INDEX TO VOLUME 1 NO.7 Chosin to Hungnam Page 3 By Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. 'i Inchon Landing Page 4 .- ; Marine Corps Gazette; Gen. O.P. Smith The Chosin Reservoir Page 6 Marine Corps Gazette; Gen. O.P. Smith Obituraies Page 8 Hagaru 1950 Page 9 Continued from Vol 1-6 The Continuing Saga of BinHall's LETTERRSFROM KOREA Page 12 Volume IV Marine Operations The Pohang Guerilla Hunt Page 18 Editor'scomments Page 24 2 Another "ancient" record we found they began their advance into the in our "musty archives. We thought you Chosin Reservotr area, the Marines might enjoy. were well aware that guerrilla forces might cut their supply lines. They prepared for this eventuality by Chosin Reservoir To Hungnam assembling heavy stocks of supplies in forward dumps and preparing for Late in the month of November, delivery of needed material by air. 1950, the 1st Marine Division, under the Because of these factors, when the command of MajGen Oliver P.Smith crisis arose, it was readily met. began its withdrawaljrom the Chosin Reservoir area to the port of Hungnam When, on the 26th of November, where it was to be evacuated. Months our forces in Korea found themselves in will pass before the complete record of a new and different war, engaged with a the withdrawal is written. The following numerically superior and fresh enemy, is the statement for the press by LtGen a logical action on the part of the X Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Corps, of which the 1st Marine Division General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and is a part, was to concentrate its forces. ~eleased upon his retumjrom Hungnam, This involved moving the First Marine IS quoted herewith: Division southward over 75 miles of the most tortuous mountain roads Pearl Harbor, T. H., conceivable. Upon receiving its order to 16 December 1950: move, the Division found itself heavily engaged with six Chinese Communist I left Hungnam, Korea, the day Divisions and, in order to carry out its before yesterday after a 10 day visit to mission, it was necessary to defeat inspect the air and ground elements of those Communist forces. the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Whereupon the First Marine Much has been said of their actions Division turned in its traces and and exploits during the past three launched a series of deadly attacks weeks and I shall not attempt to review which resulted in the complete rout of all of the details. There are certain all six of the Chinese Divisions opposing ~ngs, however, which I feel are badly it. Fighting in ice, snow and subzero m need of saying with reference to the weather, the Division assembled itself Marines in Korea and their recent first at Hagaru-ri and then at Koto-ri ' experiences. and drove its way through to its ' assigned objective. To begin with, and despite the frequent accounts in the press, the men The opposing Chinese forces were of the First Marine Division did not so punished by the Marines as to retreat. They obeyed orders - sensible constitute no further threat to our orders from higher authority - to cause. I believe that by no stretch of the conduct an orderly move from exposed imagination can this be described as positions to a more secure area near retreat, since a retreat presupposes a Hamhung. defeat, and the only defeat involved in this battle was the one suffered by the Secondly, the First Marine Division Chinese. Furthermore, when the was not "trapped" at Hagaru-rt, despite Marines arrived in Hamhung, they had the frequent misuse of that word. When 3 their arms. equipment, vehicles and supplies with them. Their spirits were high and they were proud of their accomplishments. Marine Corps Gazette - 1960 In all of this I have spoken only of the ground Marines involved. Actually, Today, the Inchon landing, in the accomplishment of their difficult task eyes of the public, is symbolized by its bold and brilliant concept. It is so would have been rendered immeasurably more complicated had it known because the execution of the not been for the tireless efforts of the concept was an unqualified success. To First Marine Air Wing, which provided me, a remarkable and little remembered close and accurate air support day and aspect of this landing was the ability of night, snow and shine, for their the Navy and Marine Corps to place a combat ready Marine division off the comrades on the ground. I have seen this Marine air-ground team grow beaches of Inchon within the time limits stronger and sounder during the past imposed, and with the resources in men, ships, and material then available 25 years, but I felt it had reached its in the peacetime establishment. full