COUNTEROFFENSIVE, U.S. Marines from Pohang to No Name Line

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COUNTEROFFENSIVE U.S. Marines from Pohang to No Name Line by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series About the Author

ieutenant Colonel Ronald J. LBrown, USMCR (Ret), is a free- lance writer and scoring director for Measurement Incorporated, an educational testing firm. The author of two monographs in the Persian Gulf series and two offi- THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the Korean War era, is published for the education and training of cial unit histories, he was also a Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine contributing author for the best- Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense selling book The Marines, and has observance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine Corps been a frequent contributor to Heritage Foundation. professional journals. He is working on a second Korean commemorative pamphlet on Marine helicopter operations. KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES Lieutenant Colonel Brown served as an active duty infantry DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS officer from 1968 to 1971 and saw combat in Vietnam. He Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (RET) joined MTU DC-7 at its inception in 1976 and served con- GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES tinuously with that unit until his retirement. He went to Charles R. Smith Korea during Exercise Team Spirit-84. Six years later he was EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION activated during the Persian Gulf War and was assigned to Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor I Marine Expeditionary Force. After Operation Desert Storm, W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist he became the Marine component historian for Combined Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician Task Force Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. Lieutenant U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center Colonel Brown, then commanding MTU DC-7, retired in 1254 Charles Morris Street SE 1996. In civilian life, Ronald Brown was a high school his- Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5040 tory teacher for three decades and is a nominee for the 2001 Michigan High School Football Coaches Hall of Fame. PCN 190 00319 400

H. Simmons, The United States the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956 Sources Marines: The First Two Hundred Years (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993); and Morgan Brainard, Men in The basic source for this pamphlet 1998). Low Cut Shoes: The Story of a Marine was the fourth volume in the series Rifle Company (New York: Tood & U.S. Marine Operations Korea, 1950- Overviews of the Korean Conflict Honeywell, 1986). 1953: The East-Central Front included: Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Duels For Korea (College Station: Texas Primary documents and military G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962), written by A&M Press, 1990); Clay Blair, The periodicals held by the History and Lynn Montross, Maj Hubbard D. Forgotten War: America in Korea, Museums Division in Washington, Koukka, and Maj Norman W. Hicks. 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, D.C., include unit diaries, after action Marine-specific books consulted were: 1987); Russell A. Gugeler, Combat and special action reports, biographical Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea Actions in Korea (Washington, D.C.: files, subject files, comment files, per- (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, Office Chief of Military History, 1970); sonal diaries, and articles in the Marine 1962); Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis Robert Leckie, Conflict, The History of Corps Gazette and the U.S. Naval (New York: McMillan, 1980); J. Robert the Korean War, 1950-53 (New York: Institute Proceedings. Among the oral Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story Putnam’s, 1962); Billy C. Mossman, Ebb interviews consulted were those of (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977); LtCol and Flow—-U.S. Army in the Korean Gen Oliver P. Smith, LtGen Alpha L. Gary W. Parker and Maj Frank M. War (Washington, D.C.: Government Bowser, Maj Martin J. Sexton, LtCol Batha, Jr., A History of Marine Printing Office, 1990); and Matthew B. John L. Hopkins, Col Homer L. Observation Squadron Six (History and Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden Litzenberg, Jr., LtCol Francis F. Parry, Museums Division, HQMC, 1982); Col City: Doubleday, 1967). Individual Maj William L. Bates, Jr., and MajGen Gerald R. Pitzel, A History of Marine perspectives included Burke Davis, Edward A. Craig. The author also used Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (History Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller (New personal files compiled during Exercise and Museums Division, HQMC, 1987); York: Little-Brown, 1962); Paul N. Team Spirit-84, and wishes to acknowl- Maj William J. Sambito, A History of McCloskey, Jr., The Taking of Hill 610 edge the recollections of retired BGen Marine Attack Squadron 311 (History (Woodside: Eaglet Books, 1992); LtGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret), 1stLt and Museums Division, HQMC, 1978); Matthew B. Ridgeway, Soldier: The Robert Harding, USAR, and SSgt Col Francis F. Parry, Three Marine War: Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New Edward Huffman, USMCR, all of whom The Pacific, Korea, Vietnam (Pacifica: York: Harper, 1956); Allan R. Millett, In served with the 1st Marine Division in Pacifica Press, 1987); and BGen Edwin Many A Strife: Gerald C. Thomas and Korea in 1951. COUNTEROFFENSIVE U.S. Marines from Pohang to No Name Line by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR (Ret)

t Hungnam, the 1st around the Pusan Perimeter and As 1950 drew to a close the mil- Marine Division, fol- were “not too happy or not too itary situation in Korea was so lowing the with- eager to see the dreadful country bleak American policy makers drawal from the they had fought over.” Regardless were seriously contemplating the Chosin Reservoir, of the speculation, the convoy evacuation of U.S. forces from that embarked all of its equipment and steamed on, and on 16 December embattled country, and American personnel in record time and arrived at Pusan. Although several military leaders had already formu- sailed for Pusan. The trip south for tank landing ships sailed past lated secret contingency plans to the half-starved, half-frozen Mar- Pusan and put in at Masan, a do so. The Korean Conflict had ines was uneventful except for the majority of the division’s Marines been raging for six months during never-closed chow lines, salt-water traveled by rail and road from which time the fighting seesawed showers, a complete change of Pusan 40 miles west to their new up and down the 600-mile length clothes, and a widespread out- area outside the small seaport of the mountainous peninsula with break of colds or mild cases of untouched by war. Gen Douglas MacArthur, America’s pneumonia. “For the first time in In an area previously occupied longest-serving soldier, was Com- weeks we felt clean,” wrote one by the 1st Provisional Marine mander in Chief, Far East, and also Marine, “and our lice were gone Brigade, a tent city quickly sprang commanded the multinational United forever—washed down a drain- up—-pyramidal tents for all mem- Nations forces in Korea. Although the hole into the cold Sea of Japan.” bers of the command and squad situation appeared ominous in early In addition to a scrub down and tents for each battalion. Hospital 1951, MacArthur later said he never new dungarees, there was a good tents and mess halls were erected contemplated withdrawal and “made deal of conjecture and discussion and with the help of Korean labor- no plans to that effect.” on the possible employment of the ers mess tables and other improve- Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC362863 division; many hoped that instead ments soon began to appear. A of landing at Pusan, the convoy large barracks in the outskirts of would proceed directly to Japan or Masan served as the administrative the United States and relief by the headquarters for the regiments, 2d Marine Division. Both officers while the division’s service and and enlisted men alike held that it support units occupied areas near was impossible to visualize the the docks and south of town. The employment of the division in the men observed the division’s first near future and that rest, reorgani- Christmas in Korea with a memo- zation, and rehabilitation was an rable display of holiday spirit absolute necessity. Then, too, despite a chilling drizzle. A choir there were those who had fought from the 5th Marines serenaded the division headquarters with car- ON THE COVER: Marines are ols, many attended a series of crouched and ready to move again as shows put on by troupes of U.S. fire slackens near Wonju. National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6630 Army and Korean entertainers, and the U.S. Navy sent Christmas trees AT LEFT: Marine riflemen hug the and decorations. It was not only a ground as they advance under fire time to be thankful, but also a during Operation Ripper. National period of rapid recuperation from Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6862 fatigue and nervous tension.

1 Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, to rally his troops just as the outlook was darkest. This fortuitous event began a dramatic reversal of for- tunes, a turnaround so startling that within six months it was the Communists who were on the ropes. The combined NKPA and CCF armies had more than a half mil- lion men inside Korea while the United Nations Command numbered only about two-thirds that many. The U.N. commander was American General of the Army Douglas MacArthur who was concurrently Commander in Chief, Far East. The major Service compo- nents of the Far East Command were the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air Force, and elements of the Seventh Fleet. Recently appointed Lieuten- ant General Ridgway commanded the Eighth Army; Major General Earl E. Partridge, USAF, the Fifth Air Force; and Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN, the Seventh Fleet. Major General Oliver P. “O. P.” Smith’s 1st Marine Division and Major General Field Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were the two major Marine units in Korea. Unlike today’s expeditionary force structure, at that time there was no Marine component headquarters so the non-Marine theater commander was the only common superior officer for both the division and aircraft wing in Korea. The nearest senior Marine was Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Gen- first one side and then the other blows that began the previous eral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in alternately holding the upper November, the United States-led Hawaii, who was responsible for hand. With 1951 only a few days United Nations Command had the logistical support of both the away the Communist forces—-con- been pushed back from the Yalu division and wing. Despite the fact sisting of the North Korean River at the North Korean-Chinese that no official direct command People’s Army (NKPA) reinforced border all the way south of the link existed between Marine air by “volunteers” from the People’s 38th Parallel, which divided North and ground units in Korea, the Republic of China, known as the and South Korea. A momentary lull respective Marine commanders Communist Chinese Forces in the action, however, allowed the maintained close liaison and care- (CCF)—appeared on the verge of energetic new United Nations field fully coordinated their actions. victory. In a series of stunning commander, Lieutenant General Several important new com-

2 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A6087 The general staff of the 1st Marine Division assembled for an General; Maj Donald W. Sherman, Assistant G-1; BGen informal photograph shortly after the New Year. Pictured Edward A. Craig, Assistant Division Commander; Col from left are: Capt Eugene R. Hering, USN, Division Edward W. Snedeker, Chief of Staff; and Col Francis M. Surgeon; Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., G-3; Col Bankston T. McAlister, G-4. Holcomb, Jr., G-2; MajGen Oliver P. Smith, Commanding mand relationships developed week before the tough and ener- porarily deploy to Japan. On the after the Marines’ fighting with- getic Army paratrooper, General home front, three replacement drawal from the Chosin (Changjin) Ridgway, was named Eighth Army drafts (the 3d, 4th, and 5th) were Reservoir. Marine aircraft, which commander after his predecessor, either already enroute or were had provided superb close air sup- Lieutenant General Walton H. preparing to ship out. Hopefully, port for Marine ground units for Walker, USA, was killed in a traffic their arrival would bring the the previous five months, would accident. depleted Marine ranks in Korea no longer be on direct call. back up to strength before the next Instead, the potent Marine air- The Masan Bean Patch round of combat began. ground team was broken up so The battered 1st Marine Division land-based aircraft of the 1st After the ordeal at the Chosin spent two weeks licking its Marine Aircraft Wing could be Reservoir, the 1st Marine Division wounds in a rest area known as incorporated into the Fifth Air moved to Masan in southern Korea the “Bean Patch” about 200 miles Force. The U.N. ground command where it became part of Eighth south of the main line of resis- also underwent some changes. The Army reserve. Concurrently, the 1st tance. Its three rifle regiments, 1st Marine Division passed from X Marine Aircraft Wing was flying each of which was led by a future Corps to Eighth Army control in from aircraft carriers and airfields lieutenant general, occupied the mid-December 1950, just about a in Korea but was about to tem- agricultural flat lands on the north-

3 James H. Brower, was evacuated from the Chosin Reservoir in November. Almost two decades later Major General Youngdale would command the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam. On New Year’s Eve the Communists opened their Third Phase Offensive. This massive attack pushed overextended U.N. lines back under heavy pressure, and the United Nations Command was forced to cede the South Korean capital city of Seoul to the enemy for a second time. But this fighting withdrawal was not at all National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-424655 like the helter-skelter retreats fol- Marines encamped near Masan in the wake of their return from the Chosin lowing the North Korean invasion Reservoir. The area had been a rest area when the 5th Marines fought to save of June 1950. This time the Eighth the Pusan Perimeter four months earlier. Army fell back in good order to a ern outskirts of Masan, which gave endary Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” series of preplanned defensive the area its name. Division head- Puller, whom General Ridgway lines, the last of which would be, if quarters and most of the combat proudly lauded as “a man of needed, just outside the port of support and service elements, indomitable spirit . . . the officer Pusan much farther back than the including the helicopters and with the most combat experience original Pusan Perimeter. American observation aircraft of Major in Korea.” The 5th Marines com- units traded ground for time while Vincent J. Gottschalk’s Marine mander was lanky Lieutenant inflicting maximum casualties Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6), Colonel Raymond L. Murray, upon their advancing foe. In short, were located nearby. The 1st another seasoned combat veteran. the U.N. lines were bending but Marine Division was in very good An “Old China Hand” who fought not breaking, and there was no hands. Devout, pipe-smoking, at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and sense of panic. “We came back white-haired O. P. Smith was tall Saipan during World War II, fast,” General Ridgway admitted, and thin with a scholarly manner, Murray brought the 5th Marines “but as a fighting army, not as a factors that led some observers to ashore in August 1950, and ably running mob. We brought our remark that he looked more like a led his regiment through every dead and wounded with us, and preacher than a Marine general. Marine engagement in Korea thus our guns, and our will to fight.” Fortunately, appearances can be far. He would later gain some liter- Fortunately, the United Nations deceiving. Smith’s performance as ary notoriety as the role model for Command stemmed the oncoming a commander thus far in Korea had the fictional “High Pockets” Huxley tide so the 1st Marine Division been outstanding. A respected mil- in Leon Uris’ best selling novel never had to assume the role of itary analyst studying the Chosin Battle Cry. Colorful, fiery-tem- rear guard. Instead, the division campaign noted that Smith was a pered, hard-driving Colonel rested, rehabilitated, restored bro- careful planner and superb tacti- Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., com- ken equipment, rearmed, and cian who repeatedly resisted pres- manded the 7th Marines. absorbed almost 3,000 replace- sure to execute rash orders issued Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. ments during the last days of 1950, by his corps commander, actions Youngdale led the division’s most filling shortages in the that probably saved the 1st Marine artillery regiment. Youngdale infantry and artillery regiments. Division from piecemeal destruc- served with the 14th Marines of the Daily security patrols were mount- tion. 4th Marine Division throughout ed with the purpose of making a The 1st Marine Division was World War II. In 1950, he came to reconnaissance of roads and ques- also blessed with four of the finest Korea as the 11th Marines’ execu- tioning Korean civilians about the regimental commanders in Korea. tive officer and then took over the nature of guerrilla activity in the The 1st Marines was led by leg- unit when its commander, Colonel area, but no enemy were encoun-

4 tered and there was no evidence of up, and perhaps even with a were doing to get themselves back any inclination on the part of the defeatist attitude after all he’d read in shape to get back into the bat- enemy or guerrillas to harass the and heard about the Chosin tle.” Very satisfied with what he division. Reservoir,” as Colonel Alpha L. saw, he complimented General There were many high-level vis- Bowser, the division’s assistant Smith for the division’s quick itors at Masan during the division’s chief of staff for operations, later recovery. Although it was short of brief stay. General Ridgway noted. But “much to his surprise men and equipment, Ridgway still dropped in to inspect the Marines the thing that impressed him most, deemed the 1st Marine Division his and observe field training. “He everywhere he went in the divi- most effective combat unit. He fully expected to find a division sion, and everybody he talked to, was, in fact, holding the Marines in which was so weary and so beaten [was] their attitude about what they reserve in case the pending crisis in the north worsened. Should the U.N. lines break, Ridgway wanted the 1st Marine Division to hold open a corridor to the port of Pusan and then act as a rear guard to cover the U.N. evacuation. Ridgway “gave the impression to us that he was a commander, with plenty on the ball, who had combat experience and the will to fight,” recalled Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, the assistant division commander. Among other noteworthy visitors was Captain John Ford, USNR, the famous motion picture director, who had been recalled to active duty by Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford, commanding the Pacific Fleet, who felt the Navy and Marine Corps had not received enough war coverage. Ford gathered background for a documen- tary he was filming, and some film clips shot at Masan were later used in the feature film “Retreat Hell.” Also on hand was military historian Colonel Samuel L. A. Marshall, USAR, who interviewed numerous Marines for a classified report about infantry combat in Korea, portions of which were later published in his book Battle at Best. The most welcomed visitors, however, were entertainer Bob Hope and his traveling USO show. The Marines at Masan thoroughly enjoyed a chance to laugh heartily, and many of them stared in awe at the first American women they had seen in months. Sleep, sports, and good chow

5 communications equipment when the call to return to action finally came. Notwithstanding the short period of recuperation, fatigue among the officers and men of the division was apparent after more than four months of combat. Con- cerned, General Smith told his unit commanders that “we had to get our men in hand, do everything we could for them, but not let them begin to feel sorry for themselves.” Some of the officers and National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5640 men, primarily the commanding During the brief stay at Masan, Marines rested, gained back some of their lost officers, noted Lieutenant Colonel weight, and found time to engage in an impromptu volleyball game. Despite the Parry, “started to lose a little of efforts of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to scrape the bottom of the manpower bar- their zip and hard-charging quali- rel, the division was still short more than 3,500 officers and men. ties. Some of the battalion com- were the watchwords at Masan. As that could properly let the troops manders of the 5th who had been Lieutenant Colonel Francis F. Parry, relax and enjoy themselves for a through three campaigns were get- 3d Battalion, 11th Marines’ com- while, such as could have been ting to be pretty sick men. They manding officer, remarked: “We obtained in Japan.” Despite a fort- weren’t charging up hills the same had so much turkey it was coming night’s respite and frantic efforts to way they had when they first got out of our ears.” Impromptu soft- bring the 1st Marine Division back there.” ball, basketball, touch football, and up to full strength, General Smith In early January, the Com- volleyball games became daily rit- was still short of men, tanks, and munist’s strategic goal was to uals, and these were occasionally followed by a well appreciated, Veterans of the exhausting Chosin Reservoir campaign used their time at the albeit limited, beer ration. Masan to hone basic military skills. Here Marines review marksmanship techniques under the watchful eye of a noncommissioned officer. Weapons familiarization and small Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5628 unit tactics dominated the training schedule. And as was done prior to the trek down from Hagaru-ri, the division’s medical staff examined all personnel, surveying the men for those who, noted Lieutenant Colonel Parry, might have “hidden the fact that they were frostbitten or didn’t consider it was worthy of note till we got down to Masan.” The serious cases were evacuated. Although the men eventually were allowed go into town, visit the stores, and purchase a lot of use- less things, such as artificial flowers and non-regulation fur hats, “there was no liberty,” Parry recalled. “A few troops got drunk on native brew and went blind and a few of them caught a venereal disease, but there was no liberty to amount to anything, no recreation

6 Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, USA

ieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway was called The real issues are whether the power of Western suddenly to Korea to take over the Eighth U.S. Army civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our following the death of its previous commander, own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat L Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker. When Ridgway arrived the Eighth Army was in disarray, its morale shat- their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the tered by heavy losses suffered during the longest with- dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to drawal in American military history. The new Eighth Army whom the individual and his individual rights are commander promptly engineered, to use the words of sacred; whether we are to survive with God’s hand to General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence Joint Chiefs of Staff, “a battlefield turnaround unlike any of a Godless world. within American History.” Within four months the United If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any Nations Command had regained all lost territory south of possibility of challenge, then this has long since the 38th Parallel. As military historian Colonel Harry G. National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC360069 Summers, a veteran of Korea, noted: “Under Ridgway the Eighth Army toughened up and became as good a fighting force as this country has ever fielded.” Just as his troops were about to reenter North Korea, General Ridgway was again unexpectedly thrust into higher command when he replaced General Douglas MacArthur as commander of United Nations forces in April 1951. The son of an artillery colonel and a West Point gradu- ate, Ridgway was an intellectual and diplomat as well as a superb tactical commander. He possessed brains, courage, and decisiveness—-traits that served him well in Korea. His peacetime military assignments included overseas stints in the Far East, Latin America, and Europe. In 1942, he was given command of the elite 82d Airborne Division and led the unit in operations against Axis forces in Sicily, Italy, and France. He was “a kick-ass man,” one subordinate said, who became known among his men as “Tin-tits” because of the hand grenades so prominently strapped to his chest. Taking command of XVIII Airborne Corps in 1944, Ridgway participated in the Battle of the Bulge and subsequent operations leading to Germany’s surrender in 1945. He was serving as the deputy Army chief of staff for plans in Washington, D.C., when his call to Korea came. Unlike his predecessor, General Ridgway was given a free hand in Korea. When he asked for instructions, General MacArthur simply told him: “The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best.” Following an initial tour of the combat area, Ridgway was astonished at the decided lack of morale and purpose, shoddy discipline, and atmosphere of defeat. Problems meant opportunity for the battle-hardened, disciplined paratrooper. First, the men of the Eighth Army needed an adequate answer from their commanding general to the question: “What are we fighting for?” “To me the issues are clear,” he wrote: It is not a question of this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is, here, incidental. It is not restrict- ed to the issue of freedom for our South Korean Allies, whose fidelity and valor under the severest stresses of battle we recognize; though that freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, and included among them.

7 ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean Allies sion; second, he acquiesced to the breakup of the Marine alone and for their national survival. It has become, air-ground team by allowing Marine aircraft squadrons to and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom, be directly controlled by the Fifth Air Force. Lieutenant for our own survival, in an honorable, independent General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the Fleet Marine Force, national existence. Pacific, commander, viewed both of these actions as tacti- The sacrifices we have made, and those we shall cal mistakes. Previously, General MacArthur—-who had yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but commanded Marine units in the Southwest Pacific during in our own direct defense. the World War II and fully appreciated their unique capa- In the final analysis, the issue now joined right here bilities—-always kept the very successful Marine air-ground in Korea is whether Communism or individual free- team intact, and he usually tried to keep the Marines near dom shall prevail, and, make no mistake, whether the the sea as well. For a variety of reasons, Ridgway did not. next flight of fear-driven people we have just wit- As theater commander, General Ridgway reorganized the nessed across the HAN, and continue to witness in U.S. Far East Command to make it a true joint headquarters, other areas, shall be checked and defeated overseas never meddled in the tactical handling of forces in Korea, or permitted, step by step, to close in on our own and maintained a good relationship with his superiors in homeland and at some future time, however, distant, Washington. After leaving the Far East, Ridgway succeeded to engulf our own loved ones in all its misery and General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of despair. Allied Forces in Europe and in 1953 he was named Chief of Ridgway not only was determined to recapture moral Staff of the Army. His tenure as Army Chief of Staff was a leadership, but also insisted that the Eighth Army needed to series of bitter quarrels with what he took to be President return to infantry combat fundamentals. He sternly ordered Eisenhower’s refusal to remember, “most of what counts in his corps commanders to prepare for coordinated offensive battle is the Infantry.” A few months short of mandatory action, and he forcefully reminded his division and regi- retirement, he left the Army in June 1955. He later served mental commanders to get off the roads, to take the high as executive director of various business firms until his ground, and to use perimeter defenses. He studied previous death in 1993 at the age of 93. campaigns and recognized a pattern to Communist opera- Military historians frequently hold him up as the epitome tions; they would advance, attack, and then suddenly break of the modern “soldier-statesman,” but it was the men who contact until resupplied. Ridgway decided the answer was served with him in battle who had the most praise. As Major to fall back in an orderly manner trading space to inflict William L. Bates, Jr., commanding officer, Weapons casualties then, once the Communists stopped, to attack Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and later operations and relentlessly pursue them. His plan proved to be very officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, said of General Ridgway successful. Ridgway’s offensive, also known as the “meat- at the time: “He is a real, down-to-earth, honest-to-God sol- grinder” because of heavy Chinese and North Korean casu- dier. He is a general who can visit a battalion, go into the alties, had by early spring 1951 resulted in the recapture of attack with it, watch it operate, remain several hours, and Seoul and the recovery of all of South Korea by mid-April, never try to tell you how to run your own outfit. He is per- when he left to take over as theater commander in Tokyo. sonally courageous and spends much of his time following Although Marines admired General Ridgway’s offensive Patton’s suggestion of letting the troops see you at the front. spirit and his professionalism, they were disappointed with He has sound ideas on the employment of infantry troops, two of his high-level decisions. First, he pulled the 1st and he knows how to fight, small and large scale. He is, I Marine Division away from the sea and began to use that would guess, the best field commander the Army has had highly trained amphibious unit as just another infantry divi- in a long time.” divide Korea in half, to separate frontal attack by Major General the 10th Division headed for the U.S. and South Korean forces. Pang Ho San’s V Corps while out- Andong. If all went according to The Chinese first carried the main flanking the U.N. lines from the plan, the United Nations Command attack aimed at Seoul and Inchon. east using Lieutenant General would lose control of its main sup- The NKPA attacked Korean-held Choe Hyon’s II Corps; the III Corps ply route and be denied passage to Line D from Hoengsong in central was his reserve. All went well at the port at Pusan. This, combined Korea not long after the CCF first. II Corps cracked through the with the loss of Seoul and Inchon, mounted its western offensive. South Korean lines and proceeded would effectively end the war. Farther east, North Korean com- down Route 29 peeling off divi- The Third Phase Offensive pre- mander General Kim Chaek want- sions to cut the U.N. line of retreat. sented problems, but General ed to drive straight down the cen- The 27th Division invested Ridgway was confident his revital- ter of the peninsula to capture the Chechon; the 31st Division ized Eighth Army could handle the U.N. staging area at Taegu. His attacked Tanyang; the 2d Division situation. Obviously, Ridgway’s plan was to take Wonju with a cut Route 29 north of Yongju; and first priority was to stop the

