent because he may have wished to maintain solidarity. There is no evidence that the American Chiefs of Staff were consulted although Spaatz did ask Portal through Bottomley that General Kuter (deputising for General Arnold) be told in Malta, on his way to Yalta, of the new priorities to which he, Spaatz, had agreed.

But it seems clear to me that all the running was being made by the British.

I don't know if you can get hold of Webster and Frankland's Vol. III. In the hope that you can, I will give some page references in what follows.

The time-table leading up to the Dresden raid seems to be something like this (pps. 99 onwards).

Jan. 25 JIC suggests "Thunderclap" on Berlin to help the Russian attack.

NOTE: The concept of "Thunderclap" had originated with Portal in a memo to Chiefs of Staff dated August 5, 1944 (p. 55). This memo contained the seeds of the attack on Dresden. (Read discussion which follows on pps. 55 et seq.)

One should remember that the Air Staff had for some time before August 1944 lost all faith in area bombing (seep. 77, Note 1 of January 1944 and p. 89 for Portal's own judgement). Portal had been fighting a running battle with Harris in the last months of 1944 to divert Harris from area bombing

... /continued - 2 -

to the attack on oil) but Portal lost when he did not accept Harris' offer to resign. This was as late as January 20, 1945 and has a particular irony when one considers what was to be set in train only five days later by the JIC memo.

Jan. 25 Following this memo Bottomley (V.C.A.S.) talks to Harris and says that Spaatz' co-operation is essential.

Jan. 26 Bottomley talks to Portal who is just about to leave for Yalta and asks whether the JIC report should be sent to Spaatz.

Jan. 25 Churchill intervenes. Talks to Sir Archibald Sinclair who wrongly concludes that he has been asked what are RAF's plans to "baste" the Germans on their retreat from Breslau.

Jan. 26 Sinclair consults Portal, who is cautiously against "Thunderclap" on Berlin: Sinclair so writes to Churchill and gets a rocket: Churchill says he had wanted to know what they were going to do about Berlin and "no doubt other large cities in East Germany" and he wanted an urgent reply.

Result: all caution thrown to the winds. Bottomley instructs Harris to make a big attack on Berlin with related attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz and "any other cities" etc. subject to the overriding claims of attacks on oil production.

Jan. 27 Churchill informed.

Portal discusses the plan with Spaatz before leaving for Malta en route to Yalta.

Jan. 28 Bottomley and Spaatz and Tedder conferred.

Jan. 31 Bottomley tells Portal (in Malta) that he and Spaatz had agreed new priorities. Oil came first and then Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden etc ..... to cause great confusion in evacuation of civilians from the East and hamper reinforcements from the West. At Spaatz' request Bottomley asks Portal that General Kuter (deputising for Arnold) be shown the message.

NOTE: These new priorities were never discussed by the 7 Combined Chiefs of Staff nor were they, it seems, specially mentioned to the Russians.

Feb. 6 Portal to Bottomley (from Yalta}: British Chiefs of Staff approve: suggests that they should now be considered by Gen. Spaatz and if he accepted them (my underlining) they should be embodied in a new revised directive for the Combined Bomber Offensive but no new directive was issued (p. 108).

. .. /continued - 3 -

Feb. 4 Russian General Antonov asked in Yalta that strategic bombers should paralyse Berlin and Leipzig. After which the Russians showed not much further interest in the strategic air offensive (p. 106).

The authors (Webster and Frankland) make a curious comment at the bottom of p. 107: "the fact that the Russians apparently were interested in only two of the targets (Berlin and Leipzig) of course had no bearing on the motives which led to the inclusion in the list of other targets such as Chemnitz and Dresden. This modification, as Sir Charles Portal expected, might well have led to a revision of the directive by Bottomley and Spaatz. A new Directive was not, however, issued."

Now, Lewis, I don't know how all this strikes you. I have selected all the relevant passages, I think, and have not of course weighted the evidence one way or the other. I have a few comments:

Churchill's intervention, just before Yalta, is explained, I think by his wish to have something with which to impress Stalin. (This is not just my opinion). And his intervention was decisive.

The original idea of "Thunderclap" in Portal's mind in August 1944 when the war was dragging on was to have a massive raid whose effect at just the right moment would be analogous to the effect one year later of the atomic bombs. When the JIC advocated it on Berlin at the end of January 1985 they thought there would be both military and political advantages. Portal reacted cautiously, but of course it was meat and drink to Harris who had an obsession about finishing off the remaining un-bombed German cities.

However, Harris could not decide these things. Spaatz was on a higher echelon than Harris as he represented Arnold in the same way as Bottomley represented Portal.

AND YET

On J a n. 31 Bottomley tells Portal that Spaatz had agreed the new priorities. This does not quite square with Portal's message to Bottomley from Yalta on Feb. 6 asking him to put them to Spaatz for consideration and if Spaatz approved that they should be embodied in a new combined directive. And it is odd that there was no new directive, although in the press of war this could get overlooked.

It is also odd that if Gen. Spaatz was fully conversant and in accord with the strategy behind the new priorities, he should have told me that it was the routeing of the two Panzer Divisions through Dresden that was the reason for the raid.

Webster and Frankland note that when Bottomley saw Spaatz on Jan. 31 to discuss the new priorities, Spaatz had already ordered 8th Air Force to bomb Berlin. This seems to imply that Spaatz, to this limited degree, had become an adherent of area bombing - do you agree?

... I continued - 4 -

As for the Russian involvement: You have the evidence from General Eaker that Novikoff asked him and later, General Anderson to bomb Dresden. I wonder what these dates were? Was the Poltava shuttle started some time earlier than January 1985?

I never heard Dresden mentioned as a target requested by the Russians but naturally didn't hear everything: I only heard in February that they were asking us to bomb Leipzig, and it was then that I learned about the plan to bomb Dresden.

I hope I have not bored y ou with all this, I have been trying to get things straight for myself but as you so kindly sent me your reflections together with such interesting evidence I thought I would pass my findings on to you, for what they are worth. I shall not write to The Times!

Yours ever,

Jim~ October 4, 1985

Dear Jim:

Your letter of September 20 is fascinating. It also reflects thP qualities that made you such a superb in­ telligence offi.cer. I am imnree::sed by your rPsearch. There is a six-volume history of "The Army Air Forces in Nor ld War II", volume 3 of which covers January 1944 to May 1945 in Europe. As this was written before the ULTRA secret was discloc:ed, I never thought it important to take even a cursorv look at its contents. Also, my work here at the Court is so demandinq I r.arely have the time and energy to do non-legal research. Your letter, however, promPted me to spend a few hours checking the historv to see whether any light is shed on the Dresden enigma. It was rewarding. Althouqh thP six-volume set may be available in London, I enclose for. your convenience, copies of paqes 309- 317 and 722-751. It was not feasible to include the foot­ notes. They usually refer to records not readily available to me. There is a good deal about Dresden, and for the most part it is not inconsistent with the results of your research. There ar.e some significant statements, however, that affirm a greater Russian involvement. 'A decision was ma~ ~nuary 1944 Malta Conference to~eavy hom rs to SUP- ort the Rnssi.ans on the eastern front, an­ ticipating .e Russian request for such assistance that was pressed at Yalta. (P. 724} This support was to include at­ tacks on transportation centers "such as Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden,'' etc. (P. 724-5) The attack on oil remained the priority tarqet system. You dll note near the bottom of page 726 the sentence that the Americans were "attacking transPortation facilities inside~ miss1ons which the u. 1an ad re uested an seemed to apprec1ate." It is c ear t at Ores en was one of them. See the next sentence that extends over to page 727. On p. 731, it also is stated that: "The Secretary of war had to be appriseo of Dresden's 2.

importance as a transportati.on center and the Sovlet request for its neutraltzation". As your research indicates, it also appears that Churchill was the primary pro?onent - along with Harris - of complving with both assumed and expressed Soviet wishes that we attack these citi~s and their transportation facilities. SPaatz clearly was not an original nor ever an enthusiastic proponent. I know personally that he consistently adhered to his oppositi.on to indiscriminate bombing of cities and civilians. The one exception was Berlin. You inquired as to \.,hen the Soviet base at Poltava was made available for us for shuttle bombing. The story of frustr.ating ":!fforts to obtain Soviet cooperation is summa­ rized, jn part, in pages 308-317. After protracted negotia­ tions, and many unexplained delavs, Poltava was made avail­ able and the first uRe of it was made on Jun~ 2, 1944, by the 15th Ai~ Force. The Soviets seJected the targets. On June 21, 1944, the 8th Air Force attacked eastern front tar­ gets and landed at Poltava only to suffer a disastrous at­ tack by the GAF on our airplanes as they were "sitting nucks" on Poltava air bane. P. 313. * * *

To the extent of ~v information, th~ Pn~l~scc ex­ cerpts from this history coincide with what I understood at the time. Although I was Chief of Operational Intelligence, . L...... _, Spaatz did not di.scu~s with rn~ the ~'·1alta agreement. I do not ) fJ-'""' Y r believe he \.,as there as he sent Fred Anderson as USSTAF' s ~ N--~ representat i.ve to Yalta. Bi.ll Haines and I wrote the brief­ V L1t-i~ ing paper (a summary of our strategic bornbi.ng successes) r ~ \ that Fred took to Yalta. We received a letter of commenda- ~ - ~ tion for thP paper, though Fred told me he was never able to submit it to Roosevelt as had been planned. Our President was then seriously ill. Also, a~ I have written, when Fred Anderson as~ed me for target material on Dresden (we had none), he said the Soviets had requested that we attack the marshaling yards in that city. In sum, Jim, there probablv is no short, clear-cut answer to the question of who was responsible for attacking Dresden. There probably i.s enough blame for all concerned. My o~m vie\>~ is that t-ltthout the request of the Soviet Union and Churchill's desire to impress our "ally", uss~AF under Spaatz never would have targeted Dresden. There were too many other ta-rgets anf. target systems that we vie\11ed aR being of greater importance to the Western Allies, and that involved less risk to our aircraft and crews. 3.

* * * Jim this exchange of letters has refreshed memories of our frien~sh!.p. Apart ft"om all else, thls has pleased me a qraat deal, and I thank you for initiating the exchange. As perhaps you know, most of USSTAF top intelligence offi­ cers have predeceased us: McDonald, Douglass, Weicker, Beeson, and Stewy McClintic. Bill Haines lives n Califor­ nia and we ~eep in touch. As ever,

~1r. JamP.s Rose 37 Pembrooke Square r,ondon i-18 , Eng land lfo/ss P.S. I am delighted the Leqion of ~4erit was at~arded you. No one deserves it more. October 4, 1985

Dear Jim:

The biography of General Spaatz by Col. Mets (former professor at the Air Force Academy was scheduled to be released this fall. If there should be an opport.uni.ty to add some of thP. information from your letter of September 20, t..roulo vou think this aopronriate? If you wi~h, I would say to Col. Mets that onlv the results of your research could bn user1, without attJ;i.buti.ng any expres<;ion o~ o;')intrm tn vou. It is curious that ?ersons inter­ ested n the oriqin of the Dresnen attac~s have not looke~ ~ore carefully into the books. I f.ault myself in this respect. I relied to a large extent on my own rgcol­ lections and the positive v,.i..e_~t~s of... Ba'

Mr . James Rose 37 Pemhrooke Square London w8, Enqlann lfp/ss

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CHAMBERS 0,.. JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

October 4, 1985

Dear Jim: Your letter of September 20 is fascinating. It also reflects the qualities that made you such a superb in­ telligence officer. I am impressed by your research. There is a six-volume history of •The Army Air Forces in WOrld War II•, volume 3 of which covers January 1944 to May 1945 in Europe. As this was written before the ULTRA secret was disclosed, I never thought it important to take even a cursory look at its contents. Also, my work here at the Court is so demanding I rarely have the time and energy to do non-legal research. Your letter, however, prompted me to spend a few hours checking the history to see whether any light is shed on the Dresden enigma. It was rewarding. Although the six-volume set may be available in London, I enclose for your convenience, copies of pages 309- 317 and 722-751. It was not feasible to include the foot­ notes. They usually refer to records not readily available to me. There is a good deal about Dresden, and for the most part it is not inconsistent with the results of your research. There are some significant statements, however, that affirm a greater Russian involvement. A decision was made at the January 1944 Malta Conference to use the heavy bombers to support the Russians on the eastern front, an­ ticipating the Russian request for such assistance that was pressed at Yalta. (P. 724) This support was to include at­ tacks on transportatioo centers •such as Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden,• etc. (P. 724-5) The attack on oil remained the priority target system. You will note near the bottom of page 726 the sentence that the Americans were •attacking transportation facilities inside cities on missions which the Russians had requested and seemed to appreciate.• It is clear that Dresden was one of them. See the next sentence that extends over to page 727. On p. 731, it also is stated that: •The Secretary of War had to be apprised of Dresden's 2. importance as a transportation center and the Soviet request for its neutralization•. As your research indicates, it also appears that Churchill was the primary proponent - along with Harris - of complying with both assumed and expressed Soviet wishes that we attack these cities and their transportation facilities. Spaatz clearly was not an original nor ever an enthusiastic proponent. I know personally that he consistently adhered to his opposition to indiscriminate bombing of cities and civilians. The one exception was Berlin. You inquired as to when the Soviet base at Poltava was made available for us for shuttle bombing. The story of frustrating efforts to obtain Soviet cooperation is summa­ rized, in part, in pages 308-317. After protracted negotia­ tions, and many unexplained delays, Poltava was made avail­ able and the first use of it was made on June 2, 1944, by the 15th Air Force. The Soviets selected the targets. On June 21, 1944, the 8th Air Force attacked eastern front tar­ gets and landed at Poltava only to suffer a disastrous at­ tack by the GAF on our airplanes as they were •sitting ducks• on Poltava air base. P. 313. * * * To the extent of my information, the enclosed ex­ cerpts from this history coincide with what I understood at the time. Although I was Chief of Operational Intelligence, Spaatz did not discuss with me the Malta agreement. I do not believe he was there as he sent Fred Anderson as USSTAF's representative to Yalta. Bill Haines and I wrote the brief- ing paper (a summary of our strategic bombing successes) , that Fred took to Yalta. We received a letter of commenda- tion for the paper, though Fred told me he was never able to submit it to Roosevelt as had been planned. Our President was then seriously ill. Also, as I have written, when Fred Anderson asked me for target material on Dresden (we had none), he said the Soviets had requested that we attack the marshaling yards in that city. In sum, Jim, bhere probably is no short, clear-cut answer to the question of who was responsible for attacking Dresden. There probably is enough blame for all concerned. My own view is that without the request of the Soviet Union and Churchill's desire to impress our •ally•, USSTAF under Spaatz never would have targeted Dresden. There were too many other targets and target systems that we viewed as being of greater importance to the Western Allies, and that involved less risk to our aircraft and crews. 3.

* * * Jim this exchange of letters has refreshed memories of our friendship. Apart from all else, this has pleased me a great deal, and I thank you for initiating the exchange. As perhaps you know, most of USSTAF top intelligence offi­ cers have predeceased us: McDonald, Douglass, Weicker, Beeson, and Stewy McClintic. Bill Haines lives in Califor­ nia and we keep in touch. As ever,

Mr. James Rose 37 Pembrooke Square London W8, England lfp/ss P.S. I am delighted the Legion of Merit was awarded you. No one deserves it more. (f) 37 Pembroke Square, ~ London, wa 6PE /_ I - .. Q- 01 -937 3772 '-C11- ~ 0

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• lfp/ss 10/17/85 RO SALLY-POW

Copy of Longhand Letter of October 8 from Jim Rose

Dear Lewis:

Thank you very much for your two letters and for the very interesting pages from the six-volume history.

To answer your shorter letter first: by all means do send a copy of my letter to Colonel Mets. If anything will help to get a straight historical record (or at least an informed historian's judgment) I am in favor.

After reading the pages from the history I tend to agree with your comment that there is very little that is inconsistent with the findings of my "research". ·

On the question of Russian involvement I get the impression from the history of the Poltava shuttle

(extremely interesting: thank you for it) and from other evidence that the Russians, who were a vast land po~er," were not impressed by strategic bombing and did not attach all that importance to it. (I suppose the full record of Yalta would confirm this).

But in general I agree with you.

I think the earlier evidence you sent me about the requests to Generals Eaker and Anderson to include

Dresden in their targets is not relevant as their requests 2.

occurred fully 6 months before the bombing of Dresden when the Russ ian armies were much father east. The strategic situation was different.

All the same I should like, if I may, to send the whole of our correspondence to Professor E. H. Hinsley. Do you remember the yung Barry Hinsley at Bletchley? Maybe you never met him: he was in the Naval Section and worked for a time in the strategic direction of the anti U-boat campaign under Stafford Cripps) . He is now President of

St. John's College Cambridge and I think, at present Vice-

Chancellor of Cambridge University. He and a team of historians are writing the history of intelligence

(including Ultra) in the war. It is a mammouth work, and they have not yet got to the Dresden raid period.

It was one of Harry's assistants who told me that there was no record in the Chiefs of Staff's papers of any request from the Russians. I am sure they would be interested by our correspondence and could profit from it: but if you have any objections on the grounds of confidentiality I would of course understand.

It has been a great pleasure to renew our friendship, Lewis. It makes me feel quite sentimental. 3.

The war time bonds of common endeavor and mutual respect are very strong, thank goodness.

I hope you will be able to visit the great exhibition of treasurers of English country homes which opens in Washington in November. It may serve to remind you of the time you spent in England.

Yours ever, Jim October 17, 1985

De r Jim: My thanks for your letter of October B. I have looked fono~ard to hearing from you. I am sending coples of our correspondence to Col. Mets, advising that I do qo with your consent. He ~ill be appreciative, particularly to have the henefit of your research. 1 hope it is not too late for him to use .it. I do not recall me-eting Prof. Hinsley when I was at Dletchlev. Indeed, my recollection is that the Admiralty ULTRA wao base in other Hut • You did brief us gener lly on the rol~ ULTRA played - perhaps a decisive role in the anti u-boat campaign. I would, of course, be happy for copies of our correspondence to go to Professor Hinsley's group.

As I dictate thiq, I do not t"ecall \

The enclosed obituary of C~rdon elchman will be of interest. I ~o not recall ever having met him, though I have his rather egotistical book. ?-ty impression is that he claims more credlt than he deserved. I hope w can find reason to continue our correspondence. As ever,

Mr. James Rose 37 Pembroke Squ re London, W8 6PE England

lfp/ss be: Lt. Col. David R. Mets w~M~~ . a..~::~~ ~ j.,Ww Nov.2,1985 , b~ · AA.MLs ~ -- ~J.. ~ IAA" ~ ,-_F~- Dear Lewis, ~~jab+-~- Recently another direct consequence of your restoring the SIAM report to me has come to light. After a circuitous search that took many months, Helen, Mrs. Curtis Lemay, reached Betty Anderson., Fred's widow, who replied with a cordial note to Francie and me. Betty is happily remarried and was grateful_for the copy of the boo1te I was now able to send her. The kindly intervention of both Lemays was not without droll­ ery to me. CO~~AND DECISION had its out-of-New York opening in Baltimore in 1947. Harris Hull, then in the Pentagon,raised a dutch treat party to go down to Baltimore for one of the per­ formances. After it, Francie and I asked the visitors back stage to meet the cast and have drinks. During them I had the temerity to say to the General "I hope you enjoyed the performance." That uncompromising man replied "Too unreal1 Showed a Major General shirking a decision. Couldn't happen1" We have had a happy year, crowned by the visit of Laura, Murray, and our two eastern grandsons to meet their cousins out here f or some red letter fishing in our western ocean. They are all well and the adults asked tenderly for you and Jo. Nothing new to report except, alas, the continuing ravages of attrition on the "old guard" for whom I note the monotonous decline you always remarko

~ rancie joins me in affectionate greetings to you and Jo and all your tribe, January 6, 1986

Dear Bill: I was glad to have your November letter, and to know you are in touch with Betty Anderson, now happily re­ married. Fred and Betty spent a weekend with us in Richmond in the late forties. We thought Betty was lovely. I \voulC! appreciate your sending me her address and marriecl name. The recitation of your experience with General LeMay is fascinating . I would not have enioved serving under him, but din admire his combat leadershlp and his strong convictions.

I had some corr~sponaence with ,J.im Rose in 1985. He inquired as to my recollection of ho~"' USSTAF was drawn into the bombing of Dresden. This question also has interested me. Although I do not know the full answer to Jim's ques­ tion, Fred Anderson surprise ~.:1 me by ;:~sking if ~1e had any target material on Dresden and its marshaling yards. I thought Dresden was off limit'3. Fred said he understood the Soviets wanted us to born~ communications facilities - par­ ticularJy the marshaling yar·is - in the cities behind the German eastern front . I also believed - or understood at the time- that Air Marshal ("Bomber") Hard.s Ttlas anxious to please the Soviets, and requested Tooey t .G join in a com­ bined effort. When the Soviet Uni.on began its Propaganda campaign against the United States for killing "tens of thousands" of German civilians and destroying historic landmarks in Ores­ den, Tooey was still living and I called him on the phone . He was a little vague, but stated that his recollection con­ curred generally with mine - par.ticularlv as to the desire of the Soviets and the British reque~t. There is a multi-volume history of the "Army Air Forces in World Wa-r II", and volume III generally supports my :recollection and considerably amplifies on it . I enclose the most relevant pages from volume III that I sent to Jim Rose . I also enclose a letter from General Eaker t·lith whom I discussed this after the Soviet propaganda was renewed .

·-:J

·'• 2.

Apart from historical curiosity, I suppose the:re is little purpose in spending time on this no\ol. HE- do know that Tooey was opposed to the type of :indiscriminate bombing that wa~ the specialty of British Bomber Command. tarshal­ lng yards are a legitimate target but where they were locat­ ed in the middle of a larqe citv - particularly an historic one like Dresden - I can't believe Tooey reljshed this.

~ro and I l)ave noted fhat Command Decision is still shown from time to t'i.me on T.V at hours inconvenient for us to see it. We have called Laura a couole of times when we noted the film would be s'l-)m~n. Laura also ls thoughtful about calling occas{onally, and she sent us a haopy Christ­ mas greeting. I reoeat mvself in saying that we think she is a delightful person. We also like her husband and admire your two eastern grandRons. I am qlad to know that thev are fishermen as \~Tell as scholars ann atl-tlf't(.>">.

I shoulr.1 he '·rork ing on hr i.efs and opinion~ for the Court, but thought you '1.110U1d h~ inter-estc>d i.n the foregolng.

