To Volume 1 No.7

INDEX TO VOLUME 1 NO.7

Chosin to Hungnam Page 3 By Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. 'i Inchon Landing Page 4 .- ; Marine Corps Gazette; Gen. O.P. Smith The Chosin Reservoir Page 6 Marine Corps Gazette; Gen. O.P. Smith Obituraies Page 8

Hagaru 1950 Page 9 Continued from Vol 1-6 The Continuing Saga of BinHall's LETTERRSFROM KOREA Page 12

Volume IV Marine Operations The Pohang Guerilla Hunt Page 18

Editor'scomments Page 24

2 Another "ancient" record we found they began their advance into the in our "musty archives. We thought you Chosin Reservotr area, the Marines might enjoy. were well aware that guerrilla forces might cut their supply lines. They prepared for this eventuality by Chosin Reservoir To Hungnam assembling heavy stocks of supplies in forward dumps and preparing for Late in the month of November, delivery of needed material by air. 1950, the 1st Marine Division, under the Because of these factors, when the command of MajGen Oliver P.Smith crisis arose, it was readily met. began its withdrawaljrom the Chosin Reservoir area to the port of Hungnam When, on the 26th of November, where it was to be evacuated. Months our forces in Korea found themselves in will pass before the complete record of a new and different war, engaged with a the withdrawal is written. The following numerically superior and fresh enemy, is the statement for the press by LtGen a logical action on the part of the X Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Corps, of which the 1st Marine Division General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and is a part, was to concentrate its forces. ~eleased upon his retumjrom Hungnam, This involved moving the First Marine IS quoted herewith: Division southward over 75 miles of the most tortuous mountain roads Pearl Harbor, T. H., conceivable. Upon receiving its order to 16 December 1950: move, the Division found itself heavily engaged with six Chinese Communist I left Hungnam, Korea, the day Divisions and, in order to carry out its before yesterday after a 10 day visit to mission, it was necessary to defeat inspect the air and ground elements of those Communist forces. the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Whereupon the First Marine Much has been said of their actions Division turned in its traces and and exploits during the past three launched a series of deadly attacks weeks and I shall not attempt to review which resulted in the complete rout of all of the details. There are certain all six of the Chinese Divisions opposing ~ngs, however, which I feel are badly it. Fighting in ice, snow and subzero m need of saying with reference to the weather, the Division assembled itself Marines in Korea and their recent first at Hagaru-ri and then at Koto-ri ' experiences. and drove its way through to its ' assigned objective. To begin with, and despite the frequent accounts in the press, the men The opposing Chinese forces were of the First Marine Division did not so punished by the Marines as to retreat. They obeyed orders - sensible constitute no further threat to our orders from higher authority - to cause. I believe that by no stretch of the conduct an orderly move from exposed imagination can this be described as positions to a more secure area near retreat, since a retreat presupposes a Hamhung. defeat, and the only defeat involved in this battle was the one suffered by the Secondly, the First Marine Division Chinese. Furthermore, when the was not "trapped" at Hagaru-rt, despite Marines arrived in Hamhung, they had the frequent misuse of that word. When 3 their arms. equipment, vehicles and supplies with them. Their spirits were high and they were proud of their accomplishments. Marine Corps Gazette - 1960 In all of this I have spoken only of the ground Marines involved. Actually, Today, the Inchon landing, in the accomplishment of their difficult task eyes of the public, is symbolized by its bold and brilliant concept. It is so would have been rendered immeasurably more complicated had it known because the execution of the not been for the tireless efforts of the concept was an unqualified success. To First Marine Air Wing, which provided me, a remarkable and little remembered close and accurate air support day and aspect of this landing was the ability of night, snow and shine, for their the Navy and Marine Corps to place a combat ready Marine division off the comrades on the ground. I have seen this Marine air-ground team grow beaches of Inchon within the time limits stronger and sounder during the past imposed, and with the resources in men, ships, and material then available 25 years, but I felt it had reached its in the peacetime establishment. full bloom when I talked to men on the bleak plateau of Koto-ri and watched tears come to their eyes when they The first impact of the concept of the Inchon Landing on the 1stMarDiv spoke about the effectiveness of their air support. came on 25 July 1950. The Division did not then know that on 15 September, As a final word, I know it will 52 days later, it would be landing at gratify many who have felt concern in Inchon, Korea. All the information it had was contained in a directive to the matter to learn that I personally know that the Marines were adequately bring the Division (less 1 RCT)to war provided with the clothing and strength and sail it for the Far East equipment necessary for fighting in the between August lOth and 15th, 16 days brutal winter weather which exists on later, ready for combat. This meant that the North Korean plateau. Nevertheless, within 16 days the Division had to and with the best of equipment which begin the embarkation of some 15,400 they had, their fighting was still ground troops in augmented war accompanied by great hardship. The strength units with the additional equipment required. For the Navy it way they bore this hardship was the most impressive aspect of my visit. The meant assembling, on short notice, 19 men faced their lot with cheerful ships of all classes. understanding and demonstrated the What were the immediate resources same steadfast character that has come to be associated with Marines in men, equipment, and ships? There everywhere. They even kept their sense were 3,500 shorttimers at Camp of humor. On one tank parked on the Pendleton. Earlier, the 1st Provisional windswept plateau near Koto-ri I saw Marine Brigade (about 5,200 ground troops), drawn from the 1stMarDiv, had the followingtimely inscription: "Only 14 more shooting days until been rushed to Korea. The bulk of the required additional equipment was in Christmas. " "mothballs" at Barstow in the Mojave Desert. The Navy had little amphibious shipping on the West Coast and had to 4 use available commercial types. By dedicated work on the part of the Division staff, and with the To meet the personnel wholehearted cooperation of Adm requirements, authority was granted to Doyle's PhibGruOne staff, within three extend the enlistments of the days a detailed plan for the Inchon shorttimers, and Marines were ordered Landing was drawn up, and two days in from posts and stations throughout later an advance planning draft of the United States, from the 2dMarDiv at IstMarDiv OpO 250 (Inchon Landing) Camp Lejeune, and from the Reserves. was issued. "Mothballed" equipment was dusted off at Barstow and rushed to Camp The plan had yet to be executed. Pendleton, or direct to the docks. There The situation in Korea worsened, and was not time to test all of the the release of the 1st Provisional Marine equipment; some had to be checked Brigade was deferred, but D-Day still after arrival in Japan. By working remained 15 September. The Brigade around the clock, incoming Marines was fmally released from combat at were classified and those deemed midnight,S September, six days before combat ready were integrated into its first LSThad to sail for Inchon. At units. Loading facilities at San Diego Kobe, as ships carrying the main body were cramped. Some of the ships were of the Division began to arrive, men and slow in arriving. One ship, after being equipment had to be reloaded into 20 per cent loaded, blew two boilers, amphibious shipping. The last ship and had to be unloaded and replaced. carrying men and equipment needed for Ships were routed to Kobe, Japan, as the landing arrived at Kobe on 3 soon as loaded. Despite the delays and September; the LSTs had to depart for setbacks all ships were sailed within Inchon on 10 September. On 3 acceptable time limits. September, typhoon Jane hit Kobe.