8 lines, endangering Wonju, a vital road and rail junction south of Hoengsong. Responding to this threat, General Ridgway flashed a series of messages to Smith’s headquarters. One of these was a warning order for elements of the 1st Marine Division to be ready to move 65 miles northeast to Pohang-dong, a sleepy fishing village about a third of the way up Korea’s east coast, in order to protect Eighth Army lines of communication and backstop some shaky Korean divisions. The Pohang area had great strategic importance because it included a significant stretch of the Eighth Army main supply route (National Route 29), housed several key road junctions, included the only protected port on the east coast still in U.N. hands, and was the site of one of the few modern airfields (Yongilman, a former Japanese fighter base labeled “K-3” by the Americans) in eastern Korea. This mission was confirmed on 8 January, but it had by then been modified to include the entire 1st Marine Division which was not assigned to a corps, but would instead be directly under Eighth Army operational control. The division staff cut orders on the 9th, and the Marines began moving out the next day with the maneuver elements going by truck and the support units by air, rail, and ship. The brief Masan interlude was over. The 1st Marine Division was headed back into action. Chinese, so he committed the bulk stage for all Marine combat opera- The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt of his forces near the west coast. tions in the spring of 1951. He knew that once the Chinese While the Marines were resting Marine activities along the east offensive was blunted he could in the Bean Patch, the struggle coast of Korea in late January and safely shift forces to central Korea. shifted from Seoul to central early February of 1951 eventually The U.S. 2d Division, the only Korea. Fighting in knee-deep snow came to be known as the “Pohang American unit he had available for and bitter cold, outnumbered U.N. Guerrilla Hunt” by the men of the the Central Front, was hastily sent defenders grudgingly fell back as 1st Marine Division. This period forward to defend Wonju. the enemy poured through a gap began with a week-long move- Ridgway’s decisive actions set the in Republic of Korea (ROK) Army ment from Masan to Pohang that

9 started with the departure of the 1st Marine Division vanguard, “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Marines organized as a regimental combat team, on 10 January. A motor convoy carried elements of the 1st Marines; the division Reconnais- sance Company; the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company C, 1st Engineers; and Company D, 1st Medical Battalion, on a tedious 10- hour journey from Masan to Yongchon. Upon arrival at Uisong the next day, the regimental combat team, later dubbed “Task Force 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan-Feb51 Puller” by General Smith, began A 75mm recoilless rifle position covers a likely avenue of approach in the vicini- patrolling a 30-mile section of ty of Andong. Crew-served recoilless rifles were more reliable and had much road. Two days later, the rein- greater range than the individually carried 3.5-inch rocket launchers. forced 1st Battalion, commanded Marines edged closer to Andong, felt they might ‘bug out’ and leave by Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Puller was convinced, despite him ‘holding the bag.’ As far as the Schmuck, a Colorado native and General Ridgway’s promise to Division was concerned, “RCT-1 Peleliu veteran, moved 15 miles keep the division intact, that the was strong enough to protect its north to occupy Andong. A key next step would be to attach his own withdrawal if it came to that.” crossroads about 40 miles inland unit to X Corps and he would be With the arrival of the division’s from the sea, it was the site of X “off to the races again.” Puller, as two other regimental combat Corps rear headquarters as well as General Smith later noted, “was teams, soon-to-be colonel, Ray- two dirt airstrips (one of which apprehensive about being put out mond Murray’s 5th Marines was long enough to handle cargo on a limb. The basic difficulty was patrolled the coast from Pohang to planes, but the other able only to that he had no confidence in the Yongdok and defended the main service light observation aircraft staying power of the Army units airfield, while Colonel Homer and helicopters). As the 1st deployed north of Andong. Puller Litzenberg’s 7th Marines occupied An aerial photograph of Pohang shows the rugged, irregu- Division’s base of operations in January and February lar hill masses where North Korean guerrillas sought refuge. 1951. This village on Korea’s east coast was the 1st Marine National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC346705

10 centrally located Topyong-dong. tently cutting supply lines and motor transport. Its only support The last Marine units disembarked occasionally attacking outposts weapons were a few heavy mor- from tank landing ships at Pohang between Wonju and Taegu so con- tars and some heavy machine on 17 January. tinued guerrilla actions were con- guns. These shortfalls limited Although there was some limit- sidered probable. General Smith General Lee’s tactical options to ed discussion about small-scale was well aware that the Marines hit-and-run raids, roadblocks, and amphibious operations by General would not be manning an exposed ambushes. The 10th Division was, Ridgway when he visited the 1st position. Several South Korean therefore, expected to conduct Marine Division command post at divisions screened the Marine low-intensity operations remaining Pohang, these never came to northern flank, the Sea of Japan under cover during the day and fruition. Instead, he ordered the protected his eastern flank, and attacking only in darkness. General Marines to defend an east-west line hilly terrain made the western Lee’s troops seeped south through just north of the Andong-Yongdok approaches inaccessible to armor. a hole in the fluid South Korean Road and to simultaneously pro- Smith, therefore, decided to lines east of the Hwachon tect the north-south-running Eighth emphasize mobile security opera- Reservoir in central Korea during Army main supply route. General tions and made linear defense a the U.N. retreat in late-December O. P. Smith faced a dilemma secondary mission. 1950, and the division’s lead ele- because he was at first uncertain The enemy threatening Pohang ments were thought to be just about which of these assignments was believed to consist of about arriving in the Pohang area in mid- should receive the highest priority. 6,000 light infantry troops from January. Should he deploy to guard against Major General Lee Ban Nam’s The 1st Marine Division zone of an all-out attack on the main line widely respected 10th NKPA action was roughly 40 miles of resistance by Communist regular Division. (Post-war analysis square, an area composed of 1,600 forces from the north or be pre- revealed that before its destruction square miles of extremely rugged pared for counter-guerrilla opera- by the 1st Marine Division, the interior terrain enclosed by a semi- tions against small groups of infil- 10th Division inflicted more casu- circular road network joining the trators? Intelligence reports indicat- alties and captured more equip- coastal villages of Pohang and ed that the latter was the most like- ment than any other North Korean Yongdok with the inland towns of ly course of action. Small enemy unit.) Although a division in name, Andong and Yongchon. Seventy- bands had already proved the 10th was short of personnel five miles of the vital Eighth Army extremely troublesome by intermit- and lacked artillery, armor, and main supply route were located inside the Marine zone. That part A Sikorsky HO3S sets down at a landing zone in the Pohang sector of operations. of the supply route ran north from These utility helicopters were invaluable in providing communications in the Kyongju to Yongchon then bent search for Communist guerrillas. 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan-Feb51 about 25 miles westward until it once again turned north to pass through Andong. A secondary road (Route 48) joined Andong in the northwest corner with centrally located Chinbo and Yongdok on the coast. The valley lowlands were dotted with small villages whose adjoining terraced rice pad- dies edged roadways and agricultural flat lands. The center of the Marine area of responsibility consisted of snow-capped mountains traversed only by a series of winding trails and narrow pathways that worked their way up and down the steep ridges. The weather was generally cold and often damp with frequent snow flurries, but

11 the 11th Marines held a narrow coastal strip north of Pohang known as Zone D; and Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne’s 1st Tank Battalion operated in Zone E southeast of Pohang. The light utility aircraft of VMO-6 were in general support. Anti-guerrilla doctrine called for constant vigilance by static units and aggressive action by mobile forces. A commander’s primary concern was force protection, and the best way to accomplish that was to keep the enemy off balance. Guerrillas had to be located, engaged, rendered ineffective, and relentlessly pursued to do this. For large units (regiments or battalions) the favored tactics were “rak- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6145 ing” (later known in Vietnam as In a long, winding, single-file column, a Marine rifle company inches its way “search and destroy”) operations down a steep mountain path before assaulting a guerrilla-held village in the val- and encirclements (“cordon and ley below. The “guerrilla hunt” was marked by numerous small-scale clashes search”). Smaller infantry units with enemy discovered by such patrols. relied upon saturation patrols to with little accumulation. The occa- called “Banana Wars” between the find, fix, and eliminate the enemy. sional high winds and overcast World Wars, some others had Most of these so-called “rice paddy hindered flight operations and lim- fought Chinese guerrillas in North patrols” consisted of fire teams and ited visibility. China after World War II, and most squads operating from platoon or On 16 January, General Smith field grade officers had closely company patrol bases. The 5th opened a forward command post studied the Small Wars Manual at Marines was particularly aggressive at Sinhung, about five miles south- Quantico. These veteran cam- and once had 29 such patrols in east of Pohang. Division paigners knew that counter-guer- the field at the same time. Operations Order 3-51 assigned rilla operations were primarily Ambushes were an effective way the Marines three missions. One small unit actions that tested indi- to keep the enemy off balance by was to protect the Kyongju- vidual stamina and required strong hindering movement and destroy- Pohang-Andong portion of the leadership at the fire team, squad, ing small units piecemeal. Squad- main supply route. A second was and platoon levels. Accordingly, and platoon-sized ambushes set up to secure the village of Andong General Smith decentralized oper- nightly along mountain trails or and the two nearby airstrips. The ations. He created five defensive fanned out to cover likely avenues third mission was to prevent pene- areas, formed mechanized task of approach to nearby villages. tration in force of the Andong- forces to patrol the roads, and sat- Motorized road patrols consisted of Yongdok defense line. Widely urated the hilly terrain with machine gun-mounted jeeps that known throughout the Marine infantry patrols to keep the enemy roved the main supply route at Corps as a “by-the-book” man, constantly on the move. The 1st irregular intervals. Convoys were Smith kept this image intact by Marines, at Andong, was assigned escorted by gun trucks, tanks, or mounting a textbook anti-guerrilla Zone A in the northwest; the 5th self-propelled guns. campaign. The long-service veter- Marines manned Zone B from The anti-guerilla campaign ans of the 1st Marine Division were Yongchon in the southwest quad- placed a heavy burden on the fir- well aware of the travails of guer- rant; the 7th Marines operated out ing batteries of the 11th Marines. rilla warfare. A few senior officers of Topyong-dong in Zone C, a cen- Once the patrols had tracked and veteran sergeants had fought trally located 20-by-25 mile corri- down groups of enemy troops, the local insurgents during the so- dor running north from Pohang; regiment’s batteries had to fire on

12 short notice and in any direction. January and February of 1951.” nearby hills and valleys, clear- “It was not uncommon to see a Although aggressive, the patrols ing all the villages in our battery sited by platoon—two soon took on an air of routine, path. And then we would guns to the east, two to the west, according to Private First Class return to camp in late after- and two to the south,” noted Morgan Brainard of Company A, noon, wash ourselves in the Lieutenant Colonel Francis Parry. 1st Marines: battalion shower tent (a real “Two platoons might be laid for Each day was much like luxury), have chow, clean our low-angle fire and the other for the one before: we would gear, write letters and engage high-angle fire to enable it to board trucks in the morning in bull sessions until it was reach over and behind a nearby following chow and in full time to stand watch. ridge . . . . I doubt if field-artillery gear minus packs, roll out five The constant patrols harried the batteries anywhere ever surpassed miles or more to some prede- NKPA and kept it on the run. the sophistication and competence termined spot, dismount, and General Lee’s troops were forced . . . demonstrated routinely in undertake a sweep of the to break up into ever-shrinking groups just to survive. Soon, hard- pressed guerrilla bands were reduced to foraging instead of fighting, and the situation was so well in hand that the Marines could be relieved in order to fight else- where by mid-February. The first contact with the enemy in the Pohang zone occurred on the afternoon of 18 January. A patrol from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge’s 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, discovered an unknown number of North Koreans east of Andong. The enemy quickly fled, but three of their numbers were captured after a wild chase. These prisoners from the 27th Regiment confirmed their parent unit was the 10th NKPA Division and reported that elements of that division’s 25th and 29th Regiments were also in the area. Four days later a patrol from the 1st Marines discovered an estimated enemy battalion near Mukkye-dong south of Andong just before sunset and promptly got the best of a one-sided exchange of small arms and mortars. Captain Robert P. Wray’s Company C suffered no casualties while the NKPA lost about 200 killed or wounded. Unfortunately, nightfall prevented full pursuit. The enemy escaped under cover of darkness by breaking into squad- and platoon-sized exfiltra- tion groups. On 24 January, Colonel

13 NKPA Regiment failed. On the 26th, Major Webb D. Sawyer’s 1st Battalion isolated an enemy company atop Hill 466 that held the attackers at bay with mortars, small arms, and hand grenades. The Marines answered with their own artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons. The outgunned enemy quickly abandoned the position after suffering an estimated 50 dead and about twice that many wounded. That same afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bayer’s 2d Battalion repulsed a NKPA counterattack and counted 44 enemy dead in the aftermath. During the entire operation, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6080 Colonel Litzenberg reported Col Homer L. Litzenberg set up his command post in a ravine near Topyong- enemy losses at about 250 killed dong. The 7th Marines was assigned to the centrally located Sector D during the and 500 wounded with a dozen Pohang guerrilla hunt. prisoners taken. These one-sided Litzenberg’s 7th Marines began a ting the regimental command post fights left little doubt about who three-day raking operation to clear at Topyong-dong and the 1st held the upper hand. Consequen- the enemy from its zone of action. Battalion three miles to the north- ly, General Lee ordered his troops The In Min Gun retaliated by hit- west, but both attacks by the 25th to cease offensive operations until

A tank-led column from Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, Pershing tank in the foreground and the 75mm gun of the stands by as a patrol from the 5th Marines searches a near- following M-4 Sherman tank provided the requisite fire- by village for guerrillas. The 90mm gun of the M-26 power. National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6076

14 they could withdraw into the mountains to regroup. “They appear,” noted General Smith, “to be as confused as we are.” The actions at Pohang thus far typified the frustrations of anti- guerrilla warfare. On every occa- sion the Marines hammered their opponents but were unable to pin down the elusive enemy so decisive action could be affected. “It became a game,” Colonel Litzenberg reported. “We would find them about 1400 in the afternoon, get our artillery on them, air National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6142 on them, and then they would dis- A tired platoon patrol pushes up another hill as it pursues fleeing remnants of the appear. The next day we would 10th NKPA Division. Such marches provided excellent physical conditioning while at the same time developing unit cohesion and tactical proficiency. have to find them again.” This dis- concerting pattern continued which we derived great benefit.” situations. They also had the throughout January and February “It was excellent training for the opportunity to utilize supporting 1951, much as it had in the new replacements,” echoed fire of all types, including naval Philippines at the turn of the cen- General Smith’s aide de camp, gunfire.” tury and would again in Vietnam Major Martin J. Sexton. “It gave A welcome addition to the 1st little more than a decade later. But them the opportunity of getting a Marine Division in late January was as Litzenburg noted, “the opera- conditioning, and an experience of Colonel Kim Sung Eun’s 1st tions in this area constituted a very, the hardest type of warfare, moun- Korean Marine Corps (KMC) very successful field exercise from tainous warfare, and fast moving Regiment. The Korean Marine regiment brought four rifle battalions A Marine sentry and his interpreter check passes and obtain information from Korean civilians passing through a roadblock near Andong. Far from support- (1st, 2d, 3d, and independent 5th). ing the Communists, the inhabitants readily reported North Korean guerrilla The original Korean Marines had movements to the Marines. trained under the tutelage of the National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6298 5th Marines while enroute to Inchon the previous September. They fought well beside the 1st Marine Division during the liberation of Seoul before being detached for other duties. The Korean Marines were attached administratively to the 1st Marine Division on 21 January, but were not trucked up from Chinhae until about a week later. On 29 January, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Harrison, a veteran of pre-war service with the 4th Marines in Shanghai and now the senior Korean Marine advisor, finally reported that the Korean Marine command post was in place at Yongdok. General Smith created a new sector in the northeast to accommodate the new arrivals. This area, Zone F, included

15 manned by the Korean Marines’ 22d Company during a successful “hammer-and-anvil” combined operation. In the 7th Marines zone of action, Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur F. Meyerhoff’s 3d Battalion killed about 45 NKPA in a sharp action northwest of Wolmae-dong, and Lieutenant Colonel Bayer’s 2d Battalion overcame fierce resistance to take Hill 1123. To the southwest, a trap set by Lieutenant Colonel John W. Stevens II’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, turned out to be a bust, but Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Tapplett’s 3d Battalion destroyed four roadblocks, killed 30 enemy, and captured three more in the vicinity of Yongchon. Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d Battalion occupied Hill 930 after ejecting some stubborn defenders. Along National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6645 the northern coast, Colonel Kim’s As two Marines guard a captured North Korean soldier, a corpsman administers Korean Marines took Paekcha- first aid to him. While the number of counted enemy dead was low, there was little doubt that the total North Korean casualties were crippling. dong and forced its defenders to scatter. A unique approach was Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, and agent reports that the 10th NKPA tried on 4 February when a loud- Chinandong. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Division had been ordered to leave speaker-equipped Marine Douglas Battalions patrolled subsectors in Pohang to rejoin the NKPA II Zone F while the 5th Battalion Corps. Concurrently, aerial ob- MajGen Smith pins a single star on worked with the 1st Marines. The servers noted a general movement newly promoted BGen Lewis B. U.S. Marines provided combat and to the west out of the 7th Marines’ “Chesty” Puller on 2 February 1951. Not long thereafter Puller, arguably the logistics support for their South Zone C into Zones A and B (1st best-known Marine in modern history, Korean counterparts. The Korean and 5th Marines, respectively). The took command of the division when Marines acquitted themselves well resulting attempts to slip out of the MajGen Smith temporarily took over IX at Pohang, just as they had before Marine noose resulted in several Corps. and would again. In fact, the 1st very one-sided clashes during the National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6175 KMC Regiment would become the first week of February. On the 1st Marine Division’s fourth rifle night of 31 January-1 February, a regiment for the remainder of the company-sized patrol from the 1st Korean War. The bond between Battalion, 1st Marines, engaged an Korean and American Marines was estimated enemy battalion near a strong one; so strong that when Sanghwa-dong. The enemy suf- asked by a reporter about the ori- fered about 50 casualties and three ental soldiers nearby, an anony- North Koreans were captured mous U.S. Marine rendered the along with several mortars and ultimate compliment when he small arms. A few days later replied: “They’re Marines!” Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter’s It soon became obvious that the 2d Battalion and Lieutenant NKPA had bitten off more than it Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3d could handle. Enemy prisoners Battalion pushed fleeing NKPA confirmed signal intercepts and troops into blocking positions

16 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A6198 Marines and South Korean laborers bring a Marine casual- casualties outnumbered battle casualties by a ratio of nine ty down from the scene of a skirmish with North Korean to one. guerrillas. During the month at Pohang, Marine nonbattle R4D Skytrain transport plane the 1st Marines, commanded by tance by diehard individuals or broadcast appeals to surrender. the division’s former logistics offi- small groups was reported to About 150 individuals answered cer, Colonel Francis M. “Frank” headquarters from then until the the call, but most of them turned McAlister, who replaced newly Marines departed Pohang. out to be South Korean laborers promoted “Chesty” Puller on 25 Enemy deserters told interroga- who had been forced into service January, routed an estimated bat- tors that disease and low morale by the NKPA. Chance-Vought F4U talion of the 27th NKPA Regiment, took a heavy toll. They reported an Corsairs from Marine Fighter south of Samgo-ri. More than 75 NKPA battalion commander had Squadron 323 then dropped enemy were killed and an been shot for desertion and that bombs, rockets, and napalm upon unknown number were seriously General Lee was immobilized by the remaining NKPA. The last wounded by the time the North severe depression. Other measures major action of the “guerrilla hunt” Koreans fled the field of battle on of enemy desperation were that occurred when two battalions of 5 February. Only scattered resis- women were increasingly being

17 drafted to serve as porters and central Korea. Unfortunately, the particularly useful for training and combat troops were donning cap- combined U.S.-Korean Marine physical conditioning. Constant tured American clothing to cover team was broken up again. On 2 movement over rough terrain their escape. Although the 10th February, the independent 5th ensured all hands were in good Division still could muster about KMC Battalion was transferred to X shape, rifle squads and mortar sec- 1,000 men, captured dispatches Corps Headquarters, and General tions developed into coherent and indicated CCF headquarters Smith learned the 1st KMC tactically proficient units, and most ordered the remaining NKPA to Regiment would stay behind when of the 3,387 Marine replacements break out of the Marine encir- the 1st Marine Division moved out. got at least a brief taste of combat clement. General Smith’s situation There were no pitched battles or conditions. With respect to opera- report to Eighth Army headquar- epic engagements at Pohang, but tions, the Marines functioned as a ters on 11 February stated that the the Marines had rendered an truly integrated air-ground team. enemy had been appreciably enemy division ineffective. Marine Although there were few opportu- reduced and declared “the situa- battle losses during the period 12 nities to use Marine close air sup- tion in the Division area is suffi- January to 15 February numbered port, VMO-6’s Consolidated OY ciently in hand to permit the with- 26 dead, 148 wounded, and 10 “Sentinel” light observation aircraft drawal of the Division and the missing in action. There were also and Sikorsky HO3S-1 “Dragonfly” assignment of another mission.” a large number of nonbattle casu- helicopters served as airborne Armed with this knowledge, intel- alties, primarily the result of frost- scouts and rescue craft while bub- ligence officers at Eighth Army bite or minor injuries, most ble-top Bell HTL helicopters were rated the 10th Division as combat returned to their units. Enemy most often used as aerial ambu- ineffective, and General Ridgway casualties and non-combat losses lances. Indeed, the 1st Marine decided the 1st Marine Division were estimated at more than 3,000 Division was so well honed after could be put to better use else- men. The “guerrilla hunt” was also Pohang that five decades later where. There were several important MajGen Smith distributes clothing donated by the Marine Corps League to Korean children in one of the nearby villages. “No attempt is made to obtain an administrative changes in the 1st exact fit,” Smith said, “as there is not time.” Marine Division at Pohang. On 2 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6437 February, Brigadier General Puller became the assistant division commander when Major General Edward A. Craig departed for the United States. This was the first in a series of command changes wrought by new rotation policies. In the next three weeks, 12 of 16 maneuver battalions would change hands. Thirty officers and 595 enlisted men, all former members of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, were sent back to Pusan to await conveyance to the United States. That much-longed-for transportation arrived when the troop ship USS General J.C. Breckinridge (AP 176) delivered 71 officers and 1,717 enlisted men of the 5th Replacement Draft to Pohang on 16 February. These new arrivals were rather hurriedly assimilated and they brought the 1st Marine Division back up to fighting strength just as it shipped out for

18 The Enemy n the spring of 1951, the forces opposing the United Nations Command consisted of more than a half mil- Ilion men of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) and the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) under the leadership of Chinese General Peng Teh-Huai. The CCF played no role during the initial stages of the Korean Conflict, but the Chinese Fourth Field Army serving under the questionable rubric “Chinese People’s Volunteers” began secretly infiltrating North Korea in the fall of 1950. Such cooperation was nothing new; the Communists in China and North Korea had often worked together in the recent past. North Korea had been a Communist sanctuary during the Chinese Civil War, and North Korean volunteers fought side-by-side with the Chinese Communists since the mid-1930s. The NKPA The North Korean People’s Army, more formally the In Min Gun, entered the Korean Conflict as a well- armed and well-trained military organization. The NKPA DIVIC (USMC) HDSN9903152 was modeled after the Soviet Red Army and was primarily armed with Soviet-made weapons. Specially Division was the guerrilla force the Marines encountered selected veteran officers attended Soviet military schools at Pohang. The NKPA V Corps screened CCF movements in 1948 then became the cadre around which the NKPA and acted as the rear guard battling the Marines on the was built. A few senior leaders and many enlisted men Central Front. were veterans of the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA), Communist Chinese Forces which fought side-by-side with Mao Tse Tung’s The Communist Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Communist guerrillas who successively defeated the (PLA) was a massive, mostly illiterate, peasant army that Japanese during World War II and Chang Kai Shek’s had been fighting for almost two decades without a Nationalists during the Chinese Civil War. The Korean break in 1951. Its sheer size and vast combat experi- volunteers returned to North Korea in 1949 and were ence made it a formidable opponent. The PLA was, promptly integrated into the NKPA. however, basically a light infantry force that possessed In the summer of 1950, the In Min Gun rolled over few tanks and its artillery arm was vastly undergunned the surprised and outnumbered South Koreans. But, just by western standards. In November 1950, Mao Tse as the victorious NKPA prepared for its final thrust to Tung sent more than 500,000 men into Manchuria and oust the United Nations from the Pusan Perimeter, North Korea. The men entering Korea called themselves General Douglas MacArthur conducted one of the most “Volunteers,” but were labeled “Communist Chinese successful amphibious operations in military history Forces” by the United Nations. when X Corps, spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division, Initially, the CCF was actually the Chinese Fourth landed at Inchon and then quickly recaptured Seoul. Field Army in Korea. This organization was divided into Outflanked and cut off from its supply bases, the NKPA group armies, armies, and divisions. The 10,000-man was quickly routed and its remnants fled to the dubious Chinese divisions included only about two-thirds as safety of North Korea with the U.N. in hot pursuit. The many troops as an American infantry division but, iron- sudden intervention of the CCF around Thanksgiving ically, mustered a much larger number of “trigger stopped MacArthur’s northern advance, and by pullers” because the spartan CCF had so few support Christmas the United Nations Command was in full personnel. A CCF division was lucky if it had more than retreat. At that time the disorganized and demoralized a single artillery battalion armed with 120mm mortars or NKPA underwent a complete make over. The NKPA was 76mm antitank guns. The lack of fire support, motor placed under Chinese command and was reorganized transport, and modern communications dictated CCF into light infantry units similar to those of the CCF. tactics, which primarily consisted of night infiltration or During the spring of 1951, the Marines faced the massive frontal or “human wave” assaults conducted NKPA V and II Corps. These units were armed with under cover of darkness. The Marines encountered the heavy mortars and machine guns, but only occasionally CCF 39th, 40th, and 66th Armies during the fighting received adequate artillery support. The 10th NKPA around Hwachon in the spring of 1951.