As ever,

Mr. William Wiste~ HainPs 33751 Brigntin~ Drive r.~aguna r-aque1, Cali:forni.a 92677 lfn/~.-;

... · WILLIAM WISTER HAINES :JAN 2 1 1986 33751 BRIGANTINE ROAD 1\' LAGUNA NIGUEL, CALIFORNIA 92677 \

Dear Lewis:

Betty Anderson, Fred's Widow is now named ~ - > ~ , Mrs. Ronald Campbell and lives at 168 Eleanor Drive,

Woodside California, 90462. I inferred from her letter that this is the house in which she once lived with f red. Long ago they were kind enough to ask Francie and me to visit them

there tho ~ gh to our regret we never made it while Fred was still alive.

It was goog to have your long letter with its enclosures about the bombing of Dresden.

This became the storm center of a Controversy I never entered. I heartily agree with you that doing so at this belated date I would be fruitless. Some day when we both have time I shoua,.. be glad to confide in you personally my own minutely trivial participation in the fuss it made in Widewing at the time.

Thanks for writing. It is always good to hear from you, though to my regret I can add little more to our correspondence than occasional listings as additions to the melancholy recital of thos¥ , we mourn.

You'll be gl ~d to hear that Murray has caught up with those thieves who call thselves The University publications of America Inc.

Now they want permission to publish another edition of the Ultra report they have already stolen from me.

In the course of this predation they had the impudence to advertise in a catalogue that the work had been written by

The United states army. I was strongly moved to remind them that in all the ancient and honorable history of that dubious organization it had never yet written so much as the first line of a dirty limerick. Murray's cooler head prevailed and we now have the promise of a new edition with the foreword I long ago wrote for the work now printed in every copy to attest my ownership and authorship. In addition they promise to pay me a royalty to sell me additional copies of the new edition at their cost.

~ ltogether Murray has given me what promises to be an economical lesson in why people hire lawyers.

Life has taught me to beware of promises prior to performance but if any or all of these pipe dreams work out it will be a pleasure to send you one of the new edition copies ,

( c.. If _,t_ ..n June 18, 1986

Dear General Doolittle: I am glad that you f.ouno the clipping and pictures of interest. I believe you are the only survivor of that distinguished group. I have been interested in the differences of view, sometimes expressed, as to whether the Russians requested that our strategic air forces bomb Dresnen. 1 was Chief of Operational Intelligence at OSSTAF at the time, and Fred Anderson told me that he unnerstood the request had comP. from the Russians, and that ·rooey had agreed reluctantly only after Air Marshal Barris had urged that ~e comply. Of course, there was some logic to attacking mar­ shaling yards being used by the Germans as the Russian forces advanced from the east. But it was tragic to destroy large parts of the ancient city of Dresden. The enclosed copies of letters from Ira Eaker and Bob Lovett will be of interest. 1 certainly do not want to burden you by reviving ancient memories, and 1 will understand if you do not reply. You always will have my respect and great admiration. Sincerely,

General James H. Doolittle 8545 Carmel Valley Road Carmel, California 93923 lfp/ss November 19, 1987

Dear Diane: Our. Houston daughter sent me the enclosed clipping of a letter to the editor of the New York Times about the bornbi ng of Dresden. The writer of the letter, a British officer who w.-~.s stationed in Dresden correctly assesses the military ju~tification for the air attacks. Thi:-; was the reason the Russians were anxious for us to bomb the marshaling yards in particular, a reason that also appealed to British Air Marshal Harris. Of course, J Generals Spaatz ana Anderson recognized the military sign if­ f icance but 'lid rot want to attack tha.t ancient city. The misinformation about Dresden, so artfully dis­ seminated by the Soviet Union, has been "bought11 by many people in the West who should know better.

Sincerely, w

Dr. Diane T. Putn~ Chief, Histori.cal Research Office Headquarters Air Force Intelligence Service Department of the Air Force Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060 lfp/ss Enc. ~.. ' . ·-·-- ---· Bombing of Dresden Hastened End ~f War 1 To the Edito;: • '] • :'f• '1 i Jessica Douglas-Home's Oct. 17 letter deploring the demolition o.f old churches in ~ucharest is encourag­ ing. It is, nevertheless, puizling that 1 ! she reasserts ~ an unrelated old aile- ' gation against Britain's Royal Air ' Force: "The destruction of Bucha- . rest' is as devastating a blow tD our heritage as was 'the obliteration of , Dresden, a)ld as would be the Fazing I of Vienna." Dresden, :although se-. verel~ damaged, Was· fiot · obliterat­ ed, nor can jt be equated culturally with Vienna. ; ,.. ;. . ', · In 1945-46, I repreliepted the British J Army in Dresden, a city I had known before the war, attach~ to the bead- . . quarters of the Soviet comrpartder in ch'ief for Saxony. H.ffoncurred that . the R.A.F. attack w~s instrumental in f forcing the GerJParh withdrawal and in speeding tile Sovjet advance. This WaS in aCCQr.dance With the StrategiC 1 Imperatives· of the 'timtr,·whicb· were j to bring. the wac. to a .victorious. con- 1 elusion as soon,' and with as small a loss of Allied lives, as possible. The critics, including film makers, -~ of the Dresden t'aitl and of the strate­ gic bomber offensive, have appar­ ently completely failed to grasp these needs. It must not be forgotten that 1 Germari war t)r6duction, because of the progressive 'enslavement of Eu­ rope, continued rjsing1nto 1944. Without the bombing offensive, the increases 'would ·' have . beeb far ~ greater and would P'osslbty h,ave ena­ bled tM Re1chsweh.;'s Panzer divi- , 1 sions .to be'·reconstit\Jted. The conse­ quent prolongation of the war would probably have' incurred far higher casijalties than those suffered in Dresden. The logic of total war, wherein civilians contribute vitally to the war effort, excludes, by definition, • their immunity from attack. As was not the case in the devasta­ tion of some British cities, Dresden's! most famous cultural heritage, the ' Raphael Madonna, was safeguarded. · Once again, she peeps out from be­ hind the special green curtains that shield her from the harsh glare of the world outside and fr.om its some­ times inexplicable flashes of preju­ dice. · MALISE LYNEDOCH GRAHAM Westport, Conn,, Oct. 19, 1987 The writer is a retired captain of the Ar.gyll and Sut erland ~ighlanders. · . vr.t,{ .. •. ,., P· ~f.

~~ THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR IIt::_ ?-iJ pounds increased heavily as a result of the steadily s:pounting air offen­ sive. To the older prisoners many of the new arriya~~ seemed conspicu­ ously youthful, cocksure, uncooperative, ·and invariably convinced that the war was on the point of terminating. The prison camps bulged and took on more of a character reminscent in superficial ways of stateside army life, with military formations, compulsory exercise, games, reading, improvised entertainment, arguments, fights, criticisms of the British, speculation about escape, prophecies (always optimistic) about the end of the war, and other familiar aspects. But there were also oYercrowding and underfeeding and a lurking fear of what the Nazis might do when their doom became imminent. The sight of FortreSses and Liberators would throw a compound into exultation; older prison­ ers would marvel when they saw American long-range fighters over eastern Germany. News and rumors about the aircrews who had been lucky enough to reach Sweden or Switzerland would make them envious. United Nations victories would produce a surge of optimism. But by the end of the summer of I 944 it became clear to most "Krie­ gies" that their liberation would not ta'ke place in the immediate future . . Morale sagged, and they became bitter and gloomy while they pre­ pared to stretch their Red Cross parcels and rations through more dis­ mal months.182 The AAF in Russia Since the early days of the war AAF leaders had been attracted by the idea that shuttle bombing between widely separated bases might pay huge dividends. The experience gained with shuttle operations be­ tween British and North African bases, notably in the Regensb~rg­ Schweinfurt mission of I7 August I943• had introduced a note of cau­ tion into AAF planning, but opportunities for shuttle bombing were among the reasons advanced for the establishment of the Fifteenth Air Force in the fall of I 94 3• and by that time the United States was urging upon the U.S.S.R. the use of Russian bases for the same purpose. It was well known that the Germans were relocating many of their plants in the east, and it ~eemed reasonable to expect that American bombers operaci_ng out of Russia could strike targets in eastern Germany which were beyond the reach of aircraft flying from England or Italy. It would be helpful, moreover, to compel the Axis to spread out its de­ fenses against air attack and to impress upon the enemy high command

• See Vol. II, 64-65, 564-65, 684-87, 724, 741. 308 WAR II THE STRATEGIC BOMBER STRIKES AHEAD •unting air offen­ at about the time of OVERLORD that Germany was exposed from all eemed conspicu­ directions. Perhaps of even more imponance was the desire to demon­ riably convinced strate to the Russians how eager the Americans were to wage war on .on camps bulged the German enemy in every possible way and to gain from the Russians •er.ficial ways of a fuller appreciation of the contribution of the strategic air forces to mlsory exercise, the war effort, for to date they had revealed scant regard for the work .fights, criticisms of the heavy bombers. And if these shuttle operations proved effective, .vays optimistic) it might be easier to secure Soviet approval for the use of Siberian bases t there were also later on in the war against Japan-a consideration seldom lost sight of ' what the Nazis by the American high command. The manifold advantages expected ~ ht of FortreSses from FRANTIC, as the project came to be called, were considered ~ n; older prison­ ample justification for the effort and expense involved. ge .fighters over It was in October I 94 3 that General Arnold secured CCS approval 's who had been for inclusion of the shuttle-bombing proposal as one of the objectives uld make them of a U.S. military mission about to be established in Moscow under ge of optimism. the leadership of Maj. Gen. John R. Deane. General Deane and Brig. to most "Krie­ Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who accompanied him, stopped off in Lon­ ~ mediate future. don on their way to Moscow and discussed the FRANTIC project '.\rhile they pre­ with Eighth Air Force and RAF officials. RAF authorities, though ·ough more dis- promising cooperation, could see little advantage for their own night bombers in having Russian bases available; in fact, they seem to have regarded the whole project as something of a stunt,183 but American air officers were quite receptive. In Moscow, Deane and Vandenberg ! n attracted by found Soviet air and army officials unresponsive. Apparently startled ed bases might by the proposal, they declined to discuss it funher until they had dis­ · operations be­ covered the wishes of theirsuperiors.134 Within two days Foreign Min­ e Regensburg- ister V. M. Molotov, however, made known Soviet "approval in prin­ 11 1a note of cau­ ciple" for FRANTIC to the premature rejoicing of the Americans, G bombing were who were not then aware of the obscurities often implied in the Russian ! Fifteenth Air usage of this phrase. ttes was urging The most earnest importunities of Deane and his staff having failed mrpose. It was to persuade the Russians during November 1943 to translate their for­ their plants in mal approval into cooperative action, Ambassador W. Averill Harri­ rican bombers man and Col. Elliott Roosevelt 'at the Tehran conference in December ermany which secured from Stalin himself what seemed to be assent for shuttle bomb­ td or Italy. It ing.188 Later in that month Molotov again told Harriman and Deane !ad out its de­ that the Soviet staff had no objection in principle to the project,"117 but ugh command January I 944 was to pass without any definite steps on the part of the Russians to implement FRANTIC, notwithstanding .the persistent ef- 309 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II )~ fons of Arnold, Deane, Harriman, and, by now, Eisenho+-r and Spaatz, to get things under way.118 But finally, on 1 February, Harri­ man had a long conversation with Stalin in which hestresseathe advan­ tages of shuttle bombing in destroying German industries and in facili­ tating the progress of the Red army, to which the Soviet ruler bluntly responded: "We favor it." He then gave instructions for six airfields to be made ready to accommodate 100 American aircraft, and assured Harriman that in time the Americans could operate at least 300 heavy bombers from the coveted Siberian bases.1811 I As the situation thus suddenly thawed out and Russian air officials became cooperative, the Americans hastened to institute their plans. ~. having received authority to communicate directly with Deane, sent to Russia a party of USSTAF officers to select the six airfields agreeaupon, a smanerOumoer, incid"entally, than the Americans had originally hoped to obtain.140 It turned out, actually, that ~ly t_hree airfields would be made available: Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin, not far from Kiev, and all three lay farthert'o the east than the Americans had desired. Because the three sites had been subjected to the Russian scorched-eanh policy and to a vengeful German retreat, much recon­ struction was required. Longer runways were needed for heavy bomb­ ers, moreover, and extensive steel mats, hangars, control towers, and 141 other facilities would have to be provided. 1 q LJ--4 Work went ahead very rapidly during April and May. American supplies poured into Russia by way of the Murmansk convoys and the Persian Gulf Command. The Russians labored with visible enthusiasm to put the bases in readiness, employing female workers in some cases, but they were able to assign to the task only a fraction of the labor force originally agreed upon.142 Sometimes the Americans c~fed at having to adjust Yankee plans to the more ponderous pace of the Rus­ sians, and irritation flared up occasionally. But the job was accom­ plished with a thoroughness which won praise from Deane and USSTAF. ua The most troublesome problem was that of bringing in AAF personnel to service the bombers and to handle other technical matters, since it had been agreed that Russians would maintain and de­ fend the bases and that a minimum number of Americans would be admitted. Not only was the number of AAF technicians excessively restricted, but the 1,100 "bodies" permitted to come were held up in~ a very exasperating fashion l!ntil Deane finally pushed through an agree­ ment to enter them under a group visa, a device which greatly disturbed 31.0 WAR II )Lfll- T H E S T R A T E G l C B 0 ~1 D E R S T R 1 K E S A H E A D ' ·, Eisen~~jr and the lower echelon of Russian officialdom.w Even then, key officers 1 February, Harri­ were sometimes delayed mysteriously at Tehran for days on end, a rnessea the advan­ matter over which General Arnold expressed annoyance as late as 30 .stries and in facili­ May 1944.us Another difficulty arose from Russian unwillingness to oviet ruler bluntly let the AAF control its own communications in operational matters. ; for six airfields to Eventually the Russians relented, however, and they even granted per­ ,craft, and assured mission for American aircraft to fly cenain types of supplies straight at least 300 heavy into Russia.146 By the e~ the bases were in adequate condigon to russian air officials accommodate heavy bombers. A recent inspection by Maj. Gen. Fred ~titute their plans. Anderson and Colonel Roosevelt of USSTAF had revealed that things ~ecdy with Deane, were going well and that shuttle reconnaissance flights preparatory to :t the six airfields bombing missions could begin.147 USSTAF had ~stabl~shed a branc~ 1e Americans had organization, known as Eastern Command, on Sovtet s01l and placed It tr, that ~ly three under the command of Maj. Gen. Roben J. Walsh, who in turn re­ , and Piryatin, not poned to General Deane in Moscow.148 It was considered of the first an the Americans importance that the initial shuttle-bombi~g mission~ dubbed F~A~­ ed to the Russian TIC JOE, should be a veritable model of arr warfare m order to msptre ieat, much recon- the Russians with admiration and confidence. Since the Eighth Air for heavy bomb­ Force was absorbed in preparations for the very imminent OVER­ iltrol towers, and LORD, Spaatz assi ned the o eration tot e Fifteenth Air Force. Late JVj¥-'/ in May 1944 he went over t e details in London wtth General Eaker, May. American who chose to lead in person the first mission. 149 Nothing, the air gen­ convoys and the erals felt, had been left to chance. All was in order to make a good im­ •isible enthusiasm pression on the Russians and to distract the Germans on the eve of the :rs m some cases, Normandy invasion. . · . ·on of the labor A disconcerting problem arose, however, with regard to the targets tricans chafed at to be bombed on the shuttle from Italy to Russia, from the new bases in pace of the Rus­ Russia, and then on the return flight to Italy. Since the avowed purpose job was accom­ of FRANTIC was to enable the strategic air forces to attack objectives ·om Deane and they could not ordinarily reach, it was planned to bomb the Heinkel t of bringing in aircraft works at Riga and at Mielec, a town near L wow, in Poland.1110 other technical More as a courtesy to the Russians than anything else, Spaatz consulted !naintain and de­ Moscow about his choice of objectives. The Russian general staff re­ :icans would be plied that there Wfre strong~ but undefined, objections to his sele_ct~on ~ians excessively of targets. Instead, the Russians recommended that the first mtsston '·ere held up in~ a concentrate on various minor targets in Hungary and Rumania which rough an agree­ were in easy range of Fifteenth Air Force bases in Italy. Harriman re­ ready disturbed monstrated vigorously, and so did Deane.151 But the Russians would

3 I I THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN \\7 0RLD WAR II not clear Riga and Mielec for the bombings. Deane inferred that the Russians feared an attack on Riga might disclose Soviet intentions of beginning an offensive in that direction,1112 but he never knew for sure why the target was not acceptable. Voicing his disappointment at the Russian attitude, he advised Spaatz to choose the targets he desired and merely to inform th,e Russians of his intentions.m General Eaker was also disturbed, feeling that the Russians had not cooperated in the selection of targets as well as the AAF had a right to I expect/114 but he spared no pains to make FRANTIC JOE a success. Four experience-hardened groups of B-I7's from the 4th Wing of the Fifteenth Air Force and a reinforced P-5 I group from the 306th Wing were organized into a task force to fly to Russia on the first clear day after June I. On the way they would attack a railway center in Debre­ cen, Hungary. All of the I 30 bombers would land at Poltava and Mir­ gorod and the 70 fighters would base at Piryatin. They would remain on Russian soil for several days; during which time Eaker hoped to clear up the problem of additional targets · and secure permission to bomb Riga and Mielec. Then, the task force would return to Italy, if possible attacking strategic targets on the way. Unusual care was taken regarding security, discipline, and personal conduct among the crews, who were instructed not to talk politics in Russia. 1115 At o65 5 on 2 J~ the FRANTIC JOE task force took off from Italy. After an uneventful flight over Yugoslavia it reached Debrecen soon after 0900 and dropped a thousand 500-pound bombs from alti­ tudes ranging from 2 I ,ooo feet to 2 5,ooo. All tracks in the main mar­ shalling yards were cut and a large quantity of rolling stock was dam­ aged or destroyed. The bombs blasted or fired the central railway sta; tion and the chief buildings of an engineering establishment. No ene\ny fighters appeared and there was no flak over the target, but one Fortress in Eaker's squadron unaccountably exploded. It was the only loss. 156 By early afternoon the main group of B-I7's, led by a flight of three in a triumphant V formation, landed at Poltava, where a large crowd of dignitaries stood in a light rain to wimess the historic occasion.157 As prearranged out of deference to Russian sensibilities/58 Moscow made the firs~ announcement of the inauguration of shuttle bombing. Deane thought the mission had been a huge success,1119 and Eaker was very pleased with the bases. The general himself was most cordially received by his Russian hosts. Eaker quickly obtained permission from the Russians to bomb the