The full impact of the concept of The docks were flooded, ships the Inchon Landing was felt by the broke their moorings, and one AKAhad Division when the division commander a damaged propeller requiring arrived in Tokyo on 22 August and was drydocklng. Reloading was set back 24 told that the Division would make an hours. SS Noonday developed a fire in assault landing at Inchon on 15 one of its holds while approaching September, the only day in September Kobe. On 8 September, by order of the when the tides were suitable for a major Secretary of the Navy, 500 men, all landing. Twenty-four days remained in those under 18 years of age, had to be which to draw up plans, issue an order, put ashore. On 10 September, after the reload the Division in amphibious LSTs had sailed from Kobe, Adm Doyle shipping at Kobe, forward to Korea the received another typhoon warning. additional personnel and equipment to Typhoon Kezia was approaching Kobe, bring the units of the 1st Provisional and the sailing of the APAand AKAwas Marine Brigade up to war strength, and advanced from 12 September to 11 then proceed to Inchon, rendezvousing September. This cut another day from with the units of the Brigade en route. reloading time, yet the Division met its On 22 August the main body of the deadline. Division were on USS Mt McKinleyin Tokyo. In the early morning hours of 15 September, D-Day, Marines were fmally

5 in their assigned landing area ready to proceed to the beaches. These Marines This article appeared in the had been drawn from many sources, Marine Corps Gazette - Sept 1960 but their training and indoctrination had been uniform. Furthermore, a large proportion of the officers and senior By Oen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret) noncommissioned officers had had combat experience in amphibious The setting and character of the operations. There had been no time for Chosin Reservoir Operation were a rehearsal, but they knew what to do, entirely different from those of the and history records that they did it. All Inchon/Seoul Operation. The that had preceded-the accelerated mountains in the Chosin Reservoir area planning, the constant pressure, the were forbidding. In late November the around the clock working parties, and weather was bitter; the single road the surmounting of seemingly available to the Division was tortuous; insurmountable obstacles-all were and the enemy situation was ominous. vital to the success of the landing, with its inexorable deadline of 15 September. Early in November the 1st Marine Today, perhaps only the participants Division had decimated one Chinese realize this. division near Chinhungni, then continued the northward advance in accordance with the general plan of the These articles (The preceding & the higher command to drive to the Yalu following: Ed.) were written in response River. Two other Chinese divisions were to a request by Lynn Montross, historian known to be in the general area, but at Marine Headquarters for the past ten were like will o'the wisp. years. They are the first comments for publication on the Korean War ever In late November, identifications of granted by Gen O. P. Smith. captured Chinese indicated the presence of additional fresh Chinese The last articles he published in the divisions. Somewhere, in the bleak Gazette were in 1925 or 1926, when the mountains surrounding us and beyond magazine was a quarterly. He has, the reach of our ground patrols, the however, prepared for Marine Corps Chinese were swarming. The excellent archives a total of more than 2,000 air discipline observed by the Chinese typed pages of historical material about during daylight hours prevented our air the Korean War. His purpose was to from giving us any clear picture of what make sure the accomplishments of his was in front of us. menjrom August 1950 to April 1951 were preserved for the future. The only In addition to the uncertainty as to fault that could befound with these the enemy, our situation gave us a records, as Mr. Montross says, is that feeling of isolation. There was a gap of they are so completely objective and self 80 miles between the IstMar Div and effacing that Gen Smith himself does the 8th Army to the southwest. A small not receive the credit he deserves. In this Army task force was on the east side of same spirit he has requested that the Reservoir near us, but beyond was a payment for these two articles be gap of 125 miles to the nearest friendly turned over to the Scholarship Fund of unit to the northeast. To the south, it the 1stMarDiv Association. was 75 miles from Yudamni, on the 6 western ann of the Chosin Reservoir, to replacements and evacuate our the coast. This feeling of isolation took casualties. Hagaru-ri was also a on a menacing aspect when the Chinese suitable location for the airdrop of closed in around us on 28 November to supplies by the Air Force. To indicate a depth of 35 miles. some measure of the importance of the airstrip to us, in a period of six days Under such conditions Marines are more than 4,200 casualties, 3,100 of at their best. Discipline, devotion, and them Marines, were evacuated from this loyalty are accentuated. The greater the strip by the combined efforts ofAir danger, the greater their cohesiveness. Force, Navy, and Marine planes, leaving Only an organization with these us casualty-free for the breakout from qualities could have made the breakout Hagaru-rt to Kotori. from the Chosin Reservoir. Although the RCTs and the The Chinese plan was to fragment garrison at Hagaru-ri had been depleted our force and then destroy the by casualties, there was a net gain in fragments. By employing their great strength. When the Chinese struck numerical superiority and by exploiting Yudamni on the night of 27/28 the gaps on our flanks, the Chinese did November, the combined strength of the succeed initially in fragmenting the 5th and 7th RCTs was about 8200. combat elements of the Division to a When the breakout from Hagaru-rt to depth of 35 miles. For Korea,.we were Kotori was launched on 6 December, considered to be well concentrated for the breakout force comprised some combat. Our combat elements, however, 10,000 troops. These were 10,000 were disposed in depth, with the major fighting men, for, until the column part of the force in the most advanced incurred new casualties, there was no position and garrisons at four other train of wounded to burden the locations to the rear, protecting our operation. vulnerable main supply road. Our plan, after we received the order to withdraw, Furthermore, this was a very was to gather our strength; hold firmly powerful force. It was well supplied with the intermediate garrisons to the rear; ammunition, fuel, and rations; was then, starting with the 5th and 7th powerfully supported by Marine and RCTs at Yudamni, drive southward, carrier based air; possessed organically successively rejoining the garrisons to artillery, tanks, and the whole gamut of the rear, and gaining strength as each infantry weapons; and had dedicated garrison was rejoined. We succeeded in officers and men to carry the fight to our plan, the Chinese failed in theirs. the enemy. The Chinese strength consisted of their superiority in Throughout the operation the numbers and their habitual action was sustained; yet, to my mind, employment of night attacks, but these there was a turning point. This came could not stop the advance. when the 5th and 7th RCTs fought their way from Yudamni to Hagaru-rt. At The fight from Hagaru-rt to Kotori Hagaru-ri we had accumulated cost us 500 casualties. These casualties supplies, and our engineers had were immediately evacuated by air and completed an airstrip capable of the advance was resumed the following handling two-engine planes. With the day. Now, including the Marine airstrip we could bring in supplies and battalion fighting up the mountain from

