HOW IRAQ CONCEALS AND OBTAINS ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION By Ibrahim al-Marashi
After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein conducted a systematic concealment operation to disrupti the mission of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), whose mandate was to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This article surveys and analyzes the different techniques used to fool and foil inspectors so as to conceal continued development or possession of these weapons.
After Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 war over Iraq’s denial and deception process was Kuwait, the Iraqi government was forced to characterized in a U.S. Department of accept agreements, defined and authorized Defence briefing as “The deliberate, by UN resolutions, mandating its full methodical, extensive and well-organized cooperation in giving up all weapons of national-level strategic effort which aims at mass destruction (WMD). In response, Iraq deceiving not just the United States, not developed a concealment apparatus: a just the United Nations or even the public network of intelligence agencies, military media, but, in fact, the entire world.”(1) units and government ministries assigned According to the briefing, Iraq’s to procure, hide, and defend Iraq’s strategy has three key objectives. The first weapons of mass destruction. By 1998, objective is for Iraq to demonstrate while many weapons had been uncovered ostensible “compliance” with UN and destroyed—often in the face of Iraqi resolutions. This ostensible compliance is non-compliance—the lack of cooperation an attempt to undermine the credibility of forced the withdrawal of inspectors. the need for an inspections regime and then, In late 2002, however, a new UN further, to erode support for continued resolution giving Iraq one more chance to sanctions. The second objective is to implement its pledges led to a new round ensure that UN inspectors will not uncover of inspections by the UN Monitoring, the full scope of Iraq’s WMD and missile Verification and Inspection Commission programs. The third objective is to (UNMOVIC). Concurrently, the obstruct UN inspectors from completely concealment apparatus continues to disarming Iraq of its chemical, biological, function, albeit with some modifications. nuclear, and missile capabilities.(2) These same agencies also have a role in The goals of the concealment apparatus, directing and controlling Iraq’s weapons according to UNSCOM, have been to systems, as well as procurement. This “retain production capability and the network involves thousands of officials ‘know-how’ documentation necessary to from Iraq’s General Intelligence, Special revive programs when possible.”(3) The Security Organization, Military Industry apparatus has been in charge of concealing Commission and the Special Republican the full extent of the nuclear and chemical Guards. weapons programs (including the VX project), and retaining the required
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 51 Ibrahim al-Marashi production equipment and raw materials. concealment of Iraq’s WMD program. The In this regard, it has been responsible for duties and functions of these agencies the concealment of warheads capable of overlap, complying with Saddam’s security delivering chemical and biological doctrine of not allowing any one agency to munitions; indigenous long-range missile have a monopoly over any one area of production, and retaining guidance systems securing and concealing Iraq’s WMD and missile engines production capability. program. While the agencies play a key Finally, this network has been tasked with role in this concealment process, its concealing the very existence of Iraq’s coordination is clearly a family affair. All offensive biological weapons program, the individuals involved were brought into while retaining all of its necessary the project only after very careful production capabilities.(4) investigations about their personal Each intelligence agency has its own connections and loyalty to Saddam.(6) The special role in this process. The elite heads of these agencies are generally from Special Security Organization, Amn al- Saddam’s immediate family, his al-Bu Khas, headed by Saddam’s son Qusay, Nasir clan or from his hometown of Tikrit. serves as one of the major command-and- In May 1991, Saddam Hussein formed a control oversight bodies of this Concealment Operations Committee (COC) concealment network. General Intelligence, to be supervised by Qusay.(7) UNSCOM al-Mukhabarat has at least two sub- inspectors became aware of the existence directorates involved in the concealment of this covert network as a result of effort: a covert operations unit and a covert inspections and interviews conducted procurement unit. Military Intelligence (al- between 1991 and 1996. They believed Istikhabarat) has a role in the strategic that this apparatus, created in 1991, was concealment of Iraq’s WMDs, while designed to hide documents, computer General Security’s (al-Amn al-‘Amm) records, and equipment related to its WMD military unit, the Emergency Forces (al- program. When the COC was created, the Quwwat al-Tawari’), provides security for Iraqis believed that the inspection process the facilities that house these programs. would last only a few months. They based The Special Republican Guard (SRG-- their assessment on the model of previous al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas) is involved IAEA inspections, which had examined in the transportation, concealment and Iraqi nuclear facilities without detecting the guarding of military facilities and materials. Iraqi nuclear weapons program.