Canadian Military History
Volume 18 Issue 3 Article 4
2009
Mass Bombing Some Moral and Historical Perspectives
Donald M. Schurman
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Recommended Citation Donald M. Schurman "Mass Bombing Some Moral and Historical Perspectives." Canadian Military History 18, 3 (2009)
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Donald M. Schurman
Introduction especially the Second World War, Abstract: This paper is an account implies a luxury of means that we his paper was originally by a historian, who participated in (Sir Arthur Harris) did not have. the bombing of Germany (1944-45), delivered at and published by an My paper shows that. Harris, that T of attitudes towards the campaign International Peace Conference in Fiji on the part of military personnel at determined figure, kept himself and in January 1985. It was written long the time and since. It examines the his force just ahead of the Luftwaffe before the Canadian War Museum attitudes of the British Government and its ground support. My paper, was forced to debate the question and their military, and comments on dealing so much with attitude, just the way historians have responded to of the most appropriate manner in the evidence since 1945. The problem manages to include that fact. It which the contribution of Canadians of responsibility and justification is could, perhaps, be argued that more in Bomber Command should be presented in some of its aspects. The resources ought to have gone to the addressed. My interest in the subject treatment is a mixture of the personal navy. I do not argue it but as a naval was not to pronounce on the morals and the professional. historian the idea has attractions of the bombing of civilians, but to for me. On the other hand the idea try to pinpoint some of the thinking When I began the paper I saw it as that the invasion of France would that characterized the attitude of the an attempt to ask where the bomber have been successful, or that it Royal Air Force and Englishmen and offensive had come from, aside could even have been undertaken Canadians and their governments from the obvious one of tit for tat. without Bomber Command seems towards the campaign. As the paper The paper traces the development of wrong to me. My opinion is that shows, the Canadians were a part of the strategic bombing idea through without Harris’s successes the war the Royal Air Force. Quite apart from references to the First World War, would have had a much more integration of the Royal Canadian British air operations in the Middle wearing conclusion, to put it mildly. Air Force into the British service, the East in the 1920s, and the Spanish war Harris said, as I note in the paper, Canadian air force had not the means of 1936-9, and especially by reference that bombers won it. Surely they or capacity to deliver, by itself, a blow to the French airman and author did. However the moralists raise that would have crippled anything Antoine de St. Exupéry. I do ask the important questions. The problem significant in Germany. I think that question “what for,” but that does is that war is, as James Wolfe put it, crews were surprised by the now not imply any scholarly endorsement “an option of difficulties.” To debate very controversial Dresden Raid of of “Don’t let’s be beastly to the those difficulties is possible, it is not February 1945, but they did not object Germans” as Noel Coward wittily put possible to ignore them. Moral high to doing it. My reference to Kurt it as some sort of theological point. ground is a hard place to find in war. Vonnegut’s account of the Dresden That was not my idea then, nor is it However, Richard Overy’s careful raid is not an endorsement of him, now. book Why the Allies Won, comes but a deliberate use of his novelistic The fact is that any debate over closest to supplying the fine print for skill to focus attention when I was in how much force should be applied my generalizations. Fiji as a lecturer among an unknown at any time, in the middle of a war, audience. * * * * *
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RAF Lancasters bomb through cloud. Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) Photograph Collection Photograph Military and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) Laurier Centre for Strategic