19 Marine historian Edwin H. the move all across Korea. At that after that meeting Ridgway direct- Simmons reminisced about that time the U.N. front was held from ed his staff to prepare plans for the time, stating: “The 1st Marine left to right by the U.S. I Corps, IX Marines to remain on the east Division in Korea was the finest Corps, X Corps, and units of the coast. fighting outfit I ever served with”; South Korean army. The United Unfortunately, these plans were no small praise from a combat vet- Nations Command was in the overcome by events before they eran of three wars. process of rolling back the could be put into effect. The cata- Communists in western Korea lyst for the movement of the 1st Back to the Attack when General Ridgway met with Marine Division into central Korea General Smith at Suwon in late was the third battle for Wonju, a While the 1st Marine Division January to discuss the 1st Marine vital communications and road link was busy rebuilding at Masan and Division’s next mission. Ridgway whose loss might well force the chasing guerrillas at Pohang, the wanted to send the Marines to cen- evacuation of Korea by U.N. vastly outnumbered Eighth Army tral Korea, but Smith lobbied hard forces. Wonju was put at great risk continued to fall back in what to have the 1st Marine Division when Hoengsong, located about eventually became the longest placed on the far right flank in 10 miles north on Route 29, was retreat in American military history. order to stay near the coast. Smith lost. This near disaster occurred But, as soon as the CCF Third noted that his division was the when the Communists launched Phase Offensive ran out of gas, only Eighth Army unit trained for their Fourth Phase Offensive in General Ridgway resumed offen- amphibious operations and added which the CCF 40th and 66th sive operations. In mid-January, he that a position near the sea would Armies and the NKPA V Corps ini- initiated the first in a series of allow the Marines to make maxi- tiated a series of devastating drumbeat attacks that eventually mum use of naval gunfire and car- attacks out of the swirling snow carried U.N. forces back above the rier-based air, supporting arms beginning on the night of 11-12 38th Parallel. Unlike the reckless with which they were intimately February. The U.S. X Corps suf- rush to the Yalu the previous year, familiar and well-practiced in fered a serious setback when three however, this time Eighth Army using. Such a disposition would Republic of Korea Army divisions relied upon cautious advances, also allow the Marines to use disintegrated and combat support which were both limited in scope Pohang as the principal port of elements of the U.S. 2d Division and closely controlled by higher entry, a factor that would ease the were cut off and then annihilated headquarters, carefully coordinat- logistical burden by shortening in “Massacre Valley” just north of ed actions intended to punish the supply lines. Amplifying, Smith Hoengsong. The 23d Infantry was enemy as well as to gain ground. pointed out that “the 1st Marine cut up, the artillery overrun, and In general, Ridgway eschewed Division with a strength of approx- “only 800 had come in so far and flanking movements and objectives imately 24,000 was larger that any only one in twenty had weapons,” deep in the enemy rear. Instead, of the Army infantry divisions or General Puller told Smith. With the numerous phase lines strictly con- ROK divisions at this time and in key city of Wonju threatened and X trolled U.N. activities and attacking that there were single . . . supply Corps reeling back, General units kept pace with those on each routes, for the corps and the divi- Ridgway had no choice but to flank. The Marines—-except for sions and it would be less of a commit what he called “the most pilots flying close air support mis- strain upon transportation and less powerful division in Korea” to sions—-missed the first three of a logistical problem to supply a “where a great threat existed to offensive operations (Wolfhound, smaller army division or ROK divi- that portion of the Eighth Army’s Roundup, and Thunderbolt), but sion inboard, well inland in Korea, lines.” On 12 February 1951, the 1st Marine Division was des- than it would be in the case of the General Smith received a warning tined to play key roles in Marine division.” This was a critical order to prepare the 1st Marine Operations Killer, Ripper, Rugged, consideration because it would Division to move to Chungju in and Dauntless. reduce overland transportation south-central Korea “on 24 hours’ Each of Ridgway’s successive problems. Marine trucks were both notice at any time after 0700, 14 operations was more ambitious few in number and in poor shape February.” As Major Martin Sexton than the previous one. By mid- after hard use at the Chosin later commented: “The 1st Marine February, the Eighth Army had Reservoir. Smith’s logic won over Division was deployed right in the gathered momentum and was on the Eighth Army commander, and center of Korea and its amphibious

20 Mountain range roughly parallels the east coast where its irregular cliffs severely limit the number of suitable landing areas and provide no spacious flat lands to support agricultural or urban development. There are few east-west overland links, and the only north-south route in the east runs tenuously along the narrow coast. Numerous fingers of the Taebaek intermittent- ly reach west across the central corridor creating a washboard of alternating river valleys and spiny ridgelines. The flattest expanses are located along the west coast, an area that includes both Korea’s major port Inchon and its largest city, Seoul. General Smith’s new orders focused Marine attention upon the central corridor, and all major com- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A7274 bat actions during the spring of A Marine light machine gun team boards a train for the trip from Pohang to 1951 would take place in that Chungju in central Korea. The 1st Marine Division was to be positioned astride zone. The dominating terrain fea- what LtGen Matthew Ridgway considered to be the logical route for the expected ture was the Hwachon Reservoir, a enemy counterthrust. 12-mile basin that blocked the capabilities destroyed at the same agricultural land. Trans-peninsular southern flowing Pukhan River time.” communications, particularly roads using a sizable dam. The reservoir The Korean peninsula can be and railways, are hampered by was located just about at the roughly described as a 600-by-150 geography. The craggy Taebaek peninsula’s dead center. It provid- mile parallelogram that descends Marines move up to the front during Operation Killer, the fourth of the so-called ever downward from the Ridgway Offensives. During that action, the Marines advanced up the Som River Manchurian border and also slants Valley from Wonju to Hoengsong against light to moderate resistance. down from the hilly eastern one- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6851 third that abuts the Sea of Japan until it gradually levels off along Yellow Sea to the west. The peninsula can be easily divided into several unique geographic areas: two horizontal sections, one in the north and one in the south, comprise the basic economic sectors; three vertical sections—-the east, central, and west corridors—each comprise about one-third the width of the peninsula. Most of North Korea is rugged mountain territory whose fast-flowing rivers provide the water and electric power necessary for industrial development. South Korea, on the other hand, includes most of the

21 and south. A string of road junctions spiraled south along Routes 17 and 29 from Hwachon at roughly 15-mile intervals. These included Chunchon, Hongchon, Hoengsong, and Wonju—-each of which would become a major objective during the Ridgway offensives on the Central Front. Operation Killer

Beginning on 16 February, the Marines mounted out from Pohang by regimental combat teams for Chungju. Fortunately, by that time the CCF and NKPA were being pounded by air and artillery until their attacks ran out of steam north of Wonju. Thus, when the Marines finally arrived at Chungju, they could be used to spearhead a U.N. counteroffensive, a closely coordinated pincer attack by the U.S. IX and X Corps intended to trap the NKPA III and V Corps called Operation Killer. Eighth Army released the 1st Marine Division from direct control when it joined Major General Bryant E. Moore’s IX Corps for Operation Killer, a two-phase drive up the Wonju basin to retake and secure Hoengsong. An Army officer, General Moore had served side-by- side with the Marines at Guadalcanal in 1942. He ordered General Smith to seize the high ground south of Hoengsong hop- ing to cut off enemy forces to the south by denying them use of their main egress routes. Although Smith lost tactical control of the 1st ed pre-war Seoul with most of its ly channeled all movement to KMC Regiment when the Marines water and electricity, but that was either the east (Yanggu) or west departed Pohang, U.S. Army no longer true. The Hwachon (Hwachon), and the side holding artillery and transportation units Reservoir did, however, have sig- the dam could threaten to flood reinforced the division. Particularly nificant tactical value. Just north of the low-lying Chunchon and welcome additions were the much- the 38th Parallel and at the south- Soyang Valleys at will. needed vehicles of the U.S. Army’s ern edge of a mountainous shelf, it Korea’s central corridor also 74th Truck Company, and the “Red marked both the political and geo- included all of the major commu- Legs” of the 92d Armored Field graphic divisions of North and nications links between both the Artillery, commanded by Lieuten- South Korea. This barrier effective- east and the west and the north ant Colonel Leon F. Levoie, Jr.,

22 USA. This was a first-rate Army Units would not bypass enemy one, the 7th Marines, in reserve. self-propelled howitzer unit that positions and had to stop at each The line of departure was located had rendered outstanding support phase line even if there was no just north of Wonju. The area in at the Chosin Reservoir. The enemy resistance. Regrettably, the the Marine zone was uninviting, to artillerymen of the 92d were, as conference closed on a less than say the least. In the words of offi- Major Martin J. Sexton noted, happy note for the Marines. cial Marine Corps historian Lynn “trained basically as Marines are in Generals Smith and Puller were Montross: “There were too many that they were essentially riflemen taken back to learn Operation crags [and] too few roads.” Rocky, too, if not first.” Killer was to kick off in less than barren, snow-covered ridges On 19 February, Smith and 48 hours, too short a time to move boxed in the narrow Som Valley Puller attended a commander’s the entire division to the line of whose lowlands were awash with conference. There, they learned departure. The Marines were fur- runoff from melting snow and the 1st Marine Division was to be ther dismayed when they were flooded by overflowing streams. the focus of the main effort for denied the use of a dedicated The weather was terrible, “a mix- Operation Killer and would Marine fighter squadron. Their ture of thawing snow, rain, mud, advance with the 6th ROK Division arguments to hold up the attack and slush,” according to 3d on the left and X Corps to the until the entire division could be Battalion, 5th Marines’ command- right. General Ridgway’s orders assembled were dismissed by ing officer Lieutenant Colonel were to “seek out the enemy and Ridgway who also refused to inter- Joseph L. Stewart. The axis of inflict the greatest possible dam- vene to assure the Marines ade- advance was generally northwest age.” In Marine terms, Operation quate close air support. In spite of along Route 29, which was sarcas- Killer was going to be “buttoned Marine objections, H-hour was set tically known as the “Hoengsong- up”; all U.N. forces were to keep for 1000 on 21 February. Wonju Highway” (it was actually a close lateral contact, to maintain General Smith elected to use primitive one-lane packed-dirt trail tactical integrity at all times, and to two regiments (the 1st and 5th totally unsuited to support vehicu- strictly adhere to the timetable. Marines) in the attack and keep lar traffic) that generally paralleled

LtGen Ridgway ordered Eighth Army troops to “get off the makes its way up a difficult trail during Operation Killer. roads and seize the high ground.” Here a Marine patrol National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6952

23 Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, and Moore, the Marines advanced rapidly in a torrential rain opposed only by some ineffectual long distance small arms fire. Colonel Francis McAlister’s 1st Marines moved up the muddy road in a column of battalions (Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck’s 1st Battalion, Major Clarence J. Mabry’s 2d Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3d Battalion, respectively). Colonel Raymond Murray’s 5th Marines had a harder row to hoe advancing north (actually climbing up and sliding down the snow- covered terrain) across a series of steep ridges and narrow valleys. 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan-Feb51 A Marine Corsair circles after delivering napalm upon a suspected enemy posi- Lieutenant Colonel John L. tion near Wonju in central Korea. The controversial breakup of the Marine air- Hopkins’ 1st Battalion, with ground team by Fifth Air Force in 1951 remained a touchy and unresolved issue Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. throughout the rest of the Korean Conflict. Stewart’s 3d Battalion in trail, maintained the high ground by the Som River. The final objective 5th Marines—-just like their World hugging the regimental left bound- was an east-west running ridgeline War I predecessors at Soissons—- ary. The Marines made it almost south of the ruins that had once had to double time to get to the four miles the first day and then been Hoengsong. The enemy line of departure in time. Luckily, covered half as much ground the defending this area was identified there was little enemy resistance. following day. “Unlike the Inchon- as the 196th Division from Chinese Under the watchful eyes of Seoul Campaign,” recalled Private General Show Shiu Kwai’s 66th Marines advance across a fog-filled valley in the Wonju-Hoengsong sector sup- Army. ported by machine gun fire. Elaborate weapons positions, common in the latter Unfortunately, a series of events stages of the war, were unusual during the seesaw fighting in the spring of 1951. beyond General Smith’s control National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6843 hampered the start of operations. Transportation shortfalls meant that the 7th Marines would not be immediately available, so the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Glen E. Martin, a reserve officer who had been awarded a Navy Cross and served as a platoon and company commander during World War II, was designated the 1st Marine Division reserve for the first phase of Operation Killer. Snarled traffic, sticky mud, General MacArthur’s visit to the 187th Airborne’s zone, and the lack of trucks conspired to postpone the planned jump-off time. But, even with the logistical problems, the assault units of the

24 First Class Morgan Brainard, “we Hoeng-song on its way to rescue Corps commander, died following were not moving out with what we several survivors still holding out a helicopter crash. Additionally, infantrymen could recognize as a in Massacre Valley where U.S. the low ground around Hoeng- set goal, other than to kill gooks, Army artillery units had been over- song had become a rain-soaked, and to move the lines steadily back run almost two weeks earlier. The muddy, impassible bog. Bad roads north.” Marines found a gruesome sight. and poor weather stopped the The first real resistance occurred Burned out vehicles, abandoned Marines in their tracks because the when the 1st Marines, moving with howitzers, and more than 200 assault units needed ammunition the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, unburied dead lay strewn across and food before they could renew and the 5th Marines in column, the valley floor. This movement the attack. Additionally, the Marine neared Objectives A (Hill 537 and also stirred up a hornet’s nest. division was still fragmented Ridge 400) and B (Hill 533), over- Enemy mortars and artillery ranged because the 7th Marines was looking Hoengsong. The 1st the ridgeline held by the 1st stranded at Wonju where a severe Marines was stopped by small Marines. The major combat action gasoline shortage idled most arms and heavy automatic of the day then occurred when trucks. This shortfall was com- weapons fire from Hill 166 on the Marine cannoneers of Major pounded by the poor trafficability left and dug in for the night. Francis R. Schlesinger’s 2d of the road net, which had become Supported by air and artillery, the Battalion, 11th Marines, bested a gooey morass due to the inces- 1st Marines secured the heights at their CCF counterparts in the ensu- sant rain. Army and Marine engi- 1015 on 23 February. That after- ing late afternoon artillery duel. By neers labored night and day to noon, the 1st and 2d Battalions dusk on 24 February, all Marine shore up the deteriorating roads conducted a successful flanking objectives for the first phase of and bridges, but the supply situa- attack to take the final hill line and Operation Killer had been secured. tion became so critical that air- were overlooking Hoengsong as The Marines had suffered 23 killed drops—-an inefficient method darkness fell. The 5th Marines in action and 182 wounded thus heretofore used for emergencies waited in vain that same morning far. only—-had to become a logistics for an air strike before mounting a The follow-on advance had to mainstay. Thirty-five airdrops were two-battalion assault to clear a pair wait almost a week. Operations required to resupply the assault of hills on the left. The next morn- were placed on temporary hold for elements of the 1st Marine ing, a mechanized patrol from the several reasons. One major reason Division. Marine transport planes 1st Marines passed through was that General Moore, the IX augmented the U.S. Air Force Combat Cargo Command partici- Marine riflemen move across a frozen rice paddy during the drive back to the pated in such drops all across the 38th Parallel. Although there were a few sharp actions, Operations Killer and U.N. front. Also used in the resup- later Ripper were remembered as “a long walk” by Capt Gerald P. Averill in his ply effort were 1,200 cargo han- memoir Mustang. National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6869 dlers of the South Korean Civil Transport Corps. These hard-working indigenous laborers toiled under the direction of division Civil Affairs Officer First Lieutenant Oliver E. Dial. These hardy individuals each carried up to 50 pounds of supplies on A-frame backpacks to the forward most Marine units. On 24 February, Major General Smith became the third Marine to assume command of a major U.S. Army formation (Brigadier General John A. Lejeune had commanded the U.S. 2d Division in France in 1918 and Major General Roy S. Geiger commanded the U.S. Tenth

25 Frank E. Lowe, sent to Korea by President Harry S. Truman to eval- uate American units, that Smith be elevated to corps command, it was obvious no Marine general was going to be allowed to do so on a permanent basis; accordingly, Smith’s tenure lasted only until a more senior U.S. Army general arrived in Korea. He also asked for recommendations as to the future employment of the 1st Marine Division, to which General Smith replied that he knew “of no better use for the Division than to continue north on the Hoensong- Hongchon axis” as the main threat would come from that direction. In addition, Ridgway announced that Operation Killer would not resume until 1 March and that he wanted a change in zones to reorient the division more to the north. The IX Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A6946 and X Corps boundary was shifted An automatic rifleman supported by another Marine with a carbine fires into a west in accord with the Eighth Communist-held position. Because of its great firepower, the Browning Army commander’s wishes. To do Automatic Rifle was the most vital weapon of a Marine fire team. this Brigadier General Puller, who Army at Okinawa in 1945) when a sizable North Korean force was filling in as the 1st Marine he took over IX Corps after which lay in front of the left Division commander, rearranged General Moore’s fatal heart attack. portion of X Corps’ zone of the Marine dispositions. He pulled Smith’s reception at Yoju was sub- action. After deliberation with the 5th Marines out of the line to dued, according to his aide, Major the G-3 and the chief of staff, become the division reserve and Sexton: the decision was forthcoming. moved the 7th Marines up into the It was a very modest and It was simply “No, thank line on the left to replace a South unassuming entrance that was you.” At which time, the G-3 Korean unit that had been holding made when General Smith excitedly called his . . . G-3 of that position. stepped out of the helicopter X Corps, repeated these Arguably, the 1st Marine and was met by General words and happily hung up Division had the most difficult [George B.] Peploe, who was the phone. As there were at assignment of any unit in the the chief of staff of IX Corps. this time smiles all around the Eighth Army. It had to cross a A brief introduction to the staff, it was my impression muddy triangular open area and staff—the corps staff of- that the general had been then eject a dug-in enemy from a ficers—followed, and I would accepted rapidly. ridgeline located about a mile-and- say that it was approximately The following day, Smith con- a-half north of Hoengsong. Phase an hour, possibly an hour and ferred with General Ridgway Line Arizona, as the final objective a half after General Smith’s regarding future operations. was known, consisted of five dis- arrival, that the first decision Although Ridgway warmed Smith tinct hill masses (Hills 536, 333, which he was required to with glowing words of encourage- 321, 335, and 201). The 1st make arose. It involved a ment, he concluded by saying “he Marines’ commander, Colonel seemingly complicated didn’t know what the War McAlister, assigned two intermedi- scheme of maneuver wherein Department would do.” Smith ate objectives (Hills 303 and 208) IX Corps would execute a knew. Despite the recommenda- as well. The nature of the terrain, flanking maneuver to envelop tions of U.S. Army Major General which required a river crossing

26 The battle for Hoengsong was a classic four-day slugging match in which the Marines slowly advanced against dug-in enemy troops under the cover of a wide array of supporting arms. On the first day (1 March), the 11th Marines fired 54 artillery missions, Marine Grumman F9F Panther jets and Corsairs flew 30 sorties, and Marine tanks lined up like a row of battleships using their 90mm guns to clear the way. Colonel Litzenberg’s 7th Marines moved out with Major James I. Glendinning’s 2d Battalion on the 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51 left and Major Maurice E. Roach, A Marine tank pushes through the wreckage from ambushed U.S. Army units, Jr.’s 3d Battalion on the right head- which clogged the road to Hoengsong. Bad weather, poor roads, and supply dif- ed north toward Hills 536 and 385 ficulties held up the Marines more than enemy resistance during the spring of 1951. respectively. Lieutenant Colonel Banning’s 3d Battalion, 1st and prohibited extensive vehicle support would be available and Marines, which was in the 7th movement, dictated a complex was further told the river was not Marines’ zone, moved in echelon scheme of maneuver. The 7th fordable. Major Edwin H. with Hill 303 in the 1st Marines’ Marines on the left would have to Simmons, commanding 3d zone on the right as its final goal; seize the hills in its zone to elimi- Battalion’s Weapons Company, concurrently, the other two battal- nate flanking fires before a battal- offered a solution. He recommend- ions of the 1st Marines held fast ion of the 1st Marines advancing ed building a “Swiss bent bridge” and furnished fire support. Three through the 7th Marines’ zone composed of “A” shaped timber artillery battalions (3d and 4th could assault its assigned objec- platforms with planking held in Battalions, 11th Marines, and the tives on the right. The CCF rear- place by communications wire. U.S. Army’s 92d Armored Field guard, consisting of elements of This field expedient did the trick, Artillery Battalion) were on call to the 196th and 197th Divisions, was and the 3d Battalion safely crossed support the 7th Marines. Major situated inside a sophisticated the Som the night before the attack Webb D. Sawyer’s 1st Battalion reverse-slope defense system began. patrolled the left flank and main- anchored by log bunkers and The shattered remains of Hoengsong as they appeared after the four-day battle. zigzag trenches immune to direct During the battle, the 11th Marines fired more than 50 artillery missions while fire. Where possible, the Marines 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Corsairs and Panther jets flew 30 sorties in support. would use fire by tanks and self- 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51 propelled guns to reduce point targets, but emplacements on reverse slopes would have to be hit by unobserved close air support or high angle artillery and mortar fires. This meant if the Chinese defended in place the Marines would have to reduce the reverse slope defenses using close combat. The most important terrain obstacle was the chilly, chest-deep, fast- flowing Som River. During the ple- nary conference Colonel McAlister was informed that no engineer

