Nuclear Developments NUCLEAR-RELATED TRADE AND COOPERATION DEVELOPMENTS FOR SELECTED STATES, JULY-OCTOBER 1996

CONTENTS

ARGENTINA CANADA GERMANY China, India, and Russia, 121 Internal Developments, 119 with: with: Germany, 123 India, 123 Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Russia, and ARMENIA Poland, Russia, and Switzerland, 124 with: CHINA Slovakia, 119 Kazakstan, and United European Union and Internal Developments, 120 Brazil, 120 States, 124 Russia, 119 with: Iran, 123 Russia, and Ukraine, 124 India, Iran, and Russia, 121 AUSTRALIA Iran, Russia, and Switzer- United Kingdom and United Iran, 121 with: land, 124 States, 124 Pakistan, 121 Iran and United States, 123 Iraq, 125 Russia, 121 IRAQ Taiwan, 132 Iraq, Jordan, Singapore, and Internal Developments, 125 CYPRUS Switzerland, 126 AZERBAIJAN with: with: Russia, 130 Internal Developments, 119 Germany, 125 Georgia, 122 with: GUINEA BISSAU Germany, Jordan, Singapore, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and CZECH REPUBLIC with: and Switzerland, 126 United Kingdom, 119 Italy, Libya, Portugal, with: ISRAEL Belarus, Germany, Poland, Russia, United States, and BELARUS Internal Developments, 126 Russia, and Slovakia, 119 Zaire, 127 with: ITALY Czech Republic, Germany, INDIA EUROPEAN UNION with: Poland, Russia, and Internal Developments, 122- with: Guinea Bissau, Libya, Slovakia, 119 123 Armenia and Russia, 119 Portugal, Russia, United Russia, 119 with: States, and Zaire, 127 FRANCE Canada, 123 BRAZIL with: China, Iran, and Russia, 121 JAPAN Internal Developments, 120 Russia, 130 Russia, 123 Internal Developments, 126 with: Russia and United States, 130 United States, 123 with: Germany, 120 Vietnam, 133 Russia, 127 IRAN BULGARIA United States, 127 GEORGIA Internal Developments, 123 with: with: with: JORDAN Russia and Ukraine, 130 Cyprus, 122 Australia and United States, with: 123 Germany, Iraq, Singapore, China, 121 and Switzerland, 126

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KAZAKSTAN RUSSIA SWITZERLAND with: Internal Developments, 129 with: Iran and United States, 124 with: Germany, Iran, and Armenia, and European Russia, 124 KYRGYZSTAN Union, 119 Germany, Iraq, Jordan, and with: Belarus, 119 Singapore, 126 Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Belarus, Czech Republic, United Kingdom, 119 TAIWAN Germany, Poland, and Internal Developments, 132 LIBYA Slovakia, 119 with: with: Bulgaria and Ukraine, 130 Australia, 132 Guinea Bissau, Italy, Portu- China, 121 Russia, 131 gal, Russia, United States, China, India, and Iran, 121 and Zaire, 127 France, 130 UKRAINE France and United with: LITHUANIA States, 130 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and with: Germany, 130 United Kingdom, 119 Russia, 127 Germany, Iran, and Switzer- Bulgaria and Russia, 130 Ukraine, 127 land, 124 Iran and Russia, 124 MIDDLE EAST Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, Lithuania, 127 with: Portugal, United States, and Middle East, 132 Ukraine, 132 Zaire, 127 Russia, 131 India, 123 Russia and Slovakia, 130 NORTH KOREA Iran and Ukraine, 124 Russia and United States, 131 with: Japan, 127 KOREAN PENINSULA Lithuania, 127 UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY DEVELOPMENT Norway and Sweden, 130 with: ORGANIZATION Slovakia and Ukraine, 130 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and (KEDO), 128 South Korea, 131 Ukraine, 119 Taiwan, 131 Iran and United States, 124 NORWAY Pakistan, 129 with: Ukraine, 131 Russia and Sweden, 130 Ukraine and United UNITED STATES States, 131 with: PAKISTAN United States, 131 Australia and Iran, 123 Internal Developments, 128 France and Russia, 130 with: SLOVAKIA with: Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, China, 121 Portugal, Russia, and United Kingdom, 129 Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, and Zaire, 127 POLAND Russia, 119 India, 123 with: Russia and Ukraine, 130 Iran and Kazakstan, 124 Belarus, Czech Republic, Iran and United Germany, Russia, and SINGAPORE Kingdom, 124 Slovakia, 119 with: Japan, 127 Germany, Iraq, Jordan, and Russia, 131 PORTUGAL Switzerland, 126 Russia and Ukraine, 131 with: Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, SOUTH KOREA VIETNAM Russia, United States, and with: with: Zaire, 127 Russia, 131 France, 133 SWEDEN ZAIRE with: with: Norway and Russia, 130 Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, Portugal, Russia, United States, 127

116 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments

OVERVIEW

During the period July-October 1996, nuclear activities headquarters. At the meeting, members approved plans to in several states of concern continued to pose challenges to begin physical work at the Sinpo site. The reactors are sched- the nonproliferation regime, as did problems in the Newly uled to be completed in 2003, but KEDO officials admitted Independent States (NIS) and China. In South Asia, de- that this is a “difficult timetable,” particularly in light of the velopment of uranium enrichment (Pakistan) and plutonium delays caused initially by U.S. funding problems and, dur- reprocessing (India) facilities heightened tensions. In the ing the fall, by North Korean actions. A North Korean Middle East, Iraq’s recalcitrance vis-à-vis the United Na- submarine incursion into South Korean territory in Sep- tions Special Commission’s (UNSCOM’s) continuing in- tember caused South Korea to halt construction at the Sinpo spections was overshadowed by new revelations that a site. South Korea was awaiting an apology from Pyongyang German nuclear technician contributed significantly to before it resumed construction. Also raising concerns was Baghdad’s uranium enrichment program. In the NIS, sev- the fact that North Korea still has not allowed the IAEA to eral smuggling incidents occurred. Finally, the incursion of verify its initial declaration of nuclear materials. a North Korean submarine into South Korea, among other The arms race between India and Pakistan continued as factors, interrupted implementation of the Korean Penin- both sides augmented their respective nuclear capabilities. sula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) agree- U.S. intelligence sources accused Islamabad of building a ments. uranium enrichment plant near Rawalpindi that can produce Incidents of nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling highly enriched uranium. The plant is being built in coop- were reported in six former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, eration with China, which has also shipped a specialized Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. The industrial furnace and diagnostic equipment to Pakistan’s largest seizure—110 kilograms of zirconium powder (a dual- heavy-water reactor site at Khushab. Meanwhile, India ex- use material used in fuel rod claddings as well as in nuclear panded its nuclear capability, as a new plutonium reprocess- weapon components)—was made in Saratov, Russia. Other ing plant at Kalpakkam neared completion. seizures included gram and kilogram quantities of uranium, In the Persian Gulf region, the Iranian nuclear program gram quantities of plutonium, and gram quantities of an uni- suffered a setback when U.K. customs officials seized a ship- dentified radioactive substance. In order to combat such ment of maraging steel bound for Tehran, which could have smuggling across its territory, the Cypriot parliament passed been used to make uranium-enrichment centrifuges. At the legislation allowing the government to seize a shipment of Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russian contractors have also nuclear-related goods from Georgia that was bound for an experienced significant engineering difficulties that could unnamed destination in the Middle East. substantially raise construction costs and delay completion Nuclear-related cooperation between the United States of the plant until after 2003. In particular, Russian workers and Russia gathered pace as the two countries agreed to a are having trouble fitting the Russian-designed VVER re- five-year program to develop fuel cell technologies (the actor equipment into the German-designed plant due to dif- Russian-American Fuel Cell Consortium). About 150 com- ferences in the equipment’s technical specifications. panies are expected to join the program, which may be ex- Meanwhile, Iraq continued its pattern of confrontation tended beyond the initial five years. Also, the United States with UNSCOM, as inspectors were denied access to a sus- during the fall of 1996 was considering the sale of Convex pect site on two occasions, in July and August 1996. Evi- SPP-2000 supercomputers to Russia, which planned to use dence about Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program continued the computers for activities related to the Comprehensive to surface following Hussein Kamel’s defection in August Test Ban Treaty. However, nonproliferation analysts warned 1995. In particular, new evidence suggests that German of possible misuse of the supercomputers, which are power- nuclear technician Karl-Heinze Schaab, the owner of Rosch ful enough to be used for nuclear weapon development. GmbH and former MAN Technolgie employee, was a ma- KEDO held its first general conference at its New York jor supplier of uranium enrichment technology to Iraq.

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 117 Nuclear Developments

Schaab allegedly provided Iraq with drawings and equip- NOTE: ment for uranium enrichment centrifuges. He also sold A date marked with an “*” indicates that an event was Baghdad a carbon-fiber-filament winding machine, which reported on that date; a date without an “*” is the date was later confiscated in Jordan along with other centrifuge when an event actually occurred. equipment. Schaab did not deny helping the Iraqi uranium enrichment program, adding that other German specialists The numbers listed in parentheses following the biblio- were also involved. graphic references refer to the identification number of the document in the CNS Nuclear Database from which the news In Latin America, Brazil resumed expansion of its previ- summaries are abstracted. Because of the rapidly changing ously stalled nuclear program with the benefit of interna- nature of the subject matter, The Nonproliferation Review tional assistance, a result of its 1994 ratification of a is unable to guarantee that the information reported herein safeguards agreement. Brasilia plans to complete the Angra- is complete or accurate, and disclaims liability to any party 2 reactor by mid-1999, and may build Angra-3 as the first of for any loss or damage caused by errors or omissions. an advanced pressurized water reactor design to be called the Brazil Standard Nuclear Power Plant.