ertainly the most provocative to do. It might be well to remember ‘Americans have finally heard Cbook about mass bombing in the Buchenwald and Coventry too. about Dresden,’ said Rumfoord Second World War was written by the [a would-be military historian] American novelist Kurt Vonnegut. As Vonnegut repeatedly says, ‘So it twenty-three years after the raid. ‘A It was about Dresden, and entitled goes.’ lot of them know now how much Slaughterhouse Five.1 In it he quotes What Air Marshal Saundby said, worse it was than Hiroshima. So two military men commenting on among other things, was this: I’ve got to put something about it the raid on Dresden as presented in my book. From the official Air in the book by David Irving on the That the bombing of Dresden Force standpoint, it’ll all be new.’ same subject.2 They were Lieutenant- was a great tragedy none can ‘Why would they keep it a secret General Ira C. Eaker, USAF retired deny. That it really was a military so long?’ said Lily. and Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, necessity, few, after reading ‘For fear that a lot of bleeding KCB, KBE, DFC, AFC. He begins with this book, will believe. It was hearts,’ said Rumfoord, ‘might Eaker: one of those terrible things that not think it was such a wonderful sometimes happen in wartime, thing to do.’ I find it difficult to understand brought about by an unfortunate It was now that Billy Pilgrim spoke Englishmen or Americans who weep combination of circumstances. up intelligently. about enemy civilians who were Those who approved it were ‘I was there,’ he said.4 killed but who have not shed a tear neither wicked nor cruel, though for our gallant crews lost in combat it may well be that they were too I was there too. with a cruel enemy…I think it would remote from the harsh realities A subject that is cross-disciplinary have been well for Mr. Irving to have of war to understand fully the and one that takes an historian remembered, when he was drawing appalling destructive power of outside his accustomed accumulative the frightful picture of the civilians air bombardment in the spring and clinical or analytical roles invites killed at Dresden, that V-1s and V-2s of 1945. caution. However, it is my view were at that very time falling on ‘So it goes.’3 that it may be wise to let emotional England, killing civilian men, women overtones ply more freely than is
and children indiscriminately, as Vonnegut later introduces this customary with historical papers if we 56330 AC Photo US Air Force they were designed and launched dialogue: are to get more balanced assessments
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from our consultations with the past. or even the United States in this to denounce mass bombing when Furthermore, it may be wise to look light then, nor do I now. However, it took place. Both during the war at the consequences of having great as for old veterans who look at any and after it Captain (later Sir) Basil technological capacities lying ready attempt to discuss their past as an Liddell Hart denounced this, what to hand in times of desperation. What attack on some sort of Holy Grail, he regarded as a retrograde method military men, politicians, and indeed and who regard criticism as some of warfare.6 I have remembered with populations do in these circumstances sort of treason, I have nothing to say some sense of frustrated misgiving seems to me to be eminently worthy except that it is 40 years on, and a new my own part in it. On the other hand of discussion in this nuclear age. generation must be served. I still remember my own comrades Indeed, it may be that the history of a On the other hand I have some with affection, and I attended a non-nuclear age may have something right to speak. I was a member of reunion of my own bomber “crew” to teach this present time. Finally, it the mass bombing forces in the war in 1984. I do differ from supporters should be said that this paper does against Hitler. I was at Dresden, of the bombing offensive in that I not search for scapegoats. It is not a overhead on its night of terror.5 do not resent present day attacks on rush to judgment. Questioning the I have had my face slapped by a it because some of my friends were effects of the bomber campaign, and German woman who was a victim killed carrying it out. Finally, I have the origins of its programmes, ought of bombing when she learned what made some attempt to keep up with not to be construed as an attack on I had done. My daughter-in-law the burgeoning historical literature the participants, certainly not on the was born of German parents. I have on the subject. After all I am an motives of my surviving friends or had German students. I have also historian by profession. those of our dead comrades. Hitler’s taught the history of the so-called But I would not undervalue the Reich seemed to me then, as it does “Strategic Bombing Offensive” to usefulness of having a participant Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) Photograph Collection Photograph Military and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) Laurier Centre for Strategic now, to have been an infamous graduate and undergraduate since trained, as an historian, consider political horror. I did not regard my 1962. I was also a friend of one of the this matter. On a topic like this one own country or the United Kingdom, few British people with the courage is inclined to get views on air war
US Army Air Force heavy bombers drop high explosive and incendiary bombs on Dresden, 15 February 1945. US Air Force Photo 56330 AC Photo US Air Force
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Air Vice-Marshal C.M. “Black Mike” McEwen (right), the commander of 6 Group RCAF, prepares for a flight in a Lancaster.