27 of reach when darkness fell. There were several administra- The attacks on 3 March to tive changes during the brief secure the heights north of respite between the end of “Massacre Valley” featured the Operation Killer and the onset of bloodiest single day of the opera- Operation Ripper. On 4 March, the tion. The 1st Marines secured Hills 6th Replacement Draft (29 officers 321, 335, and 201 after some very and 1,785 enlisted men) arrived, tough hand-to-hand fighting which bringing with them 63 postal required the intervention of pouches—-the first mail the Captain Thomas J. Bohannon’s Marines received since leaving Company A. The 7th Marines also Pohang. Concurrently, Lieutenant continued the attack against a Colonel Erwin F. Wann, Jr.’s 1st determined foe. Major Sawyer’s 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and Battalion was called up from Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. reserve to take and secure Hill 536 Cooper’s 1st Armored Amphibian on the extreme left. The 3d Battalion were detached to support National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC361108 Battalion then attacked Hill 333 the U.S. Army crossing of the Han MajGen William M. Hoge, USA, seated with fire support from the station- River and were thereafter sent to in front, was sent out to relieve MajGen Oliver P. Smith, who had been ary 2d Battalion. It was slow going Inchon to conduct amphibious given temporary command of IX for both assault units, and neither training. The amphibian tractors Corps. was able to secure its objectives would not rejoin the 1st Marine before nightfall despite suffering Division until it moved to western tained contact with the 6th ROK 14 killed and 104 wounded since Korea the following year. On the Division. The assault battalions daybreak. These same two assault plus side, a 250-man South Korean advanced about a half-mile before battalions determinedly “went over National Police company joined they came under heavy mortar and the top” amid snow flurries the the Marines. These “Wharrangs” automatic weapons fire, then were next morning (4 March) only to primarily served as scouts and completely halted by a minefield. discover most of the enemy had interpreters, but were occasionally With the main attack stalled and quietly slipped away during the used as auxiliary combat troops as darkness closing in, it was decided night. Combat clearing duties well. On 5 March, the day after to wait until the following day to ended at dark with the Marines Operation Killer ended, General finish the job. firmly in possession of Phase Line Smith returned to the 1st Marine At 0800 on 2 March, both regi- Arizona. Division upon the arrival at IX ments jumped off. In the 1st The Marines had suffered almost Corps headquarters of his replace- Marines’ zone, Banning’s 1st 400 casualties (48 dead, 345 ment, Major General William H. Battalion went after Hill 303 on the wounded, and 2 missing), while Hoge, USA, who had quickly left using a flanking attack while eliminating an estimated 2,000 flown out from Trieste, Italy. An the 2d Battalion—-well supported enemy in two weeks of combat engineer by training, Hoge super- by rockets, artillery, and tanks—- near Hoengsong. The bottom line, vised the Alaska-Canadian passed through the debris of however, was that Operation Killer Highway effort and commanded Hoengsong, then took Hill 208 on closed on an anticlimactic note. Combat Command B, 9th Armored the right with a frontal assault. The Marines drove the enemy out Division, during World War II, the Both attacks went smoothly, and of Hoengsong, but General lead elements of which seized the the 1st Marines secured its inter- Ridgway was dissatisfied with the only major bridge over the Rhine mediate objectives by midday. The punishment meted out. Although River at Remagen. 7th Marines, assisted by air strikes all terrain objectives had been and 1,600 rounds of artillery, taken, the enemy had deftly avoid- Operation Ripper gained about a half-mile on the ed a costly set piece battle and left. The toughest fighting occurred slipped out of the United Nations Operation Ripper was the fifth in the 2d Battalion’s zone where Command’s trap. As a result, the consecutive limited U.N. offensive. the Marines had to crawl forward Eighth Army commander ordered It would follow the same basic over rocky terrain. Unfortunately, a new attack, Operation Ripper, to design as the previous attacks. As Phase Line Arizona remained out begin immediately. before, the real goals were to

28 inflict maximum punishment and to drive north with I Corps holding Cairo; the final objective was Line keep the Communists off balance, in the west and the South Korean Idaho. General Hoge inserted an but this time General Ridgway Army maintaining its positions intermediate phase line, Baker, added a major territorial goal as along the east flank. The Central between Eighth Army-designated well. He wanted to outflank the Front would be Eighth Army’s pri- Lines Albany and Buffalo. The enemy near Seoul and force them mary arena. Hoge’s plan was to enemy in zone continued to be the to withdraw north of the Imjin drive north with the towns of CCF 66th Army, but intelligence River, a movement that would Hongchon and Chunchon as major officers were uncertain as to carry the United Nations Command objectives in the IX Corps zone. whether the enemy would contin- almost back to the 38th Parallel. Intermediate objectives included ue to retreat or would finally stand The plan was for IX and X Corps Phase Lines Albany, Buffalo, and and fight. Operation Ripper would, therefore, once again be a cautious advance, another limited, strictly controlled, “buttoned up” operation. As in just-ended Operation Killer, the Marines would again be the focus of the IX Corps’ main effort. A pair of U.S. Army units, the 1st Cavalry Division on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right, would guard the Marine flanks. Hongchon, an important communications hub located in the shadow of towering Oum Mountain, about five miles north of the line of departure, was the initial Marine objective. The coarse terrain included formidable Hill 930 and consisted of thickly wooded hills and swift-flowing streams. There were so few roads and trails that gravel-bottom streambeds were often pressed into use as roadways. The only thoroughfare (single-lane National Route 29) passed through Kunsamma Pass as it wound its way north to Hongchon from Hoengsong, and it initially served as the regimental boundary line inside the Marine zone. Intermittent snow, cold nights, and rainy days meant that the weather would continue to be a factor with which to be reck- oned. The Marines in Korea, just as had Napoleon’s army in Russia a century-and-a-half before, would have to deal with “General Mud” as well as enemy soldiers. The 1st Marine Division mission was to seize all objectives and destroy all enemy south of Line

29 of its objectives on Line Albany. General Ridgway decided to change tactics for the next phase of Ripper. This time he opted to maneuver instead of slugging forward on a single line. His plan was a complex one. He decided to try an airborne drop north of Hongchon to be coordinated with a double envelopment by the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, but this bold strike never came about because

1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51 the Chinese 39th Army slipped Tank and infantry teams move to the flanks of the advancing Marine column away before Ridgway’s trap could north of Hoengsong. The cold weather and sticky mud were as difficult to over- be slammed shut. The reasons for come as was the enemy during Operation Killer. this were divulged in a later intelligence find. A captured CCF direc- Albany, then seize Hongchon and ordered. The Marines advanced in tive indicated the enemy had destroy all enemy south of Line the afternoon snow against only adopted a “roving defensive” Buffalo and be prepared to contin- light resistance, primarily small whereby units were no longer to ue the attack to Lines Cairo and arms and mortar fires. The enemy hold at all costs, but should defend Idaho on order, with operations once again relied upon delaying using movement to entice the commencing at 0800 on 7 March. tactics, opening fire at long range United Nations Command to One regiment would constitute the to slow the attackers then with- overextend itself as it had the pre- corps reserve and would be under drawing before close combat could vious November so the CCF could the operational control of the IX be initiated. Additionally, Marine launch a “backhand” counteroffen- Corps commander during the latter tankers noted increased use of sive to isolate and annihilate the portion of the operation. The 1st road mines. During the first three U.N. vanguard. It was a good Marine Division would advance up days awful weather and difficult scheme, but the wily Ridgway did the Hoengsong-Hongchon axis terrain were the main obstacles. not take the bait. Instead of with “two up and one back.” The Marine attack was finally mounting a headlong rush, his General Smith initially placed 1st stopped in place by orders from offensives continued to be strictly and 7th Marines in the assault and above which halted the advance earmarked the 5th Marines as the on 9 March until flanking units Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, commanding Marine Observation Squadron 6, reserve. The two assault regiments could catch up. The next two days discusses the tactical situation with (7th on the left and 1st on the were devoted to reconnaissance Col Richard W. Hayward, command- right) were to advance astride and security patrols as the division ing officer of the 5th Marines. The Route 29 with all three battalions marked time. On 11 March, the high-wing, single-engine OY-1 on line whenever possible. The Marines resumed the advance. This Sentinel in the background was used difficult supply situation left time the enemy put up a stiff fight primarily as an artillery spotter. Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff’s 11th in the 1st Marines zone, and the 1st Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131207 Marines short of artillery ammuni- Battalion had to use artillery and tion, so an emergency agreement tank guns to reduce log bunkers between Major General Field atop Hill 549 before that position Harris, Commanding General, 1st fell. This single battle cost the Marine Aircraft Wing, and Major Marines more casualties (one killed General Earl E. Partridge, and nine wounded) than had been Commanding General, Fifth Air inflicted in the previous five days Force, temporarily placed a Marine (seven wounded). The first phase fighter squadron in direct support of Operation Ripper ended on 13 of the 1st Marine Division. March when the 1st Marine The operation started as Division successfully occupied all

30 ammunition dumps that yielded more than two thousand small arms; a dozen heavy machine guns; a dozen mortars; a dozen recoilless rifles; numerous captured U.S. weapons; assorted demolitions; and four dozen cases of ammunition. This was one of the biggest finds of the war. When the 7th Marines attacked the high ground north of Hongchon on the 15th, the 2d and 3d Battalions ran into a buzz saw. 120mm mortars and 76mm antitank guns pinned them down as they approached Hill 356. This 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51 Chinese fire was unusually accu- North of Hoengsong, Marines move up into the hills. Stamina and physical con- rate and intense, so much so that ditioning were important during the unending series of hill fights that led back three 81mm mortars were knocked to the 38th Parallel. out. Likewise, the enemy was “buttoned up” affairs. dropped by U.S. Air Force aircraft. holding firm at Hills 246 and 248 in In the 1st Marine Division zone, These deadly missiles so inundated the 1st Marines zone. Lieutenant General Smith retained the same the area that it took Captain Byron Colonel Robert K. McClelland’s 2d basic plan of attack. The 1st and C. Turner’s Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, performed 7th Marines would mount the Engineers, and all available divi- an extremely complicated maneu- assault, and the 5th Marines, now sion personnel three days to locate ver when it moved from the right commanded by Nicaragua-veteran and disarm most of the explosive flank on the east across the entire and World War II Marine para- devices before they could produce zone behind the front lines, chutist Colonel Richard W. casualties. The 7th Marines also trucked up to the village of Hayward, would be the reserve. As found a treasure trove: three Yangjimal in the 7th Marines zone before, the Marine advance on 14 A 81mm mortar crew fires in support of an attack. Under the leadership of a March moved forward against sergeant, a mortar squad was composed of seven Marines and was known as the almost no resistance. The 7th infantry commander’s “hip pocket” artillery. Marines did not need to call for 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51 artillery or close air support, and the 1st Marines encountered only scattered fire as it moved forward. General Ridgway’s hopes of cutting off the enemy at Hongchon were dashed when an intercepted message from the enemy commander reported, “We must move back . . . . Enemy troops approaching fast,” before the planned airdrop could be made. True to his word, General Liu Chen’s troops were long gone by the time a motorized patrol from Major Sawyer’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, entered the devastated town of Hongchon. Although the patrol located no enemy, it did discover a large number of “butterfly” bomblets

31 on the west, then dismounted for a terrain.” “This takes time,” he said. and 323 delivered napalm and difficult overland march to join the Smith asked if there was any relax- high explosive bombs on suspect- 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, for the ation of the Army directive. ed enemy entrenchments, artillery assault on Hill 248. Unfortunately, General Hoge’s answer was “ ‘No,’ pounded the objective, then tanks the ensuing joint attack—including but he still wanted more speed.” moved up on each side of the an air strike by Corsairs of Marine On 17 March, Hoge ordered the 1st ridge keeping pace with the Fighter Squadron 214 and plentiful Marine Division to continue the advancing infantry. The powerful mortar and artillery fire—was not attack to Line Buffalo and beyond. 90mm tank guns eliminated enemy successful. After suffering about To comply, Smith moved the 5th bunkers with very accurate direct 100 casualties, the Marines pulled Marines up on the left and pulled fire as their machine guns kept back to Hill 246 as darkness closed the 7th Marines out of the line. The enemy heads down. This coordi- in. Another rifle battalion joined 5th Marines advanced against scat- nated direct fire allowed the rifle the assault force when Lieutenant tered resistance and reached Line companies to successfully leapfrog Colonel Donald R. Kennedy’s 3d Buffalo without a major fight. In each other over the next couple of Battalion, 5th Marines, was fact, no Marine in that zone was days. This formula was so success- attached to the 1st Marines that killed or wounded in action for ful that the NKPA finally panicked night. Fortunately, a morning three straight days. The CCF had on 20 March. At that time the assault by the 1st Marines the next pulled back, but left elements of enemy fleeing Hill 381 were ham- day found Hill 248 undefended. the 12th NKPA Division behind to mered by supporting arms and Back in the 7th Marines’ zone the delay the Marines. The biggest infantry fires until they were virtu- 1st Battalion had to clear Hill 399 engagement occurred on 19 March ally wiped out. With the end of with hand grenades and bayonets in the 1st Marines’ zone. There, the that action the 1st Marine Division on its way to Line Baker. enemy was well dug in on a series was ready to renew the attack. Despite the progress, IX Corps of north-south ridges joining Hills The advance to Line Cairo was complained of the lack of speed in 330 and 381. Fortunately, the ter- made with Colonel Kim’s 1st KMC the advance. General Smith point- rain allowed the tanks of Captain Regiment, once again attached to ed out that the division was “mak- Bruce F. Williams’ Company B, 1st the 1st Marine Division. This ing a conscientious effort to com- Tank Battalion, to support the 2d allowed General Smith to use three ply with the Army’s directive to Battalion attack. After F4U Corsairs regiments (5th Marines, 1st keep buttoned up and comb the from Marine Fighter Squadrons 214 Korean, and 1st Marines) on line. The 7th Marines was placed in A Marine searches an enemy bunker. The Chinese often used small squad-sized corps reserve. The 5th Marines bunkers as a limited defense to cover the withdrawal of larger units. made it to Line Cairo without seri- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-7410 ous opposition, but this was not true for the 1st Marines or the Korean Marines. The Koreans relied upon aerial resupply as they moved forward in the undulating and trackless central sector. The biggest fight took place when the Korean regiment, supported by Major Jack C. Newell’s 2d Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel William McReynolds’ 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, fought a three-day battle to capture Hill 975. The position finally fell to a flanking maneuver. On 22 March, the 1st Marines encountered some fire from Hills 505, 691, and 627 before reaching the Idaho Line where it made contact with the U.S. Army’s 38th Infantry Regiment. Elements of the

32 1st Marines encountered some stiff resistance at Wongo-ri in the 1st Marine Division Tuchon-Myon hills while patrolling on the 27th. Two days later, the 1st he 1st Marine Division was Marines and the Korean Marine the senior Marine Corps regiment extended their lines north Tground combat unit in to the New Cairo Line without a Korea. By Table of Organization fight and brought Operation and Equipment it rated 22,343 men Ripper to a close. divided into combat, combat sup- On 31 March, the 1st Marine port, and service support units. The teeth of the division were its three Division mustered 21,798 men in 3,902-man rifle regiments which addition to 3,069 Korean Marines were subdivided into a headquar- and 234 attached U.S. Army sol- ters and service company, an anti- diers. Most Marines were at tank company, a 4.2-inch mortar Hongchon, but some service sup- company, and three rifle battalions port detachments were located far- (1,123 men), each composed of a ther back at Masan, Pohang, and headquarters and service company, Wonju. Unfortunately, when the three rifle companies, and a artillery ammunition crisis abated weapons company. The firing bat- Marine air once again reverted to teries of an artillery regiment, a included .45-caliber automatic pis- Fifth Air Force control, and Marine tank battalion, and a combat engi- tols, .30-caliber Garand semiauto- aviators were no longer in direct neer battalion furnished combat matic rifles, carbines, Thompson support. Service support came from support of their comrades on the submachine guns, and Browning assorted organic battalions and an automatic rifles; crew-served ground. In two major operations attached combat service group. A weapons included 4.2-inch, 81mm, (Killer and Ripper), the 1st Marine unique attachment in Korea was a and 60mm mortars, 155mm medi- Division suffered 958 combat casu- composite aircraft squadron that um and 105mm light howitzers, 4.5- alties (110 killed and 848 wound- included helicopters and observa- inch multiple rocket launchers, and ed), while inflicting an estimated tion aircraft. .30- and .50-caliber machine guns. 7,000 enemy casualties and captur- For the most part, the Marines Two notable new weapons were ing 150 enemy prisoners. For five were equipped with weapons of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher and weeks the Marines spearheaded World War II vintage: small arms the M-26 Pershing tank. each of IX Corps’ advances from Wonju to Chunchon and lead the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) 7th Motor Transport Battalion Eighth Army in ground gained dur- Headquarters Battalion 1st Ordnance Battalion 1st Service Battalion ing that time. Headquarters Company Military Police Company 1st Shore Party Battalion Although the men at the forward 1st Signal Battalion edge of the battlefield did not yet Reconnaissance Company 1st Marines 1st Tank Battalion realize it, the nature of the Korean 5th Marines Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket War had changed radically. In fact, 7th Marines Battalion strategic discussions now centered 11th Marines on whether to once again invade 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion Attachments North Korea or not and, if so, how 1st Armored Amphibian 1st Joint Assault Signal Company far that penetration should be. The Battalion 1st Provisional Truck Company military situation was so favorable 1st Amphibian Truck Company Det, 1st Signals Operations that U.N. diplomats actually began 1st Combat Service Group Battalion to entertain the notion that the 1st Engineer Battalion Marine Observation Squadron 6 other side might be ready to ask 1st Medical Battalion 1st Korean Marine Corps for an armistice if the pressure was 1st Motor Transport Battalion Regiment kept up. The most controversial element of strategy thus became American national command clusion of the next offensive would what to do when U.N. forces authorities agreed to go ahead and probably mark the limit of reached the 38th Parallel. After cross, but they warned General advance. Concurrently, the Joint much high-level discussion, Douglas MacArthur that the con- Chiefs of Staff informed the U.N.

33 commander that, since these tions without a break. This time he tional dividing line or continue to actions would terminate maneuver envisioned a “double whammy” in give ground. Large troop move- warfare, a diplomatic settlement to the form of Operations Rugged ments into the Iron Triangle had end the conflict after all pre-war and Dauntless. The goal of Rugged been noted, but it was a point of South Korean territory had been was to carry the Eighth Army back contention as to whether these liberated would be pursued. above the 38th Parallel to occupy a were part of a Communist “rota- Unfortunately, these high hopes trans-peninsular defense line tion” policy or if they constituted for an early end to the fighting anchored upon the centrally locat- an offensive build up. (Actually, were dashed by General ed Hwachon Reservoir. Dauntless, both events were occurring simul- MacArthur’s imprudent public ulti- on the other hand, was to be a taneously; worn out elements of matum demanding that the enemy spoiling attack to threaten the the CCF Fourth Field Army were either stop fighting or face annihi- enemy’s major staging area located moving back to Manchuria while lation. This presumptuous an- northwest of Hwachon. This was the fresh CCF Third Field Army nouncement on 24 March had sev- the so-called “Iron Triangle” that was entering Korea.) Unsure of eral far-reaching effects. First, it so included the terminus of several enemy intentions, General offended the Communists that it railway lines running down from Ridgway ordered a cautious torpedoed some promising secret Manchuria and incorporated the advance, but warned his corps negotiations and actually triggered intersection of all major roads in commanders to be ready to fall an aggressive battlefield response. north-central Korea. Its forested back to prepared defensive lines if Second, this action also sowed the flat lands were bounded by pro- ordered to do so. Ridgway’s prima- seed that later sprouted into one of tective ridges and included the ry intent was to seize Line Kansas, the most famous controversies in towns of Chorwan, Pyonggang a phase line purposely drawn so American military history. (not to be confused with the North that it included the best defensive Korean capital of Pyongyang), and terrain in the vicinity of the 38th Operations Rugged and Dauntless Kumhwa. The geographic shape of Parallel. In IX Corps’ zone this line the road net connecting these carried eastward from the Imjin All of Operation Ripper’s terrain towns gave the Iron Triangle its River to the western tip of the objectives had been taken, but name. Hwachon Reservoir and included General Ridgway felt not enough The battlefield situation was that body of water’s southern punishment had been meted out very complicated. Eighth Army shoreline. IX Corps’ axis of and this, coupled with a desire to intelligence officers were not sure advance was to be about a dozen secure a more defensible line, led if the enemy was going to defend miles almost due north from him to continue offensive opera- in place along the former interna- Chunchon astride the Pukhan River using National Route 17 as Tank and infantry teams search out possible enemy positions on either side of the the main supply route. The terrain road to Chunchon. Unfortunately, the mountainous terrain of central Korea in this zone was uneven. It was hampered effective tank support. 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 mostly flat west of the Pukhan River, but high hills on the right dominated the approaches to the Hwachon Reservoir. The enemy was believed to be stay-behind elements of the CCF 39th Army, but it was uncertain if those forces would flee or fight. On 29 March, Ridgway issued orders to initiate Operation Rugged. This time the hard-working Marines did not spearhead the attack as they had during Killer and Ripper. The U.S. 1st Cavalry and 6th ROK Divisions would carry that load, while the 1st Marine Division was IX Corps

34 reserve. General Smith hoped his men could get some well-deserved rest after replacing elements of X Corps at Line Ready near Chunchon. An unusual exception was the 7th Marines, which was actually slated to participate in the drive north. There was a small modification to the plan almost immediately. Instead of going into reserve, the 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) was ordered to continue the attack. “This arrangement,” noted General Smith, “gives me responsibility for 28,000 meters of front and I have for the time being no reserve.” The 1st Marines became IX Corps reserve and moved back to Hongchon. The 5th

Marines and the Korean Marines National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-442505 continued to move forward toward Line Ready. To do this the 5th Hospital Corpsman Richard De Wert, USNR Marines had to force a crossing of the Soyang River and seize Hills orn in 1931 in Taunton, Massachusetts, Richard De Wert enlisted in 734, 578, and 392 against moderate the Navy in 1948. Following “boot camp” and Hospital Corps train- to heavy resistance. Once this was Bing at Great Lakes, Illinois, he was assigned to the Naval Hospital, accomplished, elements of the U.S. Portsmouth, Virginia. Attached to the 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Marine Army’s 7th Infantry Division took Division, in July 1950, he participated in the Inchon, Seoul, and Chosin over, and the Marines began mak- operations. On 5 April 1951, while serving with the 2d Battalion, 7th ing their way back to the assembly Marines, on Hill 439 near Hongchon and the 38th Parallel, he gave his life while administering first aid to an injured Marine. His Medal of Honor area near Chunchon on the after- award said, in part: noon of 4 April for what promised to be five days off the firing line, When a fire team from the point platoon of his company was the first real rest for the division pinned down by a deadly barrage of hostile automatic weapons fire since moving up from Pohang in and suffered many casualties, De Wert rushed to the assistance of mid-February. one of the more seriously wounded and, despite a painful leg wound On 1 April, the 7th Marines was sustained while dragging the stricken Marine to safety, steadfastly placed under the operational con- refused medical treatment for himself and immediately dashed back trol of Major General Charles D. through the fire-swept area to carry a second wounded man out of Palmer’s 1st Cavalry Division. The the line of fire. plan was for the division to Undaunted by the mounting hail of devastating enemy fire, he advance about three miles from bravely moved forward a third time and received another serious wound in the shoulder, after discovering that a wounded Marine had Line Dover to secure Line Kansas already died. Still persistent in his refusal to submit to first aid, he just north of the 38th Parallel. resolutely answered the call of a fourth stricken comrade and, while Colonel Litzenberg’s regimental rendering medical assistance, was himself mortally wounded by a combat team, composed of the 7th burst of enemy fire. Marines; 3d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company D, 1st Tanks; The Secretary of the Navy on 27 May 1952 presented Corpsman De Company D, 1st Engineers; and Wert’s Medal of Honor to his mother, Mrs. Evelyn H. De Wert. The guid- various service detachments, was ed missile frigate, USS De Wert (FFG 45), bears his name. assigned the left (western) sector — Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret) for the advance with specific

35 instructions to keep the main sup- ties were reported. The major ous terrain, craters and debris ply route clear, protect the ferry holdup was the time it took to ferry blocking the road, and land mines. site, and maintain liaison with the the Marines across the Pukhan The 6th ROK Division on the left 6th ROK Division. River. Army amphibian trucks took moved up against virtually no Colonel Litzenberg closed his the men across. Most large vehicles opposition until it reached Line command post at Hongchon and were able to ford the river, and Kansas. Unfortunately, things did moved it to the assembly area near smaller ones used rafts operated by not go so smoothly in the 1st Chunchon. By 1000 on 2 April, the an Army assault boat detachment. Cavalry zone of action where the lead element of the 7th Marines, By the end of the day all objectives enemy increased the pressure near Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur F. had been secured. The next day’s the 38th Parallel and stubbornly Meyerhoff’s 2d Battalion, had mission was to take an intermedi- held out in the hills south of crossed the line of departure and ate objective, Phase Line Troy. Hwachon. While the 7th Marines was moving up Route 17 with the Again, all assigned objectives were had thus far encountered few other two battalions in trail. The reached, without enemy interfer- enemy, the 7th and 8th Cavalry attack proceeded against very light ence, by darkness on 3 April. The Regiments became entangled in a opposition, and no Marine casual- main stumbling blocks were tortur- fierce slugging match and fell far

