Npr 4.2: Nuclear-Related Trade and Cooperation
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Nuclear Developments NUCLEAR-RELATED TRADE AND COOPERATION DEVELOPMENTS FOR SELECTED STATES, JULY-OCTOBER 1996 CONTENTS ARGENTINA CANADA GERMANY China, India, and Russia, 121 Internal Developments, 119 with: with: Germany, 123 India, 123 Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Russia, and ARMENIA Poland, Russia, and Switzerland, 124 with: CHINA Slovakia, 119 Kazakstan, and United European Union and Internal Developments, 120 Brazil, 120 States, 124 Russia, 119 with: Iran, 123 Russia, and Ukraine, 124 India, Iran, and Russia, 121 AUSTRALIA Iran, Russia, and Switzer- United Kingdom and United Iran, 121 with: land, 124 States, 124 Pakistan, 121 Iran and United States, 123 Iraq, 125 Russia, 121 IRAQ Taiwan, 132 Iraq, Jordan, Singapore, and Internal Developments, 125 CYPRUS Switzerland, 126 AZERBAIJAN with: with: Russia, 130 Internal Developments, 119 Germany, 125 Georgia, 122 with: GUINEA BISSAU Germany, Jordan, Singapore, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and CZECH REPUBLIC with: and Switzerland, 126 United Kingdom, 119 Italy, Libya, Portugal, with: ISRAEL Belarus, Germany, Poland, Russia, United States, and BELARUS Internal Developments, 126 Russia, and Slovakia, 119 Zaire, 127 with: ITALY Czech Republic, Germany, INDIA EUROPEAN UNION with: Poland, Russia, and Internal Developments, 122- with: Guinea Bissau, Libya, Slovakia, 119 123 Armenia and Russia, 119 Portugal, Russia, United Russia, 119 with: States, and Zaire, 127 FRANCE Canada, 123 BRAZIL with: China, Iran, and Russia, 121 JAPAN Internal Developments, 120 Russia, 130 Russia, 123 Internal Developments, 126 with: Russia and United States, 130 United States, 123 with: Germany, 120 Vietnam, 133 Russia, 127 IRAN BULGARIA United States, 127 GEORGIA Internal Developments, 123 with: with: with: JORDAN Russia and Ukraine, 130 Cyprus, 122 Australia and United States, with: 123 Germany, Iraq, Singapore, China, 121 and Switzerland, 126 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 115 Nuclear Developments KAZAKSTAN RUSSIA SWITZERLAND with: Internal Developments, 129 with: Iran and United States, 124 with: Germany, Iran, and Armenia, and European Russia, 124 KYRGYZSTAN Union, 119 Germany, Iraq, Jordan, and with: Belarus, 119 Singapore, 126 Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Belarus, Czech Republic, United Kingdom, 119 TAIWAN Germany, Poland, and Internal Developments, 132 LIBYA Slovakia, 119 with: with: Bulgaria and Ukraine, 130 Australia, 132 Guinea Bissau, Italy, Portu- China, 121 Russia, 131 gal, Russia, United States, China, India, and Iran, 121 and Zaire, 127 France, 130 UKRAINE France and United with: LITHUANIA States, 130 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and with: Germany, 130 United Kingdom, 119 Russia, 127 Germany, Iran, and Switzer- Bulgaria and Russia, 130 Ukraine, 127 land, 124 Iran and Russia, 124 MIDDLE EAST Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, Lithuania, 127 with: Portugal, United States, and Middle East, 132 Ukraine, 132 Zaire, 127 Russia, 131 India, 123 Russia and Slovakia, 130 NORTH KOREA Iran and Ukraine, 124 Russia and United States, 131 with: Japan, 127 KOREAN PENINSULA Lithuania, 127 UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY DEVELOPMENT Norway and Sweden, 130 with: ORGANIZATION Slovakia and Ukraine, 130 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and (KEDO), 128 South Korea, 131 Ukraine, 119 Taiwan, 131 Iran and United States, 124 NORWAY Pakistan, 129 with: Ukraine, 131 Russia and Sweden, 130 Ukraine and United UNITED STATES States, 131 with: PAKISTAN United States, 131 Australia and Iran, 123 Internal Developments, 128 France and Russia, 130 with: SLOVAKIA with: Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, China, 121 Portugal, Russia, and United Kingdom, 129 Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, and Zaire, 127 POLAND Russia, 119 India, 123 with: Russia and Ukraine, 130 Iran and Kazakstan, 124 Belarus, Czech Republic, Iran and United Germany, Russia, and SINGAPORE Kingdom, 124 Slovakia, 119 with: Japan, 127 Germany, Iraq, Jordan, and Russia, 131 PORTUGAL Switzerland, 126 Russia and Ukraine, 131 with: Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, SOUTH KOREA VIETNAM Russia, United States, and with: with: Zaire, 127 Russia, 131 France, 133 SWEDEN ZAIRE with: with: Norway and Russia, 130 Guinea Bissau, Italy, Libya, Portugal, Russia, United States, 127 116 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nuclear Developments OVERVIEW During the period July-October 1996, nuclear activities headquarters. At the meeting, members approved plans to in several states of concern continued to pose challenges to begin physical work at the Sinpo site. The reactors are sched- the nonproliferation regime, as did problems in the Newly uled to be completed in 2003, but KEDO officials admitted Independent States (NIS) and China. In South Asia, de- that this is a “difficult timetable,” particularly in light of the velopment of uranium enrichment (Pakistan) and plutonium delays caused initially by U.S. funding problems and, dur- reprocessing (India) facilities heightened tensions. In the ing the fall, by North Korean actions. A North Korean Middle East, Iraq’s recalcitrance vis-à-vis the United Na- submarine incursion into South Korean territory in Sep- tions Special Commission’s (UNSCOM’s) continuing in- tember caused South Korea to halt construction at the Sinpo spections was overshadowed by new revelations that a site. South Korea was awaiting an apology from Pyongyang German nuclear technician contributed significantly to before it resumed construction. Also raising concerns was Baghdad’s uranium enrichment program. In the NIS, sev- the fact that North Korea still has not allowed the IAEA to eral smuggling incidents occurred. Finally, the incursion of verify its initial declaration of nuclear materials. a North Korean submarine into South Korea, among other The arms race between India and Pakistan continued as factors, interrupted implementation of the Korean Penin- both sides augmented their respective nuclear capabilities. sula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) agree- U.S. intelligence sources accused Islamabad of building a ments. uranium enrichment plant near Rawalpindi that can produce Incidents of nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling highly enriched uranium. The plant is being built in coop- were reported in six former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, eration with China, which has also shipped a specialized Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. The industrial furnace and diagnostic equipment to Pakistan’s largest seizure—110 kilograms of zirconium powder (a dual- heavy-water reactor site at Khushab. Meanwhile, India ex- use material used in fuel rod claddings as well as in nuclear panded its nuclear capability, as a new plutonium reprocess- weapon components)—was made in Saratov, Russia. Other ing plant at Kalpakkam neared completion. seizures included gram and kilogram quantities of uranium, In the Persian Gulf region, the Iranian nuclear program gram quantities of plutonium, and gram quantities of an uni- suffered a setback when U.K. customs officials seized a ship- dentified radioactive substance. In order to combat such ment of maraging steel bound for Tehran, which could have smuggling across its territory, the Cypriot parliament passed been used to make uranium-enrichment centrifuges. At the legislation allowing the government to seize a shipment of Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russian contractors have also nuclear-related goods from Georgia that was bound for an experienced significant engineering difficulties that could unnamed destination in the Middle East. substantially raise construction costs and delay completion Nuclear-related cooperation between the United States of the plant until after 2003. In particular, Russian workers and Russia gathered pace as the two countries agreed to a are having trouble fitting the Russian-designed VVER re- five-year program to develop fuel cell technologies (the actor equipment into the German-designed plant due to dif- Russian-American Fuel Cell Consortium). About 150 com- ferences in the equipment’s technical specifications. panies are expected to join the program, which may be ex- Meanwhile, Iraq continued its pattern of confrontation tended beyond the initial five years. Also, the United States with UNSCOM, as inspectors were denied access to a sus- during the fall of 1996 was considering the sale of Convex pect site on two occasions, in July and August 1996. Evi- SPP-2000 supercomputers to Russia, which planned to use dence about Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program continued the computers for activities related to the Comprehensive to surface following Hussein Kamel’s defection in August Test Ban Treaty. However, nonproliferation analysts warned 1995. In particular, new evidence suggests that German of possible misuse of the supercomputers, which are power- nuclear technician Karl-Heinze Schaab, the owner of Rosch ful enough to be used for nuclear weapon development. GmbH and former MAN Technolgie employee, was a ma- KEDO held its first general conference at its New York jor supplier of uranium enrichment technology to Iraq. The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 117 Nuclear Developments Schaab allegedly provided Iraq with drawings and equip- NOTE: ment for uranium enrichment centrifuges. He also sold A date marked with an “*” indicates that an event was Baghdad a carbon-fiber-filament winding machine, which reported on that date; a date without an “*” is the date was later confiscated in Jordan along with other centrifuge when an event actually occurred. equipment. Schaab did not deny helping the Iraqi uranium enrichment program, adding that other German specialists The numbers listed in parentheses following the biblio-