Kimber Cramer, Andrew Koch, and R. Adam Moody

118 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments

transit cargoes crossing Ukrainian territory are subject to customs control and must have ARGENTINA AZERBAIJAN appropriate documentation, including per- mission from the Ukrainian Governmental Commission on Export Control. Yanina Sokolovskaya, Izvestiya, 9/6/96, p. 3; in INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WPS, 9/17/96, p. 1 (15662). Aleksandr Korchinskiy, INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS Kievskiye Vedomosti, 8/31/96, pp. 1, 9 (15662). 9/9/96 8/16/96* Mikhail Melnik, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 8/30/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-171, 8/30/96 (15984). Felipe Sapag, governor of Argentina’s Azerbaijani police arrested four Baku resi- Neuquen province, and Anibal Nunez, head dents, one of whom was a scientist from the of the Neuquen Engineering Service Com- Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences, for pos- pany, signed an agreement to provide $130 session of 2 kg of uranium. The four had BELARUS million for modernizing the Arroyito heavy acquired the uranium for $38,000 and in- water plant. Initially, it will produce 508 MT tended to sell it abroad. The origin of the of heavy water for use in Argentina’s nuclear confiscated material has not yet been deter- power plants. mined, and an investigation is under way. Arif Useinov, Segodnya, 8/16/96, p. 6 (15642). Telam (Buenos Aires), 9/9/96; in FBIS-LAT-96-185, BELARUS WITH CZECH REPUBLIC, 9/23/96 (15749). GERMANY, POLAND, RUSSIA, AND AZERBAIJAN WITH KYRGYZSTAN, SLOVAKIA 9/29/96* UKRAINE, AND UNITED KINGDOM 10/13/96 In response to budget cuts and the reduction 8/20/96 German customs officials detained a truck of the National Nuclear Regulatory Agency’s The Ukrainian Customs Service detained an transporting radioactive scrap metal from (ENREN) staff to 200, general manager An- aircraft with 229 kg of radioactive materi- Russia to Germany at a checkpoint on the tonio Oliveira said, “ENREN will be ren- als and more than 3 MT of explosive sub- German-Czech border near the Czech town dered incapable of conducting inspections.” stances, including detonators and fuses, on of Yirzhikov. An investigation revealed that ENREN is responsible for implementing board. The IL-76, belonging to the Lviv the truck belonged to a Slovak transporta- Argentina’s safeguards obligations, includ- State Aviation Enterprise, was on interna- tion firm, which was transporting the scrap ing monitoring fissile material at 41 facili- tional flight UKR 9463 from Maastricht metal purchased by a German firm in Russia ties. (Netherlands) to Lviv (Ukraine) then Baku via Belarus and Poland. The truck was re- Clarin (Buenos Aires), 9/29/96; in FBIS-LAT-96- (Azerbaijan), and was detained after land- 194, 9/29/96 (15973). turned to the Czech Republic. ing at Lviv Airport. The crew of the aircraft Pravda-Pyat’, 10/15/96, p. 3 (15696). had permission to transport the cargo of Radium- 226, Cesium-137 and Americium- BELARUS WITH RUSSIA ARMENIA 261 to Baku, where another aircraft was to 7/3/96 fly the fissile material to Bishkek, Belarusian presidential aide Sergey Kyrgyzstan. However, Ukrainian nuclear Posokhov announced Belarus’ intention to specialists suspect that the radioactive ma- postpone the transfer of the remaining 18 terials were illegally brought to Ukraine for ARMENIA WITH EUROPEAN UNION AND strategic nuclear missiles on its territory un- burial in Zheltyye Vody. The Azerbaijani In- RUSSIA less Russia provides adequate compensation ternational Operational Company (AIOC) for the nuclear material. Belarusian officials 8/25/96 had signed an agreement with the State Pe- denied Russia’s accusation that Belarus had In Moscow, Russian First Deputy Premier troleum Company to develop three oil fields not fulfilled its commitment to withdraw the Aleksei Bolshakov and Gagik Shakhbazyan, off the Caspian shelf two years earlier. Hav- weapons, and insisted that Belarus was com- Armenia’s minister for relations with the CIS, ing obtained permission to import the ex- mitted to the 12/31/96 deadline. However, the EU, and international economic organi- plosives to Azerbaijan, AIOC experts said Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had zations, signed an agreement that includes an the cargo was to be used to bore wells in the agreed in Minsk in 1995 to transfer the 18 Rb100 billion loan to Armenia for the pur- open sea, 150–180 km southeast of Baku. Topol SS-25 nuclear missiles from Belarus chase of nuclear fuel. The radioactive materials and explosives Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow), 8/28/96, p. 3; in to Russia by 9/1/96. Belarus cited financial were being transported without appropriate FBIS-SOV-96-168, 8/28/96 (15619). problems as the cause of the delay and is now documentation. An investigation in Ukraine asking Russia to pay for the nuclear materi- revealed that the cargo belonged to the Brit- als in the warheads. According to Posokhov, ish company Cayun Aviation Ltd. Accord- Moscow plans to pay the requested compen- ing to the Ukrainian Customs Code, all sation after estimates are made and Belarus

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 119 Nuclear Developments meets the original transfer schedule. 10/31/96 Assuntos Estrategicos, 10/19/96; in FBIS-LAT-96- Disarmament Diplomacy, 7/96-8/96, pp. 48, 49 Reacting to the Council of Europe’s concern 210, 10/19/96 (15930). (15692). Interfax (Moscow), 7/3/96; in FBIS-SOV- that Belarus may not remove the remaining 96-130, 7/3/96 (15794). The Current Digest Of The BRAZIL WITH GERMANY Post-Soviet Press, 7/3/96, p. 19 (15794). Ustina 18 SS-25 nuclear missiles from its territory, Markus, OMRI Daily Digest, 7/8/96 (15794). Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail 8/6/96* Khvostov said that Belarus would transfer According to Pedro Figueiredo, director of 7/11/96 the weapons to Russia by 2001, the deadline thermonuclear production at Furnas Electric Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey stipulated in the 1992 Lisbon Protocol. While Power Plants, $1.2 billion is being invested Sannikov said that Russia’s deal to compen- Belarus has demanded “substantial compen- in the final stage of construction of Brazil’s sate Belarus was almost settled, and that sation,” Russia either cannot or does not want 1,300 MW Angra-2 nuclear power plant. transfer of the last 18 of 76 Russian ICBMs to pay the amount requested. Khvostov said German consortia headed by Dresdner Bank should be completed before the end of 1996. that the Council of Europe’s concern that and KFW will invest almost 50 percent of Disarmament Diplomacy, 7/96-8/96, pp. 48, 49 Belarus might break its promise was “overly the funds for the project. The remainder will (15692). politicized.” be provided by Electrobras and Furnas. Test- Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 11/1/96 (15793). ing of the reactor will begin when all of the 8/1/96 Interfax (Moscow), 10/31/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-213, plant’s equipment is fully assembled, which 10/31/96 (15838). Officers from the elite Alpha unit of the is expected by 12/98. Angra-2 is scheduled Belarusian National Security Committee to commence operations in 6/99. In order to (KGB) in Borisov arrested five Belarusian finish the project, Nuclebras Engineering Inc. businessmen attempting to sell 42 g of a ra- BRAZIL (Nuclen) will receive Furnas’ 1997 budget dioactive substance, most likely of Russian allocation for construction, as well as funds origin, to middlemen. Six containers had from the sale of the government-owned Light been stored in the cellar of one of the Power Services. businessmen’s homes. According to Mariza Louven, Gazeta Mercantil (Sao Paulo), 8/6/ INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS Gennadiy Senukov, spokesman for the 96, p. C3; in FBIS-LAT-96-156, 8/6/96 (15675). Belarusian KGB, the confiscated materials 9/23/96 Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 10/31/96, pp. 2, 3 The planning director of the Brazilian Elec- (15993). George Vidor, O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), could not have come from Belarusian facili- 11/4/96; in FBIS-LAT-96-217, 11/4/96 (15993). ties because Belarus has no facilities that tric Power Company (Electrobras), said that produce radioactive substances. The value his firm is negotiating with the Brazilian 10/31/96* of the confiscated nuclear material was esti- government to resume construction of the Nuclen will head a project to design a stan- mated at $50,000. When asked to identify Angra-3 nuclear power plant. The statement, dardized advanced pressurized water reac- the nuclear material, Senukov responded: made by Benedito Carraro at the Fifth Rio tor (PWR) in Brazil; Germany’s Siemens will “All I will say is that these containers were de Janeiro Energy Meeting, said construc- provide design technology. According to being readied for shipment out of Belarus.” tion of Angra-3 will be resumed by 6/98. A Brazilian officials, construction of the first Belarusian Review, Fall 1996, p. 19 (15913). study conducted by the National Nuclear advanced PWR for the Brazil Standard Krasnaya zvezda, 8/6/96, p. 1 (15652). Energy Commission (CNEN) and Furnas Nuclear Power Plant could begin in 2002, Electric Power Plants estimated that more 9/13/96 and the reactor could be operational by 2008. than 3.5 billion reals would be needed to Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 10/31/96, pp. 2, 3 Russian Security Council Secretary complete the plant. (15993). Aleksandr Lebed and his Belarusian coun- Jornal Do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), 9/24/96, p. 18; in terpart, Viktor Sheyman, reached an agree- FBIS-LAT-96-188, 9/24/96 (15926). ment to remove the remaining 18 SS-25 ICBMs from Belarus to Russia by the end of 10/19/96 CHINA 1996. Implementation has been obstructed During a symposium on nuclear energy in by Belarus’ concerns over disarmament Brazil, Brazilian Strategic Affairs Secretary funding and NATO expansion. Aleksandr Ronaldo Sardenberg outlined the future of Barkhatov, Lebed’s spokesman, said the fact the Brazilian nuclear program. Sardenberg INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS said Brazil currently operates a pilot-scale that the agreement involved no formal writ- 7/29/96 uranium enrichment lab. Nuclear Industries ten procedure would not impede its fulfill- China detonated a nuclear device at its Lop of Brazil (INB) has signed an agreement with ment. Nor test site (41.77 degrees N, 88.39 degrees Doug Clarke and Saulius Girnius, OMRI Daily Di- the Navy Technology Center to build an en- E) that measured 5.0 on the Richter scale. gest, 9/16/96 (15689). richment plant with a 12,000 SWU capacity After the test, Chinese officials stated that at the Resende Industrial Complex, at a cost the 7/29 detonation would be the final test of 15.5 million reals. Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Brazilian Secretaria De and announced an “indefinite moratorium”