7 Chinhungni, there were over 16,000 nights, many more of the enemy. Gen men to make the final successful Smith was Division Commander, had led breakout. his men from the late summer assault at Inchon north to Chosin Reservoir. He In this 13 day operation, fought directed the breakoutfrom its beginning mostly at elevations over 3,500 feet, at Yudamni to iis ftnai qoal; the seaport with the thermometer dropping to 25 ofHungnam, 75 miles away. This article degrees below zero, the IstMar Div is the second of two by Gen Smith outlasted and outfought the eight covering operations in Korea. Chinese divisions it encountered. Throughout, the Division maintained its His first, INCHON LANDING, integrity and brought out its equipment, appeared in the Gazette: Sep '60. They its wounded, and even its prisoners. are the first comments for publication on the Korean War ever granted by the The enemy suffered staggering author, and are part of more than 2000 combat losses. In addition, the Chinese typed pages of material he prepared for ineffectives due to the cold far exceeded Marine Corps archives. Purpose: to make ours. We had frostbite, but there was sure the deeds of his men are preserved no delay due solely to exposure and for the future. only two deaths where exposure was a contributing factor. The Chinese, lacking tentage and having a OBITUARIES: rudimentary medical service, undoubtedly lost many of their We have been informed that the seriously wounded due to exposure. The followingMarines have passed on: IstMarDiv was well equipped with Darrell C. Thorseth, 1/3/5 organic weapons and was ably Sault Saint Marie. Michigan supported by air, not only for close 10 March 1990 support, but also for airdrop and airlanding of supplies, and for the Don A. Anderson (Unit unknown) evacuation of casualties. LaJolla, California 21 January 1990 Yet, in the final analysis, the weapons and support would have been I've buried my.friend this mounVUl day. of no avail had not these Marines, in Why do we grieve so when.friends pass their 35 mile fight from Yudamni to away? Chinhungni, demonstrated to a It can't befor themfor they are beyond our superlative degree that physical tears and pain. Utruth be known, tis ourselves alonefor obstacles, weather, and the enemy whom grief is a gain. could not stop men who maintained their discipline, were professionally How so, you say? competent, loyal, devoted, and capable Tis the space in our hearts that it must of self-sacrifice. heal, So sorrow is but balm to repair the void that remains so real; When Marines of 1stMarDiv But not too long to suJJer this grievous loss launched their drive from Hagaru-ri on 6 [i"orlife is at best a gamble, won on the toss Dee 1950, they had already been fighting south for nearly a week. Ahead Ourfriend who has left us would not want us long mourning his passing, lay steeper mountains, colder day and For.friends never want but love's reward, 8 nOt;our pain ur u. :KIITOWJUl Cllora. near the crest. After an unsuccessful So be of good cheer, andjind a brighter attempt to hold their ground, they fell side, Ourfriend has gone where we soon will be, back and dug in at the foot of the 500- wanned by our lovefor eternity. foot hill. Their disappointment was tempered, however, by the satisfaction It's times like these that a man's deeds we of rescuing the radio operator, who had record, been wounded. Life'S efforts and their reward. We relive thejights wefought, the battles won, Marine air and artillery worked over The girls we loved, our wives, our the reverse slopes vigorously, and a daughters, our sons, second unsuccessful attack on East Hill was made that afternoon by a platoon of We all will pass through this gate soon Able Co engineers. After toiling up the enough, And therein lies our sorrow. north slope with great difficulty, they What could I have done, were pinned down by automatic Had I but tomorrow? weapons fire from Chinese communists in estimated platoon strength, and directed to withdraw.

HAGARU 1950 The casualty-thinned perimeter Continued from Vol. 1-6 defenders now fixed their hopes on reinforcements getting through from Koto-ri. A task force had fought its way At 0400 there was little to prevent over half the distance by late afternoon the communists on East Hill from and requested a command decision as pouring into the perimeter except their to the advisability of proceeding. Upon own lack of numbers. After the Division being ordered by CG 1st MarDiv to CP had been hit by several bullets and resume the advance, George Co of 3/1, mortar shell fragments, a bodyguard the company-size 41st British was assigned to the commanding Commando and 2 platoons of Marine general in case of a breakthrough. The tanks slugged ahead against stubborn hero of this anxious hour was a radio resistance while the rear elements of operator who voluntarily remained the column returned to Koto-ri. This left alone at his post and sent back an Army Infantry company, a information about the enemy. Commando platoon and about 100 Marine service troops isolated with their Toward dawn, the CO of 3/1 gave vehicles in "HellFire Valley. After a his executive officer the mission of brave all-night fight the survivors ran assembling what troops he could scrape out of ammunition, and those who together and attacking to restore the could not escape were forced to lines on East Hill. It was broad daylight surrender. when this composite force of about 200 men, odds and ends of a dozen service About 1915, the head of the task units combined with stragglers, climbed force fought through to Hagaru at the slope with artillery and air support. grievous cost in casualties. There were Casualties were not heavy, but steep, no CCF attacks of any consequence on icy heights had as frustrating an effect the night of 29-30 November and, at as CCF automatic weapons fire on the 0800, George Co moved out in an 75 exhausted men who were stopped attempt to retake East Hill with air and 9 artillery support. Again it was found that the terrain itself offered as many Equally heartening was the radio difficulties as the enemy; and though message to the effect that the Marines the Marines recovered some of the lost at Yudam-ni and Toktong Pass had ground, they were unable to close the seized the initiative and begun their gap to the left. fighttng breakout to Hagaru.

That night, 3 bugle calls and a Although the CO of 3/1 and his green flare were the signals for a large- officers could not have realized their scale attack at 2335 on the Item Co good fortune, the enemy had already front, followedhalf an hour later by an shot his bolt at Hagaru for the time assault in force on the new George Co being. There were to be no more large- line near the crest of East Hill.Artillery scale CCF attacks on the perimeter and mortar fire supported communists from 1 December until the 5th, after who poured into the gap on the left, 3/1 was relieved at 1200 by the 5th which was taken under direct fire by Marines, recently arrived from Yudam- How Btry howitzers. ni. During this period, with the CG 1st MarDivin operational control of all From the doorway of his CP the Army as well as Marine units in the commanding general watched the fight area, the remnants of 3 hard-hit 7th by the flickering light of a burning Infantry Division battalions east of the Korean house. Advancing communists, Reservoir were taken into the perimeter. silhouetted against the flames, made Supplies were replenished by airdrop lucrative targets for the machine guns after the arrival of the Yudamni of stationary Martne tanks and the Marines, and final preparations made rocket launchers of the AT Co, 7th for initiating the breakout from Hagaru Marines. to the sea on 6 December.

George Co, under attack both from Not until then, when it was too late, front and flank, pulled back until it did the enemy at last make the all-out could form a V-shaped line of defense. attack on East Hill which would But at last the CO of 3/1 had the probably have resulted in a disastrous luxury of a few good combat troops in breakthrough at a time when the reserve, and he sent a detachment from perimeter depended on 2 Marine rifle the 41st Commando as reinforcement. companies as its main pillars of By daybreak the MLRhad been defense. As it was, the battle-hardened regained on East Hill and enemy action 5th Marines had a tough fight and took in the Item Co zone was reduced to heavy casualties to stop a CCF assault scattered small arms fire. in force.