(8) The al-Hadi agency, which is responsible UNSCOM investigations into the for monitoring signals intelligence, is activities and tactics of the concealment believed to eavesdrop on UN inspectors’ apparatus began in March 1996 and were communications. One of the most continuously impeded by the Iraqis. As a important agencies of all in the result, UNMOVIC’s, and its predecessor concealment operation is the Military UNSCOM’s, mandate evolved from Industrial Commission (MIC), which is inspection agencies to detective agencies in part of the Ministry of Industry and order to investigate, impede and unravel Military Industrialization (MIMI). Both the activities of this Iraqi concealment MIMI and MIC oversee Iraq’s military network. Chairman of UNMOVIC Hans industries and seek to conceal sensitive Blix declared on January 28, 2003, “As we activities from UN inspectors.(5) know,” the idea that Iraq would declare its These agencies form a vast, complex weapons and then the inspectors would and wide-ranging labyrinth, all of which verify these statements “too often turned play a role in the procurement and into a game of ‘hide and seek.’”(9)
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The “hide and seek” game mentioned in Several related tactics that the Blix’s statement has characterized the concealment apparatus has used is the interaction between the Iraqi concealment destruction or bulldozing WMD-related apparatus and UN inspectors. Blix adds, facilities, constructing false or decoy “Rather than just verifying declarations and facilities or altering suspected facilities to supporting evidence, the two inspecting deceive inspectors. A document found by organizations found themselves engaged in UNSCOM in August 1995 demonstrates efforts to map the weapons programs and how these tactics were implemented. The to search for evidence through inspections, Iraqi document, known as "The al-Atheer interviews, seminars, inquiries with Center for the Development of Materials suppliers and intelligence Production: Report of Achievements organizations.”(10) Blix indicated that the Accomplished from 1 June 1990 to 7 June deception practiced by the Iraqi 1991” recorded how the facility staff was concealment apparatus continues unabated. ordered to remove evidence of nuclear weapons activities, evacuate documents to TACTICS OF THE CONCEALMENT remote sites, physically alter the facility APPARATUS and conduct mock inspections to prepare The concealment apparatus has for UN inspectors.(14) launched a coordinated effort to thwart full According to U.S. Secretary of State discovery of Iraq’s proscribed programs. Colin Powell’s briefing to the UN on These agencies have used numerous February 5, 2003, “We know that Iraq has techniques to disrupt, thwart and fool UN embedded key portions of its illicit weapons inspectors.(11) One tactic the chemical weapons infrastructure within its Iraqis have used was to falsely insist that legitimate civilian industry. To all outward they had destroyed most of their WMD appearances, even to experts, the arsenal themselves (known as unilateral infrastructure looks like an ordinary destruction), that their WMD infrastructure civilian operation.”(15) The Iraqis learned was destroyed during the 1991 war, or that how to conduct such tactics based on their chemical munitions were depleted during own innovations as well as through KGB the war with Iran. Often the concealment assistance in the early 1980s. apparatus would conduct a policy of The concealment apparatus has focused “calculated concessions,” where it would on hiding only critical materials and WMD sacrifice certain non-essential or outdated components, while destroying non- components to convince the inspectors that essential items unilaterally or handing them the Iraqis were cooperating. This policy of over to inspectors. It was reported that “calculated concessions” led to a cycle in these critical components of the nuclear, which inspectors would discover the false biological, chemical and missile programs nature of previous disclosures, Iraq would were dispersed to the environs surrounding amend them, and then these new Tikrit, Saddam’s hometown, where they disclosures would, in turn, be discredited were concealed in presidential palaces or by the inspectors, thus leading to more new the residences of Iraqi security officials declarations.(12) As the military analyst belonging to the Special Security Anthony Cordesman explained, these Organization and Special Republican tactics “created a morass of confusing false Guards.(16) trails, documentation, sacrifice facilities, Proscribed materials and documents and stockpiles” for the inspection team to have been concealed in places ranging find.(13) from the basements of official state buildings to the private farms of officers
