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Strategy for Terror: An analysis of the progress in Allied responses to the emergence of the V-2 Rocket, 1943-1945.

Gavin James King

B.A., University of Ottawa, 2002

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor: Marc Milner, Ph. D., History

Examining Board: Marc Milner, Ph. D., History Steven Turner, Ph. D., History Lawrence Wisniewski, Ph. D., Sociology

Gary K. Waite, Ph. D., History, Chair

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada ABSTRACT

The V-2 rocket, developed in Nazi Germany during the late 1930's and early

1940's, was the world's first ballistic missile. Between September 8, 1944 and March 5,

1945 some 517 V-2 rockets fell on Greater London, the weapon's primary target.

Although considered a technological milestone, military historians have generally dismissed the V-2 as a costly enterprise that failed to deliver any strategic benefits. The thesis argues that Hitler and the Nazi leadership backed the rocket program because it offered a powerful vehicle to wage psychological warfare and proved a valuable propaganda tool. More substantially, based upon research of original British government documents, the thesis demonstrates that the threat of long range rocket bombardment succeeded in raising a major strategic challenge for the British government. It is shown that the British government perceived the threat of rocket bombardment far more seriously that the establish literature would suggest. The threat from the weapon, elevated by uncertain intelligence, was understood to be as much psychological as material in nature. It was feared that any material destruction from a rocket bombardment of London would be greatly magnified by the psychological trauma that would accompany this revolutionary form of attack. Planning to meet the contingency of rocket attack took place at the highest levels and included the drafting of extraordinary measures.

li TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii

Table of Contents iii

Chapter 1: A Historiography of the V-2 1

Chapter 2: Vengeance 30

Chapter 3: The First Rocket Scare, 1943 47

Chapter Four: A Renewed Threat, 1944 75

Chapter Five: Conclusion 96

Bibliography 101

Curriculum Vitae

iii Chapter One: A Historiography of the V-2

Throughout the Second World War both the Axis and the Allies sought to develop new weapons and devices that would give them the winning edge. As the war began to go against Germany, Hitler increasingly staked his hopes for victory on his scientists and their ability to develop new weapons of war. The V-2 rocket was one such weapon; the second of Hitler's so called 'vengeance weapons.'1 However, unlike its contemporary the VI, the V-2 rocket was much more than simply a bomb with wings. It was a technological giant leap, the cumulative result of decade's enthusiasm and research into liquid fuelled rockets. Designed by a team of German scientists led by the young Wernher von Braun and army General Walter Dornberger, the forty-six feet high and 13.6 tons ballistic missile carried its one ton warhead approximately 180 miles.

Between September 8, 1944 and March 27, 1945 some 517 V-2 rockets fell on Greater

London, the weapon's primary target. The attacks cost Britain 2724 dead and twice that badly injured; light casualties when viewed in context.2 However, these figures belie

The V-2 is actually the missiles propaganda name. The 'V stands for vergeltungswqffe or 'vengeance' To its developers, and to the German Army, the V-2 was known as the A-4 rocket. Pocock, Rowland. German Guided Missiles of the Second World War. (New York, 1967) p. 12 2 Magenheimer, Hemze. Hitler's War. (London, 1999) p. 253 what was the A4 rocket's primary function. It was foremost a terror weapon, intended to deliver onto Britain a psychological blow whose detriments would far surpass the weapon's material destruction. Unlike any bombardment weapon before it, the rocket could strike its victims from a great distance without warning. Moreover, crashing down at 3, 500 miles per hour there was no defense against it. The long range rocket heralded the arrival of a new and terrifying form of warfare.

The following chapter will provide an overview of the V-2's operational history and explore its historiography. It will demonstrate how the history of the V-2 is characterized by a division between those books that place it in the history of rocket development and space travel, and those concerned only with its effect on the Second

World War. To the former, the V-2 is afforded considerable status as the first rocket capable of reaching outer space. It is hailed as the blueprint for future rockets, including the Saturn 5 which sent men to the moon. For others there appear two distinct approaches to the history of the V-2. The first looks at why the Third Reich decided to embark on the development and production of long range rockets in the first place.

Generally, the military efficiency of the rocket program is examined in order to determine whether the money, material and scientific expertise devoted to the V-2's development and production were worth it, or whether these resources could have been better utilized elsewhere. The second approach to the history of the V-2 looks at the rocket's impact on the Allied side, specifically the British. This approach tends to focus on how British intelligence discovered the German rocket program and how they sought to counter its threat both before and after the first V-2 attack. While some books on the

Von Braun and Ordway. History of Rocketry and Space Travel. (New York, 1975) p. 108

2 V-2 and the war take both these approaches, most tend to focus on one or the other.

The general story of the development of the V-2 is relatively straightforward and uncontentious. During the interwar years German interest in rocketry surpassed that of any other nation. This was in no small part due to the Versailles Treaty, which had banned Germany from possessing long range artillery and an air force, but said nothing of rockets. As early as 1932, Walter Dornberger, an artillery officer with funding from the German War Office, began work on the development of liquid fuelled rockets aided by young physicist and rocket enthusiast Wernher von Braun. Encouraged by the rocket team's progress, in 1936 the War Office agreed to build a secret research facility at

Peenemunde, a small island off the Baltic coast. Though no plans for collaborative research were made, the cost of building and running the facility was to be shared equally between the War Office and the Air Ministry. By 1937 the rocket team successfully launched the first liquid fuelled rockets and began to make plans for a much larger device, what would eventually become the V-2.5 In 1939, Hitler observed the first test firings of a large rocket engine but was not impressed. Nonetheless, research into long range rockets continued under financial constraints.

Hitler's interest in the long range rocket was rekindled in the spring of 1942 as it became clear that the war would drag on longer than expected. More importantly,

Britain's area bombing of German cities, beginning with Lubeck in March of 1942, infuriated Hitler, who ordered 'terror' attacks of a retaliatory nature.6 After he had serious second thoughts about value of developing a long range rocket, in July of 1943

4 Existing rockets used solid fuel which, at that time, had considerable limitations. von Braun accurately calculated the basic characteristics of what would become the V-2 in 1937, outlining its range, accuracy and warhead in a memorandum to the War Office. 6 Collier, Basil. The Battle of the V-Weapons. (London, 1964) p. 156

3 von Braun and Domberger showed Hitler a film of the first successful V-2 launch, made the previous October. Hitler was extremely impressed by the spectacle and gave the rocket program highest priority throughout Germany's industry and armed forces. At this same time the German Long Range Bombardment Commission recommended development of both the air force V-l Flying Bomb and the army V-2 rocket. In

December of 1943, Hitler announced the formation of a new 'special duties' Army

Corps, the Sixty-Fifth, to take command of all secret weapons formations. The Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-General Erich Heinemann, a soldier, was a hybrid of army and air force officers. Heinemann immediately began to question the wisdom of continuing the V-2 project. It was far too costly he thought, and the warhead could never equal a heavy raid by conventional bombers. Heinemann communicated these thoughts to the German High Command that same December, recommending that the whole V-2 project be shut down in favour of the air force's less expensive flying-bomb.8 The High

Command, however, insisted that the rocket had unique advantages and the program would continue. Having finally overcome numerous technical faults, the V-2 rocket was put into production in the summer of 1944 with the use slave labour. After Hitler ordered the rocket offensive against London to begin, responsibility for the project was transferred to Himmler's deputy, SS General Hans Kammler. On the morning of

September 8, the first V-2 was successfully launched against London from outside The

Hague. Without warning it struck the London borough of Chiswick, killing thirteen

Peenemunde was given priority on available labour and material effectively unlimited financial resources. According to David Irving the A-4's average cost, including overheads, was twelve thousand 1945 pounds per missile, compared with 125 pounds per V-l. Irving, David. The Mares Nest. (London, 1964) p. 304

4 people.9 Before the rocket campaign ended in March 1945, some 3, 500 were launched.

The first account of the V-2 rocket program was written by none other than

Walter Dornberger himself. His book V2: Per Schuss Ins Weltall, was published in

1952. A now rare English translation was published two years later under the simple title

V2. Dornberger covers the entire development of the rocket throughout the war years.

His account details the scientific challenges faced by the developers in addition to the political machinations that surrounded the program. Dornberger maintains throughout his book that the effort to develop and deploy a long range rocket was a strategically sound endeavor. The rocket's failure to impact the war more forcibly was not due to any intrinsic flaw with the device. On the contrary Dornberger maintains, Hitler's indecision, interference by the SS, and the fact that the rocket was rushed into production with the use of slave labor were what prevented the technology from significantly altering the course of the war. Indeed, Dornberger argued that had more been invested in the development of the V-2, and at an earlier stage, it could have been deployed in the thousands much earlier. "We were all aware that the operational employment of the A4

[V2] in the autumn of 1944 could not of itself win the war. But what might have happened if from two years earlier, say summer of 1942, for years on end, by day and night, more and more long range rockets with ever increasing range, accuracy and effect had fallen on England?"10 Dornberger writes that it would be idle to speculate on this but nonetheless concludes that, "The use of the V2 may be aptly summed up in two words: too late."11

In an attempt to forestall future criticism of the rocket's strategic value

9 Collier, p. 170 10 Dornberger, Walter. VZ (London, 1954) p. 255

5 Domberger addressed both the issue of the weapon's cost and what alternatives existed.

"It will be said" he wrote, "that we should have produced more fighters and bombers instead of the A4." According to Dornberger this reproach made little sense. He pointed out that, "We lacked not fighters but petrol. Our vital artery, fuel, had run dry." 12 Not only was there a severe fuel shortage but a shortage of experienced pilots. This is a point often overlooked by subsequent histories. Dornberger also predicted that the rocket would be stigmatized in future histories as too expensive. This objection also made little sense to the author. Dornberger points out that once in mass production the A4 cost much less than a twin engine bomber. Manned bombers are reusable but Dornberger points out, "how often, after 1941, could a German bomber fly to England before being shot down?" Of course the A4 rocket, powered by liquid oxygen, required neither petrol nor pilots and was invulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses. It therefore represented one of the only means by which Germany could maintain a strategic long distance bombardment capability in the face of fuel shortages and allied air supremacy.

Dornberger's own centrality to the rocket program provides his account with some unique insights, not only into the rocket program, but into the characters and mindsets of Hitler and other senior Nazis. For the same reason however, Dornberger's history of the V-2 will always be an inherently biased account. Indeed, while V2 is presented as a history rather than a memoir, it relies heavily on the author's own recollections, at least some of which are false. Although Dornberger provides a solid defense of the strategic value and promise of the A4, analytically what V2 most plainly

11 Ibid. p. 255 12 Ibid. p. 255 13 For instance Dornberger claims that prior to their July 1943 meeting he had not seen Hitler since March 1939, curiously omitting an encounter in 1942.

6 lacks is discussion of the weapon's essential purpose, to forment terror. This is not surprising when one considers that V2 was written less than a decade after the war.

Dornberger was surely anxious to avoid material that might be used to prosecute him for war crimes. With respect to the V-2 as a tool of psychological warfare, Dornberger simply states, "The operational use of the V2 at an imperfect stage of development will also be called pointless, brutal and inhuman, but if so all long-range artillery and bombing must accept the same condemnation."14 Perhaps, but by avoiding discussion of the V-2 within the context of a terror weapon, Dornberger ignored a vital aspect of the long range rocket's history and undersold its strategic value in this regard.

The first extensive English language histories of German rocketry and the V-2 appeared in 1964. Both Basil Collier's, Battle of the V Weapons and David Irving's, The

Mares Nest are detailed, compelling narratives. However, both are popular history and lack a high degree of analytical analysis, particularly Collier's, and neither contains footnotes. Why it took until 1964 for the first English language histories of the German

V weapons to be written in somewhat puzzling. Perhaps the development of global reach nuclear missiles and the moon race during this era had something to do with their appearance. With the advent of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles and the moon race, long range rockets were finally reaching their full potential. Indeed, they became the strategic cornerstone of both Soviet and Western security, something both feared and marveled. However, the emergence of ever more powerful nuclear armed rockets has also tended to skew historical judgments regarding the conventionally armed V-2. As will be seen, many historians dismiss the V-2 as an inherently absurd proposition given

Ibid. p. 255

7 its conventional arming. Consequently, analysis of the actual degree of threat that the weapon engendered, before the fog of war had lifted, is largely absent from the historiography of the V-2.

Of all the early works Irving' s provides the most comprehensive history of the

V-2 and The Mares Nest is often cited by subsequent authors writing on the subject.

Irving, who claims to have utilized many German documents, narrates the German pursuit of long range rockets while at the same time discussing British intelligence and military efforts to identify and eliminate the threat. He documents the V-2's meteoric rise in face of the conflicting demands of the German war effort and Hitler's on-again, off-again support. He maintains that from its inception, in 1937, the V-2 rocket with its exotic fuels, costly mechanisms and one-ton warhead must have seemed a military absurdity, especially to strategists familiar with the achievements of the manned bomber.15 However, Irving contends that because its development was directed by the army in general and an artillery officer, Dornberger, in particular, the V-2 program was shielded from impartial criticism.16 Moreover, Irving asserts, rivalry between the army and air force played a major role in concealing the limitations of the long range rocket.

Hitler's elevation of the V-2 program to top priority, following the rocket's first successful launch, caused great consternation in the air force. As Albert Speer later commented to his Allied interrogators, "The German Air Force was disturbed that the

Army alone would be bombing London."17 Accordingly, Irving wrote, the German air force attended the development of their long range bombardment device, the V-l, with

Irving, p. 18 Ibid. p. 19 Ibid. p. 23

8 "redoubled vigour." Thus the two branches of the German armed forces sought to out do each other. As each developed their own cause celebre, Irving argued, the military logic of developing either weapon was put aside.

In his last chapter, appropriately titled 'Account Due,' Irving further criticized the rocket program. He maintained that the V-2 project, "interfered severely with both submarine and radar requirements."20 More importantly Irving asserts, it, "critically invaded Germany's aircraft production capacity." In making this claim Irving ignored the vital factor of fuel shortages first raised by Dornberger. He goes on to speculate that the V-2 program's greatest victim was the German anti-aircraft rocket program. This contention is the subject of considerable deliberation in later histories. There were 1, 940 scientist working on the V-2 at the end of the war, while only 220 worked on the

Wasserfall anti-aircraft rocket.21 Considering Germany's need for an effective air defense, Irving argued, this was a grave misdirection of priorities. Moreover, by the end of the war some 200, 000 people were working on the V-2 program in Germany alone, yet only half of 6, 000 manufactured were ever launched. Irving contends that in and of themselves these figures represent an extreme misallocation of resources.

Irving's study contains compelling arguments to explain the V-2's creation.

However, he almost completely ignores the psychological aspects of the weapon both in relation to German propaganda and British morale. This is evident, for instance, in his comments following a quote from the German High Command. In response to

Lieutenant-General Erich Heinemann's attempt to shut down the V-2 project the High

18 Ibid. p. 23 19 Ibid. p. 305 20 Ibid. p. 305 21 Ibid. p. 305

9 Command responded, "Its advantage lies in being able to make itself felt day and night, with no warning at all. It will strike at the Englishman's morale; and actual damage caused is of secondary importance." Rather than analyze this important insight into

German thinking regarding the rocket's strategic mission, Irving simply dismissed it as,

"the first hint of an attempt at self justification."

In contrast to Irving's general account, Basil Collier's, Battle of the V Weapons is primarily focused on the history of British intelligence gathering on the VI and V-2 and the effort to develop effective counter measures against these weapons. Collier explains that the British were slow to learn of Germany's plans to produce of a long range rocket, but became rapidly disconcerted by the prospect in 1943. The first reconnaissance photos of Peenemunde were not taken until December 1942, and then only by happenstance.24 Moreover, it was not until the spring of 1943 that the British began to take the facility seriously as intelligence reports accumulated that Germany was using it to test new long range weapons. Subsequently, over flights of Peenemunde began and appeared to show that the Germans had made considerable progress. After much debate about whether the evidence was part of an elaborate German deception, the

British Defence Committee (Operations), chaired by Winston Churchill, decided on June

29, 1943 that the threat of Peenemunde warranted a massive bombing raid as soon as weather conditions permitted. The Peenemunde bombing raid on the night of August 17,

1943 involved six hundred aircraft of Bomber Command. The ensuing loss of forty

zz Ibid. p. 188 23 This was despite knowledge that such a device had been the goal of German researchers long before the war and Hitler had warned in a 1939 speech that German scientist were not idle. 24 Collier, p. 26 10 bombers was arguably the V-2's most measurable toll on the British military. Many buildings at Peenemunde were destroyed, but the nucleus of research scientists survived and the V-2's development continued relatively unmolested. Hitler moved testing sites to Poland and transferred assembly to an underground factory near Nordhausen in the

Harz Mountains.

In his concluding chapter titled 'Inquest' Collier attempted to address what he called the "legacy of questions" left by the V weapons campaign. The chapter covers similar ground as Irving only more briefly. For example, Collier put forward the question, "Were the German High Command right, from the German point of view, when they decided to produce the V-weapons, and afterward to use them?"27 He speculates that the productive effort that went into the V weapons could have been better used in the production of aircraft, but that this theory depends largely on whether enough new pilots could be trained and fuel acquired: a consideration first pointed out by

Dornberger but overlooked by Irving. On the other hand, Collier does not debate whether alternatives avenues of research, such as the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile, were more worthy of investment.

In judging the long range rocket's strategic value, Collier, like Dornberger and

Irving, overlooks the weapon's psychological aspects. Throughout his study Collier makes virtually no mention of the V-2's potential or real impact on British morale, nor does he comment on how great a threat it engendered in the British government prior to deployment. He is content to say that the British public found the technologically impressive V-2, "a less alarming weapon than VI," for the reason that, unlike the VI,

25 Ibid. p. 33 26 Ibid. p. 138

11 the rocket's arrival over its target area was unheralded, and outside the immediate vicinity of its impact hardly noticed.28 No evidence is presented to support this claim and it can equally be said that a weapon that offers no warning of its arrival is more terrifying than one that does. Although Battle of the V-Weapons is an important contribution to the history of the V-2, especially with regard to the British point of view, it lacks a depth of analysis. This is reflected in the book's extremely limited bibliography.