312 N"AR II THE STRATEGIC BOMBER STRIKES AHEAD .inferred that the originally scheduled target at Mielec. There seemed reason to believe riet intentions of there would be no further misunderstandings about target selection, 1 er knew for sure and Eaker was mightily pleased at the cooperative attitude he found.t' " pointment at the But weather conditions prevented an attack on Mielec for several days. tts he desired and Finally, on 6 June, a force of 104 B-17's and 41 P-51's attacked an air­ field at Galatz, Rumania, with moderately good results and no bomber Russians had not }()sses. Two Mustangs were shot down, however, and the Americans J' had a right to claimed eight enemy aircraft.llll The weather showed no signs of clear­ : JOE a success. ing up sufficiently to allow the Americans to bomb Poland or eastern tth Wing of the Germany, but Spaatz cabled Eaker to remain in Russia for a few more the 306th Wing days in order to pose a threat, psychological if nothing more, to the te first clear day Germans during the Normandy invasion.182 Since there was no flying, ;enter in Debre­ the crews wandered about the bases and the devastated towns near by. 'oltava and Mir­ They made friends with Russian civilians, who were hospitable and Y' would remain willing to go out of their way to entenain the visiting airmen.163 Eaker hoped to Despairing of a break in the weather, Eaker finally led his task force ,e permission to back to Italy on 11 Ju.ne. On the way it bombed Foscani airfield in turn to Italy, if nonheastern Rumania, where the Americans achieved fair results and care was taken lost one B-17.184 The return to Italy was an occasion for commenda­ 1ong the crews, tions and jubilant publicity, as well as optimistic plans for the future. Eaker felt cenain that the Russians admired the Americans greatly and ·e took off from that they were deeply appreciative of the assistance being offered ched Debrecen them. 18~ 1mbs from alti- On 11 J~~~.!.2~ the Eighth Air Force began its participation in the main mar­ FRANTIC witn amission that was to prove historic in more than one rock was dam­ respect. It began well. As part of the previously described operation on ~ al railway sta­ that day, • a task force composed of 114 B-1']'s and 70 P-s 1 's bombed ~ nt. No enemy the synthetic oil plant at Ruhland, south of Berlin, in perfect weather m one F oruess and proceeded to the Russian bases. Unknown to the Americans, a Ger­ te only loss. 156 man He-177 trailed the Fortresses to Poltava. Within five hours the ght of three in Russian warning system reponed that a large force of German bombers arge crowd of and fighters was crossing the front lines, and shonly arterlnidnight ICCasion. 1 ~ 7 As these airplanes were over Poltava. The Germans dropped great num­ \loscow made bers of flares which illuminated the airfield and the B-17 's on it. Then mbing. Deane they deposited approximatelY.. 110 tons of bombs-demolition, incen­ 1ker was very diary, and fragment,.ation:_and fairly wrecked the target area. Some of ·lially received the German aircraft flew low over the airdrome, strafing it thoroughly and scattering murderous antipersonnel bombs. The enemy's blow was ; to bomb the • See above, pp. 184-85. THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II brilliantly successful.160 Forty=three.. B-Iz's were destroyed and twen­ ty-six were damaged. Besiaes,lifteen Mustangs and miscellaneous Rus­ sian aircraft were destroyed, American ammunition dumps were fired, and 45o,ooo gallons of gasoline which had been brought into Russia so laboriously were ignited. Only one American was killed, but the Rus­ sians, who fought the fires heroically and refused to let the Americans endanger themselves, suffered twenty-five fatalities. And not a single German aircraft was brought down. A few months later Spaatz told Hermann Goering that this was the best attack the Luftwaffe ever made against the AAF, and the prisoner reminisced, "Those were won­ ) derful times."167 The Poltava disaster was not the end of the story, for the elated Ger­ mans returned on the following night to punish Mirgorod and Pirya- tin. They were unable to locate the latter airdrome, however, and the Americans flew their airplanes away from Mirgorod before the enemy arrived. But considerable damage to bomb dumps and gasoline supplies was inflicted at Mirgorod,168 and Eastern Command was temporarily immobilized. The Russians had demanded that they alone be respon­ sible for the defense of the bases, and they had made a very poor show­ ing during the German raids.169 But both the Americans and the Rus­ sians were careful not to indulge in recriminations, and they labored together to salvage and repair the remaining aircraft. They took steps to provide hospitals in. the area, to disperse airplanes and supplies, and to set up machine-gun defenses-all in a cooperative spirit which helped reduce the embarrassment both sides felt.l1° The Americans, however, were determined not to expose their airplanes unnecessarily, and on 2 7 June, Harriman thought he had obtained Stalin's approval to establish J an AAF night fighter unit to protect the bases,171"but somehow nothing . , ever came of the matter. The Soviet authorities postponed and ob:. structed until the project was dead. \Vithout additional protection, it ( was evident that American bombers should nOUJ:W_~in more than one \ night on Russian bases,172 and plans forthe expansi~ whiffinadlOOlrea"forward to the basing of three AAF heavy bomber groups permanently in Russia began to cool.178 The surviving Eighth Air Force bombers and fighters, seventy-one Fortresses. and fifty~five Mustangs, some of which had been patched up after die German raids, had left Russia on 16 June. On the way to Italy they severely damaged a synthetic oil plant at Drohobycz, Po­ land.174 In Italy they flew one mission with the Fifteenth Air Force and 314 AR II THE STRATEGIC BOMBER STRIKES AHEAD lyed and twen­ then returned to their bases in England. An entire month passed before cellaneous Rus-. another FRANTIC mission took place, a delay arising partly from the mps were fired, preoccupation of the strategic air forces with the land campaigns and tt into Russia so the urgent need to neutralize German industrial targets within reach :d, but the Rus­ of the principal bases. But another factor was the continuing inade­ : the Americans quacy of defenses at Eastern Command and the reluctance of the Rus­ nd not ~ single sians to permit significant operations by the Americans from FRAN­ tter Spaatz told TIC bases. Luftwaffe ever Finally, not willing to see FRANTIC lapse altogether, USSTAF de­ ~ose were won- cided to send a task force of fighter-bombers to Russia. On 22 July, seventy-six Lightnings and fifty-eight Mustangs of the Fifteenth Air the elated Ger­ Force carried out a devastating attack on Rumanian airfields while 'rod and Pirya­ bombers of that organization were operating against Ploesti. After de­ ~ wever, and the stroying fifty-six enemy aircraft, according to pilots' claims, the task fore the enemy force continued on to Russia. From FRANTIC bases the American asoline supplies fighters attacked the airdrome at Mielec on 2 5 July and wrecked seven ras temporarily enemy aircraft. Flying back to Italy on the z6th they swept over the one be respon­ Bucharest-Ploesti region and destroyed twenty more enemy air­ ery poor show­ planes.1111 Another task force, this time composed only of P-38's, oper­ ts and the Rus­ ated on 4, 5, and 6 August between bases in Italy and Russia in an eager d they labored attempt to comply with the first direct Soviet request for assistance the 'hey took steps AAF had received, this in the way of attacking airfields and railroads .d supplies, and in Rumania.176 At the conclusion of these operations Eastern Command it which helped advised USSTAF that, balancing losses and battle damage against the cans, however, relatively unprofitable targets, fighter-bomber attacks from FRAN­ .rily, and on 27 TIC bases were proving too costly.177 val to establish On 6 August 1944, soon after the Fifteenth Air Force Lightnings nehow nothing left Russia, an Eighth Air Force fleet of seventy-six Fortresses and )Oned and ob­ sixty-four Mustangs flew in, having bombed a Focke-Wulf aircraft I protection, it factory at Gdynia, Poland, on the way. After spending an uneventful more than one night on Soviet territory, part of this force raided oil refineries at Trze­ OiFRANilc' binia, Poland, with good results and no losses. On 8 August the entire heavy bomber force took off for Italy, bombed Rumanian airdromes on the way, and . eventually completed the triangle back to England. Not until 1 I Sep­ :s, seventy-one tember did the Eighth Air Force engage in another shuttle mission. On I been patched this occasion seventy-five Fortresses and sixty-four Mustangs attacked On the way to an armament plant at Chemnitz on the way to Russia. Spending I 2 Sep­ rohobycz, Po­ tember at FRANTIC bases, this force left on I 3 September, bombed Air Force and steel works at Diosgyor, Hungary, and landed in ltaly.178 This was the 31 5 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR. II last of the shuttle-bombing missions. Autumn was setting in, and by now FRANTIC bases were so far to the east of Soviet lines they were of scant value as springboards "for bon:tbing Germany. · 1 The tragic finale to FRANTIC operations was the protracted effon, ~ I expended largely in appeals and negotiations, to deliver supplies to the W~ \besieged patriot force in War5aw during August and September 1944. This army, led by Gen. Tadeusz B6r-Komorowski, rose against the Nazis on 1 August 1944 upon receipt of what the Poles·in Warsaw and London regarded as authentic radio orders from Moscow. T.he Soviet armies were approaching Warsaw and it seemed that the Polish capital might be delivered in a matter of days after B6r's uprising. The Rus­ sian advance in that direction mysteriously ~t~ however, and came no closer to the city than ten kilometers for months thereafter. ne The rebellious Poles, facing powerful and vengeful German forces, fought on with typical bravery, and on 15 August General Eisenhower re­ ceived a message from \Nashington urging him to undertake a supply­ dropping mission to the beleaguered city.180 Heavy bombers were un­ able to complete an England-Warsaw-England flight, and it was very difficult to carry out a round-trip mission from Italy toWarsaw. Hence a shuttle to FRANTIC bases seemed in order. But at this point the course of events took a dism~rn. ~ sian officials suddenly denounced the \\: ?JSaW forcesas recKreS'S adven­ turers who hia risen prematurely-·and without"'Soviet incitement, and refu~ermi_!_ a FRA~T!__C o~a~ in behalf of Warsaw. Strong pressure froifrtlieAmenc~BrltiSh ambassadors failed to alter the Soviet attitude, as also did an appeal from President Roosevelt and , " Prime Minister Churchill.181 The British, employing the Italy-based · RAF 105 Group with volunteer aircrews, between 14 August and 16 October sent seven exceedingly difficult and costly relief missions to drop supplies by night.182 But while the Germans were beating down the Poles and destroying Warsaw stone by stone, as they had said they would, the Russian army did not budge from its position ten kilometers away, and some high-ranking officers in USSTAF were of the opinion that further insistence o·n supply-dropping could only endanger Russo­ American rel~tions with no other effect.183 By early September the situation had become so tragic, however, that the western Allies renewed their appeals for a FRANTIC mission to Warsaw. The Russians gave their approval on II September and, per~aps as a concession to the western Allies, they themselves com- 316 . I I T H E S T R A T £ (i J C 8 0 M B £ R 5 T R I K E S A ~ E A J)

~in, and by menced dropping supplies on the Polish capital on 13 September. 1 ~ 1 es they were The only American mission of this nature, and the last of all FRAN­ TIC operations, was carried out by the Eighth Air Force on 18 Sep­ ·acted effort, tember. One hundred and seven B- I 7's circled the area for an hour and pplies to the dropped 1,284 containers with machine-gun parts, pistols, small-arms ember 1944. ammunition, hand grenades, incendiaries, explosives, food, and medical : against the supplies. VVhile at first it appeared that the mission had been a great Warsaw afld success, and so it was hailed, it was later known that only 288, or pos­ 185 . The Soviet sibly only I 30, of the containers fell into Polish hands. The Germans 'olish capital got the others. ' g. The Rus­ A strong disposition remained in Allied circles to send another day­ !r, and came light shuttle mission to Warsaw. The Polish premier-in-exile, Stanis­ 1711 1fter. The laus Mikolajczyk, made a heart-rending appeal to Prime Minister ,rces, fought ChU;rchill, who telephoned USSTAF on 2 7 September to repeat and !nhower re­ indorse the Pole's message and to add his own request for another ke a supply­ supply mission, "a noble deed," as he called it.186 From Washington, !rs were un- President Roosevelt ordered that a FRANTIC delivery to Warsaw It was very be carried out, much to the discomfiture of the \:V ar Department and rsaw. Hence its air staff which regarded such missions as both costly and hopeless.187 The second supply operation was never cleared by the Russians; Stalin 188 ~ turn. Rus­ himself seems to have refused permission on 2 October 1944. A few k!eSs ad~~n ~ days later the Nazis extinguished the Warsaw insurrection, which had tement, and cost the lives of perhaps 2 so,ooo Poles. Not until January 1945 did the saw. Strong Russians take over the city, or what remained of it. to alter the The fortunes of Eastern Command never recovered from the Ger­ •osevelt and man attacks on Poltava and Mirgorod on 2 I-22 June I944· Contrary Italy-based to American hopes,189 the 'disaster did not make the Russians easier to gust and 16 deal with. Nothing came of the project to base permanently on Soviet missions to soil a night fighter squadron and heavy bombardment groups. In fact, :acing down the Russians gave scant indication of being impressed with strategic ad said they bombing, or of desiring to facilitate the bomber offensive, or even of 1 kilometers using heavy bombers for their <>-wn purposes. While a few FRANTIC the opinion missions were carried· out after the 2 I-22 June affair, the impression nger Russo- grew among the Americans that the Soviet authorities wanted the AAF to pull out of Russ_ia altogether. This feeling was not slaked when :::, however, Molotov, in late August 1944, pointedly indicated the Russians needed riC mission the three air bases which had been turned over to the Arnericans.180 ·ember and, General Arnold, as yet not prepared to abandon FRANTIC, made ,elves com- determined efforts to persuade the Russians to allow heavy bombers 317 ~~1-Jz_

T l1 £ A R J\1 Y A 1 R FORCES IN WORLD WA0r~1--tf? tion as fulfilling his ideas concerning a postponed victory in Europe.ss AAF Headquarters felt it was too vague ·and that USSTAF had con­ ceded too much to the RAF.87 Portal, on the other hand, accepted the new directive with some reluctance, since he believed the war might be won by May I 945, in which event the effort expended on jets and the marginal target systems might drain some of the force from a deci­ sive campaign against oil and transportation.88 The RAF chief of air staff insisted upon securing specific CCS confirmation of the new priorities, a circumstance which resulted in a major alteration of Direc­ tive No.3 toward the end of January.• January Operations \Vhile in no month after the Normandy invasion had it been pos­ sible for the heavy bombers to concentrate on a "pure" strategic offen­ sive, January I945 was a period of unusual absorption with the land battle. Approximately three-fourths of USSTAF effort went on tacti­ cal targets,39 and RAF Bomber Command was similarly taxed. Eighth Air Force mission reports for most of January show enormous numbers of heavy bombers, sometimes as many as I ,5oo, going out day after day ro bomb targets whose neutralization would benefit Allied ground forces but would not directly accelerate the dislocation of Germany's industries. The preponderant weight of such air effort went on what was officially a secondary objective, enemy communications. Some I47 rail and road targets-rail centers, marshalling yards, repair shops, junc­ tions, bridges, and traffic bottlenecks- received USSTAF raids during the month. It was seldom possible to evaluate the damage inflicted because of the confusion of battle and the overstrained condition of " photographic reconnaissance units.40 The Germans continued to repair their bombed railways and bridges expeditiously,41 but the delays were sometimes determining factors in winning a tactical advantage, and the cumulative effect on German transportation was slowly mounting to the point of disaster. Thus, transportation bombings in behalf of the ground forces helped wreck Germany and were by no means wasted even from the most extreme strategic air point of view. Meanwhile, the Fifteenth Air Force was prosecuting its long campaign against rail­ ways in Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, and Italy. The relatively small number of missions directed at strategic targets during January I945 were very successful in keeping oil production • See below, p. 725. 722 II THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS in Europe.as low and in hampering tank manufacture. On I January a force of 109 ~had con­ B-z7's of the Eighth Air Force bombed an oil refinery at Dollbergen LCcepted the with signal effectiveness.42 For about two weeks thereafter Germany's ! war might oil producers received no visits from the heavies. In the middle of Jan­ on jets and uary, Bomber Command delivered several heavy blows in mass area from a deci­ raids at night upon the major synthetic oil plants in central Germany chief of air which were coming back into production: Politz, Briix, Zeitz, and of the new Leuna.43 There was unaccustomed air activity over Germany on 14 m of Direc- January, when zo Eighth Air Force groups ran into 350 GAF con­ ventional-type fighters, half of which the Americans claimed to have shot down to their own loss of 5 fighters and 9 bombers. 44 Bombing results that day were reasonably good. A crude-oil refinery at Hem­ it been pos­ mingstedt was knocked out of operation, several oil depots were tegic offen­ struck, and fair success was achieved against a benzol plant in the Ruhr ith the land and a synthetic oil plant at Magdeburg.45 Magdeburg required another :nt on tacti­ attack, which it received on 16 January along with Ruhland and tank xed. Eighth plants at Bitterfeld and Buckau. The Eighth struck at oil refineries in ms numbers Hamburg and Harburg on the I 7th to some effect46 and bombed the 1y after day Blohm and Voss U-boat yard in Hamburg with less success. .ied ground Weather conditions during the last of January greatly restricted the Germany's air war. Because of difficult icing conditions over the Alps the Fif­ :nt on what teenth Air Force was able to fly on only eight days in the entire month, s. Some I47 and Bomber Command had to cancel missions because of treacherous ;hops, junc­ flying weather. Even when parts of Germany were open to bombing, ·aids during Eighth Air Force aircraft were often hampered by late-morning fog at ge inflicted their bases or by heavy clouds in the early evening.4 7 The air forces had ondition of made much progress in the past year toward overcoming their worst ed to repair opponent, the weather, but radar-bombing methods continued to prove :lelays were disappointing. The Eighth Air Force had an average circular probable tge, and the error of about two miles on its blind missions,48 which meant that 10unting to many of its attacks depended for effectiveness upon drenching an area :half of the with bombs. With identical equipment the Fifteenth Air Force was !ans wasted doing twice as well-or h'alf as poorly-as the Eighth, possibly because nwhile, the of a more thorough training program in preparing lead crews for win­ tgainst rail- ter bombing.49 The only answer seemed to be to provide more radar

operators and equipment and to build up experience. AAF Head­ 'I• I egic targets quarters determined that one-fourth of each heavy bombardment production group should be composed of radar-equipped aircraft, an aim which was reached early in March I945• whereupon the Eighth and Fif- 723 T H .E. A lU\1 Y A 1 H. li U R C E S 1 N W 0 R L D WAR II teenth Air Forces requested that twice this proportion be provided.~ 0 Although new methods of radar bombing were under development Juring the winter of I 945, they were not introduced into the Euro­ pean air war in time to improve accuracy sharply. Good bombing conditions or not, the air forces operated during the last few days of January I945 as well as they could. The Fifteenth managed on 20 January to place 228 tons on the large oil storage depot 1 at Regensburg, its first oil mission for three weeks. 5 On the next day it sent I 89 B- I 7's to bomb two oil refineries in the Vienna area while soP-38's shot up a refinery near Fiume. For nine days thereafter the Fifteenth was grounded. Then, on 3 I January, it delivered a heavy blow at the vast Moosbierbaum synthetic plant in Vienna with 2 I 7 Fortresses and 407 Liberators. The Eighth Air Force got 36 Fortresses through on 20 January to bomb the synthetic oil plant at Sterkrade, which was reattacked on the 22d. A tank factory at Aschaffenburg received a blind attack from 66 Fortresses on 2 I January. Toward the last of the month, on 28 and 29 January, the Eighth again undertook small strategic missions. On the 28th, I I 5 Liberators bombed two ben­ zol plants in the Ruhr and on the next day 93 Fortresses inflicted fresh Jamage on the Henschel tank works at Kassel. 52 These January mis­ sions were very difficult to carry through and unimpressive in size. Yet, with the area raids of the RAF, they were successful in restraining German industrial output. The transportation chaos, largely brought on by the air forces, continued to aggravate the enemy's problems. The war situation was much improved when the CCS convened on 30 January I945 at Malta, just prior to the Yalta conference of Roose­ velt, Churchill, and Stalin. In the west the Allies had removed the Bulge and were preparing to resume the march to the Rhine. More promising was the massive Russian advance in the east. For a few days it looked as though East Prussia, Silesia, and even Berlin itself might he overrun. At that point, just when the CCS had tacitly approved the Spaatz-Bottomley Directive No. 3 for strategic air operations,53 the Malta conferees decided to throw the weight of the heavy bombers into the battle in the east. Perhaps this decision grew out of foreknowl­ edge ,of a formal Russian request for such assistance which was put forward a few days later at Yalta. 114 At any rate, the western Allies and the Russians were in strong agreement that the strategic air forces might prevent German reinforcement of the crumbling eastern front. Primarily, this assistance was to take the form of blocking the major 72 4 I I THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS provided.11o transportation centers through which the Germans might send units I !velopment from west to east, such as Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cottbus, Chemnitz, the Euro- and others. There was also a hope that heavy air raids would increase the panic and confusion already prevalent in those cities, which were ted during thoroughly frightened by the sudden Russian advance and full of refu- e Fifteenth gees. Pandemonium in Berlin, particularly, might have a decisive effect rage depot in speeding up the disintegration of Hitler's regime. Accordingly, the e next day air leaders at Malta issued with the strong approval of General Mar- area while sha11, and with what they took to be the concurrence of AAF Head­ reafter the quarters, a revised directive.55 As second p,ci,o.rit¥ (after synthetic oil L . d a heavy plants) came "Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, and associated cities where /~ with 217 heavy attack will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the Fortresses east and hamper reinforcements." As a third priority the heavy bomb- Sterkrade, ers would direct their efforts on communications in the Ruhr-Cologne- affenburg Kassel area to keep the GermanSfromwit11Clrawing forces in the west 6 )Ward the to bolster the east. 5 mdertook The Eighth Air Force was braced for several days awaiting an op- !}~ two ben­ portunity to blast !!erli_~, which had gone for two months without a -----·-­ :ted fresh major bombardment. Always a prime target because of its industries ilary mis- and government offices, the capital was especially important now be- e m size. cause of its transportation. Accordingly, marshalling yards and railway !Straining stations throughout the vast urban center were the chief objectives.57 · brought · Underlining the urgency of bombing Berlin at this time was the belief )lems. that the Sixth Panzer Army was moving through the city on its way vened on to the Russian front and the feeling that a good attack on the eve of the ,f Roose­ Yalta conference might help convince the Soviet Union of American " )Ved the willingness to assist it. Another consideration was the possibility of de- te. More moralizing the Nazi government with a smashing bombardment. Ac- :ew days cordingly, the Eighth Air Force planned to put its full B-17 force on lf might Berlin, attacking transportation and governmental targets heavily in :>Ved the what would probably be radar, and therefore inaccurate, bombing. It ns, 113 the was recognized that the Germans on the receiving end might regard it ')ombers as a terror raid, but the Americans made careful preparations to con- eknowl- duct as precise an attack as possible.rrs was put The mission took place on 3 February 1945. Nearly r,ooo Fortresses }5-e_ 1 ~.;_, !lies and flew to Berlin while 400 Liberators simultaneously attacked railway -­ ~ forces and oil targets around Magdeburg. The B-r7's reached the capital n front. without interference and found most of it exposed to visual bombing. e major Hence accuracy was fairly high, although the bombers unloaded their 72 5 TilE ARJ\LY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II