The new day, 1 December, proved Losses of3/1 were 33 KIA,10 to be a turning point for the Hagaru DOW,270 WIA,2 MIAand 105 non- perimeter. That afternoon the first cargo battle casualties, chiefly frostbite cases. plane landed on the 40 per cent completed airstrip and took offwith 39 Although the total losses of the wounded men. It was to be the many other diverse units is still forerunner of others during the next 5 unknown, the cost in casualties of days until all casualties were evacuated defending a perimeter 7,650 yards in and 573 Marine replacements flown in. circumference and 4,670,000 square 10 yards in area, can only be considered problems of the CCF. remarkably moderate. The limitations of CCF ammunition Enemy units during the period were also explain why so few enemy artillery identified by prisoners as the 172d, and mortar rounds ever hit the interior 173d and 174th Regiments of the 58th of a vulnerable perimeter. Apparently CCF Division and the 176th Regiment the Communists saved every available of the 59th Division. Casualties, as shell for the front lines in an effort to estimated by prisoners, were 90 per set up a decisive breakthrough. cent for the )72d and 50 per cent for the other 3 regiments, making a total of On the other hand, there can be no 8,550 killed and wounded. doubt that the Marine battalion, so much outnumbered in terms of warm Some puzzling aspects of CCF bodies, owed its defensive victory to tactics were also cleared up by prisoner unstinted use of ammunition as well as interrogations. It was hard to a great superiority in supporting arms. understand, for instance, why the Not many reliable statistics have been Chinese attacked in force on the night compiled, but we do know that the 2 of 28-29 November and again in the infantry companies fired 2900 60mm early morning hours of 1 December, rounds alone during the critical night of only to allow 3/1 a comparative lull 28-29 November, or more than 10 times during the next 4 nights. The answer the entire supply of a CCF battalion. seems to be that the 2 CCF divisions, During the same period, the 81mm depending on animal and human mortars of 3/1 fired some 1100 rounds transport, reached the objective area and Dog Btry about 1200 rounds. with a limited amount of ammunition; and when it was expended, operations A Marine engineer officerfound 3/1 had to be curtailed accordingly. supporting arms an awesome spectacle that night as seen from the high ground Each infantry battalion, according north of Hagaru. "Attimes," he said, to POWtestimony, left the Yalu with "the whole perimeter seemed to erupt 180 rounds for its two 82mm mortars like a volcano in one great explosion. and 240 rounds for its eight 60mm The chatter of the machine guns and mortars. One box of cartridges was the drumfire of the mortars and allotted to each of the 12 light machine howitzers never stopped the whole guns in every infantry company, and night long." the 120 enlisted men received 80 rounds of small arms ammunition The importance of supporting apiece. Thus, it is evident that the arms, then, appears to be the first communists had staked everything on lesson of the Hagaru perimeter. A close delivering a quick knockout blow to the second is the necessity for good local IstMar Div, and their losses must have intelligence, such as the CICteam been frightful after a repulse left them provided, not only for the disposition of stranded in sub-zero weather with troops around the perimeter but also inadequate food and shelter and only the assignment of targets for artillery the most primitive care for the sick and and mortar interdictory flres. For there wounded. Moreover, the continued air is no question that more than one and artillery harassment and potential CCF attack was broken up or interdiction compounded these seriously blunted in the assembly area. 11 ------.--.-.~

before he is shipped over here. There were object lessons, too. Foremost was the lapse in terrain We have one more man in our tent reconnaissance which led to so much now learning the work, but it still isn't trouble on East Hill. For lack of time crowded. Yesterday I took over the office this ground was evaluated from a and made all the reports, as well as distance, during the appraisal of the assigning the ammunition to the area in general. As a consequence, various revetments when it arrived. I when the Marines lost the original MLR, have to learn quite a few codes yet, but they were at such a handicap in terrain, one doesn't do that in a day. I had little that comparatively small CCF numbers to do today but read part of a copy of could not be dislodged by attackers Newsweek and listen to the stories told using ropes to climb the icy slopes. by the men who came in from the field Fortunately, it took the Chinese 48 to draw ammunition. hours to perceive their advantage; and by the time they sent reinforcements, I think I can say that very little is the Marines had a rifle company in line happening around here except that instead of service troops. we're chasing down guerrillas, sometimes in large groups and But even allowing for errors of sometimes in small ones. They're so commission and omission in an elusive that once, when our people had operation with a 3 hour planning them trapped in a village and gave them period, the conduct of the defense left time to get the women and children out precepts which can be studied with before the bombardment commenced, it profit. Judging by the results, it would was found that the village had been be hard to find a more economical completely evacuated. Occasionally they means of holding vital ground against will ambush a truck or jeep in hopes of superior numbers. In fact, the moral of finding ammunition or food. I'm using Hagaru is that if you can't be "we"very loosely, of course. everywhere at once during a fight against odds, the next best thing is to We had a little snow last night and be in a perimeter. it looks threatening again. We have an oil barrel attached to the stove and it works quite well, especially during The Continuing Saga of Bob Hall's warm weather. LETTERSFROM KOREA We received shots for smallpox this Pohang, Korea morning and no one objected. February 5, 1951 We're willing to take any shots they I must be about 15 letters behind want to give us, especially for typhus. now...received four night before last. We were even given lice powder to put Letters average seven or eight days on seams, etc. getting here and five or six to get back to the States. I wrote Bill tonight so he I don't know how the war is would hear from me before he left. I progressing, but I wouldn't be surprised have no doubt that hell be sent directly if we moved from here in the near to Korea. Everyone seems to hear that future. The Marines have never stayed he is going to be sent somewhere else in one place for very long over here. 12 They know from expertence mat as soon as they get comfortable, they can be certain that they will be told to pack up and move out. I wouldn't mind seeing more of Korea anyhow. I'm beginning to get tired of this place. '

Ajet fighter cracked up on the air strtp near here a few days ago. The plane burned and the pilot was unable to get out.