from life.7 We were not mindful of those ghosts, whom our ground crews had known personally, when we set out on trips.8 Furthermore, there was the fact that the opposition was still there, even in the winter of 1945, with real anti-aircraft fire and real night-fighters to greet those who thought the war was over. Finally, I freely admit to strong feelings of satisfaction with the intelligently deployed techniques of Bomber Command generally, and with the personal and practical performance of my own crew in particular. When it ended and we got on the boat for Canada, Bomber Harris came to say good-bye. He said to us in the mess on the Empress of Something or other, that “when we came to dandle our children on our knee, and they asked ‘what did you do in the last war, daddy?’ you can tell them that Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) PC 2479 Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) Canadian Forces you won it, because you did.” In my case, for the moment, the war ended there. The university that was to be my life gobbled up my from people who have had no direct could think had some idea of what time. I did think about the war from connection with it, except that they we were doing. Nobody was much time to time. A “sincere” but juvenile have developed, in these tense times, fooled by talk concerning military essay on the bombing of Dresden a sense of immediacy about the targets around which civilian houses got me a well-deserved D+ from my need to control war from the air; or “just happened” to be grouped English professor. I took the hint conversely, one gets talks from those making it unavoidable that some of and majored in history. Later I went who want to justify the use of air threat them would get the odd stray bomb. I to England again, in a new capacity, as a deterrent, and who are associated sometimes thought about that, as did that of a research student in history. in some way with the development of most of us. However, we were very During my time in Cambridge I read public military policy. Both kinds of young and we thought it a good idea the reports of the Nazi atrocities activists have laudable objectives. I at the time to kill Germans. We also written up for the Nuremburg trials am different only in that my present had it in mind that the British had had until I was too disgusted to read sense of immediacy comes from a good dose of bombing in 1940-41. more. It did, then, occur to me my memory of past involvement Some people knew about the German more strongly that bombing women as a very ordinary participant and bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam. and children was not too civilized this experience is filtered through It was retaliation. We also knew an occupation. I noticed also that subsequent professional study as the that on our squadron (in 1945) there Bomber Command did not seem facts have became more generally lingered the ghosts of those who had to be receiving the accolades that a available. perfected the system back in 1943, successful and decisive campaign Let us go back in time. During and they were not simply retired seemed to demand. What was the the war, of course, every airman who from operations, they were retired matter with us? As I began to think
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about it, it seemed that there were professionally and dispassionately as bomber offensive began to surface. As three central questions. Who ordered he could, chronicled what happened mentioned, Hans Rumpf’s book came it? Was it right? What good did it do to Germany from the underneath on the market giving the picture for the war effort? These are still very person’s point of view. When I from the enemy on the ground. The difficult questions. At one level, of finished reading Rumpf I could no four-volume official history, entitled course, Harris ordered it, but a little longer be horrified by tales of frying The Strategic Air Offensive against reflection makes it clear that he did flesh. As I had discovered before Germany was published by Her not rule the British Cabinet. Generally in reading the Nuremburg trials Majesty’s Stationery Office, over the speaking the moral question, then documents, the human mind can signatures of Noble Frankland and as now, was sluffed off on the basis only take in so much horror reading. Sir Charles Webster.14 Also, in 1962 of the notion that it was total war, Many people seem to have had a R.H.S. Crossman, the British Labour and after all, it was comfortably but similar reaction to such compulsive M.P., wrote in Esquire of his horror uncritically held, the Germans began and detailed fact-finding.13 at what had happened at Dresden - the bombing. This was denied by However, help was at hand for of how an innocent, non-industrial Liddell Hart.9 Practically speaking it confused airmen like me. Books on the town was flattened and treated to was held to have been essential for eventual victory. Many intelligent people believed this then, and they believe it still. The question of my own responsibility I have lived with, as have all the surviving members of the Bomber Force then and now, some more successfully than others.10 Some PL 40683 CFJIC of us are not such passionate devotees of pursuing every “war criminal” as others have been. I got down to reading the evidence. What was the evidence? There was F.J.P. Vale’s Advance to Barbarism,11 in which the whole concept of unrestricted warfare against civilians was presented as a return to the days before war had any rules at all, any code, or any of what might be called the Red Cross mentality. The whole thing was indicated as a policy which the British and the Americans had been perfectly willing to execute, and did, despite the fact that it was a barbarous way to make war. Another book that became available then was Hans Rumpf’s The Bombing of Germany.12 Rumpf had been a German urban survival expert, who, as
The pilot and bomb-aimer of a 428 Squadron Lancaster stand beneath the open bomb bay of their aircraft prior to an attack on an oil refinery in the Ruhr in late 1944. The short range to the target allowed a full load to be carried, in this case 500-pound, high explosive, general purpose bombs.