Truman Fires MacArthur

ighting men in Korea, as were people all across the United States, were shocked to learn American FPresident Harry S. Truman had relieved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of his commands (Commander in Chief, Far East; United Nations Command; and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers) on 11 April 1951. This removal of America’s longest-serving warrior turned out to be one of the most controversial military decisions in American history. The President was well within his constitutional authority to depose a field commander, but Truman’s action initiated an acri- monious debate about both U.S. political leadership and America’s proper role in world affairs that deeply divided the country. This incident was the result of long-standing policy disagreements about grand strategy and the ultimate purpose of military action. General MacArthur sought an absolute commitment to victory and felt anything less National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC353136 than surrender by the Communists was an unacceptable Gen Douglas MacArthur greets President Harry S. outcome of the conflict. President Truman, on the other Truman on his arrival at Wake Island for their October hand, believed that Korea was only one theater in the 1950 conference. Within five months the President Cold War and insisted the Communists would be would be forced to relieve his Far East commander. deterred in other arenas if the viability of South Korea could be maintained. In short, the general wanted a mil- ly and more vociferously aired his views in public as itary victory akin to those that ended the two World time wore on. The U.N. commander felt he was being Wars, but the leader of the free world viewed Korea as saddled by unrealistic restrictions and chafed at not a limited military action intended to achieve very specif- being given the resources he needed to successfully ic diplomatic aims without embroiling the world in glob- fight the war. Controversial statements about these al warfare. President Truman framed the essence of this issues caused Truman to personally confront MacArthur dispute when he wrote about Korea: “General at Wake Island in October 1950 and then led the MacArthur was willing to risk general war; I was not.” President to issue several “gag” orders over the next few The roots of the dispute began almost as soon as the months. United States became enmeshed in Korea. MacArthur One problem was that MacArthur’s track record with bristled over what he considered political meddling in respect to Korea was enigmatic, one marked by brilliant military affairs in August 1950, and then more frequent- successes offset by seriously flawed diplomatic and mil-

36 itary judgements. The general predicted, despite intelli- half-past midnight on 11 April 1951, President Truman gence reports to the contrary, that China would not issued orders to recall General MacArthur. intervene in Korea; then, after his U.N. forces were This unexpected and seemingly rash act, spurred by roughly pushed out of North Korea, demanded mea- the insensitive manner in which the relief was handled, sures well outside of the U.N. mandate (i.e. bombing created a firestorm on the home front. MacArthur Red China, blockading the Chinese coast, and interven- returned from Korea a hero. He was welcomed across tion by Nationalist Chinese forces). His recommenda- the country by an adoring public before he culminated tions were immediately rejected by all allied nations his 52-year military career with a moving and an elo- even though MacArthur proclaimed failure to adopt his quent speech to Congress. MacArthur’s popularity was plan would mean the annihilation of the United Nations at an all-time high as he enjoyed his final triumph—-a Command. MacArthur suffered a loss of face when his gala ticker tape parade through New York City—-before, dismal forecast did not come true, but instead United like the old soldier in his speech, he “faded away” by Nations forces rolled back the enemy and regained the dropping out of the public eye. On the other hand, 38th Parallel without drastic measures in the spring of Truman’s action was so controversial that his popularity 1951. dropped to an all-time low. The President’s opponents The most egregious of MacArthur’s forays into the flamed the fires of public dissatisfaction with the war diplomatic arena came when he purposely torpedoed when they demanded public hearings. These were held, secret peace feelers in late March 1951 by publicly taunt- but did not turn out as expected. In the end, the Senate ing the enemy commander and threatening to widen the reaffirmed the President’s right to dismiss a subordinate war. The near simultaneous publication of an earlier let- and surprisingly vindicated Truman’s decision after ter to Republican House Leader Joseph Martin, which equally venerated General of the Army Omar N. many viewed as a thinly veiled attack on the Truman Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted Administration that closed with the inflammatory state- MacArthur’s plan would have resulted in “the wrong ment, “There is no substitute for victory,” finally brought war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place, and with the the Truman-MacArthur controversy to a head. Thus, at wrong enemy.” behind schedule as they battled as he dragged injured men to safe- battery fire, as well as American their way north. Still, a milestone ty at Mapyong-ni. De Wert was tank and mortar fires, eventually was achieved on 4 April when a awarded a posthumous Medal of silenced the enemy guns. The Marine patrol from First Lieutenant Honor for his actions. Ten very enemy suffered about 150 casual- Orville W. Brauss’ Company B accurate close air strikes coordinat- ties trying to hold out. The Marines became one of the first Eighth ed with artillery fire enabled the lost five killed and 22 wounded. Army units to recross the 38th Marines to push forward late in the On the afternoon of 6 April, the Parallel. The 11th Marines fired 17 day. Good coordination between 7th Marines finally reached the missions hitting some enemy the assault and support companies Kansas Line after some tough fight- troops in the open and peppering (Captain Jerome D. Gordon’s ing. Twenty Marines were wound- suspected emplacements with Company D, Captain Merlin T. ed during the day, most by enemy excellent results, and a four-plane Matthews’ Company E, Captain 76mm fire but some to small arms flight scattered an enemy column. Raymond N. Bowman’s Company and mortars. With the Kansas Line The next day, the Marines F, and Captain William C. Airheart’s reached, the men of Colonel became heavily engaged and had Company G) provided textbook Litzenberg’s regiment patiently to fight their way forward for the examples of infantry fire and waited for the 1st Marine Division next 48 hours. On 5 April, the 1st maneuver. The next day enemy to relieve the 1st Cavalry. General Battalion met very stiff resistance. opposition was less formidable, Smith received orders to do so on Automatic weapons and mortar but First Lieutenant Victor 8 April, and the relief was tenta- fire pinned down two companies. Stoyanow’s Company I took a tively slated for the 10th. General The 2d Battalion likewise met stub- beating when it became pinned by Ridgway also told General Smith born resistance and had to call for automatic weapons fire in some that the 1st Marine Division (less tank support to overrun its objec- low ground which was also zeroed the 1st Marines in corps reserve) tives. Navy Corpsman Richard D. in on by enemy mortars. There would then attack north to seize De Wert, serving with Company D, was no air support available the northwest end of the Hwachon was mortally wounded after fear- because of weather (low-lying Reservoir. The situation did not lessly exposing himself to enemy cloud cover, high winds, and look promising. The 1st Cavalry fire four times and being hit twice heavy rain), but artillery counter- Division had been stopped by

37 Wyoming Line were now the objectives for an expanded Operation Dauntless. With this in mind, General Smith assigned his division an intermediate phase line. The Quantico Line included the heights overlooking the Hwachon Dam and the hills north of the village of Hwachon, while the exact positions held on the Marine left flank were to be tied to the advances made by the 6th ROK Division. This was the plan when the 1st Marine Division deployed along the line of departure. Then, Operation Dauntless was suddenly postponed. Although a time of general tran- quility on the Central Front, the break between operations was one of international tumult. Its root cause was President Harry S. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131342 Truman’s decision to relieve Generals meet along the central Korean fighting front. Pictured from left are General MacArthur of command. MajGen Oliver P. Smith, USMC, LtGen James A. Van Fleet, USA, and MajGen This unexpected announcement William M. Hoge, USA. LtGen Van Fleet replaced Gen Ridgway as commander was greeted for the most part by of the U.S. Eighth Army. stunned silence in Korea, but cre- uncharacteristically fierce resis- machinery became a high priority. ated a considerable stateside tance and was stalled almost three Unfortunately, several Army uproar known as “the great miles from its final objective, and ground attacks and a night raid debate.” the Chinese still controlled the failed to achieve that goal. The lat- General Ridgway was named Hwachon Dam. ter was a water-borne raid by the new commander of United This situation became serious Army rangers paddling rubber Nations forces and was in turn when the enemy opened some of assault boats, not an amphibious replaced as Eighth Army comman- the dam’s sluice gates on 8 April assault as is sometimes claimed; der by Lieutenant General James A. sending a massive wall of water and, contrary to some sources, no Van Fleet, USA. A former football around the river bend and onto the Marine units were involved in coach, 59-year-old “Big Jim” Van Chunchon flood plain. Luckily, the either the planning or execution. Fleet was an aggressive leader who low level of water within the reser- Failure to take or knock out the favored expending fire and steel voir and the fact that not all the Hwachon Dam meant its capture instead of men. A veteran of both gates were opened kept the dam- unexpectedly became the next World Wars and the general officer age to a minimum. Only one major Marine task for Operation who had seen the most frontline bridge was knocked out, although Dauntless. combat in the European theater several other pontoon bridges had The Marines began arriving at during World War II, Van Fleet had to be disconnected until the rising the Kansas Line as scheduled on recently served with the Joint water subsided. In the end, this 10 April, but not all units were in Military Aid Group that saved man-made flash flood only raised place until two days later when Greece from Communist insur- the river level about a foot down- Korean Marines relieved the last gents. Like-minded Generals Van stream. Still, the pent-up waters of elements of the 1st Cavalry Fleet and Ridgway made a good the reservoir represented a poten- Division. Seizing the Hwachon team. This was fortunate because tial threat to future operations. Dam as well as securing the main Ridgway had planned Operation Accordingly, seizure of the dam supply route leading north to Dauntless, but Van Fleet was going itself or destruction of the gate Kumhwa and reaching the to have to carry it out. Obviously,

38 the meandering Pukhan River as well as Route 17 and a line of hills north and west of the village of Hwachon. At 0700 on the 21st, the 1st Marine Division resumed the attack with the 7th Marines on the left, the 5th Marines in the center, the Korean Marines on the right, and the 1st Marines in reserve. The 5,000- to 9,000-yard advance, in the words of one regimental commander, was “made into a vacu- um.” Strangely, there was almost no sign of the enemy other than a few pieces of lost equipment and the ashes of a few cooking National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A7862 fires—the flotsam and jetsam left After 10 days of patrolling and preparation of defensive works on Line Kansas, behind when any large body of the 5th Marines resumed the advance toward Line Quantico. troops moves out in hurry. Korean the new commander needed a few series of desperate fights and some Marines made the only significant days to “snap in” before leading a intricate maneuvers that kept the contact by killing one straggler and new offensive. enemy at bay until the Chinese capturing another. About the only Van Fleet was greeted with Spring Offensive lost its momen- reminder that an unseen enemy some ominous news. In the wake tum. was lurking nearby was a green of Operation Ripper intelligence haze of deliberately set fires that officers began to grasp that anoth- CCF Spring Offensive hugged the damp earth. er Communist offensive was near, The lack of enemy activity was the fifth such major effort since the Spring finally arrived in mid- welcome, but it was also baffling. CCF intervened in Korea the previ- April. The days were generally The front was eerily quiet, too ous fall. Prisoners of war reported warm and sunny with the temper- quiet for many wary veteran the attack could begin within one ature reaching into the mid-60s. Marines who felt something big week, and captured documents The nights were mostly clear and was about to break. Lieutenant claimed the ultimate goal was to cool, but there was no longer the Colonel John L. Hopkins, com- eject U.N. forces from Korea after need for heavy winter clothing or manding officer of 1st Battalion, the Communists celebrated May arctic sleeping bags. All of the 5th Marines, thought this “strange Day in Seoul. To this end more snow had melted, and patches of atmosphere of silence . . . was than 700,000 CCF and NKPA troops flowers were sprouting up among much like the stillness which had had been amassed. The enemy’s the scrub pines. And, although preceded the first CCF attack on main force, 36 Chinese divisions, there were still a few April show- Yudam-ni on 27 November.” This gathered inside the Iron Triangle. ers, the heavy rains let up and the nearly universal feeling of unease About half of the NKPA divisions mud was finally drying out. along the front lines was support- were also poised to strike in the Thanks to the high-level turmoil ed by several ominous signs. Aerial east. Although the time and place caused by the sudden change of observers suspected the enemy of the expected offensive had been command, the 1st Marine Division was up to no good, but could not generally deduced, an unforeseen spent 10 quiet days on the Kansas be specific because the area was development—-a deep penetration Line before beginning Operation shrouded by smoke that masked of South Korean lines far from the Dauntless on 21 April. The IX troop movements. There were enemy’s planned main effort—- Corps objective was the Wyoming unconfirmed reports of several unexpectedly placed the Marines Line, but the Marines were also thousand troops on the move, but of the 1st Division in the center of given an intermediate objective the Marines spotted no actual the action, and the period from labeled Quantico Line, which enemy. Enemy prisoners of war late April until mid-May featured a included the Hwachon Dam and taken in other sectors indicated

39 and two dozen wounded (20 U.S. and four Korean). At the end of the day, the 1st Marine Division was at the Quantico Line arrayed on a nearly straight line north and west of the Hwachon Reservoir with the 7th Marines, 5th Marines, and the Korean Marines from left to right. Two tank companies (B and C, in support of the 5th and 7th Marines, respectively) were forward deployed. The 11th Marines, reinforced by corps artillery (including the 8-inch guns of the 213th and 17th Field Artillery Battalions and the 155mm howitzers of the 92d Armored Field Artillery) was set up in the flat land just behind the front line troops. The Army guns were 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 positioned near the west flank so By 22 April the Marines had seized and held Line Quantico. To the north Chinese Communist Forces were poised to attack and the IX Corps zone was to be the tar- they could reinforce either the get area for the attempted breakthrough. Heavy machine gun teams were the ROKs or U.S. Marines as needed. backbone of the defense. Artillery ammunition trucks and prime movers jammed the narrow that at least four CCF armies were Hwachon village under intermit- road making resupply and over- poised to take on IX Corps, and tent fire. They found more than a land travel difficult. The 1st they named 22 April as the date of dozen badly wounded men left Marines was in reserve several the attack. A particularly disturbing behind by the Communists and miles away across the Pukhan bit of information was that the 6th spotted several dozen more fleeing River at Chunchon. ROK Division on the Marine left north. The 7th Marines, command- Enemy resistance seemed to be had opened a 2,500-yard gap, and ed by pre-war China veteran and stiffening, but there was no reason all physical contact with that unit World War II artilleryman Colonel for alarm as the Marines settled in had been lost. Numerous patrols Herman Nickerson, Jr., who had on the night of 22-23 April. The failed to find the elusive South relieved the ailing Colonel Homer evening promised to be crisp and Koreans. Consequently, on the eve Litzenberg, advanced several miles clear with a full moon. At about of what appeared to be a major on the left flank with only one 1800, General Smith issued instruc- enemy effort the Marine western man wounded. Air strikes hit sus- tions for the 1st Marine Division to flank was dangling. pected enemy assembly areas and continue its advance to seize the At 0830 on the morning of 22 possible field fortifications. The Wyoming Line at 0700 the next April, preceded by low-flying 5th Marines moved up Route 17 morning. These orders, however, observation aircraft and jeep- and occupied the hills on either were overcome by events three- mounted ground reconnaissance side of a slender valley encom- and-a-half hours later. Although units, the 1st Marine Division pro- passing the village of Hwachon unrealized at the time, nearly ceeded up the Chunchon Corridor against moderate to heavy fire. 350,000 enemy troops were push- west of the Hwachon Reservoir. Korean Marines seized the ing silently forward between Unlike the day before, however, Hwachon Dam and the heights Munsan-ni in the west and the this time the enemy harassed the protecting it, but were then pinned Hwachon Reservoir in the east. Marine advance with small arms, down for a while by accurate The CCF Fifth Phase Offensive was automatic weapons, and mortar enemy indirect fire. Total losses underway just as the enemy pris- fire. Captain Robert L. Autry’s when the Marines reached oners had predicted. Furious mor- Reconnaissance Company, aided Quantico Line were five men (two tar and artillery barrages struck by a tank detachment, entered America and three Korean) killed United Nations lines all across the

40 front before midnight. The first blows on IX Corps’ front were not directed at the Marines, but at the shaky 6th ROK Division on their left, which was hit full force. That hapless unit simply evaporated as its frightened soldiers fled the field of battle. Facing only token resistance, the CCF 40th Army was on its way south in full gear by midnight. Soon, a 10-mile penetration was created and the 1st Marine Division was in serious jeopardy. Some of the toughest fighting of the Korean War marked the next 60 hours, and the magnificent defenses of Horseshoe Ridge and Hill 902 were reminiscent of similar heroic Marine stands at Les Mares Farm in World War I and Guadalcanal’s Bloody Ridge during World War II. The dull mid-watch routine at the 1st Marine Division command post was interrupted when the duty officer was informed at about 2130 that the Chinese had pene- trated South Korean defenses and were headed toward Marine lines. Not long after the message arrived the vanguard of a long line of demoralized South Korean army soldiers began filing in. By midnight, the Reconnaissance Company and Captain Donald D. Pomerleau’s Military Police Company were rounding up stragglers and placing them under guard at the ferry site just south of the 5th Marines’ command post. These dejected remnants of the 6th ROK Division reported their unit was in full retreat and further main supply route and all crossing after being ambushed. The ill-fated noted that thousands of enemy points of the Pukhan River were at artillery unit had lost about half of troops were rapidly moving south. great risk. its 105mm howitzers to the Despite attempts to reconstitute The first U.S. troops to confirm ambush, and the 2d Rocket the division as a fighting force, the the disaster on the left were can- Artillery Battery lost all of its 1st Division’s liaison officer called noneers from Army artillery units weapons when its defensive posi- and said: “to all intents and pur- that earlier had been sent west to tion was overrun. As Lieutenant poses, the 6th ROK Division had shore up the South Koreans. Colonel Leon F. Lavoie, command- ceased to exist.” This was alarming Elements of the battered 987th ing officer of the 92d Armored news because the Marine left flank Armored Field Artillery came pour- Field Artillery Battalion acidly was wide open, and the division’s ing back into the American lines observed: “there had been more

41 stricken South Korean soldiers Private First Class Herbert A. Littleton escaping the battle zone. Captain John F. Coffey’s Company B led n the night of 22 April the way. At about 0130, while still 1951, radio operator 1,000 yards short of its assigned OHerbert A. Littleton serving position, the long column of vehi- with an artillery forward observer cles stopped at the tight perimeter team of Company C, 1st Battalion, formed by the 92d Armored Field 7th Marines, sacrificed his life to Artillery Battalion, which a short save the lives of his team members. Born in 1930, in Arkansas, he time before had established a road attended high school in Sturgis, block, collected more than 1,800 South Dakota, where he played South Koreans, and attempted by football and basketball and then machine gun and bayonet with lit- worked for Electrical Application tle success to deploy them to slow Corporation in Rapid City. Shortly the Chinese advance. Moving west, after his eighteenth birthday, he Coffey’s company assisted in the enlisted in the Marine Corps, extricating the 987th Artillery’s received recruit training at Marine 105mm howitzers that were stuck Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, in the mud. After as many guns as and additional training at Camp Departmentt of Defense Photo (USMC) A46967 possible were freed, Coffey Pendleton before being sent to arrival of the remainder of the returned to friendly lines where Korea with the 3d Replacement team, he unhesitatingly hurled the 1st Battalion was manning a Draft in December 1950. His Medal himself on the deadly missile, of Honor citation read, in part: absorbing its full, shattering wooded semi-circular ridge with Standing watch when a impact in his own body. By Captain Thomas J. Bohannon’s well-concealed and numeri- his prompt action and heroic Company A on the right, Captain cally superior enemy force spirit of self-sacrifice, he saved Robert P. Wray’s Company C in the launched a violent night attack the other members of his team center, and the 81mm mortars of from nearby positions against from serious injury or death First Lieutenant Wesley C. Noren’s his company, Private First and enabled them to carry on Weapons Company on relatively Class Littleton quickly alerted the vital mission that culminat- level ground in the immediate rear. the forward observation team ed in the repulse of the hostile Company B was promptly and immediately moved into attack. assigned the battalion left flank. an advantageous position to Private First Class Littleton’s hero- The enemy began probing assist in calling down artillery ic actions were later memorialized Marine lines around 2300 on 22 fire on the hostile force. at Camp Pendleton by a marksman- When an enemy hand ship trophy, a baseball field, and a April and then mounted an all-out grenade was thrown into his street, all named in his honor. assault to turn the Marine flanks vantage point, shortly after the — Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret) about three hours later. The 7th Marines on the left was the hardest hit U.S. unit. Enemy mortar, auto- artillery lost in Korea up to that while the Marines at the main line matic weapons, and small arms fire point than there was lost in the of resistance dug in deep and ner- began at about 0200 on the 23d. whole of the European theater in vously checked their weapons. In This reconnaissance by fire was the last war by American forces.” addition, Smith ordered Colonel followed by a very determined By 2224, the impact of the dis- McAlister to send Lieutenant ground assault an hour later. aster on the left was apparent, so Colonel Robley E. West’s 1st Shrieking whistles, clanging cym- all plans to attack the next day Battalion, 1st Marines, up from bals, and blasting bugles signaled were abruptly canceled. Units Chunchon to tie in with the the onslaught. Up and down the along the forward edge of the bat- artillery and tanks located in the line grizzled veterans of the Chosin tlefield were placed on full alert valley on the far west flank. West’s Reservoir walked the lines to settle with orders to button up tight. battalion was soon on trucks head- down young Marines who had not Commanders hurriedly sent out ed for its new position, but the yet experienced a terrifying combat patrols to locate the enemy convoy could only creep along “human wave” ground assault. and to try fix his line of march, over roads choked with panic- Noncommissioned officers force-

42 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 Near the Quantico Line, a Marine 75mm recoilless rifle crew were light enough to be carried up and down Korea’s moun- opposes the Chinese Communist attack on 23 April. tainous terrain. Recoilless rifles provided long-range pinpoint accuracy, but fully and profanely reminded their the enemy appeared. He sounded Marine tanks successfully guarded charges not to use grenades until the alarm then moved to an the lowland approaches. the enemy was close at hand, and exposed position from which he In the division’s center, Chinese more than one of them tried to adjusted supporting arms fires infiltrators silently slipped through calm the new men by remarking despite fierce incoming machine the 5th Marines’ outpost line to about the frightening cacophony: gun fire and showers of enemy occupy Hill 313. A futile counterat- “Those guys sure could use some grenades. Forced back into a tack was quickly launched, but music lessons!” bunker by enemy fire, Littleton despite tremendous heroism (three At least 2,000 enemy troops hit threw himself upon a grenade to Marines received the Navy Cross Major Webb D. Sawyer’s out- save his comrades in that crowded for their actions) the assault pla- manned 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, space at the cost of his own life. toon was held in check and suf- full force. That attack by the CCF He was awarded a posthumous fered heavy casualties. It was not 358th Regiment, 120th Division, Medal of Honor for his selfless until the next morning that ele- primarily directed at Captain actions that night. Heavy ments of the 1st and 2d Battalions, Eugene H. Haffey’s Company C fighting—much of it grenade duels 5th Marines, retook the hill. At and Captain Nathan R. Smith’s and close quarters combat—lasted around 0300, Korean Marines on Company A, was repulsed by several hours. Enemy mortar fire the right came under heavy attack hand-to-hand fighting that lasted and small arms continued through- in the vicinity of Hill 509. The stal- almost until dawn. Private First out the night and into the next day. wart Koreans threw back succes- Class Herbert A. Littleton, a As always, supporting arms were a sive enemy attacks throughout the radioman with the forward observ- critical Marine advantage. The 11th long night and had ejected the er team attached to Company C, Marines ringed the endangered enemy by the next morning. was standing the mid-watch when position with a wall of steel, and Particularly hard hit was a single