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 53 Ibrahim al-Marashi and officials. For example, during the last Another possible, though unconfirmed, months of 1997, the Iraqis transported location for WMD materials are in mobile sensitive military materials to a large shed facilities. An unnamed Iraqi defector used to house military uniforms, within the claims this is being done: “These are compound of the Ba’th party office in materials that are easy to transport…The Baghdad.(17) A White House report states, military apparatuses’ and intelligence “We have many reports of WMD material services’ trick lies…in making these being buried, concealed in lakes, relocated devices invisible by constantly moving to agricultural areas and private homes, or them around on tanker trucks that travel hidden beneath mosques or hospitals. In either under escort or being trailed at a one report such material was buried in the distance.(24) The German intelligence banks of the Tigris River during a low agency, BND, has also reported that WMD water period.”(18) laboratories are hidden in trucks that Documentation of Iraq’s military appear completely normal on the program could also be easily concealed or outside.(25) evacuated from locations just prior to the inspectors’ arrival or moved while guards THE EXECUTIVE BODIES OF THE or officials were stalling the UN personnel. CONCEALMENT APPARATUS At various times, documents relating to the The Presidential Secretary WMD program were either destroyed, One of the most powerful executive forged, or converted into microfiche to offices in Iraq is the Presidential Secretariat facilitate their concealment.(19) Richard (Sakratayr al-Ri’asa), with a staff of about Butler, former chairman of UNSCOM, 100 people. All defense, security and relates that, during one inspection, the intelligence matters are channeled through UNSCOM team was delayed for 20 this office before reaching Saddam Hussein minutes in front of a facility as the Iraqis himself. General Security, General scrambled to remove computer hard drives Intelligence, and Military Intelligence with critical WMD information stored on usually report directly to the Secretariat, them.(20) before reporting to Saddam. Since the At times, materials were moved in the early 1990s, the Secretariat has been presence of UN inspectors. For example, headed by ‘Abid Hamid Mahmud who during a September 17, 1997 visit, comes from Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit inspectors witnessed the movement and and belongs to the Khatib family.(26) burning of documents which were then Mahmud, along with Qusay, has led the emptied into a nearby river.(21) Private efforts to conceal Iraq’s programs for homes could also be used to hide developing missiles and weapons of mass documents. On January 16, 2003, a joint destruction. According to Scott Ritter, UNMOVIC/IAEA team found a significant former chief inspector of UNSCOM, cache of documents related to Iraq’s signals intelligence revealed that Mahmud uranium enrichment program in the home had directed the Special Security of Iraqi scientist Faleh Hassan.(22) Hans Organization to remove documents from Blix referred specifically to this instance, sensitive sites and delay inspectors in case saying, “We cannot help but think that the that time was needed for evacuation.(27) case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to The Special Security Committee make discovery difficult and to seek to While not an agency in itself, al-Majlis shield documents by placing them in al-Amn al-Qawmi (The National Security private homes.”(23) Council) is an important element of Iraq’s
54 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction security network. Saddam Hussein government agencies of impending visits established the Council to manage the so that they could conceal materials.(35) activities of the other intelligence The NMD assigned minders who agencies.(28) The Council is chaired by escorted the inspectors, ostensibly to Qusay, and includes ‘Abid Hamid Mahmud overcome problems that might rise during and the heads of Iraq’s main security units. an inspection.(36) However, minders from A sub-committee of the National the NMD were reported to have Security Council, known as the al-Majlis “interrupted interviews and instructed Iraqi al-Amn al-Khas (the Special Security site personnel to provide wrong Committee), coordinated Iraq’s information or to refuse to answer relevant concealment effort,(29) presided over by questions.”(37) The NMD would not allow Mahmud and senior figures from the personnel at a site to speak with inspectors intelligence/security agencies, as well as unless these minders were present. The the Special Republican Guard.