Rowland F. Pocock's 1967 work, German Guided Missiles of the Second World

War, is best described as a technological handbook to German guided rocket development during World War Two. Hence, it is not a history in the fullest sense.29

Nonetheless, it is the first and perhaps most easily understood, 'record of the technology' providing the reader with comprehendible descriptions of the technical features of the V-2 rocket. Other rockets, particularly anti-aircraft missiles, that never made it to production are also detailed. These possible alternatives to the V-2, such as the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile, are often discussed in other works. A grasp of the objective science is important for it provides a solid foundation upon which to examine the more subjective political and military aspects of the V-2, the focal point of most of the literature.

Ian Hogg's German Secret Weapons of World War Two published in 1970 is concerned with German secret weapons programs as a whole, from those that never made it off the drawing board to those that were actually deployed. Hogg defines "Secret

Weapons" as all those devices which were considered secret until after the war, and

Ibid. p. 138 Ibid. p. 124

12 which, in many cases, were unknown to the allies until discovered by interrogation and investigation teams after Germany's defeat. German Secret Weapons of World War

Two is a useful addition to the historiography of the V-2 not because of any new information it provides on that device in particular, but because it effectively illustrates the immense effort that Nazi Germany put into weapons development as a whole. These weapons programs, Hogg explains, were often well funded but pursued by such a diffuse assortment of German agencies and military branches as to impair actual production and deployment. Although the V-2 was eventually produced and deployed, the suggestion made is that had German science and industry been a more focused effort the V-2 could have got of the ground much earlier and hence impacted the war much differently:

Dornberger's main point

Inside the Third Reich (1970), Albert Speer's seminal work on the inner workings of the Nazi regime, contains valuable insight into German secret weapons development and the V-2. Like Doraberger, however, Speer's own proximity to the rocket program, and senior position in the Nazi hierarchy, infuses his writing with an inherent bias. Speer, in line with Irving, argues that the rocket program was a strategic misstep that distracted from the vital task of creating an effective air defense over

Germany. He believed that had Germany, in 1942, put the same effort into developing the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile as it did the V-2 it could have beaten back the Allied bombing offensives of 1943-1944. In fact, Speer contends that the Wasserfall was quite advanced in its development by 1942. Moreover, he maintained it could have been put into mass production much sooner than the big rocket, and being one third the V-2's

Pocock. p. vii

13 size, produced in much greater numbers, "had we better utilized the talents of those technicians and scientists busy with rocket development at Peenemunde under Wernher von Braun." Although Speer was the regime's Minister of Armaments during the later war years, and as such was directly responsible for the efficiency of the German war economy, this is a fairly brash statement of technological certitude. Later histories cast doubt on whether the perfection of an effective anti-aircraft rocket was technologically feasibility in those years considering the absence of crucial component technologies, particularly in the area of guidance.

Speer's analysis concerning the general approach of German weapons development closely resembles that of Hogg. Corroborating Hogg's assertion, Speer writes that Germany was, "literally suffering from an excess of projects in development.

Had we concentrated on only a few types we would surely have completed some of them sooner." Like Irving, Speer also referred to the rivalry that existed between the different German services and their refusal to share information as another reason hampering weapons development. Meanwhile, concerning the potential strategic value of the V-2 as a weapon against England, Speer cited Irving's analysis and "precise documentation." He reiterated Irving's contention that from its conception the idea of the V-2 as an effective means of striking back at England was "absurd."34 Speer argued that the complex rocket could never be produced in the massive quantities needed to makeup for its small payload and therefore could never have had a meaningful effect on

Hogg, I.V. German Secret Weapons of World War Two. (New York, 1970) p. 9 31 Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. (Toronto, 1970) p. 365 32 Ibid. p. 364 33 Ibid. p. 556 34 Ibid. p. 365 14 the allied war effort. However, like those before him in assessing the V-2's potential strategic value Speer almost completely ignored the weapon's psychological aspects and the actual degree of threat it engendered in the British.

Frederick Ordway's and Michael Sharpe's, The Rocket Team (1979) is very similar in format to Irving's, The Mares Nest. It charts the progress of the V-2, and flying bomb programs within Germany while at the same examining the British discovery and response to the threats. Unfortunately, The Rocket Team is without footnotes and tends to discuss the V-2 in close conjunction with the VI making separate analysis difficult. However, with regard to the progression of the historiography on the

V-2, The Rocket Team is the first major work since Domberger's monograph to take a less critical view of the V-2 program. This may be due in part to Ordway's writing relationship with Wernher von Braun. The two men had earlier collaborated on writing the History of Rocketry and Space Travel, published in 1966. In The Rocket Team

Ordway and Sharpe choose not to question the strategic wisdom of developing a long range rocket, but instead concentrate on how the Germans failed to fully exploit the weapon once it was ready for mass production. In this way the book sets itself apart from previous works.

Ordway and Sharpe contended that as many as six months were wasted in which the V-2 could have been operational, due to SS interference in the program, especially once it had gained Hitler's favour. This interference delayed the proper training of launching crews as the services argued over who should have control of the weapon, and

Speer excuses his own support of the rocket program in 1943 and 1944 as the result of the same enthusiasm that overtook Hitler after witnessing a successful test firing. 36 Ordway, Frederick and Mitchell Sharpe. The Rocket Team. (New York, 1979) p. 273

15 even resulted in the brief arrest of von Braun. Indeed, Ordway and Sharpe base their analysis of the V-2 on the presumption that it could have improved Germany's strategic situation if only it had been introduced sooner, particularly they maintain, before the

Allied landings in France in June 1944.38 The V-2, along with the VI, they argue, could have been aimed at Allied troops and supplies in southern England when they were at their most concentrated and therefore vulnerable, greatly complicating Operation

Overlord if not making it impossible. This presumption was supported by General

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in 1944-45, in his book Crusade in

Europe, "If the Germans had succeeded in perfecting these new weapons six months earlier... our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult... Overlord might have been called off."39 To be fair, Ordway and Sharpe note that neither Churchill nor Speer, in their postwar writings, supported this contention.40

Concerning alternatives to the V-2, Ordway and Sharpe note Speer's argument that Germany could have put her scientific and production efforts into the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile and perhaps have created a weapon of far greater strategic utility.

However, they discount this theory by arguing that had Germany pursued this course of action it still would not have altered the outcome of the war. Allied losses would have been greater according to the authors but, "Germany would have suffered not only a more prolonged conventional bombardment but the onslaught of atomic bombs."41

Hitler's Rocket Sites (1985) by Philip Henshall is unique in the historiography of

37 von Braun was in fact a ranking member of the SS. Piszkiewicz, Dennis. Wernher von Braun. (Westport, 1998) document of first page. 38 Ordway and Sharpe. p. 272 39 Ibid. p. 281 40 Ibid. p. 281 41 Ibid. p. 282

16 the V-2. As its title suggest the work is a study of the fixed launching sites that Hitler ordered constructed for the storage and launching of his V weapons. Concerning the V-

2, Henshall focuses his study on two large bunker sites at Watten and Wizernes and two silo launching sites the Germans constructed around Cherbourg in 1943. These were the first silos ever built for the storage and launching of ballistic missiles. Based on the assumption that silos are not suitable for frequent launchings, Henshall makes a novel claim, "Such sites only have any meaning if the missiles used there provided larger than normal military benefit, and this points to nuclear or chemical warheads."42Additionally,

Henshall claims that the bunkers at Watten and Wizernes were constructed with a ceiling height that could accommodate at least an 80 foot rocket almost double the height of the

V-2. With this in mind he concludes that the two sites, "must have been built with the objective of launching long-range rockets with nuclear or chemical warheads, target the

United States of America."43 If Henshall's claims are to be taken as correct then

Germany's initial reason for pursuing the V-2 and long range rockets in general must be entirely re-evaluated. In the context of a long term plan to eventually threaten, if not attack the United States with intercontinental missiles. Certainly, as illustrated in Hogg and Pocock's works, Germany's rocket scientists had developed plans for much larger rockets, including the multi-stage A10 with a projected range of 3000 miles.

Henshall has no concrete evidence to back his theory that the Germans intended to eventually arm their rockets with chemical or nuclear warheads. However, the fact that they did have plans for large intercontinental rockets and did construct silos capable

Henshall, Philip. Hitler's Rocket Sites. (New York, 1985) p. 204 Ibid. p. 205

17 of launching rockets much larger than the V-2 is beyond doubt. Although his theory that the Germans planned on arming rockets with nuclear warheads is undocumented and research into the construction of a nuclear bomb never progressed very far in

Germany, the idea of a chemical armed rocket is not at all unrealistic. Henshall points out that the Germans had first produced the nerve gases Sarin and Tabun in 1940 and by the end of the war had manufactured at least 15, 000 tons of the nerve agents.45

Therefore, the possibility of arming the V-weapons with potent chemical warheads was plausible. Henshall argues that Hitler never attacked Britain with chemical weapons because, "It must be assumed that it was known in Germany that the USA was on the verge of producing an atomic bomb." Therefore, he concludes, "Germany in turn would be eliminated by the use of American atomic weapons, and as far as America was concerned, Germany had no effective means of reaching her."46 Indeed, the A10 never progressed beyond the drawing board and Henshall believes Germany abandon the fixed rocket sites when it became obvious that they were unnecessary. Curiously, Henshall's theory does not address the effect that the mere threat of chemical attacks on Britain might have had and whether the allies feared that Hitler might resort to such attacks in a final bid to stave off his regime's collapse.

At this juncture in the historiography it is important to note that the V-2 has largely been evaluated based on its cost relative to its actual effect on the war. This conceptual framework for discussing the V-2 carries into Michael J. Neufeld's, The

44 Henshall argues that there is no surviving German documentation to support his theory because the scientists, eager to avoid prosecution, probably destroyed any such evidence. Curiously, neither von Braun nor Dornberger ever discuss even the possibility of arming the V2 or any other rocket with chemical or nuclear warheads. Ibid. p. 211 45 Ibid. p. 120 (The British did not possess such potent chemical agents) 46 Ibid. p. 210

18 Rocket and the Reich (1995). Neufeld's study is well documented and unique in the literature for its focus on the rise of the Peenemunde rocket research facility. Neufeld puts forth the theory that the V-2's development at Peenemunde essentially came about because of two different, yet equally devoted groups of rocket enthusiasts. On the one hand, key officers, such as Domberger, interested in artillery development came to believe during the nineteen-twenties and thirties that liquid fuelled rocketry, "could be the basis for a potentially war winning secret weapon: the ballistic missile."47 The other was a small but determined band of space enthusiast, including Wernher von Braun, inspired by the futurist science fiction of Weimer Germany and films such as Metropolis and Woman on the Moon. For them, liquid fuelled rockets were not seen as the key to future military victories, but as a means of reaching outer space and other planets. With

Hitler's rearming of Germany, the Army invested more heavily in its rocket ambitions and a close collaboration with the country's leading rocket scientists naturally followed.

Neufeld, like most authors before him, is critical of the rocket program's strategic merits and attempts to perform a cost benefit analysis to illustrate his point.

Although there is no systematic accounting for the Third Reich's expenditure on liquid fuelled missile research, development and production, Neufeld makes a rough estimate based on what fragmentary German documentation exists. He calculates that the whole

V-2 effort cost Germany, by conservative estimate, about a half billion U.S. (World War

Two) dollars.49 By way of comparison, the Manhattan Project cost about two billion

1940's dollars. However, because the German economy was smaller than the American

47 Neufeld. p. 2 48 Ibid. p. 272 49 Neufeld. p. 273. Lending credence to this assertion is the fact that the first operational anti-aircraft missile system, the U.S. Nike Ajax, was not deployed until 1953.

19 one, the rocket program, Neufeld asserts, placed roughly the same burden on the Reich as the Manhattan Project on the U.S. For this expenditure the Germans produced a weapon that killed some 5, 000 Allied civilians. This figure is dwarfed, the author points out, by single Allied air raids on Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities. Regarding the rocket's psychological impact, Neufeld maintains that it was equally unimpressive.

"Outside East London and Antwerp" he writes, "the V2 was little more than a nuisance."50 In reaching this conclusion Neufeld, like those before him, does not factor the level of threat engendered by the rocket prior to deployment or in what Clausewitz called 'the fog of war.' Although he is critical of the V-2 program, Neufeld refutes the suggestion of previous authors, specifically Speer and Irving, that the Wasserfall anti aircraft missile offered a genuine alternative for the rocket researchers. Even if it had been the primary objective of the rocket scientists, he maintains, "overwhelming technical problems would be faced in the guidance sector," of an anti-aircraft missile.51

The first positive treatment of the German rocket program since Dornberger's

V2, Benjamin King and Timothy Kutta's, Impact: The History of Germany's V-

Weapons in World War Two (1998) stands out in the historiography. The authors, both from military backgrounds, maintain that it was perfectly logical for the German military to pursue the development of long range rockets. "No corps or army commander would have objected," they write, "to a mobile weapon capable of hitting enemy targets deep in rear areas with a one-ton warhead." Uniquely amongst the literature, Impact focuses primarily on how the V-2 affected Allied operations in and around Antwerp. After that city's capture it became, along with London, a primary target for both the V-weapons.

50 Ibid. p. 273 51 Ibid. p. 154

20 The authors argue that the A4, together with the flying bomb, succeeded in limiting the amount of supplies, particularly ammunition, that the Allies could bring into the vital port city. This slowed overall military progress and forced the allies to expend additional resources to open the port at Ghent.

Even prior to Antwerp's targeting, the authors maintain, the V-2's deployment against London affected Allied progress on the continent. The day after the first two rockets fell on London on September 8, 1944, Montgomery received a letter from the

Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff asking him, "to report most urgently by what approximate date" the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht and Rotterdam would be captured. "When this area is in our hands" the letter informed Montgomery, "the threat from this weapon will probably have dispersed."54 Evidently, this news persuaded

Montgomery to change his plan of attack. The author's quote from his memoirs,

On the 9th of September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V-2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I am concerned that settled the direction of the thrust of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and the Rhine, it must be towards Arnhem.55

Originally, according to the authors, the plan was to capture a crossing over the Rhine only, from which the Allies could strike into the heart of Germany and bring the war to a rapid conclusion. The rocket threat, however, convinced Montgomery to attempt a much more audacious and ultimately disastrous operation, "Market Garden." It follows, according to the authors, that were it not for the rocket threat, Montgomery would have

King and Kutta. (Cambridge MA, 1998) p. 314 Ibid. p. 226 Ibid. p. 245

21 stuck to the original plan, concentrated his forces on capturing the Rhine crossing alone.

This concentrated operation would have had a greater chance of success and perhaps would have led to an early end to the war.

King and Kutta's study essentially maintains that the V-2, once deployed, succeeded in creating a more favourable strategic situation for Germany, even if the effort came at a time when the war had already been lost.56 The weapon, they argue, could have had even greater success were it not for political interference and the unforeseen technical problems. These retarded the V-2's deployment far more than did

Allied counter measures.57 They point to the fact that unlike the flying bomb, the V-2 steadily improved in accuracy and reliability throughout its operational life and the

British government remained frustrated that it could not stop the rocket attacks.58

Although King and Kutta's analysis of the V-2's strategic impact after deployment is impressive, their study would be more convincing were it not based almost entirely on secondary sources. Moreover, what remains unexplored in Impact, and in the historiography generally, is the degree to which the emergence of the long range rocket created a strategic challenge for the British prior to its deployment.

The cost benefit conceptual framework for evaluating the V-2 program remains ascendant in Roy Irons, Hitler's Terror Weapons (2003) the latest book on the V weapons. Irons study includes statistical analysis of everything from German industrial capacity and troop strengths, to speculative assessments of potential V-2 damage to

London had the weapon been produced in greater numbers. He also devotes considerable

55 Ibid. p. 245 56 Ibid. p. 286 57 Ibid. p. 313 58 Ibid. p. 315

22 discussion to the issue of poison gas, although mostly relating to the V-l. Citing

Neufeld's estimates of the V-2's monetary cost to Germany, Irons agrees that the V-2 from a cost benefit standpoint was a waste of resources. He makes perhaps the most illustrative comparison of any history to show the V-2 campaign's lack of destructive force, bringing to attention the fact that the number of people killed by both the V weapons, 8938, the majority of these from the VI, was less than the total number of

British citizens killed in road accidents, 11,672, over the same period.59 In the end, Irons agrees with the verdict of most historians critical of the V2 program. It survived he states, "due mainly to the protection afforded by the politically powerful army and the artful zeal of Dornberger."60

Of all the works covering the V2, Irons is the only one to discuss the weapon's psychological aspects at some length. Irons argues that both Germany and Britain believed a collapse in enemy morale could be achieved through aerial bombing.

However, he maintains that "There seems to have been no clearly thought out picture on either side of the exact stages to be expected in a collapse in civilian morale. Panicking crowds, pressures on governments, even their overthrow, how was this to be accomplished?"61 Irons suggests that the Germans believed that the V weapons, especially the V2, "was a new and more terrifying thing" than the manned bomber and would thus generate far greater fear.62 Irons goes on to give a survey of how the morale of the British public was affected by the V weapons and how the British government dealt with the situation. However, his analysis in this regard is all too brief and primarily

59 Irons, Roy. Hitler's Vengeance Weapons. (London, 2003) p. 128 60 Ibid. p. 49 61 Ibid. p. 130 62 Ibid. p. 131

23 focused on the V-l. Indeed, his discussion of the two weapons is so intertwined as to be confusing at times. Ultimately, Irons admits that the whole topic of the V weapons and psychological warfare is "very subjective." He is satisfied to conclude that "Morale where it mattered most, at the top, held secure."63

General analytical histories of the Second World War are more or less consistent in their appraisal of the V-2. Indeed, they echo the basic conclusion of most works specific to the V-2 and German weapons research. The weapon was a disaster for

Germany, a strategic blunder that diverted the Reich's limited labour, material and scientific expertise away from far more pressing needs, specifically air defence. So far as the British point of view is concerned, most general histories only comment on the intelligence situation and the rockets lack of affect post deployment. Echoing a gap in the historiography of the V-2, they overlook the strategic threat engendered by the

German rocket program prior to the missile's actual deployment and operation.