bloom when I talked to men on the bleak plateau of Koto-ri and watched tears come to their eyes when they The first impact of the concept of the Inchon Landing on the 1stMarDiv spoke about the effectiveness of their air support. came on 25 July 1950. The Division did not then know that on 15 September, As a final word, I know it will 52 days later, it would be landing at gratify many who have felt concern in Inchon, Korea. All the information it had was contained in a directive to the matter to learn that I personally know that the Marines were adequately bring the Division (less 1 RCT)to war provided with the clothing and strength and sail it for the Far East equipment necessary for fighting in the between August lOth and 15th, 16 days brutal winter weather which exists on later, ready for combat. This meant that the North Korean plateau. Nevertheless, within 16 days the Division had to and with the best of equipment which begin the embarkation of some 15,400 they had, their fighting was still ground troops in augmented war accompanied by great hardship. The strength units with the additional equipment required. For the Navy it way they bore this hardship was the most impressive aspect of my visit. The meant assembling, on short notice, 19 men faced their lot with cheerful ships of all classes. understanding and demonstrated the What were the immediate resources same steadfast character that has come to be associated with Marines in men, equipment, and ships? There everywhere. They even kept their sense were 3,500 shorttimers at Camp of humor. On one tank parked on the Pendleton. Earlier, the 1st Provisional windswept plateau near Koto-ri I saw Marine Brigade (about 5,200 ground troops), drawn from the 1stMarDiv, had the followingtimely inscription: "Only 14 more shooting days until been rushed to Korea. The bulk of the required additional equipment was in Christmas. " "mothballs" at Barstow in the Mojave Desert. The Navy had little amphibious shipping on the West Coast and had to 4 use available commercial types. By dedicated work on the part of the Division staff, and with the To meet the personnel wholehearted cooperation of Adm requirements, authority was granted to Doyle's PhibGruOne staff, within three extend the enlistments of the days a detailed plan for the Inchon shorttimers, and Marines were ordered Landing was drawn up, and two days in from posts and stations throughout later an advance planning draft of the United States, from the 2dMarDiv at IstMarDiv OpO 250 (Inchon Landing) Camp Lejeune, and from the Reserves. was issued. "Mothballed" equipment was dusted off at Barstow and rushed to Camp The plan had yet to be executed. Pendleton, or direct to the docks. There The situation in Korea worsened, and was not time to test all of the the release of the 1st Provisional Marine equipment; some had to be checked Brigade was deferred, but D-Day still after arrival in Japan. By working remained 15 September. The Brigade around the clock, incoming Marines was fmally released from combat at were classified and those deemed midnight,S September, six days before combat ready were integrated into its first LSThad to sail for Inchon. At units. Loading facilities at San Diego Kobe, as ships carrying the main body were cramped. Some of the ships were of the Division began to arrive, men and slow in arriving. One ship, after being equipment had to be reloaded into 20 per cent loaded, blew two boilers, amphibious shipping. The last ship and had to be unloaded and replaced. carrying men and equipment needed for Ships were routed to Kobe, Japan, as the landing arrived at Kobe on 3 soon as loaded. Despite the delays and September; the LSTs had to depart for setbacks all ships were sailed within Inchon on 10 September. On 3 acceptable time limits. September, typhoon Jane hit Kobe. The full impact of the concept of The docks were flooded, ships the Inchon Landing was felt by the broke their moorings, and one AKAhad Division when the division commander a damaged propeller requiring arrived in Tokyo on 22 August and was drydocklng. Reloading was set back 24 told that the Division would make an hours. SS Noonday developed a fire in assault landing at Inchon on 15 one of its holds while approaching September, the only day in September Kobe. On 8 September, by order of the when the tides were suitable for a major Secretary of the Navy, 500 men, all landing. Twenty-four days remained in those under 18 years of age, had to be which to draw up plans, issue an order, put ashore. On 10 September, after the reload the Division in amphibious LSTs had sailed from Kobe, Adm Doyle shipping at Kobe, forward to Korea the received another typhoon warning.