tonnages from 24,ooo to 27,ooo feet anJ haJ to take c\·asin action to avoid murderous German flak, which brought down 2 r heavy bomb­ ers. P-5 1 escorts were entirely effective in keeping the German Air Force from troubling the bombers, and they shot up locomotives and strafed railway cars with spectacular success while the bombers in­ flicted severe damage on m llin ards and railwa stations thro_u[h9u~_t~ Berlin area. Furthermore, t e om pattern was heavy in the go~ernment i'Strict. The Reichschancellery, Air Ministry, For­ eign Office, Ministry of Propaganda, and Gestapo headquarters all sus­ tained many hits. Before long, German officials and state documents began to flow to other cities and Berlin lost many of its furtctions as a capital. Finally, civilian casualties were exceedingly high, the num­ 59 ber of fatalities reaching perhaps 2 5 ,ooo, and Swedish newspaper accounts were full of lurid details about the horror in Berlin. This Berlin raid and the scheduled attacks on other population cen­ ters turned attention briefly again to the question of terror bombing, about which the Nazi propaganda machine was having much to say. The leaders of the AAF had long been on record in opposition to indis­ / criminate attacks on civilians. • If bombardiers were sometimes less cir­ cumspect in this matter, or if Germans found it hard to differentiate between spillage and terror bombing, it nevertheless seemed important during those pre-Hiroshima months not to deviate from the stated policy of attacking legitimate military objectives. But were the current and planned bombardments of German cities which served the eastern front deviations from that policy? General Kuter, who was represent­ ing General Arnold at the Yalta conference during Arnold's conva- ,. lescence from a recent illness, asked Spaatz whether the revised direc­ tive of 3 1 January 194 5 authorized indiscriminate attacks on cities. 60 From Washington, Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles cabled his support to Kuter's query,61 a question which must have seemed inappropriate to direct at ~tz, who had steadfastly upheld the principle of precision ~I ( bombing in the face of much pressure. He replied that USSTAF was . really observing Directive Ncale operations of rapidly worsening weather conditions. Then, on the 9th, six forces ress1ve in every totaling I ,296 heavies attempted again to strike at high-priority targets Bomber Com­ in central Germany but, except for Liitzkendorf and three viaducts, led well under only secondaries and targets of opportunity could be reached. The Germans failed wreckage at Liitzkendorf, however, was sufficient to place that objec­ ·am for under­ tive on the inactive list. 75 And damage to an oil storage depot at Dul­ transportation. men and an ordnance plant at \Veimar seemed substantial. For the first oil production time in many weeks the dreaded Me-262's attacked Eighth Air Force ry, and Silesia, bombers on this mission of 9 February. Exploiting their superior speed rural Germany the twin-jet aircraft made wide S's around the bomber formations, the Ruhr. The eluding the bursts fired by the gunners but also spoiling their own aim. ts repaus were P-5 1 pilots believed they destroyed two of the nine or more attacking ic and tactical jets, and only one bomber came down.76 Only minor operations were :k certain fuel possible on 1 o and I I February, the sole important target being the such installa­ Dulmen oil depot, 'which caught 750 tons in two attacks. \Veather lped postpone closed in altogether on the Eighth on the I 2th and qth, preventing ~t fighters, dis­ missions in behalf of the Red army or the oil offensive. niracle. More- T H E A R l\1 Y A I R F 0 R C E S I ~ W 0 R L D W A R I I With the Fifteenth Air Force, as with the Eighth, obligations to assist the Anglo-Amr;:rican and Russian land forces involved much attention to the Gennan transportation system. In particular, marshal- · ling yards in Vienna, around which the Russians were beginning to close, and railway installations in Hungary, l~aly, and Yugoslavia re­ quired heavy tonnages. Heavy base fog or disturbances over the Alps kept the Fifteenth out of Germany for the first four days of February. On the sth, despite high clouds and generally poor flying conditions on the route, 589 heavies got into Germany and dumped more than I, I oo tons on the Regensburg oil storage plant, which was very severe­ ly damaged. After a day of prohibitive flying weather, the Fifteenth vaulted the Alps again on 7 February to bomb several crude-oil re­ fineries around Vienna; in addition, the synthetic plant at Moosbier­ baum caught 52 8 tons and the greatest damage. 77 Follow-up bombings of 9 and I4 February were believed to have left this vast establishment half destroyed in productive capacity.78 Railway targets in Austria re­ ceived moderate raids on 8 and 9 February, after which a three-day lull ensued because of unflyable conditions. On the I 3th almost the full weight of the Fifteenth Air Force, 837 heavies, struck at Vienna, concentrating on the south ordnance depot, repair shops, freight yards, oil refineries, and railway depots, as well as marshalling yards in west­ ern Hungary and Austria. After a light day of bombing railways lead­ ing toward the fom1er Austrian capital, the Fifteenth returned in full force on IS February to reattack marshalling yards and freight stations inside the city. General havoc was wrought in Vienna stations. In parts of the city all railway lines were blocked. 79 But it was the kind of damage that would not stay done. vVith Vienna temporarily under control, the Fifteenth turned Oil' / I 6 February to German jet aircraft. It was the day General Eaker had been waiting for to "crack the jets,"80 and approximately 700 heavies flew into southern Germany. Flying conditions were not helpful, how­ ever, and only one weighty attack was carried out, when 163 Liber­ ators unloaded 5 59 tons on the jet airfield and adjacent Me-262 plant near Regensburg. Perhaps 2 3 jets were destroyed on the ground and 19 were severely damaged. Curiously enough, the Germans could not get their' jets off the ground in time. It looked as though new damage was inflicted on the factory, and results of a much smaller bombing at Neuburg seemed good. 81 Scattered effort on I7 February broqght damage to naval objectives in Trieste and Fiume as well as to the benzol 73° II T H £, : C L t M A X 0 F S T R ATE G I C 0 P E R A T I 0 N S >ligations to plant and marshalling yards at Linz, Austria. The Linz benzol installa­ C>lved much tion caught 4I 7 tons on the 18th, otherwise an inconspicuous day in ar, marshal­ the air war. On the 19th, strong head winds kept the heavies from 'egmnmg to reaching Vienna, with the result that the Graz and Klagenfurt mar­ tgoslavia re­ shalling yards were attacked.82 Well over 550 Fifteenth Air Force ,·er the Alps heavies were out on 20 February, bombing oil refineries and railways >f February. in Vienna and attacking harbor areas at Trieste, Fiume, and Pola. s conditions A similar number of bombers wound up this phase of the long air i more than offensive against Vienna on 21 February with a furious bombing of very severe­ rail·ways and stations. Vienna was almost done for. Its oil, industrial, :te Fifteenth w penetra­ Eaker concluded that "you and Bob Lovett are right and we should lk plant and never allow the history of this war to convict us of throwing the stra­ r, and mar­ tegic bomber at the man in the street."91 There were other objections ention then to CLARION, chiefly with regard to its probable effectiveness. Portal me time by and Bottomley counseled against the plan as one unlikely to injure the 1s.87 On 20 enemy seriously and as an undesirable diversion from the oil offensive. I February CLARION involved a diffusion of effort over wide areas, which had Jhs showed been singled out by the Combined Strategic Targets Committee in January I 945 as the chief flaw of transportation attacks in the past. s were pre­ There was some objection to exposing heavy bombers to ground fire l Rundstedt by sending them at low altitudes over minor targets.92 But the skeptics 1assive push were outnumbered where it counted, in SHAEF, and Spaatz himself 93 n~nipulated \vas not averse to giving CLARION a try. SIVe prepa- The opportunity came on 22 February, when most of Germany tO mount was expected to be vulnerable to visual-bombing attacks. The tactical lll available air forces received assignments in western and northwestern Germany, nunications the Fifteenth Air Force was to op~rate over a wide area in southern situation.• Germany, RAF Bomber Command retained its semimonopoly over !rs to range the Ruhr, and Eighth Air Force planned to bomb several dozen towns tck all sorts in the middle and north central part of the Reich. The Eighth Air docks, sig- Force had to depart from its usual operating procedures in several re­ objeccives spects. Most important of all, the heavy bombers attacked from about ore. Hence 1 o,ooo feet or even lower instead of the customary 2o,ooo- to 25 ,ooo­ f ligaments foot altitudes. Also, the heavies formed small attacking units instead of :e a stupe­ organizing into the usual large formations. All the Eighth's fighters In general, went along, mainly for ,independent strafing and bombing operations. :ion cham­ The GAF had not undertaken a serious interception since the New a! Marshall Year's Day disaster, and seventy-odd German fighters which were air­ borne on this day caused no serious problem for the American escorts. 733 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II Bombing was good, although low clouds spoiled most of the primary targets for the 3d Air Division of the Eighth. The 1st and 2d Air Di­ visions dropped 2,408 tons from 87 5 heavies on 25 different targets. Only 7 of the 1,411 Eighth Air Force bombers which left England were lost, although 8 5 sustained battle damage from flak, which was not surprising in view of the low bombing altitudes. Meanwhile, the tactical air forces operated as planned in their area, and Bomber Com­ mand managed to attack two Ruhr oil plants in addition to its objec­ tives. The Fifteenth Air Force also had a good day although it had to bomb a number of last-resort targets. Over 700 of its heavies and 350 fighters bombed 30 different towns in an area 300 miles long, and 100 miles wide.94 CLARION seemed highly gratifying, so much so that another oper­ ation of the same nature was prescribed for 23 February. Bomber Com­ mand singled out Gelsenkirchen and Essen for daylight bombing and Berlin for a night mission. The Fifteenth Air Force sent 455 heavies to attack eight transportation targets in the south, and the tactical air forces repeated the pattern of 22 February. The Eighth Air Force planned to finish off the objectives which had escaped on the day before. It seemed incredible that GAF reaction would not be stimu­ lated, so all fifteen fighter groups again went along, this time with more expectation of tangling with German fighters. Yet the GAF scarcely appeared at all, and when sighted, the Germans, even the jet aircraft, evaded combat. The Eighth struck twenty-six of its targets with 3,327 •• tons. Of its 1,193 bomber sorties only 2 heavies failed to return; one of them ditched in the North Sea and the crew of the other parachuted safely in friendly territory.95 All the news seemed good at first. Accu- , racy was unexpectedly high, losses were slight, and the German people had received an unforgettable demonstration of Allied air power. Moreover, at least 150 marshalling yards were damaged, perhaps 500 railway cuts were effected, and about 300 locomotives had been de­ stroyed.96 The enemy's communications system had apparently suf­ fered a staggering blow, and railway traffic was at a standstill in many parts of the Reich. , Subsequel}t assessment of the two CLARION operations greatly slaked the enthusiasm of the moment. It was never possible to evaluate all of the structural damage inflicted on German railways, for the re­ connaissance and photographic effort was insufficient for such a sur­ vey. But there was no sign of a general breakdown, no evidence of the 734 II TH E CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS he primary Reichsbahn's repair facilities being saturated or of German train 2d Air Di­ crews deserting in significant numbers.97 Nothing in particular hap­ ent targets. pened after the German people beheld Allied warplanes striking towns ft England which usually escaped bombings. Perhaps it was a case, as a SHAEF which was press conference was told in a slightly different connection, of trying 1while, the to injure the morale of a people who had no morale.9 8 The depressing nber Com­ refrain which followed so many Allied air efforts against German > its objec­ transportation again seemed sound: high-priority military traffic con­ h it had to tinued to go through, the bombings having had only local and tem­ 99 es and 3SO porary effects. The Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that 1g and IOO CLARION had not seriously affected Germany's capacity to resist, and Portal, in indorsing this opinion, advised against any further at­ 1ther oper­ tempts with this type of operation.100 Tedder, Spaatz, and Doolittle lber Com­ were inclined to disagree with these judgments/01 but they launched nbing and no further CLARION operations. Authoritative postwar studies also 5s heavies differed radically in assessing CLARION.102 :a cti cal air A sidelight of the first CLARION mission was the accidental bomb­ A..ir Force ing of the Swiss town of Schaffhausen, which one year before had been 1 the day an innocent recipient of an Eighth Air Force attack. USSTAF crews be stim~­ were supposed to observe a safety belt around Switzerland of so miles .vith more for visual and I so miles for blind bombing in which they could not ' scarcely hit any but positively identified targets. Nevertheless, reports of vio­ t aircraft, lations, mainly when fighters were chasing trains or when Friedrichs­ rith 3.32 7 hafen was bombed/03 continued to reach the attention of General turn; one Marshall. The incident of 2 2 February I94S at Schaffhausen provoked 1rachuted the U.S. Army chief of staff to send a personal cable to Eisenhower st. Accu­ and McNarney asking them to look into the matter.104 A few qays m people later, on 4 March I 94S, the most flagrant breach of all occurred when r power. nine B-24's bombed Basle and six others attacked Zurich. These Eighth haps soo Air Force bombers dropped thirty-four tons in all on the Swiss. In been de­ both cases the squadrons had wandered from accompanying forma­ ntly suf­ tions on an exceptionally cloudy day and bombed what they mistook mmany for Freiburg, twenty-five miles from Basle and forty-five miles from Zurich, through holes in the sky which were not as opportune as the ; greatly crews thought. 10 ~ • evaluate As soon as he heard of the violations General Marshall cabled Spaatz r there­ to go to Switzerland very secretly and make a formal apology and :h a sur­ explanation-something more than a mere expression of regret. The :e of the USSTAF commander made his visit and received a few davs later 735 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II messages from the Army chief of staff and from General Arnold thanking him for trying to make amends for the blunder. 106 USSTAF took more care in indoctrinating its crews, and there were no further reports of violations. The general success which attended the Allied land offensive toward the Rhine after 2 3 February enabled the heavy bomber commands to return to the strategic air offensive. The goals remained the same: deny oil products to the enemy, ruin his communications, reduce the num­ ber of weapons he could use in land battles, and, if there remained marginal effort, attack his budding jet aircraft force and new subma­ rines. \Vith the stabilization of the eastern front, commitments to bomb large population and communications centers dropped down the pri­ ority list. The air battle against German transportation was shaping into a new phase, however, and attacks would continue in great weight. " ' ith the Ruhr marked as the next strategic objective for the land forces, the several air forces began an ambitious campaign to isolate that valley from the rest of Germany. The purpose was to cut at least one vital bridge or viaduct on every line of communication in a wide arc extending from Bremen in the north down the Weser River through Bielefeld to Coblenz in the south. In all, eighteen bridges or viaducts were involved, six of which were assigned to the strategic air forces. Then, every marshalling yard of any importance between the broken bridges and the Ruhr had to be attacked repeatedly in order to insure interdiction.107 Fighter-bombers would operate against roll­ ing stock as they had ten months before in northern France. The major portion of the plan devolved upon the tactical air forces, and the prin­ cipal purpose of the whole program was tactical: to prevent the Ger­ mans from building up their forces in the Ruhr prior to the Allied assault. Nevertheless, the isolation of the Ruhr, if successful, would vastly influence the strategic air war against Germany's war-making capacity, particularly in denying hard coal and steel which were now so vital to the Reich since Silesia had fallen to the Russians. 108 Because the plan was expected to produce this significant strategic result, Gen­ eral Vandenberg had insisted that the strategic air forces take a sub­ stantial part.109 Eighth Air F~rcc returned to the bomber offensive on 24 February with a large but not very successful mission against northwestern Ger­ many. Cloud conditions were even worse than anticipated, so that nearly all the bombs were dropped by H2X. The 1st Air Division con- 736 .

!

,R I I THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS eneral Arnold centrated on oil refineries in Hamburg, the 2d Air Division struck r. 106 USSTAF marshalling yards and an oil refinery at Hannover, and the 3d Air Di­ ere no further vision aimed at a submarine pen in Bremen, two bridges near Minden, and the industrial area of Osnabrtick. Only 2 of the I ,o9o heavy :ensive toward bombers failed to return; German antiaircraft fire, like American commands to bombing, was inaccurate that dayY0 The missions of 25 February he same: deny constituted a substantial if not outstanding assault on Germany. A gen­ luce the num- erally unfavorable forecast left only southern targets open to bombing, 1ere remained and 1, I 77 bombers with eleven fighter groups reached the Bavarian ::l new subma- area. Marshalling yards at Munich and Ulm, various airfields for jets, nents to bomb the oil storage depot at Neuburg, the tank assembly plant at Aschaffen­ ::lown the pri- burg, and a tank engine factory at Fricdrichshafen were the chief ob­ 1 was shaping jectives. Losses were light-only five bombers and five fighters. Bomb­ great weight. ing was good at the airfields, railway yards, and the oil depot. And an for the land almost complete failure at Friedrichshafen was matched by the de­ tign to isolate struction of practically all the buildings at the Aschaffenburg tank to cut at least plant and severe damage at Neuburg.lll Such missions as these, which ·ion in a wide seemed inconclusive in some respects and which were often not carried Weser River out as planned, had a way of producing significant results. In the long en bridges or run the stubborn policy of dispatching bombers over Germany at e strategic air every possible opportunity brought about the effects envisaged by the : between the Allied leaders. edly in order Berlin came in for another Eighth Air Force visitation on 26 Febru­ I : against roll- ary, since a predicted overcast covering the Reich ruled out visual :e. The major operations planned against southwestern Germany. All forces were and the prin- thus directed against the most suitable area for instrument bombing: 1ent the Ger- railway targets in east central Berlin, especially the Schleisischer, Alex­ to the Allied ander Platz, and North railroad stations. Each air division took one of ~ssful, would the three stations for its main target. The bombers reached "Big B" war-making 1,102 strong, dropped 2,879 tons, and, as anticipated, encountered no ch were now enemy fighters. Five bombers and five fighters were lost to flak or 1s. 108 Because because of operational difficulties. Assessment showed that only the : result, Gen- Schleisischer station of the three main objectives was severely dam­ s take a sub- aged. But enormous fires burned in many parts of the city intensely enough to dispel the clouds, and that night RAF Mosquitoes were able 24 February to make good visual sighting on their regular raid. It was apparent that .vestern Ger- moderate damage had been inflicted on railway targets and power ned, so that stations. Also, the Reichstag building was hit, a wing of the Ministry )ivision con- of Propaganda ·was destroyed, and other public buildings were dam- 737 T H E A R .1\1 Y A I R F 0 R C E S I N W 0 R L D W A R I I aged. Spillage from the transportation bombings damaged industrial plants and scattered sections in the business and residential areas. 112 Admiral Doenitz assured his Fuehrer a few days afterward that Berlin had been bombed only for political reasons. He said he thought sea­ ports like Stettin and Swinemunde, full of supplies and crowded with refugees, would have been better targets for the Allies. 113

The operational commanders chose for 27 February, on the custom- '1· ary basis of weather predictions at the r 6oo-hour conference the day before, a complex of targets in the Leipzig area, mainly aeroengine plants, a tank factory, and marshalling yards. Nearly r,roo bombers and the full fifteen fighter groups sortied. Visibility proved even poorer than had been anticipated, with the result that only railway targets at Halle and Bitterfeld and the central transportation point in Leipzig itself received attention. The bomb fall was not accurate, but spillage on adjacent industrial and residential areas in Leipzig caused considerable destruction. On 28 February the only exposed section of Germany was the west central part. Accordingly, bombings of that ' day were mainly in fulfilment of the over-all transportation program to isolate the Ruhr. Good attacks were also made on the Henschel tank plant at Kassel and a castings factory at Meschede.u 4 The attacks on marshalling yards, even though most of them were nonvisual, were unusually good, and several targets were suspended or removed from the list. The Fifteenth Air Force had fine weather during the last few days of February over its bases and routes, although conditions at targets usually made it necessary to employ blind-bombing techniques. Nearly all of the Fifteenth's objectives were tactical: railway targets in north- ern Italy, Austria, and in southern Germany, most of which would ~ " benefit the Russian land forces gradually moving up toward Vienna. On 24 February the Fifteenth carried out a phase of the long and in­ conclusive campaign to break the Brenner Pass railway line, in which the tactical Twelfth Air Force concentrated on bridges and lines and the Fifteenth on main marshalling yards. On the 25th the familiar ben- zol plant at Linz received a light bombing, as did the ordnance depot in that city; marshalling yards there also caught significant tonnages. Bombers were not able to surmount the Alps obstacle on 26 February, but on the next day 430 B-r7's and B-24's dropped almost r,roo tons on Augsburg's marshalling yard. The Brenner Pass line received most of the effort of 28 February, when 533 B-24's and 222 B-17's bombed 738 R II T H E C L 1 J\1 A X 0 F S T R A T E G I C 0 P E R A T I 0 N S