I took over the office again today. I'm still learning about ammunition: nomenclature, codes, etc. I even got a haircut today, my first in about a month. I'm trying to grow a mustache, it seems to be the style over here. (No \ luck) There is a lot of scuttlebutt about I'm reading my second ammunition some of the men being sent back to the book now. I've learned a good deal since States on a rotation plan, but it I've been in the A.S.P. (ammunition wouldn't affect me anyhow. T/Sgt. supply point) office here. I really believe Bowen says he will call you up if he gets I now know almost as much about the back to Silverdale under this rotation job as the sergeant (not Bowen) in here plan. who has been with the company for about a year. We don't get along very Pohang, Korea well either. Every now and then he February 14, 1951 reminds me, indirectly, that he is a Happy Valentine's Dayl SERGEANT. I feel like reminding him that I was in the Corps when he was I know I haven't written for some still in the eighth grade. Who knows, I time. It may be longer before I write could even be a Pfc. one of these days if again, but don't worry if that's the case. I can't overcome the temptation to poke I can't say any more than that changes him squarely on his oversized nose. He are in the offing. may settle down yet and we may be able to get along. I'm willing to meet him We've had our share of rain lately more than halfway. and everywhere we walk there are two or three inches of mud, the stickiest I haven't heard from Glenn and kind I ever saw. A wind came up Gloria for quite a while. I did get a long suddenly and the tent is shaking as if it letter from Mrs. Keel, telling me about might come down. Bill's getting the measles, etc. Unless I misunderstood, Bill is on his way over One of our interpreters was here a here. If so, I hope I get to see him. It's while ago, a graduate of Seoul been almost two months since I left the University, and I was trying to help him states. A few men are finally being sent read an edition of Stars and Stripes. He back on rotation, those who were does very well but some words are hard among the first to arrive here last to explain, of course. He knows his summer. I wouldn't want to be sent English is weak and he wants to back right now anyhow because I would improve it. We told him he speaks no doubt be sent back here before long better English than some of the men in with another outfit. the company and that isn't stretching the truth very far. Wonju, Korea February 25, 1951 I still don't know much about the situation on the front lines. I've heard Recently I've been either extremely that the army is moving forward and, busy or where I couldn't mail a letter so now that they've met a few Chinese, I didn't try to write. seems to be getting bogged down again. They seem to scare too easily. With our We've been on the move for about a superiority in air power we should be week now. We got up in the middle of able to handle an infinite number of the night to pull out and stayed that Chinese. We've heard that they are night in Sangju. An army outfit was in using abandoned army tanks dug in as the same building and one of the pill boxes. doggies (a Negro) shot himself in the arm that night to get evacuated, I

13 suppose. When we came over from we found out, is to stand outside, put Japan in that old Japanese ship I soap on, rinse it off, and then get into mentioned earlier, an ambulance was the tub and soak. The rest of us brought up to haul offtwo doggies who followedthat routine and didn't have to had got some bad whiskey and fallen off change the water so often. the ramp and broken some bones. We also engaged some Koreans to Anyhow, next day we headed for wash our clothes and they worked at it Chungju over the worst road I've ever all day and were paid by Bowen 2,000 been on. It reminded me of the Fraser yuan (50 cents). We found a barber to Canyon road, only it winds more and is cut our hair, 20 men, and he was paid even narrower. We saw a lot of snow 3,000 yuan. and everything was covered with a heavy coat of dust. I went over to visit a nearby church that was still standing. It was built of We finally reached Chungju and red brick, a New England style building stayed there several days in order to set in fairly good condition, considering the up an ammunition dump. There were condition of the rest of the town. I only a few of us because we were the examined the quarters once apparently forward echelon for the battalion. After occupied by a missionary and moving around for awhile we finally set underneath found about a ton of silk up the dump right in the middle of town cocoons, evidently the basis of a silk in an area that had been completely industry. There were quite a few straw demolished. hats there too. Only a few civilians were left in the town and they had been We were situated next to what ordered to leave that day. appeared to be a former Jap housing area. People obviously left in a huny We had to cross another mountain because we found half-filled rice bowls, range to get here, but the road was not etc. Most of the furniture was still there. so high this time. Still, it was raining I enjoyed looking over the area and I've and the road was in poor condition, become somewhat familiar with barely passable, from the enormous Japanese architecture. amount of traffic it had to cany. One truck loaded with infantrymen slipped We found some abacuses (Jap over the side, killing two men and counting devices) and Sgt. Bowen, the injuring eight. It was a real strain on lieutenant, and I spent some time the drivers and I think they deserve a learning to operate them. In one of the world of credit for negotiating the road structures was a Japanese bathtub, a as well as they did. To make matters big iron pot set in concrete with space worse, some of them had to head back beneath for a fire. Bowen asked the late that night for another load. I felt interpreter to round up a Korean and cold and miserable when we got here some kids and they started a fire under until I saw the infantry slogging along it the next morning. in the mud, headed for the front. The doggies came along riding in trucks and Bowen took the first bath, the the Marines, who were walking, still lieutenant was next, and I was third. had enough spunk to bark at them or Bowen hopped right into the tub but make wisecracks. found out that was a mistake. Jap style,

14 We were dumped off in the middle back to Manchuria. of a rice paddy, as usual, and had to pitch our tents in the dark. Bowen and I Wonju occupies a strategic position stayed in the cook's tent. It poured all controlling important road junctions night and everything was damp, but we and has been the scene of some very were able to dry out most of our things bitter fighting. The town was probably the next day. We took over an leveled long ago. I haven't actually been abandoned army dump and I spent all in it. All around are foxholes, gun day yesterday inventorying. The emplacements, ruined buildings, etc. I weather has improved and it's spring- hear that the areas north of us were like today, but the roads and bridges heavily mined by the gooks, not that it were rendered almost impassable by the has held up our advance very much. rain. We'vebeen watching the cargo planes dropping supplies by parachute The night before we left Pohang I into the fields near us. got three packages, the candy from Grandma Fenno and the package you Right near the area where we first sent airmail. pitched our tents we found our chief attraction for a while, a gook with the I certainly am grateful. However, top of his head blown off. I was a little the watch was badly damaged and has hesitant at first about looking at him, never really run but I can easily get but in short order I was able to pass by along without one. and go on to chow without my appetite being affected at all. I suppose it's a sad Those of us in the A.S.P. office commentary on the nature of so-called aren't very busy at the moment. We civilizedbeings, but I wouldn't be issue what ammunition we can but our surprised if this sort of thing becomes supplies are very limited. I'm still more common as we move forward. learning about ammunition and will probably continue to as long as I'm I suppose our move up here is no here. There were a lot of items in the secret now, if it ever was. We don't army dump that I had never seen before exactly know what is going on in the because we don't carry them. Of course, vicinity, but we have a fairly good idea. they removed all of those items as well How I would like to hear a news as some we had hoped they would broadcast or see a late paper so I could leave. get a better understanding of the overall situation. I wouldn't be surprised if this I doubt that I'll be writing very drive carries us back to the parallel often for a while until things settle where we will stop only if the Chinese down a little. Don't worry about me. I , show any indication of wanting to settle have things rather easy at present, in this dispute. We are apparently making fact, too easy. I volunteered for guard better use of planes and artillery duty back at Chungju but Bowen instead of sacrificing men wholesale as wouldn't hear of it. We are quite some we did in the last war, which is not to distance behind the lines now and, say that our casualties are not high. I since this is a Marine area, we'll just hope that the army doesn't turn tail probably be much farther before long. again. I'm not worried about the Marines at all. If we could keep supplied I think we could fight our way right 15 South of Hoengsong, Korea to go investigate while he calls up all March 19, 1951 the outfits around us to find out what happened. We have several outposts I realize I haven't written for some here, machine guns, etc., but he still time. I suppose the main events are wants some of us in the office to stay General MacArthur's arrival, seeing Bill awake as additional guards. last night, and the latest move of the dump, which is a continual process, Furthermore, he is one of the and I haven't arranged these items in stupidest, as well as the most egotistical the order of their importance. This time and insolent men I've ever met and the I'll be staying behind. I'll probably be company officers hold the same here a week or two before we move up opinion. Next to the Chinese, he is the to Hongchon, approximately 20 miles major obstacle we have to contend with ahead. I suppose the lines are only 20- over here, and, except for him, things 25 miles from the Parallel by now. are going quite well.