120 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments on nuclear testing. missile defense systems in outer space. Last, 10/10/96* Trust & Verify, 8/96, p. 1 (15743). negotiations should commence to conclude In 9/96, China admitted that it had sold dual- an international convention on the prohibi- use equipment to Pakistan in 1995 and early 9/11/96* tion and eradication of nuclear weapons. 1996, but said that the transfer occurred be- After three years of trial commercial opera- Qian Qichen, Press Release, Embassy of the People’s fore the 5/11/96 pledge not to provide assis- tion, China’s Daya Bay nuclear power plant Republic of China to the United Nations, 9/26/96 (15966). tance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. received its operating certificate from the U.S. intelligence officials confirmed the National Nuclear Safety Administration. The Chinese claim. The equipment included a CHINA WITH INDIA, IRAN, AND RUSSIA plant, located in Shenzhen, Guangdong Prov- specialized industrial furnace and some di- ince, is China’s first nuclear power station 8/16/96* agnostic equipment, apparently headed for to obtain formal certification to operate. According to Lev Ryabev, Russia’s first a heavy-water reactor site at Khushab. China Daily, 9/11/96, p. 5 (15951). deputy minister for atomic energy, Russia has R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 10/10/96, p. A38 signed agreements to provide India, Iran, and (15840). 9/14/96* China with VVER-640 reactors. China’s Chongqing Chuanyi Co., one of Ivan Cheberko, Kommersant-daily (Moscow), 8/16/ CHINA WITH RUSSIA 96, p. 8 (15946). China’s three largest producers of meter in- 10/9/96 struments, has “mastered the technology” to Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor CHINA WITH IRAN manufacture nuclear reactor instrumentation Mikhailov arrived in China to discuss and control systems, a significant indigenous 10/1/96* projects to build a nuclear power plant and a development. Few countries are capable of According to an Iranian military source, Iran uranium enrichment facility in China. producing these instruments, and developed made a formal request to China regarding Mikhailov is scheduled to meet Chinese countries prohibit the transfer of such tech- the dispatch of an Iranian observation team Prime Minister Li Peng on 10/11/96. Rumors nology to China. to China’s next scheduled nuclear test. Iran have circulated that the Russian Ministry of China Daily, 9/14/96, p. 2 (15950). also requested training for 10 or more Ira- Atomic Energy (Minatom) is offering to sell nian personnel at Chinese nuclear weapon highly enriched uranium (HEU) to China, 9/24/96 test sites. possibly as part of a wide-ranging nuclear China was one of the first five countries to Iran Brief, 10/1/96, pp. 4, 5 (15742). cooperation deal which includes production sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of two VVER-design reactors at either (CTBT) after the United States, when the Liaoning or Shanghai. Any reactor deal is treaty was opened for signature at the United CHINA WITH PAKISTAN subject to further approval by Chinese agen- Nations on 9/24/96. 2/12/96* cies. Mikhailov may offer HEU to China as Judy Aita, US Information Agency [Online] Gopher WWW, 9/24/96 (15843). Additionally, China transferred 5,000 ring an incentive to close the deal on the VVERs. magnets to Pakistan for use in a uranium Russian sales of HEU to China would be 9/25/96 enrichment centrifuge. The ability to hold the contingent on a commitment to its peaceful Qian Qichen, China’s vice-premier and min- Chinese government responsible for such use. ister of foreign affairs, outlined China’s po- transfers is complicated by China’s party- Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 10/21/96, p. 10 (15968). sitions on arms control and disarmament government structure. According to a U.S. before the U.N. General Assembly. Qian said Congressional Research Service report, China supports the goal of complete elimi- “many analysts believe that sensitive Chinese nation of all nuclear weapons and views the arms sales are controlled by only a few very CTBT as only the first step in that direction. influential military and political officials in Qian also outlined five major steps that need the Central Military Commission and Polit- to be taken in order to reach that goal. First, buro—and not the weaker Foreign Ministry.” the nuclear weapon states should renounce Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, 2/12/ the policy of nuclear deterrence and continue 96, pp. 1-15 (15964). the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. Sec- ond, nuclear states should pledge not to be 7/2/96* the first to use nuclear weapons under any China has manufactured its first nuclear re- circumstance. Third, nuclear weapons de- actor pressure vessel for a project in Paki- ployed overseas should be completely with- stan. The vessel’s total weight is 205 MT. drawn, and nuclear-weapon-free zones Harbin Heilongjiang, People’s Radio Network, 7/2/ should be established and respected. Fourth, 96; in FBIS-CHI-96-130, 7/2/96 (15841). no state should deploy nuclear weapons or

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 121 Nuclear Developments

dia Radio Network (Delhi) made a contra- ate Government Affairs Committee in 1989, dictory report on the progress of the ATV, Director of Central Intelligence William GEORGIA alleging that India had already successfully Webster said that indicators of work on ther- tested a nuclear submarine at an undisclosed monuclear weapons, such as research on location on the east coast.] lithium separation of stable isotopes, reveal Atul Aneja, Hindu, 7/11/96, p. 14 (16019). All In- that India has an “interest leading towards GEORGIA WITH CYPRUS dia Radio Network (Delhi), 7/8/96; in FBIS-NES- capability.” India’s program includes ura- 96-132, 7/8/96 (16019). 7/13/96 nium and tritium production facilities and an An unnamed senior Cypriot official said that 7/15/96 inertial confinement fusion program at BARC. Inertial confinement fusion technol- equipment “related to nuclear facilities” was D. D. Sood, director of the radio-chemistry ogy is useful in studying hydrogen blast-re- seized at the port of Limassol, Cyprus. The and isotope group of the Bhabha Atomic lated phenomena. The report concludes that, official denied a 7/12/96 report by the tele- Research Centre (BARC), said that a repro- due to its thermonuclear program, India may vision station Antenna that the seized mate- cessing plant at Kalpakkam was nearing have a greater need than Pakistan to conduct rials included spare parts that “could be completion. Sood added that two reprocess- nuclear tests (Pakistan is believed to be de- assembled into a weapon that could carry ing plants are already functioning, at BARC veloping less sophisticated nuclear weap- nuclear warheads.” Antenna reported that the and Tarapur. shipment originated in Georgia and was Hindu, 7/16/96, p. 16 (15977). ons). India has the capacity to weaponize its bound for a country in the Middle East via thermonuclear capability rapidly following Cyprus. The Cypriot parliament passed a law 7/15/96* “modest” testing. on 7/11/96 temporarily granting the govern- Jonathan Medalia, CRS Report For Congress, 7/17/ From 12/96-6/97, three plants will be built 96 (16014). ment the right to confiscate goods “for rea- at India’s Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in sons of public interest or to maintain good Hyderabad, doubling its ability to manufac- 10/14/96 diplomatic relations.” The seized equipment ture uranium dioxide (UO2) pellets. When India’s Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) had arrived in Limassol in 5/96. completed, the NFC will have the capacity established the Indian Atomic Industrial Fo- Reuter, 7/13/96; in Executive News Service, 7/16/ to manufacture 600 MT of UO2 pellets per 96 (15718). rum (IAIF) to assist in commercializing the year. The three new plants will produce UO2, country’s nuclear power sector. Commercial- zirconium, and uranium fuel assemblies. ization would affect 40 major and 500 NFC Chief Executive K. K. Sinha said on 7/ smaller Indian companies, including Bharat INDIA 13/96 that “budgetary sanctions” have al- Heavy Electrical Ltd. (BHEL), Larsen and lowed the expansion plans, at a cost of Toubro, Electronics Corporation of India, Rs2.15 billion. The NFC provides fuel as- Keltron, MTAR, BARC, Indian Rare Earth, semblies to all nuclear reactors in India and NEERI, and the Alloy Steel Plant. The IAIF produces zircaloy components for the Fast INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS plans to develop nuclear power plants both Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) at Kalpakkam. domestically and internationally. 7/11/96* The facility also houses special-purpose fur- India Power Daily, [Online] http:// India will have to wait 10 to 15 years before naces and specialized welding machines. www.power.indiaworld.com, 9/27/96 (15976). India testing a nuclear-powered submarine, Rahul Hindu, 7/15/96, p. 6 (16018). Power Daily, [Online] http://www.power. Roy-Chaudhury, a defense analyst at the In- indiaworld.com, 10/15/96 (15976). stitute of Defence Studies and Analyses said. 7/17/96* Scientists working on the Indian nuclear sub- BARC has had problems with loose inven- 10/24/96* marine program, also known as the advanced tory control. For example, a 2 cm radioac- As part of a plan to expand its nuclear ca- technology vessel (ATV), may soon test an tive “self-serve aluminum ball” was pacity to 20,000 MW by 2020, India wants indigenously built reactor at an undisclosed discovered in a desk drawer in 3/93. Investi- to build 22 nuclear power plants over the next land-based testing facility. “The main tech- gators found no inventory record for any such 20 years at an estimated cost of $25-30 bil- nological problem is to miniaturize the ball, indicating that no one knows how many lion. According to Atomic Energy Commis- nuclear reactor, provide it with a suitable con- may have left the facility. sion Chairman R. Chidambaram, six 500 tainment vessel, and make it compatible with Sumit Ghoshal, Indian Express, [Online] http:// MW reactors are under construction, two of the hull design,” unnamed Indian experts www.express.indiaworld.com, 7/17/96 (15747). which are close to completion. said. The reactor will burn plate-type fuel Neel Patri, Nucleonics Week, 10/24/96, p. 8 (16020). using uranium enriched at a facility in 7/17/96* 10/29/96 Rattenhalli. The submarine is being devel- According to a report by the U.S. Congres- India’s 30 kW Kamini research reactor, oped at centers in Mumbai [Bombay], sional Research Service (CRS), India may which burns Uranium-233 separated from Hyderabad, Delhi, Kalpakkam, and be “pursuing” the development of thermo- thorium as fuel, went critical. The reactor was Vishakhapatnam. [Note: On 7/8/96, All In- nuclear weapons. Testifying before the Sen-