(30) The White House report states, “The minders Committee, formed in 1996, employs are often former engineers and scientists approximately 2,000 security personnel, with direct WMD (weapons of mass monitors the daily work of the inspectors destruction) experience, and first-hand and coordinates the removal or transfer of knowledge of what needs to be protected sensitive documents, equipment, and from the inspectors when they arrive at a materials from one location to another.(31) facility.”(38) Richard Butler accused this It also has a role in importing necessary organization of frequently obstructing the WMD material to rebuild Iraq’s non- work of his inspectors.(39) Hans Blix’s conventional arsenal.(32) statement at the UN Security Council on February 14, 2003 indicated that the The National Monitoring Directorate minders on the inspections often Iraq established a unit to deal with the outnumbered the inspectors. He said, “The inspectors, as well as to observe and number of Iraqi minders during inspections monitor their activities, known as the had often reached a ratio as high as five per National Monitoring Directorate, headed inspector. During the talks in January in by General Hussam Amin. The NMD was Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the established in November 1993, in response ratio to about one to one.”(40) to the long-term monitoring of Iraq called for in UN Resolution 715.(33) The Special SECURITY AGENCIES OF THE Security Committee essentially is a shadow CONCEALMENT APPARATUS(41) organization of the NMD. It is believed Special Security that the NMD is divided into departments Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security or SSO) responsible for concealment affairs, such as is responsible for command-and-control the Missiles, Chemical, Biological, and oversight of the concealment apparatus. Nuclear departments, all of which are The current director of the SSO is responsible for securing these respective Saddam’s son, Qusay Hussein, who also WMD programs in Iraq.(34) controls the Special Republican Guard. UN inspectors coordinated with the The responsibilities of SSO towards Iraq’s NMD over inspections and the latter WMD program include purchasing foreign provided UNSCOM with technical and arms and technology, securing Iraq’s most logistical support, such as ground and air critical military industries, and directing services. However, the U.S. government efforts to conceal Iraq’s WMD considered this group “an ‘anti-inspections’ programs.(42) It manages the concealment organization” that warned other Iraqi of Iraq’s non-conventional weapons as well
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 55 Ibrahim al-Marashi as the relevant scientific documentation of regular missile force and launch them these programs.(43) against Israel.”(52) The Chemical Corps, in UNSCOM ascertained that overall addition to deploying chemical munitions, direction of the concealment apparatus also played a role in salvaging Iraq’s comes from the SSO.(44) As part of chemical warfare capability after the 1991 UNSCOM’s investigations into the Gulf War.(53) apparatus, inspectors tried but failed to During an inspection, UNSCOM access SSO sites. Iraq failed to even discovered that the SSO not only had a role acknowledge SSO, Special Republican in deploying chemical agents but was also Guard, or General Intelligence involvement involved in the development of biological in these operations, even though weapons, proven by confiscated SSO inspections obtained an SSO document documents detailing the testing of agents related to dual-use biological activities and such as anthrax and botulinim toxin.(54) materials.(45) Another UNSCOM inspection discovered One reason Saddam entrusted a that Staff 7 of the SSO developed gas security/intelligence agency, the SSO, to gangrene bacteria.(55) Apparently, an SSO deploy these weapons--as opposed to a intelligence assessment of Israel’s WMD regular military unit--was out of fear that capability in 1988 encouraged the Iraqi such powerful assets might encourage regime to further develop biological these soldiers to launch a coup.(46) weapons as a strategic deterrent.(56) Saddam wanted to ensure that those who After the 1991 war, Special Security controlled, and might use, WMD were the coordinated the drive to thwart the efforts personnel most loyal and close to Saddam of UNSCOM to eliminate Iraq’s weapons as possible.(47) of mass destruction. Its activities in the Hussein Kamil, Saddam’s cousin and son- concealment apparatus included evacuating in-law (as well as the then minister of materials from sites in advance of the MIMI), was instrumental in the creation of inspection teams, or delaying the inspectors this ultra-elite intelligence agency.(48) until all materials were removed.(57) Kamil defected to Jordan in August 1995, Because of these activities, its facilities where he revealed to Western intelligence were among the key targets of Anglo- sources the concealment techniques of the American air strikes during the Desert Fox apparatus that he worked so diligently to operation in December 1998.(58) build.(49) Hussein Kamil also used Special This agency also controls units of Iraq’s Security to facilitate his extensive arms and Chemical Corps, which is responsible for technology procurement network as part of deploying Iraq’s chemical weapons Iraq’s covert drive to build weapons of arsenal.