43 rifle company of the 1st KMC Battalion, 7th Marines, and solidi- zon. Eight Marine Corsairs Battalion holding the left flank. fied the division west flank, but swooped over the battlefield guid- The 150-man company was fierce fighting continued into the ed onto their targets by aerial reduced to only about 40 men next morning. The Chinese, well observers flying vulnerable OY ready for duty by daylight. aware that they would be pounded observation aircraft; Marine Fighter The timely arrival of the reserve from the air during the day, hur- Squadron 323 flew in support of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, eased riedly retreated as the first rays of the 5th Marines while Marine the pressure on Major Sawyer’s 1st light began to creep over the hori- Fighter Squadron 214 worked over the Chinese in the 7th Marines’ zone. The retreating enemy was slaughtered by this blitz from above. Enemy casualties by all arms were estimated to be well above 2,000 men. By noon on the 23d, it was obvious the Marines had won the first round, but it was also obvious that the fight was far from over. For his skillful and aggressive leadership in securing the division’s vital flank, Major Sawyer, the recipient of two Silver Stars for the Chosin Reservoir campaign, was awarded a Navy Cross. Although the Marines held fast and remained a breakwater that stemmed the onrushing Red tide, the Chinese were still pouring through South Korean army lines. “The position of the 1st Marine Division was beginning to appear to some persons,” noted Major Martin Sexton, “very similar to the situation at the Chosin Reservoir.” On the Marine left a deep envelopment threatened. As a result General Hoge ordered the 1st Marine Division to fall back. Consequently, General Smith passed the word for his units to retire to new defensive positions on the Pendleton Line at 0935. This would be no small feat. The enemy threat was so great that Smith was forced to place the entire 1st Marine Division on the high ground north of the Chunchon Corridor to protect the vital Mujon Bridge and several ferry crossings. This was a bold move because the Marines would have an unfordable river at their back and there was no division reserve in place. It also required a complex set of maneu-

44 and the attached 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, to cover the retrograde. The hard-hit 1st Battalion pulled back covered by fires from the 2d Battalion. Major Maurice E. Roach Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, seized some fiercely held high ground while Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, fought off repeated enemy probes that lasted until nightfall. Units of the 1st Marines held the southernmost positions. The remaining two reserve battalions had moved out of their assembly areas that morning, crossed the Pukhan River, then occupied a pair of hills protecting the main supply route and several crossing points. Actually, the arrival of the 2d and National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-429642 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, was a A Bell HTL-4 light helicopter waits for a badly wounded Marine to be loaded on close run thing. The Marines had board for a trip to a rear area hospital. These bubble-top aircraft saved lives by to virtually race up the hills to beat cutting the amount of time it took seriously wounded men to get to medical atten- the Chinese who were also on the tion. way to take what was obviously vers whereby the Marines would soon shouldering M1 rifles or car- the most important terrain feature have to defend the Pukhan River rying stretchers under fire. Just as in the area. Hill 902 (actually a line, and at the same time move at the Chosin Reservoir, the creed 4,000-foot mountain top) dominat- back to Chunchon. General Smith that “every Marine is a rifleman ed the road to Chunchon and pro- would have to carefully coordinate regardless of his military occupa- tected the concrete Mojin Bridge as his supporting arms as well as tional specialty” saved the day. well as two ferry sites. Its defense effect a passage of lines under fire. General Smith wanted to form a became the focal point of the Air and artillery would keep the semi-circular defense line that Marine retrograde. In the center, enemy at bay while armor and the arched southwest atop key ground Colonel Richard W. Hayward’s 5th division’s heavy weapons protect- from the tip of the Hwachon Marines moved back under scat- ed the avenues of approach and Reservoir west for a few miles then tered small arms and mortar fire, the river crossings. Smith’s plan bending back along the high but encountered no enemy ground was to give ground rapidly in the ground abutting the Pukhan River units. On the division right, Korean north while slowly pulling back in and over looking the Chunchon Marines pulled back and then dug the south, letting his westernmost Valley. To do this he immediately in just before being ranged by units alternately pass through a ordered the rest of the 1st Marines enemy mortar and artillery fire. series of blocking positions. forward from Chunchon to hold Unfortunately, the 1st Marine Engineers would finally blow the the hills in the southwest while in Division’s line was fragmented, not bridges once the rear guard made the north he instituted a “swinging continuous, with units of the 1st it over the river. A key element gate” maneuver whereby the and 7th Marines holding widely was the Marine aviators whose Korean Marines anchored the far separated battalion-sized perime- fighter-bombers would be guided right, the 5th gave ground in the ters located atop key terrain. The onto their targets by airborne spot- center, and the 7th Marines pulled 11th Marines, reinforced by several ters to delay enemy pursuit. All back in echelon to link up with the Army artillery battalions, was busy hands were called upon to con- 1st Marines registering defensive fires as night tribute during this fighting with- Fighting continued throughout fell on 23 April. drawal. Cooks, bakers, and typ- the day. In the west, the 7th That day also marked the first ists—-even a downed pilot—-were Marines had its own 3d Battalion mass helicopter medical evacua-

45 tion in history. All of VMO-6’s Bell HTL-4 “bubble top” helicopters Technical Sergeant Harold E.Wilson (able to carry two litter cases and one man in the observer seat) orn in 1921, in Birmingham, were airborne at first light. Fifty Alabama, Harold E. Wilson critically wounded men were Benlisted in the Marine Corps flown out by these Marine “egg- Reserve and was assigned to active beaters” between 0600 and 1930. A duty in April 1942. During World total of 21 sorties (22.6 flight War II, he served 27 months overseas stationed on Midway Island. In hours) were made from Chunchon addition to his Pacific service, he to the front lines then back to the was stationed at Parris Island, South 1st Medical Battalion collecting Carolina; Camp Lejeune, North and clearing station. Every flight Carolina; and Portsmouth, Virginia. encountered some type of enemy Sergeant Wilson was honorably dis- fire, but there were no losses of charged in 1945. aircraft or personnel. Captain Recalled to active duty in August Dwain L. Redalin logged 9.7 flight 1950, he was assigned to Company hours while carrying 18 wounded G, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and men to safety. First Lieutenant participated in the Wonsan landing Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A46634 George A. Eaton accounted for 16 and was wounded during the more evacuations. The final flight Chosin Reservoir Campaign. In round in his face. Dazed and March 1951, he was awarded a suffering from concussion, he had to be guided in with hand- Bronze Star Medal for “fearless and still refused medical aid and, held lights because the airfield had untiring leadership” of his platoon. despite weakness from loss of been officially blacked out. While serving as a platoon sergeant, blood, moved from foxhole to Ground personnel and flying offi- his bravery on the night of 23-24 foxhole, directing fire, resup- cers alike were formed into provi- April 1951 brought an award of the plying ammunition, rendering sional platoons and assigned Medal of Honor, with a citation that first aid and encouraging his defense sectors in case the enemy read, in part: men. broke though, and all excess mate- Wilson braved intense fire Following the April 1951 action, rial and equipment was loaded on to assist the survivors back into Wilson was evacuated to the trucks for movement back to the line and to direct the treat- Yokosuka Naval Hospital in Japan Hongchon that night. ment of casualties. Although and five months later returned to the On the night of 23-24 April, the twice wounded by gunfire, in United States. He was awarded a the right arm and the left leg, meritorious promotion to master 1st Marines caught the brunt of the he refused medical aid for sergeant in 1951 and commissioned CCF 120th Division attack. In the himself and continued to move as warrant officer in 1952. After a north, the 1st Battalion, 1st about among his men, shout- number of assignments, he assumed Marines, still under the operational ing words of encouragement. the post of Adjutant, Marine Corps control of Colonel Nickerson’s 7th After receiving further wounds Engineer Schools, Camp Lejeune, in Marines, was dug in on Horseshoe in the head and shoulder as December 1962, and a year later, Ridge. This was a key position the attack increased in intensi- was assigned to Force Troops, Fleet which, if lost, would split the 1st ty, he again insisted upon Marine Force, Atlantic, serving as Marine Division wide open and remaining with his unit. adjutant and personnel officer of the allow the enemy to defeat it in Unable to use either arm to 2d Tank Battalion. detail. Farther south, the 2d and 3d fire, and with mounting casual- During the Vietnam War, Chief Battalions, 1st Marines, manned ties among our forces, he Warrant Officer Wilson served with resupplied his men with rifles Marine Aircraft Group 13 prior to separate perimeters on Hill 902 and ammunition taken from being assigned as the 6th Marine overlooking the flat lands of the the wounded. Corps District’s personnel officer in Chunchon Corridor. These posi- After placing the reinforce- November 1968. He retired from the tions constituted the last line of ments in strategic positions in Marine Corps in 1972 and died in defense, and if they were lost the the line, [he] directed effective Lexington, South Carolina, on 29 division would be surrounded and fire until blown off his feet by March 1998. cut off. In short, the situation that the bursting of a hostile mortar — Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret) night was as desperate as any in

46 the history of the Marine Corps. joined the hard-fighting can- Despite being wounded on four The Marines were hit by noneers, scattering the enemy with separate occasions, he refused artillery, mortar, small arms, and deadly flat-trajectory fire. Enemy evacuation and remained in com- automatic weapons fire all through stragglers were cleared out by joint mand of his platoon. Unable to the night. The 1st and 7th Marines Army-Marine patrols before the man a weapon because of painful on the left flank were probed as Army artillerymen displaced to shoulder wounds, Wilson repeat- Chinese forces searched for crew- new positions. edly exposed himself to enemy fire served weapons positions and The enemy’s main thrust that while distributing ammunition and weak spots in the line. The four- night, however, was directed far- directing tactical movements even hour fight for Horseshoe Ridge ther south where the CCF tried to though he was hit several more began at about 2000. There, the turn the open Marine flank but times. Wilson was later awarded men of the 1st Battalion, 1st instead ran headlong into the Medal of Honor for his stirring Marines, managed to blunt an Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. leadership that night. The Marines attack by the CCF 358th Regiment Banning’s 3d Battalion, 1st took heavy casualties during fierce in savage hand-to-hand fighting. Marines, atop Hill 902. A series of hand-to-hand fighting, but the Farther north, the 3d Battalion, 7th full-scale assaults began at about Chinese were unable to dislodge Marines, repelled enemy probes all midnight. The CCF 359th and them. At 0930 on 24 April, the bat- night long. As part of that action, 360th Regiments repeatedly tered Marines were almost out of the “Redlegs” of the Army’s 92d crashed into the 3d Battalion’s ammunition and their ranks had Armored Field Artillery Battalion exposed perimeter, but all efforts been severely thinned, but they acquitted themselves well by to eject the determined defenders were still standing tall. The repelling a dawn ground attack were unsuccessful. After enemy Chinese plan to trap and annihilate using machine guns and direct fire mortars pounded Banning’s the 1st Marine Division had been a artillery to eliminate several hun- Marines for several hours a costly failure. dred enemy troops, while continu- “human wave” ground assault General Hoge ordered the ing to deliver fire for the hard- almost cracked First Lieutenant Marines to pull back to the Kansas pressed Marines on Horseshoe Horace L. Johnson’s Company G. Line as part of a general realign- Ridge. Marine M-26 Pershings from That this did not happen was a ment of IX Corps. This would not Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans’ tribute to the actions of Technical be an easy maneuver because it 1st Tank Battalion eventually Sergeant Harold E. “Speed” Wilson. would require disengaging under fire and making several river cross- A Marine 105mm howitzer battery near Sapyong-ni fires on suspected enemy ings. To do this, General Smith positions. The guns of the 11th Marines rendered outstanding fire support had to restore tactical unity prior to regardless of time of day or weather limitations. 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 movement. The 1st Marines was reunited on the morning of the 24th when 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which had been hotly engaged while attached to the 7th Marines for the past few days, rejoined the regiment. Concur- rently, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, conducted a fighting withdrawal protected by Marine, Navy, and Air Force air strikes and artillery fire by Marine and Army units. The battered 3d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion and then both units fought their way back to the high ground cov- ering the river crossing. The regiment was under continuous fire during the entire movement and suffered numerous casualties

47 enroute. At the same time, Major Roach’s 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, set up farther south on Hill 696 to defend the Chunchon-Kapyong road as well as the southern ferry sites. This key position, the southernmost high ground, dominated the Chunchon Corridor and the Pukhan River and would be one of the last positions vacated. On the right, the 5th Marines and the Korean Marine battalion pulled back harassed by only scattered resistance. The resultant shortening of the division front allowed Smith to pull the 7th Marines out of the lines and use it as the division reserve. By the evening of 24 April, the 1st Marine Division’s lines resembled a fishhook with the Korean Marines at the eye in the north, the 5th Marines forming the shank, and the 1st Marines at the curved barb in the south. The 7th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, was charged with rear area security and its 1st and 2d Battalions were posi- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8030 tioned to protect river crossings MajGen Oliver P. Smith bids farewell to division staff officers before turning com- along the route to Chunchon as mand over to MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, center, on 25 April. BGen Lewis B. well as the town itself. Puller, the assistant division commander, would follow Smith a month later. The 24th of April was another busy day for Marine aviators as were both killed when their plane other hand, 5th Marines and well. First Lieutenant John L. Scott spun out of control, hit the ground, Korean Marine scouts ventured a evacuated 18 wounded in his HTL- and burned. mile to the north without contact. 4 to become the high-rescue-man The 1st Marines again bore the Air and artillery plastered the west- that day. Another HTL-4, piloted brunt of Chinese probes on the ern flank, but enemy machine gun, by First Lieutenant Robert E. night of 24-25 April, but accurate mortar, and artillery fire continued Mathewson, was brought down close-in fires by 105mm and to hit Marine positions. In the 1st near Horseshoe Ridge by enemy 155mm howitzers kept potential Marines’ zone Chinese gunners fire. Mathewson escaped unhurt, attackers at a distance. The 2d found the 3d Battalion command but had to wave off a rescue Battalion repelled an enemy com- post, wounding Colonel McAlister; attempt by First Lieutenant Harold pany in the only major action of Lieutenant Colonel Banning; Major G. McRay because enemy fire was the evening. But the Chinese were Reginald R. Meyers, the executive so intense. The downed pilot was still lurking in the west as became officer; and Major Joseph D. promptly given a rifle and joined evident when patrols departing Trompeter, the operations officer. his fellow Marines as they broke friendly lines in that area quickly Banning and Meyers had to be out of the Chinese encirclement. struck an enemy hornet’s nest the evacuated, and Major Trompeter Over the battlefield an OY obser- following morning. One such took over the battalion. Colonel vation plane flown by Technical patrol was pinned down less than McAlister refused evacuation and Sergeant Robert J. Monteith, struck 200 yards from friendly lines. remained in command of the regi- a Corsair in midair and crashed. He Another platoon suffered 18 casu- ment. and his artillery spotter, First alties and had to be extricated It was obvious the Chinese were Lieutenant Roscoe F. Cooke, Jr., from an ambush by tanks. On the biding their time until they could

48 marked a radical change in U.N. tactics. As will be recalled, upon taking charge of Eighth Army General Ridgway adopted mobile defensive tactics to deal with enemy attacks. Instead of “hold your ground at all cost,” he instituted a “roll-with-the-punches” scheme whereby U.N. units traded ground to inflict punishment. To do this Ridgway insisted that his troops always maintain contact with both the enemy and adjoining friendly forces during retrograde movements. This time, however, General Van Fleet decided to completely break contact. He opted to pull back as much as 20 miles in National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A8362 places. There, from carefully Marine infantry and vehicles start the long haul back to Chunchon, where they selected positions, his troops could would defend along the south bank of the Soyang River until service units could move their large supply dumps. trap exposed attackers in preplanned artillery kill zones at the gather enough strength for another tion of his outstanding combat per- same time air power pummeled try at the Marine lines. There was formance during World War I, then ever-lengthening enemy supply continual pressure, but the 11th pulled sea duty and fought in the routes. In hindsight, this sound Marines artillery harassment and Banana Wars between the World combined-arms approach fully uti- interdiction fires, direct fire by Wars. His experience as a highly lized United Nations Command Marine tanks, and an exemplary air respected staff officer in the Pacific strengths while exploiting enemy umbrella prevented a major during World War II prepared him weaknesses, but at the time it assault. Enemy action was limited to handle a division, and his post- befuddled many Marines to have to only a few weak probes and a war duties at Headquarters Marine to abandon hard-earned ground handful of mortar rounds as the Corps and Quantico gave him a when there seemed to be no seri- Marines moved back. The 1st good look at the “big picture” as ous enemy threat. Such was the Marine Division reached the modi- well. Despite the hurried nature of case when the 1st Marine Division fied Kansas Line in good order. the command change and the fact was told to fall back to a section of Despite suffering more than 300 that it occurred in the midst of a the No Name Line located near casualties in the last 48 hours, the complex combat action, the transi- Hongchon far to the south. Marines handled everything the tion was a smooth one that did not This movement would be done enemy threw at them and still held hinder operations. in two stages. The first leg of the a firm grip on the IX Corp right The first order General Thomas journey was back to Chunchon flank when the Chinese Fifth received was one no aggressive where the rifle units would cover Phase, First Impulse Offensive commander relishes. He was told the support units as they pulled ground to a halt. to pull the 1st Marine Division out. When that was accomplished During this very brief break in back to a new position where the combat units would continue the action a new division comman- Korean laborers were toiling night on to the No Name Line. Luckily, der took over. Major General and day to construct a defensive there was no significant enemy Gerald C. Thomas became the 1st bulwark. The Marine movement interference with either move. The Marine Division’s commanding was no isolated withdrawal. All initial departure began at 1130 on general at a small ceremony across the front, the United Nations 26 April. The 5th Marines and attended by the few available staff Command was breaking contact in Korean Marines retired first, fol- members on the afternoon of 25 order to man a new main line of lowed by 1st Marines, with 3d April. Thomas had been awarded a resistance known as the No Name Battalion, 7th Marines, attached. A battlefield commission in recogni- Line. This unpressured retrograde curtain of close air support supple-

49 mented by rocket and artillery fires shrouded these movements. All units, except the rear guard, were safely across the meandering Pukhan River before dark. The last remaining bridge across the chest- deep river was blown up at 1900, forcing 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, to wade across the chilly barrier in the middle of the night. The movement back to Chunchon was completed by noon, and the Marines took up defensive positions along the southern banks of the Soyang River on the afternoon of the 27th without incident. The only enemy encountered during the pull-back was one bewildered Chinese straggler who had inadvertently fallen in with the Marine column in the darkness. Needless to say, he was more than somewhat surprised to discover himself in the midst of several thousand Americans when daylight came. On 28 April, the second phase of the withdrawal began. The Marine retrograde was again unpressured, but it took three days to finish the move south due to serious transportation problems. Finally, on 30 April, the Marines settled in at the No Name Line with the 5th Marines on the left, the 1st Korean Marine Regiment in the center, the 1st Marines on the right, and the 7th Marines in reserve. The month of April cost the did not materialize. This time there ever, was about to end because a Marines 933 casualties (93 killed, was no “bug out,” to use a popular Second Impulse Offensive was 830 wounded, and 10 missing), phrase of the day. Instead, most aimed at eastern Korea. To meet most lost during the First Impulse breaks in the line were quickly this threat, General Van Fleet rede- of the Chinese Fifth Phase sealed, and the United Nations ployed his command. As part of Offensive. The enemy enjoyed Command was holding firm at the this reorganization the 1st Marine some local successes, but overall No Name Line. By the last day of Division was taken from IX Corps their attacks fell far short of expec- April, it was apparent to both sides and was once again assigned to tations. The U.N. counteroffensive that the Communists would not be Major General Edward M. had been stopped in its tracks, but parading through the streets of Almond’s X Corps (it will be what little ground the enemy Seoul on May Day as their leaders recalled that the Marines landed at gained had been purchased at a had promised. Inchon, liberated Seoul, and fearful cost; the CCF lost an esti- The first days of May were so fought their way out of the Chosin mated 70,000 men. The headlong quiet that no Marine patrols made Reservoir as part of X Corps). This U.N. retreat the Chinese expected contact. This temporary lull, how- was easy to do because the 1st

50 Nickerson’s 7th Marines onto some high ground over looking the Chunchon Valley with orders to keep the road open and be prepared to fight its way out if the Chinese came down in force. Thomas also protested that shooting a unit of fire each day was a wasteful practice, one that would surely cause an ammunition shortage sooner or later. He was over- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A155669 ruled in this case. A tank-infantry patrol from 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, moves through the desert- The expected Second Impulse ed city of Chunchon. The ebb and flow of Korean fighting ended when the U.N. of the Fifth Phase Offensive fell lines stabilized after the Marines reached the Punchbowl in June 1951. upon units of the Republic of

Marine Division was located on the IX and X Corps boundary. That imaginary line was simply shifted about 12 miles west, and only one battalion of the 5th Marines had to actually move. Other than that the only action required was to redraw the grease pencil lines on tactical maps. The next two weeks were devoted primarily to improving defensive positions, but some tactical issues came to the fore. General Thomas was particularly disturbed by two Eighth Army orders. First, the 1st Marine Division was told to establish an “outpost line of resistance” to maintain contact with the enemy, provide early warning of a major attack, and delay the enemy advance as long as possible. Second, the 11th Marines was ordered to shoot a unit of fire each day whether there were observed targets or not. Thomas felt he could adequately cover his zone of action using aerial observation and long-range reconnaissance patrols, so he protested the placement of an entire battalion outside of 105mm artillery range. When told that the post must be manned, Thomas requested that an entire regiment be located at the exposed position. When this request was granted, he sent Colonel

51 Korea Army in the east on 16 May, pass controlled the road, the tack to throw the enemy back out and soon a 30-mile penetration Chinese made Morae Kogae a key of Company I’s lines. The critical threatened the U.S. 2d Infantry objective. Under cover of dark- battle for the pass did not end until Division on the Marine right. That ness, they carefully slipped in daybreak when the Chinese vainly night Chinese forces entered the behind the Korean Marines and tried to pull back but were instead Marine zone in regimental strength headed straight for the pass, which caught in the open by Marine where the 5th Marines and the they apparently thought was artillery, mortars, and some belated Korean Marines had several com- unguarded. The assault force air strikes. The Chinese lost an esti- pany-sized patrol bases well north unexpectedly bumped into the mated 530 men. By actual count, of the main line of resistance in the northern sector of the 7th Marines they left behind 112 dead, 82 pris- left and center sections respective- perimeter at about 0300 and a furi- oners, and a wealth of abandoned ly. To the right, Colonel ous fight broke out. Within min- weapons that included recoilless Nickerson’s 7th Marines had utes the 11th Marines built up a rifles, mortars, machine guns, and Lieutenant Colonel John T. wall of fire at the same time the even a 76mm antitank gun. Marine Rooney’s 1st Battalion patrolling infantrymen initiated their final losses in this one-sided battle were the Chunchon Road, 2d Battalion protective fires. Burning tracer seven dead and 19 wounded. (now commanded by Lieutenant rounds crisscrossed all avenues of The following day, 18 May, the Colonel Wilbur F. Meyerhoff, for- approach and exploding shells 1st Marine Division performed a merly the 3d Battalion, 7th flashed in the night as Marine very tricky maneuver to readjust Marines, commanding officer) artillery pinned the enemy in place defensive dispositions that allowed manning the outpost, and from the rear while Marine rifle- the U.S. 2d Infantry Division to Lieutenant Colonel Bernard T. men knocked them down from the move east to reinforce its right Kelly’s 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, front. In spite of the curtain of steel flank which was bearing the brunt holding Morae Kogae Pass—-a surrounding the Marine positions, of the new Chinese offensive. The vital link on the road leading from the quilt-coated enemy closed the 7th Marines pulled back to the No the forward edge of the battle area position. Amid the fierce hand-to- Name Line to relieve the 1st back to the main front line. Well hand fighting First Lieutenant Marines which then sidestepped aware that whoever controlled the Victor Stoyanow led a counterat- east to take over an area previously held by the U.S. Army’s 9th Col Francis M. McAlister, left, extends congratulations to Col Wilburt S. Brown, Infantry Regiment and the 5th as the latter assumed command of the 1st Marine Regiment. Marines swung over from the far Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8654 left flank to relieve the 38th Infantry Regiment on the extreme right. By noon on the 19th, all four regiments (1st Korean Marine, 7th Marines, 1st Marines, and 5th Marines) were aligned from left to right on the modified No Name Line as the enemy’s offensive lost its momentum. That same day, Colonel Wilburt S. Brown, an experienced artilleryman known throughout the Marine Corps as “Big Foot” because of his large feet, took over the 1st Marines. There was also a change at division headquarters. Brigadier General William J. Whaling—-an avid sportsman and Olympic marksman who commanded regiments at Guadalcanal, New Britain, and Okinawa during World War

