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Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction Du Branch Patrimoine De I'edition Strategy for Terror: An analysis of the progress in Allied responses to the emergence of the V-2 Rocket, 1943-1945. by Gavin James King B.A., University of Ottawa, 2002 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts In the Graduate Academic Unit of History Supervisor: Marc Milner, Ph. D., History Examining Board: Marc Milner, Ph. D., History Steven Turner, Ph. D., History Lawrence Wisniewski, Ph. D., Sociology Gary K. Waite, Ph. D., History, Chair This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUSWICK October, 2006 © Gavin James King, 2006 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49691-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49691-6 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada ABSTRACT The V-2 rocket, developed in Nazi Germany during the late 1930's and early 1940's, was the world's first ballistic missile. Between September 8, 1944 and March 5, 1945 some 517 V-2 rockets fell on Greater London, the weapon's primary target. Although considered a technological milestone, military historians have generally dismissed the V-2 as a costly enterprise that failed to deliver any strategic benefits. The thesis argues that Hitler and the Nazi leadership backed the rocket program because it offered a powerful vehicle to wage psychological warfare and proved a valuable propaganda tool. More substantially, based upon research of original British government documents, the thesis demonstrates that the threat of long range rocket bombardment succeeded in raising a major strategic challenge for the British government. It is shown that the British government perceived the threat of rocket bombardment far more seriously that the establish literature would suggest. The threat from the weapon, elevated by uncertain intelligence, was understood to be as much psychological as material in nature. It was feared that any material destruction from a rocket bombardment of London would be greatly magnified by the psychological trauma that would accompany this revolutionary form of attack. Planning to meet the contingency of rocket attack took place at the highest levels and included the drafting of extraordinary measures. li TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Table of Contents iii Chapter 1: A Historiography of the V-2 1 Chapter 2: Vengeance 30 Chapter 3: The First Rocket Scare, 1943 47 Chapter Four: A Renewed Threat, 1944 75 Chapter Five: Conclusion 96 Bibliography 101 Curriculum Vitae iii Chapter One: A Historiography of the V-2 Throughout the Second World War both the Axis and the Allies sought to develop new weapons and devices that would give them the winning edge. As the war began to go against Germany, Hitler increasingly staked his hopes for victory on his scientists and their ability to develop new weapons of war. The V-2 rocket was one such weapon; the second of Hitler's so called 'vengeance weapons.'1 However, unlike its contemporary the VI, the V-2 rocket was much more than simply a bomb with wings. It was a technological giant leap, the cumulative result of decade's enthusiasm and research into liquid fuelled rockets. Designed by a team of German scientists led by the young Wernher von Braun and army General Walter Dornberger, the forty-six feet high and 13.6 tons ballistic missile carried its one ton warhead approximately 180 miles. Between September 8, 1944 and March 27, 1945 some 517 V-2 rockets fell on Greater London, the weapon's primary target. The attacks cost Britain 2724 dead and twice that badly injured; light casualties when viewed in context.2 However, these figures belie The V-2 is actually the missiles propaganda name. The 'V stands for vergeltungswqffe or 'vengeance' To its developers, and to the German Army, the V-2 was known as the A-4 rocket. Pocock, Rowland. German Guided Missiles of the Second World War. (New York, 1967) p. 12 2 Magenheimer, Hemze. Hitler's War. (London, 1999) p. 253 what was the A4 rocket's primary function. It was foremost a terror weapon, intended to deliver onto Britain a psychological blow whose detriments would far surpass the weapon's material destruction. Unlike any bombardment weapon before it, the rocket could strike its victims from a great distance without warning. Moreover, crashing down at 3, 500 miles per hour there was no defense against it. The long range rocket heralded the arrival of a new and terrifying form of warfare. The following chapter will provide an overview of the V-2's operational history and explore its historiography. It will demonstrate how the history of the V-2 is characterized by a division between those books that place it in the history of rocket development and space travel, and those concerned only with its effect on the Second World War. To the former, the V-2 is afforded considerable status as the first rocket capable of reaching outer space. It is hailed as the blueprint for future rockets, including the Saturn 5 which sent men to the moon. For others there appear two distinct approaches to the history of the V-2. The first looks at why the Third Reich decided to embark on the development and production of long range rockets in the first place. Generally, the military efficiency of the rocket program is examined in order to determine whether the money, material and scientific expertise devoted to the V-2's development and production were worth it, or whether these resources could have been better utilized elsewhere. The second approach to the history of the V-2 looks at the rocket's impact on the Allied side, specifically the British. This approach tends to focus on how British intelligence discovered the German rocket program and how they sought to counter its threat both before and after the first V-2 attack. While some books on the Von Braun and Ordway. History of Rocketry and Space Travel. (New York, 1975) p. 108 2 V-2 and the war take both these approaches, most tend to focus on one or the other. The general story of the development of the V-2 is relatively straightforward and uncontentious. During the interwar years German interest in rocketry surpassed that of any other nation. This was in no small part due to the Versailles Treaty, which had banned Germany from possessing long range artillery and an air force, but said nothing of rockets. As early as 1932, Walter Dornberger, an artillery officer with funding from the German War Office, began work on the development of liquid fuelled rockets aided by young physicist and rocket enthusiast Wernher von Braun. Encouraged by the rocket team's progress, in 1936 the War Office agreed to build a secret research facility at Peenemunde, a small island off the Baltic coast. Though no plans for collaborative research were made, the cost of building and running the facility was to be shared equally between the War Office and the Air Ministry. By 1937 the rocket team successfully launched the first liquid fuelled rockets and began to make plans for a much larger device, what would eventually become the V-2.5 In 1939, Hitler observed the first test firings of a large rocket engine but was not impressed. Nonetheless, research into long range rockets continued under financial constraints. Hitler's interest in the long range rocket was rekindled in the spring of 1942 as it became clear that the war would drag on longer than expected. More importantly, Britain's area bombing of German cities, beginning with Lubeck in March of 1942, infuriated Hitler, who ordered 'terror' attacks of a retaliatory nature.6 After he had serious second thoughts about value of developing a long range rocket, in July of 1943 4 Existing rockets used solid fuel which, at that time, had considerable limitations. von Braun accurately calculated the basic characteristics of what would become the V-2 in 1937, outlining its range, accuracy and warhead in a memorandum to the War Office.
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