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round the clock bombing by both air propagandists. The idea that its defend its cities contributed to the the Americans and us, and how a precision capacities were highly total stretching of German resources firestorm had made the old historic developed seems to have been which was the best help that could city one vast flaming coffin.15 It had, meekly accepted by many Americans. be given the Russians who were, it turned out, happened before at English and other air historians after all, the ones who defeated the Hamburg.16 However, Hamburg was have not strongly questioned this Wehrmacht. This paragraph is merely an important port. Crossman was an idea.23 It is important to note that to show that the argument between indignant man, and he was interested this does not involve an argument “precision” and “area” bombing is in assigning responsibility. Perhaps between advocates of precision mostly a sham. The only question that this Labour politician was aiming at bombing and area bombing at the any moralist or indeed realist can ask,
Churchill? core. It is really an argument that once air war and bombing has begun AC 57193 Photo US Air Force In any event I had some idea of American air forces flying to targets is, what determined target selection, what the issues were, and of what the that the Germans perceived as vital terror, or military purposes (with recipients on the ground thought of or strategic, invited air combat, and communications, strategic supplies, it all. When David Irving’s book on from that would flow “command of and the attempt to secure “command Dresden came out, I was advanced the air” consequent on the decimation of the air” over Germany) is included enough in knowledge that he did not of the fighter section of the Luftwaffe. in the term ‘military’? The choice was tell me anything significant that I had Referring to the “Ultra” report24 it is not, as will be shown, clear cut. But not known before. The exact casualty extraordinary how arguments about it was largely determined by past figures are still disputed. Estimates of command of the air over Germany are thinking about bombing policy. the Dresden dead have been put up interspersed with arguments about Who said anything against the to over 200,000, and down to about how this fight over Germany took air bombing of Germany during the war? 30,000.17 Every dead man counts in command away from the Luftwaffe I discovered that George Bell, Bishop Heaven’s scheme of things, but the on the Russian Front. Furthermore, of Chichester, had asked, in the House numbers game does not alter the German speculation about the effect of Lords, what the Government moral problem, does it? In all the war of particular raids is meshed with thought they were doing at this mass Bomber Command lost some 50,000 American speculations about the bombing game. He was supported men. same things: that is to say, if a raid was by Lord Lang, the ex-Archbishop of Almost immediately after the supposed to achieve such and such an Canterbury in the House of Lords.26 war in 1945 the Americans conducted effect is proven to have occurred.25 Bell also carefully distanced himself and published most of the results of a Harris, with his photographs of from any idea of attacking the survey of strategic bombing.18 It has night bombing, did better than that bombing of military targets, or of since been expanded and amplified - he provided evidence of his own the airmen who were the agents of the with comment by David MacIsaac.19 Command’s limitations as a strike government. But he thought the idea As Middlebrook and Everitt indicate, force. The United States Strategic that to strike an industry justified the it is surprising that with the full Bombing Survey (USSBS) had the obliteration of a city somewhat out and intact records available nothing opposite object and achieved what of proportion. He asked whether or similar has ever been attempted it set out to do. Of course the US not “old German towns” might not for Bomber Command.20 Whatever Army Air Forces (USAAF) played a be next attacked. Archbishop Lord the reason for this, it had the result large part in stretching the Luftwaffe, Lang supported Bell and argued that as Chester Wilmot’s 1952 book, but so did the Russians, the Royal against the tendency to “gloat” The Struggle for Europe21 set the Navy, the Mediterranean Front, over the capacity for retaliation, boundaries for the general European the Scandinavian Front and, of which he said, showed “real moral strategic debate for the next 30 years, course, the persistent attacks of deterioration.” Viscount Cranborne, so the American bombing survey Bomber Command. Quite apart from replying for the government, denied established American credentials as questions of morality and target utility deliberate terror, and promised no specialized bombing experts almost it is difficult to determine whether the abatement due to the duty to “our by default. Recently, the Ultra part of interdiction of parts and fuel moving own people, their allies, and to the that body of information has become to Luftwaffe squadrons was more world. (Cheers).”27 British member of available22 and from this source due to attacks on communications Parliament Richard Stokes also spoke it can be seen that the dominant centres (cities) than it was to direct out in 1943. He said, among other power of American “strategic” attacks on refineries and oil fields. things, “we have forgotten out aim, bombing is founded largely on the Cumulatively there can be no doubt the preservation of civilization.”28 immediate speculations of American but that Germany’s pressing need to Similarly, Captain Basil Liddell
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Concentrating on blasting three railway centres in the Dresden area, choke points for the Germans that are headed southeast into the mountains, Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of US 8th Air Force blasted the target on 17 April 1945 with high explosive bombs.
Hart questioned the wisdom of the All that the proponents of air fact was that the bombers were never Government’s policy. He thought power had to offer was that bombing entirely moved from a strategic to an that Churchill should consider that shortened the war by smashing army support role. The USSBS, which bombing (and blockade) “tend to industrial targets and specialized had become available shortly after leave a deeper scar, and have a more industries; that the invasion would the war, claimed that terror bombing degrading effect, on civilized life, have been impossible without it; and was, and had proved to be, much than what has been experienced by some it was argued that the war more overvalued and that specialized in any modern war.”29 He thought would have been over if the bombing target bombing did the most to blitzkrieg, conceived as an army-air had been supported as a priority cripple German industry, and bring military support system, was humane weapon and Harris had been allowed on the final victory.33 Frankland and by comparison. This was not his only to go all out.31 Webster partially agreed with this, assault on such methods. Writing Frankland and Webster came but claimed that the capability of both after the war, Liddell Hart stated down on the side of the idea that the British and American bombing forces that the mass bombing “inevitably invasion needed the air support, but precluded pinpoint accuracy before produced a deepening danger to they refrained from estimating its 1944, when the invasion was made a the relatively shallow foundations total effect, cautiously stating that the priority for support bombing by the of civilized life.”30 Neither Bell nor bombers produced “indispensable Supreme Command and when the Liddell Hart were then popular for military advantages” for the invading Norden bombsight became generally their views, but both are remembered armies.32 Like Harris himself they available to the RAF. Their argument for them now with honour – in some seem to have been unhappy with was that bombing competence was quarters. estimating army support effects. The a product of developing skill and
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German cities were hard hit from the air, as these postwar photos of Cologne attest.
