Journal of Personality and Social Psychology People Both High and Low on Religious Fundamentalism Are Prejudiced Toward Dissimilar Groups Mark J

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology People Both High and Low on Religious Fundamentalism Are Prejudiced Toward Dissimilar Groups Mark J. Brandt and Daryl R. Van Tongeren Online First Publication, November 2, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000076

CITATION Brandt, M. J., & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2015, November 2). People Both High and Low on Religious Fundamentalism Are Prejudiced Toward Dissimilar Groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000076 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2015 American Psychological Association 2015, Vol. 109, No. 11, 000 0022-3514/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000076

People Both High and Low on Religious Fundamentalism Are Prejudiced Toward Dissimilar Groups

Mark J. Brandt Daryl R. Van Tongeren Tilburg University Hope College

Research linking religion to prejudice suggests that highly religious individuals, and religious fundamentalists specifically, may be especially susceptible to expressing prejudice toward dissimilar others, whereas people who are less religious and fundamentalist do not show the same effect. The selective prejudice hypothesis predicts that this pattern of results occurs because the cognitive and motivational styles or particular values associated with fundamentalism exacerbate prejudice. In 3 studies, using 4 data sets (N ϭ 5,806), we test this selective prejudice hypothesis against the religious values conflict hypothesis, which predicts that both people with high and low levels of fundamentalism will be prejudiced toward those with dissimilar beliefs to protect the validity and vitality of people’s belief systems. Consistent with the religious values conflict hypothesis, we found that people both high and low in fundamentalism were prejudiced toward dissimilar others (Study 1) and these differences were primarily due to differences in the content of religious belief rather than the style of belief (Study 2). In Study 3, we expanded these findings to additional measures of prejudice, found that multiple measures of threat were potential mediators, and explored the possibility of an integrative perspective. In total, these results suggest that people with both relatively high and low levels of fundamentalism are susceptible to prejudice and in some cases the size of this religious intergroup bias may be higher among people with high levels of fundamentalism.

Keywords: fundamentalism, religion, prejudice, belief style, similarity

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000076.supp

A long history of ideologically motivated violence suggests that ilarly be motivated to express negative attitudes toward attitudi- meaning systems, such as fundamentalist religion, can serve as nally dissimilar others (e.g., religious fundamentalists; e.g., powerful justification for committing a wide range of atrocities. Yancey, 2010). The central goal of the current research was to test Research linking religion to prejudice suggests that highly reli- two competing models explaining the link between fundamental- gious individuals, especially those taking a fundamentalist ap- ism and ideological conflict: the selective prejudice model, which proach to religion, may be particularly susceptible to demonstrat- presumes that those high in religious fundamentalism primarily ing prejudice toward dissimilar others (Allport & Ross, 1967; demonstrate prejudice toward dissimilar others, and the religious Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; for a values conflict model, which predicts that individuals, regardless review see Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). It is perhaps unsurpris- of their level of religiousness or fundamentalism, will demonstrate ing that a belief system that claims “inerrant truth about existential prejudice toward ideologically dissimilar others. and ethereal existence” (Brandt & Reyna, 2010, p. 715) leads to One feature of the research on the association between religion prejudice as adherents attempt to vigorously defend the validity and prejudice is the focus on different dimensions or styles of and vitality of their religious beliefs (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; religiosity. These include the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its alliedGoplen publishers. & Plant, 2015; Van Tongeren, Davis, Hook, & Johnson, in originally discussed by Allport and Ross (1967) and later updated This article is intended solely for the personal use ofpress); the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. however, extant research on fundamentalism and prejudice by other scholars (Gorsuch, 1984), but also include dimensions of paints a one-sided picture that fails to capture the variety of ways religious quest (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b) that intends in which nonreligious and nonfundamentalist individuals may sim- to capture a questioning stance toward religion, and religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) that intends to capture an unquestioning stance toward religion. Many of these dimensions have undergone several rounds of critique because it is difficult to know precisely what they are measuring (in the case of Mark J. Brandt, Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University; intrinsic and extrinsic; see Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990) or if they Daryl R. Van Tongeren, Psychology Department, Hope College. are measuring religion at all (in the case of quest; see Donahue, The work was partially supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation (grant #40136) to Daryl R. Van Tongeren. 1985). In the investigation that follows, we focus on religious Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark J. Brandt, fundamentalism because it is the dimension with the highest de- Tilburg University, Department of Social Psychology, P.O. Box 90153, Tilburg, gree of conceptual agreement among scholars and because it is 5000 LE, the Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] most robustly associated with prejudice (e.g., Hunsberger, 1995;

