HOW IRAQ CONCEALS AND OBTAINS ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION By Ibrahim al-Marashi After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein conducted a systematic concealment operation to disrupti the mission of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), whose mandate was to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This article surveys and analyzes the different techniques used to fool and foil inspectors so as to conceal continued development or possession of these weapons. After Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 war over Iraq’s denial and deception process was Kuwait, the Iraqi government was forced to characterized in a U.S. Department of accept agreements, defined and authorized Defence briefing as “The deliberate, by UN resolutions, mandating its full methodical, extensive and well-organized cooperation in giving up all weapons of national-level strategic effort which aims at mass destruction (WMD). In response, Iraq deceiving not just the United States, not developed a concealment apparatus: a just the United Nations or even the public network of intelligence agencies, military media, but, in fact, the entire world.”(1) units and government ministries assigned According to the briefing, Iraq’s to procure, hide, and defend Iraq’s strategy has three key objectives. The first weapons of mass destruction. By 1998, objective is for Iraq to demonstrate while many weapons had been uncovered ostensible “compliance” with UN and destroyed—often in the face of Iraqi resolutions. This ostensible compliance is non-compliance—the lack of cooperation an attempt to undermine the credibility of forced the withdrawal of inspectors. the need for an inspections regime and then, In late 2002, however, a new UN further, to erode support for continued resolution giving Iraq one more chance to sanctions. The second objective is to implement its pledges led to a new round ensure that UN inspectors will not uncover of inspections by the UN Monitoring, the full scope of Iraq’s WMD and missile Verification and Inspection Commission programs. The third objective is to (UNMOVIC). Concurrently, the obstruct UN inspectors from completely concealment apparatus continues to disarming Iraq of its chemical, biological, function, albeit with some modifications. nuclear, and missile capabilities.(2) These same agencies also have a role in The goals of the concealment apparatus, directing and controlling Iraq’s weapons according to UNSCOM, have been to systems, as well as procurement. This “retain production capability and the network involves thousands of officials ‘know-how’ documentation necessary to from Iraq’s General Intelligence, Special revive programs when possible.”(3) The Security Organization, Military Industry apparatus has been in charge of concealing Commission and the Special Republican the full extent of the nuclear and chemical Guards. weapons programs (including the VX project), and retaining the required Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 51 Ibrahim al-Marashi production equipment and raw materials. concealment of Iraq’s WMD program. The In this regard, it has been responsible for duties and functions of these agencies the concealment of warheads capable of overlap, complying with Saddam’s security delivering chemical and biological doctrine of not allowing any one agency to munitions; indigenous long-range missile have a monopoly over any one area of production, and retaining guidance systems securing and concealing Iraq’s WMD and missile engines production capability. program. While the agencies play a key Finally, this network has been tasked with role in this concealment process, its concealing the very existence of Iraq’s coordination is clearly a family affair. All offensive biological weapons program, the individuals involved were brought into while retaining all of its necessary the project only after very careful production capabilities.(4) investigations about their personal Each intelligence agency has its own connections and loyalty to Saddam.(6) The special role in this process. The elite heads of these agencies are generally from Special Security Organization, Amn al- Saddam’s immediate family, his al-Bu Khas, headed by Saddam’s son Qusay, Nasir clan or from his hometown of Tikrit. serves as one of the major command-and- In May 1991, Saddam Hussein formed a control oversight bodies of this Concealment Operations Committee (COC) concealment network. General Intelligence, to be supervised by Qusay.(7) UNSCOM al-Mukhabarat has at least two sub- inspectors became aware of the existence directorates involved in the concealment of this covert network as a result of effort: a covert operations unit and a covert inspections and interviews conducted procurement unit. Military Intelligence (al- between 1991 and 1996. They believed Istikhabarat) has a role in the strategic that this apparatus, created in 1991, was concealment of Iraq’s WMDs, while designed to hide documents, computer General Security’s (al-Amn al-‘Amm) records, and equipment related to its WMD military unit, the Emergency Forces (al- program. When the COC was created, the Quwwat al-Tawari’), provides security for Iraqis believed that the inspection process the facilities that house these programs. would last only a few months. They based The Special Republican Guard (SRG-- their assessment on the model of previous al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas) is involved IAEA inspections, which had examined in the transportation, concealment and Iraqi nuclear facilities without detecting the guarding of military facilities and materials. Iraqi nuclear weapons program.(8) The al-Hadi agency, which is responsible UNSCOM investigations into the for monitoring signals intelligence, is activities and tactics of the concealment believed to eavesdrop on UN inspectors’ apparatus began in March 1996 and were communications. One of the most continuously impeded by the Iraqis. As a important agencies of all in the result, UNMOVIC’s, and its predecessor concealment operation is the Military UNSCOM’s, mandate evolved from Industrial Commission (MIC), which is inspection agencies to detective agencies in part of the Ministry of Industry and order to investigate, impede and unravel Military Industrialization (MIMI). Both the activities of this Iraqi concealment MIMI and MIC oversee Iraq’s military network. Chairman of UNMOVIC Hans industries and seek to conceal sensitive Blix declared on January 28, 2003, “As we activities from UN inspectors.(5) know,” the idea that Iraq would declare its These agencies form a vast, complex weapons and then the inspectors would and wide-ranging labyrinth, all of which verify these statements “too often turned play a role in the procurement and into a game of ‘hide and seek.’”(9) 52 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction The “hide and seek” game mentioned in Several related tactics that the Blix’s statement has characterized the concealment apparatus has used is the interaction between the Iraqi concealment destruction or bulldozing WMD-related apparatus and UN inspectors. Blix adds, facilities, constructing false or decoy “Rather than just verifying declarations and facilities or altering suspected facilities to supporting evidence, the two inspecting deceive inspectors. A document found by organizations found themselves engaged in UNSCOM in August 1995 demonstrates efforts to map the weapons programs and how these tactics were implemented. The to search for evidence through inspections, Iraqi document, known as "The al-Atheer interviews, seminars, inquiries with Center for the Development of Materials suppliers and intelligence Production: Report of Achievements organizations.”(10) Blix indicated that the Accomplished from 1 June 1990 to 7 June deception practiced by the Iraqi 1991” recorded how the facility staff was concealment apparatus continues unabated. ordered to remove evidence of nuclear weapons activities, evacuate documents to TACTICS OF THE CONCEALMENT remote sites, physically alter the facility APPARATUS and conduct mock inspections to prepare The concealment apparatus has for UN inspectors.(14) launched a coordinated effort to thwart full According to U.S. Secretary of State discovery of Iraq’s proscribed programs. Colin Powell’s briefing to the UN on These agencies have used numerous February 5, 2003, “We know that Iraq has techniques to disrupt, thwart and fool UN embedded key portions of its illicit weapons inspectors.(11) One tactic the chemical weapons infrastructure within its Iraqis have used was to falsely insist that legitimate civilian industry. To all outward they had destroyed most of their WMD appearances, even to experts, the arsenal themselves (known as unilateral infrastructure looks like an ordinary destruction), that their WMD infrastructure civilian operation.”(15) The Iraqis learned was destroyed during the 1991 war, or that how to conduct such tactics based on their chemical munitions were depleted during own innovations as well as through KGB the war with Iran. Often the concealment assistance in the early 1980s. apparatus would conduct a policy of The concealment apparatus has focused “calculated concessions,” where it would on hiding only critical materials and WMD sacrifice certain non-essential or outdated components, while destroying non- components to convince the inspectors that essential items unilaterally or handing them the Iraqis were cooperating. This policy of over to inspectors. It