technology. Certainly an argument that bombers were all that the British had to offer in 1942 had strength. Heavy bombers had begun to roll off the production lines in numbers at the precise moment when the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was producing crews in numbers, and when Churchill felt the greatest pressure due to the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Furthermore the British felt the need to offer their new allies something in CFJIC PL 42536 CFJIC the way of offensive capability. At that precise time Harris, not yet chief of Bomber Command, was in the United States. He was there at the same time as the Prime Minister, and he did have a plan of attack!34 War is, as General Wolfe once put it, an option of difficulties. It was not an open option of clear available choices. No matter what the consequences, and to CFJIC PL 42542 CFJIC the very last days of the war, Harris stuck to his terror bombing plan.35 He was a hard man to convince. Harris did have his engaging side. This was revealed in his unshakeable conviction that in total war all means were necessary, and that if the Germans had won he would have been hanged as a war criminal. No doubt! And his crews would have been condemned as the equivalent of the SS. In a way the crews sensed this. It is possible that the solidarity of his Command in the face of exceptionally heavy losses had something to do with a sort of complicity in unpleasant work. That is a speculation that will be unpalatable to many, and nothing more than a speculation.36 There has been no attempt here to dwell on the fact that when targets were selected in the last months of the war it meant devastation on
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a vast scale. It was the scale of the In this context it must be noted theoretical backing, became Royal destruction in the final months of that for many years after the war, Air Force doctrine.44 The British the war that made even Churchill the moral question of whether it was tried it for Imperial policing. If recoil somewhat.37 The photos of the right to terror-bomb whole cities was peoples in the Arabian Desert, or German cities bombed provide clear not seriously raised. When Harry on the North-West frontier of India, examples of this. I am not attempting Truman had to make the decision resisted a call for an apology for some to state that the Germans as a people about destroying Japanese cities with “outrage,” then the airmen bombed did not invite much of what they nuclear weapons, he at least had the their tents, flocks and waterholes. received. Their own methods do not ability to state that he would be able This had an effect that tremendously bear much close scrutiny. Revenge to save lives on both sides, even if encouraged submission to the forces was not, however, the avowed they were American military lives at of “civilization.” Airmen remembered purpose of the Allied governments. the expense and deaths of Japanese, how effective this had been! Arthur The purpose was to win the war, both civilian and military. Churchill Harris was involved in developing notwithstanding Richard Stokes’ agreed with Truman. Even Leonard this technique, which offered remark about “civilization.”38 It is Cheshire, the distinguished British financial and practical advantages, more interesting to reflect that for airman who flew with the Americans in Mesopotamia in 192245 It has almost 15 years after the war the as an observer, did not object at the been suggested in a recent and most number of commentators who even time.42 Churchill’s use of the bomber perceptive study that this testing raised moral or practical question weapon, although it caused as much ground was partly responsible for concerning mass bombing in the destruction, did not even have the not only the survival of the RAF as Second World War could be counted luxury of that clear cut choice. At an independent entity, but also for on the fingers of one hand. Why? any rate the morality of bombing its tendency to identify offensive Partly, no doubt, it was because cities in a mass way was never the capability with the bomber and not the atomic bombing of Hiroshima premier question, but I say this in with a more balanced force.46 It is and Nagasaki (by the very power the belief that Churchill, if I read even more remarkable that it was of destruction in relation to the size him at all correctly, must have found Winston Churchill, in his capacity of the bombs) had obliterated the the choice agonizing. Liddell Hart as a colonial secretary in the Lloyd memory of previous methods. Also would doubtless have questioned George coalition government, who it was due to the fact that, both from this judgment as other historians supported the use of air forces in the point of view of the effectiveness, may, on the grounds that it ascribes such a way, and that he supported and from the point of view of bomber too much in the way of humanist it mainly on the grounds of saving casualties to our own crews, it raised scruple to Churchill. This is a subject money and sparing British men. unpleasant questions. Winston too complex for easy judgment and Based on this criteria, it was effective. Churchill, no stranger to bearing I simply record that this view is It is also interesting to note that responsibility, felt it necessary to controversial. What else could he when reports reached Churchill