1 2 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). This latter feature makes it a “feminist” (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011), presumably because particularly strong test of the religious values conflict model that feminists promote gender norms that are inconsistent with the we outline below. traditional gender norms often endorsed by religious fundamentalists. The Standard Model Fundamentalist Personality and Values Religious fundamentalism has been associated with prejudice— that is, negative attitudes and behaviors directed at a group or an Following demonstrations of selective prejudice, researchers individual based on their group membership (Crandall, Eshleman, turned to the question of why fundamentalists show selective & O’Brien, 2002)—toward a number of groups, including African prejudice, but people who are low on fundamentalism or who are Americans, women, and gay men and lesbians (Altemeyer & not religious do not show the same type of association. Indeed the Hunsberger, 1992; Brandt & Reyna, 2010, 2014; Hall, Matz, & typical result from the selective prejudice perspective looks like Wood, 2010; Jackson & Esses, 1997; Kirkpatrick, 1993; for a Figure 1 (left panel; see, e.g., Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011; review see Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). These associations have Blogowska et al., 2013). Fundamentalists show different levels of been identified with representative samples, in multiple countries, prejudice and tolerance whereas nonfundamentalists show no clear and in meta-analyses. The effect of religion on prejudice can vary effect. There are several prominent explanations for this pattern of in size, but in general, the effect size is approximately a moder- results (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). ately sized effect (cf. Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Hunsberger & First, religious fundamentalists have personality traits and asso- Jackson, 2005), suggesting that it is robust, especially in compar- ciated cognitive styles that lead them to be more prejudiced. For ison with many effects in social psychology. example, religious fundamentalists score lower on measures of openness to experience (Saroglou, 2002b), higher on measures of the need for cognitive closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Saroglou, Selective Prejudice 2002a), lower on measures of need for cognition (Hill, Cohen, A key question for scholars of religion is the source of this Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2010), and lower on measures of integrative prejudice. Some consider the fundamentalism–prejudice associa- complexity (especially regarding religious topics; Hunsberger, tions a sort of paradox (cf. Hall et al., 2010; Hunsberger & Pratt, & Pancer, 1994). These personality traits are often associated Jackson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2011). Most world religions preach with more prejudicial and stereotypical thinking (Roets & Van messages of love and tolerance (Schumann, McGregor, Nash, & Hiel, 2011; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) and have been found to Ross, 2014). For example, Christianity is known for encouraging statistically mediate the association between fundamentalism and its followers to “turn the other cheek” and to “love your neighbor prejudice (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hill et al., 2010). Thus, the as yourself.” Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, and many other religions research suggests that religious fundamentalists may be more have similar messages. The work on religion and values bears this prejudiced because they have a prejudiced personality. out; there is a positive correlation between religiosity and benev- Second, religious fundamentalism is associated with a number olence values (although not universalism values; Saroglou, Delpi- of values that provide justification and, perhaps, motivation for erre, & Dernelle, 2004) and prosocial value orientation (Malka, prejudice. Fundamentalism is highly correlated with traditional Soto, Cohen, & Miller, 2011). Experimentally, religious primes values, such as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer & lead to more prosocial behavior (Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Hunsberger, 1992; Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Johnson, Labouff, Norenzayan, 2015; but see Gomes & McCullough, 2015 for an Rowatt, Patock-Peckham, & Carlisle, 2012; Johnson et al., 2011) unsuccessful preregistered replication). From this perspective, the and traditionalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Saroglou, Delpierre, & association between fundamentalism and prejudice is rather unex- Dernelle, 2004). The associations between fundamentalism and pected, as it conflicts with the explicit tenets of many of the right-wing authoritarianism remain even after removing a number world’s religions. of items that have overlapping content between the two measures To explain this paradox, scholars have proposed that fundamentalists are selectively prejudiced (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011; Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Jackson & Esses, 1997; for similar find- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. ings with measures of religiosity instead of religious fundamen- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. talism see Blogowska, Lambert, & Saroglou, 2013; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015; Rowatt et al., 2009). They are not prejudiced toward all groups and all people, but rather only those groups that most engage in beliefs and behaviors that violate the values of the fundamentalists. Consistent with this idea, research finds stronger and more reliable associations between fundamentalism and prejudice toward gays and lesbians than it does between fundamentalism and prejudice toward Native Canadians (e.g., Jackson & Esses, 1997). The thinking goes that homosexuality is inconsistent with the principles of (Christian) religious fundamentalism, whereas being a Native Ca- Figure 1. Hypotheses for selective prejudice and religious values conflict nadian is not. Similarly, work finds that religious fundamentalists models. Higher scores indicate more tolerance to reflect the direction our are more likely to help someone described as a “woman” than a measures are coded. RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 3