For example, Heinz Magenheimer's Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic

Decisions 1940-1945, (1999) reiterates Speer's argument that AA rockets held great promise and should have been the focus of German weapons development. He further postulates that if the anti-aircraft rocket had been perfected, thousands of AA guns tied down in the Reich could have been transferred to the East, where they were desperately needed to defend against Russian tanks.64 Furthermore, Magenheimer identifies the V-2 program's negative effect on German air defence, specifically fighter aircraft - production, as being its most substantial repercussion.65 In making this argument, however, he ignores the question of whether sufficient pilots and fuel could also have

63 Ibid. p. 138 Magenheimer. p. 231

24 been produced, a point first raised by Walter Dornberger some fifty years prior. The effect of V-2 attacks on the allies were few and fleeting Magenheimer writes. They succeeded in causing some initial panic among the civilian population of London, but created, "no important interruptions' in the progress of the allied war effort.

Magenheimer puts forward the idea that the V-2 campaign was not simply a result of

Hitler's insistence on vengeance, but also of a mistaken belief, held by many in the

German command, that Britain, if hit hard enough, just might reconsider its demand for unconditional German surrender.

The notion that the V-2's most significant aspect was its diversion from the real priority of German air defence is echoed in Williamson Murray's book, German Military

Effectiveness (1991). Murray makes this argument more forcefully than does

Magenheimer and comes to an unambiguous conclusion. "In the summer of 1943,"

Murray writes, "they could have radically restructured their aircraft industry for a massive output of day and night fighters... The other choice, the continued emphasis on retaliation weapons, meant the loss of the air war in the skies over Germany." Murray cites the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign" Report

60, January 1947, to prove his contention. The survey calculated that German expenditures on the V-2, and the V-l, in the last eighteen months of the war alone could have equaled the production of 24, 000 fighter aircraft.69 This is a number to reckon with. However, Murray, like Magenheimer, overlooks the question of fuel and pilot training. Murray expands upon the notion that the V-2's production was driven by

65 Ibid. p. 231 66 Ibid. p. 253 67 Ibid. p. 255 /TO Murray, Williamson. German Military Effectiveness. (Baltimore, 1992) p. 76

25 Hitler's desire for vengeance. Hitler was not just reacting to the dictates of his own mania, Murray argues, but to a restless German population that was demanding retribution against the English. He cites an October 1943 quote from Goering, "All they wished to hear when a hospital or children's home in Germany is destroyed is that we have destroyed the same in England; then they are satisfied." Undoubtedly, the psychology of revenge was a vital influence behind the long range rocket's development.

By and large historians have concluded that because the V-2 failed to prevent allied victory it was of no strategic value. While some maintain that it could have been effective had come onto the scene earlier, most argue that it was a poorly conceived weapon from the outset, whose extraordinary expense diverted from other far more pressing needs. Most of the established literature maintains that Germany's strategic situation would have been better served had the resources poured into the rocket program been used instead on the manufacture of conventional aircraft or even the less costly V-l. If rockets were to be pursued, some contend, then the creation of an effective anti-aircraft missile, the Wasserfall, should have been the focus. Indeed, some historians have surmised that such a weapon could have altered the outcome of the war or, at the very least, prolonged it. Others dismiss the idea that such a technology was feasible in those years and some even cast doubt on whether Germany possessed sufficient fuel and pilots to make the production of additional aircraft a viable alternative to the V-2 rocket.

Amid these well worn debates crucial aspects of the V-2's history remain relatively unexplored. Psychological factors were crucial both to the V-2's development

Ibid. p. 78 Ibid. p. 77

26 and to its very nature as a weapon of war. Like the manned bomber it was a weapon that could deliver explosives over a long distance. Yet, unlike the manned bomber it was an automated weapon: fast, indiscriminate and unstoppable. In these ways it represented the dawn of a new era of warfare, one that offered the possibility of achieving strategic goals through maintaining a psychological advantage over one's enemy.

Most of the major works of history that cover the V-2 also cover the history of the V-l flying bomb and other German secret weapons projects. This can be problematic, especially when one considers that the flying bomb and the rocket were very different weapons, not only in terms of technological sophistication but in terms of the different expectations, perceptions and responses they engendered. Although contrasting and comparing the history of the devices can be useful, each is deserving of independent analysis. However, with the exception of Philip Henshall's Hitler's Rocket

Sites and Michael Neufeld's The Rocket and the Reich there are no major academic works of history that focus on the V-2 exclusively. Even with these works analysis is largely confined to the German point of view. Hence, there is a considerable gap to be filled with respect to independent analysis of the V-2 rocket's history from the British perspective. It is not sufficient to conclude that simply because the long range rocket failed to inflict severe casualties, collapse British morale and win the war for Germany it failed to present the British government with a major strategic challenge.

The British government's responses to the long range rocket threat were greatly influenced by their intelligence assessments. F.H. Hinsley's, Official History of British

Intelligence in the Second World War (1984) effectively illuminates the intelligence puzzle that was the German rocket program. Hinsley's writes that "by May 1943 the intelligence which had accumulated," on German efforts to develop rocket weapons

27 "was causing serious alarm." Following the deployment of the V-l, Hinsley writes

"Anxiety about the rocket threat at the end of June (1944) was all the greater... because intelligence about the development, the performance and production of the weapon was still scanty." Indeed, anxiety over the rocket threat remained high until late August

1944, when a clear intelligence picture of the rocket's performance emerged and

Germany retreated out of France.

An official history of British intelligence, Hinsley study does not discuss the myriad of strategic implications presented by the advent of long range rocket technology. He is merely concerned with detailing the history of the intelligence: what was known when and how concerning the V-2. The Allies offensive efforts to hamper the German rocket are covered in the course of this history. However, how the British government reconciled the uncertainty of the rocket threat with the need to prepare an effective Civil Defence strategy is not covered by Hinsley. What, if any, were the unique dangers, material and psychological, that the British government saw in the rocket?

What plans and measures were put in place or discussed to meet the contingency of rocket attack? In essence, how great a threat was the rocket truly perceived as being?

One most go beyond the history of the intelligence in order to answer these questions.

This thesis will first explore what motivated Hitler's decision to suddenly back the rocket program and why it continued, in his mind and that of other Nazi leaders, to hold such importance. It will be argued that the elevation of the V-2 program to highest priority rested chiefly in Hitler and much of the senior Nazi leadership's belief that the escalating destruction of Germany's cities could be halted through psychological

71 Hinsley F.H. British Intelligence in the Second world War: It influence on Strategy and Operations, (London, 1984) Vol. 2. p. 128

28 warfare. They saw in the long range rocket a weapon that could reinvigorate German morale and "shock and awe" the British into peace negotiations. More substantially, this thesis will explore to what degree the threat of long range rocket bombardment succeeded in raising a strategic challenge for the British government. It will be demonstrated that the British government perceived the threat of rocket bombardment as far more serious than the established literature would suggest. Their anxiety, elevated by uncertain intelligence, centered not on the rocket's potential threat to military operations in the field but on its potentially devastating psychological effects on a war weary

London public. Planning to meet the contingency of rocket attack took place at the highest levels and included the drafting of extraordinary measures. Ultimately, this thesis will prove that although the V-2 had no promise of winning the war, it was nevertheless a strategically valuable undertaking. The mere threat of long range rocket bombardment succeeded in creating substantial strategic challenges for the British government; one echoed in many instances of contemporary history.

Ibid. Vol. 3 p. 441

29 Chapter Two: Vengeance

The Fuehrer agrees that air warfare against England must now be conducted according to psychological rather than military principles. fGoebbles Diary, March 20, 1943)

In July of 1943, Hitler put the A4 rocket program, "on a par with tank production" in terms of priority in the German war economy. As the war began to go against Germany, Hitler and many senior Nazi ministers came to regard the A4 as a miracle weapon, capable of reversing the Reich's precarious and declining strategic position. Their faith in the weapon's strategic utility was based on an appreciation of its psychological value. Hitler believed that the deployment of such a revolutionary technology had the potential to deliver onto Britain a crippling psychological blow. It was hoped that a rain of rockets on London would not only complicate allied military operations and strategy, but turn British opinion against the continuation of the war. This in turn would lead the British government to halt the area bombing of German cities and even led to the negotiation of a separate peace. At the very least the A-4 would provide a useful propaganda vehicle as the V-2. It could be used to glorify the notion of German technological superiority as decisive and provide a war weary nation with a reason to keep fighting.

Retaliation against Britain had been extant in the minds of Hitler and the Nazi

30 elite ever since the first British bombing raid on Berlin took place on August 25 1940.

Ineffectual as it was, Hitler had regarded the raid as a disgrace and threatened immediate and overwhelming retaliation. In a speech at the Sportpalast on September 4 he promised that when, "the British drop two or three tons of bombs, the German flyers will answer with fifty, a hundred, two hundred tons of bombs on Britain, until the cities of

England are razed and until these pirates of the night are forced to desist."74 In conclusion Hitler remarked, "The hour will come when one of the nations will break down, and it won't be Germany."75 Three days later the nightly bombing of London began, in what came to be known as the Blitz. Hitler had never been completely convinced that Britain could be successfully invaded and the move to terror bombing ushered in a new strategy. Instead of creating the conditions that would help make an invasion successful, namely the destruction of British airpower, the German air force was to terrorize the British into seeking a peace. Hitler and other senior Nazis belief in the power of airborne terror to break British resistance would continue despite the failure of the Blitz.

The Luftwaffe was simply not strong enough to both overcome British air defences and deliver the sort of bomb loads that would force the British to the negotiating table. Despite nightly raids over the winter of 1940-41 that devastated large parts of London and other cities, the British held out and German losses in the skies over

England mounted. Almost a month after the most intense aerial activity over Britain the

Luftwaffe's Chief of Operational Staff, General Otto Hoffman von Waldau, stated that

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. (London, 1995) p. 497. Shirer, William. This is Berlin. (London, 1999) p. 395 Ibid. p. 395

31 an air fleet four times the size would be needed to force Britain to its knees. By the winter of 1941 Hitler, frustrated that the British remained unbeaten, began to focus his attention on planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The bulk of the Luftwaffe would be needed in the East and the bombing offensive against Britain had to be dramatically scaled down. By June 21, 1941, one day before the invasion of the Soviet

Union, German bomber strength in Western Europe stood at just 136 serviceable aircraft down from a high of 787 on September 7, 1940.77 For the time being, Hitler left the task of bringing Britain 'to her knees' to the U-boats.

By the beginning of 1942 it was clear that Germany was not going to achieve an early end to the war. On December 11, 1941 war had been declared on the United States even as Britain continued to hold out, offering a base for American operations. The invasion of the Soviet Union had not gone according to plan. Despite spectacular early success, the German advance had stalled outside of Moscow and Hitler's armies faced a bitter winter before any major operations could be resumed. Hitler's appointment of his trusted architect, Albert Speer to the new post of Minister of War Production in February of that year indicated such a realization. 1942 also witnessed the first major bombings of

German cities by British air flotillas. The Luftwaffe also began to be challenged for control Germany's airspace. Early RAF raids on Germany had delivered but a small fraction of the bomb loads Germany had dropped on Britain during the Blitz. These raids incensed Hitler and came as a psychological shock to the German public but they were regarded as an irritation rather than a dire strategic threat. Nevertheless, according to historian A.J.P Taylor, Hitler felt, "he must retaliate for the sake of his prestige" more

76 Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: Nemesis. (London, 2000) p. 309 77 AIR 41/17 Appendix 10

32 than anything else. This sentiment intensified as the RAF switched to a strategy of

'area bombing' targeting German industrial and urban centres in February. In a major speech at the Reichstag on April 26, Hitler once again promised to retaliate against the

British. However, in the days that followed only smaller English towns such as Bath and

Norwich were reported bombed. According to one Sicherheitsdienst (SD) report few results were expected, "from the bombing of these British spa and provincial towns" which were not viewed as appropriate retaliation for the destruction in Germany.80 The calls for retaliation were to grow stronger as the destructiveness of the allied bombing attacks increased dramatically. Hitler and the German leadership were concerned by falling public moral, but were frustrated that little could actually be done to counter the allied bombing. They had to confront the fact that either more planes or new weapons of war would be needed to retaliate against the British attacks.

On May 30, 1942 Hitler dismissed the RAF's threats of heavy air-raids, Q 1 believing that the necessary anti-aircraft precautions had been taken. That same night the RAF mounted its first "thousand plane" raid against Cologne, and two nights later struck Essen with almost equal force.82 These 'mass bombings' caused the first extensive losses of German civilian life since the war began. Again, Hitler was enraged by the renewed ferocity, and aim, of the British attacks. He personally blamed Goring for neglecting the construction of sufficient flak installations. Nevertheless, the bombing represented a serious blow to his prestige.83 Moreover, the inability of the Luftwaffe to

78 A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (London, 1965), p. 499. 79 The Sicherheitsdienst or SD was the intelligence service of the SS. 80 Cited in Kershaw, Ian. The Hitler Myth. (Oxford, 2001) p. 183. 81 Kershaw. Nemesis, p. 524. 82 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, European War. p. 3 83 Kershaw. Nemesis, p. 524. 33 either prevent the attacks or to retaliate in kind was a particular source of public concern.84 Indeed, where previous allied efforts had not, these first 'mass attacks' began to "touch a raw nerve" of public confidence in the German leadership.85 Although at first

Goring's popularity suffered in particular, the Fuhrer's massive prestige would tarnish as the bombing attacks gained in ferocity and losses in Russia mounted, with no sign that victory was imminent.

Not surprisingly then, Hitler's next major speech in the Berlin Sportpalast on

September 30, 1942, was clearly aimed at boosting morale on the home front. He emphasized that gains made in Russia over the previous summer had made available new resources that would improve foodstuff provisioning in the Reich. More importantly he addressed the bombing situation. Once more Hitler promised the German public that retaliation against Britain, exceeding that of the Blitz, would be forthcoming.

The man who invented bombing warfare against the innocent civilian population declares that soon this bombing warfare will be expanded very strongly against Germany. I would like to express one thing here: In May, 1940, Mr. Churchill sent the first bombers against the German civilian population. I warned him at the time and for almost four months but of course in vain. Then we struck and indeed so thoroughly did we strike, that he suddenly began to cry and declared, it was barbarism and it was terrible. England would take revenge for it... Again today they are conducting this warfare and I would like to express one thing here: The hour will come this time also in which we will answer. May both chiefs of this war and their Jewish backers not begin to squirm and whine if the end for England is more horrible than the beginning.

Evidently, the speech did not have any lasting effect on morale. "The war weariness is

Kershaw The Hitler Myth p. 185. 85 Ibid. p. 185 Qfi Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, Federal Communications Commission. "Chancellor Adolf Hitler's Address at the Opening of the Winter Relief Campaign." Berlin, September 30, 1942. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420930a.html

34 just too strong" the SD reported a month later. From the beginning of 1943, Germany's military fortunes both on the Eastern and home fronts were to take a dramatic turn for the worse. Hitler, and much of the top Nazi leadership, would seize upon the science of rocketry as a new means to avenge the British and boost confidence in a final victory; a victory that would become increasingly remote in the eye's of the German public following the disaster at Stalingrad and the escalation of allied bombing.

At the Casablanca conference in January of 1943 the objective of the allied air forces was firmly established as the "destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German

no people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." In effect, the wholesale destruction of Germany's cities was given the green light. On the night of March 27, 1943 the ferocity of allied air power was brought to bear on Berlin as

British bombers dropped 900 tons of bombs, twice the number dropped on London in its worst raid. Berlin Radio immediately went on to characterize the raid as, "a terror attack."89 As the allied bombing campaign intensified in the spring and summer of 1943 the promise of retaliation was increasing viewed by Germany's civilian population as a question of the utmost importance.90 For Hitler and his acolytes, retaliation was a means to victory itself.

For those Germans most affected by the bombing raids the idea of a paralysing counterblow was seen as the most effective means of stopping the attacks. They were encouraged by rumours of revolutionary new weapons, including rockets, that were

Cited in Kershaw. The Hitler Myth, p. 186. 88 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, European War. p. 5 89 The Daily Telegraph. March 29, 1943. 90 Kirwin, Gerald. "Waiting for Retaliation: A Study in Nazi Propaganda Behaviour and German Civilian 35 being developed at Peenemunde and, more directly, by the renewed emphasis on retaliation that began to appear in Goebbels propaganda.91 In April of 1943 Goebbels wrote in Das Reich92, "By day and night we are working on the possibility of repaying the British terrorists in kind. We are certainly not looking at the British air war with folded arms." Without doubt this new emphasise of the propaganda on retaliation was aimed at giving the German people hope. It was designed to assuage their fears that victory was out of reach following the catastrophe at Stalingrad and amidst the intensified bombing. According to one SD report in early July, "In regards to this question, the conviction is very often expressed that, whereas there is no chance of developments in eastern and southern Europe ending successfully, only the destruction of aircraft-carrier England can bring about a final decision in our favour." 4

Those who actually controlled the levers of power in Nazi Germany firmly believed that the bombing raids could be halted through terror attacks. Goebbels diary entries at this time provide evidence of the growing importance that he placed on retaliation. On March 17, 1943 he wrote,

We also talked at length about air warfare. Goering is still not fully aware of the extent of the damage done to property and persons. For instance, he was absolutely flabbergasted when I told him almost seven hundred people had been killed in Berlin. Nor did he know the full extent of the material damage to Berlin. But he, too, now realizes that the English air raids can be stopped only by counter-terror. There is no point in attacking English industrial cities and ports; one must strike the English where they are most easily inclined to defeatism; namely, in the residential sections and homes of the plutocracy. 5

Morale." Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 16 (1981) p. 566 91 Ibid. p. 567 92 Das Reich was a widely-circulated Nazi weekly magazine. Goebbels wrote the lead editorial each week. 93 Quoted in Kirwin, "Waiting for Retaliation." p. 566. 94 Cited in Kirwin, "Waiting for Retaliation." p. 567

36 Indeed the magnitude of allied bombing, unleashed on Germany's cities in the spring of

1943 gave the importance of retaliatory measures new impetus. While Hitler had long promised retaliation against England primarily for the sake of prestige, he and other leaders of the regime came to see it as key to final victory. To this end Goebbels wrote in his diary, "We cannot stand air warfare indefinitely. We must try to develop counter measures as fast as possible, especially reprisal attacks."96 Several days later he wrote,

"Personally I shall look upon our situation as critical only if we fail in replying to the

English air raids with a series of reprisals. They are apparently very much afraid of a recurrence of our blitz air raids."97 Although retaliation in early 1943 was still understood by Goebbels as the recommencement of conventional 'Blitz' style air-raids, this was to change over the course of the year as the V weapons, in particular the A4 rocket, was seized upon as a decisive weapon of retaliation.