(50) During the 1991 Gulf War, the mass destruction. Up until 1995, Hussein SSO controlled and concealed the SCUD Kamil headed this agency as well as the missile arsenal.(51) Hussein Kamil stated, Ministry of Industry and Military “Saddam declared that if contact with him Industrialization and the Military Industrial was severed [SSO units possessing non- Commission, essentially emerging as the conventional warheads were based deep in “father” of Iraq’s WMD program. The the deserts of western Iraq], and if SSO covert techniques Kamil learned while officers believed that communications had head of the SSO aided his quest in been broken off because of a nuclear attack obtaining sophisticated Western on Baghdad, they should mate the chemical technology through a clandestine and biological warheads in their custody procurement network. The SSO served as with missiles in the possession of the the central coordinating body between MIC,
56 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction al-Istikhbarat, al-Mukhabarat, and the ordered to report to the headquarters of the military in the covert procurement of the Special Security Organization to receive necessary components for Iraq’s WMD counter-intelligence training. The training arms.(59) Special Security also recruited focused on evasion methods, interrogation personnel for MIC after conducting resistance techniques, and how to mislead extensive security checks, including inspectors.”(67) soldiers with engineering or other technical qualifications.(60) Military Intelligence Ritter indicates that Special Security has Mudiriyyat al-Istikhbarat al-‘Askariyya a Concealment Operations Room in its al-‘Amma (General Military Intelligence Baghdad headquarters, which operates as Directorate) is responsible for the strategic the concealment effort’s main coordinating concealment of Iraq’s WMD program. Its center.(61) According to Butler, the responsibilities include assessing threats of presidential palaces of Saddam Hussein a military nature to Iraq and the protection have also served as the “nerve centers” of of military and military-industrial facilities. the concealment process, as well as After the 1981 Israeli raid on Iraq’s physical structures where WMD Osiraq nuclear research facility, Military components could be stored.(62) Intelligence turned to the Soviet KGB for Along with the Special Republican assistance. From 1982 to 1985, the KGB Guard, the SSO also has a role in instructed Military Intelligence in transporting components of Iraq’s WMD concealment and protection techniques for program. Their vehicles were disguised as its military programs and facilities, as well refrigerated container trucks, and were as strategic deception methods, such as responsible for carrying nuclear material. how to conceal activities and sites from The destination of these truck convoys satellite and aerial reconnaissance. At the would be determined by the central same time, Special Security watched over command of the SSO.(63) the activities of al-Istikhbarat and the KGB Sensitive WMD related documents were during the Iran-Iraq War.(68) Thus, Iraq’s guarded by the SSO and it kept a microfilm activities in concealing its WMD program copy of such documents in reserve. They did not begin with UN inspections, but were responsible for transporting this rather in the early 1980s. The KGB may archive and storing it in civilian facilities have instructed Military Intelligence how such as the Ministry of Agriculture and to build facilities in tunnels or in Irrigation.(64) If Western intelligence mountains;(69) create decoy facilities to learned the location of this archive, the confuse intelligence-gathering activities; tactic of constantly moving it around would and conceal strategic facilities especially keep its current location a secret.(65) from aerial surveillance.(70) According to the White House dossier, Ironically, the Iraqis also learned the SSO continues its activities in valuable lessons in concealment from the monitoring the activities of inspectors. It United States itself. During part of the Iran- states, “The SSO tracks the number, Iraq war, the United States shared expertise, equipment, vehicles, location, intelligence with Iraq on Iranian troop and heading of inspectors.”(66) Powell told movements. During this period, Military the UN that the SSO also trains those Intelligence was responsible for receiving involved in Iraq’s WMD program to evade this information and analyzing it. However, UN inspections. He said, “In mid- the SSO closely supervised the interaction November [2002], just before the between al-Istikhbarat and U.S. inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were intelligence sources.(71) It could thus learn