of duck this burden though privately wage war with before the Americans women and children being strafed he recognized Harris’ contribution were invasion-capable? in a lake where they had withdrawn to the war effort.39 Yet the restraint Let us pause and go back before for safety, he condemned the brutality in public recognition was marked the war. When the Second World without stifling the method.47 The by many. Churchill shunned Harris, War broke out what was to have first Labour Government did not and he avoided a real appraisal of been expected? The Germans had change this money-saving situation, the subject in his books. It was clear used population bombing against although that redoubtable MP George that he was not over-anxious to give London in 1916-17 and the results Lansbury acted as the conscience of emphasis to the bombing campaign were unpleasant. The population was the nation when he stated that the Air as the war concluded. He stopped the nervous.43 The “experts” interpreted Minister and his department were “ official survey from going forward.40 this to mean that weight of attack the lineal descendents of the Huns,” This is surely not surprising! The would smash morale. After the First and Cox went on to say: effect was debatable. Bomber crew World War it was widely believed by casualties were in high - 55,000 killed; air power exponents in the United I know there is a sort of feeling that a 8,403 wounded and 9,838 prisoners Kingdom that “the bomber would coloured person is of less value than of war.41 The destructive results always get through” and that the a white person, but I do not think were horrendous. This was not terror resulting would swiftly break so. I think you are baby killers, and encouraging material for a political an urban people’s will to resist. This, inhuman baby killers, whether you apologist to work with! with the Italian Giulio Douhet’s kill a black baby or a white baby. I
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do not see any difference. I think the latter, due to their supposed Meanwhile, as Donald Cameron Watt that one is a crime and the other is temperament. In 1936 the Joint says, trenchantly, “For nearly twenty a crime.48 Planning Committee, chaired by years the Air Force High Command Arthur Harris, outlined measures to had been preaching a strategy of the The point was that terror bombing defend the UK in event of war with Emperor’s clothes being preferred was perceived to work. Charles Germany, but it refused to assign to one of cutting one’s coat to fit the Portal, who was to play a major role priorities. It opined that without available cloth.54 in the Second World War bombing, the threat of bomber retaliation for Airmen, in fact, believed what told the Disarmament Conference at both terror and interdiction, other they wanted. In Spain the horrors of Geneva in 1932 Guernica were that “criticism of remembered, police bombing but the fact that w a s ‘ w e l l the Republicans meaning, but did not submit 49
ill-informed.’” PL 144265 CFJIC easily t o air When the terror was not. r e a r m a m e n t The point was campaign began m a d e i n t h e after 1935 it was Pa r i s p a p e r s i m m e d i a t e l y b y t h e m o s t apparent that famous French air would get a aviator of the substantial slice time, Antoine of the defence de St. Exupéry, budget. In fact but it was not it got a healthy digested. His 40 percent, a b i o g r a p h e r p r o c u r e m e n t writes: r a t i o i t m a i n t a i n e d Years before until 1945!50 It the analysts, is interesting to the statisticians, A group of cluster bombs falling towards Hanover, Germany, 25 March 1945. note that when a n d t h e a joint services autopsists of committee was set up in 1936 to study defence measures would prove to be the Second World War were to defensive measures against enemy inadequate.52 Three things are to be proclaim what the Goerings and the attack, they credited the German noted here. The first is the evidence Bomber Harrises were too obtuse air planners with a horrendous that if terror was available a foe to understand, what the Curtis ruthlessness in respect to air bombing. would use it; second, that the best Lemays and their ilk have never In Manfred Messerschmidt’s yet antidote was counter-terror, and third been able to fathom. Saint Exupéry unpublished paper, “Industrialisieter the underlying assumption was that had put his finger on the pathetic Krieg und Volkerrecht in den beiden terror would work. futility of mass bombardments. “A Weltkrieg,” he states that the British Of course when the war began, in moral role? But a bombardment is were programmed to use mass the days before France fell, Bomber self-thwarting. It defeats its very bombing in such a way that is not Command was not able to deliver purpose. Each shellburst in Madrid accurate to state that it was merely accurate counter-terror attacks, nor provokes a gradual hardening. What a response to an enemy that was was the Luftwaffe able to initiate was wobbly indifference stiffens. A National Socialist.51 They estimated them. The bomber argument was dead child matters when it is yours. 400 tons of bombs a day for two largely frustrated, to the chagrin of A bombardment, it seemed to me, weeks would be dumped on the the Air leaders, by civilian officials.53 does not disperse; it unifies. Horror United Kingdom in either attempts at The priority was switched to the induces a clenching of the fists, a interdiction of food supplies or terror, marriage of fighters with radar in closing of ranks in the same shared and on balance they leaned to the time to allow the “Few” to work shudder…. Madrid is there, taking notion that Germans would favour effectively in the Battle of Britain. its blows in silence. But so it is with