122 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments developed and built in Kalpakkam by BARC INDIA WITH UNITED STATES IRAN WITH AUSTRALIA AND and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic 7/17/96* UNITED STATES Research (IGCAR). India will use the reac- The United States transferred a dual-use Cray 9/9/96* tor for conducting neutron radiography stud- super-computer to India that might facilitate The Australian subsidiary of Varian Associ- ies of irradiated fuel from the FBTR, also its nuclear weapons development effort. ates, a California-based manufacturer spe- located in Kalpakkam. Ghani Eirabie, Nation (Islamabad), 8/28/96, p. 6; in cializing in scientific equipment, supplied Neel Patri, Nucleonics Week, 11/7/96, p. 2 (15991). FBIS-NES-96-170, 8/28/96 (16014). Indian Express, [Online] http://www.express. high-technology items to Iran. According to indiaworld.com, 10/31/96 (15991). shipping documents, Varian’s Australian manufacturing unit Optical Spectroscopy INDIA WITH CANADA IRAN Instruments, formerly known as Tektron, 10/16/96* delivered 140 mass spectrometers, spectro- Following a trip to Canada by Indian Minis- graphs, and photospectrometers to Iran over ter of External Affairs I. K. Gujral, India and three years without obtaining U.S. export li- Canada decided to renew their nuclear co- censes. According to a Varian spokesman, INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS operation. Canada had withheld such coop- the spectrometers were produced in Austra- eration with India after New Delhi tested a 7/5/96* lia, and the shipments “were made in com- nuclear device in 1974. Iran was reportedly able to “steal or secretly pliance with applicable Australian export Express News Service, 10/15/96; in Indian Express, buy” two nuclear weapons. Unnamed U.S. control laws.” The company also required [Online] http://www.express.indiaworld.com, 10/16/ sources are cited as saying that there are 200 that the shipments be made in accordance 96 (15780). specialists and 2,000 researchers working in with the Enhanced Proliferation Control Ini- the nuclear field in Iran. tiative (EPCI), which stipulates that products INDIA WITH: Adil Hussein, Al-Sha’b (Cairo), 7/5/96, p. 5; in FBIS- may not be sold to any entity determined to China, Iran, and Russia, 121 NES-96-137, 7/16/96 (15667). be engaged in weapons production. U.S. li- censing officials admitted that current pro- 8/4/96* INDIA WITH RUSSIA visions of the U.S. trade embargo are unclear According to nuclear specialists, Iran could about restrictions on U.S. overseas subsid- 10/96 acquire a nuclear weapon by 2001. Iran re- iaries’ trade with Iran. Since spectrometers During a visit to India by Russia’s Minister portedly has several top-secret nuclear fa- and similar equipment could be used in ura- of Foreign Economic Relations Oleg cilities that are not safeguarded, the largest nium enrichment, exporters of such devices Davydov, Indian and Russian officials dis- being an underground nuclear facility at are required to obtain export licenses from cussed a deal for the provision of two VVER- Isfahan. Other clandestine Iranian nuclear the U.S. Department of Commerce. The 13 1,000 reactors, expected to be built in installations are the Neka facility, built near unlicensed exports involved spare parts or- Koodankulam. During a 10/28/96 press con- the Caspian Sea, and a facility at Darkhovin, dered by the Atomic Energy Organization ference, Davydov said the two sides are close run by the Revolutionary Guard. of Iran. The last shipment, delivered by to signing a deal, possibly by the end of 1996. Con Coughlin, Sunday Telegraph (London), 8/4/96, Varian’s Salt Lake City branch in 7/95, in- However, a problem may arise over credit p. 20; in FBIS-NES-96-151, 8/4/96 (15703). cluded x-ray tubes. Iran was able to repeat- terms set by Russia. Furthermore, India’s edly avoid the EPCI’s catch-all clause by Nuclear Power Corp. Chairman Y. S. R. 8/11/96* purchasing sensitive dual-use items through Prasad said New Delhi wants the project to Pentagon officials have reportedly consid- unidentified front companies, hospitals, uni- be provided on a turnkey basis. The project’s ered destroying an Iranian nuclear weapons- versities, and foundations. related facility, located 25 miles north of cost has not been announced, but the world Iran Brief, 9/9/96, pp. 3, 4 (16008). market price for two VVER-1,000 reactors, Tehran in the Argoz Mountains. An attack on the facility, which is reported to be lo- generators, design, and construction is ap- IRAN WITH: proximately $1.7 billion. In 1989, Soviet cated “deep underground” and “invulner- President Mikhail Gorbachev and Indian able” to attack by conventional weapons, China, 121 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an ac- would halt further development of the Ira- China, India, and Russia, 121 cord to supply the two reactors, but the deal nian nuclear weapons program. Iran is not was suspended following the collapse of the expected to have the capability to produce a IRAN WITH GERMANY Soviet Union. nuclear weapon before 2000. 7/24/96 Aleksandr Koretskiy, Kommersant-daily (Moscow), Uzi Mahnaimi and James Adams, Sunday Times, An Iranian construction worker was irradi- 10/31/96, p. 4; in FBIS-SOV-96-213, 10/31/96 [Online] http://www.sunday-times.co.uk, 8/11/96 (16020). Wall Street Journal, [Online] http:// (15811). ated by Iridium-142 at the Gilan combined- www.interactive5.wsj.com, 10/28/96 (16020). Neel cycle gas plant near the city of Rasht. The Patri, Nucleonics Week, 10/24/96, p. 8 (16020). worker found the unshielded iridium, which had been misplaced for about two hours, and

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 123 Nuclear Developments

“carried it to another part of the construc- However, Western firms will not join the ventory.” tion site.” The incident was reported to the project as long as the United States opposes Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, 10/24/96, IAEA by the Atomic Energy Organization it. Iran has paid Russia less than $100 mil- p. 3 (15923). of Iran (AEOI) on 7/31/96. According to lion for its work and will not make further Hamshahri, a Tehran city government news- payments until Minatom commits to a “firm IRAN WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE paper, 50 people were exposed to radiation, completion deadline.” Participating Russian 7/4/96* including seven engineers from the German companies refuse to accept a deadline be- Ukraine will participate in a Russian-Iranian firm Siemens. The paper also reported that cause of numerous unsolved technical prob- nuclear project by supplying a turbine for the incident resulted in the hospitalization lems at Bushehr, as well as concerns about the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The tur- of 21 people. The AEOI denied the reports, having to pay large penalties if the reactors bine will be manufactured at the Kharkiv referring to testing results that showed that are not completed on time. Turbatom factory. According to the terms of only the one worker was injured. According Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 9/26/96, pp. 3, 4 the contract, Ukraine will supply the 1,000 to a press release issued by Siemens, no Ger- (16009). MW turbine and other equipment to Iran by man workers were injured. According to the end of 1998. The Sumy Pump Factory, “Western intelligence experts” the radiation IRAN WITH KAZAKSTAN AND also in Ukraine, produces pumps for nuclear incident occurred at the secret Neka nuclear UNITED STATES power plants and is expected to participate facility near the Caspian Sea. Unnamed Ira- 10/10/96 in the $50 million project. nian reports cited in London’s Sunday Tele- According to a U.S. Department of Energy Peter Coryn, Nucleonics Week, 7/11/96, pp. 1, 11 graph state that the Neka facility is part of (DOE) memo, a discrepancy exists between (15812). Interfax (Moscow), 7/4/96; in FBIS-SOV- 96-131, 7/4/96 (15812). Iran’s nuclear weapons development pro- the amount of highly enriched uranium gram. (HEU) acquired from Kazakstan in 11/94 IRAN WITH UNITED KINGDOM AND Nucleonics Week, 8/8/96, p. 6 (15770). Nuclear under Project Sapphire and the amount mea- News, 9/96, p. 32 (15770). New York Times, 8/1/96, UNITED STATES p. A4 (15770). NucNet News, [Online] http:// sured during processing at a U.S. plant. A www.aey.ch, 7/31/96 (15770). Con Coughlin, Sun- DOE official said the difference amounts to 8/11/96* day Telegraph (London); in Washington Times, 8/ 120 lb, enough to produce two nuclear weap- British Customs seized a 110 lb consignment 15/96, p. A15 (15770). ons. The DOE source, as well as other gov- of U.S.-origin maraging steel bound for the ernment sources, are concerned that the Iranian military. The shipment of specialized IRAN WITH GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND material may have been diverted, through steel, which could be used to produce cen- SWITZERLAND theft or sale, to a state like Iran that is ac- trifuges for a uranium enrichment program, 9/26/96* tively seeking materials to build a nuclear was estimated to cost $25,000. Customs of- Russian companies participating in the con- arsenal. The memo said that independent ficers at the London port of Barking discov- struction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power analysis conducted by a DOE laboratory ered the steel in a container depot in 3/96. A plant failed to supply Tehran with VVER- confirmed the discrepancy. A DOE source U.S. company delivered the steel, believing type reactor equipment as stipulated under said the diversion could have occurred dur- that the order was made by Eurotrade, a Brit- an $800 million contract. Officials from the ing the time between the plant inspection and ish defense company. A spokesman for the Russian firms said “metallurgical specifica- the arrival of the air force C-5 cargo jets that unnamed U.S. company stated, “Eurotrade tions” of the German equipment, installed at transported the HEU from Kazakstan. Tech- said they wanted it for resale in the United the Bushehr plant by Siemens, do not match nicians noticed the 120 lb discrepancy while Kingdom, and gave us specific assurances it specifications for the Russian equipment. dissolving the uranium-beryllium alloys. But was not for re-export.” According to British According to Russian industry sources, the on 10/23/96, a DOE spokeswoman said there Customs, the smuggler Ali Asghar “optimal solution...would be for Minatom is no conclusive evidence that any material Manzarpouri is a British citizen of Iranian [the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy] to was diverted, since the process of blending- nationality residing in Brighton. down the HEU into low-enriched uranium Con Coughlin, Washington Times, 8/11/96, p. A8 exactly match the metallurgy of the [Russian] (15758). Iran Brief, 9/9/96, p. 2 (15758). UPI, 8/14/ equipment” with that of the equipment in- (LEU) for use at commercial power plants 96; in Executive News Service, 8/14/96 (15758). stalled by Siemens. Such a move would is still in its early stages. The spokeswoman greatly increase the construction costs and also said that the exact amount of HEU con- delay completion of the reactor until after tained in the 2.4 tons of discarded metals, 2003. Russian firms are having trouble fit- oxides, and uranium-beryllium alloys is dif- ting VVER steam generators into the Ger- ficult to determine. According to a DOE man plant design, causing Iran to seek to statement, “lower recovery values during the acquire Siemens steam generators. Iran also beginning of a material recovery process are seeks to expand participation in the project not unusual. Until the campaign is com- to include Western firms such as Electrowatt pletely finished it would be premature to of Switzerland and Hochtief of Germany. apply these results to the entire material in-