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 57 Ibrahim al-Marashi the ways that U.S. aerial reconnaissance also headed by Kamil. After he fled Iraq, and signals intelligence uncovered strategic the SSO’s function was shared with the facilities.(72) General Intelligence, complying with Saddam’s security doctrine of not allowing General Intelligence any one agency to have a monopoly over Da’irat Al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma, The any one area of security. Directorate 28 of General Intelligence Directorate is roughly the General Intelligence was established divided into two departments, responsible specifically to deal with security for Iraq’s for internal and international operations Ministry of Industry and Military respectively, and consequently deals with Industrialization.(76) covert operations relating to WMD materials inside Iraq, as well as clandestine MILITARY UNITS OF THE procurement of weapons material abroad. CONCEALMENT APPARATUS Directorate 19 is tasked with covert The Special Republican Guard procurement of necessary WMD materials Al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas (The and components from foreign countries.(73) Special Republican Guard) was founded In this process, Directorate 19 used Iraqi after 1991, following two assassination diplomatic missions and established front attempts on Saddam Hussein.(77) It is companies. For example, UNSCOM responsible for the logistics of moving reports it obtained “direct evidence of this proscribed materials since this role requires agency’s involvement when long-range communications and transportation support missile gyroscopes, accelerometers and test of a highly reliable and sensitive nature. equipment were discovered being imported Additionally, it conceals certain military into Iraq in 1995.”(74) components, as well as provides security Directorate 4 of this agency, known as for various facilities related to Iraq’s WMD the Secret Service, is responsible for program.(78) domestic operations involving the WMD The SRG played a role in securing program, such as interpreting signals WMD warheads and maintained control of intelligence from the Al-Hadi unit. Al- a few launchers after the Gulf War. Hadi is the organization responsible for According to an Iraqi defector, the SRG collecting, processing, exploiting and hid two missile launchers from UN disseminating signals, communications and weapons inspectors.(79) SRG forces often electronic intelligence. Though it reports guarded the facilities visited by UNSCOM, directly to the Office of the Presidential obstructing them from conducting their Palace, the intelligence it collects is passed searches in many cases.(80) An example of on to other agencies for their utilization. their activities includes an incident in July Al-Hadi facilities operate around-the-clock, 1991, when the SRG received a shipment with five other ground collection stations of production equipment and critical located around Iraq. The organization’s components for the indigenous missile sophisticated computer equipment program. They buried these materials in a intercepts both domestic and international private villa belonging to ‘Izz al-Din al- communications traffic, and monitors the Majid, a major in the Special Republican communications traffic of UN inspectors in Guard, in a suburb west of Baghdad.(81) In Iraq. (75) March 1992, the SRG moved them to Kamil’s defection to Jordan caused the another unspecified location.(82) During restructuring of security for military this period, SRG vehicles transferred industries. Previously, this service was equipment involved in nuclear weapons provided by Special Security, which was production in order to conceal them from
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IAEA inspectors. Reconnaissance imagery (The Ministry of Industry and Military taken during inspections in 1996 and 1997 Industrialization or MIMI).(87) In August showed significant SRG vehicle movement 1987, the law of Military Industrialization at sites under UNSCOM inspection.(83) was passed giving Hussein Kamil the At a remote site called al-‘Alam, the chance to augment his role in the domestic Iraqis declared that ten SRG vehicles arms industry.(88) That same year, the containing prohibited missile items were Ministry of Heavy Industry, Ministry of sent there in July 1991. According to Light Industry and Special Security UNSCOM’s imagery of this area during Department, as well as the General that time, Ritter wrote, there were in fact Technical Industry Corporation were more than 100 vehicles present at this consolidated into the Ministry of Industry remote location. On a related point, and Military Industrialization.(89) however, Ritter notes that in July 1998, The Military Industrialization Iraq conceded that for two years it had Commission (MIC--Hiy’at al-Tasni’ al- misled the Commission with false claims Askari)(90) was created in 1988 by of unilaterally destroying components for Hussein Kamil to serve as the key agency its indigenous missile engine program.(84) within MIMI for acquiring and developing It was also reported that the SRG was seen equipment for Iraq’s military industrial transporting concrete pillars whose size establishments. According to UNSCOM, and dimensions, according to Rolf Ekeus, “The concealment and deception activities former executive chairman of UNSCOM, had distinct technical requirements. This indicated they were actually SCUD implied, inter alia, the continued missiles.