The great reversals of early 1943 both on the Eastern front and in the air war came at a time when the A4 rocket project had reached new developmental milestones.

Hitler had been briefed on the A4 project by Dornberger and von Braun on August 20,

1941. According to a memorandum of Dornberger, and the only surviving account of this meeting, Hitler said, "this development is of revolutionary importance for the conduct of warfare in the whole world. The deployment of a few thousand devices per year is therefore unwise. If it is deployed, hundreds of thousands of devices per year

go must be manufactured and launched." Hitler's comments reveal that he was quite

95 Lochner, Lewis., (editor and translator) Goebbels Diaries. (London, 1948) entry dated March 17, 1943. 96 Ibid., Entry dated May 21, 1943. 97 Ibid., Entry dated May 25, 1943 98 Cited in Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich. (London, 1995) p. 139. It must be noted that in Dornberger's book, V2, no mention in made of this encounter. In fact, Dornberger claims that prior to their July 1943 meeting he had not seen Hitler since March 1939! 37 cognisant, at this early point, of the rocket's limitations in accuracy and payload. He remained unwilling to improve the program's priority status. However, this first meeting between the Fuhrer and the rocket scientists took place at time when the war was going

Hitler's way, when victory seemed well within his grasp. Some two years later the war situation had changed completely. There was no sign of imminent victory in the summer of 1943, only punishing reversals on all fronts. The Russians had gained the initiative in the east whilst Germany's cities were being destroyed from the sky. People were increasingly losing confidence in the Fuhrer's ability to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Yet, Hitler could not entertain the possibility of defeat.

October 3, 1942 witnessed the first successful launch of an A4, with one notable qualification; the rocket did not contain a warhead. Problems surrounding the premature explosion of the warhead would require many months to overcome. Nevertheless, Hitler was informed by Speer, on October 14, 1942, that, "his doubts could be over."99 Already by this point circumstances in the war had changed such that Hitler now enthusiastically embraced the idea of the rocket. Speer recalls that "his desires underwent instant inflation. He insisted that before the rocket was put into action a flock of five thousand missiles was to be ready."100 This was a climb down from the 'hundreds of thousands per year' that Hitler had insisted on a little over a year earlier as a prerequisite for a mass production order. Speer was promised delivery of the final technical data that would make preparations for mass production possible by July. However, problems with the rockets warhead continued to delay final plans for a mass producible version long after this date had passed. Regardless, the delay did little to diminish Hitler's new enthusiasm

99 Speer. p. 495. 100 Ibid. p. 496

38 for the A4.

On July 7, 1943 Hitler was presented with a demonstration of the successful A4 launch made the previous October. The event is recollected in detail by Speer and

Dornberger in their post-war writing. Speer had invited General Dornberger and

Wernher von Braun to Hitler's headquarters upon the Fuhrer's request. As has been explained in the previous chapter, Hitler had hitherto remained sceptical of the Army's rocket program, but with retaliation against Britain now seen as a war winning necessity, his interest was rekindled. Dornberger and von Braun presented Hitler the fruit of their labours with the zeal of polished salesmen. After a brief introduction, Hitler was shown a colour film of a successful A4 rocket launch. For the scientists the spectacle had exactly the desired effect. Speer recalls that, "from this moment Hitler had finally been won over. Back in the bunker he became quite ecstatic about the possibilities of this project."101 In fact, Speer quotes Hitler remarking, "The A4 is a measure that can decide the war. And what encouragement to the home front when we attack the English with it!

This is the decisive weapon of the war."102 It was then that Hitler placed the rocket program on par with that of tank production in terms of material and labour resource distribution.

Throughout the summer of 1943 ever more powerful allied bombing raids only served to reinforce Hitler's demand for retaliation measures. In a situation conference with his Air Force liaison Lieutenant Colonel Eckhard Christian, he made his feelings clear, "Terror must be broken by terror - there is no other way! The critical point is that the English will stop only once their own towns are destroyed - nothing else will do it.

101 Speer. p. 496. 102 Ibid. p. 496.

39 No more monkey business. Our population expects retaliation strikes now."104 However, despite Hitler's admonitions there was still little that could be done to repay the English for their city raids. The A4 with a one ton warhead was still under development. To make things worse, Allied landings in Italy had opened up a new war front and necessitated a further dispersal of the Luftwaffe. Raids on England were mounted, but they had little more than a nuisance effect. The German air force's inability to protect

German airspace was put beyond doubt, over three nights in late July and early August

1943, as the RAF struck Hamburg in one of the most devastating city raids of the war.

Roughly a third of civilian dwellings in the city were destroyed and over 60, 000 people killed.105

In a radio address on September 10, Hitler again made reference to a horrible revenge that awaited the British, but set no date.106 He knew that setting a time frame for the retaliation, one that not even he could be sure of, would only result in disappointment, further deterioration in morale and confidence in his leadership. Other regime leaders were not so nuanced. On October 19, 1943 Dr. Willey Ley, the Reich organization leader, in a widely covered speech at the University of Berlin, boasted that within six weeks Germany would have a weapon capable of levelling entire British cities.107 Ley's speech is further evidence of the exuberance for retaliation that permeated much of the Reich's top political leadership. Hitler's reaction to Ley's speech was recorded in the minutes of a situation report on October 26. Colonel General Alfred

Jodl asked Hitler, concerning the deployment of the A4, "Should it be announced?

103 Ibid. p. 496. 104 Hitler and his Generals. Midday Situation Report, July 25, 1943. p. 188-89 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, European War. p. 3. Kershaw. Nemesis, p. 601.

40 Should we speak about it or not? I ask because the various press reports are coming in now as a result of the speech by Ley. Should we speak about it in general?" To this

Hitler responded, "No!" Jodl then suggested, "I wouldn't give a time frame at all, because otherwise there will be disappointment again. It has been said on different occasions, in general terms, that we do have something, and that doesn't do any harm."

Hitler agreed, "Yes indeed. They know that."108 Hitler knew that many Germans, not least himself, were placing great hope in the retaliation. He would not set a time frame, but continued to return to the subject. In his last public speech of 1943, made on

November 8, he again promised that overwhelming retaliation against Britain was imminent.

While it became necessary from a propaganda standpoint not to raise expectations of retaliation too high, the propaganda minister himself continued to believe, no less than Hitler, that revenge was the answer to Germany's deteriorating situation. Goebbels, too, saw the A4 rocket as a means of knocking Britain out of the war. In his September 23,1943 diary entry he gives a glowing appraisal of Hitler's rocket ambitions,

Now, as before, he is unflinchingly determined to inflict reprisals on the English which will pay them back for what they have done to us. Construction of rockets as a weapon of retaliation is underway. If submarine warfare develops as we hope and if in January or February of the coming year our retaliation weapon swings into action, both these German successes will hit the English hard at a time when they are tired of war. Possibly a fundamental change can be affected in the British attitude towards the war. I learned for the first time from the Fuehrer that our big rocket weighs fourteen tons. That, of course, is a murderous tool. I believe that when the first of these missiles descends upon London a sort of panic will break out among the English people.109

Hitler and His Generals, p. 905. Ibid. p. 281 Goebbels Diaries. Entry dated, September 23, 1943.

41 The A4 was not going to knock Allied bombers out of the sky, yet faith in the weapon's potential to terrorise British civilians was so strong that this was not at issue. Goebbels remained convinced that the British were petrified of German retaliation, "The theme of retaliation against England has struck home. The English people are in a state of great unrest, especially since they don't know how this retaliation is to take place. Rumour mongering is therefore the order of the day."110 However, despite Hitler's public assurances that retaliation was coming, impatience was growing. Even Goebbels, after several punishing British air raids on Berlin, in November 1943 began to show frustration. In late November he wrote in his diary, "The zero hour is being postponed again and again. That's the real terror of terrors. If we could only strike back at the

English soon! But, look where you will, no such possibility is to be seen."111 Still,

Goebbels clung to the belief that the retaliation against England would reverse

Germany's fortunes. His hopes were stirred by even the faintest reports of English unease at a German counter-strike in the air war. In early December he wrote to himself,

"We have received a valuable report via Lisbon about the domestic situation in England.

According to it the fear of German retaliation is almost indescribable, especially in the

English capital. The English have a bad conscience."

With no certainty as to when the retaliation weapons would be ready Goebbels propaganda had done its best to emphasize the damage that conventional Luftwaffe bombing raids were inflicting on Britain. Raids were indeed still taking place. However, as mentioned earlier, these had little more than a nuisance effect. Indeed, throughout the

Goebbels Diaries. Entry Dated, November 11, 1943. Goebbels Diaries. Entry Dated, November 27, 1943.

42 whole of 1943 the Luftwaffe dropped a paltry 2,240 tons of bombs on Britain compared to 200, 000 tons dropped by the Allies on the Reich.113 The pinprick attacks of the

Luftwaffe were no substitute for the 'fantastic' retaliation that was promised. In an attempt to prove that the Reich was still capable of mounting major attacks against

Britain and to shore up confidence in the leadership, in the absence of the retaliation weapons, a new conventional bombing offensive against Britain was mustered. This would come to be known by the British as the 'Baby Blitz.' All planes that could possibly be spared were brought to northern France. From January through March 1944

London was again subject to bombing attacks. However, as the name suggests, the

"Baby Blitz" proved far less powerful than its precursor. In fifteen major attacks, all but two of which were aimed at London, only 2,350 tons of bombs were dropped, not nearly enough to effect allied operations.114 Moreover, British air defences had much improved since the raids of 1940/41 and many of the German bombers, flown by inexperienced crews, were shot down. Indeed, the 'Baby Blitz' killed almost as many German airmen as it did British civilians. American analysts viewed the "Baby Blitz" as nothing less than an attempt to give the population confidence in Germany's aggressive potentialities ahead of the readying of the retaliation weapons, and of the looming threat of an Anglo-

American invasion.'15 They were right.

When the first of the vengeance weapons, the VI, began to hit London on June

13, 1944 a virtual euphoria in Germany was the result. Just as all seemed lost the promised retaliation was finally underway. This mood was to be very short lived. It was

Goebbels Diaries. Entry Dated, December 5, 1943. Kirwin. "Waiting for Retaliation" p. 570 114 Ibid. p. 576 Cited in Kirwin, "Waiting For Retaliation" p. 576

43 quickly realized that the weapon failed to bring about the promised results, and the V-l would not knock Britain out of the war at a stroke. Moreover, there was no cessation to the Allied bombing attacks, which if anything grew in intensity rather than diminished.116 As the Allies established a foothold on the continent and began to push the German army out of France, it dawned on all but the most ardent supporters of the regime that the war was irretrievably lost. Nevertheless the German army would continue to fight hard, buoyed by a continued belief in the strategic potentialities of the rocket weapon.

How the promise of retaliation affected the morale of the German army is an important consideration. It was after all the German army's continued will to fight that sustained the war effort at its sharp point, even whilst a majority of the German public thought the war lost. According to a report by the Psychological Warfare Division of the

Allied Expeditionary Force prepared on July 19, 1944 belief in retaliation was a positive factor influencing the morale of German soldiers. Indeed, it lists "Belief in Secret

Weapons and Miracles" as one of seven "main buttresses" sustaining German combat morale. The report, based upon the "recent" interrogation of 600 captured German prisoners of war and an opinion survey of 363 of those prisoners, found that 23 per cent of those polled thought that the flying bomb would decide the war. More significantly, with regard to the V2, 37 percent were convinced that Germany had other secret weapons of greater potency.117 Indeed, the report goes so far as to say that, "This faith in the Secret Weapons must be underestimated, as it seems to supply a rational for 'holding out in the West' at all costs. Psychologically related to the Secret Weapons belief is a

Kirwin. "Allied Bombing and Nazi Propaganda" European History Quarterly. Vol. 15, (1985) p. 356 117 WO 219/4717

44 mystical hope of some miracle, part of the faith in the 'superiority' and 'mission' of

Hitler's Germany, which will turn the scales once more in her favour."118

Clearly, the promise of retaliation continued to boost German army morale more than a month after the first VI attacks failed to fundamentally alter the war situation.

This indicates that the Nazi leadership's faith in the V2's war winning capability had been impressed upon a sizable portion of German soldiers. Although they would not have known of the nature of the rocket program, they were nonetheless confident that something big was in store. Indicating both an absence of intelligence on the rocket and supreme confidence in allied victory, the report suggests that, "It is too early to estimate the possible disillusionment among the Germans if they find that their expectations have not been fulfilled."119 Obviously the V2 did not turn the tide of war but it did provide the ordinary German soldier with a reason to keep fighting. Its strategic value in this sense cannot be denied.

The following chapter will examine what the British government knew of the rocket's development and performance, how great a threat they perceived in it and how they planned to deal with the possibility of rocket bombardment. It will be demonstrated that the British government, while struggling to get a clear intelligence picture of the

German rocket program, was extremely concerned by the possible deployment of such a revolutionary device. It was generally believed that the Germans were working towards the construction of a rocket far more powerful than was in fact the case. Throughout the spring and summer of 1943 difficult decisions were made as to how to best deal with the emergence of the rocket threat. The decision to launch a hazardous large scale bombing

45 raid against Peenemunde on August 17,1943 was a reflection of just how serious a strategic threat the British government came to regard the rocket. Domestically, various studies outlined the potentially catastrophic physical and psychological damage to the capital that might result from a sustained bombardment. The British strategy for countering such an event focused on maintaining an adequate shelter system, devising an early warning of attack and controlling information. The government understood that in the event of rocket attack information to the public had to be tightly controlled not only to prevent the Germans from knowing the results of their attacks but to foil the spread of fear and panic that Hitler was so confident the rocket would produce.

9 Ibid.

46 Chapter Three: The First Rocket Scare, 1943

Within the near future it may be necessary to put into effect certain counter measures such as attacks on specific targets in enemy territory, and to take 1 OA special precautions in this country.

The British were aware of German scientists interest in developing rocket technology before the war began. The first tangible piece of intelligence to indicate that the Nazi Government was developing secret weapons for hostile purposes was received in late 1939 in the form of the Oslo Report. This report, delivered to the British Naval

Attache in Oslo by an anonymous correspondent, mentioned amongst other things that the Germans had constructed an experimental station on Peenemunde. Little attention was paid to this warning. In May of 1942 a chance over-flight of the Baltic island by reconnaissance aircraft revealed the construction of several large circular earthworks.

Photographic interpreters did not know, at first, what to make of them. However, as further intelligence reports pointing to German research into long-range rockets accumulated over the course of the year, it was decided that Peenemunde required further scrutiny. Subsequent over-flights revealed continued construction on the island and in March 1943, intelligence obtained from high-ranking prisoners of war confirmed that the Germans were working on at least one secret weapon of novel design. The

' AIR 20/8199 June 29, 1943, Air Vice Marshall, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff Ops. 121 WO208-3437

47 strategic challenge that faced the British government over the next year was determining the true scale of the rocket threat, how close Germany was to unleashing this revolutionary weapon and what counter measures could be undertaken that would not unduly divert resources from offensive operations. In contrast to the autocratic dictates of Hitler that underlay the V2 program, the British response to the threat of rocket attack was, on the whole, carefully considered and deliberate. It included both active and passive measures designed to thwart the rocket's deployment and to ameliorate its potential to cause physical destruction and psychological harm.

By April of 1943 the accumulation of intelligence pointing to German development of a rocket weapon, "however inaccurate the details may be," spurred the

British War Cabinet to take further action. The Cabinet was well aware that a long-range rocket, if deployed in sufficient number, could present a new and terrible menace. In a letter to the Ministry of Home Security, the War Cabinet outlined their understanding of the rocket weapon and the threat it posed. It was thought that, "they would carry a 1000 kilogram bomb for a range of up to 130 miles," and that, "Owing to the inaccuracy of the rockets at long ranges, an efficient attack would necessarily be limited to an area target like London." This initial assessment of the rocket was remarkably close to reality but it was not to last. Of particular concern was how to defend against rocket attack. It was recognized by the British Cabinet that such a weapon, by its very nature, meant that, "there is no certainty that we should detect them before an attack was made without warning. Bad weather conditions would be no deterrent." Indeed, the grave psychological implications of rocket bombardment were clearly the government's main

122 HO 186/2271 April 20, 1943, Letter by Brigadier C. Hollis to J.A.R. Pimlott Esq., Ministry of Home Security.

48 impetuous for action, "The Chiefs of Staff have considered the above possibilities and have submitted to the Prime Minister that indications are sufficient to justify taking certain action in view of the powerful moral and surprise effect of such weapons." It was decided that Duncan Sandys, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Supply and

Churchill's son in law, would head a new committee to review the evidence collected thus far and report to the Chiefs of Staff the most likely nature of the German weapon and the best means of preventing its success. Sandys was to have access to the best scientific and technical advice as well as the latest intelligence. The code name for his investigation was "Bodyline."

Upon his appointment, Sandys most pressing task was to obtain a clearer idea of what exactly the Germans were developing. The intelligence picture was far from complete. On May 17, 1943, Sandys submitted an interim report to the War Cabinet

Chiefs of Staff Committee on German long-range rocket development. From the report's outset Sandys maintained that the evidence available was not, "sufficiently complete or reliable to enable a firm and final opinion to be reached." However, he believed that

"the seriousness of this menace" warranted a number of provisional conclusions on the nature of the German rocket. Accordingly, the report concludes that the Germans had likely been trying to "develop a heavy rocket capable of bombarding an area with H.E. or gas from very long range." Moreover, it was believed that though, "extremely difficult" such a device was, "technically quite possible." The report suggested that what scant evidence that did exist as to the rocket's progress suggested that, "it may be far in advance." Most significantly, the report included an awesome overestimation of

123 Ibid. 124 HO 186/2271 May 17, 1943, Interim Report by Joint Parliamentary Secretary. Ministry of Supply. the rocket's destructive power. Based on their own scientific calculations and information gleamed from prisoner of war interrogations, it was believed that the rocket the Germans were developing weighed somewhere in the order of 70 tons, could carry a warhead of up to ten tons and had a range of some 100 to 150 miles. Its lack of accuracy was still thought to limit the rocket to area targets such as London. This staggering overestimation of the rocket's power was a result both of a general lack of knowledge concerning rocket technology and the fact that information obtained from German prisoners of war was likely more influenced by the ostentatious boasts of Nazi propaganda and rumour rather than on specific knowledge of the rocket program.126

Over the next year the notion that the rocket could carry a ten-ton warhead overshadowed the government's understanding of the threat and the actions it warranted.