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man: hardships slowly fortify their ramifications of terror bombing and To quote Vonnegut: virtues.”55 deliberately chose it. It was discussed many times in British decision- ‘It had to be done,’ Rumfoord told We now look back at Warsaw making circles. On 30 October 1940, Billy, speaking of the destruction and Rotterdam as moral outrages. in the War Cabinet and Churchill of Dresden. No doubt; and the Germans were argued that, “whilst we should ‘I know,’ said Billy. capable of much more than that. adhere to the rule that our objective ‘That’s war.’ Nevertheless, militarily speaking, it should be military targets, at the ‘I know. I’m not complaining.’ was the defeat of the Polish Army, not same time the civilian population ‘It must have been hell on the the bombing of Warsaw, that defeated around target areas must be made ground.’ the Poles. Rotterdam was bombed as to feel the weight of the war.”57 ‘It was,’ said Billy Pilgrim. part of the military offensive and, it The War Cabinet approved what ‘Pity the poor men who had to was claimed, as a “mistake” after the they specifically termed “the Prime do it.’ city had surrendered, and had no real Minister’s Proposal.” To say the least, ‘I do.’ campaign significance. The Battle of Harris did not try to dissuade him. It ‘You must have had mixed Britain was militarily important in was only the shock waves of Dresden feelings, there on the ground.’ the war; the Battle of London was that caused Churchill to cringe a ‘It was all right,’ said Billy. not. There was moral outrage against little. Harris did not cringe.58 I think, ‘Everything is all right, and the Germans for the Blitz, but it was however, that enough has been said everybody has to do exactly what accepted as St. Exupéry had predicted here so that one can see that it was he does…’ it would be. The British certainly had a whole background of theory and So it goes.63 no doubt about what they wanted practice that developed the mind-set to do to Germany. Despite the scale with which the air war was fought. of their effort they failed to conquer In this sense Harris was a proponent Notes by terror and achieved a debatable and agent of an accepted way of success in the strategic or military waging air war, and it is manifestly This article was originally published in Jeanette sense, and any reader of Albert unfair to saddle him with special P. Maas and Robert A.C. Stewart, eds., Toward 56 a World of Peace: People Create Alternatives. Speer’s diary knows. To be sure moral opprobrium, when manifestly Proceedings of the International Conference on Speer thought that concentrated he was merely carrying out the wish Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies in the United simultaneous attacks on all ball- of his country men, both in Whitehall Nations Year of Peace, 1986 (Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1986), pp.193-206. bearing factories would have brought and in the streets, when the subject German industry to its knees. He is looked at from a national point of 1. Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five (New York: Dell, 1971). was ambivalent towards the effect view. 2. David Irving, The Bombing of Dresden of area bombardment. I am not For it cannot be too strongly (London: W. Kimber, 1963). 3. Vonnegut, pp.187-88. suggesting here that the Germans emphasized that very few objected 4. Vonnegut, p.191 would have hesitated to obliterate in public. I have named them in 5. My aircraft did not actually bomb London if they had had the power. I England. In Canada, Prime Minister Dresden, but used the cover of the Main Force to come in range of our target, am not advocating German morality Mackenzie King thought that more which was Böhlen. Nevertheless we as opposed to British. I am simply airmen waging war by terror would could see the colouration of the sky saying that the moral indifference have saved many lives and money for clearly, and we know what was going on 59 in Dresden. The night was distinguished to mass bombing was international, Canada. The Minister of State for by the fact that the weather path across and also that, until Hiroshima, it was Air, C.G. “Chubby” Power, stated that Germany offered limited scope for height based on the questionable premise of the matter had never been discussed movement, so we went out and returned with the Main Force. I remembered 60 efficiency. in Canada’s wartime cabinet. There the red sky after the war, long before it Two other aspects remain. was a consensus. No Canadian all became a general subject of public The first is the fact that the British churchmen objected.61 When Cologne controversy and remark. 6. Liddell Hart thought the bombing Government was more concerned got its 1,000 bomber raid in 1942 campaign a logical extension of Britain’s to give an impression of reasonable the Globe & Mail stated that it was a naval blockade methods; a cheap but behaviour than it was to carefully good way to deal with that “Hunnish ruthless way of dealing with continental nations. (B.H. Liddell Hart, The Revolution delineate important targets. Perhaps hive.” It also said that of the 1,000 in Warfare (New Haven: Yale University the nature of the weapons available, Canadians thought to have assisted Press, 1947), pp.90-91. 7. My unit was 429 (Bison) Squadron, and the slow progress towards in that precedent-making operation, latterly of Leeming, Yorks. The squadron their most efficient use, dictated none, “we may be sure, shirked their was formed in 4 Group, and transferred, strategy, but Churchill considered the duty!”62 No doubt! on 1 April 1943 to 6 Canadian Group