52 Spring Offensive ended General Thomas remarked that he commanded “the finest division in Marine Corps history.” Marine Air Support

Major General Field Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing comprised of two aircraft groups, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton’s Marine National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A133537 Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) and A Grumman F7F Tigercat armed with napalm flies over North Korea seeking a Lieutenant Colonel Radford C. suitable target. The twin-engine, single-seat, carrier-borne Tigercats were pri- West’s Marine Aircraft Group 33 marily used as night fighters, but sometimes conducted bombing and aerial (MAG-33), and flew more than a reconnaissance missions. dozen different aircraft types. II—became the assistant division Chosin Reservoir. The 1st Marine Lieutenant Colonel “J” Frank Cole’s commander on 20 May. Division not only weathered the Marine Fighter Squadron 312 The final action of the Chinese storm, it had given the enemy a (VMF-312), Lieutenant Colonel Spring Offensive occurred at about bloody nose on several occasions Richard W. Wyczawski’s VMF-212, 0445 on 20 May when Major Morse and performed many complex Major William M. Lundin’s VMF- L. Holladay’s 3d Battalion, 5th maneuvers well. Reiterating his 214, and Major Arnold A. Lund’s Marines, caught elements of the experiences in Korea, General VMF-323 all flew “old reliable and CCF 44th Division in the open. Smith said that blunting the rugged” propeller-driven Chance- The Marines on the firing line Chinese counterattacks in April Vought F4U-4 Corsair fighter opened up with everything they “was the most professional job per- bombers. Lieutenant Colonel Neil had as Major Holladay directed formed by the Division while it R. MacIntyre commanded the rockets, artillery, and air support was under my command.” “hottest” squadron, VMF-311, during a five-hour battle that cost Likewise, by the time the CCF which flew Grumman F9F-2B the enemy 152 dead and 15 prisoners. This action marked the end A VMF-323 “Death Rattler” F4U armed with 5-inch rockets and napalm readies for take off from the Badoeng Strait (CVE 116). At least one Marine squadron of Marshal Peng’s attempts to drive was on board an aircraft carrier at all times during the spring of 1951, as this the 1st Marine Division into the duty rotated among the Corsair squadrons. sea. The enemy, short of men and Photo Courtesy of LtCol Leo J. Ihli, USMC supplies after the previous month’s heavy combat, had finally run out of steam and was now vulnerable. With the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive successfully blunted, General Van Fleet was ready to shift back into an offensive mode to exploit what was clearly a devastating Communist defeat. The United Nations Command had come through the last month with relatively light casualties and for the most part had only ceded territory on its own terms. Many Marine veterans of both campaigns, however, later recalled that the hard fighting to hold the Pendleton Line was as desperate as any they encountered at the

53 and Sikorsky HO3S and Bell HTL 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1951 helicopters, was attached to the 1st Marine Division and did not come arine land-based tactical under the operational control of and support aircraft, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Other Mexcept for the observation Marine aircraft serving the Korean planes and helicopters attached to theater but not part of the wing the 1st Marine Division, comprised the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in included Marine transport planes Korea. The wing had two aircraft such as four-engine Douglas R5D groups (MAGs -12 and -33) that Skymasters and twin-boom flew more than a dozen different Fairchild R4Q Packets. aircraft types in 1951. Its most Normal operational relation- famous airplanes were World War 1st Marine Aircraft Wing ships were disrupted by the CCF II vintage F4U Corsairs and brand Marine Aircraft Group 33 Winter Offensive, which forced new F9F Panther jets, but also Marine Aircraft Squadron 12 retreating U.N. forces to close air included in the combat aircraft mix Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 bases at Yonpo, Wonsan, Seoul, Marine Ground Control Intercept were F7F Tigercat and F4U-5N Kimpo, and Suwon as they pulled Squadron 1 Corsair all-weather fighters. Most back. The few airfields still in U.N. Marine land-based aircraft were Marine Fighter Squadron 212 hands in early January 1951 could under the operational control of Marine Night-Fighter Squadron the U.S. Fifth Air Force, and the 513 not handle all United Nations Joint Operations Center coordinat- 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion Command aircraft, and the resulted most air operations. Marine car- Marine Night-Fighter Squadron ing ramp space shortfall scattered rier-based aircraft, on the other 542 Marine air assets throughout Korea hand, were under the operational Marine Fighter Squadron 323 and Japan. This unanticipated dias- control of the U.S. Navy task Marine Air Control Group 2 pora placed Marine squadrons forces to which their respective Marine Tactical Air Control under several different control carriers were assigned. A few utili- Squadron 2 agencies. The “Checkerboard” ty aircraft (SNBs and TBMs) were Marine Ground Control Intercept Corsairs of VMF-312 were in Japan Squadron 3 assigned to headquarters squad- at Itami Air Base on the island of Marine Fighter Squadron 214 rons. The aircraft of VMO-6 (OY Honshu along with the wing rear “Sentinels,” as well as HO3S and Marine Fighter Squadron 312 support units. The other three HTL helicopters) flew in direct Marine Fighter Squadron 311 support of the 1st Marine Division. Detachment, Marine Transport Corsair squadrons were carrier- Marine R4Q Packets and parachute Squadron 152 borne. The “Devil Cats” of VMF- riggers of the 1st Air Delivery Supporting Naval Air 212 were on the light carrier USS Platoon supported the U.S. Air Transport Service Bataan (CVL 29) under the opera- Force Combat Cargo Command. Marine Transport Squadron 242 tional control of combined Task Marine transport planes (R4D Marine Transport Squadron 152 Group 96.8 operating in the Yellow Skytrains and R5D Skymasters) Marine Transport Squadron 352 Sea near Inchon, while VMF-214’s flew in support of the Naval Air “Black Sheep” were on the USS Transport Service and the Combat Attached to 1st Marine Division Sicily (CVE 118) and the “Death Cargo Command. Marine Observation Squadron 6 Rattlers” of VMF-323 were flying off the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) under the operational control Panther jets. Lieutenant Colonel ured General Motors (TBM) of U.S. Navy Task Force 77 in the David C. Wolfe led Marine Night Avenger single-engine torpedo Sea of Japan. The only land-based (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron 513 bomber radio relay planes, F7F-3P fighter squadron still in Korea was (VMF[N]-513) mounted in F4U-5N and F4U-5P photo reconnaissance the “Panther Pack” of VMF-311 Corsair night fighters. The other planes, Douglas twin-engine R4D operating from airfield K-9 at night fighter squadron, Lieutenant Skytrain and SNB light utility trans- Pusan. Unfortunately, the Panther Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr.’s ports. Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s jets were temporarily out of service VMF(N)-542, flew twin engine Marine Observation Squadron 6 due to mechanical and electronic Grumman F7F-3N Tigercats. Wing (VMO-6), flying Consolidated OY teething problems serious enough headquarters had specially config- Sentinel light observation planes to ground the entire squadron until

54 it could be pulled back to Japan for maintenance. The two Marine night fighter squadrons, the “Flying Nightmares” of VMF(N)-513 and the “Tigers” of VMF(N)-542, were in Japan under the direct control of U.S. Fifth Air Force flying air defense missions as part of the 314th Air Division. VMO-6 was attached to and collocated with the 1st Marine Division at Masan. Two Marine transport squadrons supported the Naval Air Transport Service. Colonel William B. Steiner’s Marine Transport Squadron 352 (VMR-352) shuttled between California and Hawaii, while Colonel Deane C. Roberts’

VMR-152 flew two legs, one from Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A132120 Hawaii to Japan and the other from A Vought F4U Corsair from VMF-214 is guided into position for take-off on its Japan to Korea. way to a close air support mission. The bent-wing, single-seat, propeller-driven All four Marine fighter-bomber “Dash Fours” featured six .50-caliber machine guns. squadrons flew daily sorties during the first week of January. Their coastal surveillance, and interdic- Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Fontana missions included close air support tion bombing. By mid-month the replaced Lieutenant Colonel for the Eighth Army, combat air wing administrative and service Radford C. West as MAG-33’s com- patrols, armed reconnaissance, units, the Corsairs of VMFs-214 and manding officer. New squadron -323, and VMF-311’s jets were tem- commanders included Major Calling “Devastate Baker.” A Marine porarily ensconced at Itami until Donald P. Frame (VMF-312), Major pilot serving with a ground unit directs facilities at Bofu on Honshu and K- Stanley S. Nicolay (VMF-323), a close air support mission. The 1 (Pusan West) in Korea were acti- Major James A. Feeley, Jr. (VMF- assignment of Marine aviators to ground units ensured proper ground- vated. Wing headquarters stayed at 214), and Lieutenant Colonel to-air liaison. Itami, MAG-33 was slated to move Claude H. Welch (VMF-212). National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A9458 to Bofu once the airfield was oper- Lieutenant Colonel James R. ational, and MAG-12 was tem- Anderson took over both night porarily assigned to K-9 (Pusan fighter squadrons (VMF[N]-513 and East) until all of its squadrons VMF[N]-542) in February, a unique returned to Korea. arrangement that lasted until This Japanese interlude was a VMF(N)-542 returned to the United period of transition for Marine avi- States in mid-March. The ation. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons slated to move to Bofu was reorganized, some command were assigned to MAG-33 and the changes occurred, and several squadrons returning to Korea were moves were accomplished. As part assigned to MAG-12. In addition, of the wing reorganization, the night fighter squadrons squadrons were realigned among returned to Marine control. the air groups. The 1st Marine This temporary turmoil was a Aircraft Wing had to be realigned source of irritation, but it was far because its elements were going to less ominous than an emerging be split up, some operating from doctrinal issue. The 1st Marine air bases in Japan while others Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft would be stationed in Korea, and Wing were separated for the first one squadron would be afloat. time since they arrived in the Far

55 East. Marine land-based aircraft port ground Marines. As the wing the Fifth Air Force, and all missions had been under the titular control pulled back to Japan, however, would be assigned by the Fifth Air of the Fifth Air Force for months, Harris’ de facto control of Marine Force-Eighth Army joint operations but a verbal agreement between air was lost and this agreement center. Leery veteran Marine avia- Marine General Harris and U.S. Air went by the wayside. Thereafter, tors foresaw procedural and alloca- Force General Earl E. Partridge all land-based wing aircraft would tion problems and, needless to say, allowed the wing to regularly sup- be under the operational control of there was great trepidation by all A Sikorsky HO3S helicopter sits on a mountaintop landing and observation duties, these helicopters also often flew zone while Navy Corpsmen prepare three wounded Marines search and rescue missions behind enemy lines. for evacuation. In addition to standard command, liaison, National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-439571

56 Marines about the breakup of the support of Eighth Army units con- Hongchon. Responding to intense combat-proven Marine air-ground ducting Operations Thunderbolt criticism from ground comman- team. These concerns were and Roundup in western Korea. ders, General Partridge reluctantly acknowledged, but General This was because the 1st Marine granted General Harris at least 40 Partridge insisted that a vastly Division needed few air strikes sorties per day in support of the increased enemy air threat and during the “guerrilla hunt” at gravel-crunching Marine infantry. plans to initiate a deep air interdic- Pohang, but on 26 January MAG- In the way of organizational tion campaign demanded new air 12 aircraft flying from K-9 (Pusan changes, VMF-312 became the car- control measures. Unfortunately, East) did manage to conduct close rier squadron when it replaced Marine reservations about this sys- air support strikes for the division VMF-212 on board the Bataan, tem were soon justified by events for the first time since the Chosin VMR-152 established a five-plane on the battlefield. After the joint campaign. forward echelon at Itami, and an operations center took over, The next month saw the return additional Marine Air Control Marine air and ground comman- of the wing to Korea. In mid- Squadron (MACG-2) was sent to ders chafed at what they consid- February, K-1 at Pusan became the Korea. The efficient performance ered inordinate delays and inap- new home of MAG-12, and MAG- of Lieutenant Colonel John F. propriate use of aircraft. The prob- 33 moved from Japan to K-3 at Kinney’s refurbished Panther jets lems were so serious that every Pohang. The night fighters of of VMF-311 for armed reconnais- commander of the 1st Marine VMF(N)-513 and -542 moved to K- sance and close air support was a Division (Generals Smith, Puller, 1 and K-3 respectively. Major pleasant surprise after their inaus- and Thomas) filed formal com- Donald S. Bush’s task-organized picious introduction to combat. plaints about the quality, quantity, “Marine Photographic Unit” oper- There were several important and timeliness of close air support. ated its reconnaissance planes command changes in April and Late January and early February from K-1 under the auspices of the May. Lieutenant Colonel Fontana 1951 were devoted to mainte- Air Force’s 543d Tactical Support departed MAG-33 on 31 March and nance, training, and movement Group. Thus, all Marine tactical Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. back to Korea. General Harris squadrons were back in Korea in Beard, Jr., became acting comman- opened his command post at Itami time for the upcoming U.N. spring der until Colonel Guy M. Morrow and MAG-33 completed its tempo- offensives. arrived on 9 April. When Major rary move to Bofu during the third The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Donald P. Frame was killed in week of January. The only Marine flew most of its sorties in support action on 3 April, the combat sorties during the 1st of Eighth Army units during “Checkerboard” executive officer, Marine Aircraft Wing stand-down Operation Killer, but Operation Major Frank H. Presley, assumed from 16 to 23 January were con- Ripper found the Marine air- command of VMF-312. Major ducted by VMF-212 on board the ground team once more in action David W. McFarland took over Bataan. When the land-based as wing aircraft cleared the way for VMO-6 on 5 April. On 3 May, Corsair squadrons returned to the 1st Marine Division’s rapid Major Charles M. Kunz replaced action, most sorties were flown in advance from Hoengsong to Major Donald L. Clark who had commanded VMF-323 since 1 Panther jets of VMF-311 are gassed up at K-3 (Pohang). Refueling operations were a slow and laborious process. Fuel had to be transferred ashore in landing March. On 16 May, Lieutenant ships, hand pumped into fuel trucks, and then hauled out to the airfield. Colonel James W. Poindexter took National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130478 the reins of VMF-214 from Major Edward Ochoa and Colonel Stanley W. Trachta assumed command of MAG-12. On the 28th, Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman became commanding general of the wing when General Harris rotated back to the United States. Cushman was a veteran avi- ator who had commanded the 4th Marine Base Defense Wing in the Central Pacific during World War II

57 and brought MAG-33 to Korea in August 1950. Marine air was used all along the U.N. front during the CCF Spring Offensive, and close air support played an important, if not decisive, role during that hectic time. Fifth Air Force regularly used Marine planes not earmarked to support the Marine division for armed reconnaissance and battlefield interdiction beginning in late April. On 20 April, a pair of VMF- 312 pilots flying off the Bataan, Captain Phillip C. Delong and First Lieutenant Harold D. Daigh, 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan-Feb51 A Marine 105mm howitzer sets up for a fire mission in the Andong area. The encountered four North Korean trusty “105” was the backbone of the 11th Marines in Korea, just as it had been Yakovlev YAK-9 fighters over cen- during much of World War II. tral Korea. Delong, a double ace with 11 kills during World War II, locomotives. The price of this suc- lack of ammunition and other sup- shot down two of them. Daigh cess was, however, high; the plies [so] air interdiction alone was knocked one YAK out of the sky Marines lost a plane a day during not enough to knock a determined and left the other one trailing the first week. Much to the dismay adversary out of the war.” smoke as it fled north. These were of ground and aviation Marines Despite these problems, many the first Marine aerial victories in alike, close air support became a innovations were instituted in Korea, and they were among the secondary mission. This change in Korea. In addition to well-prac- very few kills scored by Marines priority abruptly cut the number of ticed daylight air-ground combat not on exchange duty with the U.S. sorties allocated to ground units procedures, new techniques Air Force or flying a night intercept almost in half. In addition, cum- improved nighttime close air sup- mission. Seventy-five Marine air- bersome joint operations center port. Marine R4D transport planes craft, Panthers and Corsairs, partic- request procedures often delayed were put to use dropping flares ipated in the largest air raid to date air strikes for excessively long peri- that illuminated the battlefield and as part of a 300-plane sweep that ods of time. Generals Puller and allowed VMF(N)-513 to deliver hit Communist airfields at Sinuiju Thomas successively complained accurate night close air support. just south of the Yalu River on 9 directly to the Fifth Air Force com- This experiment was so successful May. mander, and Lieutenant General that the U.S. Navy provided the One reason for pulling the 1st Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Com- wing with four-engine, long-range Marine Aircraft Wing away from manding General, Fleet Marine PB4Y Privateer bombers, nick- the 1st Marine Division was that Force, Pacific, took the issue up named “Lamplighters,” whose big- the Fifth Air Force instituted an all- with the theater commander, all to ger payloads and longer linger out effort to halt enemy traffic no avail. The controversial joint time were put to good use. south with a deep interdiction operations center control and allo- In characterizing Marine air sup- campaign codenamed Operation cation procedures remained in port from January to May 1951, Strangle. The goals of the cam- force. The official Marine Corps Marine aviators provided crucial paign were to cut enemy supply history describes the questionable support to their ground brethren routes, which were channelized by success of the Operation Strangle throughout. Venerable per- the mountainous terrain, and to deep interdiction campaign: formers—both aircraft and person- destroy supply columns halted by “There can be little doubt nel—from World War II once again swollen streams. Bomb damage [Operation Strangle] added enor- proved their mettle, and new types assessments credited the wing with mously to the Communists’ logisti- of aircraft and pilots were intro- the destruction of more than 300 cal problem. It is equally certain duced to combat. The ground enemy troops, more than 200 that . . . . their combat units were Marines were well served by the trucks, about 80 boxcars, and 6 never at a decisive handicap for attached observation squadron,

58 was not always true, because the U.S. Marines provided artillery support for the 1st KMC Regiment as well as its organic units, and when all four rifle regiments were on the main line of resistance every artillery battalion had to be used for direct support. The nature of the fighting in Korea dictated that additional firepower was needed so the 11th Marines had Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, per- manently attached. Marine units 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan-Feb51 were often supported by U.S. A tank commander carefully scans the hills near Pohang for signs of the enemy. Army artillery as well. It was com- Pershing tanks like the one shown were the forerunners of the “Patton” tanks that mon for the corps commander to served as the Marines’ main battle tanks in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. furnish at least one self-propelled howitzer battalion and a battery of which directed artillery fire and Commanded by Lieutenant 8-inch heavy guns to the 1st close air support, evacuated Colonel Carl A. Youngdale and Marine Division for additional fire- wounded, and brought in emer- then Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff, power. Army artillery units work- gency supplies. Transports deliv- the regiment mustered 54 M2A1 ing with the 11th Marines at vari- ered badly needed replacements 105mm towed howitzers (18 each ous times included the 17th Field and carried returning veterans in the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions) Artillery, the 92d Armored Field safely home as well as dropping while the 4th Battalion had 18 M2 Artillery Battalion, the 96th vital supplies by parachute to for- 155mm towed howitzers. The Armored Field Artillery Battalion, ward units. Aerial reconnaissance 105mm units were most often used and the 987th Armored Field kept ground commanders for direct support with one artillery Artillery Battalion. Offensive informed of enemy movements battalion assigned to fire exclusive- artillery missions included support- and locations. The pilots of the 1st ly for a particular rifle regiment, ing maneuver units, neutralizing Marine Aircraft Wing relentlessly and the 155mm were most often in enemy fire, and isolating the bat- attacked the enemy at every possi- general support so they could use tlefield. On defense, artillery fire ble opportunity, and Marine close their longer range and heavier fire- was used effectively against CCF air support was the envy of every power to the best advantage. This mass infantry assaults. Forward United Nations Command com- Marine engineers construct a bridge near the Kansas Line. Road construction mander. The appearance of Marine and bridge building took the lion’s share of the 1st Engineer Battalion effort in air on the scene almost always the spring of 1951. forced the enemy to rush for cover, 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 and occasionally caused him to surrender or abandon key positions. It was with great reluctance that Marine fliers were diverted from their close air support mission, and all Marines became extremely frustrated when that vital support was gradually dimin- ished due to circumstances beyond their control. Combat and Service Support

The 11th Marines was the 1st Marine Division artillery regiment.

59 point target guns). Tanks were also sometimes pressed into service as armored ambulances In addition to the modern M-26 Pershing main battle tanks, there were also a dozen or so World War II-vintage M-4A3 Sherman bulldozer tanks with 105mm short-barrel guns and front-mounted plows used for mine clearing, hasty engineering, and tank recovery as well as fire support. Although Korea’s mountainous terrain was generally unsuited for armor operations, frequent use was made of separate axis attacks whereby the road- bound tanks in the valleys supported infantry units as they worked their way along ridgelines. During the CCF Spring Offensive tanks were used to protect lines of communication and river crossings or cover nearby flatlands with their 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 machine guns and main guns. Marine combat engineers remove a land mine on a road near Hongchon. Trained to install and maintain friendly minefields, the engineers were the first The 1st Engineer Battalion, com- called to remove enemy mines. manded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge, provided ser- observation teams at the leading tion”) fire became a bone of con- vices including rebuilding airstrips, edge of the battlefield controlled tention between the Eighth Army constructing and repairing roads most artillery fires, but airborne and the Marines. and bridges, emplacing and clear- spotters flying in light observation The 1st Tank Battalion, under ing mines, demolitions, manning planes also sometimes directed the command of Lieutenant water points, and preparing field them. The main problems encoun- Colonel Harry T. Milne, also pro- fortifications. Although the 1st tered by the cannoneers of the vided excellent combat support. Engineers did all of these things, 11th Marines were transporting The battalion was divided into four Lieutenant Colonel Partridge’s heavy guns over poor roads and companies (A, B, C, and D) each number one priority throughout intermittent ammunition shortages. with 17 medium tanks. These com- the spring of 1951 was keeping the Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet panies were usually placed in main supply route open. The 1st preferred to “use steel instead of direct support of a specific rifle Engineer Battalion spent most of men” and artillery was the favored regiment. It was not uncommon its time and energy constructing, combat arm under both men. for five-vehicle tank platoons to improving, and maintaining the Ammunition expenditure was accompany combat patrols. When supply route. Korea’s primitive much heavier in Korea than during the regiment they supported was roadways were neither designed World War II, and shooting several in reserve, the tankers tried to use nor built to meet the demands of a units of fire on a single mission that time for maintenance and rest. major modern military force. There was referred to as a “Van Fleet The super-accurate 90mm guns of were few hard-surface roads, and load” by Marine artillerymen. the M-26 Pershing tanks were par- there was no true road network. Unfortunately, this practice some- ticularly well suited for long range Most roads were little more than times drained carefully hoarded “bunker busting” and were occa- narrow dirt pathways that simply ammunition caches that were not sionally used to supplement ran between local villages by the easy to replenish, so orders to artillery fires (much to the chagrin most direct route. Almost all road- deliver specific amounts of unob- of the tankers who felt this practice ways were poorly drained, inade- served (“harassment and interdic- was a deplorable misuse of their quately bridged, and unpaved.