The weather has really been mild (ONCE IN A WHILE ON OUR lately. I've been going around without a NOCTURNALTRIPS TO DIVISION shirt. I even got rid of the top part of my HEADQUARfERS THE POSSIBILITYOF winter underwear. Another cold spell is AN AMBUSH ENTERED MYHEAD. I just beginning so I may have to put it RECALLEDTHE AMBUSHES I HAD back on again. HEARDABOUTWHEN WE WERE BACKAT POHANG.BUT WE WERE NO Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Ridgway, LONGER IN THE SAMEAREAAND THE our own Gen. O. P. Smith, and other NORfH KOREANGUERRILLASHAD brass arrived the other day or, rather, BEEN WIPED OUT. WE WERE NOW passed by on an inspection tour of the BEHIND lliE MARINELINESAND Marine sector. I took a couple of THATWOULD HAVETO BE THE pictures of Mac, but I doubt if they turn SAFEST AREA IN KOREA. I NEVER out. A helicopter followed the party SHARED MYTHOUGHTS WITH MY along, probably on the lookout for COMPANIONAND HE NEVER snipers. BROUGHT UP lliE SUBJECT EITHER).

Two of us have been driving up An enemy plane flies over forward to division headquarters at occasionally at night, so we have a night with the daily reports. One of us complete blackout here. I heard that drives and the other rides "shotgun," Don Bruns' outfit got bombed the other that is, armed in case of ambush. Our night. company commander takes the jeep up forward every day souvenir hunting and We are right on the MSR (main doesn't return until dark, thus our late supply route) so see everything passing night trip. It's a fairly long drive and the through to the front. Quite a few territory looks rather forbidding at truckloads of prisoners have come night. The captain would never make through lately; in fact, I got some the drive at night, too dangerous, I pictures of them the other day. Also, suppose. He comes back and hunkers quite a few South Koreans have been down in his tent and remains there brought back recently too. There are unless he hears some shots. If he does, two versions. Either they are deserters he grabs his rifle and rouses everyone or, more likely, they were captured by

16 the North, taken to China for political The baby was wailing for some reason, indoctrination, returned to the lines possibly because he was hungry, with safe conduct passes, and sent though he didn't appear to be starving. back to us with best wishes ... They say the woman is out of her mind. Her husband, a ROK (Republic of Korea On our way back from division soldier) was killed somewhere in this headquarters last night we stopped at area about two weeks ago and she is the 7th Motor Transport Battalion area looking for him. She stares at the back in the woods and found Bill's ground as she walks and does appear to company and then him. I yelled through be deranged. Gunner Alexander, one of the door, "Keel,open the door," because the warrant officers, said he saw her I couldn't see how it opened, and he walking along in the same manner the nearly fell off his cot when I walked in. I other day about 20 miles up the road. gave him the latest Islander that Frd One of the men took some of my candy Nicolhad sent and some candy bars bars out to give to her. She saw him that I got at the battalion PX in coming and started walking faster, but Hoengsong yesterday. He's working in the baby reached out and grabbed the their shop and he could be much worse candy and, I believe, started eating off.We visited for about 15 minutes and some. Anyhow, he stopped squalling for I told him where we are located and a while. This is one little example of the then it was time to leave. We're only a aftermath of war, insignificant but couple of miles apart. Don Bruns' outfit pathetic just the same. is not far away either. If I had moved up to the forward dump, I might have seen I heard that until recently, maybe him. even yet, there were a large number of bodies of soldiers from a U.S. division Hoengsong, three or four miles along the road to Hongchon, where they north of here, was completely leveled as were ambushed in retreat by a large most Korean towns have been. From group of inflltrating Chinese. I've also there it's about 20 miles to Hongchon, heard that the Chinese (or North with part of it being a narrow, Koreans) had shot quite a few civilians treacherous "road" through a mountain in the same area, probably to keep pass. I haven't been over it yet. them quiet. It's also been reported that some of the Chinese dead have been While I think of it, I now have an "marked up" a little by some of our own excellent map of Korea, obtained by one troops, something that would have of the warrant officers from G-2 at surprised me once but does no longer division headquarters. There were only because I'm beginning to realize that life a few so I consider myself lucky. on the front lines is dehumanizing and a man can easily lose his sense of I was glad to hear about the new values and his respect for human life sink and refrigerator. That Bruce is a and almost everything else. conscientious little guy to get up so early and get the fire ready. The road north is uttered with trucks and equipment where it was I saw something this morning that either caught by the Chinese or I won't forget for a while. A Korean destroyed by the army, probably the woman walked slowly past one tent former. I can vouch for the part of the with a fairly large baby on her back. road I've traveled. The same thing is

17 true beginning a few feet from our tent WOLFHOUND.Its only importance lay and each truck would have its own in its distinction as the first Eighth story to tell. There are rifles, sleeping Army counterstroke in reply to the bags, nails, gas cans, ammunition, enemy's January offensive. Other mines, rackets, etc., lying around the EUSAK advances were soon to follow, wrecks, and even an occasional leg or each more ambitious than the last and arm or a Chinese hand grenade. , bearing a more bristling code name.

The way things are going at present General Ridgway proposed by this in our sector it looks as if we will be up means to exert continual and increasing near the Parallel in a week or two and pressure on an enemy paying for victory then it's anybody's guess as to what with extended supply lines. Meanwhile, happens next. I hope the Chinese see he hoped to build up the morale of his the folly of their ways and don't force us own troops without asking too much of to grind along like this all the way to them at first. China. No one would gain much. In less than seven weeks, from 1 I'm not doing much right now December 1950 to 15 January 1951, except playing volley ball, pinochle, the Eighth Army had been pushed back checkers, and cribbage and doing a lot an average distance of 200 miles. Never of reading. before in the Nation's history had an American army given up so much (To be Continued) ground and equipment in so short a time, and damage to morale was inevitable. Yet the commanding general From Volume IV was confident that a cure would be History of Marine Operations effected by better combat leadership and discipline. He planned to The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt emphasize the need for these remedies until he restored the Eighth Army to tactical health. The New Marine Zone of Operations-l st MAW Moves to BOfu- Ridgway agreed with Marine Marine Rice Paddy Patrol operations generals that the 1st Marine Division THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP-Action had come out of its 13-day battle in the in the Pohang-Andong Zone-KMC Chosin Reservoir area with its fighting Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division- spirit undulled. Minor respiratory ills 10th NPKA Division Scattered-New seemed to be the only consequences felt Missionfor the Marines by the survivors. "Ahacking cough," recalled a Marine staff officer long ON 15 JANUARY 1951, a reinforced afterwards, "was the symbol of the Bean regiment of the U.S. 25th Infantry Patch." Division drove northward from Line D to a point about half a mile from Suwon Such ills soon responded to rest in the I Corps sector. VMF-2l2, flying and medical care, and it was a from the CVE Bataan, supported the physically fit division that made the movement along with land-based Air move to the new zone of operations. Force planes. No CCF troops were About one man out of three in the encountered during a two-day thrust infantry and artillery battalions was a dignified with the name Operation 18 ------_._--