~ed industrial bridges and rail centers on the Italian side. In terms of tonnage, the last :ntial areas.U 2 week of February was one of the most notable in the history of the rd that Berlin Fifteenth Air Force.115 For the aircrews another pleasant aspect was thought sea- the almost complete absence of the enemy's fighter force. The Ger­ :rmvded with mans could no longer fly their conventional fighters, and their jets were not quite ready for full-scale participation in the air war. During n the custom- this interval both the Eighth and the Fifteenth suffered minimum losses. ·ence the day Flak was more concentrated than ever before, however, now that Ger­ y aeroengine many had shrunk in area. But Allied countermeasures were better than , I oo bombers ever before, too, and the use of 27-plane instead of 3 6-plane formations proved even after February I945 seemed a main factor in keeping flak damage low o?ly railway in the Eighth Air Force.116 1t1on point in As March opened, the only air force problem was to maintain the accurate, but offensive along the lines set by February's operations. Allied land eipzig caused forces were moving forward. German oil supplies were adequate only ;ed section of for a fitful, uncertain defense, and the three Allied strategic air forces bings of that were to direct 36,ooo tons, the second largest amount in the entire oil tion program ' offensive, at refineries and storage dumps in March. The only setback Ienschel tank occurred when the Germans surprisingly recaptured some of the Hun­ he attacks on garian oil fields from the Russians.117 The protracted campaign against nvisual, were enemy transportation was now paying off in economic and military ~ moved from paralysis, perhaps long overdue but nonetheless final. Shortage of all sorts of equipment and weapons for waging war- largely the accumu­ last few days lated result of the long series of RAF-AAF bombings-now hampered ms at targets the German armies. Even if new jet and submarine forces were about iqucs. Nearly to appear, the Allies were no longer worried about the war. The stra­ ~ ets in north- tegic air offensive had only a few more weeks to go before victory w-hich would was secure. At the beginning of March the air forces had no new di­ vard Vienna. rectives. They needed none. A steady application of blows for a few long and in- weeks would leave the Third Reich helpless, ready for occupation. ine, in which The I March I945 mission of the Eighth Air Force required dis­ and lines and patching I ,2 I 9 heavies, a normal effort by this date of the war, to familiar ben- southern Germany. Targets were mainly marshalling yards in that :lnance depot section of the Reich. Ulm caught over I,3oo tons, but disappointing mt tonnages. weather conditions made it necessary to bomb many secondary objec­ 26 February, tives that day. Even so, German transportation was reaching a state of •st I, I oo tons collapse which made almost any bombing effective. Several jets jumped eceived most the lead bomber box and a straggler without success. The possibility of ·I]'s bombed such attacks made it necessary to dispatch enormous and otherwise in- THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II congruous numbers of fighter escorts with the bomber formation these days. On 2 March such precautions again proved valuable. All fifteen · fighter groups went along with 1,210 bombers which carried out un­ usually heavy and effective attacks on synthetic oil plants at Magde­ burg, Ruhland, and Bohlen, a tank plant at Magdeburg, and marshal­ ling yards in Dresden and Chemnitz. Deducing that another Berlin raid was about to takepTace, the Germans put up three large formations of fighters to protect the capital, where they cruised for some time. Final­ ly, about seventy-five of them headed out toward Dresden and Ruh­ land to attack B-r7's of the 3d Air Division and shot down six of the bombers. AAF fighters and bomber crews claimed about half of the attacking fighters, and results of other engagements in the air made the attempted interceptions disastrous for the Germans.118 The opposition on the following day, 3 March, came from the dreaded jets. More than fifty Mc-262's and Me-I63's playfully encir­ cled the slower P-5 I 's, making a few attacks ~e1uding the Mustangs without apparent difficulty. Finally, the jets shot down six American fighters and three bombers before allowing themselves to be driven off by the P-5 I 's. 119 The Germans seemed to be experimenting with for­ mations and tactics and were not prepared for another two weeks to challenge the Allies again. The 1,o48 Eighth Air Force bombers got in good blows that day against widely scattered targets in central and western Germany: synthetic oil plants at Magdeburg and Ruhland, oil refineries at Dollbergen and Misburg, tank plants in Brunswick, and several marshalling yards on the Ruhr interdiction list.120 The mission of 4 March was generally unproductive except for 657 tons dropped on the ordnance depot at Ulm. Most of the bomber formations encoun­ tered very unfavorable weather conditions and struck targets of op­ portunity.121 An operation against oil objectives in Hamburg and Ruh­ land scheduled for 5 March was also inconclusive. Because of excep­ tionally poor visibility, railway targets of low priority and a Hamburg refinery received blind attacks from the 500 heavies that were airborne that day.122 One good piece of news at this time was that American bombers were often not being shot at when they flew over the Ruhr.123 The enemy ~: as at last feeling severe shortages in flak. Grounded on 6 March, the Eighth Air Force sent 926 heavies on 7 March to bomb through the overcast important oil and transportation targets in the Ruhr. Benzol plants at Dortmund and Castrop and an oil refinery at Dortmund received fairly effective attacks, but the railway 740 l R I I THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS ormation these targets were mostly secondary or last-resort targets. 8 March was a )le. All fifteen better day for bombing if not for weather. About I,340 heavy bombers arried out un­ ranged over the western extremity of the Reich, bombing by instru­ nts at Magde­ ment various marshalling yards on the Ruhr interdiction list, the Gel­ , and marshal­ senkirchen oil plant, and five different benzol plants. The 3,773 tons her Berlin raid were unloaded on most of the primaries, and there were no losses on the formations of mission. Breaks in the cloud-covered continent developed on 9 March 1e time. Final­ in the Kassel-Frankfurt area. Over I ,ooo bombers finished off the great den and Ruh­ tank plant at Kassel, which was abandoned after the mission, and in­ •wn six of the flicted notable damage on a castings work at Frankfurt and several ut half of the important marshalling yards on the transportation list. 124 Operations e air made the were much the same on IO March except for greater emphasis on rail­ way targets. Thirteen hundred and fifty-eight heavy bombers with ten me from the groups of fighter escorts left England to bomb by H2X numerous tyfully encir­ transportation targets, a task they accomplished with no losses and with the Mustangs "customary good results," as Doolittle boa~ted. 125 The monotonous six American pounding of western German railways, most of which was carried out be driven off on cloudy days when oil and jet targets were not in need of urgent ing with for­ treatment, was rapidly compounding Germany's troubles. wo weeks to The offensive shifted northward on I I March. Germany was still >mbers got in protected by clouds and effort could be spared for a marginal target 1 central and system, submarine yards. Accordingly, Eighth Air Force sent its three Ruhland, oil air divisions at normal strength to attack, one division to each objective, mswick, and U-boat yards at Kiel, Bremen, and Hamburg. Bombing was entirely The mission blind and first reports indicated considerable success in covering the ·?ns dropped target areas with about 3,ooo tons, but Doolittle soon afterward IOns encoun­ assessed the mission as a failure. 126 Exceptional accuracy was required trgets of op­ to harm these difficult and well-concealed targets. The mission of I 2 trg and Ruh­ March brought an exciting variation from the normal routine. A last­ se of excep- hour Russian request for an operation against Swinemi.inde, a Baltic 1 a Hamburg port assuming tactical importance as a German center of seaborne re­ ·ere airborne inforcement now that the Russians were moving into eastern Germany, 1t American brought a vigorous Eighth Air Force response. About half the operat­ the Ruhr.128 ing strength of each air division was pulled off planned operations and dispatched to Swinemi.inde, a total of 67 I bombers making sorties. heavies on 7 Although the city was only fifteen to twenty miles from the Russian msportation lines and ordinarily too close for an H2X mission, it was decided to use p and an oil the radar device because the area was so easily identified on screens. the railway The attacks were good, I ,6o9 tons falling on vessels in the harbor, 741 T H E A R .l\1 Y A l R F 0 R C E S l N W 0 R L D W A R I I quays, slipways, and a large number of buildings in the port and on industrial areas. Flak was meager and inaccurate, and the only bomber which failed to return made for Sweden. Doolittle hailed the mission as successful in spite of the 101 I o cloud. The Americans requested the Red air force to photograph the results of the Swinemunde attack After a three-week delay came a brief reply minimizing the effective­ ness of the bombing, but no photographs. British photographs taken later showed substantial damage.m Bomber Command's contribution to the last phase of the war steadily grew in weight. Often flying in daylight, the RAF heavies unloaded vast tonnages on the marshalling yards in western Germany and kept the familiar benzol and oil targets in the Ruhr immobilized. On r I March the greatest weight of bombs ever dropped in a single strategic attack fell on Essen, when I ,079 bombers deposited 4, 73 8 tons. This record stood for only one day, for on I 2 March Dortmund received 4,899 tons from I,I07 aircraft. Also, the 12,ooo-pound Tallboy bombs were dropped successfully for the first time on the Bielefeld and Arns­ berg viaducts, difficult targets against which bombing effort had hith­ erto been of scant effect. The ruined cities of the Ruhr were kept in ruins. Casualties, unemployment, and primitive conditions had become commonplace in many formerly busy areas. Mosquitoes continued their regular attacks on Berlin which had been going on almost nightly for many weeks. Mine-laying and antishipping operations remained as a major function of the RAF. As the war in the air drew to a close Bomber Command, like the American strategic air forces, poured out the heaviest tonnages of its long history, eclipsing its own impressive records as it rained explosives on the Reich.128 The Fifteenth Air Force was expending approximately two-thirds of its effort on transportation targets and one-third on the oil campaign. As strategic targets vanished more attention could go toward aiding the Allied and Russian advances. In the second week of March it was the Russian land offensive which claimed most assistance, and the Russians sent in a stream of requests for bombings which would benefit their ground forces. 129 Thus marshalling yards, airfields, bridges, and strong­ points in western Hungary, southern Austria, and northern Yugoslavia absorbed heavy tonnages. The most spectacular Fifteenth Air Force mission at this time was the I 2 March assault on the massive Floridsdorf oil refinery near Vienna. A force of 225 B-r7's and 522 B-24's dropped I ,667 tons on this objective in the largest single operation yet carried 742 T H E C L 1 i\1 A X 0 F S T R A T E G 1 C 0 P E R A T l 0 N S and on out by the Italy-based heavies. On the next day a force of almost 6oo bomber heavy bombers dropped I,2oo tons through a complete undercast on tsswn as the marshalling yards at Regensburg, severely damaging an important sted the transportation center which had largely escaped significant injury be­ attack fore. The results of nearly all the bombings were satisfying.130 Tactical fective- and strategic objectives alike were succumbing to these repeated as­ 1s taken saults. The air forces bombed at will, restricted only by weather and I maintenance. And bombing accuracy was becoming high. steadily A long-awaited opportunity for a visual mission enabled I ,246 nloaded Eighth Air Force heavies on I4 March to attack high-priority objec­ nd kept tives. Oil refineries in the vicinity of Hannover received considerable On I I damage, and the Panther tank works in that city was knocked perma­ trategic nently out of action. Also, effective bombing wrecked a jet castings 1s. This plant at Hildesheim and more marshalling yards and bridges in the ·eceived Ruhr interdiction program were damaged.131 The chief target of I 5 ' bombs March was a tempting objective, the headquarters of the German dArns- high command at Zossen, twenty-eight miles from Berlin. Long re­ ld hith- garded as invulnerable to bombing even with the heaviest explosives,132 kept in and for that reason not systematically attacked, there seemed to be a become chance now to interfere with the evacuation of this citadel by the ed their OKW. Then, too, the Russians had requested an Allied air attack, 1tly for which was carried out as a gesture of collaborationY3 Another target ,ed as a decreed for the day was the railroad center at Oranienburg, not far a close from Berlin on a main route leading toward the Russian front. More red out than I ,340 heavy bombers with fifteen fighter groups took off, half JfeSSl\'e destined for each objective. Jets appeared at a number of scattered points in the Reich and occasionally fired rockets at the formations but >-thirds made no organized efforts at interception. The bombers dropped al­ npatgn. most I ,400 tons visually on Zossen, blanketing the area with bombs ./ ling the and destroying most of the buildings above the ground. The force at­ .:vas the tacking Oranienburg inflicted considerable damage with I ,J 27 tons on 134 .usstans the railways and the city itself. On I 7 March blind attacks were it their made on the Ruhland oil plants, and on Bohlen, whose synthetic plant strong- was reported about to return to operation. The weather proving worse ;oslavia than anticipated, secondary targets such as power stations and marshal­ · Force ling yards absorbed the remainder of the bombing effort that day. 135 idsdorf For two weeks the Allied air forces had encountered practically no 136 ropped German air opposition, but the mission of I 8 March revealed that carried the long-hovering menace of a jet air force finally had materialized. 743 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II On that occasion the Eighth Air Force, while projecting a limited penetration operation into western Germany, received orders from USST AF to mount a 1,2oo-plane assault on Berlin, which was again the goal of moving Russian armies. As it turned out, 1,2 so heavies with fourteen fighter groups of P-si's (the P-47 group was convening from the D to theM series and was not operable) reached the German capital and dropped over 3,ooo tons by H2X indications on transpor­ tation and industrial areas. It was the biggest daylight raid ever made on Berlin. Damage was widespread and distributed throughout the whole of the city, but tvventy-four bombers and five fighters were lost, main­ ly to jet fighters which attacked in formations as large as thirty-six aircraft and displayed a range of interception greater than the Ameri­ cans had expected. The aggressive German attack on the bombers pro,miscd a new phase of the air war. Moreover, flak had been heavy and accurate enough to damage more than half the bombers, and six­ teen were so badly damaged they crash-landed behind the Russian lines instead of trying to reach England.137 Danger from the jets was expected on the mission of the following day, 19 March, when nearly I ,ooo bombers and fourteen fighter groups set out for the Leipzig area to bomb high-priority oil and jet objectives. The jets appeared on schedule, shot down three B-I 7's, and artempted, apparently, to force the P-sI's to drop their extra tanks. On this operation the Germans even tried to send up the old­ fashioned Me-Io9's, but AAF fighters managed to keep most of them from getting far off the ground. Bombing was not generally successful around Leipzig because of dense haze and contrails; thus secondaries such as marshalling yards caught a substantial tonnage. But a timely attack on jet airfields at Leipheim and Neuburg and two jet compo- ~ ' nents plants justified the mission. 138 With most of the Reich covered by a IO/JO overcast on 20 March, only a shallow penetration by lim­ ited forces was feasible. The Eighth sent 4 Is bombers to strike U-boat yards at Hamburg and oil refineries in that city and at Heide-Hem­ mingstedt. As it turned out, most of the 700 or more tons were strung out unevenly over the general dock area at Hamburg, but the Heide­ Hemmingstedt refinery was very severely damaged.130 About forty jet aircraft. challenged the P-sI's and shot down two of the bombers. The jet pilots seemed less skilful than those who had operated against the Americans two days before. But it was only too clear that the time had come for an all-out attack on the new GAF, as Doolittle and Ted- 744 THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS der agreed on the following day. 140 Before March was out close to thirty Eighth Air Force bombers were known to have been lost to the enemy's jets. The Fifteenth Air Force was operating at full strength in mid­ March, winding up its part of the strategic air war. Fortunately, it seldom encountered jets or any other type of fighter, although the Germans possessed sizable forces in the south and would certainly have employed them if they had had the fuel. On 15 March the Fif­ teenth carried out its longest mission of the war when I09 B-17's bombed the synthetic plant at Ruhland, Germany's leading producer at that time. Similar forces worked over the familiar Vienna oil tar­ gets: Floridsdorf, Moosbierbaum, and Korneuberg. Perhaps the Vien­ na plants were out of operation by that time, but rubble and ashes were stirred up to assure complete cessation. These same refineries caught similar punishment on I 6 March, when marshalling yards in Austria leading toward the Russian front were also reattacked. After a two-day lull the bombers resumed the offensive against transporta­ tion in and around Vienna by depositing the largest tonnage of the Fifteenth's history, more than 2,ooo. On the next day production at Korneuberg oil refinery definitely ceased. Then, on 2 I March, 366 Liberators carried out one of the most effective raids of the war, an 8oo-ton visual bombardment of the jet plant and airfield at Neuburg, which had been damaged by the Eighth Air Force two days before. The jet center was almost obliterated, and three days later when 2 7 1 Liberators returned to finish off the destruction, they killed an esti­ mated 25 jet fighters on the airfield. 141 A period of excellent weather enabled the Fifteenth to complete its strategic air offensive. On 2 2 March, 13 6 Fortresses flew again to Ruhland and damaged it severely. Another visit on the 23d by 157 Fortresses assured the prostration of that stubborn target. On the first mission the Germans resisted energetically, sending up perhaps forty jets which shot down three B-x7's. On the second mission to Ruhland there was no air opposition at all. Meanwhile, I 24 Liberators put a Czech oil refinery at Kralupy out of operation and, on 2 3 March, 15 7 B-24's poured 4 37 tons on the disintegrating St. Valentin tank works in Austria. The Fifteenth Air Force conducted its first assault on Ber­ lin on 24 March, while' thousands of American and British aircraft were operating to the west of that target. Nearly ISO Fortresses dropped 357 tons visually on the Daimler-Benz tank engine works 745

tDROME, MAY 1945 T H E A H. l\1 Y A I R F 0 R C E S I N W 0 R L D W A R l I in the suburbs of the Nazi capital and damaged other industrial objec­ tives. The Germans sent a force of jets up to intercept the bombers and succeeded in shooting down two B-r7's, the last aircraft positive­ ly known to be lost by the Fifteenth to jets.142 On the same day three large Liberator forces of the Fifteenth bombed jet centers at Neu­ burg, Munich-Riem, and Budejovice. Airfields and tank plants were the leading targets of 2 5 March, when the Prague area, seldom touched by the Allied air forces, 14 3 absorbed the last real strategic air assault of the Fifteenth Air Force. There were missions enough re­ maining for the Fifteenth to fly, but they were tactical and local in effect. Its oil targets were O\'errun or devastated beyond recovery, and time was running out rapidly for all aspects of Germany's war-making capacity. The victory drive against Nazi Germany was about to begin. Rus­ sian forces were cro·wding Vienna and Berlin and Eisenhower's ar­ mies in the west were making ready to cross the Rhine on a wide front and finish off German resistance. Air preparations for the western operation had been going on for more than a month. As has been seen, the strategic air forces had devoted a majority of their tonnage to­ ward paralyzing German transportation and, in particular, sealing off the Ruhr from the rest of the Reich. This last program was com­ pletely successful, although the ground force encirclement of the Ruhr a few days later oYershadowed the extent of the air victory. The tactical and strategic air forces of America and Britain had, by the third week in March, broken fourteen of the eighteen bridges on the target list and interdicted the other four. Twenty of twenty-five main marshalling yards were not functioning. 144 German traffic in and out of the Ruhr was at a standstill, and even within that unhappy valley there was little mo,·ement. Hence Germany's most valuable industrial section no longer served her war effort. It co'uld not even be rein­ forced by troops in the face of the Allied onslaught. And behind the Ruhr lay a demoralized population, a stricken industry, a beaten army, ~md a fading government. Just before the great airborne and land assault o\·er the Rhine (VARSITY and· PLUNDER), the air forces undertook a gigantic operation lasting four days to perfect the isolation of the Ruhr and to pulverize German defenses. Furthermore, the Eighth Air Force set out in particular to neutralize airfields in northwestern Germany from which jets might fly to shoot up the transports of the First Allied 746 A R II THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

1dustrial objec­ Airborne Army. For these purposes the entire strength of the Eighth )t the bombers Air Force was turned over to the demands of the Rhine crossing, rcraft positive­ along with the RAF Bomber Command, the tactical air forces, and same day three diversionary assistance from the Fifteenth Air Force. On the first day, :!nters at Neu- 2 I March, the Eighth sent I ,2 54 heavies to bomb ten airfields in excel­ 1k plants were lent weather. They followed up this assault on 2 2 March with mis­ · area, seldom sions against five more airfields and about z,ooo tons on military en­ :al strategic air campments, defended villages, and store areas close to the expected ns enough re­ site of the crossing. In view of the splendid flying weather the twenty ll and local in B- I 7 groups attacking the ground objectives attempted to obliterate recovery, and rather than to harass them as first planned. On the third day of the 's war-making pre-crossing bombings the Eighth sent I ,240 heavies to finish off a large number of marshalling yards in and around the Ruhr.145 Mean­ :o begin. Rus­ while, Bomber Command was conducting similar operations, on one enhower's ar­ occasion sending 700 heavies in daylight for a devastating blow. On n a wide front D-day, 24 March, the tempo increased. Bomber Command's attack 146 ~ the western on \\' esel was saluted by Montgomery as "a masterpiece." More has been seen, than 1 ,ooo Eighth Air Force heavies laid on a stunning attack against r tonnage to­ the airfields again, rendering most of them unusable for days. Libera­ cular, sealing tors supplied the airborne troops which had jumped earlier in the day am was com­ and subjected airfields to reattack. The crossing proved magnificently ~ menr of the successful. The enemy was isolated and battered, and of the 200 GAF Yictory. The sorties that day, none reached the battle area. 147 As Eisenhower told had, by the his press conference a few days later, Germany was a "whipped ridges on the enemy. " 148 1ty-five main Tbe U.S. Air Forces and the Soviet Ally ic in and out r 'v....__,___.,___ ~ happy valley Early in 1945 several attempts were made to secure Russian coop- ble industrial eration in air matters. These efforts failed; little came of them but in­ Yen be rein­ furiating deadlocks. By this time, however, American officials were d behind the more accustomed to Russian rebuffs than they had been in I 944 and )eaten army, perhaps they had become more philosophical about accepting them. The chief issues affecting the air forces were bases near Vienna and · the Rhine Budapest for the Fifteenth Air Force, bomb lines between Russian and k a gigantic Allied forces, and the establishment of radar stations in Soviet-occu­ Ruhr and to pied territory. The air base project had been under consideration since ir Force set the late summer of 1944, when it seemed for a time that Russian land :1 Germany forces were going to overrun Hungary and Austria very speedily. First Allied The advantages of placing a few Fifteenth Air Force groups there 747 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II were compelling: the Alps would no longer be an obstacle to the bombing of Germany, flying distances would be much shorter, and more disabled airplanes and distressed crews might be saved. At a meeting of top air commanders from ETO and MTO at Cannes in late November 1944 the project received warm indorsement.140 The Russians who were approached on the subject exhibited an indiffer­ ence bordering on hostility. After some weeks of stalemate General Spaatz considered hinting to the Russians that further inaction might cause the removal of some Fifteenth Air Force groups to England. It soon became clear, however, that a threat of this type would be unwise. Perhaps the Russians would be only too pleased to see Ameri­ can air strength in southern Europe reduced.150 Since the military had made no progress in the Vienna-Budapest base matter, President Roosevelt talked it over with Stalin at the Yalta conference. On 1 2 February 1945 news of "agreement on highest level" came through.151 Yet a month passed before the Soviet officials could be induced to act. Finally, in mid-March, General Eaker was allowed to tour eastern Hungary and to pick out an air base at De­ brecen.152 Difficulties and practical problems could not be resolved, however, although the Americans thought they made modest and reasonable requests. Eaker could not even get permission to go to Moscow to make arrangements, although he went to Belgrade and was lionized by Marshal Tito.153 More weeks went by without any genuine Russian move to implement the agreement. It was the usual matter of procrastination, bland stalls, refusal to negotiate, and un­ answered correspondence.154 In April the Americans dropped the whole question. m The bomb line had a more protracted and painful history. When Soviet armies first broke into the Balkans, in the spring of 1944, the Allies undertook to set up machinery to coordinate MAAF operations with those of Russian air and ground forces. It seemed to both the British and the Americans a matter of urgency that the MAAF and Red air units not mistake each other for Germans or get in the way of one another.156 And a bomb safety line in front of the Russian land forces see.med essential if important German targets were to be bombed or strafed without jeopardizing friendly troops. Yet the Rus­ sians steadfastly refused to establish liaison except in Moscow.157 At length Maj. Gen. John R. Deane secured permission to designate the line Constanza-Bucharest-Ploesti-Budapest as a temporary boundary 748 R II THE CLIMAX OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS >Stade to the between MAAF and the Red air force, and the Russians finally con­

1 shorter, and sented to a loose supervision from Moscow by the Red am1y general : saved. At a staff and an AAF officer. 158 General Eaker in October succeeded in at Cannes in establishing an unofficial liaison unit with one of the three Russian :ment.140 The armies operating in the Balkans. It worked well until Moscow found j an indiffer­ out about it. Then, the liaison unit was not allowed to advance as the .I nate General Russian front moved into Hungary and Austria but sat helpless in t, taction might Bucharest.159 The whole bomb-line question flamed up in November : to England. 1944 when P-38's of the Fifteenth Air Force strafed a column of I pe would be Soviet troops in Yugoslavia and killed a Red army lieutenant gen­ to see Ameri- eral.1 60 The Russians acted as though the tragedy might have been something more than the accident it was, and they still refused to nna-Budapest permit close liaison. General Eaker finally took matters into his own 1 at the Yalta hands and adjusted the bomb line on a day-to-day basis ahead of the lt on highest Russian front lines. He would notify the U.S. military mission in Mos­ oviet officials cow, which would in turn inform the Russians 24 to 48 hours ahead ~1 Eaker was of time. The CCS objected to the principle involved in such arbitrary : base at De- methods, but they guardedly accepted Eaker's plan, which worked be resolved, out reasonably well for the rest of the war.161 modest and Late in I 944, as Allied and Russian armies moved closer to each !On to go to other, the bomb-line issue began to affect General Eisenhower's com­ 3elgrade and mand. Again the Russians were invited to exchange liaison units without any among the air and ground headquarters concerned, and again they vas the usual declined, confusing or pretending to confuse bomb lines with theater ate, and un­ boundaries.162 In December they startled the Allies by recommending dropped the that no targets east of a bomb line running from Stettin to Berlin be bombed. Since the Red army was far to the east of this line and some ;tory. When of the prize German oil and jet targets lay beyond it, the Allies re­ of 1944, the jected the proposal. General Deane soon discovered the real Russian .F operations purpose, which was to prevent the RAF from arming partisans who to both the adhered to the hapless Polish government in London.163 For some MAAF and weeks there seemed little possibility of coordinating the air war with t in the way the Russian offensive. At the Yalta conference, however, when the Russian land Russians were requesting air assistance from the western Allies, an were to be agreement seemed within reach. On 6 February I 94 5 the Russians were 'let the Rus­ believed to favor an Anglo-American proposal to set a bomb line at )Scow . 1 ~ 7 At Stettin-Berlin-Ruhland-Dresden-Brno-Vienna-Maribor-Zagreb. The lesignate the Allies said they would noutythe Russian high command 24 hours be­ 164 y boundary fore carrying out a mission east of that line and, unless the Russians 749 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN \\'ORLJJ \\'AR II objected, would go ahead with the attack. Three days later, however, the Russians gave a new twist to the proposal: unless they approved, the mission would not be carried out.165 The Allies could not agree to this arrangement, since it would take weeks for a request to go through Russian channels, if it were answered at all. So they con­ tinued to bomb what they wished at the discretion of Spaatz and Eaker, notifying the Russians ahead of time if the attack were close to Soviet lines. As the strategic air war drew to a close in March almost every bombing had to be coordinated in this fashion,IGG and the Rus­ sians finally accepted the original Yalta proposal.167 A third problem which concerned the American air forces and the Soviet Union had to do with the unrewarded effort to set up on Soviet soil three pairs of Micro-H stations. From these installations radio impulses of very high frequency could be sent out to bombers in flight up to 1 So miles away. The conjunction of these impulses on H zX equipment in the bomber would allow far greater accuracy in attacking twenty-six high-priority oil, jet, tank, and railroad targets in Germany. Meanwhile, the British desired to establish small stations for their Gee and Gee-H equipment. Both the American and British units would require the services of a small number of their own na­ tionals, about roo individuals in the case of the Micro-H stations.168 Russian objections of a technical nature were transparently spurious; it was clear they did not want foreign personnel within their lines.1 c9 The Russians were also unwilling to designate certain airfields be- ! hind their lines as bases for crippled American bombers. Instead, dam­ aged aircraft were free to land wherever they could in Soviet-con­ trolled areas, but they were likely to tum up later with Red air force insignia. 170 The recovery of American aircrews from Russian zones continued to offer difficulties, many of which arose less from delib­ erate ill-will than from physical problems and perhaps a low regard among the Russians for human life. Finally, the AAF was anxious to survey the chief targets which it had bombed. At Yalta Marshal Stalin gave President Roosevelt written, broad approval for survey teams to operate in the Russian occupied areas. 171 For some time before V-E, however, it became clear that American teams were not going to be allowed to examine bombed targets in regions held by the Red army. In all of these matters a certain amount of rancor was apparent. It was hard for AAF officials to understand why the Russians usually refused their offers for assistance-which the Americans regarded as altogether 75° 1 I T J J E C L I J\1 A X 0 F S T I~ A T E G I C 0 P E H. A T I 0 ~ S ·,however, sincere and unselfish-and deprecated it when it was given, or why approved, such bad feeling and frustration resulted when the western powers ot agree to made requests. 1est to go Victory they con­ )paatz and After the success of VARSITY-PLUNDER the Eighth Air Force :re close to returned to its dwindling strategic targets. Only a few remained. rch almost Recuperating oil refineries and storage depots were still in top priority. :l the Rus- Jet production had to be watched, for the GAF could still do mischief to Allied airplanes and ground forces if a fanatical last-ditch resistance :es and the were to be made. Otherwise, the Eighth was concerned with keeping >on Soviet weapons from reaching the German armies and in deliv@ring a blow ions radio or two at submarines. During the VARSITY-PLUNDER bombings ombers in one force of IO? B-r7's had bombed a tank plant at Plauen, in central :1pulses on Germany, and on 26 March a reattack reportedly put this works out 172 ;curacy in of operation. On 28 March nearly 400 Fortresses attacked tank 1ad targets and armaments plants in suburban areas of Berlin through IO/JO 173 all stations cloud, inflicting, as it turned out, little fresh damage. Good weath­ I .nd British er had been used up in VARSITY-PLUNDER. Now there were bad r own na­ days and, as on 29 l'vlarch, days when the Eighth was grounded. On 30 I. stations.168 March a mission into northwestern Germany was possible, and the · spunous; very low-priority U-boat targets at Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg, and :ir lines.169 Bremen received their largest tonnage from the Eighth Air Force, rfields be­ approximately 2,500 tons. The spillage of bombs at \Nilhelmshaven :ead, dam­ proved fortunate, since it struck nineteen German ships in the harbor. oviet-con­ Thirty German jets took to the air around Hamburg but made no I air force attacks on the bombers. The enemy reaction was almost the same on >tan zones 3 I March, when I,338 Eighth Air Force bombers hit oil storage tanks om delib­ in central Germany, Brandenburg, and various targets of opportunity. >w regard Jets appeared in large numbers but in only one case was a bomber 174 mxious to formation attacked. One Liberator was shot down. Meanwhile, >hal Stalin RAF Bomber Command exceeded irs August I 944 rate of operations r teams to by dropping 67,365 tons during the last week of March. Hannover, fore V-E, Paderborn, Munster, Hamburg, and Osnabriick were punished. As 1ing to be March ended, the strategic air forces were almost out of targets. led army. The fine weather of April I945 was all the more gratifying to the nt. It was Allies because of the unmistakable smell of victory. The Ruhr was en­ ly refused tirely encircled by the beginning of the month. Armies of the United tltogether Nations began to move rapidly into the compressing Reich, sometimes 751 ~ ' ) ~··'

