THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF LUIS MUNOZ RIVERA (1859-1916) OF PUERTO RICO By FREDERICK ELWYN KIDDER A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNQL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA August, 1965 ACXN0WLEDGM3NTS It is my privilege to thank publicly the members of my supervisory committee, under each of v/hom I have studied: Manning J. Dauer, Professor of Political Science Ph.D. , University of Illinois, 1933 Robert W. Bradbury, Professor of Economics Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1937 Gladys M. Kammerer, Professor of Political Science Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1946 Lyle N. McAlister, Professor of History Ph.D., University of California, 1950 Harry Kantor, Professor of Political Science; Chairman Ph.D., University of California at Los Angeles, 1952 I am also grateful to Dr. A. Curtis Wilgus , former Director of the School of Inter- American Studies, who first suggested that I come to the University of Florida. Financial aid xvas supplied by a Graduate Fellowship in Political Science and a Rockefeller Caribbean Research Grant administered by the University of Florida; by a fellowship grant from the Southern Fellov^ships Fund; and by a year's leave of ab- sence with full salary provided by tbe University of Puerto Rico. Mr. Juan Suarez, librarian at Mayagiiez , greatly facilitated my research by providing me with an office. To my wife, Georgina G. Kidder, I owe so much that I cannot do less than dedicate this dissertation to her. IX . PREFACE This study proposes an examination of the political philosophy of Luis Munoz Rivera with particular respect to the political autonomy of Puerto Rico, as this philosophy is re- flected in his public acts, speeches, articles, poetry, correspondence and contemporary public documents. An attempt will be made' to demonstrate the importance and viability of his ideas in connection with recent and contemporary political problems Related Influences . Any significant political philosophy is shaped by three different but closely related influences.^ The first of these is what Alfred North Whitehead has taught us to call the "climate of opinion" -- those fundamental pre- suppositions which in any age so largely determine what men think about the nature of the universe and what can and cannot happen in it, and about the nature of man and what is essential to the good life. The "climate of opinion" of nineteenth century Spain and of nineteenth and early twentieth century United States have been widely discussed elsewhere, so this study will endeavor to bring a closer scrutiny to bear upon the funda- mental presuppositions of Puerto Ricans in the half century from 1867 to 1916. The second influence is more specific: it derives from the particular political and social conflicts of the time, which iii dispose groups and parties to accept a particular interpretation of current ideas as a theoretical support for their practical activities. Since there is no political history of Puerto Rico in print in English, it will be necessary for this writer to provide in English translation a considerable amount of what first may appear to be only antiquarian history but which is necessary background for the primary objective of analysis. In this dissertation the translations are always those of the writer except when referring to a work which has been cited as translated by another. The third influence is more specific still: it derives from the mind and temperament of the individual who gives to the political philosophy its ordered literary form. Whatever is original in the philosophy is usually contributed by the individual who gives it this form. Whatever value it has for its own time and place will depend largely on the extent to which it serves to illuminate or resolve the particular polit- ical issues of that time and place. But its value for other times and places will depend upon the extent to which the general presuppositions upon which it rests have a universal validity, the extent to which they express some enduring truth about nature and the life of man. The political philosophy of Luis Munoz Rivera was not in essentials original with him. It was his only in the sense that he gave to ideas widely accepted at the time and genuinely entertained by him a Munoz-ian form and flavor. Munoz Rivera might well have said, as did defferson, that it was not his XV purpose "to say things which had neve.r been said before, but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject," and to harmonize the "sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or the elementary books of public right." It was indeed Munoz Rivera's merit, and the high value of his articles, poems and speeches, that he expressed in lucid and persuasive form political ideas then widely accepted and thereby provided a reasoned justification for demanding autonomy, first from Spain and then from the United States. In providing the reasons for demanding autonomy from a particular government at a particular time, Munoz Rivera looked toward the formulation of the universal principles which, as he thought, could alone justify self-government, or self- determination of peoples, at any time. A Time of Troubles . In outlining our method and our primary sources, we have used the term, "political philosophy," without defining it. It is dangerous, at this time at least, to use "political philosophy" without some clarification. Indeed, American political theory, and political science as well, seem to be upon a "time of troubles," with respect to such fundamental considerations as meaning, scope and role.^ Pro- fessor Harold D. Lasswell, for one, has suggested that political science may stand in danger of being "given back to the Indians," it is said that some persons feel that political science is a discipline only "by the grace of God, the indifference of the other sciences, and the tolerance of the humanities.""^ Three V political theorists have asserted, and demonstrated to a con- siderable degree, that more creative work is being done outside the profession than within it.'^ This is hardly the place for solving or resolving all of these problems, but the doubts expressed should at least impel anyone who presumes to wite in the field of political theory to make a careful examination of the authorities who are attempting to clarify some of these matters--to make clear the justification for the particular study being undertaken (as political theory or political philosophy) and to show how it may make some contribution to the field. Some of the arguments employed here may occasion the charge that the writer "protesteth too much," but the statements supporting the study of ideologies, others supporting political theory "in action" and others indicating a generally more "down-to-earth" approach, are necessary to a justification of this study. From the vantage point of having communicated with people who knew Munoz Rivera and his career, I feel sure that the "ideology" label (or worse, "opportunism") is attached to most of what he thought or said, simply because he was Munoz Rivera--a politician known more for his strenuous political action and rough-and-tumble debate than for his intellectual abilities or attainments. Far from having great misgivings about embarking upon a study of Munoz Rivera's philosophy, I expect that this study will demonstrate that his thought will qualify under any of the definitions of political theory or political philosophy. VI . Some Definitions . A determination of the proper province of political theory or political philosophy involves the definition of these terms as well. A group of leading American political scientists has recently undertaken the task of developing some workable definitions of these terms in the course of attempting to determine the relevance of political theory to the "study of politics."^ Harry Eckstein's "interpretive commentary" on this conference reports that "all agreed" that the term "political theory" should not be used interchangeably with "political philosophy."^ Apparently the critical difference between the two terms was to be found in the aspect of scope--political philos- ophy having as its scope the "construction of comprehensive theories of politics." Eckstein admitted to the lack of precision of such a distinction, and offered a rule-of-thumb guide: one may present a theory as to the reasons for defeat of the British Labour Party in 1951, but political philosophy would be " exemplified . by . theories like Marx's analysis of the state and the determinants of political power, which obviously involve the ordering of almost the whole of political experience and call for a judgment as to what is significant and insignificant in experiences as such."^ In brief, then, political philosophy is theory, but not all theory is philosophy. the arbitrariness or this definition, one is entitled to ask for further explanation of "comprehensive," and also to wonder if more than a handful of works could pass muster as philosophy vxx A no more satisfactory conclusion is to be derived from the conferees' discussion of ideologies. No attempt was made to define the term, but it was agreed that "ideologies" were fundamental to the analysis of political behavior. Further confusion was contributed by the conferees' labeling of the content of our history of political thought course as "highly refined ideologies One must ask, "When does ideology become 'highly refined ideology'? When does 'highly refined ideology' become political theory? When, with any exactitude, can we say that political theory becomes political philosophy?" The only empirical "proof" of the meanings of these terms and what should or should not be included in their scope is the testimony, implicit and explicit, of leading students of the subject.