Two Faces of Revolutionary Consciousness
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TWO FACES OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS solidarity and ideology in the Arab Spring By Mila Ghorayeb Supervised by Professor William Clare Roberts Department of Political Science: Political Theory McGill University, Montreal A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of M.A. Political Science (Thesis) © Mila Ghorayeb, April 2019 Ghorayeb 1 Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 2 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 3 Chapter 1 / Introduction: igniting revolution ............................................................................ 4 §1.1. Why theory? The relevance of political thought in revolution ........................................ 10 Chapter 2 / Ideology and political consciousness ..................................................................... 16 §2.1. Bowing to spontaneity ...................................................................................................... 17 §2.2. Spontaneity and class consciousness................................................................................ 23 §2.2.1. Ideology and counter-ideology .................................................................................. 25 §2.3. ‘Elitist and erroneous’: critiques of Leninist consciousness-raising ................................ 34 Chapter 3 / Movement: the art of the (im)possible .................................................................. 42 §3.1. Background information .................................................................................................. 43 §3.1.2. Tunisia ....................................................................................................................... 43 §3.1.3. Egypt .......................................................................................................................... 47 §3.2. The revolution ‘in their own image’: movement and solidarity ....................................... 51 §3.2.1. Failure to change: the limitations of revolution as movement .................................. 55 Chapter 4 / Change: working with unprimed grounds ........................................................... 59 §4.1. Political political Islam: a small offering of ideology ..................................................... 60 §4.2. Ideology and consciousness revisited .............................................................................. 69 §4.3. Inherent and derived ideology .......................................................................................... 74 Chapter 5 / Undertows: shifting ideological hegemony ........................................................... 80 §5.1. Counter-ideology: dismantling what we take for granted ................................................ 85 Chapter 6 / Conclusion: ‘first as tragedy…’ ............................................................................ 90 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 95 Ghorayeb 2 Abstract Twentieth-century theorists of revolution focused on articulating what conditions were necessary for motivating transformative political change. In particular, theorists were concerned with the concept of consciousness raising. V.I. Lenin’s theory famously argued that consciousness – an understanding of the inner-workings of one’s unfreedom – must be brought to people by revolutionary vanguards. Leninist theory was later challenged when post-colonial theorists such as Ranajit Guha rejected the claim that people require their consciousness to be raised by external actors. Guha’s work showed that rebels can be conscious on their own terms by highlighting evidence of oppositional consciousness in peasant insurgents in colonial India. My thesis situates itself in this debate by answering the question: what is it that will make people with legitimate claims against existing powers articulate and act on this claim in a way that radically shifts the current political order? Overlaying my argument on the early uprisings in the Arab Spring, I argue that Lenin and Guha describe two crucial, but conceptually distinct forms of political consciousness. Guha’s articulation of oppositional consciousness, I argue, answers the first form of the question: rejecting one’s subordinate status through solidarity and self-identification with others of the same status will bring about political contestation. Lenin’s conception of revolutionary class consciousness answers the second part: a cohesive and public counter-ideology to that of the status-quo is required to challenge and shift hegemonic political practices. Guha’s oppositional consciousness leads a revolution to what Asef Bayat calls ‘revolution as movement’: the radical mobilization and solidarity of political subjects against existing powers. However, the deciding factor for whether the political order will shift or restore is dependent on which actor(s) cohesively articulate the source of peoples’ unfreedom, as well as a blueprint for a freer order. This is what Bayat deems ‘revolution as change,’ which he argues failed to materialize during the Arab Spring. Just as Bayat argues for a conceptual distinction between movement and change, my thesis complements his concepts through mirroring conceptions of revolutionary consciousness. As a result, my argument shows that Lenin’s and Guha’s conceptions of consciousness are distinct and complementary rather than rivalling accounts. Les théoriciens de la révolution du XXe siècle ont cherché à définir quelles conditions étaient nécessaires pour motiver un changement politique transformateur. En particulier, les théoriciens se sont intéressés au concept sensibilisation. La théorie de V.I. Lénine affirmait que la conscience - une compréhension du fonctionnement interne de la non-liberté d’une personne - devait être amenée du «dehors» par des avant-gardes révolutionnaires. Par la suite, certains théoriciens post-coloniaux tels que Ranajit Guha ont contesté la théorie léniniste en rejetant l'affirmation selon laquelle les individus exigent que leur conscience soit élevée par des acteurs extérieurs. Les travaux de Guha ont montré que les rebelles peuvent être conscientes selon leurs propres termes, en mettant en évidence des preuves de la conscience opposée chez les paysans insurgés de l’Inde coloniale. Ma thèse se situe dans ce débat en répondant à la question: qu'est-ce qui assurera que ceux qui ont des revendications légitimes contre les pouvoirs existants articulent et agissent sur cette revendication d'une manière qui modifie radicalement l'ordre politique actuel? En reprenant mon argument sur les premières étapes du Printemps arabe, je soutiens que Lénine et Guha décrivent deux formes cruciales, mais conceptuellement distinctes, de la conscience politique. Je soutiens que la formulation par Guha de la conscience oppositionnelle répond à la première forme de la question: rejeter son statut de subordonné par la solidarité et l’auto-identification avec des personnes du même statut suscitera une contestation politique. La conception de Lénine de la conscience de classe révolutionnaire répond à la deuxième partie: une contre-idéologie cohérente et publique qui s’oppose à celle du statu quo est nécessaire pour défier et modifier les pratiques politiques hégémoniques. La conscience oppositionnelle de Guha mène une révolution à ce que Bayat appelle «la révolution en tant que mouvement»: la mobilisation radicale et la solidarité des sujets politiques contre les puissances existantes. Cependant, le facteur décisif pour savoir si l’ordre politique changera ou restaurera dépend de quel (s) acteur (s) énonce de manière cohérente la source de la non-liberté des peuples, ainsi qu’un plan pour un ordre plus libre. C’est ce que Bayat considère comme étant une «révolution en tant que changement», qui selon lui n’a pas réussi à se matérialiser lors du Printemps arabe. Tout comme Bayat plaide pour une distinction conceptuelle entre le mouvement et le changement, ma thèse complète ses concepts en reproduisant cette dualité, cette fois-ci appliquée à conscience révolutionnaire. En conséquence, mon argument montre que les conceptions de la conscience de Lénine et de Guha sont distinctes et complémentaires plutôt que rivales. Ghorayeb 3 Acknowledgments I would first and foremost like to thank my graduate advisor and thesis supervisor, Will Roberts, who has, throughout the years, challenged me profoundly. I could not have been under better guidance in these formative years as a student, TA, as well as an activist. Professor Roberts has had a substantial, inspirational influence on my work and beliefs. His insightful scholarship, seminars, and his public and principled solidarity has made him a solid supervisor for this project and an absolute pleasure to work with. Second, I thank Jacob Levy, who has been an indispensable source of guidance as I have navigated through my academic endeavours. An acknowledgment can hardly do justice to the ways Professor Levy has been present in my development as an aspiring theorist. He has played a major role in believing in my work, pushing me further, and encouraging me to go as far as I can. I would not have made it to grad school if not for him as he consistently goes above and beyond