124 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments

8/16/96 said Schaab is a principal supplier to Iraq’s Iraq barred UNSCOM inspectors from a nuclear weapons program. A report prepared IRAQ “suspected” weapons storage facility that was by a customs authority unit of the Hesse state the site of a similar confrontation in 7/96. government says that, according to While the UNSCOM team was denied ac- UNSCOM, the know-how, production equip- cess to the facility for two hours, Iraqi oil ment, and materials for Iraq’s gas centrifuge INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS minister Lt. Gen. Mohammed Rasheed, es- program are almost exclusively of German 7/1/96 corting the U.N. inspectors, was permitted origin. In 12/95, the 500-page report on Ger- Following a five-day confrontation between to enter the facility. According to UNSCOM man firms suspected to be involved in the United Nations inspectors and Iraqi officials head Rolf Ekeus, Iraq hid prohibited items deals was released. The report accuses 16 in 6/96, UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus declared prior to the team’s delayed inspection. managers and employees from firms such as that UNSCOM will expand its inspections Evelyn Leopold, Reuter, 8/22/96; in Executive News Frankfurt’s Degussa AG, Hanau’s Leybold Service, 8/26/96 (15704). of suspected Iraqi missile and nuclear facili- AG, and Dieburg’s Reutlinger of participat- ties. The standoff prompted UNSCOM to ing in the development of Iraq’s missile and 9/96 issue “two condemnations and a resolution gas centrifuge programs. The deals were During a 9/96 private discussion in Wash- demanding access to the inspectors.” Sum- worth more than DM21 million. The firms ington, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin marizing a new “joint program of action” named in the report deny any involvement Netanyahu said Iraq possesses enough fis- reached by Ekeus and Iraqi Deputy Prime with Iraq. Although investigators did not find sile material to build a nuclear weapon. Minister Tariq Aziz in 6/96, Ekeus said that any corroborating evidence in Germany, they Netanyahu’s comments were initially re- UNSCOM “will intensify [its] activities in believe evidence had been destroyed before ported in the Israel newspaper Ha’aretz. Iraq.” Ekeus confirmed that Iraq had given the firms’ offices could be searched. Most Later, U.S. defense sources said that neither the United Nations two parts of a weapons of the evidence was found in filing cabinets the CIA nor the Mossad, Israel’s foreign in- of mass destruction (WMD) declaration re- and safes during searches by U.N. inspec- telligence agency, have any evidence to sub- garding chemical and biological weapons, tors in Iraq. The seized documents included stantiate Netanyahu’s claim. and “most probably” had submitted the inspection reports of German-built gas cen- Martin Sieff, Washington Times, 10/22/96, p. A11 trifuge equipment. The report notes that nuclear and missile sections as well. (15992). UPI, 7/1/96; in Executive News Service, 7/2/96 Baghdad’s gas centrifuge was built using (15666). 10/10/96 designs from MAN Technologie. According to Schaab, his involvement with Iraq began Speaking before the U.N. Security Council, 7/20/96 in spring 1989, when four Iraqis visited him IAEA Director General Hans Blix said that Following a 60-hour standoff at an unidenti- at his firm Rosch GmbH in Kaufbeuren. IAEA inspectors have found no forbidden fied Iraqi facility, an UNSCOM team began Dietrich Hinze, co-owner of H+H Iraqi nuclear activities over the past six inspecting Iraqi sites suspected of hiding Metalform, was also there. Schaab said the months. Blix added that the IAEA will con- WMD equipment and documents. The in- Iraqis wanted special pipes and other high- tinue monitoring Iraq’s compliance with U.N. spections, part of a mission to investigate tech equipment. In addition to Schaab, Iraq resolutions because “the know-how and ex- Iraqi concealment techniques, were con- sought engineers who had once worked for pertise acquired by Iraqi scientists and engi- ducted by Nikita Smidovich and three other MAN, a firm specializing in gas centrifuge neers could provide an adequate base of UNSCOM inspectors after the United Na- technology. Schaab worked for MAN from reconstituting a nuclear weapons-based pro- tions Security Council demanded that Iraq 9/70 until the end of 1981, and he “almost gram.” grant unrestricted access to the sites. The AFP, 10/10/96; in FBIS-NES-96-199, 10/10/96 exclusively dealt with GUZ [gas centrifuge]” team was escorted by General Dhaif (15940). technology. Schaab said two former senior Akbdulmajeed, Iraq’s Military Industrializa- MAN employees, Bruno Stemmler, who was tion Commission chairman. UNSCOM head IRAQ WITH GERMANY a separation process expert and Walter Rolf Ekeus said that during the confronta- Busse, who “knew a lot about pipes,” were 9/16/96* tion, the inspectors “were not even allowed involved in the gas centrifuge program as German technician Karl-Heinz Schaab, ac- to come close” to the site. Iraqi guards barred well. Schaab said “they supplied the [gas cused of contributing to Iraq’s nuclear weap- the inspectors from using a road to the site, centrifuge] plans to Baghdad,” and noted that ons program, has been in hiding since 1/96, claiming that it led through a “presidential one Iraqi told him “other German experts attempting to avoid prosecution by area.” were also involved, at least two people.” He Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor. Reuter, 7/20/96; in Executive News Service, 7/22/ said that even though everything “went in the Schaab allegedly supplied Iraq with classi- 96 (15945). Leon Barkho, Reuter, 7/22/96; in Ex- direction of GUZ” he thought “they [Iraq] ecutive News Service, 7/22/96 (15945). Robert H. fied centrifuge technology used for enrich- would never make it.” It was only after U.N. Reid, Washington Times, 7/18/96, p. A11 (15945). ing uranium. In addition to the German inspectors found 147 boxes of information government accusations, the United Nations about Iraq’s defense program that Schaab

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 125 Nuclear Developments was suspected of being a major supplier. built by Siemens. In addition to the winding not foresee any possibility of setting up a According to Horst Robert Puetter, one of machine, the IAEA also discovered auxil- nuclear power plant in Israel in the near fu- the U.N. inspectors, and a former colleague iary equipment such as O-rings and uranium ture.” The IEC was prepared to build a of Schaab, the boxes contained important gas hexafluoride (UF6) resistant valves in Jor- nuclear power plant and conducted a survey centrifuge drawings. The documents carried dan; these were produced by the Swiss com- of possible sites in the Negev desert. Sharon a “MAN logo and a separate stamp.” The pany Cetec. The centrifuge equipment’s proposed that the IEC delay construction of name “Rosch” also appears frequently as one seizure raised suspicion that, prior to the a nuclear power plant until a more appropri- of the main suppliers of “key components of 1990-91 Gulf War, Iraq may have diverted ate time. GUZ” technology. Puetter said Baghdad de- to Jordan even more of its nuclear technol- Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 8/24/96; in FBIS-NES-96- scribed Schaab as the “key figure in the de- ogy than has been tracked by the IAEA. An 166, 8/24/96 (15679). velopment of the Iraqi GUZ program.” unnamed U.S. arms control official said: Schaab later admitted that he earned “We’re worried they may have an entire cen- 8/31/96* DM980,000 from the deals, and that he “trav- trifuge manufacturing set-up outside Iraq.” According to a report published by the Brit- eled to Iraq four or five times” and “helped Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 9/19/96, pp. 1, 11, ish defense publisher Jane’s Information the authorities there.” Investigators from 12 (15970). Group, Israel possesses 100 to 300 nuclear Germany’s Federal Office of Criminal Inves- warheads. Several unnamed retired Israeli tigations (BKA) believe Schaab is some- generals confirmed the Jane’s estimate, say- where in Brazil. ISRAEL ing “everything that was said is true.” Der Spiegel, 9/16/96, pp. 29-33 (16016). Der Dmitriy Kulik, Komsomolskaya pravda, 8/31/96, p. Spiegel, 9/16/96, pp. 32, 33 (16016). Focus 3 (15665). (Munich), 9/16/96, p. 11; in FBIS-WEU-96-181, 9/ 16/96 (15816). INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS JAPAN IRAQ WITH GERMANY, JORDAN, 7/24/96 SINGAPORE, AND SWITZERLAND A U.S. military source said that U.S. defense 9/19/96* officials do not know the extent of Israel’s In Jordan, the IAEA has confiscated an Iraqi nuclear weapons program, nor the amount INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS of money invested in it, because Israel has carbon-fiber-filament winding machine, 7/22/96* which can be used to produce gas centrifuges. not disclosed information on its nuclear ca- According to the North Korean state-run ra- The equipment was allegedly built for Iraq’s pacity. Experts in the U.S. military believe dio station, Japan has stockpiled enough plu- uranium enrichment program by Karl-Heinz that Israel has 20 to 30 nuclear weapons and tonium to build 3,000 crude nuclear Schaab, a former employee of German’s would likely deliver them by air. weapons. Japan is building a plutonium re- MAN Technologie. Schaab arranged to send Barbara Opall, Defense News, 7/29/96, pp. 3, 56 (15700). processing plant with a capacity of 5 MT of the equipment to Iraq through a Swiss com- plutonium per year in Rokkasho-mura and pany and a middleman in Singapore, and then 7/25/96* plans to stockpile 100 MT of plutonium over to Jordan. Although Iraq was the intended Disputes about Israel’s budget revealed that the next 20 years. The Japanese have 150 final destination, the delivery to Baghdad the Nuclear Research Center (NRC) at firms and 3,200 plants capable of producing was hindered by the 1990-91 Gulf War and Dimona is funded through the defense bud- nuclear warheads, enabling Tokyo to produce subsequent U.N. inspections. Iraq allegedly get and that soldiers from the Israel Defense a nuclear weapon within a week. ordered Jordan to “dispose of” the machine Forces (IDF) are stationed there. The pre- Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), as well as other related components. On 9/ liminary version of the 1997 budget allocates 7/22/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-144, 7/22/96 (15711). 16/96, German officials said the IAEA had 110.55 million shekels to the Israel Atomic confirmed in 1995 that Jordan kept a car- Energy Commission (IAEC) for the nuclear 9/6/96 bon-fiber-filament winding machine built by reactors at Dimona and Nahal Soreq. Ac- Shumpei Tsukahara, head of Japan’s Minis- Schaab for Iraq. Sources say that Schaab is cording to the IDF, the NRC is funded by try of International Trade and Industry known to have built at his German company the Ministry of Defense at a level far beyond (MITI), said the Japanese government will another winding machine, which was pro- the IAEC budget allocation. not abandon plans to build a nuclear power grammed to wind about 50 carbon-fiber ro- Aluf Ben, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), 7/25/96, p. B4; in plant in the town of Maki, despite results of tor tubes. The tubes were sold to Iraq around FBIS-NES-96-145, 7/25/96 (15698). a local referendum opposing the project. 1989. According to unnamed sources, However, Maki Mayor Takaki Sasagushi Schaab built the winding machine at his con- 8/24/96* said the town will not sell a parcel of land sulting firm, Rosch GmbH in Kaufbeuren, National Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco) needs Germany, using electronic control equipment met with the Israel Electric Corporation to build the plant. In 1981, MITI approved (IEC) board of directors and said he “does plans to build at least one 825 MW boiling