USAr ~ DJ.yl.afa ...... IMU..... •· •T his document consists ot ur tlld.wrllir ..3 8 pages. Copy lo. _J__ o1 ':1 oopies. • .4eu :S"ff>Dri, ·,., Do~ tJ n-1 k' n -;'( 1 HISl'aucAL .AJULISIB f6 l'BI ]k-15 FEJI\UARY 1945 BCIIBDiiS ~ lltiSDIII

I. IIT.R a>UCTI C. a

1. 1be WQ' for ud the Mt.yn aDd QAPMQ!1fPQ11 of the

bombing ot Dlwden, Gera.D¥, by Allied air forces on 14-l!> l''fibruary

19.45 have ~tedl.y bMn the subject r4 official r:.Dd semi-otfioi&l.

i.aquiriea aDd ot J'WIOr azad a:aawat-iorl by l.Ulintol"JJed or inadequ.at.ely

1ntQl"Jied peraau • .MoreOYer 1 the Co'IJ'!Ian J at,a have 'Wi t.b incre&a!ni

frequency aDd by meana or diat.ortiOil aDd falsifioe. tion UMd the

February 1945 Allied bcabinga or Dre8den aa a baaia tor dia•minatin& -

anti-'Weatern ad anti--American propapnda. From time to time there

appears in 1et.tere ot inquiry to the United Statefl Air Force eviuence

. tbat. Anlll!lrioan national• are theuelves bei.ni. telten in bi t he Conum.uU.st

propaaanda l ia cODCerni.Di the February 1945 bom.binga oC Dreaden.

2. 1be urpoee or t.hia hiatorio&l &DIIlyaia, baMd in its I enti...,ty .ljt~;,;;,J O::r;.,w doc-Dta ODd OD otaDdor~ rete,..,.,. l aouroee, 1a to prOYide a more detailed IJ1d deti.Ditive account of the

reasons for &!It the nature and coneequenoes of the February 1945

1Jre8den bombi.JIIa than has beretafore been an.u.bl.e. l'be D&rr&t-ive

portion ot t.h.1a hiatorioal analysis Mt'-a forth a tru.vork tor

arriviJli at d initive anawera to aUGh recurring queetior... CC)D(lern-

iDg the februc,Y 1945 bOIIbiaga ot Dn~ aa the !ollCNi.Jaca

a. waa Dreaden a le&it.i-.t. .Uitaey ta:raet7 b. What at.rat.ecio oeJeoUvea, ot mt-ual .bport.u:aoe to the

. .lllaa ud t,o the au.u.a., \IDderlq t.be baabiDca ot :Dretldc?

•. o. l>id tM Ru•J.aD• requeat that Dreaden be bombed by

Allied air tCIII"Ma?

d. <& whOM reoc-•Ddation, whether tv an i.ndividuo.l ar by a oommittee, &Dd by \!bat aut.borit;y 'Were Allied air forces arder.d. to bollb Drucie?

•· Were t.b8 .au..i&Da ofi'ioia.ll¥ WorlMCi by t.btl Allie• oODOern.1.Di. the in~ da t.e ot ana the t arco a to be commit ted to tbe bomb' D& ot Dn.tent

t. \"ith \Jbat !'orcoa a.nd wit.h what lllEMtna did the J~~.ilie<.. force a botlb Dre.O.en i'

~>• What were tba 8p8citlc tartet obJectives in the Dreaden

:t.. Wlw.t were the ilnrt..e<.Uaw anu. act.uu.l couae4uencep Qi' the l.Jresden bo:zbing8 on the phyaic£.t s t.ructure and .the populace of t.he cit;ri

i . Were the Dretlden bombinga in ~ · ·;A;..y a devic.. tioll from estflblishol! bombing policies set forth in o!'ficla.'!. bombint, direc- tives·i'

J. ~ere the .sp&cU'ic forces c.nc uecns e~o.reu ir' the

D:rt.aden bo::lbings aimilar to ar d!i'f'erent !rom the forces 6,!lll. l!li~Wm& enployed by the All lea in other aerial attacka on oon.pa.rable . targeta

L.• Gerl:!J'mYZ

L . In what apecif lc wap and to what d&greil did the tomb­

~o 0:: .Dreaden nch!evo or support the at.rate,ic obJeotivos t.b&:t. underlay the attack a.nd wore ot .muttal importance to the Allie• and t.hc ftussian:J? I •

3. Each atate.nt ot tact 111 t.ba D~.rr~ttive portion of t.bia

&DilJ.Taia u, aa hldioat.d in the reterelliD8 DOtea, a oitation f'roa a

ttfu:wJ•rd Ntereaoo wrk or u •tMatioated or Ulplitiod 'in tbe \ .uppartiD£ ~t• t.bat are a~1ieebw1 Mlrevitb. Tbeee latter oom- (

\priee an otrioial aDd detialt.in oaee hhtor.Y ot the bombings or

I Dntclen.

4• I-.8111UCh •• it u UIDlue1Tel.J' the 14-lS J'ebrulary 1945 bollb­ !D&• or Drelde t.bat bave npeatedJ.7 been t.be eubject ot inquiry &Ad

OCDt.rooeray OJid the bo.oU of C-lat pi'OI>II£OJida, the ll\lbaoquont \

~~ioal aual.;yaie aDd the attaehed wpportinc doc'I.UDitnta are pz'1ma- . .

Jnertheleu, a.e a Jllltter ot record, the tQUOidllg ia u authorita- 1 tive tabUlaticm of all Allied bombiJl&• or DreiJienl

Actual ~t lumber ot Bomb Tmmage on aDd 11roraft .rarget •• 1 To ttl lat.~. •a••• Point lqrp• A~ttek nr ij.E1 I.B1 7/10/44 Mlreballi.Bg Yards Bth AF JO 72.5 72.5 16/1/45 Marllb&llillg I&Nt 8th Al' 133 :!'19.8 41·.6 .);(1.4 , J.J./2/45 ctv Are& RU 8J 712 147'1.7 llSl..6 2659 •.) 14/2/45 Ma.rtball!ng tarde St.h Al ,316 4137.7 294.3 782.0 15/~45 Manball~ Iaria 8t.h AF .2ll 4P5.6 46'),6 ~J/4S *r'ahallia& I&l'da 8th u 406 9J.O.J ua.s lOSO.S 17/4/45 }ilJ'.;-.l11Be !arda 8t.h J.'l S72 1S26.4 164.s 1690.9 IDdut.rial Ana 8th 11 8 28.0 28.0

5278.0 1822.5 -- •..: 4

II. AIALISIS

.t. IDrl• M a @liwz PN'nt·

5. .tt tM out--.t ot Wo.rld War II, Dn.te •• tbe •wnt.h 2 larp•t o1ty ill G--. proper. VUh a population of 642,143 in

1939, DN&e •• ••••ct.ci in •1M Gilly tv .&wli.n, Bamburg, lt.mich, Colope, Leipd&, aDd .._, 1n \bat Cll"der.J l'he ..rial ~nta

auteiMd c1v1D& WGI"lcl War II b7 tbe •ftD l.arpat oitiea of Geran;r a:re Uow1 1n Cbart A.

6. Situated 7l llilea i.S.E. from Leipsic and lll mile• s.

ot Berlin, b7 rail, Dnllden waa OIM ot the i"&te•t ~roi&l aDd

t.rauport.at.ion oentera ot Ciera~V' aDd tbe hiatoric capital ot tha

iJiportaat ud populou atl'te of S&xolv• 4 It waa, howev.r, beoau..

of it. aeopphical looaticm a.ad topQ~r&phy and •• a pri.m&ry communi-

cationa center t.bat D.N.cie &8aumed maJor •i&nll'icanoe •• a Jlilit.ary

taraet 1n lebzouarT l94S, .. tbe Alli~ ground foroea DIOftd ••tward

and the .Rwlai&n &l'Jiiea JIOftd we•t-..rd in the great combined operationa

de•iped to entrap &Dd oi"Uh the Gerana into tiDal deteat.

7. Geop'tLpbioaJ.l¥ aDii topocraphioally, Dreaden comMDded

4• fwm1modit lritt,e,p1•, Chioap, 1148, Vol. IV, P• 646 •

--. 5 two &n&t ud. b.Utorio t.l'el.fic rwte• of pr~ military •'&nifi• cano.a ~oath 'betWMD ~&Dei CMchoalovakia t.hrouih the vall•7 aDd 1orae ot t.M &lbe riwr, ADi ea•t-wut along the toot ot t..M cen~ iuropean '~ •ad•• 5 The poaraphioa.l and topographioal ' iapor't&Dae ot ~- N t.bo lowar ba1tion in the vaat Allied-

Ruuiaa war ot ....-nt ap'••t the G..-u .LA t.he ole»~ month• ot the .-r 1n Europe i• lhown a Ml.p:. r-vr. \

,S..Ction of t.brH &re&t. t.ruDk rou.te• in the GelWUl railw.y 11•tema

(l) Berlin-~-Vasma, {2) Mwlich-Bnal.au, and (J) Haiabur&­

Leipa:li-Pracue. A1 a kay oe;ater in tbe deue Berlin-Leipai& rallw.y ccmplex, D.niiCiG waa OODD8cted to both cities qy two main li.Da1. 6 l'.be den11't1, vol-uu., &lid i.JIIport.ance of tb.e .Dre aden-Saxony railway q1tem withill tbe Genan Pocr&~ and eooDQJD¥ 1e IHil in tile tact• t.bat in 1139 S.XOD¥ wa• Mftnth in area among the aJor Ger.n eta te1, rs.rat.d Mftnt.h in ita railway .mileage, but r&llkec1 third in 7 t.b8 total t.olmap carried by raU. lhe Dreaden-Sax~ re.ilW&¥ - , I ' qetem •• it uitlted in 19.39 ia ahown in Map vn.

9. In adtition to ita &eographic&l poeition iiJld topot-rapby

in hbruar'J 1945, Jmcnm to contain at 1-..t 110 taotorie1 ud in­ dutrial ent.erprt.ee t.bat wre lea1U.te aUitary tarpt1, and were

5. QbtJit=r• bAm1Wd!'t New York, 1950, Vol. IV, P• 636. 6. C=au looxil1qptdiA, lew York, 1950, Vol. IV, P• 6.)6. N 6

8 repor·ted to bav• e~Ol*l so,ooo WQII'.".kara in ar.we planta al.ooe. ~

t.be• were diaper.-d &J.Ioo.r&ft. o.,...,anent.a t'aoto.riAUiJ a poiacm ~aa fao­

tor1 (Che"1ache FabriA) co1• &lid c~xv)J az;. &nti•irerat't and field

&un raotor,r (Letua;g)J the ar-t Z.iu Ikon A.a., G~r~- ·· illOst

import.wlt optical gooda Jllt.DUtaot.orrJ a.ad, &mODi ot.bera, re.ot.orie~

engaged ill the product:!.oo o! electrical and I-1'6.i ~o.ppa.rldol.f.& (Kooh and

S tera.el A.c.), .-ll usu (Seidel u. NaUman) , .moulda &Dd me tal p&.ck­

illl• (bt.on Reiohe A.G.), &Mora ud c:iitt'eruU&l.a {&oxcmiawerke), Uld 9 electric i•U&e• {Ciabrud.er B&aal.er).

10. Spttoif'ic llli.l1t&ry inaw.J..aUona in Dre-.len 1D ~brunr;y

194.5 ino1uc.led bl.rracU aDd hutteci 01U11p11 ancl at leaat. OM mllll.it.iona

atora~ depot.10

ll. Drelden \.fia protect.eci by ant!airoratt defenscu; (varioua

t;ypee) anti6.1rora.n. t(Wl8 aad ~~Mrehliibt.a, in antlcipat.ion o.f

.Allied air ra.t.U apiut t.ba ci~.ll 'l'ba Drellt.lc air clefenMa wra

under t.be C

III) Lutt.w&!fa !da1ntatl"&t.1on Ca-""aaa.l2

eM t.be '"M''P'· YMtrlJJne th8 Ur!eiM JkMh1nea.

1 8. .or..;;iu, ~. City Area, Eccmomic Report..a, Vol. .No. 2, Bead- quart.ra V.s. sva~io Jbuht Di S11r't'ay, lO JUl.)" 1945; &Dd C6S LoDdon, llo. &-lm/4, 1 March 1945 (SECRET), in ..., ~tam.

9. See ~t.at.ion Btpgrt Ia· l· An. Drelden, 22 Mlrch 1945 (COOIDJIIT , Svpport.J.Dc Doo.-t. Jo. 3.

lOe See iar.t&t,joo .B.ggrt II• l• J.Ul., Drea4M, 22 Manh 1945 (CCIIFn>DT , 8UJII)Ort1Dg Docu.Jit Jo. 3.

ll. OOS LoDdon, T-3472, Cenaey: Air/Political, Codditicma in Drallden, · 6 April 1C)4' (UCBBT), 111 .._ aou:roa aa tootaot.. S.

12. lti lb. P-OSO, W..torioal D11'1aion, European C()IJI9Dd. 7

12. Aa earl.7 aa 194:3, t.be Alliea and Ruaeiarus bed begun h1ah-lew1 oClft8Ultat1cma tor tbe ouduct ot the war againat G~J in e..-., tar ocwhiaed opeat.loaa deaiped to defeat GerJaD¥ by

Allied ~nt trem t.be air, hf AJ.liAtd ground operations againat

Germany from the wat, aDd bT Ruui&n operations apinat the Gerana from the il&.at. At the l'ehre.n Confere1»e (28 November-11 lJeoember 1943) between Rooeewlt, Ch.-ohill, and Stalin, t..b& grand atreteu i'or theae ooabiMd opue.ticma ~ at1t.UMd and agreed upon by the three· powera.lJ .O.talla far eaout!Dg the .Cl-and atr&tegy wre not con- aidered. at tb. contere~e, but were to be worked out by the indiv idlal to.roea in keepiJ:ac with the fortunea and progreN ot th8 lAr•U.

lJ. In t-he cloai.Da montha ot 1944, .lllied. land adft.DOea in the weat and RuNi&n ac.tvances from tbe eaat, coupled_ wit.h t.he ever- growing dn&lltation from aerial attacka b.f the Allied heavy bomber foroea, naade u. apparent t.bat early' illl')45 Ge~ proper could be

1.nW4ed. tra. both fronte and that the Allied atrat.egic air forcee

WQW.d be .-zoe ud mare _oal.led upon t.c &1.,. direcT. support to tbe•

't'llat 181ld gperatiou. In S.ptellber aDd October 1944 t.he A.lliea and

the Ruoiau bepn t.b.e exc~e of information on t.heir .,.oific 1 plau tor opera tiou ...~cned to orini \be war t.o • oJ.oee in 194.5 • s

JJ. L•w siltei IDf. J& V.M lfll: .1k lila Jursw'n Theta Rt. M"tt-· Cr•lt"fl•n·3 At.t'rli· W&ahiDit.on, D. c., 1951, PP• 121- 1 • 1h1a ~-- 1a by G. A. Barr1.aa.)

14. Same 1t.em. 15. · al'DDCII su-.r;r,

SiJallW..oualy, t.be Allie1 aDii tM Ruuiau laid the p•re.l grOUIId­ varit ter ol01111r Ooopmltiol:l ad ..u't.aue 1a tMir torthocai.Dg operat.t.ou.16

- 14• OD l4 Deoellber 1944, the A.r.t.ou Aaba...ador t.o Ru.. i.a,

Ml" • AftrUl ~~~ periODI'l ly It&ted to Mar8bal lt.al.in t.ba t.

GeDUal Dvicht }>• IU.Dbowr, Svprue C..-nder, ~ H..aquartw•, · lll.Ud bpedit10DQ7 Panel (aBAKF) 1 "waa "fffl7 M~oua t.o apente in o..,..t v1 th the ftua.SU. Ulll to help the Ruuian armi.e1 wbeDnwr IIUOh l7 .uppart. Jli.&ht. be DMC:l«i.• ••••dar Barri.mi.D tpecif'oall;y di.- ouued with SW..U.n ·tae ue ot lllied air foro•• in t.be Mldiierr&Dean 18 .in wppar't. ot Jtu..iu lud operat.t.ou .in tM Balkan•. While t.hare

W.. DO direot. .-nti.~ .in t.be 14 Deoellber CODYV•t.iou bet.we.n

Stalin and Hu-rian, ot tbe upl~t. ot t.be •••.ive Ulied 1t.r&t.egic air fcaroe• openti.Dc trca t.be w1t., it •• to be a...-.d tbt.t tbe• f01"088 wou.lcl be uecl to Appelr't. luaian• operat.iou on t.be Ea•t.ern froDt.

15. , C& 23 Deoeaber 19.44, Pre•ident Roo.ewl t. iDtor.l:l*i

Stalin t.bat.-&iWA tbe Mlt.rllb&l 11 pel"JJiilion-GeDer&l EUenhower would be J.ut.rv.ot.ed to Mild a repre .. zitat.ive to l.foecov t.o 11d18CUI8 with TOU t.be 11~t.ioD 1n t.be Wit aDd ita Nlati.oD t.o the Ruuian troat .1n 01"'CCR tbat i.Dtonation e111e11t.t.al to our ettort• -r be

\

17. Mlaor&Ddla, Coanr•t..t.on betwen tbe '-rioan bbauad.or, ~. ~~ &1111 Mlrllb&l I~ V. Stalln, 14 Deolmbtr l i44 (T~ SEC.R&'l') , See ~ Doo.~Dt ··4· - •. JA. Saml it.. 9

19 ·a'f&ilable to all ot ua.• ()1 26 J»oe.r Stalin 1tated his acoep- a> taDoe or Pnaideat .aoo.n.l.t.'• propcMM11· The officer dellipat.ed

to oonter vi t.h Stalin waa ~ ~ t.be BU, Sir Arthur Tedder,

Deputy SupNM C.-Deler, SJIAD', &Dd u.ediatel.y :re8ponaible to the

Supreme Cow-Ddc tar all Allied a1r operatiou. Amonc the topic• dUcuued bT Stalin aDd t.dMr at t.beir liMtin& on 15 J&nUAr/ 1945

wa• the eJII'lcv-nt ot tbe Allied •t:r&t.e,ic aJ.r !ore•• ill t.h6 fort.b­

c~ OCIUiMcl Cllplfttiou. · t.dd.er outlJMd to Stalin tM "applica­

tion ot the Allied air .ttort with partioul.ar refereDCe to at-re.tegic

bombiJ:I& or cOPWtnJoationa a• repreMDted by oil target•, railroad• 2l aDd ,.~•·" There •• allo apeoitic di~CUMiOD ot the pi"'blem

t.bat would taoe the RUMiADI if the Germana atteupted to ab.i.tt taroea from the weat to the ••t aad of tbe neceaaity of pnnent.inG thi ~ polllibility. 22

16. 'l'herefo:re, OD 25 January 1945, tbe Joint Intel.lipnce

Sub-Committee ot the Brit!& war C&biMt, which W&8 re8p

entitled "St.re.t.e&J,c Bollbia& in R.lation to tbe lla•at Ruuian

19. Mtua.p, SHAD' 1659 WA.RX-8a:>70, 2S D.oellber 1944 (TOP S.ie~T). See Svppartizae Docu.D.Dt lo. 5. 1

3>. Ha ....., WA.RX-821.44 SHAD', 26 DMeiiDer 1944 {TOP SBOBIT) ... SupportiJll Doou.mt Bo. 6.