newcomer to Korea. These replacements at a point about 19 miles southeast of were shaping up nicely, and the new Pohang. operation promised to be ideal combat training. Keeping open the 75-mile stretch of MSRfrom Pohang to Andong was The move took nearly a week. While considered the principal mission of the the other troops proceeded by motor, Division. Strong points were set up at LSTs 898 and 914 sailed with elements Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong,and of the Tank, Ordnance, Engineer, and Andong. Service Battalions. The Division CP opened at Sinhung, about 5 miles Captured documents indicated that southeast of Pohang, on 16 January. By enemy forces in unknown numbers had the followingday all designated motor already infiltrated through gaps in the and water lifts were completed. eastern sectors of the Eighth Army's Line D. Guerrilla activity was reported On the 18th the Marines were as far west as Tanyang, on the MSR of assigned a three-fold mission by IX Corps, and as far south as Taejon, Division OpnO 3-51: threatening the supply line of I Corps. (1)the protection of the Pohang- Train ambushes occurred on 13 Kyongju-Andong MSR (main supply January in the Namchang area and to route); the south of Wonju. Other attacks took (2)the securing ofAndong and the place on the rail line about 60 miles two airstrips in the vicinity; and north ofTaegu. In expectation of further (3)the prevention of hostile attempts, trains were provided with a penetrations in force to the south of the sandbagged car, pushed ahead of the Andong-Yongdok road. engine, to absorb the shock of land mine explosions. Another car was occupied The followingzones of patrol by guards who had the duty of dealing responsibility were assigned to Marine with direct guerrilla attacks. units: Zone A: RCT-l: an area about 10 The tactical problem of the Marines miles east and west of the Uisong- was quite simple on paper. About 1,600 Andong road, including both Uisong square miles, most of them standing on and Andong. end in mountainous terrain, were Zone B: RCT-5: an area some 15 to included in the new zone of operations. 20 miles wide astride the Kyongju- The experience of World War II had Yongchon-Uisong road, including demonstrated how effectiveguerrilla Kyongju but excluding Uisong. warfare could be as an adjunct to large- Zone c: RCT-7: an area 20 to 25 scale military operations. Officers of the miles wide from east to west and 1st Marine Division had no illusions extending north from the latitude of about their mission, therefore, when Pohang to the Andong/Yongdok road. they received unconfirmed reports of Zone D: 11th Marines: a strip seven NKPAguerrilla infiltrations behind the miles wide along the coast astride the EUSAKlines toward Andong. road from Pohang to a point about 10 miles north ofYongdok. All uncertainty vanished on 18 Zone E: 1st Tank Battalion: the January, shortly after the issuing of area bounded by the road from Pohang OpnO 3-51, when a patrol of the 3d to Kyongju and thence to the east coast Battalion, 1st Marines, flushed out an 19 undetermined number of North Korean As the Marine units moved into troops east of Andong. They took to their assigned zones, General Ridgway their heels so earnestly that the flew to Pohang to confer with General Marines barely managed to catch three Smith. Not only did he express of them after a long chase. confidence that the Marines would soon have the situation well under control; The prisoners identified their unit he also suggested the possibility of as the 27th Infantry of the NKPA lOth small amphibious landings along the Infantry Division. The other two east coast. The purpose was to block a regiments, the 25th and 29th, were also possible southward advance of the three in the general area. All three were CCF armies that had operated in supported more in theory than fact by Northeast Korea during the Chosin artillery, mortar, medical, and engineer Reservoir campaign. units organic to the division. In reality, however, the estimated total of 6,000 The east coast littoral was troops consisted largely of infantry. A considered the most likely route of few mortars, according to the prisoners, approach. Smith was of the opinion, were the largest weapons. however, that an amphibious landing should be made in strength, if at all. Following the Inchon-Seoul And there the matter rested. operation, the remnants of the badly mauled NKPA lOth Infantry Division had straggled back across the 38th 1st MAW Moves to Bofu Parallel to the Hwachon area. There they were reorganized by the Chinese During the operations of the first for guerrilla operations and placed few days the Marine ground forces had under the command of NKPAMajor to depend for air support on FEAF General Lee Ban Nam. planes sent by JOC. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had its hands full at this Late in December the rebuilt time with housekeeping activities. Work division, still short of arms and began at Bofu on 20 January as a equipment, departed Hwachon with a Seabee detachment arrived with its mission of infiltrating through the UN graders and bulldozers. They were lines to cut communications and harass assisted by details of Marines from rear installations of the Andong-Taegu MAG-33. area. Shots were exchanged with United Nations troops near Wonju, but General The job went ahead with typical Lee Ban Nam and his troops contrived Seabee efficiency. While specialists to slip to the east through the installed plumbing for the galleys and mountains. Stealthily moving barracks, other crews graded taxiways, southward, marching by night and laid pierced steel planking, and poured hiding by day, they were soon in a concrete to patch up runways, parking position to heckle the rear of the X ramps, and warm-up aprons. Corps sector. This advantage did not last long. Before they could strike a MAG-12 kept busy at the task of blow, the element of surprise was lost moving men and equipment from Itami along with the three prisoners taken by and other Japanese fields to Korea. the Marines. Aircraft ofVMR-152, commanded by Colonel Deane C. Roberts, provided 20 transportation. Since safety measures blockading the Korean west coast. precluded the use of the K-l runway during construction activity, K-9 VMF-212 sent out a morning and substituted temporarily. As fast as the afternoon reconnaissance flight each planes unloaded, passengers and gear day up the coastline as far as the 39th were trucked 15 miles through Pusan to parallel. On the trip north the pilots K-l. scanned the coastal waters for small enemy shipping which might indicate It was a transition period in more reinforcement from Chinese ports on ways than one for the 1st MAW. the Yellow Sea. The return trip along Following are the changes of the highways and railroads of the commanders that took place during the littoral was made to detect signs of any last 2 weeks of January: new enemy activity on land. Four Colonel Radford C. West, relieved aircraft flew each of the two coastal by Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Fontana sweeps; eight maintained a defensive as commanding officer of MAG-33; patrol over the carrier itself; and any Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole, remaining flights were under control of joined MAG-33 staff as personnel officer JOC, with FEAF Mosquitoes providing after being relieved of VMF-312 liaison between fighter-bombers and command by Major Donald P. Frame; ground forces. Major Arnold A. Lund of VMF-323 , relieved by Major Stanley S. Nicolay and To insure sea room beyond the assigned to General Harris' staff as islands and mudbanks of the west assistant operations officer; coast, the Bataan had to stay outside Major William M. Lundin, relieved the 100-fathom curve. This meant that ofVMF-214 command by Major James the pilots must fly across 65 to 80 miles A. Feeney, Jr., and transferred to the of