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which had been formed in January 1943. MD: University Publications of America, 47. Ibid. Air Vice-Marshal C.M. McEwen, RCAF, 1980). 48. Ibid. was Officer Commanding from February 23. In volume 4 of Frankland and Webster 49. Ibid. 1944. See Martin Middlebrook and Chris (1962), (annex 1 of Annex and Appendices, 50. Alan S. Millward, “British Strategy in Everitt,The Bomber Command War Diaries entitled “The British and United States the Second World War in Comparative (London: Viking, 1985). Note that Bison Surveys of the Strategic Bombing Offensive,” Economic Perspective,” Unpublished squadron suffered the heaviest losses in pp.40-56, the authors give a complicated paper, International Committee for the Wellington aircraft in 6 Group; mostly in account of the British and American History of the Second World War, at the the Ruhr valley attacks of 1943. evaluation techniques. They do not 16th International Congress of Historical 8. Bombing operations were called “trips” come to strong conclusions, but do Sciences, Stuttgart Conference, August by us. They were not “missions,” a word reveal that Churchill was averse to the 1985. used by the United States Army Air Royal Air Force producing a comparable 51. M a nfred Messerschmidt, Forces, which, for all we knew, might document to the US survey. On the “Industrialisieter Krieg und Volkerrecht have referred to converting heathen in other hand MacIsaac frankly states that in den beiden Weltkrieg,” unpublished, Flying Fortresses. controversy “has subsequently evolved quoted with permission. 9. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare. on the question of the degree of accuracy 52. Captain T.S.V. Phillips, Colonel Sir R.F. 10. No doubt the backlash from the strain attained by ‘precision bombing.’ Looking Adam Bart and Group Captain A.T. of operations has been imperfectly back, it would appear that the term Harris, “Appreciation of the Situation understood by the general public and precision bombing represented an in the Event of War Against Germany in even the medical profession, then and unhappy choice of words for the level 1939,” Appendix 6. now. In the same way it would be quite of capability attainable in 1940’s…” The Joint Planning Committee (COS (JP)), 26 wrong to think that because bomber crews “choice of words offered more than October 1936, The National Archives, do not talk about their past activities and could be delivered in the event, thereby United Kingdom (Public Record Office), the results of them, that they do not think contributing to both controversy and – in Cabinet Records Office, 54/3; see also RAF of them. Canada’s young airmen were not this case unnecessary – confusion.” See Narrative, The Growth of Fighter Command, all naïve by any means. USSBS, preface to vol. III, p.viii-ix. June 1936 – June 1940: The Air Defence of 11. F.J.P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism 24. Kesaris. Great Britain (First Draft), Vol.1, (London: (Appleton, Wisconsin: C. Nelson Pub., 25. Kesaris gives an example of how flights Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, 1936). 1953). over Rumania were supposed to have 53. Donald Cameron Watt, Personalities and 12. Hans Rumpf, The Bombing of Germany, produced massive effects. This report Policies (London: Longmans, 1965). trans. Edward Fitzgerald (London: F. is, in fact, replete with examples of the 54. Ibid. Muller, 1963). optimistic reading of evidence. MacIsaac 55. Curtis Cate, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry 13. A good example of overexposure on an carefully states that the lack of competent (New York: Putnam, 1970). author’s part is A.I. Solzhenitsyn, The historians hampered the ability of the 56. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New Gulag Archipelago, 1918-56 (New York: Survey’s authors to assess ‘evidence.’ York: MacMillan, 1970). Harper and Row, 1957). Three volumes 26. UK Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 57. Quoted in Richard Overy, The Air War are too much despite the obvious need 5th series, volume 130, 9 February 1944, 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, for information! cc.737-55. 1980), p.49. 14. Noble Frankland and Charles Webster, 27. Ibid. 58. Saward. The Strategic Air Offensive Against 28. Richard Stokes, Letter to the Editor, 59. W.L. Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of Germany, 1939-1945, 4 vols. (London: London Daily Herald, 16 March 1943. William Lyon Mackenzie King,” 6 & Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961). 29. B.H. Liddell Hart, This Expanding War 7 September 1942, available online at 15. R.H.S. Crossman, “Apocalypse at (London: Faber and Faber, 1942).
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