126 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments water reactor (BWR) in Maki. The referen- 1,000 “operation regimes,” including acci- ket. Police in Sicily wire-tapped a phone dum is not legally binding. The Maki refer- dents. The training center in Novovoronezh conversation in which Vilarino told Monteiro endum is a major setback to Japan’s nuclear will train specialists from Russia, other coun- that, “with this material we can build a poor power industry, may affect nuclear power tries in the CIS, and Western Europe. man’s nuclear bomb, something that can al- policy, and is likely to prompt referenda in Gennadiy Litvintsev, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 7/30/96, ways be sold to the Mafia, to Libya, or in the other municipalities. A petition for a similar p. 1 (15646). United States.” Monteiro denied that he was referendum has been filed in Hamaoka, a smuggler, insisting that he was helping the where Chuba Electric Power Co. operates JAPAN WITH UNITED STATES Russian secret service to retrieve red mer- four BWRs. In the towns of Kushima, 8/96 cury smuggled out of the Soviet Union in Kubokawa, Nanto, and Kisei, referenda are In 8/96, diplomatic notes were exchanged by 1989. According to Sicilian police, five ad- required before proposed nuclear sites are U.S. and Japanese officials in order to per- ditional uranium bars are hidden “some- accepted, but none of these cities have re- mit five European mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel where.” quested a referendum. plants to be added to Annex 1 of the U.S.- Alfio Sciacca, Corriere Della Sera (Milan), 7/2/96, Kyodo (Tokyo), 9/6/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-174, 9/6/ Japan nuclear cooperation agreement. The p. 1; in FBIS-WEU-96-177, 7/2/96 (15813). Peter Shadbolt, UPI, 7/1/96; in Executive News Service, 96 (15997). Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 8/8/96, additions were approved by the U.S. Con- pp. 1, 1011 (15997). Kyodo (Tokyo), 8/4/96; in FBIS- 7/1/96 (15813). Segodnya, 7/2/96, p. 3 (15813). EAS-96-152, 8/4/96 (15997). Atoms In Japan, 9/ gress on 7/31/96. U.S. House International 96, p. 57 (15997). Affairs Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman requested that a letter of assurance 9/17/96 from the State Department acknowledge the LITHUANIA The Panamanian-registered ship “Eastern need for similar security measures when ship- Hero” arrived at the Japanese port of ping MOX as when shipping bulk plutonium. Mutsuogawara carrying 600 tons of uranium The letter stops short of requiring an armed hexafluoride (UF6). The shipment was escort for the shipments, although Japanese LITHUANIA WITH RUSSIA bound for the Rokkasho-mura uranium en- proposals for alternatives have thus far been 10/31/96* richment plant, which produces 600 SWU rejected. An unnamed Capitol Hill source According to Lithuanian officials from the per year. According to the plant’s operator, said the United States and Japan are negoti- Visaginas Prosecutor’s Office, part of the 100 Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (JNFL), production ating which security measures are to be taken. kg of uranium stolen from the Ignalina Kathleen Hart, NuclearFuel, 8/12/96, p. 5 (15760). capacity will be increased by 1.75 times by nuclear power plant in 1992 has been recov- 1999, and 2.5 times by 2000. Kathleen Hart, NuclearFuel, 8/26/96, pp. 11-12 (15760). ered. Sixteen “pills” [fuel pellets] were un- Kyodo (Tokyo), 9/17/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-181, 9/ 17/96 (15936). earthed not far from Ignalina. Investigators believe the fuel came from the shipment sto- len in 1992. So far, only 10 kg of the 100 kg 10/7/96 LIBYA Hamaoka town officials decided to support that was stolen has been recovered. The the construction of Hamaoka-5, a 1,358 MW whereabouts of the suspects in the case are advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR). unknown. However, one of the suspects, The decision was taken despite a petition by former Ignalina engineer Rinat Salikhov, is LIBYA WITH GUINEA BISSAU, ITALY, town residents for a referendum on the is- believed to be hiding in Russia or one of the sue. The Chubu Electric Power Co. will start PORTUGAL, RUSSIA, UNITED STATES, southern states of the former Soviet Union. AND ZAIRE Interfax (Moscow), 10/31/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-212, building the plant in 1999, with commission- 10/31/96 (15918). ing expected in 2005. 6/13/96 Naoaki Usui, Nucleonics Week, 10/10/96, p. 8 Sicilian arms dealer Pietro Bellia, Portuguese LITHUANIA WITH UKRAINE (15702). businessman Belarmino Vilarino, and Carlos Monteiro from Guinea Bissau, were arrested 7/96* JAPAN WITH RUSSIA for smuggling a 25 kg bar of uranium from In Klaipeda, Lithuania, six people were ar- 7/30/96* Zaire to Italy. The uranium has an estimated rested for attempting to sell 13 kg of ura- A new training simulator, built in coopera- value of $4.25 million. According to the Ital- nium for $300,000. The uranium may have tion with the Japanese firms Mitsubishi and ian police investigation, the uranium was come from a military base in Ukraine or from Marubeni, was opened at the Russian brought to Milan, where Monteiro traded it the Ignalina nuclear power plant, a police Novovoronezh nuclear power plant after al- to Bellia for red mercury concealed in two spokesman said. However, Stanislovas most three years of research, development, champagne bottles. The uranium was next Kayris, an Ignalina official, said the radio- and construction. The new facility is a rep- delivered to Vilarino in the Sicilian city of active material did not come from Ignalina lica of the fourth power unit of the Balakovo Avola; it was then concealed for several days because the nuclear power plant is “closely nuclear power plant and can simulate about prior to its attempted sale on the black mar- guarded.” Lithuanian nuclear experts said the

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 127 Nuclear Developments confiscated uranium could be used in nuclear gram coordinator for the KEDO light water DPRK... and that this is still the case.” It is weapons. This is the fifth such incident in reactor project in Sinpo, North Korea. A of particular importance with regard to the Lithuania in three years. After each incident, contract has not yet been signed. BNFL Inc., spent fuel that North Korea may have re- security has been increased at Ignalina due the U.S. subsidiary of British Nuclear Fuels, moved from its Yongbyon facility, to which to fears that the stolen nuclear materials may received a $500,000 contract to help NAC North Korea has not given the IAEA access. have come from this nuclear power plant. International, based in Atlanta, Georgia, to On 9/17/96, Ho Jin Yun, a DPRK represen- Juris Benders, Dmitriy Novikov, and Tereza complete the canning of 8,000 spent fuel rods tative to U.N. agencies in Vienna, stated that Smirnova, NTV (Moscow), 7/2/96; in FBIS-SOV- from North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor. The North Korea “will not give the IAEA any 96-135, 7/2/96 (15624). canning is expected to be completed in the information whatsoever” about spent fuel first half of 1997. from their Yongbyon reactor “until the new Kathleen Hart, Nucleonics Week, 8/15/96, p. 6 reactors are finished and begin operating.” NORTH KOREA (15741). This statement contradicts North Korea’s agreement in the KEDO-DPRK Supply 9/18/96 Agreement that North Korea must be in com- South Korea caught a North Korean subma- pliance with IAEA safeguards before they rine team on an incursion into South Korea. NORTH KOREA WITH KEDO (KOREAN receive delivery of key nuclear components As a result of the incursion, South Korea has for the reactors. North Korea and the IAEA PENINSULA ENERGY delayed construction of the Sinpo light wa- are scheduled to hold a technical coopera- DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION) ter reactors until North Korea apologizes for tion meeting at the end of 9/96, and the IAEA 7/1/96 the incident. may request clarification of the official’s In response to actions taken recently by the Washington Times, 11/8/96, p. A16 (15798). Deseret News: World & Nation, [Online] http:// statement. U.S. Congress to cut KEDO funding, North www.desnews.com, 11/7/96 (15798). NuclearFuel, 9/23/96, p. 3 (15956). Hans Blix, Dis- Korea, through its official news agency, de- armament Diplomacy, 9/96, pp. 28-30 (15952). clared that if “heavy oil is not supplied in 9/23/96* 10/17/96* time as scheduled, we will be compelled to From 9/10/96 through 9/12/96, KEDO held The Executive Board of KEDO had its first reconsider our nuclear freeze.” As part of its first General Conference at its New York ambassador-level meeting with representa- the foreign aid appropriations bill, Congress headquarters. At the conference, the United tives from the European Commission in has allocated only $13 million of the $25 States, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Brussels, Belgium, where it was decided that million requested by the Clinton administra- Canada, Chile, Finland, Indonesia, and New the European Union (EU) would become a tion to fund KEDO’s purchase of heavy fuel Zealand approved plans to begin physical member of KEDO by the end of 1996. At oil for North Korea. Despite the statement work at the Sinpo, North Korea site, particu- their next meeting in Brussels, scheduled for issued by North Korea, the U.S. State De- larly before the November-December win- 11/11/96, the parties are expected to reach partment remains confident that the United ter season. KEDO’s light-water reactor an agreement making EU membership pos- States will uphold its end of the bargain. “The advisory committee and the spent fuel advi- agreement calls for the delivery of 500,000 sible by the end of the year. sory committee also held sessions. One of Jiji Press Newswire, 10/17/96 (15947). metric tons of oil per annum, and that will the important issues remaining is the amount take place,” said State Department Spokes- and type of compensation that North Korea man Nicholas Burns. should receive for suspending its nuclear KCNA (Pyongyang), 7/1/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-127 (15727). Terukaki Ueno, Washington Times, 7/2/96, power program. Steven Bosworth, KEDO’s PAKISTAN p. A11 (15727). New York Times, 7/2/96, p. A2 executive director, said that the compensa- (15727). tion package might include aid in the form of food. Despite Bosworth’s generally opti- 7/26/96 mistic outlook at the conference, he admit- INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS South Korea’s Korea Exchange Bank an- ted that the scheduled 2003 date of 9/2/96* nounced that it is one of four banks that completion presented “a very difficult time- According to an unpublished IAEA report KEDO has selected to manage the finances table,” due largely to financing problems. In acquired by The Muslim, Pakistan, Algeria, of the $5 billion light water reactor project addition, North Korea has not yet been co- Argentina, Brazil, China, the former Soviet in Sinpo, North Korea. The other three are operative with the IAEA’s verification re- Union, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Ko- Citibank, Tokyo Bank, and Mitsubishi Bank. quirements. On 9/16/96 at the IAEA’s Annual rea, and South Africa have been identified KoreaUpdate, 8/5/96, pp. 4-5 (15767). General Conference in Vienna, Director as having undeclared nuclear facilities and General Hans Blix said that the 1995 safe- “hidden quantities” of nuclear material. The 8/15/96* guards implementation report states that “the report says that Pakistan is “an active nuclear Duke Engineering & Services, based in Char- IAEA remained unable to verify the initial importer and has been willing to use secret lotte, North Carolina, will serve as the pro- declaration of nuclear material made by the