21. ~ of Collterezaoe w1t.h Manbal Sta.lin, lS January 1~. See Suppc:wrtiJt& Doou.nt lo. 7 • (T<»- SICKET) 22. Salllt it. aact • .....,.. W78, v.a. M111t.&l7 MiNion MoHov, 16 .Jamar,y 1945· lor thia J.ut ... Sv.pport!ai Docsulmlt lo. S. (T~ SECRET) 10

crreuive."23 '1be t'1ndha&• at th1• authoritative body were •• follow•z

b degrM ot IUCMU achi.eftd by t.be pre•nt Ruuian Qfteuiw i• Ual,y to haw a cleouiw ettect GD t..be leD&th ot tbe war. w. ocm•U., t.t.nt.. , tat t.aae a ..i•tuoe wh1oh mpt be &J.'ND to t.M Jbi.-!M8 cluriDc t.he Dext tev WMb tbe lritah aDd '-r1ou •trateiic bomber tare•• b7 24 Juat.itt.• AD \ll"pDt J:'ft'iMI ot ~ir eJ9].o.r-nt to t.h.U ead.

It i• probable that the Gemau wlll be conpelled to · withdraw fCJJ'Cel, partioularl;r pu..r 4b1.•1ou, trom tbe We•tena holat to reiatGl"'e t.be Jut •••• To what extent air balbardment o&n dela;y the IIO'ft ea•tward• ot tbette or otbu' 41TSaSOD8 4Nti.Md tor tM INten Fl"'Olt 1a ••• AD opel'&tiGDIJ. •tter. It i1 Ullder8tood that t'~ing re.ult.l haw ~ bee.D aohiewd in the We•t by d18rl.lptive ettect ot lllt.d air attacb on ~8ballin& yards &Dd c~ .-mloaUou pDH'&l.l.,r. 1M• haye hitherto been aimed at aoi•'tanc• to the We•tern l'ront. and rahould now be co~Wid.~d in relation to cl&lqilt& t.be tru.arer ot force• ea•t..-rd•• ~'

For the next eeveral dq• the• reo~Dda tioDII were careful..ly

•tudiecl am evaluated by t.he approprU.te authorities in t.he Suprema

CODIDAnder'• starr, particularly .IJDOJl.{f; those immedU.tely responeible

to him for pl&rm1J1i &Dd &Ut.horizirlg air oper&tiODII• CO 31 January~ .

the deciaioa wa• ~. by the Deputy Supre• Coumwuxier (I'edder) &Dei

hi• air •t&t't that tba eeocmd priority tor the Allied •trategic air

force• should be t.be "attack of BERLIJ, LEinlL, l~:t.ESDEN and

•••ociated eitie• where heaq at.taok W'1ll ••• ba.llper IIOVe.uant of - 26 reinforoeMat• from other front.a. " .l• o:f .31 Jaimary 1945, t.be

23. J. I .C. (iJ) .31 ( 0) (Revaed 1inal), 25 .lanuary 1945 (C CJCFm. DTIAL). See Supporting DocUDtn t No. 9. \ I I 24· Same item.

25. Same ICNl"'Ce, but tor ready reteruce preM!lted •• Supportina Docu•nt lo. 10.

26. ._.... , SHAD' SCM CIJ'l' 4025 1Z141. 1 .31 January 19J.5 (SEOBET). See Supportin& DoouJ.nt Bo. 11. 11

Allied deciaion to eatabliah Dre8den as a eecond priority target, be- oau.e it waa a prt.r;y CO'DJD1oatiou center &Dei in support of t.be

Ru.aian &rlliea, waa b,y no .-n. unilateral. The d.eciaion waa fOUDCied on baaio and. elQ')licit embanpa ot information betwen the Allie• and

Ru.aia llDd •• clearly a at.rategic deoiaion of wt\al import.anoe to the Allie• aDd the Ruu.i.&Da.

17. 1he Allied-&luian interchanges t.b£ t bad begun in the oloaine months oi' 1944 &Dd bad beccae, wit.h the paaaing of time, more

:Mi.niater Churchill, aDd Har8b&l Stalin, togct.her with their foreit;n - •cretariAta &Dd ailit.ary adviaora, aa...W.ed at Yalt.a to pre•nt de- tinitin and apecU1c plana, and requ.et•, . for briDging the l!.er api..zwt Ge~ t.o a v1ctoriou. couolueion, by tbe 8\IDIII8r of 1945, if po~aaibl.e. • it thi• .IDBeting, .Mil.rabal Stalin .. aek:ed A~ General

AlltoDOV, Deput7 Chief of 1ibe ItuNi&n Gener&l Staff', to out.llae to the

Coo!erence . the aituation exiating on· the Eaatern Front and to deacribe·

. . ext.ended preaentatiOD, ~ .AntODOT -.de three apecitic reque•t• tor AUW auiata.Doe to tbe Ruuiaua Zl

• other ooaeidera tiona iDYolwd in the ARO CIIAU'r delibera tione are not pert.lMnt ar relnaat here~

'Z7. AHGCIIAlJT Coateruoe MiDutea ot tbe PleDII.ry MMtiag between t.Da U.S .A. 1 G~t Bri taill, Uld the U.S.S.R., held in Li'f'8dia Palace,: !alta, on Suda¥ 1 4 Febr\az7 1~, at 1700 (T~ SECRET). See Suppart­ !Dg Docwa11t Jo. 12. 12

1.• To apeecl 11p ta. ad.,.._ at the Ulied troopa on tbe W.aten lrollt, tw. C1oh the pre.. nt aituation 1a '"7!¥ taYGr&blea

(l) To deteat tM 0..... Oil tM Eaatern ll'roDt.

(2) To det.. t t.ba o.r.n groupJ.Daa which have acl"f&DMd illto the .lrde~mea.

(3) lbe w·ant'll ot tGe Geran foroea in the Weat ill OODDNt.iOD. vit..b t.ba ahitting of their n•n.• to tba kat.

It ia ca.airable to tJeaia tbe lldwnoe d.viJli ~ rtrat balt ot '•bruarT. R• Bi air action on oc micationa hiDder t.be eDeJII1 trca O&l'T'TiD& out tbe allitt.iJa& ot hia troop• t.o t.be kat trca the We a tern front, .trom :Norway, and trom Ital.T•

In particular, to piU'&l.yse the junctiona ot' Ber­ lin &Dd Leipzig.

a.. Not permit the ~ to reJIOYe bia !'orcea from lt&l.¥• 18. It waa~).ci!ic Rwaai&n requaat for bombi.Dc comwmica- tioM, coupled wi t.b. the uphaaia on tarein& troopa to ahitt from wat

cOIIIplex, aa ou:t.li.Ded in parapoaph 8 abo'n, required that J.>readen, aa well aa Berlin aDd Leipzia, be bollbed. 'lbenlan !llied air authoritiea acmclu4ed that tbe boabiDc ot .Qreaden vould bave to be uodertaken (1) in order to tapJe.-t atftte&ic obJeat.i'fN, ot -.tllll. i.llport&Dce to the Alliea and the RuNi&Aa, aDd now acree

Dmb're At Dn"M•

C()IIIMM am the United Stat.• St.rat.eaic .lir roroe• tbat Dre.Oa we.• . . 8liOJli a number ot tarpt. tbat bad been Mleoted tar bombing ~auM

of their illlport&Jaae in relatiOil to tbe man•nt• ot ailitary foroea

to the Ea1tern Pront.28 lbia action, ba•d upon the authoritatlYe

noo wtiOD ot toe COIIbiMcl St.ratecic '!Vpt.. Ccmtaittee, SIW'J'

(Air), a.Dd 1n tum baMCl upon t.ba reca.enda tiou ot the Joint ID­

tellipDOe Ca.itt.M (.. • parapoaph lb aboYe), w&l in k&epiD& with

t.he prooeduftl 1t.ruoture and authority ..t up in SHAEF tor the con­

duct or aerial ope:Ntiou by .lllied. tare••· 29

a>. lllied aerial opera tiorw were ul tim& tely the reaponai­

bUity ot the Supre• Ccwender, GenereJ. liaeDhower, though nona.lly

be delepted tbe immecU.ate autborit7 tor qpl.CJ1111Rt ot Allied air

toroe• to hi• Deputr Supra• CG Dder, MarMal. Tedder. 1'be latter,

in turn, relied upon t.be oo-Dder• of the RAJ' Bomber CODimi.Dd and

the United State1 St.rete1ic Air Force1 (General Carl Spu.t•, CQIIIIW.Dd•

ing) for the acta! cCIDduct ot •pecitic •trategic aerial operation~.

lbe top c~DL»n ot tbe Allied •tratecic 'l::lolaber rozoee·• were re- .

quired to cODduct all ot their ~tio.aa within t.be t~vart ot

II. Mel ..., Air M1Diat.r;y IISW 11J'1, Ser1al Jo. 7/9, 8 February 19J1 (~(F SECRET). See Sllpportilti D~t llo. 1). :

29. ..._...,_, SH.lll SCM llt 51S7, 1.4 J'e....-;r 1 c;\45 (SIC.RIT) • See SWortiDc Docu.-t Jo. u. ba.bU& directive• laid dow to t.bem br the Combinad Chieta ot Statt

(tbe Bl"itiah Ohieta ot Statt aDd tbe American Joint ChWa ot Start).

In Fe~r,y 1945, when SBAE1 (Air) dinoted the bombing ot Drellden

in i.liDM.iiate, npport ot tbe Ruuiana &Dd in U.pin& with atratei1C · objectivea of IIUtual intenat to t.be Al.liea and the Russians, the

st.rateg;io bomber torcea were oparat!JI& UDder the .euthority o! the CCS

"Directive Jo. J tor the Strategic Air Faroe• in E\.Lrope, 11 dated 1.2

Jalmar¥ 194S.JO Dae ...c.~ priar'iV (atter borlbi.DI ot t.bt Gel'D'.n pet.raluem i.Dduatry) tor t.be Allied atrat•&ic air forces ••, in that 31 directive, liated aa tbe bollbha& ot "Ge~ liDea of C()llunnfoat.10lla.•

The authority tor &Dd t.h4t orcleri.Dc ot t.l'w boabln& of Dreaden by

.Allied atrategic air toreea aDd the atepa taken t.o earn- ·out t.lw~~e

ordera were theretore w1 thin the f:ra.n:.work of the existint; baaie

CCS Directiw )lo. 3 i""~ the operetiona ot the Allied atrategie air toroea ill Europe.

E. WarMtiPP QC!1g1tl)y Qiygp t.g tho lhaeeiapa bl the AllitJ

litlced t,g t.tw Bgnb1pg ot $DEep.

21.. Al.t.hoUih the e:xaet proo.ciurea tor ~intaining day to

Q&y liaaan betwe.u t.be Rue~ W t.ba AJ.liH Ql1 Allied bombJ.D&

opera~iona •• tar a lQI'J& tiM tbe nbJect ot De&otiatJ.on betwen t.be

Allie• and tbe Ruaai&Da, oertaia prooectu.r.a tor auch liAiacm were

)(). See Suppo!'ting Doewaent Jo. 15 (TOP S~RET). ,

)1. Same item. lS

32 nevert.haleu in e.ftect prior to t.be lliied bombing• oC Dreaden. tberetar., tbe tollowiJli aotiou wre taken by All ted auth.oritiea to notity t.be Ruuiana t.bat in aooOII"daDce with tbeir expre~ wishes

•• to action. &Dd ti.m.l.Q&, atated. at tbe ARGCKAUT Conference on 4

Febnary 1~, Allied atretegic air force• would bomL Dr•Jsden duriJa& the fir•t biJ.f' of february.JJ

22. ~ 7 February 1945, G8Deral Spa& tz, Commandi.nc Oenera+, tha1\ed Stat..e Stre.tegia Air hroee, W.-..c:t Major Qener&l J. R.

DMM, Chief of the United .State• tW.itary Miaaion, Hoeoov, t.bat t.be ·

OOJIIIIWlioaUona target• for •treteiio bombing by the Eigblih Air Force were, in the order ot tbeir priority, Berlin, Leipzitt, lireBd.en, 34 Cbe.aita (and ot.hara ot 1•~ iJipart.&Doe) • Ql tM ·aame date, .

ot t.be i.ntu.tion to cond11et. actual bombing operationa againat Ureeden

(aDd tbe other tarpta of JAttual ooricern t.o the Rua•ian• R.Dd t.be

Alliee) ~ be tcana:rded in order t.bat Geueral Deane lldcht ao notify 35 the Ru.N1au. ~ 8 .Pebru.ary, t.be Amarioan lW.it.azoy Mb•ion in

,32. MeaeaGe,_ AllHIIAUT-WT-43, 0617.39Z, 6 1ebru.ary 1945 ('l·IJP S!X:Ril'), ... S~t.in& .Oocnu.nt Ho. 1oJ Meuap Hq U8Tlll UA-5.38Ql., 7 Fe~ 194.5 (T(J) SECRET), aee SUpporti.ng Docw.nt Ho. 17; l,atter,_Maj .Gen. S.P. Sp&ld.J.D&, .Acti.D& Cb.W, V.S. Milit&r7 Miuion f)loacr:IJII, to MaJ. Gen. N. V. Slavin, .luiatant Chiet ot Statt ot lted Arlq, 8 February 1945 (1'~ ~ii:'J.' ), ... Supporti.Di Uocuant lo. 18J M.•eap, J.llHJU.Ul' 122, - lO February 1945 (TCP SECRET), •e Sv.pporti.Dg Document Bo. 1~J letter, Spe.l41D& to &Iavin, 10 fe~ 1 'l45 (TOP SICUT), Me SUpj)Ql"tiD& ~oou­ •nt. lo. ala Mea-.p, Hq aAF Ml-45899, 11 February 1945 (TOP SECRET) 1 Me S.,art.J.Di DocpiJMDt llo. 21..

33. See Support!»& Doelmant lo. 12~

34• Me-., UST.Ul UA-53861.,· 7 lebnla:l7 1W.S (Tc»> SECRi:T). See SvppQl"t.­ !Di Docu..nt Jo. 22. lt. 11\let be pnnMQ. that tbe COlDDlnCler-in-chial, BAF Bo-ber C~Dd, t~ a ei•Uar • ...,. to the Brt.t.iah iU.lit.ary Mia1ion, Moscow, alt.houch the dooumentarr eourcea t.bat would nri!y t.hu fact -.r. :uot available a·t. t..t» preaent tU. t.o the usu. · lo

Moaoow notitied t.be proper Rwlaiaa authority" that Dreaden ~• &IilOQ{; the tarpta Mleoted tor atrateg1c bollbi.Dg b,y the Amarioan Eighth Air laroe.J6 Cb 12 leDNu-y, CieMftl. Sputa iDtor.d the United statea

Military MJ.uion that, weather permittiJlc, t.he Eighth Air l"orce in­ tended to at.tack the Dreald.ea ~ar.hallina Yarde with a force of l:l)O to 1..400 botiber pl.aaea an 13 February'.J7 Ch 12 February, t.herefore, the Ruaai.a.Da were iDtor.d ot the Aaericanal intention to bomb . 8 Drellden.3 Weatt.r ..U.tiou did DOt pendt the Ei&hth Air Force to carry out. ita att.a.ck against Dreeden on 1.3 Februar~· . 39 Accord­ ingly, on~bruary 'by si.lr.Ullr prooe

Ruaaiana, tat the Eighth Air Force would attack ·t:.he Dre~en Marshall­ ing Yards a:r the 14th.~ Sub•quently, i;.he Ruaaians wre Wormed by the AzDerleana that Dre8den, t.oc;ether with tho other high priority communicat:iorul eentera targeta, w·ould be subJect to e.t :i:.ack wnenever weather conUtione permitted.41

.36. Letter. MaJ. Ge~a. s.P. Sp&lai.ZJi, kc~ Ch.i.ei', u.s. Mi.l.it.&ry MUsion, lbcow, to MBJ. Gen. N.V. Slayin, Aseisl.tint Chief o! Staff o£ Ited Arsq, 8 febnYI.r;y l~. S.. Support.~ Doou.-.nt. .Wo • .c.;;. (l'OP SECRET) .. ~ ,. . ' J?. ~ ...., liq USUJ'F ~02, .1.2 February 1945 (TOP SEC.RIT). See Supporting Docu.llt Jo. 24•

)8. Letter,. Maj. Gen. E.W. Hill, Chief, Air Diviaion, 0 .s. Mllitacy Miaaion, Mc.oow, to MaJ. Gen. N. V. SJ.&-...in, Aaaiatant Chiet ot Start of H.ed Arl»f• 1.2 F•bruar"J 1945 (TOP SECRET). See Supporting Docu.ment. »o. 25. .in, it. mat. be pre.u.d tM.t aiaU&r 1Dtor•t1on •• ccm­ veyed to t.ba Ru.a.t.a.u by the lh·itiah, thro~h the Britiah Military Miado:n, hdicat.i.Di thai. the &AF Beaber Co-ad waa preparin& t.o •trike l.JrearlRe

,:3 9. .Mea~, .Ligb.t.h b.ir 1on:e lJ-69.497, 1.) !'ebruarl 1945 (SiCR&T). a- Support.ini ~t. Jo. 26.

40· Mit ...., lii,bth Air lwoe D-600l0, lJ hbruaq 1945 (1•QP SICRET), ... Suppor~ DooWI8llt lo. 27J Letter, Lt.. Col. D.V. AndarlfOI'l, h:ecu­ u .... Qttioa-1 Air .Di'Yiaioa, u.s. M1llt.&r7 M:I.UiOD, Moeow, to NaJ .Gen. Ji .. V. Sla'Yir., .a.aaiatant Chief of ~t.att of Red .&.nq, l3 Fe~ 1945 (fOP SECREi ), ... SUpporti.Di Doowaent lo~ 28. - 17

F • The Fcaw• Md &In• §rwa] q.red W tbe A11 ie• iQ ttw Uwhi Pt'f

American Eighth Air Force and the RAJ' Bo.lriber Collllll&nd tocether e.IIJPla.Y*i a tot&l.l of 1299 bomber aircraft (527 from the E!Dtn ~ •.ir 1' orce, 7 22 _ from the W' So:.nber C·lDJIAnd) far a ·~tfU w.liillt., on t.a.r.;~tJi 1 o.f

3'/Jt..'} t.on11. Of thla t.onna~e, lU.7 . G t.ona were e.xpellcied b.l l.he L.ight.h

omployed ~.3.3 tona of h~ explosivu bvJJ1be and 294.3 tona at' in-

l3ritlah &mpl~Jed 1477.'/ to.us oi.' h.igh oxplos.ive uo.:ci.>e and ll8l.b tone of i.ocenaiar~· boi~J.lla-a.il. a.1J~~eJ. abaiut l..iw Drt1aden city area. 42 .L.'he

American airuAft. 1..1.86<.1 H2I (radar) bwb:i..llt,; ~t.n o cl, with viwal e.ssiata,

CtJlj ~he llr hiab uaea the .tiillr.kel.· and viauai I.GI8 Ulo<.l/.. .3

ulli w:r· tar.., .s ~ ;, ·-· (1), r~ oi' overr ..i. ll ~ .imp or t:.&.noc, ~ pr ~j - ca.- . , nn.miac::..tions c ~::~.:.~t.cr- ~ t...'lc :Jer·lln-l.olpz~-Jreeden ra.Uway cOlaple.x; (2) aa an 1;.-por:t.G.nt. indust.r1£.J. a.a.l ...tSa.nu.t'uct.uria& oeniAr J..i.recUJ C&.aaooiated

'With the proo.uct.ion o! airorG.ft COi»pp.Dents and Cltblar WJ.ita.ty ii.elu,

includ~ po SOl1 ~&.&, &.nti-airor&.ft. .&JXl i'ieJ.d ~~ and 8ll*li g\maJ 18 and (3) aa an a.rea cc;mt&iD.l.Jli apaoitic military J.n.et.&l.lation8. 1be ni&ht; raid by the llA.I' Bomber C• and w.. int..enaed to llevaali& t.e the

diarupt the nor-.1. o1Yllian lit'• upon wh1oh t.be larpr uouaunioai.iOWJ activit.Lea amd t.lw Jallutacturi.Jli 811twpl-1Ma ot t.lle cil..y uepeOO.ea.

1urt.l::ler, t..lle videapread. area l"flid ooaducted by the J:boit.iah entailed bollbiiJ& atri.Ua &&&inat t.b8 J18D¥ 1D4uat.rial. pl&llta t.brou&hout. the cit7 vhioh wen 1:.bwl to bi. OOIUtru.d aa apeoitio tarpta vithin the larcer pattern ot t..U area re.id.44 The Eighth Air Faroe raida, wb.ioh were by da,yligbt and tollw.d, on the l4t.b and 15th February, the night raid o.C t.hs .Britiah U:3/l4 lebruary), we~ directed againat rail aotivitiea in tba c1~.45

PbYaigtl S\ructuro !Ad Pqpul&Qp g( the City.

2;. 1:be RAF Bomber COII1IQA:¥l•a u.rea raid on Draaien, conducted on the n igh ·~;, o! 1.3/14 February 1945, 'resulted in tires t.bat did ~t dama.~e 1:.0 th6 cit,t l?l"oper, piU't.lcu::i.l:ll'lJr in the older and mare deneel.y built up ar.aa.ith Early Qf."!'icial A.l.lltta post-atrike reports estimated tba t 8.5 per eeut oi' tb& ful.l,i bull t-up cH.,y ii.re& waa dt~atroyitd 1 tb.l. t the old part of the city, which compriaed t.be poeater portion ot the

44• See SupportiDg Document No • .3 and !oot.Dote 8.

45. See Supportilli Docw.nta loa. l ud ,3.

J/;1. RAY inoelld.iarJ J'&iu an )2 G.-n eitiea (e:rcluiYe ot DreadenJ with popul.atiou GMr 100,000 are deNribed. and ~d in J:.ka i ll1de AP C'D'P ga,t.'••, l'be United lt.atea St.rateaic Boabing SUMey, PlaJ•ioal ~ DiYiaion, 1947 (BIS!IlC:tZD). Bapeoiall7 pertiDent •otiona ot thia 400UMnt--6N. · ~NICIUO«i in Supporting DocWI8llta Nos. 30, Jl, 32, JJ, 34, Js. 19 built,.up aN&a waa larpq wiped out, that the D&Jority ot buildint!;a in t.be ino.r .uburba waa cut.ted, aDd t.bat in tbe outer auburba, tew bulld.J.Daa were ett.ct.ed b,y t.l.w ana bollb!Dg attack. V1rtual.l¥ all maJor public buil41Dca appearecl lMAYi.l¥ sutt.ecl ar aeverely ~ed.