The psychological as well as physical destructiveness of such a weapon combined with the possibility that the Germans might arm the rocket with gas remained the focus of concern. Indeed, Sandys report warned that heavy attacks by such a weapon, "upon

London, particularly if gas were employed, would undoubtedly have a very serious effect upon the machinery of government, upon production and upon civilian morale."

Strategically, it was thought that the Germans had good reason to pursue such a weapon.

"The economic effort involved in the production and projection of such rockets, though very considerable, is not prohibitive when compared with the cost of dropping an equal weight of explosives from the aircraft, allowing for the heavy losses which the German

Air Force must now expect." Above all Sandys was convinced that "the likelihood of this new weapon sooner or later materializing," justified "certain precautionary action to

125 Ibid. 126 WO208-3437

50 be taken forthwith." The first and most obvious priority was to obtain more and better intelligence on the rocket program through continued reconnaissance flights, prisoner of war interrogations and spies. Additionally, it was recommended that "every effort should be made to secure information from Swedish sources." As fate would have it, Swedish sources would over a year later, provide invaluable intelligence on the true form of the rocket. It was also recommended that the Ministry of Home Security draw up special civil defence measures that would be needed in the event of an attack by the rocket envisaged. The issue of press censorship was also given attention. It was believed that special measures would be needed to "deny to the enemy as far as possible all information about the effects of his attack."128 However, Sandys believed that the rocket threat was so severe it required not just civil defence planning but pre-emptive military action.

That Sandys was ready to call for the, "effective bombing" of Peenemunde based on uncertain intelligence is evidence of the exceptional danger he saw in the

German attempts to deploy a long range rocket. To bomb Peenemunde "effectively" would require the diversion of a large portion of the bomber fleet from other pressing tasks. Sandys would require more evidence of Peenemunde's centrality to a German rocket program if this diversion of resources were to be approved. In the meantime, the lack of definitive evidence did not stop him from pressing the issue. By late May,

Sandys had forwarded a preliminary list of suggested targets to the Air Ministry. He maintained that while "the existence of the long range rocket cannot be definitely proved," Peenemunde and two other sites, also suspected of being connected to the

127 HO 186/2271 May 17, 1943, Interim Report by Joint Parliamentary Secretary. Ministry of Supply. 128 Ibid.

51 rocket were, "in any case of great importance to the German war effort."129 If this was not enough, to further sway opinion Sandys made issue of recent reconnaissance over

Peenemunde that revealed some evidence that the Germans were, "strengthening the

Anti-Aircraft defences" around the island.130 For this reason he recommended that

Peenemunde be bombed, "at an early date" before its A.A. defences were built up.

Sandys call for the destruction of Peenemunde was to gain support as new photographs of the island taken on June 2 showed what appeared to be a tall object standing on newly asphalted ground. It was in actual fact a rocket standing on its fins.

With this new evidence, on June 11 Sandys again pressed the Air Ministry with the urgency of destroying Peenemunde. This time he went so far as to suggest that the rocket was "either in a very advanced stage of development or already in limited production." He also recommended that Peenemunde be photographed "about once a fortnight."132 Sandys believed that the new photographs provided, "strong evidence" that the Germans were, "pressing on as quick as possible with development of the long range rocket...at Peenemunde" and provided adequate justification for a bombing attack "upon this establishment.. .as soon as possible."133 As it turned out, additional air reconnaissance photographs obtained on June 23 clearly revealed several rocket-shaped objects lying horizontally on trucks parked inside an elliptical earthwork. This was just the hard evidence Sandys required. Moreover, adding to suspicions about Peenemunde was a new spy report that month that described, "the secret weapon to be used against

London" as "an air-mine with wings, long distance steering and rocket drive" that was

129 AIR 20/8199 130 Ibid. 131 Collier, p. 32 132 AIR 20/8199 June 11, 1943, Letter by Duncan Sandys to A.C.A.S. 133 AIR 20/8199 June 18, Letter by Duncan Sandys to A.C.A.S. (Ops.)

52 launched by catapult. In fact this was not the rocket but the VI flying bomb. A week later the Air Ministry communicated to Sandys that, "an attack of a very heavy scale" would be required to effectively destroy the installation and that, "owing to the short hours of darkness of summer such an attack would not be practical until about the beginning of August."135

Sandys duly reported the most recent information obtained on the German rocket program to the Defence Committee. On June 29 the Committee, with Churchill in the chair, convened to deliberate his findings. Not everyone was convinced that

Peenemunde was at the centre of a German rocket program or that such a program even existed. Lord Cherwell, the Paymaster-General and Churchill's scientific advisor, remained sceptical, believing that the rocket was some sort of deception plan hiding a

1 -3/- genuine development program such as the flying bomb. His scepticism was understandable. There still existed no concrete evidence of a German rocket program.

The rocket shaped objects photographed on June 23 could have been dummies.

Moreover, there was still some doubt over the technical feasibility of constructing a long-range rocket, especially one that carried a ten-ton warhead. One the other hand the flying-bomb, on which intelligence had also accumulated, was thought a much more realistic proposition from a technological standpoint. The British had even experimented with their own design for a such a device prior to the war. In the end, Sandys along with his technical advisor R.V. Jones effectively argued that Peenemunde, irregardless of the rocket, was of some great importance to the Germans and that they were unlikely to stage a deception on the island when that would only serve to invite an air raid upon it.

134 Collier, p. 32 135 AIR 20/8199 June 26, A.C.A.S. (Ops.) Letter by N.H. Bottomley to Duncan Sandys

53 An additional piece of evidence brought to bear by Sandys and Jones was a German Air

Ministry priority list for fuel distribution that put Peenemunde above other installations

•I o*7 of known importance.

The Committee decided that on the face of the evidence Peenemunde and the rocket it was suspected of developing, were a clear and present danger. A number of decisions were therefore reached. First and foremost it was decided that an attack upon

Peenemunde was necessary, "on the first occasion when conditions were suitable."

Moreover, it was decided that the raid would, "take the form of the heaviest possible night attack by Bomber Command."138 A letter to the Commander and Chief of Bomber

Command outlining the objectives of the raid left no illusions as to why the government thought it necessary. "The German long range rocket had probably reached an advanced state of development," it was stated and "reports indicate that the enemy intend to employ this weapon in retaliation against this country for the bombing of the Ruhr."

The precise objectives of the raid were listed as the "destruction of the two production sheds, the technical buildings, and living accommodations, and inflicting maximum possible casualties upon skilled technical personnel engaged in development work." The goal of inflicting maximum casualties was driven by a sombre logic. Buildings could be rebuilt but the scientist and engineers that were developing Peenemunde's secret weapon could not be easily replaced and were therefore crucial targets. To inflict as many casualties on Peenemunde's technical personnel as possible required not only the element of surprise but a very powerful first strike. For this reason it was recognized

136 CAB 69 D.O. (43), 5th meeting 137 Collier, p. 33 138 AIR 20/8199 July 1, 1943, D. of I. (O) Copy to: Wing Commander Lamb D.B. Ops. R.D.F Counter Measures - "Bodyline" 139 AIR 20/8199 CMS. 82/A.C.S. (Ops.) German Long Range Rockets.

54 that, "an initial attack on a very heavy scale will be needed... to secure the maximum element of surprise which would be required if heavy casualties are to be inflicted on the technical personnel."140

The fact that Churchill and the Defence Committee were willing to commit a large portion of the bomber fleet to an attack on Peenemunde in the summer of 1943 is revealing. Although evidence of rocket development was mounting, the workings of the installation were still in question. Even Sandys had to admit this much. Nevertheless, the possibility of a German rocket weapon, armed with a ten-ton warhead, was regarded with sufficient dread that a powerful pre-emptive strike was felt necessary. At this juncture of the war losses being incurred by the R.A.F. on heavy bombing raids of

Germany were high. To bomb Peenemunde with a large force was especially hazardous given the island's distance from England. Significant losses of aircraft had to be expected. Yet, Churchill was convinced that the threat of bombardment from a ten-ton rocket was of such magnitude that a diversion of military force was justified. One can only speculate whether the raid would still have been approved had it been known that the German rocket was to carry only one tenth the amount of high explosives suspected or that it was almost a year short of production.

The Peenemunde bombing raid was the most significant diversion of allied military resources that the V-2 rocket was to achieve. The raid carried out on August 17,

1943 included just under 600 aircraft of Bomber Command of which 40 failed to return.

The installation, for all intensive purposes, was effectively destroyed and German casualties were heavy. While Von Braun escaped injury hundreds of technical staff were

140 Ibid.

55 killed, most notably Dr. Thiel, the chief of engine development for the rocket. While this remained unknown to the British a post-raid reconnaissance report confirmed, "Damage both to manufacturing and to huts for personnel appears to be very severe."141 The War

Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee was informed that, "good results had been achieved" on August 19.142 Historians have argued over just how long the raid actually delayed the

V2's deployment, but it is generally accepted that it was put back by at least two months as the Germans scrambled to reconstitute and disperse their resources. The raid's apparent success helped alleviate anxiety over the rocket to a significant degree but not entirely. The Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, was particularly pleased with the raid based on the preliminary examination of damage. In a letter of congratulations to the

R.A.F., however, he made it clear that in his opinion the site would have to bombed again if closer examination revealed that, "material parts of the installation remain intact."143 The Home Secretary, whose department was overall responsible for Civil

Defence, had a particularly acute fear of the rocket and was an unqualified proponent of robust active and passive anti-rocket measures. Indeed, his letter goes on to state that,

"the Home Secretary assumes that the R.A.F. or U.S.A.F. will regard it as a duty to bomb the place again as well as to attack any other outposts of mischief in France or elsewhere. While appreciating the very natural desire of the Air Staff not to be diverted from their offensive effort in Germany."144

The detection of strange but imposing constructions in Northern France also represented a worrying development for the government and another tactical challenge.

141 AIR 20/8199 August 19, 1943. Immediate Interpretation Report No. KS. 104a. 142 AIR 20/8199 August 19, 1943. C.O.S. (43) 192nd Meeting (0) 143 AIR 20/8199 August 24th 1943. Copy of Letter signed by Harold Scott from the Ministry of Home Security. 144 Ibid.

56 On June 29, 1943 the Defence Committee ordered that "the most searching and rigorous examination of the area of northern France within a radius of 130 miles of London," corresponding to the rocket's assumed range, was to be, "organized and maintained" with, "no step being neglected."145 The Defence Committee was evidently very much alarmed at the appearance of the constructions in northern France. They could not be certain of their purpose, but judging by their physical features and proximity to London it was suspected that they had something to do with the big German rocket. In fact, the sheer size of the constructions, especially at Watten, added support to the estimation of a

60-70 ton rocket. They also augmented the idea that the rocket would be fired from fixed projectors. The rocket sites were so heavily fortified that the ability of existing bomb types to destroy them was questionable and this was another cause for concern. A deep penetration bomb had been invented for the purpose of destroying mine shafts and the

Air Ministry had some confidence that these could be used to attack the "rocket projector sites."146 The Commanding General of the U.S. 8th Air Force had agreed to attack the sites, "with the maximum effort of his forces," however, "Owing to the dearth of conclusive evidence as to the exact nature and positioning of firing points" it was thought more prudent to continue air reconnaissance rather than diverting a large number of bombers.147 The government remained anxious to neutralize the threat of rocket bombardment but did not want to divert assets when the tactical advantage of doing so remained unclear. "It is clear that to ensure destruction of these points, a great weight of attack must be diverted from Germany. It is essential, therefore, that the fullest

145 AIR 20/8199 July 1, 1943, D. of I. (O) Copy to: Wing Commander Lamb D.B. Ops. R.D.F Counter Measures - "Bodyline" 146 AIR 20/8199 June 29, 1943. Minute Sheet D.B. Ops. German Rocket Projector. 147 AIR 20/8199 July 22, 1943 C.O.S. Meeting (43) 395 (0) German Long Range Rocket Development.

57 possible information as to the nature of the firing points and the imminence of the threat be obtained before such a diversion is undertaken."

As with Peenemunde, the accumulation of further intelligence on the suspected rocket sites created sufficient anxiety within the government to divert offensive operations. The Chiefs of Staff remained frustrated that, "intelligence resources have not been able to provide more detailed information" to assist them in determining their

"course of action."149 This intelligence failure was despite the presence of a large number of French and Belgian workers at the Watten site. What was clear from air reconnaissance was that the Germans were investing considerable effort in construction at Watten. This was enough to convince the Chiefs that it would "eventually be of considerable military importance." Additionally, they felt that if the site was "not connected with the rocket" it might have had some "connection with anti-invasion measures." The case for bombing the construction at Watten was further boosted by concern that once completed, particularly the roof, there would be, "as little hope of destroying it as there is the U-boat pens." Based on this assessment the Chiefs of Staff decided that the site needed to be bombed before the roof was completed. However, they remained reluctant to divert resources and only countenanced an attack on Watten if it could be done "without undue diversion of effort from the main bomber offensive." It was thought that this could be done by waiting for weather conditions that precluded bombing over Germany but allowed for Watten to be targeted.150 With this compromise orders for an attack on Watten were authorized at the "earliest opportunity" so long as it

148 AIR 20/8199 August 16, 1943. Draft Memo: Attack of Objectives Connected with the Development of German Long Range Rockets. 149 AIR 20/8199 August 21, 1943. C.O.S. (43) 481(0) German Long Range Rocket. 10th Interim Report by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply. 150 Ibid.

58 remained, "second in priority to the attack of your primary objectives in Germany."151

The task was thought more suitable for the precision minded American 8 Air Force than a R.A.F. Bomber Command, which was busy by night laying waste to German cities. On August 27 1943 and again on September 7, Watten was pummelled by

American bombers. In early November it was reported that the Germans maintained a show of activity at the site but appeared to have abandon heavy construction.

The Peenemunde raid, and those on the suspected rocket projectors in northern

France, represented the Allies' most robust military efforts to upset Hitler's rocket program. However, a multitude of passive measures and precautions were also implemented in an effort to minimize the rocket's physical and psychological effectiveness when, or if, the Germans managed it. As with Peenemunde and the suspected rocket sites, the government's planning for civil defence was heavily influenced by an inaccurate and incomplete intelligence assessment of the rocket's basic characteristics and a reluctance to divert resources away from offensive operations.

Indeed, in terms of material, no appreciable diversion of resources towards civil defence occurred. This was largely the result of Churchill's intervention. On June 4, 1943 the

Ministry of Home Security submitted a report outlining, "what special civil defence measures would be needed in the event of heavy attacks" by the large rocket described in Sandys First Interim Report. The Ministry believed that so far as the "civil population" was concerned, the problem fell under four categories, "Warning of attack"

"Structural precautions, shelters, etc.", "Information to be given to civil population and

AIR 20/8199 Draft Memo: Bodyline CMS.82/D.C.A.S. AIR 20/8199 Air Ministry Weekly Progress Report No. 19 for period 2/8 November, 1943.

59 advice as to conduct" and lastly, "Security." It was thought that through a combination of measures addressing each of these problems, the physical and psychological damage from rocket attacks could be kept to a minimum. When the first rocket attacks finally began in September 1944, security and control of the press would prove the most relevant and most important aspect of the civil defence. In the intervening time, however, plans were laid to address all four areas

Although its understanding of the V-2's salient features remained considerably distorted, the British government was cognisant of one inherent feature of long range rockets that made them a particularly daunting adversary, their immense speed. Unlike conventional bombers, the rocket's journey from the continent to London would only take a matter of minutes. The "practical difficulties" of issuing a public warning were therefore recognized as "great."154 It was widely understood that the physical and psychological effectiveness of the rocket would be considerably enhanced by the absence of any warning. If people had no time to take to shelters before an attack, casualties would be much worse. The government was therefore eager to develop and put in place some kind of early warning system that could detect rocket launches. Based on the erroneous theory that the rocket was radio guided, it was believed that Radio

Direction Finding technology, or radar, offered some hope in this regard. At their June

29,1944 meeting, the Defence Committee decided that, "the manufacture and installation of R.D.F. equipment required for detection of the firing points of long range rockets should be energetically pursued."155 If the rockets firing could be traced then, not

153 HO 186/2271 Report dated June 4, 1943 Ministry of Home Security. 154 AIR 20/8199 Report dated June 4, 1943 Ministry of Home Security. 155 AIR 20/8199 July 1, 1943, D. of I. (O) Copy to: Wing Commander Lamb D.B. Ops. R.D.F Counter Measures - "Bodyline"

60 only would a public warning, however short, be possible but active counter measures

against the launch site could be undertaken. A system was devised whereby the public

would be warned of rocket attack by the firing of maroons and red flares. Yet, assuming

a rocket launch could be detected, it was thought that this system in the best of

circumstances would offer less than one minute warning. 5 Plans for such a warning

system came to nothing. The rocket was not radio guided and it firing points were

eventually discovered to be mobile. A rocket launch could not be traced precisely or

quickly enough to allow for active counter measures. In fact, no record exists of a V-2

battery being successfully attacked before or after launching.

The need for secrecy and the control of information was the most essential

element in combating the efficiency of the rocket weapon. Sandys Interim Report had

stressed the importance of preventing the enemy from "obtaining information about the

effects of his attack." In order to deny the Germans any opportunity to correct the

rocket's aim, Sandys recommended the preparation and, "speedy introduction, if the need arises, of special censorship and security measures."157 Two weeks later, the Home

Office reiterated the need for secrecy and the tight control of information. Indeed, in view of the rocket's imprecision, the Home Secretary thought that, "the whole question

is conditioned by security to an almost unprecedented extent." He believed that it might be possible to keep the Germans "ignorant not only in what part of the attacked city their bomb had fallen, but even whether it had fallen in town or country." A campaign of misinformation to fool the Germans into aiming their rockets at less populated areas was

156 HO 186/2271 August 25, 1943. Long Range Rocket Development. Eighth Progress Report by Sir Findlater Stewart's Committee. 157 HO 186/2271 May 17, 1943, Interim Report. 158 HO 186/2271 Letter dated May 31, 1943.