(85) involvement of the Military Industrial Commission.”(91) MIC’s Technical General Security Service Department was responsible for covert Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-‘Amm (General manufacturing and its Commercial Security Directorate) is essentially a Department for the covert procurement of political security police force, whose Iraq’s WMD program.(92) It was further paramilitary wing Quwat al-Tawari’ (the divided into units for research and Emergency Forces) provides security for development, commercial activities, concealed components of Iraq’s WMD planning, continuity, and technology.(93) program. For example al-Quwat al- Scott Ritter relates how MIC employees Tawari’ units were responsible for hiding were asked to take sensitive documents Iraqi ballistic missile components.(86) home with them so that they would not be Thus, its mission is similar to that of the discovered.(94) SRG, demonstrating once again how During the Iran-Iraq War, MIMI was Saddam divides responsibilities among responsible for innovations in the military units for protecting his military development of Iraq’s WMD arsenal, as programs. well as its conventional arsenal. MIMI successfully modified Iraqi aircraft to give THE MINISTRY OF THE Iraq an air surveillance capability (airborne CONCEALMENT APPARATUS warning and control system), as well as The Ministry of Industry and Military modifying its Soviet aircraft for mid-air Industrialization and the Military refueling.(95) After the end of the Iran-Iraq Industrialization Commission War in 1988, Iraq’s arms program Traditionally, the military procurement continued unabated. In May 1989, Hussein system of Iraq was managed by the Kamil proclaimed that Iraq’s Wizarat al-Sana’a wa Tasni’ al-Askari industrialization program was intended to
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 59 Ibrahim al-Marashi provide all of Iraq’s basic industrial Altogether, it is estimated that, at its peak, supplies from indigenous sources.”(96) MIMI operated 60 establishments One of MIMI’s goals was to develop an connected to Iraq’s WMD program.(102) infrastructure that would allow Iraq to For example, the Badr General produce everything needed to use any Establishment, Al-Kindi Research WMD weapon.(97) December 1989, Kamil Complex, the Nasr State Establishment, the announced that MIMI had developed a Salah al-Din State Establishment, The long-range missile, known as Al-‘Abid, Nida’ Factory, The Nu’man factory, Al- with a range of 1,110 miles.(98) Qadisiyya State Establishment, Al-Qa’qa The current head of MIMI is ‘Abd al- State Establishment, State Establishment Tawab al-Mulla Huwaysh, who replaced for Automobile Industries, and State the former head of this organization, Establishment for Mechanical Industries General Daif ‘Abd al-Majid, in 1997.(99) were all reportedly involved with the Huwaysh, (who comes from Saddam’s program to modify and produce Scud-B/al- hometown of Tikrit), along with senior Hussein class missiles.(103) figures from this ministry, met with ‘Abid Iraqi security documents left in Kuwait Hamid Mahmud every week.(100) During during the 1991 Gulf War provide evidence these meetings, it is believed that the of the functions, chains-of-command and security of the Ministry and the objectives of MIMI and MIC from 1990 to concealment of the WMD program were 1991.(104) discussed. Key figures that have attended Secretary of State Powell indicated in these meetings include General ‘Amr his briefing at the UN that the Iraqis had Muhammad Rashid (from the ‘Ubaydi the capability to eavesdrop on UN weapons family), responsible for the development of inspectors’ communications. Such Iraq’s missile program, ‘Amr Al-Sa’adi, a eavesdropping has been a recurring high-ranking member in MIMI and Ja’far phenomenon over the years. Dhiya Ja’far, who is responsible for Iraq’s Correspondence on August 16, 1990, from nuclear program.(101) Ali Hassan al-Majid (at that time the head MIMI employed a network of stated- of the Ba’th party in Kuwait) ordered owned institutions to buy and build Iraq’s Hussein Kamil, then head of MIMI, to WMDs, including the necessary forward the intelligence gathered from technology from the West. MIMI often their eavesdropping equipment and stations, used civilian activities as a front for which are under the control of the Center procuring equipment to produce these of Technical Research.(105) weapons, and then transferred these On September 17, 1990, the Iraqis materials from foreign suppliers directly to showed interest in a Kuwaiti government military projects. For example, fronts for building for scientific research that had a purchasing materials for dams were sent to storage area for chemicals.(106) Ali the Condor II ballistic missile program Hassan al-Majid forwarded the letter to the while others were used for a proposed Iraqi MIMI representative in Kuwait on the next super gun, capable of extremely long-range day, informing him to “do what you need artillery fire. to do.” (107) The military side of MIMI produced On that same day, Hussein Kamil wrote supplies to complete weapons systems. to ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid, informing him MIMI had civilian production facilities to that there were substantial materials in cover up the ultimate destination of the storage facilities and in private factories in military-related technology that was Kuwait that MIMI desperately needed, shipped to these weapons-related facilities. such as precursors for making plastics and