open sea in order to reach the coast. command of Service and Maintenance The winter weather varied from Squadron-33 (SMS 33). unbelievable to unbearable, and bulky, uncomfortable survival suits were a This left only Lieutenant Colonel necessity. They could be a death trap, Richard W. Wyczawski ofVMF-212 and however, if a leak developed or if they Lieutenant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, were not adjusted tightly at the throat Jr., ofVMF(N)-542 still in command of and wrists. Captain Alfred H. Agan, for the tactical squadrons they brought to instance, was shot down southeast of Korea; and the latter was to be relieved Inchon and had to choose between by Lieutenant Colonel James R. landing in enemy territory and ditching Anderson in February. in the sea. He tried for a small island offshore but crash-landed into the surf. The only combat operations of the Before a helicopter from the Bataan 1st MAWduring the week of could fly 65 miles to the rescue, he died housekeeping from 16 to 23 January from the shock of icy water which were carried out by VMF-212 from the partially filled his survival suit. deck of the Bataan. This CVL carrier alternated with the British light fleet The pilots of VMF-212 reported an carrier HMS Theseus on the Korean increase in enemy antiaircraft fire, west coast blockade. Their activities particularly in CCF rear areas. They were coordinated by Vice Admiral were amazed to find troops dug in along Andrewes, RN, commanding the group the coast as far back as 50 or 60 miles 21 from the battle lines. These precautions were the enemy's tribute to Marine Marine Rice Paddy Patrols capabilities for amphibious warfare. The fear of another Inchon caused the Operations of the first few days Chinese to immobilize thousands of demonstrated to 1st Marine Division men on both coasts to guard against ground forces that locating the enemy another such decisive landing far was more of a problem than defeating behind the front. him. Obviously, the NKPAlOth Division had few if any of the advantages which On the squadron's third day of sea make for effectiveguerrilla warfare. Far operations, three planes were hit by rifle from receiving any voluntary support and machine gun fire on from the inhabitants, the Korean Reds reconnaissance missions. One of them, had their own movements promptly flown by Captain Russell G. Patterson, reported to the Marines. Retaliations on Jr., was shot down behind the enemy civilians, such as burning mountain lines but a FEAFhelicopter rescued the villages, were not calculated to improve pilot. First Lieutenant Alfred J. Ward relations. Nor did the enemy possess was not so fortunate. His plane was any of the other requisites for riddled the followingday by enemy fire successful operations in an opponent's and he crashed to his death in the rear, a base, a source of supply, good midst of CCF soldiers. communications, and a reliable intelligence system. Not until 22 January did the reconditioning of Bofu reach such an If it came to a fight, there could be advanced stage that Lieutenant Colonel little doubt about the outcome. But Fontana could set up his MAG-33 Marine staff officers must have been command post. VMF-312 moved in the reminded of the old recipe for rabbit pie next day and the first combat missions which begins, "First, catch your rabbit." were launched to the vicinity of Seoul, 300 miles away. On the 24th General Such a situation called for Harris established his headquarters. A systematic patrolling in all Marine few hours later VMF-214 and VMF-323 zones of action. Secondary roads and arrived from Itami, where they had put mountain trails were covered by "rice in an idle week, with no place to go, paddy patrols." Numbering from four after their carrier duty. On the 26th, men to a squad, these groups ranged when they flew their first missions as far and wide on foot in an area that was land-based squadrons, MAG-33was more often vertical than horiontal. On a back in business and Bofu was a going single day the 5th Marines alone had 29 concern. of these rice paddy patrols in action. No better training for replacements could No such claim could have been have been devised. Sometimes the men made for MAG-12and K-l. Although were on their own for several days, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton set up his depending for supplies on helicopter command post on 27 January 1951, drops. And while casualties were light, two more weeks were to pass before the there was just enough danger from K-1 runway was fit for the flights to sniping and potential ambushes to keep tactical aircraft. Meanwhile, the MAG- the replacements on the alert. 12 squadrons had to make out as best they could at K-9. Roads fit for vehicles, especially the 22 75-mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to the remaining 6 days of the month, only Andong, were under the constant three (10 sorties) were in support of the surveillance of motorized patrols, each 1st Marine Division. supported by at least one tank or 195 howitzer. The farthest distance was 15 For routine operations the Marine miles between the main Marine strong ground forces found the support of points at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, VMO-6 sufficient. The nimble little OY and Andong. observation planes were ideal for seeking out an enemy who had to be Close air support was seldom caught before he could be fought. And needed against such an elusive enemy the helicopters did their part by as the Marines faced. General Craig put dropping supplies, evacuating in a request, however, for an air casualties, and laying wire. squadron to be based at Pohang or Pusan (Map 2). The two Marine all- Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Aircraft weather squadrons, VMF(N)-513 and Wing strengthened its administrative VMF(N)-542, were General Harris' first ties with the I st Marine Division. and second choices. They had been Although the two organizations had no flying under Air Force (314th Air common operational commander other Division) control in the defense of than General MacArthur, they Japan, a mission of dull routine and maintained a close liaison. Harris waiting for something to break the attached two TBM Avengers to VMO-6 monotony of patrolling. for use as radio relays when ground-to- '-- ground communications failed in the The twtn-engmed F7F-3N Ttgercats mountainous Pohang-Andong area. He of VMF(N)-542 were well equipped with also set up daily courier flights, at electronics equipment for night General Smith's request, to provide fast interceptor work. VMF(N)-513 flew F4U- administrative liaison between widely SNs, the night-fighter modification of dispersed Marine air and ground units the latest Corsair. in Korea and Japan.

General Harris' plan for VMF(N)- To be Continued 542 to take over the duties ofVMF(N)- 513 at ltazuke had the approval of General Partridge. This made it possible The fates willing and the creek don't to send the latter squadron to K-9 at rise, you will have received this Pusan to replace the VMF-311 jets, newsletter, Volume I Number 7, along which in turn left for ltami to await with all the lATE back issues. As I said corrections of engineering defects. once before, our problem was getting the computer/scanner hookup up and VMF(N)-513 flew its first combat working. We finally accomplished that, missions from K-9 on 22 January. though somewhat belatedly and These consisted of routine armed crudely, but it works sufficient to make reconnaissance flights and an it possible to get these articles we are occasional deep support mission for the finding, printed in reasonable time, Eighth Army. Not until the 25th did the along with the selected chapters from squadron respond to a request from the 5 volume History of Marine Marine ground forces. And out of 49 Operations in Korea. I am hopeful we combat missions (110 sorties) during will keep it timely.