128 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments or illegal means to gain access to the mate- formation. Saleem also sought to procure sics branches of the Saratov District Pros- rial and technologies it desires.” The report nuclear-related materials and arrange lines ecutor General’s Office. The day before their cautions that Pakistan has a number of un- of credit and export licenses for Pakistan’s arrests, the suspects had already sold four declared nuclear sites, including a uranium nuclear program. The British Home Office boxes containing 60 kg of zirconium to conversion plant at Dera Ghazi Khan, ura- said that “since late 1991, Mohammed middlemen. Saratov law enforcement agents nium enrichment facilities at Kahuta, Golra, Saleem has been conducting covert nuclear had learned earlier that 1.5 tons of zirconium and Sihala, a fuel fabrication plant at procurement activities in Britain.” The in- had been stolen from one of Saratov’s de- Chashma, a heavy water production facility formation and materials were provided to the fense plants. at Multan, and a tritium purification plant A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta. Oleg Bedula, Krasnaya zvezda, 8/8/96, p. 4 (15643). south of Rawalpindi. U.S. intelligence Ciaran Byrne and Tim Kelsey, Sunday Times, sources suspect that these facilities are be- [Online] http://www.sunday-times.co.uk, 8/4/96 8/10/96* (15995). ing used to produce highly enriched uranium Several containers holding radioactive iso- (HEU). The United States believes that Pa- topes were discovered in a wooded region kistan broke its promise not to construct an of the Russian Khanty-Mansiyskiy autono- enrichment plant by building one near RUSSIA mous district. Local law enforcement agents Rawalpindi-Islamabad with Chinese help. expect to find the owner of the containers According to an anonymous official source within two to three days by tracing the in Pakistan, the United States is demanding container’s markings. Izvestiya, 8/10/96, p. 1 (15653). on-site inspections of the Pakistani nuclear INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS facilities that do not fall under IAEA safe- guards, but Pakistan has resisted these de- 8/5/96 8/21/96 mands. Pakistan admitted having a facility A special train delivered the first shipment Vladimir Fortov, newly appointed vice- that can produce low-enriched uranium of spent nuclear fuel from Russia’s Pacific prime minister in charge of Russian scien- (LEU), but the United States said Pakistan Fleet to the Mayak reprocessing plant in tific and technical policy and chairman of is building an enrichment facility that can Chelyabinsk. The shipment is being moni- the State Committee on Science and Tech- produce HEU. tored by a special interdepartmental commis- nology, said that preventing “brain drain” Aroosa Alam, The Muslim (Islamabad), 9/2/96, pp. sion. This transfer has been under way since from Russia and providing sufficient financ- 1, 11; in FBIS-NES-96-173, 9/2/96 (15994). Aroosa 8/1/96, but was kept secret due to potential ing for Russian science will be the top pri- Alam, The Muslim (Islamabad), 7/3/96, p. 1; in FBIS- terrorist activity. No shipment had taken orities of the State Committee on Science and TAC-96-008, 7/3/96 (15994). place in the last two years due to financial Technology. constraints and railroad repairs. It is expected Aleksei Makarkin, Segodnya, 8/21/96, p. 2 (15650). 9/7/96 that 700 nuclear fuel rods from the Pacific Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of Pakistan’s Fleet will be delivered to the Mayak plant 8/26/96 Kahuta Research Laboratories, said that his by the end of 1996. According to Russian Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed De- organization has achieved a breakthrough in officials, it could take up to 10 years to de- cree No. 1268 “On Controls Over the Ex- research on controlling vibrations in its ul- liver all the spent fuel from the Pacific Fleet port of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies tracentrifuge machinery. for reprocessing. from the Russian Federation,” which ap- Sohail Abdul Nasir, Nawa-I-Waqt (Rawalpindi), 9/ Yevgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 8/5/ 8/96, pp. 1, 11; in FBIS-NES-96-178, 9/8/96 proves the list of dual-use items and tech- 96; in FBIS-TEN-96-009, 8/5/96 (15637). Nuclear (15980). nologies whose export from Russia is to be Engineering International, 9/96, p. 8 (15637). Nikolay Litkovets, Krasnaya zvezda, 8/7/96, p. 1 controlled by the government. Implementa- PAKISTAN WITH: (15660). Interfax (Moscow), 7/19/96; in FBIS-TEN- tion of the decree will bring Russia into com- 96-008, 7/19/96 (15660). China, 121 pliance with the Wassenaar agreements on export regulations of conventional arms and 8/8/96 dual-use technologies and goods. The decree PAKISTAN WITH UNITED KINGDOM Law enforcement agents from the Saratov will enter into force on 11/26/96. 7/96 organized crime unit arrested eight Saratov Nikolay Nikonorov, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9/3/96, p. Mohammed Saleem, an employee at residents as they attempted to sell 110 kg of 6 (15657). Segodnya, 8/29/96, p. 1 (15657). Pakistan’s high commission in London, was zirconium powder to a buyer who paid deported after the U.K.’s Security Service $28,000 for the material. The suspects in- RUSSIA WITH: (MI-5) identified him as the head of clude: two unemployed persons with prior Armenia and European Union, 119 Pakistan’s nuclear procurement network. convictions, the director of the Saratov joint Belarus, 119 Saleem was deported for recruiting a network stock company “Progress” (who was identi- Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, of Pakistani-born scientific students at U.K. fied only as “Sh.”), a lawyer from the Saratov Poland, and Slovakia, 119 universities to collect sensitive nuclear in- law firm Advokat, two private detectives, and two prosecutors from the medical and foren-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 129 Nuclear Developments

RUSSIA WITH BULGARIA AND UKRAINE RUSSIA WITH FRANCE AND general designer. GRS will participate in the 9/11/96* UNITED STATES project as an independent expert. Minatom and Siemens signed an additional agreement In an interview, an unnamed former captain 9/13/96 that calls for Siemens to sell Russian-origin in the Soviet Army alleged that a top-secret U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary autho- low-enriched uranium (LEU) in Europe. The Soviet base near Sofia, Bulgaria, existed until rized General Atomics’ (GA) request to de- deal will allow Minatom to pay for Siemens’ it was closed in 1988. The captain said the liver technology and designs for a plutonium work on the reactor project. According to base, located across from the Borovets ski- burning, gas turbine modular, helium reac- Buerkle, the LEU deal, which includes the resort, held about 70 nuclear warheads aimed tor (GT-MHR) to Russia. GA’s program to cost of enrichment, is estimated to be worth at Turkey and Greece. The captain served in consume weapons-grade plutonium in the DM50 million-DM100 million a year. Rus- “GUMO Unit 12,” under the leadership of GT-MHR is authorized for five years. The sia plans to build eight units equipped with Marshal Baychuk, from 6/16/87 to 1988. The U.S. Department of Energy can renew the VVER-640 reactors, including one in base’s nuclear warheads were transferred agreement “in light of experience and cir- Sosnovyy Bor, four at the Far East Atomic from Bulgaria to Ukraine. According to a cumstances at that time.” The conditions for Power Plant, and three at Kola-2. well-placed Bulgarian source, the base was authorization require that the technology Ivan Cheberko, Kommersant-daily (Moscow), 8/16/ established in response to NATO’s 1979 de- delivered to the Russian Ministry of Atomic 96, p. 8 (15946). X-USSR Antinuclear Campaign cision to deploy new-generation tactical and Energy (Minatom) be used only for peace- Newsletter, 8-9/96 (15981). Viktor Kostyukovskiy, strategic nuclear weapons. The Bulgarian ful purposes, that retransfers have prior U.S. Izvestiya, 8/15/96, p. 2 (15822). source said the base was not located in approval, and that any Russian reactor using Borovets but refused to reveal its location. the technology must meet the Russian vol- RUSSIA WITH: Elena Ardabatskaya, Komsomolskaya pravda, 9/11/ untary safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Germany, Iran, and Switzerland, 124 96, pp. 1, 2 (15934). Olesya Nosova, Moreover, GA must inform the DOE and Komsomolskaya pravda, 10/23/96, pp. 1, 2 (15934). Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, Portugal, other U.S. agencies about the status of the United States, and Zaire, 127 program, when such information is re- RUSSIA WITH: India, 123 quested. Walt Simon, GA senior vice-presi- Iran and Ukraine, 124 China, 121 dent for reactor programs, confirmed that the China, India, and Iran, 121 French firm Framatome joined GA’s partner- Japan, 127 ship with Russia’s Minatom in 1/96. Lithuania, 127 RUSSIA WITH FRANCE Michael Knapik, Nucleonics Week, 9/19/96, p. 5 (15620). RUSSIA WITH NORWAY AND SWEDEN 9/9/96* The implementation of a deal for Russia’s Fall 1996 RUSSIA WITH GERMANY Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) to Representatives of atomic energy agencies, provide France’s Institut Max von Laue-Paul 8/16/96* police, customs, and armed forces of Nor- Langevin (ILL) with highly enriched uranium Construction of the $800 million Russian way, Sweden, and Russia met in the Norwe- (HEU) has been delayed. Implementation Northwest Scientific-Industrial Center for gian city of Pasvik to discuss joint measures was delayed until negotiations between ILL Atomic Energy has begun in the city of to prevent nuclear smuggling from Russia. and the Russian subcontractors in charge of Sosnovyy Bor. The center will be equipped Scandinavian countries will provide Russia the deal are completed. The current contract with a newly designed VVER-640 pressur- with computer programs to track possible stipulates that the HEU will be delivered ized water reactor (PWR), which is expected nuclear smuggling routes and will provide sometime in 1997, but ILL wants the deliv- to go on-line in 2002-03. Cooperation agree- financial assistance to reinforce security ery to be made by mid-1997. The deal was ments for work on the project have been measures at Russian nuclear facilities. part of an intergovernmental agreement signed by Russian and German companies. Zelenyy, No. 21, 1996 (15639). signed by Minatom head Viktor Mikhailov Minatom signed contracts with Siemens head and Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique Wulf Buerkle, Gesellschaft fuer RUSSIA WITH SLOVAKIA AND UKRAINE (CEA) Director General Yannick d’Escatha. Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) director Adolf 10/14/96* In exchange for providing ILL with 55 kg of Birkoffer, and Minister of Bavaria Tomas A Russian and a Ukrainian were arrested on HEU per year for nine years, Minatom would Goppel. Siemens also signed an agreement the border between Ukraine and Slovakia for become a partner in the institute, which op- with the St. Petersburg-based attempting to smuggle 29 g of Pu-239 out of erates the 58 MWt high-flux reactor. Atomenergoproyekt Institute to supply Ukraine. According to the State Customs Ann MacLachlan, NuclearFuel, 9/9/96, p.11 equipment for a large test stand. Siemens will Committee of Ukraine, the nuclear material (16015). oversee work on the reactor, which will take was hidden in the fuel tank of the smugglers’ place at the Izhorskiy, Metallicheskiy, and vehicle and was detected using radiation Elektrosila factories in St. Petersburg. The detection equipment. Atomenergoproyekt Institute is the project’s Unian (Kiev), 10/14/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-200, 10/ 14/96 (15687).