Public utilities, and facllitiee such aa sU,.aughter houses, ~~~&rehouaea, and dillt.r1bution center•, wre eeverely' attected. 47 A ver;( laree nwraber of the city'• lnduatrial facllitiea were O.eatroyed or •ftrely d.aapd,48 vith perhaps a fouz-fitt.h'• reduction in t.he pi'Od\actin 4 9 capaoi ty of the a.rnw planta. LEJ. ter ll:ri tish neoe snJuoon ts, wich wre more oonaervat1Te, concluded that 23 per cent or the city'• iDduatrial buildincs Wflr4:1 aerloual.l ~ and that )o per ce~t ol· the non­ iDduatrial builctiD&• (exolueiv. of dwelling•) had been neavil,y ~·

ar the total nu.mber or dwe.Uizl& -units 1ll tho city propet', 78,000 wre reiarded as dexnoliahad, Z/ ,7~ telli>OI'f.r.ril;. WlinlJ.nlJlt.ahle but ulti­ matol;r repairable, Wll.1 w.,,;oo readily repl':l.ir&ble from minor d•Jtat:.re•

l'his later aaee..-n1. 1ndioateu. that 80 per cent of the city'• l10uai.Dg

uni ta hAd underuone oOI.Qe degree of d&I~ie and tJlAl ~ 50 per cent of . -~0 the dwellings had been demolished or seriously d8JIIfl-¥ed •

.26. 1'be Eighth Air Force r&.idB againat the city'• railway

47. See Supportil'lg Doou.nt No. 3.

JJ3. Same 1 tem.

49. QiS LoDdon, 'l'-J472, Ger~a J_ir/Politioal, CODditioaa in DreadeD, 6 April 1945 (sEcRET). See footDotea 8 and ll.

;o. Air Milli.at.ry, Ri. 8. Area .A.tiaclt , ...~t& Dreaclen, UDdat.eo. (tUed 30 ~tober lw.,5) (SicRET). he SuppartJ.nc .Doou.ut lo. 35. taoUit.iea on 14 aDd 15 hbnary re.W.t-.ci 1D •ftre aDd uteui•• cta•p that utirelJ' paralped oc mtoaticma. 1'be citT'• pa-apr term1la&l.a &Dd •Jor heilht. 1t&tiou, wrehou..Ma, IUid atorap abed• were, when not t.ot&ll.y dea~, ao M'ftl"ely daapd that t.bey wre

1li1Wit.ble. Roundhou~~&a, r&ilW.Y rep&ir and work shops, coal statiou,

daapd. l'h8 raUway bride•• OTer the Elbe r1Ter-vital ~ i DOomi.D&

&lid outcoiztc ~1o--wre naden4 W~U.a&bl.e &Dd re-.iMcl oloeec1 to jl t.rattio tor -..zq WMk8 a.t'ter tM :raida.

:n. Caaaal tie a UDD& t..U Dreaden populace were i.Dn'it.abl¥ veq ha&v,y 1n OOIIIeqlMDOe ot tM tilw tbat .wpt aver the city tollovi.D& t.be RAJ' ana raid em tM Jlicht or l.J/1.4 February. ID. ad.'1- tion to ita ~ papulation, the oit.y b&d experieDCed a be&Ty in­ tlux or retua•• trom t.ba eaat and ot ew.oueea trom bollbi.D&a in ot.ber areaa, pari.ioul.arl¥ trom BQ-lin.!j ~ lbe uaot mamber ot oal\l<iea 5 tram t.be DreedaD boStnca oan nner be tirlll.y eatablJ.aW. ? COD­

~ Britiah eatiaatea were that tram 8,200 to 16,1.00 peraOiDI . I , were ltUlea ~ tbat eill1l.ar nWDbera Or peraODS •Y bave been •rit~ ly inJured..-54 Moat of t.be lateat Geran poati-wr eatiatea an that; I about. peraou were killeci aDd about 30,000 were wowad.e

:;J.. See Svpporti.D& Dooumant No. 3.

52. Con~~ eati-.tea or ODI nl.Uiber ot nt~ee• arld wacueea ~ Drellllen 1a fe'bzw.r,y lw.5 IUpCl ,t,. M...-.l huJad.Nd ~ J.n\o MTeral ailliana. See BuppartJ..Dc Document lo. 2 (aeoood J.Dclo.ure tbento) aD4 extJoaot. troa '"''"'' 9f*'="" fnh'D'• 1943-1946, P• 7054, in Suppart.in& Doewent NC?• ) •

53. See Support.in& Documeat Ho. 34.

54• Air Ministry RE. • See Suppor.,_ iDe .Doou.nt. Jlo • .30. 21

61 ~ lJ/14 Februf.r7. Alt.boueh tblt lat.at aftilable poat;..war aaoWD~ pla7 up t.be "terrorittic" aapec~ ot the Dl'Nd• bollbiact, it it aignitioaDt t.ha t t.be7 aooept alOil lCNV oaeual t7 tigur.t t.a1a11 t.ho .. circulated by the C.1WJ11J illr:led1ateJ.7 att.er t,he rtLida and, fro. tm. to time, 1u the years .i.mmodifttely following the war.~6 The most diatortod. account ot the Drellden bombing• one that •Y baYe beca. the baau ot Cotamist p~ agai.nat the Alliee, part.icula.rly

-.wt tbe '-r.ioana, in reoeDt yMr...... prepared by Wo ton.r

C--.n pneral. ofti~r• for tho H.!.:storical. Diviaion, European COllDflltd 5? ; . (U.I.A.) 1n 1948. In thU account, the Dumber of dead .t'l'Oln the

DNad• bollbiD&• \!tL8 ~ to be 2SO,OOO. That I.W.e r~ JJ~.Ay be t.be DWWI number of d.ad, .wlt.iplied by ten for the !IBke at ext1g- pration, becou:~t~s apparent by CODp&rin(; t:1e 'l.ro .l.{;hL of the Dresden I bomb~• of 14-15 February 1945 with the total tonnagce expended by

t.be A.lliea a"ainst the aix other larpat Ccroan cit1et~ (eee Chart A, above) and b7 co.mparine the 'variaua eat.U..te1 o! tht; l)rel!(lcn casual-

tas with t.he beet estimfite or th6 t.otn.l caaueltie& Buffered. by the

Germana from fAll Allied bombin4;a durint \lorld wnr II.

28. A:.1 shown 1n Chart A, the fallO\Ii.n& total tonnages of bombs wre expended by the Allies C&rairust the oix cities in Germany

55. See Svpporti.Dg Doou.ata 1011. 37 aDd .)8.

56. See BappartiAc .OOCW.nt No. 2 (aMaad iaolotntre tbent.o) tor uaaplea ot t.be ·propap.Dda reJ.-..e 1.1.-.cl by the a.r..u U.,diate- 11 tollowin€ the bombi.rJbe.

,7. MS Jo.- ..OS(), Jliatarioal DiYiaion, lurapean COID'Dd. 22

mo••'·· 1cn2 tota1 'neb ron•u• Bezolin 4,))9,000 ·67,tu/.) Mlllburi 1,129,000 39,6W7.6 Mm1cb &41,000 'Z7,ll0.9 Col ope "f'/2,000 44,9Z).2 Leipai& 7CTI,OOO 11,61.6.4 luan wr,ooo 37,9.)8.0 Dnaiu. 642,000 7,100.5

The United State• Stftt.e&ic Jloeb1ac SUney eettated tat 305,000 perecma wre t.Uled &114 7~ ,000 wre voamded •• t.be ooueqUUCM ot 8 ~ Allied boiM»J.a&e apiut Oerazyr in WOil"ld War II, 5 tr.. a t.g*if,] 59 Allied bolll> apenditure ot 3,6f17,47J t.ona. It •Y tber.t'Ql"e be pre..w.d til& t tbe ••u.-. tea or ~, 000 dead aDd JO '000 vOUDdM, ... pn~~ented in aoat o! th6 lateat aynilal.:l.e C..rlllliUl eetu.-. ot the

D:reeden 'bc.biJ2&a, are reaaOD&ble and acceptable.

29. Deapit.e the la.ot ot accurate atatiatica on the m.uaber · of killed aD4 wounded ill t.be I)Z'eCen raid, u well •• in ot.ber Allied. babin&• at Genan oit.t.a~ it voal4 appear from_euch eatiatee aa are an.i.lab.i.e t.bat tbe oaiN<.iea autt~red in t.be Dre-.len b

DOt diaproportioat.e to tboae aurter.d in area atta.oka oo ct. her GerJII!-!1 ' oit.t.a. tbe r.parte ot the Unit..d Statea BoiLbiD& Survey liTe apecitic eat.latea ot the dead tor ~ tour ot tbG C'.rerii&Il citiea which wre (:j) . nbJeot to tiN Nid.a 4ur1D& ana attaoka. ~8UI'Il!Di that tbln ay

~8. OrmU Jepgrt lJyrn•n )lv), United state• St.rete&io Ba.bi»& S'&&l"ft1 1 )0 S.pte.ber 194S, P• 95.

59. S.. aCMrOe, P• I.

60. Un .lttde • r..,=n Ci$1••, UniW State• Stftte&ic ac.b1nc Sunq, ~~ ~ D1Yiai0l'l1 .Jam.aaq 1~ (Us1RIC1ZD), See / Suppart.i.rc .OO.W.nt Jo. )4,g probabl.7 haw been about 1,000,000 people in DN8Clen 011 t.be Jliiht. the 61 . lJ/14 lebruey RU attao.t, the• an the ~tive cieath rat.• 1n

.Drelldoen and the tour oitiea tor W:dob t.be United State• Stftteaio

Bambi»& Surny baa &iYen eatilatea ot JIOJ't&l.ltiea tr0111 inceDd.J.a.ey 62 area attaob 1 Pawl•W,gp ''111d Ptntpt.age lt\1 lMnatadt 109,000 8,100 .075 laaal 2-a),OOO 8,659 .0.)9 DreadeD t- - 1,000,000 25,000 .02S He•• , 1,7)8,000 41.~ .024 Wvppert.al 400,000 5,219 .Ol)

.)0. 'lhe or1&1Dal Co-b1•ci Cb.Wa ot ~tatt Dirtctift covern­

J.Dg empl~t ot the Britiab alXi barioan atrategic air farce• e•t.&•

bliahed the author1tat1w principle t.bat the prt.ry et:rort of t.be

RAP' Bomber Ca.aDd aboul.d be the ... cle•truction ot illport&llt German

il'lduatrial anaa and population cent:.er• by night area b

the pr.t.ey ef fort of tht-~ American Eighth Air Force ahoul.d be da7l1gbt

preoia1on bombin~ ot key insta.llati~ 1Ji th1n the larger indU8trial 63 and population centere attacDd by the HAl' Bomber C

61 See toot.Do111 .52.

62. The ..port ot tbe United State• St.rateaio ao.bJ.ni Surn;,y, UMd aa t.he baaia tt:IZ' thlat oa~~p&riacm doea not liat the n\Uiber or inJured 1n t.be tire raid• cited.

6). 9QS 166/l/D, 2l Juua:ry 194.3 (Ttl' SECa&T). raid• are d.etu.cl and d4teoribecl 1D Seoti011 J, be1qjJ. '1hia Joint aad

OOIIple.-nt..ar)r ertort ot tbl Brit18b aDd Ameri.Oua at.rat.aic air fore•• waa authorised b7 tbl Collbil»d Obieta of Statt 1A order to aooOIIIpliah

"toM pro,reaeive deatruction &ad dialooa tion of -u:a. German mll.J:tar,y, i.Dduat.rial and eoono.1o qatem, and the UD4endni.Ja& or t.he lOOl"&.le ot t.be Qeran people to a point vbere their capacity-tor &nl8d r.aietanoe 64 1a tat&lly we&keJ»d.." Approved in principle by the ec.bi.Ded Chiefa

ot St&tt on 21 Jamary 1943, 6S ~ apeoit1o•lly Jnalll'lftW OD 10 J'uM

1943, &6 the cOIIlbined Britiah and American a'ta-ategic bom.ber offenaive apinet Ge~ oont~ vit.b ever-.untJ.Di power until 16 April ·~ ~ . 1945, vben all str6te&ic/operat1ona apiDat Gernl8rq ceaaed. Aa the

WBr progreaeed, t.bere were oert&in alter&tiorul in the operatiOD&l

control of the Allied atrs.t.e"ic air foroea and in the order ot

prioritlee aeaipeci t.o tai·&et SJ'Stelu and obJ'-ctivea. /j.e paragraph•

19-.20 above;] By II.ACl lar&e, however, tbere waa no al~tion 1D the

fundlt•ntal. principle tbat AMrioall etr&tegic air .foro•• in Europe .

voul.d ellia&c only in·da.Y1i&ht preciaion raid.a apinat 8pe01fic iut&l­

lat.iona and that ~t area l'flida voul.d be conducted by tbe Britiah.

64. Same a01r ce.

66. Report ot Lieutenant GelWral Ira c. Eaker 011 USAAF Acti'f'itiea in tbe U.1. Ccmtring P.riod trom February a:>, 1942 to 31 . December 194), lab E thereto (TCP SICRET) •

67. US '!'AAI Meaaap l6l.551B, 16 April 1945 (rOP SECRIT) • -

li'f~~(I· & 1 t r r 1 1 1 ' 1 r 1 E! 1 1' 1 ~-r,f~1 1 l ~ i · ~i ~ ~

a • •~' ~ . f ( 9 i I ~ --

~ t ~f • ~ t~ ;r E 1 ' J r I f J· i iM f , .. . I' .. . l . ~ . I . I

f:rl ; •'r ~, i · 1 ~f ! 3 ~~ t r I . I i ~5 lff~~ t ft 0 i 1 ~ '

r!l~e~i·•b f I ~f I I ; l e ~i - 1 · r - ; 1 slJ f ~ 1 f E , r r I ! ! , ~i~!~~f~ i ~~ J I i t ~~ ¥ I f ; I i J f - I ~ ·~l • li l I. ~ S' • .. ~ & ..

·(_:.:.•r I f §,. i t • £ I 1 j ! .. t I .. I 1 f ' 1 f .. .: ~!j( ~ r ~ r 4" l " ,: ' f .. 6C '- I " I ~ { •/ . ~-_/ ' - ....

!·~~ Fit. .i:! . ~I f ( i l ~; J ! I ( I I ~~1 f I ~~ ~r w fr ! .. r&!ii~iff11,.. fi .• J • ~ f ~ ~ , i [ • 1l{il· t;"

• ~ f.c r &J '- -s I· i~!i i ; ~~ ~ I , 1 ~~ , t r ~; f

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l I! 8 ~ f J I f I i : J I ' t i ~f r I ' f f ! l -iiii;i ~i ~' : - I I I r ' I 1 I 1 1 4 r 1 i -a • • .. • .. • 1 I I I ~A f I ! t ! f I i f l ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '·~, l(rt"=-f .. 'fliil;ft,l iii I .. ia ~~~~~~~~if 0 I C I J ; § t l t : f I i f l ~ ~ j 1 1 . ! rt-l]~lti~.1Jt11~ II II 1 . I 1l . f ... f ' I ! f I ( .. I ' ( ~il .._:: f r .. ,. I .. ~f 1:1 1 if "" I \ i ! , ~11 ', § i i a r ~i ! i ; 1 i ~ · · 1 { J '=' r 1:. f _ ~ , f I I .. : ~I 2 ! ~ ! i !. ~8s: I ~' ; .. I ~ I ~~!~1:1:§1,1l"lflli I .. ; I ( : I I f . I I i i f f f ; ., .. - ~ ' leNt. ax ...... IRUAt •' lAiaet. tift tiAoh apSn•t. lallburl, Mmtu, ...... , lAlla' - .....- Ocal ....., ' 7'1• .. t .... * - -.:J.CV'ecl 11r \1111 JW' 1a 11M ana baWtwc ~ ..... ,.. atpt'~• 11111t •t 'IMI1.r l..arp• 72a llea'f7 ~. UGJJ •• 14"·' w. f/6 ILI&b -.,1-.twa M4 1181..6 t-. 84 fit ~. a wta1. wilt&" 1/6 a6P·l -... a tte --•u.c~ ...... ,,,.IU'I 1a lt.U, • l&r w -.4 ·~ ...... ot ...... n 1a ...... "'*• ,_ ·•••· 11/J Mav _....._.. - 24/2.5 Ju1.J, 739 • "'/ z.,q, ..a ?a6 • 29/)0 .a.J.T. ~s In otMr ana l"&iU,

the ..1u.h 1114 cU.Ipa--.cl ...m \cl1•.. • aa ll177.3 t.oaa ot Ja1P ft'!-

li44, 4,368 t.-. ot AlP -.l.Gaiwe Ud 3,846 t.ou ot h ..lliiv~•

..hwt ...... 01l 7 .1..,...... t 1CJ43, ud .3,476 t,oua or· hich a:pl.a.ive•

... .3,81.4 t-. ot ~ ·•'••"' ra.etur~ Gil a4 Haroh 1~.86

)1. la 1t.e 14 ,...._,., _,JJ.cbt p.rec1a1GD at.t&Gb Gil tall

Dluda Martlllll.illl laNa, tM IJ.abth .11r Faroe -.101*1 .316 :t.av

balbllr• • tM 14~ t.- a to.e• ot. 4111.7 tou ot h1&h uploa1ft• ud 294 • .3 t.aa fit tanndlariu, a oO'IIbhaed -..., ot 782 tou, and. 1a 1\1 at.-... • u r.111 '17 it eipl.cpcl m M&v bO'IIbu'a M4 465.6 t.-. fit hiP -.loei'tN (ao taoewtiariaa)-a t.okl. oC JZ/

8. iiiii .-,..., SIL. ._. 4 ud ,. 4..,. -~~.·--·

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~~~!~r~~ij.. ~ . ! I ~ :p .. l I t J ( ' f I i - ~ ~ t ~ . - . ~ ii & f ... 1 f II r f r J ¥1 l !: ~I 1 '" ' f I f ,. ". L ! I li f . li I ~ \ - ·-- • ~ , - -

!t p i ~II ~" i l " I i . ! ~I r I • & f I r I 1 r r ;r r tr ! 1 f • ~r I =- j [ ! J i ~ 8

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,~ ~I',, t I! y I I I ~i : f I .J· 1\~l i ! J I 1 ! ;I ;~I ~ I ! i i • ! I I ! . ! f ! II ~: ! f I I

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JU.Me ot .. J-U.. ot ,.. .. -- lcwta'\ ~. Mculd be 1a \M ana ot Jrtu-~--.·96 '-• t.ba tour WMka later, em r! · AprU, '-r1oaa ud Bul.t.u toroea Jcat.l at. 1'.,.au, 011 t.be Elba,., ri'IV MAr Leipaic1 ADd JIUJ.e'a Gw FIV' lMMi Deu. 01R J.D two. &lnu.,.. law, • ~ llq ta..,. l~), a ta. tial. .Uiiaz7 Mt.iaD ill~ war • 1Nt a..z.~~r, HI:NIItJ. '-UY1a arat.a a\ered aDd captuncl In~en. l'bla .-zo 1n larope ,.. onr;98

III. CCICLUSIW

4). l'be tC~~N&oi.Dc hiatario&l. ~ia eatabliabea the tol.­ lGIWiJI& detiaiUw ..-ra t.o t.be reourr.ilai ~·Ucm. ~ph 2, abcmt) OODOel'D1Di tile 1ebriaz7 l ·~ bombtnga ar Dreaden by Allied at.:oa~ &1r toroeaa a. 1ft._ -. a J.eciU..te m.Uita.J:7 Wpt. ? ~-- • ''"~ obJeot-1.,.., or mt,wal iqM!rtuce to t.t. .UU•• &1111 tM au..1taa, 111Mrla¥ 1M bollbha&• ot nr.-.,.

cl. 1111 S\9J'UI Alli-.1 0 2 Dder, h18 D.put7 &....-

O..Jid•, u4 ~ llla7 Brit.Uil ud "-rie&n opezw.tiOMl air aatAar1U.a rec_.llded IUJd ar8Ncl t.be 'bollb''ll fll Dra.._.

l ' ,,

•· '1M lbJUS.u wre artie~ Wor.d ·'b.Y t.be .lllie•

c~ the iatarlec' .... &114 tbe r-... to be ·~tted to tbe bollb1Jac ot ......

t, 1'1le &ll • k1r Can-nd eJII)l~d "1'l2 he&'ty 'bollber1,

1471.7 tau ot hlch ap1.•1w a.1 1181..6 tou ot 1Doe•Uar.r bomb•, &Dd

A.rican Zi&bth Air PCII'M ...()Jed a total or ''Z7 beav,r bollliber1, ~.) •.) tau ot hlch CIPl..tw ... $., tcu or haeeDd1Ar7 bomba, 1n the 14-15 , • ...._.,. 1l1dt,.. C D.N••n•

I• . 1'111 1JIOU'1o Wpt ol»J.at.ivel 1n the DNalen bollb­

i.Dp were, tor the RA1 Bomber Gomn-Dd, the D.r,u~elen oit.y area, inolud­

UC iBclu.ltri.al plant., col!IIW'tioatiOJUJ, m.Uitary wt.allat1011l8, &Dd,

tor 1ibe .&Dir1oan liahth Air Poroe, the Drelden ~ing Yards and

r&Uw.y raclllt1es.

h. the inllbtdiat.e and act\ull ccm8eqU~~Deea of the Dreldu

boabinga were de•tru.otion or aewre d.amlt.ie to at leaat .z3 per cent

or tbe city'• 1Ddu•tr.1&l bulldinc•J ...,..1"8 daniLge to at lea•t 56 per

oent ot t.be ~ city'• zaon-1Ddu.lt.r1Al bu.Ucli.ng1 (excl.u.ive o! dwllJ.lai•) J

deat.ruCtion ar ..-re daJII&i• to at l•at 50 percent of t.be reaidentJ.al

unita 1n ~ city, ADd at l..,.t •~ ~· to 80 p41r cent ot t.he

citT'• d.wll 1n&•l tbe total ~t.ion el $be it,y ... a •Jo.r OOIS!I••S•

oatiOn. ooter, 1D . ~qU8DICM o£ cleetnat.J..oll &D4 da>•p Wlict.ed oa

ita railway tacll1U.aJ aad cie&th ~ ,...Dll .¥,000 per~tGU &lld

· aerioua iaJUI"f to probabJ.T 30 1000 ot.Mn, Yirtw'l 1T all f1l r.he• caaual tiea beiJI& .the NIIUlt at tM W .._ aid.

1. b Dreldc bamblDp ,_.. iD AO \lay a deviation

traa eatahl.UW bollb1D& pol.Jaiea •t .t'_.t.h in at.fioi&l 'bCJrab'~ ' J• n. ~pG1t1o farMa aiW1 .-au ellplc:ved in the Dre.ta bcab1naa ...u. 1n aep':nc with t.M t .... aa4 ....- Nplcv-cl " t.-

.ll.l1H 1D •tiler Mri&l ·~ ~ w.rpt. Jn lw .,. k. 2he InaU.u .._...... aollJ.ayed the atre.te&io obJeo. I""J

t.iwa t.bat u.ndR'l.a7 toM at.taok Gad wn at •t.ual illporta.noe to t.be ~

..