60 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction substances that could be used to substitute The vast nature of Saddam’s for other unspecified materials. Kamil had concealment apparatus is an indication of to ask permission from Ali Hassan al- how much he has invested in protecting the Majid, who was the de facto governor of “crown jewels” of his military arsenal. Kuwait (as well as his uncle), to be granted A select committee under the the power to take all the needed materials. supervision of Presidential Secretary ‘Abid Kamil stresses that due to the UN sanctions, Hamid Mahmud makes the decisions MIMI has had difficulties in acquiring regarding concealment. However, Saddam “basic elements” for its production Hussein also assigns many duties regarding efforts.(108) ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid WMD to each of the agencies of this responded to Kamil saying that he would apparatus, following his policy that form a committee to decide on what could competition will produce better results, and could not be transported from thus decentralizing the network ostensibly Kuwait.(109) There was an implicit tension centered around Mahmud. in the correspondence between nephew and For example, both the Presidential uncle, where Kamil wanted an agreement Secretary and Special Security rival each to withdraw any materials he wanted from other for operational control of the Kuwait, while ‘Ali Hassan al-Majid concealment process. MIMI, MIC, Special responded indirectly that such power Security and General Intelligence all play a would not be granted. role in covert procurement of Iraq’s WMD From October to November 1990, technology in foreign countries. The MIMI requested the reallocation of Special Committee of the National Security refrigerators, freon gas cooling Council and the National Monitoring compressors, water coolers,(110) 800 tons Directorate were designed to have identical of reinforced iron,(111) 700 tons of missions. Both the SRG and the aluminum cables,(112) copper pipes, spare Emergency Forces compete in protecting, parts for refrigerators,(113) an oxygen moving and concealing Iraq’s programs. device,(114) as well as an “oven” in the Special Security and General Intelligence Kuwait airport that could reach are both responsible for providing security temperatures over 1200 degrees centigrade for Iraq’s military facilities. In Saddam’s that was an “utmost necessity.”(115) While vision, if one agency fails in its mandate, it is difficult to link this material to WMD another will compensate for its failure. applications, these requests in 1990 The Iraqi concealment apparatus has demonstrated how Hussein Kamil gave a over seven years of experience now in “shopping list” to Ali Hassan al-Majid of countering UN inspections, as well as a the materials that MIMI required in a way four year “window-of-opportunity” to hide, comparable to how WMD shopping might conceal and camouflage its WMD program be conducted. in the absence of any inspectors. The Delegations were also sent abroad to concealment apparatus benefited from obtain WMD materials. For example, in these years of expertise to call on October 1990, MIMI dispatched a mission numerous intelligence agents, scientists, of engineers.(116) A ministry memo and soldiers to fill it ranks. indicated that such teams included military French inspectors on the UNMOVIC generals and army engineers whose task team have remarked that the Iraqis have was to obtain materials necessary to made “progress in their know-how and MIMI’s objectives.(117) ability to hide things in the twelve and a half years of embargo.”(118) Other CONCLUSION inspectors expressed how impressed they
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were with the apparatus’s professional skill, 7. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq which makes it “difficult to find irrefutable and Iran After the Gulf Wars (London and proof and evidence of flagrant New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 49. violations.”(119) 8. Con Coughlin, Saddam, King of Terror The UNMOVIC team in Iraq has a (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 284. formidable adversary. UN inspections 9. The Security Council, 27 January 2003: have slowed Iraq’s progress in further An Update On Inspection developing its WMD capability, but the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. scope of this concealment apparatus could Hans Blix. indicate that many of these programs
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Disarmament.” 64. Hiro, p. 64.
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