60 Snow and ice hampered move- ground and aviation units Marines relied upon their own ment in cold weather, the dry sea- remained separate logistical enti- robust organic service and support son choked the roads with dust, ties operating without central units. The 1st Combat Service and spring thaws and summer direction because no equivalent of Group functioned as an intermedi- rains often turned them into Vietnam’s Force Logistics Com- ate clearing house and established impassable bogs. Unfortunately, mand or modern force service sup- liaison with the other Services. The the need for constant road mainte- port groups emerged in Korea. Marines drew upon Eighth Army nance sometimes required forego- Luckily, Lieutenant General for theater-level support and fur- ing other vital engineer functions, Lemuel Shepherd, the command- ther relied upon Navy and Marine which were then left to the combat ing general of Fleet Marine Force, service support from Pacific units. Pacific, was an energetic leader Command. The Marines also Logistics—the acquisition and who took an active role. His force- obtained support from the distribution of the means to wage ful suggestions and direct interven- Republic of Korea. war—encompassed the supply, tion unclogged many bottlenecks The first option when answering maintenance, medical, transporta- and kept the personnel and supply logistics challenges, of course, was tion, and administrative services pipelines flowing smoothly. to make the most effective possible necessary to support combat oper- Difficult terrain, bad weather, use of organic assets. 1st Marine ations. Although the efforts of the and the inadequate road and rail Division logistics units included men who furnish the beans, bul- networks were physical obstacles Commander Howard A. Johnson’s, lets, and bandages are often over- not easily overcome, but doctrinal and after 23 January, Commander looked, logistics are no less impor- issues and equipment shortages Clifford A. Stevenson’s 1st Medical tant than tactics in determining the also created logistics problems. Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Olin outcome of a battle because— The 1st Marine Division, specifical- L. Beall’s (Lieutenant Colonel John according to an old military ly structured for amphibious war- R. Barreiro, Jr., commanded after adage— “logistics set operational fare, was neither organized nor 16 March) 1st Motor Transport limits.” This was particularly true in equipped for sustained inland Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Carl Korea where Marine logisticians operations like those on Korea’s J. Cagle’s 7th Motor Transport faced a wide array of challenges. Central Front. Unfortunately, this Battalion; Major Lloyd O. Williams’ Most short-term problems were the simple fact was either misunder- 1st Ordnance Battalion; the 1st result of Korea’s poorly developed stood or ignored by the high com- Service Battalion (commanded suc- infrastructure, rugged terrain, mand. Repeated requests to keep cessively by Lieutenant Colonel inhospitable weather, the rapidly the Marines close to the coast in Charles L. Banks, Colonel Gould P. changing tactical situation (which order to minimize logistical con- Groves, Lieutenant Colonel Horace saw the entire 1st Marine Division cerns fell upon deaf ears at Eighth E. Knapp, and Lieutenant Colonel go from offense to defense within Army and United Nations Woodrow M. Kessler); and 1st a matter of hours on several occa- Command headquarters. Service Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant sions), and the wide physical sep- support challenges were further Colonel Henry P. “Jim” Crowe until aration of Marine air and ground complicated by the physical sepa- 10 May and thereafter commanded elements. Unfortunately, some ration of the 1st Marine Division by Lieutenant Colonel Horace H. nagging problems also stemmed and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Figuers). The 1st Marine Division from doctrinal shortcomings. In Additionally, during the spring of was specifically tailored for 1951, U.S. joint operations did not 1951 the 1st Marine Division pro- amphibious operations, but in feature the smooth multi-Service vided much of the logistical sup- Korea the specific needs of the integration common among port for the Korean Marines. moment very often superseded today’s branches of the Armed Logistical support in Korea was doctrine. Amphibious combat sup- Forces. The Marine air-ground task a massive multi-Service operation; port units, such as the 1st force concept was not developed, it was a complicated logistical Amphibian Tractor Battalion and hence, there was no single Marine maze, one not easily traversed by the 1st Armored Amphibian component commander in Korea the uninitiated, that existed Battalion, could not be fully uti- so the Marine air and ground com- because Marine units had to draw lized by the 1st Marine Division bat elements had no common upon the resources of all four when it operated far from the superior below the theater com- Services as well as indigenous coast, so one amphibian tractor mander. For the most part Marine labor. At the lowest level the company provided ship-to-shore

61 Saving Lives

o cry for help on the battlefields of Korea carried companies—-two hospital companies and three collect- more urgency than the plea “Corpsman up!” ing and clearing companies. Headquarters and Service NThis chilling entreaty invariably meant that a Company (Commander William S. Francis and Marine was seriously wounded. Within moments, a Lieutenant Commander Gustare T. Anderson, succes- medical corpsman would come scurrying forward sively) provided administrative and support personnel through a hail of fire to lend life-saving assistance, often and functions. Hospital Companies A (Commanders conducted in full view of the enemy and done at great Buron E. Bassham, Philip L. Nova, and James A. peril to the caregiver. Addison, respectively) and B (Lieutenant Commanders The U.S. Navy provided medical (doctors, nurses, and James A. Kaufman) were staffed and equipped to oper- corpsmen) and morale (chaplains) personnel to the ate one 200-bed hospital each. The three collecting and United States Marine Corps. The chaplains were known clearing companies were: Company C (Commanders by a variety of names that indicated their particular sta- Harold A. Streit and Lewis E. Rector), Company D tus or religious affiliation; “Father,” Rabbi,” “Reverend,” (Lieutenant Commanders Gustare T. Anderson and and “Padre” were among the most common nicknames. Daniel M. Pino), and Company E (Lieutenant On the other hand, Navy medical personnel—-from the Commanders Charles K. Holloway and John H. lowest ranking hospital apprentice all the way up to the Cheffey). Generally speaking, Company C worked in chief surgeon of the Medical Corps—-were simply direct support of the 5th Marines, Company D in sup- known as “Doc” to the Marines they served. port of the 1st Marines, and Company E in support of Most medical personnel assigned to the 1st Marine the 7th Marines during the spring of 1951. Division in Korea came from the 1st Medical Battalion, The lowest rung on the medical evacuation chain was which was successively commanded by Navy the individual hospital corpsman. Generally, two junior Commanders Howard A. Johnson and Clifford A. ratings of the 40 corpsmen assigned to each infantry bat- Stevenson. That parent unit was divided into a talion accompanied each rifle platoon into action. The Headquarters and Service Company and five medical primary jobs of these men, most of whom had only six

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A155354

62 weeks of advanced medical training under their belts, were to stabilize wounded men and to supervise the initial evacuation process. Under fire on the battlefield they would conduct a hasty exam and apply necessary first aid measures (start the breathing, stop the bleeding, stabilize or bandage the crucial area, and treat for shock). Once this was done, the corpsman would arrange for evacuation. Usually, this meant four Marines or Korean litter bearers would carry the wounded man to the nearest collection point (usually the company command post) for transportation to the battalion aid station. The 28 chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division often played a critical role in this stage as well. They frequently lent a hand as stretcher-bearers or administered first aid in addition to performing last rites or building up the sagging spirits of the wounded. Two Navy doctors, usually lieutenants, manned the National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC358063 battalion aid station (called the BAS), along with 10 or so enlisted corpsmen headed by a chief pharmacists 150 officers and more than 1,000 enlisted men to man mate. Incoming casualties were quickly inspected by an the operating rooms and healing wards which could experienced corpsman so they could be categorized for accommodate several hundred critical short-term treatment precedence (“triage”). The BAS facility was patients at one time. This practice, combined with the simple: usually an open air or tent operating arena, increasing use of helicopters for medical evacuations, where rudimentary “meatball” surgery was performed ensured rapid advanced medical treatment was avail- while the patient’s stretcher was placed upon a pair of able. Several Haven- and Comfort-class hospital ships sawhorses. This procedure saved time and minimized rotated station watches during the spring of 1951, and the amount of uncomfortable shifting. The battalion the USS Consolation (AH 15) was fitted with a heli- medics applied either life-saving surgery or gave just copter landing pad—-an adaptation that soon thereafter enough treatment to get the casualty ready for further became standard practice. evacuation. Many view the advent of rotary-wing aircraft as the The collecting and clearing companies then evacuat- most important aviation innovation during the Korean ed patients from the BAS to one of the 60-bed mobile Conflict. Inevitably, the nimble helicopters soon field hospitals (in Army parlance, a MASH; to the naval became an important means of medical evacuation services, depending upon which letter company was because they could fly directly to the forward areas, used, the nomenclature was something like “Charlie pick up wounded men from previously inaccessible Med”). Here the facilities and care were more locations, then deliver them to an advanced care facili- advanced. Surgical teams treated non-evacuables ty within a matter of minutes rather than hours or days. requiring resuscitation or immediate surgery then sent Helicopters could land atop the mountains and ridges them on their way to semi-permanent division hospitals, that dotted Korea eliminating the rough handling and which provided definitive care and short stay hospital- long movements necessary for overland evacuation. ization. Extreme cases that were stable but could not Unfortunately, the Sikorsky HO3S-1 could carry only return to duty in the near future were sent on to theater- one stretcher case at a time (and the patient’s lower level hospitals from whence they usually were returned extremities would have to extend out the rear hatch), to the United States. limiting their utility as an evacuation machine. By the Two intermediate steps in the evacuation process spring of 1951, the bubble-topped Bell HTL, which came into their own during the Korean War, use of hos- mounted a pair of stretchers on each side and could pital ships and aerial evacuation. Prior to the Second carry a sitting evacuee as well, augmented these older World War, hospital ships were used only to transport machines. Eventually, even more capable evacuation badly wounded men home. During World War II, how- helicopters (Sikorsky HO5S and HRS) made their way to ever, hospital ships could often be found waiting off the Korea. Fixed-wing observation aircraft were sometimes landing beaches to provide a safe haven for treating pressed into service for emergency evacuations as well. casualties incurred during the opening rounds of Twin- and four-engine fixed-wing transport planes were amphibious operations. In Korea it was common prac- used to deliver men to in-country theater-level facilities, tice to keep at least one hospital ship nearby at all times. hospitals in Japan, or to take the badly wounded back These Haven- and Comfort-class vessels mustered about to the States.

63 transportation at Pohang while the remaining tracked landing vehicles were used by Eighth Army for non- Marine support. The 1st Engineer Battalion often used Shore Party motor transport and engineer assets. In addition, U.S. Army transportation units or trucks on temporary loan from other Marine units often reinforced the motor transport battalions. Navy Seabee Construction Battalions regularly furnished construction engineer support, Army engineer assets were often temporarily attached to 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51 Marine units, the U.S. Air Force A column of Korean Civil Transport Corps bearers brings supplies from a rear provided equipment and materials area to the main battle line. Rugged terrain and lack of roads often dictated that for air base construction and main- man-packing supplies was the only way they would reach the front lines. tenance, and the Korean Service Corps furnished laborers. Service furnished inter-theater lift Major equipment shortages Colonel John N. Cook, Jr.’s 1st of supplies, personnel, and equip- occurred in communications and Combat Service Group at Masan ment. Army Brigadier General transportation. The Marines had furnished Marine general logistics Crump Garvin’s 2d Logistical only half their authorized radios support. The 1,400-man group was Command replenished common and only 58 (of 1,162) EE8 tele- composed of headquarters, main- use items for all Services in Korea. phones. The division was also tenance, supply, support, and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific’s short 58 jeeps and 33 two-and-a- truck companies. It furnished most Service Command furnished half ton trucks. Not revealed in service support functions: unique Marine equipment and these statistics is the poor condi- advanced maintenance and repair, supplies. The situation was more tion of the trucks that survived the central storage, general administra- complex with regard to aviation. Chosin campaign. Most were in tion, and laundry services. Colonel The 2d Logistical Command pro- terrible shape and badly needed Cook coordinated inter-Service vided a few aviation-related items advanced maintenance and new logistics efforts, requisitioned sup- but for the most part did not stock tires. The only significant combat plies and equipment from higher technical equipment such as air- arms shortfall was tanks; the 1st echelons, controlled and main- craft parts, special maintenance Tank Battalion had only 78 of its tained rear area depots, stored tools, or aircraft ordnance. The 97 authorized M-26 and M-4 tanks. spare parts and high demand U.S. Navy Pacific Service Com- After the Marines left Masan in items, and distributed these to the mand handled most of these, mid-January, resupply became the division and the wing. The group although Marine-specific items overriding logistics concern. The also mustered special support units came from Fleet Marine Force, supply pipeline ran from the including a bath and fumigation Pacific. Emergency resupply proce- United States to Japan then on to platoon and an air delivery pla- dures allowed critical items to be Korea. Cargo and transport ships toon. Although it provided support flown to Korea from the United and long-range airplanes carried to the wing, the 1st Combat Service States. men, supplies, and equipment Group was actually attached to the Marine logistics problems mir- from the United States to depots 1st Marine Division. Group detach- rored the tactical situation. In and processing centers in Japan. ments were located in Japan, January 1951, the major challenge The 1st Combat Service Group Pusan, Pohang, and operated for- was filling critical personnel and maintained an administrative pro- ward area supply terminals at equipment shortfalls in the wake cessing center and a supply receiv- Wonju, Hoengson, and Chunchon. of the costly Chosin Reservoir cam- ing area at Kobe, Japan. The Military Sea Transportation paign. After that the major logistics Unfortunately, there was a poor Service, Military Air Transportation challenge became sustaining units supply flow from Japan to Korea, Service, and Naval Air Transport almost constantly on the move. partially due to labor and trans-

64 portation shortages and partially tion storage areas during the CCF note that the pilot did not have suf- due to red tape. The Marines in Spring Offensive also created ficient space in his small plane to Korea had few rear area storage problems. The closures created carry two such gigantic facilities and inadequate trans- temporary ammunition shortages “Boondockers” at the same time. portation assets. There was only and stopped the flow of “A” and This joke, however, must have one true deep-water seaport in all “B” rations so the troops had to tried Brown’s patience because of Korea, Pusan, and it was locat- rely upon less tasty and less filling pilots in Nicaragua had first used it ed at the peninsula’s southernmost “C” and “K” field rations. The only three decades earlier. tip, which was serviced by a very solution to this problem was to air- One of the most difficult logis- limited road and rail network. This drop supplies and ammunition. tics challenges was overland trans- created a tremendous supply bot- Poor flying weather and limited portation. Gasoline and tire short- tleneck. The Marines were able airfield facilities made air trans- ages often idled much-needed make some use of Pohang as a portation an iffy proposition, and trucks, jeeps, and weapons carri- port of entry, but unloading there airdrops were inefficient in terms ers. The Marines were also con- was a cumbersome and time-con- of equipment, manpower, and loss stantly hampered by lack of vehi- suming process. The U.S. Army rates, but there was simply no cles; for example, in April the divi- 55th Quartermaster Depot which other choice. The multi-Service sion was short 1 tracked landing handled joint-Service requests did Combat Cargo Command accom- vehicle, 13 tanks, 18 jeeps, and 59 not back-order most types of sup- plished airdrops. Marine transport trucks. Although the 1st Marine plies, hence, requests were rou- planes joined those of the Air Division had been augmented with tinely denied if a particular item Force and the Navy to deliver sup- an extra motor transport battalion, was not on hand. Eventually, 1st plies all across the front. The most there were still insufficient trucks Service Battalion assigned a Marine unique air delivery was a single to move men and supplies in a liaison team to smooth out this size 16 EEE combat shoe dropped timely manner. Heavy demands, problem. Regardless, there was a over the 1st Marines headquarters combat losses, accidents, and hard constant shortage of expendable from an OY light observation air- use all contributed to the problem. items, such as steel wool or sta- craft. This jocular package was Pooling Marine resources and bor- tionery supplies, and individual addressed to Colonel Wilburt S. rowing U.S. Army trucks some- requests sometimes required a “Big Foot” Brown and included a times addressed this concern, but four-week lead-time before issue. The 1st Combat Service Group ran Marines line the rail as the attack transport General J. C. Breckinridge (AP 176) railheads at Masan and Dalchon, docks in San Francisco. These veterans, some with more than six months of combat, were among the first Marines to return from Korea. the 1st Shore Party Battalion han- National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428299 dled incoming supplies at Pohang and ran the railhead at Yodo-nae, and the division established truck- heads as far forward as possible. The poor roads, inadequate rail- road system, and fluid nature of the fighting made resupply of forward units a never-ending headache. Trains, trucks, and airplanes carried in-country supplies from rear areas to forward supply points. From there, however, it was division’s job to get those supplies to its troops in the field. Unfortunately, there was no rail line north of Wonju, and there were often too few trucks to move the supplies that did arrive in a timely manner. The closing of forward supply points and ammuni-

65 Transportation Corps comprised “cargodore” companies consisting of about 200 “Chiggy Bear” porters. The Korean government provided almost 300 laborers to the 1st Marine Division. Yoboes were used for roadwork and manual labor by combat and service support units. The Chiggy Bears were parceled out to each rifle regiment where they labored under the supervision of a senior Marine noncommissioned officer or junior lieutenant. Organized as a unit under a headman and a straw boss, these never-ending columns of porters, called “Mule Trains” after a popular song of the day, kept frontline Marines supplied under the most trying circumstances. There are no specific figures as to how many of these loyal workers were killed or wounded in action, but those numbers were undoubtedly high. Although sacrifices of the Chiggy Bears may have gone unrecorded, their tireless efforts were certainly not unappre- ciated by the cold, thirsty, hungry Marines at the front. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s major engineering headaches were airfield renovation and upkeep. This was particularly difficult because the wing was almost constantly on the move. The wide dis- persal of Marine air units located at air bases in Japan (Itami, Itazuke, and Bofu) and Korea—-Pohang (K-3), Pusan (K-1 and K-9), even additional vehicles could do few combat units could spare men Hoegsong (K-46), and Seoul (K- nothing to alleviate the major for. The South Korean govern- 16). Marine Wing Service Squadron transportation obstacle, the inade- ment, at the request of Eighth 1 (successively commanded by quate Korean transportation infra- Army, organized a pair of quasi- Chief Warrant Officer Aubrey D. structure. military organizations—-the Taylor, Lieutenant Colonel James Food, clothing, ammunition, Korean Service Corps and the C. Linsay, and Colonel Roger T. and other necessities slowly made Korean Transportation Corps—-to Carleson) was the unit charged to their way forward to regimental fill this need. Members of the provide such support, but the and battalion supply dumps in Korean National Guard and volun- overworked Marines often had to trucks, jeeps, and weapons carri- teers from refugee camps manned ask for help from Navy Seabee ers, but then most often had to be these organizations. The Korean construction units as well as Army hand carried to the front lines. This Service Corps included “Yoboe” and Air Force engineers. When was a labor-intensive process that construction gangs, and the such support was not immediately

66 forthcoming, as it often was not, Marine technicians had to be pulled away from other jobs to pick up shovels. Fuel handling was also a problem. For example, Marine Aircraft Group 33 at K-3 (Pohang) had to rely upon tracked landing vehicles to haul fuel drums ashore, which then had to be hand pumped into 1,200-gallon fuel trucks. This slow, inefficient, labor- intensive process siphoned off men whose skills could have been put to better use. Additionally, vehicles designed to handle World War II ordnance were ill-suited to service modern aircraft. The primitive conditions in Korea also took a toll on wing motor transport. These problems required constant attention throughout the spring of 1951. National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A157778 That operations only intermit- Marine replacements come ashore from a Navy landing ship. Three replacement tently suffered for lack of service drafts were rushed to Korea after the Chosin campaign, and about one replacement draft with about 100 officers and more than 1,000 enlisted men arrived support is a tribute to Marine ser- each month thereafter. vice and support personnel. The Marines faced seemingly insur- largest part of these drafts consist- based upon time served meant that mountable logistics challenges ed of recalled reservists, but there the most experienced Marines between January and May 1951, were also some veteran regular were constantly leaving Korea and yet—-despite a few hiccups—-the Marines included. Freshly minted their places taken by inexperi- only serious long-term supply Marines from the recruit depots enced replacements. The introduc- shortfall was the lack of artillery and “shiny-bar” second lieutenants tion of new men, as individuals ammunition caused by Eighth just arrived from officer training rather than units, created cohesion Army policies dictated from above filled out replacement rosters. Two problems in small units. Personnel over the strenuous objections of hundred and thirty men with criti- shortages after major engagements Marine commanders. That this was cal military occupational special- remained a nagging problem the case is a testament to the hard ties were flown directly to the throughout the spring of 1951. working, but too often unsung, combat zone. The 4th Replacement Marines of the combat service sup- Draft sailed for Korea on board the Extraordinary Heroism port units. fast transport USNS General The 1st Marine Division William O. Darby (AP 127) and The period from January to May received two replacement drafts in was due in mid-January. The just- 1951 encompassed three designat- December 1950, but was still short forming 5th Replacement Draft ed U.N. campaigns: Chinese almost 3,000 men on New Year’s was assigned to the USS General J. Intervention from 3 November Day. The initial personnel deficit C. Breckinridge (AP 176) and was 1950 to 24 January 1951; the First was partially alleviated by the slated to arrive in mid-February. U.N. Counteroffensive from 25 return to duty of 945 men, most of Replacement drafts containing January to 21 April; and the CCF whom had been frostbite evacua- about 1,700 men each continued Spring Offensive from 22 April to 8 tions, and the arrival of 700 veter- arriving on a monthly basis from July 1951. It is ironic that the an Marines pulled from posts and then on. This personnel replace- spring of 1951 is one of the most stations in the Far East. Two ment system was adequate, but it overlooked periods in American replacement drafts were also was not perfect. The adoption of a military history because that period formed at Camp Pendleton. The combat rotation system primarily featured some of the most intense

67 and hard-fought Marine actions of had been the case in 1950, in the during which United Nations forces the Korean Conflict. The anony- spring of 1951 the 1st Marine traveled from the brink of defeat to mous battles of that time were as Division was stripped of its direct the edge of victory several times as desperate and bloody as those at air support and became just one fierce fighting ebbed and flowed the Pusan Perimeter, the Inchon more Eighth Army ground maneu- across Korea’s midlands. The landing, and the liberation of ver unit. Thus, contrary to the enemy still remained a potent and Seoul, yet they remain almost wishes of Marine commanders, the dangerous foe after the spring of unknown except to those who 1st Marine Division was used as a 1951, but the United Nations fought there. Too often relegated “second land army.” The forced Command had become a seasoned to the dustbin of history is the fact separation of the 1st Marine force that was not about to be that some Marine units suffered Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft ejected from the peninsula. All talk more casualties during the drive to Wing and the lack of an in-theater of evacuating Korea due to enemy the Punchbowl than they had dur- Marine commander prompted the pressure was silenced by the recent ing the legendary fighting at the later creation of permanent Marine stellar performance on the battle- Chosin Reservoir. Indeed, the air-ground task forces. field. This favorable reversal of for- events of that time might well be Another factor that affected the tunes in Korea between January called the “Forgotten Campaigns” future of the Marine Corps was the and May has been characterized by of what is now often termed the performance of the Marine Corps the eminent military historian “Forgotten War.” What should be Reserve. Without the Reserve, it is Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., remembered is the key role played doubtful that the Marines would USA, as “the single greatest feat of by the Marines, both on the have been able to deploy an entire arms in American military history,” ground and in the air. The 1st division and aircraft wing to Korea. and the Marines played a key role Marine Division rendered ineffec- The character of the 1st Marine in that amazing reversal of fortune. tive one NKPA division at Pohang, Division underwent a drastic The impact of that stunning spearheaded the United Nations’ change in the spring of 1951. When turnaround was, however, not real- recapture of the Hwachon the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade ized on the home front. By mid- Reservoir during Operations Killer arrived in Korea in August 1950 it 1951 many Americans were dissat- and Ripper, and stabilized the cen- was virtually an all-regular forma- isfied with “Truman’s Police ter of the U.N. line in the midst of tion, by the time of the Chosin Action,” and there was deeply felt the CCF Spring Offensive. The ver- Reservoir campaign in November sentiment across the country for an satile 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew about one-third of the Marines end to the fighting. The resulting a wide variety of missions; heli- were reservists, but by the end of political pressure led to a funda- copters proved their utility in com- May 1951 almost two-thirds of the mental change in American foreign bat and Marine close air support U.S. Marines in Korea were policy. A Joint Chiefs of Staff direc- was unsurpassed in efficiency. reservists. There were very few tive stated that the military objec- These accomplishments did not go regular officers below the rank of tive was no longer to unify Korea, unrecognized at the time; both the captain and almost no regular but “to repel aggression against 1st Marine Division and the 1st enlisted men other than staff non- South Korea.” In fact, both sides Marine Aircraft Wing were award- commissioned officers by the time unofficially accepted a mutual ces- ed Presidential Unit Citations for the 1st Marine Division reached the sation of major offensive actions their actions in the spring of 1951. No Name Line. Similar figures also after the U.N. regained the modi- Luckily, the military lessons of apply to the 1st Marine Aircraft fied Kansas Line in June. The the day were not forgotten. The Wing. This proved that the Marine Korean War then passed its first Marines in Korea fought well, but Corps could count on its Reserve anniversary without fanfare or cel- they were not employed in accord when the chips were down. This ebration, and not long after peace with their envisioned inter-Service lesson was validated in the Persian talks began. The United Nations role. They, even more than their Gulf some 40 years later when Command briefly mounted a limit- antecedents in World War I, Marine reservists once again ed offensive after the talks broke became an integral part of a United answered the call to the colors dur- down, but the Korean Conflict States field army fighting far from ing the Gulf War and acquitted thereafter became a bloody stale- the sea for an extended period. themselves well. mate marked by two more years of Instead of acting as a semi-inde- The period January to May 1951 contentious negotiations and pendent combined arms team, as was one of transition and tumult inconclusive fighting.

68 About the Author

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series