61 also contemplated. This was all thought feasible as a result of the growing confidence in allied air supremacy. The Home Secretary conceded that there was no point in taking

"immense precautions to conceal information" if the Germans could find what they wanted through air reconnaissance. However, by this stage of the war, the Luftwaffe was in such decline that its ability to even carry out effective reconnaissance was in doubt. In view of this the Home Secretary thought a, "special policy of security and publicity" needed to be formulated.159

While the government assumed that German efforts to aim their rockets could be frustrated through a combination of secrecy and misinformation, the need to conceal and even to alter information out of concern for public morale was also recognized.

British fortunes in the war had improved dramatically from the dark days of the Blitz.

The realization that the enemy might unleash a devastating and likely unstoppable new weapon had the potential to drive a dagger through public morale. A wave of evacuations from London would almost certainly have resulted were the government's appreciation of the rocket threat made public. This alone was reason to keep the matter top secret. However, in the event of actual attack no one could be certain of the public reaction. As early as June 24, 1943 the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, addressed the issue of public morale in a paper outlining civil defence measures in the event of rocket bombardment. He was generally confident in the public stating that, "they have stood up to a great deal on the whole very well."160 This was certainly true in reference to the

Blitz. On the other hand Morrison had to admit that "how they would react to this new weapon is difficult to say." So long as they were given a warning and assured that the

HO 186/2271 Letter dated May 31, 1943. HO 186/2271 Memo dated June 24, 1943.

62 government was, "doing everything in its power to meet the situation" and had, "planned beforehand," Morrison was confident that a, "fair amount of reliance" could be placed on their behaviour. In other words, he was confident that there would be no mass panic.

Nevertheless, people would certainly "evacuate themselves" on a "formidable scale," whether authorized or not, and this could cause problems especially as many of the children who had fled London under the Blitz had since returned.161

The government's understanding of the psychological ramifications of the rocket were such that it took extensive precautions to keep the nature of the threat secret.

Duncan Sandys had identified the Ministry of Information as the appropriate authority to be charged with, "preparing and issuing the necessary secret warnings to newspaper editors."162 Accordingly, the Ministry of Information drew up three separate,

"Confidential letters to the Editors designed to prevent the leakage of information through the Press about the effects of rocket bombardment." A draft public announcement was also drawn up. The first draft, to be used in the event that the bombardment began without any warning, tells the editors that the large explosion was caused by a, "powerful explosive shell fired from across the channel."164 No mention of rockets is made. Rather, the letter refers to, "a new type of long range gun." It concludes by insisting that nothing "be published which might assist the enemy in this new form of attack" and asks editors to, "publish nothing about this incident for a period of at least 48 hours." The second draft, to be used to warn editors before an attack, also makes no mention of rockets. It refers to "a long range gun which may shortly be used to fire a

161 HO 186/2271 Memo dated June 24, 1943. 162 HO 186/2271 Letter dated May 31, 1943. 163 HO 186/2271 August 25, 1943. Eight Progress Report by Sir Findlater Stewart's Committee. Long Range Rocket Development. 164 Ibid. Annex I.

63 powerful explosive shell." The third draft, to be used to warn editors at the same time as a public announcement was made, contains the same misinformation about the form of the projectile as the first two letters. It does, however, note that, "the projectile which may be used will have an explosive force substantially greater than the largest bomb hitherto in use," a faint signal of the ten-ton giant that the government feared. The public announcement also refers to a long-range gun instead of rocket. It informs the public that a "warning system has been devised," but that, "a warning cannot be guaranteed."165

Indeed, what efforts had been made at designing a warning system were futile at best.

The fact that the government was prepared to conceal the rocket's existence even in the event of attack proves how seriously they viewed its potential to sow terror. It was obviously felt that the public would be more at ease with the notion of a long-range gun.

It offered a more readily understandable and therefore less terrifying prospect than a technologically unheralded rocket weapon.

The rocket threat forced a rethinking of structural precautions and shelters in

London. It was thought that the rocket could carry two types of high explosive warhead, an instantaneous fuse or a timed fuse. With an instantaneous fuse the main damage would come from the blast. The Home Office estimated that the blast from ten tons of high explosive would create a 750-850 foot radius of complete or partial destruction and render homes uninhabitable for a radius of 1500-1700 feet.166 This was a scale of destruction far in excess of anything experienced during conventional air raids.

Moreover, as has already been mentioned, the casualties inflicted by the rocket's blast would be far greater if people had no warning to take to shelters. A rocket carrying a

165 Ibid. Annex I. 166 HO 186/2271 Report dated June 4, 1943, Ministry of Home Security.

64 ten-ton warhead with a timed fuse also offered a new and daunting challenge. Crashing

down with immense speed the rocket could bury its warhead deep in the ground before

exploding. It was conjectured that this would form a massive crater 160 feet in diameter

and 45 feet in depth. Some 14 000 tons of debris could be thrown up creating a serious problem in itself. A time fuse warhead was also a danger to deep shelters, which would

be, "liable to damage from earth shock from any buried bomb within 150-180 feet."

Another worry was that panic would create "the possibility of an ugly rush to shelter."

Serious loss of life had occurred in the past as people were caught in a crush trying to enter a large shelter. It was noted that, as a result of this incident, steps were already being taken, "to improve the physical means of controlling access to large shelters."

In the final analysis the Home Office believed that, "The value of existing shelters would be greatly reduced" in view of the rockets unpredictability and destructive power. A "dispersion of the shelters" was therefore thought to be, "the only practicable course." The Morrison shelter, a steel table that protected people from the crush of debris until they could be dug out and reinforced surface shelters were thought to offer the best protection. A reinvestment in shelter construction and strengthening necessitated a diversion of resources from offence to defence. Besides labour and other materials, shelters required steel, a commodity vital in the manufacture of all kinds of armaments. It was, "for consideration" the Home Office concluded, "whether steps should be taken to restart the manufacture of Morrison shelters and expedite the strengthening of such surface shelters in London as remain un-strengthened."169 While the damage expected from the big rocket was understood to be great, the question that

167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. remained was how many rocket attacks of this type the city could endure before being overwhelmed by the sheer scale of destruction.

The ability of the civil defence services and by extension the public to cope with rocket attack was, above all, conditional on the frequency and duration of the rocket bombardment. The Home Office drew up an estimate of the carnage that could be expected from a "sustained attack" by the big rocket on July 16, 1943. It was based on the assumption of a ten-ton warhead crashing down, "every hour of which 50% would

1 70 fall within a circle of a four mile radius and 50% within a circle of a 16 mile radius."

During the blitz, the heaviest raids on London had dropped approximately 400 tons of high explosive in one night. The civil defence apparatus in these instances had proved equal to the task. If a ten-ton rocket went off in London every hour for 24 hours this would equate to 240 tons of high explosive. On this scale of attack the rocket appeared to offer no more of a problem than had already been experienced and overcome in 1941.

However, it was understood that the rocket held certain advantages over the conventional bomber that gave it the potential to be a far more dangerous weapon. To reason otherwise the report stated, "would be a seriously misleading conclusion."171 The raids on London during the blitz were generally not heavy and those that were heavy were not continuous. With the rocket it was realized this might not be the case and the implications were unsettling: "A sustained attack, not only night after night, but 1 7? throughout the 24 hours, on the scale envisaged would be something entirely new."

During the Blitz a two-ton bomb dropped on Hendon, an area with a population density 169 Ibid. 170 HO 186/2271 July 16, 1943. Report by the Home Office. Long Range Rocket, London Region Appreciation. 171 Ibid.

66 of some 150 an acre, killed 80 people and hospitalised 148 more. Based on this incident the casualties that could be expected from each individual missile, armed with ten tons of H.E., were estimated to be anywhere from, "0 to 1000 killed according to the conditions at the point of impact." The average casualties per missile were estimated to be 150 killed and 150 hospitalised.17 When these figures were applied to an intensity of attack of one missile per hour for thirty days the number or estimated casualties was

108, 000 killed and 108, 000 hospitalised.174 These were alarming figures for the Home

Secretary, far worse than had been experienced during the height of the Blitz. Indeed, it was felt that, "Apart from the complications of organization which this would involve, the cumulative effect on morale of continuous incidents of this size, together with the fact that there would be no visible active defence, could hardly fail to be very much greater than that of the 1940/41 blitz."175

It was believed that one of the most important elements, "in the maintenance of morale would be the ability of the civil defence service to function as in 1940/41."

However, for the scale of attack envisaged the report made clear that this would be all but impossible. "The present forces in London Region might be exhausted after the first day if services were sent to deal with each incident effectively."177 Even if a fraction of the required personnel were dispatched to each incident, the emergency services would be overwhelmed in a matter days. This factor combined with the sheer number of casualties produced would inevitably lead to, "mass refugee movements" in the opinion

173 Ibid. Annex A 174 Ibid. Annex A 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid.

67 of the Home Office.178 It conjectured that the number of people rendered homeless each day could be in the order of 100 000 and that another 100 000 non-homeless could be expected to flee the city every 24 hours. After a matter of days the services would be unable to provide accommodation for this outflow of refugees and considerable chaos would inevitably result. In fact, after taking into account the rocket's estimated accuracy and overlap of shot, it was believed that 1200 missiles would, "to all intents and purposes, lay waste the city of London."179 Even if spread out over a period of six months this number of ten-ton rockets would effectively destroy the city. Moreover, it was accepted that, "No conceivable strengthening of the passive defence organization would make it possible to cope with a sustained daily attack at the rate envisaged." For this reason the Home Office proposed two alternatives, "to prepare plans for a large scale evacuation of London" or to undertake, "military action against the source from which the missiles came." It was recognized that the former option, "even if practicable,

1 SO would be tantamount to accepting a major defeat." Indeed, such an action would have given the rocket exactly the result Hitler and Goebbels had hoped it would achieve. It is not surprising then that the Home Secretary was elated by the bombing of Peenemunde and remained a vigorous advocate of pre-emptive military action against sites suspected of involvement in the rocket program.181 On the other hand, he believed that a robust civil defence apparatus had to be maintained in the event that a limited rocket attack materialized.

Any effort to enlarge the existing civil defence services in view of the

178 Ibid. Annex A. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 AIR 20/8199 August 24th 1943. Copy of Letter signed by Harold Scott from the Ministry of Home Security.

68 uncertainty of the rocket threat would inevitably meet with opposition. Shortages of accommodation, equipment and transport imposed "serious limitations" on such a step regardless. In view of this the Home Secretary proposed the "cancellation or postponement" of cuts that were being made to the existing civil defence establishment.182 He believed that although the size of the cuts had no practical bearing on the problem, they could have "unfortunate psychological consequences in the event of the contingency materializing," (further proof that the threat of the rocket was understood to be psychological as much as physical.) As an alternative to additional recruitment, the Home Secretary thought plans were necessary for enabling assistance to be "rapidly obtained from every source." This would include bringing in emergency services from other regions and mustering the Home Guard. Since London was the only target thought likely, other regions and cities could afford to divert their resources to the capital. The Home Secretary also felt that "military assistance would be essential" and that units of Royal Engineers should be "earmarked in advance." The idea of having army units available for civil defence was by far the most serious of the Home

Secretary's proposals since it would involve a diversion from offensive to defensive planning. For these plans to function the necessary administrative arrangements had to be made with all of the departments concerned with civil defence and this meant intimating to a large number of people the extent of the rocket threat. However, the

Home Secretary felt that the security risk was offset by the need to prepare thoroughly for the eventuality of rocket attack.184

182HO 186/2271 July 16, 1943. Report by the Home Office. Long Range Rocket, London Region Appreciation. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid.

69 Despite the Home Office's dire assessment of the rocket's potential to raze

London, Churchill remained sceptical. The Prime Minister was not convinced that the destructive potential of the German rocket was as great as estimated or that the attack could be sustained on the scale envisaged. Responding to Churchill's skepticism, the

Home Secretary admitted that the rocket's potential effects both physical and psychological were a matter for conjecture. "There were many forms which the weapon could take" he wrote, "H.E., incendiary or, poison gas."185 He stressed that his experts had concluded that, "the maximum loss of life, terrorizing effect and interruption of the war effort" was most likely to be produced by high explosive and that the estimated strain on the emergency services from a sustained attack were soundly based. On July

31,1943, Churchill informed the Home Secretary that,

I agree that you should acquaint the Civil Defence Committee of the facts, so that they can be thinking out what part they would have to play in the emergency. It must be made clear to them that no diversion of effort on this account can be authorized until we get more definitive evidence that the danger is imminent, and therefore that the stage has not yet been reached at which local authorities should be informed.186

Churchill had approved the strike on Peenemunde, convinced that the installation, whatever its exact purpose, was of considerable importance to the Germans. However, he was unwilling to countenance any further diversion of resources based on the uncertain threat of the big rocket.

Churchill's decision was influenced by two major considerations. The Prime

Minister had decided with Roosevelt, at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, to launch an invasion of northern France in the spring or summer of 1944, and from there

185 HO 186/2271 August 4, 1943. Letter to Prime Minister from Herbert Morrison.

70 to push on until Germany was totally defeated. Every available resource would have to be geared towards ensuring the success of the invasion, Operation Overlord. A major reinvestment in civil defence, especially recruitment of additional emergency services personnel, was virtually out of the question. Moreover, had Churchill chosen to invest heavily in a reinforcement of the civil defence apparatus, which had been "substantially reduced" since the Blitz, a diversion of resources from offensive operations would not have been the only consequence.187 The public would have inevitably realised that the

Germans were expected by the government to renew their bombardment of the capital.

The attendant damage to morale would have played directly into the hands of Hitler, and given the rocket weapon a pre-emptive victory. Hence there was a strong argument for keeping the rocket threat as secret as possible for as long as possible. The Home

Secretary was forced to heed the Prime Minister's instructions. On August 3, 1943 a memo went out from the Home Office stating that,

The Prime Minister has authorized me to mention to Ministers, the work of whose departments may be more or less affected, a new development of enemy action that may be directed against London and other built up areas of the South of England. As much of the evidence of this development comes from enemy sources and may have been circulated for the purpose of misleading and scaring the public and in hope of diverting man power from offensive to defensive operations, it is of the outmost importance that, until we get more definite evidence that the danger is imminent, what I have to report upon the subject shall be kept most secret. For that reason I am not circulating any paper.1

Indeed, little to no paper was circulated and no substantial moves to bolster the civil defence system were made. The Home Office instead made arrangements to maximize

185 HO 186/2271 Letter dated July 31, 1943. 187 HO 186/2271 July 16, 1943. Report by the Home Office. Long Range Rocket, London Region Appreciation. 188 HO 186/2271 Letter dated August 3, 1943.

71 the efficiency of the civil defence system with available resources. At a meeting of the

War Cabinet on February 3, 1944, Herbert Morrison stated that, "the number of full time

civil defence workers had been considerably reduced" but that this had been, "offset to

some extent by the organization of mobile columns comprising highly trained personnel."189

The bombing of Peenemunde on August 17,1943 relieved the British government's anxiety over the rocket threat, but did not extinguish it. The strategic threat of long range rocket bombardment remained a major challenge. On September 13,

Sandys submitted another report detailing the latest appreciation of the German rocket program. It was presumed that the level of destruction done to Peenemunde would preclude any large scale rocket attack until at least February 1944.190 However, the report also noted a speech by Hitler in which the dictator claimed that, "technical organizations and preparations are in hand" for some unspecified form of retaliation. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on October 28, 1943, Sandys latest report was scrutinized.

Cherwell remained doubtful over the existence of any German rocket program. He thought that the big rocket was "technically possible," but that the effort involved in developing, producing, and deploying it in quantity was too prohibitive for the Germans to undertake. The flying bomb was a far more economical and therefore the likely object of German efforts, he maintained.191 Churchill decided to continue a wait and see approach with the rocket. He felt that there was not enough solid information to sanction a diversion of resources to civil defence. On the other hand the Prime Minister made clear to his colleagues that the government could "hardly ignore the existence of

189 CAB 69/6 CO. (44) 4th meeting. February 3, 1944. 190 HO 186/2271 October 27, 1943. Memorandum from Home Office.

72 unexplained facts." Additionally, Churchill was very much aware of his adversary's desire to strike back. He stated to the cabinet that, "There was no doubt of the presence of an overpowering urge on the part of the German government to retaliate for our bombing." For the Prime Minister this was reason enough to maintain vigilance.

There are few more revealing examples of the British government's apprehension over the rocket than the deliberation on whether to use poison gas in retaliation. The issue was first raised at a defence committee meeting in November. The

Vice Chiefs of Staff were left to consider whether, "rocket attacks should be denounced as acts of indiscriminate warfare against the civilian population and that if they took place we should retaliate by the use of gas."194 They decided that any use of gas was likely to have more negative than positive results. As a weapon against rocket projector sites, gas was unlikely to prevent launches. Used against the German civilian population, it might create panic but not an unconditional surrender. That Germany would retaliate with gas attacks of its own was also a major consideration. Rockets carrying gas warheads could hit London. The invasion force could also be targeted with gas to which it would be vulnerable especially in the early stages. What the British did not know was that in Taubin and Sarin, Germany possessed far more potent gases then they did. There were also moral and legal considerations in view of the Geneva Convention, to which

Britain was signatory, which forbade the use of gas. Additionally, the Vice Chiefs thought that as Britain was actively engaged in a campaign of area bombing Germany's cities, it would be pure hypocrisy to complain over the indiscriminate nature of rocket

191 CAB 69 D.O. (43), 11th meeting.* 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 CAB 69/5 D.O. (43) 14th meeting.

73 attacks. The Cabinet decided on December 22, 1943, to let the Political Warfare

executive study whether it would be advantageous to merely threaten the use of gas.195 It was decided that any such threat would convince the Germans that they were on the right track and any failure to follow through would also imply weakness. The debate ended there for a time. The fact that the British considered retaliating against the rocket with poison gas further demonstrates the high level of threat the weapon engendered.

Unfortunately, so far as Germany's strategic aims for the rocket were concerned, the threat from the weapon was seen by some in the British government as sufficient reason to greatly escalate the offensive against Germany, rather than reconsider it. Indeed, the use of poison gas was not the only recourse that would be considered in view of the rocket threat.