130 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments

RUSSIA WITH SOUTH KOREA pects for cooperation between the Ukrainian technologies. About 150 companies are ex- 8/5/96* State Nuclear Energy Committee pected to join the consortium. A joint DOE/ (Goskomatom) and the Russian Ministry of Minatom committee will evaluate projects South Korea has agreed to accept a $75 mil- Atomic Energy were specified, and condi- based on the advice-of consortium members. lion shipment of enriched uranium from Rus- tions for shipments during the next 10 years The program will span five years, with a sia as partial payment of that country’s $450 were defined. possibility for extension. U.S. labs that will million debt to South Korea. In addition to Vecherniy Donetsk (Donetsk), 7/9/96, p. 1; in FBIS- participate include Argonne, Los Alamos, the uranium shipment, Russia will supply SOV-96-165-S, 7/9/96 (15614). Interfax (Moscow), and Sandia National Laboratories. Initial South Korea with military hardware, includ- 7/4/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-131, 7/4/96 (15618). projects include development of “high-tem- ing anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. The perature sealants for solid oxide fuel cells,” first arms transfer is expected to be complete RUSSIA WITH UKRAINE AND “pore-free separator plates for phosphoric by 9/1/96. UNITED STATES Doug Clarke, OMRI Daily Digest, 8/5/96 (15728). acid fuel cells,” and “advanced catalysts for Doug Clarke, OMRI Daily Digest, 8/13/96 (15728). 8/15/96* polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells.” The U.S. firm GSE Systems of Columbia, RAFCO projects also include the improve- RUSSIA WITH TAIWAN Maryland, will provide analytical simulators ment of “bi-polar plate materials for molten 10/30/96* for RMBK, VVER-440, and VVER-1000 carbonate fuel cells” and the “processing and characterization of nanostructured zirconia Radio Canada International reported that reactors in Russia and Ukraine. The three for solid oxide fuel cells.” Taiwan and Russia are ready to sign an agree- simulator contracts total $6.5 million and were awarded by Pacific Northwest National Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 9/30/96, ment allowing 5,000 barrels of Taiwanese pp. 5, 6 (15837). Segodnya, 9/27/96, p. 1 (15695). nuclear waste to be delivered to, and stored Laboratory (PNNL) and the U.S. Nuclear Uranium Institute News Briefing, [Online] http:// at, Russian storage facilities. However, ac- Regulatory Commission. Two of the con- www.uilondon.org, 9/18/96-9/24/96 (15792). cording to Andrei Pechkurov, deputy head tracts were awarded by PNNL and will sup- of the Ecological Safety Department of the ply Ukraine with two simulators for use at 10/12/96* Russian State Committee on Ecology, in 11/ Chornobyl-1 and -3 under a U.S. Department The U.S. DOE authorized the USEC to buy 95 the Russian scientific and industrial as- of Energy program. Under the third contract, 18 MT of Russian LEU in 1997. Although sociation Radon and the Taiwanese firm Yu GSE will supply three analytical simulators the USEC will receive 18 MT of HEU in Sheng Technology Limited signed a 10-year for use in Kiev, Moscow, and the Don re- 1997, the amount for 1998 has not been technological agreement to “compare” new gion of Russia. These will be used under the settled. A dispute over deliveries of Russian methods of reprocessing “not nuclear but terms of the Lisbon safety initiative and will LEU arose when the Russian Ministry of radioactive waste.” According to the agree- be supplied to the Ukrainian Nuclear Regu- Atomic Energy (Minatom) requested that the ment, the Taiwanese firm will deliver radio- latory Administration and Russia’s USEC buy 18 MT of LEU instead of 12 MT, active materials to Radon where they will be Gosatomnadzor. as had been agreed. Minatom officials justi- reprocessed to make them ready for burial Wilson Dizard III, Nucleonics Week, 8/15/96, pp. 5, fied their request by stating that Russia needs 6 (15684). and then transported back to Taiwan. The additional funds to complete the dismantle- contract was endorsed by the Russian gov- ment of nuclear weapons withdrawn from RUSSIA WITH UNITED STATES ernment, and its implementation is being Ukraine. monitored by the Russian Federal Inspec- Late 8/96 Melor Sturua, Izvestiya, 10/12/96, p. 3 (15819). Russia transported about 400 MT of low- Wilson Dizard III and Michael Knapik, NuclearFuel, torate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety 10/7/96, pp. 16, 17 (15826). (Gosatomnadzor) and the State Committee enriched uranium (LEU), blended down from on Ecology. 13 MT of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 10/18/96* Tatyana Smolyakova, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 10/30/96, to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The United States is considering selling a p. 3 (15800). Reuter, 9/23/96 (15844). The HEU was enough nuclear material for powerful class of supercomputers to Russia. about 600 nuclear weapons. Although Russian officials say the comput- RUSSIA WITH UKRAINE Uranium Institute News Briefing, [Online] http:// www.uilondon.org, 9/25/96-10/1/96 (15828). ers will be used to conduct work within the 7/1/96 framework of the Comprehensive Test Ban At the South Ukraine nuclear power plant, 9/17/96 Treaty (CTBT), the United States questions the chairman of Ukraine’s State Nuclear At the 40th General Conference of the IAEA “how far [it] should go in supporting Russia’s Energy Committee, directors of the in Vienna, U.S. Department of Energy head ability to honor its end of the treaty,” and “to Yuzhnoukrainsk, Zaporizhzhya, Chornobyl, Hazel O’Leary and Russian Minister of what extent Russian scientists can be trusted Rivne, and Khmelnytskuy nuclear power Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, signed an to use the high-performance computers for plants, representatives of Russian nuclear agreement to establish the Russian-Ameri- treaty-related work only.” The U.S. Depart- fuel manufacturers, and TVEL, can Fuel Cell Consortium (RAFCO) and to ment of Commerce’s Bureau of Export Af- Atompromkomplekt, and Atomresource cooperate on the development of fuel cell fairs is considering a request from Russia’s agreed on nuclear supplies to Ukraine. Pros-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 131 Nuclear Developments

Minatom to export a Convex SPP-2000 eration with Russia. Though specific project Taiwan does not meet the strict safeguard supercomputer, which far exceeds Russia’s plans have yet to be developed and approved, requirements of Australia. However, an of- current computing capabilities. The SPP- DOE officials said that restrictions for po- ficial from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign 2000 (which is at least 10 times faster than tential collaboration demand that the plans Affairs denied any knowledge of the plan to any computer now in Russian laboratories) remain unclassified and not improve perfor- sell uranium through a third country. can be used not only to create nuclear weap- mance of Russian nuclear weapons nor con- Sofia Wu, Taiwan Central News Agency WWW, 8/ ons but also to simulate all stages of a nuclear tribute to their design. The export option was 16/96; in FBIS-CHI-96-160, 8/16/96 (15842). explosion. When asked how it planned to use first raised during CTBT negotiations. Rus- the supercomputer, Minatom indicated that sian and U.S. representatives discussed the TAIWAN WITH: the SPP-2000 would help maintain Russia’s possibility of a restricted collaboration on Russia, 131 nuclear stockpile, and that the other comput- scientific and technical issues with respect ers requested (an IBM and a slower version to the safety and security of each country’s of the Convex SPP-2000 manufactured by nuclear stockpile. The United States agreed Hewlett Packard) would be used for envi- to make the transfer of computers consistent UKRAINE ronmental regulation at Russian nuclear with U.S. export laws. According to Johnson, weapons laboratories. U.S. specialists, how- DOE officials said that access to computers ever, doubt the sincerity of this statement. provided to Russian scientists will be con- According to the Washington-based Wiscon- sistent with current U.S. export laws. This UKRAINE WITH: sin Project: “Considering that Russia is ex- safeguard is based on a new U.S. adminis- Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and United periencing an acute shortage of currency, tration high-performance computer export Kingdom, 119 how can we believe it will spend on ecology policy announced in 10/95, which places Bulgaria and Russia, 130 the millions earmarked for military nuclear controls on computers that have a major im- Iran and Russia, 124 programs? So far, the Russians have dis- pact on U.S. and allied security interests and played no special interest in their environ- eliminates controls that had become need- Lithuania, 127 ment.” According to Duncan Hunter, a less or ineffective due to rapid advances in subcommittee chairman of the U.S. House computer technology. UKRAINE WITH MIDDLE EAST of Representatives National Security Com- Kevin M. Baerson, Defense Week, 10/21/96, pp.1, 2 8/27/96 mittee, Minatom head Viktor Mikhailov re- (16013). Melor Sturua, Izvestiya, 10/18/96, p. 3 (16013). A Kiev regional court convicted three em- quested that U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel ployees of the Chornobyl nuclear power O’Leary authorize the delivery of three Con- plant and a businessman of stealing 5.3 kg vex SPP-2000 supercomputers to help of uranium from the fourth power unit of the “verify the reliability and safety” of Russian TAIWAN plant. Viktor Tsvetkov, Igor Kabachenko, nuclear arsenals. According to an anonymous Mikhail Bobyrev, and a man identified only U.S. administration representative, as Shumakov stole 1.3 kg of uranium on 4/ Mikhailov had promised in letters to O’Leary 25/96 and 4 kg of uranium on 5/4/96. They that Russia “has no intentions” of using the INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS then sold the material for $2,100 in Slavutich, computers for “the upgrading or develop- 10/18/96 a suburb of Kiev, to middleman Nikolay ment of nuclear weapons.” An investigation Kolesnikov, director of the Kiev trading firm Taiwan’s legislature voted 83-0 in favor of authorized by Hunter revealed that Hewlett- Asket. Moscow’s NTV reported the quan- restoring the budget for Taiwan’s fourth Packard, which produces the tity of the uranium delivered at 5.5 kg. An- nuclear power plant at Lungmen. supercomputers, has requested that appro- other source says the men delivered 10 kg of Nuclear News, 11/96, p. 17 (15955). priate agencies issue an export license for a uranium. Kolesnikov had previously prom- “slower model” of the Convex to Russia. ised to pay the men $6,000 for 10 kg of ura- TAIWAN WITH AUSTRALIA According to Marlin Somsak, a Hewlett- nium. An investigation revealed that Packard representative, the company has 8/16/96 Kolesnikov was acting on behalf of never received a request for the SPP-2000 Taiwan’s state power company, Taipower, Konstantin Gladkov, a “representative of an from Russia. Nevertheless, the prospect of confirmed that Australian firms offered to Arab firm.” Ukrainian law enforcement the sale has alarmed the General Account- sell uranium to Taiwan. The statement was agents failed to detain Gladkov, who had ing Office (GAO) and angered some Repub- in response to an article published in the offered to purchase 10–100 kg of uranium licans in Congress. Harold Johnson, associate Australian newspaper, The Age, which for $6 million. According to court docu- director of International Relations and Trade claimed that the Australian government was ments, Gladkov was a member of the Ukrai- Issues in the GAO’s security and national preparing a secret deal with Taiwan. The ar- nian police organized crime unit. According affairs division, said that discussion of the ticle also alleged that the uranium was to be to Vitaliy Tolstonogov, chief engineer of the sale was pursuant to U.S. policy on coop- sold to Taiwan via the United States, because Chornobyl nuclear power plant, the uranium

132 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments stolen from the fourth power unit cannot be used for military purposes Zakhar Butyrskiy, Segodnya, 8/31/96, p. 5 (15661). Yanina Sokolovskaya, Izvestiya, 8/17/96, p. 6 (15661). Yanina Sokolovskaya, Izvestiya, 9/17/96, p. 4 (15917). NTV (Moscow), 10/26/96; in FBIS- SOV-96-209, 10/26/96 (15917).

UKRAINE WITH: Russia, 131 Russia and Slovakia, 130 Russia and United States, 131

VIETNAM

VIETNAM WITH FRANCE 9/13/96 Yannick d’Escatha, head of the French Com- missariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA), and Vietnamese Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) Director Nguyen Tien Nguyen signed a framework agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. The two countries will cooperate in operating nuclear reactors and will study nuclear reactor fuel. According to a CEA statement, the VAEC plans to acquire the technological capability to produce nuclear energy by approximately 2010. AFP, 9/13/96; in FBIS-WEU-96-180, 9/13/96 (15817). VNA (Hanoi), 9/27/96; in FBIS-EAS-96- 189, 9/27/96 (15682).

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