195 Ibid.

74 Chapter 4: A Renewed Threat, 1944

The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonshine — gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance. Carl von Clausewitz

Over the winter of 1943-1944 little new intelligence would accumulate on the

German rocket and attention shifted to another possible menace, the flying bomb. A report in November prepared by the Ministry of Economic Warfare correctly identified the suspected rocket as the A4. It further stated that, "we believe the destructive effect has been greatly exaggerated; the size of the weapon may also have been exaggerated."196 This new intelligence acted to diminish the immediacy of the rocket threat. Moreover, once Peenemunde and the suspected rocket sites in northern France had been thoroughly bombed, no more targets presented themselves. British intelligence managed to intercept several Enigma signals to German radar stations warning them that a rocket was about to be fired but nothing more substantial.197 The location of manufacturing facilities or other experimental installations connected with the rocket program remained a mystery along with details of the weapon's performance. The threat from the rocket was also superseded by the emerging menace of the flying bomb. As D-

196 AIR 20/8199 November 13, 1954. Ministry of Economic Warfare - Enemy Branch. Bodyline. Review of Ground Intelligence on Bodyline Manufacture. 197 Hinsley F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Vol. 3. (London, 1984) p. 434

75 Day approached for the assault on France it was the flying bomb that would dominate the British government's attention, becoming the object of a rigorous campaign of counter measures. However, the rocket threat remained, ominously in the background and would re-emerge in the summer of 1944 with renewed force. The strategic challenge of the rocket threat remained undiminished until late August, 1944.

The British government had long suspected that the Germans were working on a flying bomb either in tandem with the rocket or as the real object of their developmental efforts. By 1944 it was clear to most that Germany was pursuing both weapons as means of retaliation. As with the rocket, opinions varied over when and how powerful an offensive Germany would be able to launch with the flying bomb. The construction of

"ski sites" from which the weapon was to be launched had been detected in November of 1943.198 Many of the sites were heavily defended by A. A. guns and additional intelligence soon emerged that suggested the Germans were close to deploying the weapon. Consequently, in the run up to D-Day the flying bomb became the more immediate threat to London and the success of the invasion. The ski sites became the focus of an intensive bombing effort soon after their detection. Unlike the suspected rocket sites, the V-l launch sites were numerous and easily repaired, offering a constant stream of targets for allied airpower. Additionally, the flying bomb, unlike a rocket, offered the possibility of being shot down and a considerable array of anti-aircraft measures were put in place during the winter of 1944.

The flying bomb offensive against London began fitfully less than a week after the invasion of France. It quickly gained pace, however, and proved a considerable terror to the people of London. The V-l created many of the challenges for London's

76 civil defence that had been predicted of the rocket. It struck steadily at all hours of the

day leaving little respite for citizens and emergency personnel. It also dampened morale,

even amidst the spectacular advances in Europe. As with the rocket there was talk of retaliating against the flying bomb with gas. On July 3, the government began registering children for evacuation from the capital. Just two weeks later 170, 000 people had left the city. By the middle of August approximately 1, 450, 000 people had left

London for fear of the V-l, resulting in a 25 percent loss in productivity. This was many more people than had fled the city under the Blitz and was testament to the powerful psychological impact of the V-l. On the other hand, the active defences against the weapon steadily improved throughout the summer. The flying bomb could usually be detected by radar or visually by observation posts allowing some warning of its approach. The low flying weapon proved extremely vulnerable to both A. A. and fighter aircraft once these resources were ideally placed to meet the threat. By the end of

August the defences were shooting down some four out of five V-l that managed to cross the channel.20 The government was also able to keep the Germans in the dark as to where the bombs were landing through strict censorship and deception measures,

"designed to mislead the enemy as to the physical and psychological effects of his attacks." However, just as the British government was coming to grips with the arrival of the flying-bomb, the threat of rocket attack, which had diminished considerably in the months ahead of D-Day, returned with renewed urgency.

For the British government the crash of an A4 rocket in Malmo Sweden, on June

198 King and Kutta. p. 164 199 Ibid. 200 Ibid. p. 208 201 CAB 79/77 C.O.S. (44) 218th Meeting, July 1, 1944.

77 13, 1944 would reaffirm the weapon as a major strategic threat. While the established literature on the V weapons tends to concentrate analysis on the battle against the flying- bomb, for many senior ministers it was the threat of bombardment from long range rockets that would continue to represent the greater danger. Indeed, the rocket menace re-emerged just as the flying bomb was demonstrating the considerable psychological advantages of an automated area bombardment weapon capable of striking indiscriminately at all hours of the day. It was feared that the rocket would have similar repercussions as the flying bomb only on a much greater scale. Preliminary intelligence gained from the A4 wreckage in neutral Sweden acted to confirm the government's worst fears. After some minor diplomatic wrangling two British air crash experts were allowed to examine the recovered wreckage while negotiations to have it shipped to

Britain continued. On July 7, they reported that, "the weight of the warhead could not be less than 10, 000 pounds and might be considerably more."202 The Malmo rocket was being used to test the radio guidance system of the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile. This led the British investigators to erroneously conclude that the A4 was radio guided and could therefore be susceptible to radio jamming counter measures, a mistake that would not be realized until well after the rocket offensive against London began. Fresh intelligence was also received out of Poland, where the underground had been observing test firings at Blizna, reporting the rocket to have a range of 200 miles. Adding weight to the new intelligence was an official announcement by Goebbels on June 24 that the flying bomb was 'vengeance weapon' number one, strongly implying that something worse was to follow. It was at this point that the German rocket weapon entered the

Hinsley, Vol. 3. p. 445

78 public consciousness as an evasive rumour, and gained its more notorious designation,

V-2.

On July 10,1944 Duncan Sandys informed the War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff

Committee that based on the latest intelligence out of Sweden and Poland the existence of the long range rocket was, "now established beyond doubt."203 Lending further immediacy to the threat Sandys concluded that, "it would be wise to assume that at any rate a small number of these projectiles could be fired at London as soon as suitable launching points on the other side of the Channel are complete." Sandys informed his colleagues that the four large sites in France at Watten, Siracourt, Mimoyoeques and

Wizernes, identified the previous year, had been extensively damaged by recent bombing and would continue to be bombed in order to assure their inoperability.

Because it was assumed that the rocket was radio guided, Sandys reported that "the possibility of jamming the controls" was being "urgently explored." With regard to

Peenemunde, Sandys stated that because it was "of the utmost importance to interrupt and delay the development of the long range rocket," it had "been decided to carry out a further heavy raid on the experimental establishments at Peenemunde."204 The very next day, July 18, 1944, Peenemunde was bombed by 35 B-17's of the American Eighth Air force. The raid, and a smaller follow up raid the next day, succeeded in destroying parts of the facility. However, the dispersion of buildings at the installation and of the rocket program at large, in the aftermath of the massive R.A.F. raid a year earlier, meant that the impact of these raids was minimal. The bombing attacks were simply a repeat of those made the previous summer, yet there was little else that could be done. While fear

203 CAB 79/77 C.B.C. (44) 17, July 10, 1944. 204 Ibid.

79 of rocket attack was raised to a new high, a frustrating lack of intelligence presented few targets for allied bombers. The Allies had no information on whether or not the rocket had gone into mass production, or, if so, where. All that was known at this juncture was that the Germans had made considerable progress in their efforts and an attack by long- range rockets, carrying ten-ton warheads was as real and immediate a possibility as it had ever been. For those with knowledge of the threat, a feeling prevailed that in terms of physical destruction and psychological shock the rocket would far surpass the already considerable effects of flying-bomb attacks.

The new bombing attacks on Peenemunde and the suspected rocket sites did nothing to allay the government's renewed anxiety over the weapon as intelligence pointing to the rocket's refinement continued to accumulate. On July 24, 1944 Sandys submitted a report that contained several ominous conclusions. The rocket, "A4" had

"reached a state of development in which it could be effectively used in active operations."205 The weight of the warhead and the range of the rocket was indicated as between five to ten tons and it was now determined that the rocket was, "probably brought to the firing point by road on a transporter" and that "no elaborate projector is required." The mobility and simplicity of the weapon and its firing meant active counter measures would be extremely difficult to mount and that the bombing of the sites in

France had been largely a wasted effort. So far as scale and imminence of the attack were concerned things looked even more ominous. A speech by Goebbel's on July 26, in which he stated that the rocket had "partly entered upon the process of manufacture", was observed by British intelligence, further suggesting an attack in the near future.

205 CAB 79/78 C.B.C. (44) 32. War Cabinet "Crossbow" Committee. Eight Report by Chairmen. 206 CAB 79/78 J.I.C. (44) 336. Imminence of Attack By Big Ben. Report by Joint Intelligence Sub-

80 The possible imminence of rocket attack remerged just as the flying bomb was proving that sustained bombardment from an automated weapon had psychological effects considerably more powerful than conventional air raids. If the flying-bomb could set off a wave of evacuations from London, in addition to its physical toll, with just one ton of explosive, a giant rocket carrying a ten-ton warhead could cause out right panic and the abandonment of the city altogether.

At a meeting of the War Cabinet on July 27, 1944 the renewed threat of attack by long range rocket led the Home Secretary to call for a re-examination of the government's plans for dealing with the consequence of such an attack. He reported that based on the latest intelligence it was presumed that, "Each rocket might carry a 7-ton warhead, of which 5 Vi tons might consist of aluminized explosive" and that, "the enemy might have a stock of about 1000 rockets." Allowing, "a reasonable margin for error," the Home Secretary communicated that in his estimate, "a rocket attack on the scale which now seemed likely would produce 18, 000 fatal casualties, with perhaps as much as three times that number of seriously wounded." While more dire assessments had been made during the previous summer's rocket scare, it was understood, especially with the experience of the flying bomb, that the weapon's power would lay not only in its ability to devastate physically but psychologically. The flying bomb had succeeded in creating a considerable exodus from London through its ability to terrorize. People were killed and injured by the weapon, homes and places of production damaged and destroyed, but the hundreds of thousands who fled the city out of fear greatly magnified the weapon's physical destructiveness. The casualties from rocket attack predicted by

Committee. 207 CAB 65/47 Meeting of the War Cabinet July 27, 1944. 97th Conclusions. Minute 2, Confidential

81 the Home Secretary, at this juncture, were more than three times what the flying bomb

had produced. It was only logical therefore to assume that the physical destruction

produced by the rocket attack envisaged would produce approximately three times the

number of evacuees and loss of productivity that the flying bomb had achieved.

Regardless of the availability and soundness of bomb shelters, the city of London would

be hard pressed to sustain this amount of disruption and continue to function effectively

as a center of government and production. In view of this, the Home Secretary stated to the War Cabinet that, "So far as active defences were concerned, he could only press for the most energetic measures." However, because active measures could not guarantee the neutralization of the rocket threat, the Home Secretary also insisted that a broad range of passive defence plans were urgently needed to meet the contingency.

During the first rocket scare, in the summer of 1943, the Prime Minister had been unwilling to countenance any material diversion of resources. However, with the existence of the German rocket an established fact, Churchill was sufficiently alarmed to authorize a number of actions to be "taken forthwith."209 Among the actions Churchill authorized was the stimulation of voluntary evacuation of priority classes from London, namely schoolchildren and their mothers. Additionally, some 10, 000 government staff without adequate accommodation and access to shelters were to be moved into better quarters or out of the capital altogether. Steps to remove patients from London hospitals to hospitals in other parts of the country were also to be initiated, "without publicity."

The process of "shifting production from factories in London to factories elsewhere" that had begun in response to the flying bomb was directed to continue and was to be

Annex.

82 accelerated with regard to key technologies. Beyond these immediate actions the

Prime Minister also called for a series of contingency plans to be put in place.

Arrangements to enable the supply of labour for debris clearance and the repair of

damaged buildings were to be made, "drawing upon both civilian and Services sources."

Transport and accommodation was to be made available "in order enable up to two

million additional persons to be evacuated from London to safe areas within a period of

three or four weeks." Alternative plans were also to be prepared, in the event of a

particularly heavy bombardment, "for moving the same number of people in a shorter

period to a distance of 20 miles from London." Plans for the evacuation of "non

essential Government staffs and for the allocation of the most highly protected

accommodation to those staffs who must remain in London" were also called for by the

• •911

Prime Minister. Churchill remained determined that the British government and vital

industries in London would continue to function should the rocket bombardment

materialize on the scale envisaged. This would be known as the 'stand fast' policy. The body responsible for drawing up the contingency plans for the expected rocket attack

would be known as the 'Rocket Committee.' Reflecting the urgency and seriousness of the missile threat, the Rocket Committee would be comprised of the Ministers of

Production, Labour and National Service, and Health and War Transport, with the Home

Secretary, Herbert Morrison, in the Chair.

The Rocket Committee first convened on August 3, 1944, one of its foremost concerns was how to evacuate shelter and feed several millions of people in an orderly

209 Ibid. 210 CAB 65/47 Meeting of the War Cabinet July 27, 1944. 97th Conclusions. Minute 2, Confidential Annex.

2,1 Ibid.

83 and efficient manner. In keeping with the 'stand fast' policy this would have to be done without stimulating panic and without paralyzing the central government and vital production facilities. It was assumed that once rocket bombardment began the psychological stress on London's population would lead to a massive exodus from the

city. The Minister of War Transport estimated that it would be possible to remove by rail

919

"up to 150, 000 people a day to reception areas some distance from London." Even at this rate, however, it was believed that the transportation system was likely to be overwhelmed and large numbers would choose to evacuate on foot. The Transportation

Minister and Minister of Labour and National Service were against using London's buses for evacuation as these would be essential for the continued functioning of the city's government and industry. The War Office's representative on the committee,

General Godwin Austen, stated that "the Army had little or no transport which could be made available." The only real option left was to bring in buses from other cities. How to feed and accommodate several million evacuees also represented a problem. The

Minister of Food stated that the rearrangement of food supplies was being studied by his department but suggested that if a mass evacuation were required, "people should be encouraged to carry some food with them." So far as accommodation was concerned the Minister of Health informed the committee that in the areas adjoining London only a quarter of the expected two million evacuees could be sheltered in existing facilities.

People would either have to be evacuated further from the city, adding to the problem of transportation, or additional resources would have to be made available. General Austen offered to furnish information on the availability of empty Army Camps. 212 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 1st meeting, War Cabinet, Rocket Committee, Minutes of Meeting held on Thursday, August 3, 1944.

84 Along with the logistical challenge of moving, feeding and housing two million evacuees, the Rocket Committee was charged with maintaining the "stand fast" policy under which London's industry and the central government was to continue to function during the emergency. It was by interrupting these areas that the rocket bombardment had the greatest potential to disrupt the march towards Germany. With regard to industry, the Minister of Labour, during the Rocket Committee's first meeting, had gone so far as to warn that by encouraging the immediate evacuation of mothers and their school aged children, London would be deprived of essential, "juvenile labour."214

When added to the loss of labour that had already been suffered this would, "cripple many factories engaged in the production of essential supplies." The Minister of Labour was "strongly of the opinion that as much as possible should be done to remove production from London in anticipation of rocket attacks, since by this means the risks of unorganized evacuation were diminished." The process had already begun and its continuation represented the rocket's first material effect on the Allies production of war materials. Moving entire factories was not a quick or easy process and the Minister of

Works pointed out that "it would be a considerable time before any help could be derived from them."215 If factories were to continue production in London amidst the rocket attacks then their workers would have to be discouraged or prevented from fleeing the city. Additionally, they would also have to be provided with adequate food and access to shelters. The adequacy and availability of bomb shelters, that had been the subject of much analysis during the rocket scare of 1943, was now less of an issue. With millions expected to evacuate the city there would be plenty of shelter space for those

XL/IVA. 214 Ibid.

85 essential workers, both in government and industry, who remained.

In order to maximize the retention of workers in the city the Rocket Committee decided that the implementation of a voucher scheme, whereby only those with a voucher would be permitted to board trains out of London, was the best option.

Factory workers, emergency services personnel and a host of other professions would be forced to remain in the city or flee on foot. The question of how such a scheme could be administered fairly and implemented without stirring a panic would occupy much of the

Committee's time. Added to this was a realization that "if rocket attacks were to give rise to a very large unorganized movement, the voucher system would almost certainly break down."217 So far as the feeding of workers was concerned, the Committee agreed that the retention of people involved in the city's food supply would be especially important.

As the previous chapter examined, the problem of how to inform the Press and wider public about the rocket threat without causing undue alarm had been addressed by the drafting of several provisional announcements. In each of these the government thought it preferable to refer to a powerful 'long-range gun' rather than a long range rocket. The idea of a long range gun was less disturbing psychologically than a futuristic rocket. The failure of the rocket threat to materialize in 1943 meant that none of these drafts announcements were ever used. A policy of strict security and censorship with regard to the rocket threat remained the government's default position. However, with the re-emergence of the rocket threat in the summer of 1944 the problem of publicity

1L/1U, 216 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 2nd meeting, War Cabinet, Rocket Committee, Minutes of Meeting held on Wednesday, August 3, 1944.

86 was again brought into focus. The Rocket Committee realized that its plans for the

organized evacuation of London would depend on a certain amount of publicity. As before the problem lay in how to inform the public of the threat so as to better prepare them physically and mentally while not creating a panic. "There was general agreement

in the Committee that it was of the utmost importance that in any Government

statements made either before or after the rocket attack came, every effort should be made to prevent any panic movement and to encourage those who had work to do in

London to stand fast."218 At the Rocket Committee's third meeting on August 18, 1944 it was decided that no publicity would be given to the voucher evacuation scheme until the rocket attack had actually developed.219 It was still thought that the balance of advantage lay against making a public statement that referred specifically to the possible imminence of rocket attack. To acknowledge the threat before it was a certainty would only lend credence to German propaganda. The British population had heard German boasts trumpeting the imminent deployment of a rocket weapon and the issue had gained some attention in the press. However, so long as the government remained silent it was a threat without credibility and certainly nothing to cause a panic. Indeed, while a specific warning of rocket attack was felt by the Rocket Committee as having too many drawbacks, it was concerned that by not intimating any threat whatsoever Londoners and the population at large would be completely unprepared for the emergency and in fact more likely to panic. The Rocket Committee was not alone in this assessment.

On August 18, 1944, D. B. Briggs, Director of the Home Division, wrote a letter

218 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 1st meeting, War Cabinet, Rocket Committee, Minutes of Meeting held on Thursday, August 3, 1944. 219 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 3rd meeting, War Cabinet War Cabinet, Rocket Consequences Committee, Minutes of a Meeting held on Friday, August 18, 1944.

87 to the Home Office expressing the need to prepare the country for the possibility of rocket attacks. He was particularly concerned that, according to Home Intelligence, people in the Midlands were "apathetic to Londoners experience of the Fly-bombs."220 and that the "real danger of the present situation is that if Rocket bombardment begins, with consequent evacuations from London, the ground is not prepared in the Provinces."

This provincial indifference to the plight of London under VI attack is largely attributed to the "exaggerated stories" of evacuees, "which were subsequently found to be untrue when casualty figures were published, but these did not indicate the widespread nature of damage to houses and the number of people rendered homeless." Accordingly, Briggs writes, "The 'Rocket Committee' will presumably be taking into consideration the question of preparing the Country to cope with V.2, and agreeing what steps can be taken within security limits to bring home to the Provinces the part they will have to play in helping evacuees."221 On July 28, 1944, the War Cabinet had invited the Minister of Information to inform editors confidentially about the danger of rocket attack, "in such a way as to keep the public aware of its possible imminence, while taking special care not to cause alarm."222 However, the Minister of Information had declined to do this and informed the Rocket Committee at its August 18 meeting that "he would defer any approach to editors until some progress had been made with the plans for meeting the rocket attack." The Minister of Health expressed concern that "in the meantime, the newspapers and, to an even greater extent the B.B.C. seemed to be minimizing the danger of rocket attack and the seriousness of the present flying bomb attacks. There

220 HO 1033/1 August 18, 1944. 221 Ibid. 222 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 3rd meeting, War Cabinet, Rocket Consequences Committee, Minutes of a Meeting held on Friday, August 18, 1944. 223 Ibid.

88 was a danger that persons who had been evacuated would drift back to London, and

difficulties were being experienced in finding billets because householders in the

reception area did not realize the true position in the evacuation areas."

More and more people had indeed begun to drift back to London as the potency of

flying-bomb attacks began to diminish. More substantially, by mid August 1944, Allied

successes on the Continent gave many people reason to believe that victory was close at

hand and that the ability of Hitler to strike Britain, by any means, was rapidly

disappearing. The Rocket Committee accepted the Minister of Information's position but

further urged him to explore what steps could be taken "by general publicity... to prevent the drift-back to London of persons already evacuated and to encourage further evacuation from London in advance of Rocket Attack."

While the Rocket Committee was busy deliberating on how best to deal with rocket attack domestically, options of an offensive nature were again talked about.

According to recently declassified documents, the idea of retaliating against Germany for deploying the rocket was again discussed in August 1944. This time, however, the form of retaliation considered was not poison gas but the atom bomb. The evidence in this instance comes from the diaries of Guy Liddell, the head of the espionage "B"

Branch of MI5 between 1939-1945.226 Liddell, alarmed at the latest intelligence pointing to the rocket's imminent deployment, asked Sir Stewart Menzies, the head of MI6 and referred to as "C", if a nuclear threat could be used against Hitler. Both men were among the few people who knew that an atomic weapon was being developed. It is recorded in

224 Ibid. 225 ibid.

89 Liddell's diary, "I saw 'C today about the uranium bomb and put to him the suggestion

that it should be used as a threat of retaliation to the Germans if they used V2." He then

recalls Menzies response, "He felt... that there was nothing to be lost and said that he

would put the suggestion to the PM, who might who might take it up on his visit to

Roosevelt, which is to take place early next month. On the other hand, he might decide

to act more quickly."227 There is no record of the result of Menzies discussion with

Churchill. However, it is not unlikely that the Prime Minister would have seriously

considered using the atomic bomb against Germany in order to stop the V-2. Churchill

had not been averse to previous suggestions that poison gas be used to bomb the V-l

launch sites and Britain was already engaged in a terrifically destructive bombing

campaign against entire German cities. Of course the atom bomb would not be ready before Germany surrendered. Had it been available earlier, one can only speculate whether it would have been used as a deterrent against the rocket or in retaliation for its use. However, that the possibility was even discussed of using the atomic bomb in view of the rocket threat further reveals the extent to which the weapon was feared. It also demonstrates that even while plans for a large scale evacuation of London were being devised, members of the British government were willing to escalate the destruction of

Germany in face of the rocket rather than diminish it as Hitler hoped.

Between the Rocket Committee's third meeting on August 18, and its fourth and last meeting on September 1,1944, two factors would rapidly diminish the British government's long held fear of rocket attack. Firstly, the rapid retreat of German forces from France and Belgium late in the summer of 1944 brought into question whether or

226 The Daily Telegraph. December 1,2002. "MI6 urged Churchill to nuke Berlin"

90 not London, in the near future, would still be within range of the rocket. Secondly, the

A4 that had crashed in Sweden on June 14, 1944 had been brought back to England and painstakingly reconstructed. As a result of this effort, by mid August Air Ministry scientists were finally able to gain a true idea of the rocket's capabilities. While the weapon's mobile launching capability was confirmed it was finally understood to carry a warhead of just one ton, only a tenth the size long feared. On August 24, 1944 a letter from the Minister of Home Security and the Chair of the Rocket Committee asked the

Chiefs of Staff to consider, "in light of the latest information available... the extent to which the progress of our forces on the Continent might prevent the development of serious rocket attacks." The Minister was concerned that with the latest developments,

"the Rocket Consequences Committee might go to unnecessary lengths in planning measures for the evacuation of London." It had been agreed just two days earlier that

Duncan Sandys, still chairman of the Crossbow Committee, would provide a new estimate on the probable scale of rocket attack. This would be based on the latest intelligence on the rocket itself and Eisenhower's estimate of the progress of Allied forces towards the Franco-Belgian frontier. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on August

31,1944 it was agreed that the Rocket Committee would have to base their plans on the new assessment which was delivered that same day.230 At its fourth and final meeting on

September 1, 1944, the Rocket Committee was left to ponder Duncan Sandys up-to-date appreciation of the probable scale of rocket attack. According to Sandys new report,

227 Ibid. 228 CAB 69/80 C.O.S. (44) 286 Mtg. (0) War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee. Minutes of Meeting held on August 24, 1944. 229 Ibid. 230 CAB 65/43 W.M. (44) Conclusions of a meeting of the War Cabinet, August 31, 1944.

91 "The attack may start at any time from now onwards."231 It was thought that the

Germans would be capable of launching up to 60 rockets per day, during the first month

of the bombardment. Half to two-thirds of those rockets could be expected to fall in the

London Region or within 15 miles of Charring Cross. It was therefore assumed that in

combination with flying bomb attacks, "Up to 80 tons of H.E. per day" could be

expected to fall on London, compared with 48 tons during the worst week of flying

bomb attacks.232 This scale of attack still represented a significant threat. However, it

was a dramatic reduction from previous estimates that had assumed the rocket would

carry a warhead many times larger than a single ton. Sandys now assumed that once the

Allied armies had crossed the Franco-Belgian frontier, London would be out of the

rocket's estimated 200 mile range. Eisenhower had provided him with an estimate that this frontier would most likely be reached between September 25 and October 15. The

Rocket Committee therefore assumed that by mid October, at the latest, the rocket would cease to be a threat to London. With the weight and duration of the expected rocket attack dramatically reduced, the Rocket Committee determined that while its plans remained important they had lost much of their expediency.

In view of the lengths to which action and planning, on the basis of the earlier appreciation, had gone, and of the possibility that London might yet have to undergo a short period of heavier attack from flying bombs and rockets combined, a complete reversal of present action and plans would be a mistake. At the same time regard should be had to the increasing unlikelihood of any bombardment of London on a scale sufficient to warrant exceptional remedial measures. It followed, therefore, that, whilst action which would be of value from the point of view of flying-bomb attack alone should not be stopped, plans on a more ambitious scale to meet the contingency of severe rocket attack

231 CAB 98/39 C.B.C. (44) August 31, 1944. War Cabinet "Crossbow" Committee. Rocket. Fourteenth Report by the Chairmen. 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid.

92 should, so far as possible, be kept on a paper basis.

In effect the Rocket Committee believed that any material action that had not already taken place was no longer warranted. In their minds the long feared physical and psychological threat of rocket bombardment was evaporating.

On September 4, 1944, Herbert Morrison the Minister of Home Security and

Chair of the Rocket Committee addressed the War Cabinet. From the rocket threat's earliest inception he had been a strong advocate of robust action and planning, but now communicated that in his opinion material action to meet the contingency was no longer called for.235 The War Cabinet agreed with Morrison's call to reverse its previous directions and discontinue "the scheme for evacuation from London of members of the priority classes" and to stop "the movement of patients from London hospitals to other parts of the country."236 The next day, September 5, 1944, the Rocket Committee delivered its first and final report to the War Cabinet. It described what material actions had been taken in accordance with the War Cabinet's directions while conveying the opinion, reached at its last meeting, that the implementation of more substantial plans to meet the threat of rocket attack was no longer expedient. It was reported that as of

August 30,1944,14, 126 patients had been moved out of London hospitals and 1, 608 staff. The transfer of, "10, 000 headquarters staff, formerly housed in poor accommodation with no form of shelter" was also reported to be, "well advanced."237 On the movement of production outside of London the Committee reported that this was continuing but it had decided to avert any movement that could not, "be substantially

234 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 4th meeting, War Cabinet, Rocket Consequences Committee, Minutes of a Meeting held on Friday, September 1, 1944. 235CAB 65/43 W.M. (44) Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, September 4, 1944.

93 completed by October 15 ," or that involved "a loss of production equivalent to two months output."238 With regard to evacuation the Rocket Committee reported that the

evacuation areas had been, "extended to include 27 Boroughs and Urban Districts

around the Metropolitan area" and that evacuation facilities had been made available "to all mothers with children of school age or under." The report also described in detail the far more substantial plans that were to be initiated after the rocket attack had begun.

These included the "voucher scheme," arrangements for the feeding and shelter of two million evacuees, workers remaining in London, and provisions for the clearance of debris and repairs in the city. Due to the fact that these plans were now based on an outdated appreciation the Rocket Committee proposed that the whole matter "be reviewed again in, say, a fortnight's time."239 Within days however, favourable events on the continent led the government to conclude that the threat to London of long range rocket attack had passed altogether.

At its final meeting the Rocket Committee concluded that, "no publicity regarding the danger of rocket attack was now likely to deter the drift back to

London."240 Without doubt the retreat of German forces from France and Belgium, including the capture of Antwerp on September 5, 1944 ignited a wave of optimism among the British public. With the coastline from which the flying bombs had been launched in Allied hands the offensive by that weapon against London was forced to an end. The scope and rapidity of the Allied advance was also regarded by most as the death knell of the rocket threat and the strategic challenges of dealing with it. Anxiety

236 Ibid. 237 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44), War Cabinet, Rocket Consequences Committee, September 5, 1944. Report. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid. 240 CAB 98/39 R.A. (44) 4th meeting, War Cabinet, Rocket Consequences Committee, Minutes of a

94 over the possibility of rocket attack, that had first gripped the government in the spring

of 1943, finally abated. On September 7, Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary,

officially ended the evacuation of London. At a press conference that same day, Duncan

Sandys stated that, "except possibly for a few last parting shots what is coming to be

known as the battle of London is over."241 However, when asked about the possibility of

Germany deploying its V-2 weapon against the capital Sandys was more circumspect, "I think we have got enough to deal with if we stick to the VI. I am a little chary about talking about the V2...I Think it would be very dangerous for anybody to make a

statement."242 Evidently, for Sandys the rocket threat still lingered and remained a

subject best kept away from the public consciousness.

Meeting held on Friday, September 1, 1944. 241 Irons, p. 123

95 Chapter 5: Conclusion

The V-2 bombardment of London which began on September 8, 1944 and ended on March 5, 1945 failed to achieve the widespread panic in the British population that

Hitler had been confident it would produce. The V-2 never came close to providing the leverage that Germany would have needed to negotiate a separate peace with Britain. It did not lead to the abandonment of London and had minimal impact on war production.

The V-2 provided Germany with no respite from Allied bombing which reached its greatest intensity after the weapon was operational. In short, the rocket never came close to being the war winning weapon that Hitler and the Nazi leadership had deluded themselves into believing. On this basis the established literature has generally dismissed the rocket program as an abject failure. With a one-ton warhead, little accuracy and limited production potential, most studies have sought to explain how the

V-2 attained such lofty status in the German war effort despite these shortcomings.

Inter-service competition, scientific zeal and an irrational obsession with revenge on the part of Hitler and the Nazi leadership were certainly major factors. However, in all but dismissing the V-2 as an irrational misadventure for Germany and a mere nuisance for

Britain, the established literature has overlooked vital aspects of the rocket's history. As

96 a revolutionary weapon the V-2 carried with it a new set of strategic implications. These were as much psychological as physical in nature.

This thesis has established that while Hitler, and the Nazi leadership, had impossible expectations for the V-2, they clearly understood the opportunity for propaganda it represented. Indeed, in psychological terms, overlooked by the established literature, the V-2 was in many ways a notable success. It has been demonstrated that for the soldier in the field the idea that the German government was preparing to unleash a revolutionary rocket weapon against Britain had a major influence on morale. The notion that Hitler was waiting for the most opportune moment to unleash a devastating barrage against Britain was widely accepted amongst German soldiers in the summer of

1944. Belief that such an attack would salvage Germany's strategic situation appears to have been one of the chief factors sustaining German combat cohesion during the Allied onslaught that followed the Normandy invasion. This faith in the rocket's ability to improve Germany's strategic situation was matched by the British government's anxiety over the possibility of such attack.

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that attack by long range rocket was understood by the British government as a dire threat. Indeed, the German rocket program was viewed as a major strategic challenge with potentially catastrophic war altering consequences. British intelligence greatly overestimated the size of the German rocket, leading government planners to believe that each missile had far more potential for destruction than was in fact the case. The faulty intelligence picture served to heighten fear of the rocket but was not the sole reason behind the British government's concerns. The government was acutely aware of the inherent difficulties of combating a supersonic long range bombardment weapon regardless of the size of each individual

97 rocket. This thesis has established that the threat from rocket bombardment was understood by the British Cabinet to be as much psychological as it was material. It was feared that any material destruction from a rocket bombardment of London would be greatly magnified by the psychological trauma that would accompany this form of attack.

When the specter of rocket attack first appeared in the spring and summer of

1943, the British government responded by attempting to obliterate Peenemunde as the suspected center of German rocket research. The robust military response to the rocket threat, while still in its infancy, is evidence of the severity of danger that the government perceived in the rocket weapon. It was also evidence, as thesis has pointed out, of a realization that effective passive measures of a civil defense nature were problematic in light of the weapon's fundamental characteristics. The British were aware that the speed of the rocket was likely to negate any possibility of an effective warning system being devised. The ability of the rocket to strike 24 hours a day regardless of weather conditions was another concern. If people could not be given adequate warning of attack, and attacks could happen at anytime, bomb shelters would be much reduced in value. Consequently civilian casualties were likely to be much greater than in conventional air raids and psychological trauma more intense. People could not be expected to stay in shelters 24 hours a day indefinitely, and the war economy could not sustain such a situation regardless. The Prime Minister was also concerned that any diversion of resources from offense to defence would be perceived by the public as indication of an impeding attack. This would cause morale to suffer and by extension the war effort as people would inevitable flee the capital. Ultimately, it would alter the strategic landscape of the war and impede Germany's defeat. Such was the

98 government's level of anxiety over the rocket weapon's potential to psychologically perturb, that a policy of strict security and censorship was rigidly adhered to. Even if the rocket bombardment materialized the government thought it better to refer to a 'long range gun' in any public pronouncement. Indeed, when the rocket bombardment became a reality, the government, in order to minimize civilian concern, waiting several months to even acknowledge the fact.

The arrival of the V-l and intelligence indicating that the Germans had made great strides with their rocket set off a new wave of anxiety within the British government. This thesis has demonstrated that the V-l acted to confirm the government's fears that a rocket bombardment was likely to have psychological effects out of all proportion to the weapon's actual material destruction. The immediacy of the rocket threat in the summer of 1944 led the British government to form a Cabinet level

Committee to plan for this eventuality. The actions of the Rocket Committee receive scant, if any, attention in the established literature. This thesis has shown, however, that the Rocket Committee and the plans it drafted were extraordinary in scope; a reflection of the great strategic threat seen in the rocket weapon. The Rocket Committee struggled over the problem of how to handle the destruction and massive population movements that would accompany a sustained rocket attack on the scale though possible. A system to effect the organized evacuation of two million people from the capital was devised.

An effort to move vital production away from London was nearly embarked upon while hundreds of people in hospital were actually moved out of Capital as a direct result of the rocket threat. Although precise intelligence and Allied military successes eventually downgraded the rocket threat to a level where no extraordinary measures were thought necessary, this thesis has proven that the weapon succeeded in creating a major strategic

99 challenge. One which was centered largely on the long range rocket's extraordinary ability to project psychological warfare.

To the present day, a high psychological impact continues to be associated with the use and the threatened use of long range rockets, both conventional, and nuclear. For many Western governments the technology, in the hands of rogue states and organizations, continues to represent a major strategic challenge.

100 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Kirwin, Gerald. "Allied Bombing and Nazi Domestic Propaganda" European History Quarterly. Vol. 15 (1985) 341-62

Kirwin, Gerald. "Waiting for Retaliation: A Study in Nazi Propaganda Behaviour and German Civilian Morale." Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 16 (1981) 565- 83.

Primary Sources:

The Daily Telegraph. December 1, 2002. "MI6 urged Churchill to Nuke Berlin."

The Daily Telegraph. March 29, 1943. "V-2 Ready, Say Germans."

Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, Federal Communications Commission. "Chancellor Adolf Hitler's Address at the Opening of the Winter Relief Campaign." http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420930a.html

Lochner, Lewis. (Editor and translator) Goebbels Diaries. Hamish and Hamilton,

102 London, 1948.

Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945: Complete Stenographic Record of the Military Situation Conferences from Stalingrad to Berlin. Enigma Books, New York, 2004.

Shirer, William L. This Is Berlin: Reporting From Nazi Germany 1938-1940. Hutchinson, London, 1999.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, (European War). United States Printing Office, Washington, September 30, 1945.

Public Record Office (London, Kew)

AIR 20/8199 AIR 41/17

CAB 65/43/47 CAB 69/5/6/80 CAB 79/77/78 CAB 98/39

HO 186/2271 HO 1033/1

WO 208/3789/4341/3437 WO 219/4717

103 CURRICULUM VITAE

Candidate's Full Name: Gavin James King

Universities Attended: University of Ottawa, B.A. History, 2002