(Mavor, Louis, & Laythe, 2011; Mavor, Macleod, Boal, & Louis, The religious values conflict model builds on these dissimilarity 2009) or using measures of authoritarianism that do not have perspectives and is an alternative to the standard model that can overlapping content (Brandt & Reyna, 2014). Both authoritarian incorporate both the findings of the standard model and the dis- and traditional values have been linked to prejudice (Bierly, 1985; similarity perspective. Our alternative model makes similar pre- Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) and have been shown to statistically dictions as the standard model for religious fundamentalists, but mediate the association between religious fundamentalism and unique predictions for people who are nonfundamentalist and prejudice (Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Hall et al., 2010; Johnson et al., nonreligious. Our central thesis is that people will be prejudiced 2012, 2011). Thus, previous research also supports the notion that toward people with opposing religious values. Full stop. This religious fundamentalists may be more prejudiced because they includes both fundamentalists and nonfundamentalists, such that have values associated with prejudice. people with religious fundamentalist beliefs will be prejudiced Our reading of this literature is that it is clear that people toward those with different religious beliefs (including, people not relatively high on religious fundamentalism will show prejudice, having any religious beliefs) and people without religious funda- but it is difficult to find reasons to predict that people relatively mentalist beliefs will be prejudiced toward those with strong low on fundamentalism will show prejudice based on the correla- religious beliefs. tion between fundamentalism and personality traits, motivations, Our model is consistent with recent work in both political and and values typically associated with prejudice. As one example, personality psychology, including scattered findings suggesting Brandt and Reyna (2010) suggest that religious fundamentalists that people who are less religious express prejudice of religious are more prejudiced because they have a higher need for closure values (Bolce & DeMaio, 2008; Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van than people relatively low on fundamentalism. Because people Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009; Yancey, 2010). Most directly, the lower on fundamentalism score lower on measures of need for religious values conflict model is an extension of the ideological closure, it isn’t clear how these personality traits could be invoked conflict model (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, to predict prejudice by people low on fundamentalism. A recent 2014), which is a model that predicts when and why people with study (Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015) comes to a similar conclu- different political ideologies will show prejudice. This work has sion. It found that uncertainty avoidance was primarily connected found that people on both the left and the right of the ideological with religious belief (not disbelief) and was unrelated with style of spectrum will be prejudiced toward and express a willingness to belief (i.e., literal or symbolic). This led to the hypothesis that “as discriminate against those with different actual or perceived ide- a reaction to uncertainty, religious beliefs lead to prejudicial atti- ological beliefs (Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; tudes, especially against those who are most threatening to reli- Iyengar & Westwood, 2014; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). gious worldviews” (p. 73). Therefore, we suggest that according to For example, whereas conservatives are prejudiced toward African the standard, selective prejudice model, religious fundamentalists Americans and gays and lesbians, liberals are prejudiced toward will be prejudiced toward people with different religious beliefs rich people and Evangelical Christians (Chambers et al., 2013). These effects appear to be primarily mediated by the perception because of a prejudiced, closed-minded personality and because of that these ideological outgroups violate important moral values values that promote prejudice. This perspective typically assumes (Crawford, 2014; Wetherell et al., 2013) or are threatening to other that religious disbelief and low levels of fundamentalism are people’s rights (Crawford, 2014). Other work has extended this associated with tolerance. idea to the openness to experience, finding that even people high in openness will be prejudiced toward people different from them- Religious Values Conflict Model selves (i.e., people who are perceived as conventional), and this is again primarily mediated by the perception that the groups violate The standard model contradicts a long line of work in social and important symbolic, moral values (Brandt et al., 2015). In short, personality psychology that finds that people—in general—are prior research in other domains has found that groups typically more likely to dislike people dissimilar to them and like people defined by their tolerance will still be prejudiced toward dissimilar similar to them (Amodio & Showers, 2005; Byrne, 1969, 1971; others. Fawcett & Markson, 2010; van Osch & Breugelmans, 2012; Roc- Given these prior findings, why then have researchers found that cas & Schwartz, 1993; Rokeach, 1960). This line of thinking can fundamentalists and people with strong religious beliefs tend to be This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. be traced back several decades, with roots in balance theory and more prejudiced? One possibility is that prior research typically This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. the motivation for cognitive consistency (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, focuses on groups who violate the values of religious fundamen- 1956). Over time, these ideas have been updated and refined, such talists (e.g., gays and lesbians) or who are presumed to have that more recent conclusions suggest that differences in values or different religious beliefs from fundamentalists (e.g., atheists). morals are a particularly potent form of dissimilarity (Brandt, When researchers find that fundamentalists are more prejudiced Chambers, Crawford, Wetherell, & Reyna, 2015; Chambers & toward African Americans, this may reflect measures that empha- Melnyk, 2006; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, size ways that African Americans may violate the values of fun- 2005), overriding more traditionally studied differences, such as damentalists. For example (Brandt & Reyna, 2014), fundamental- race and ethnicity (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; In- ists compared with nonfundamentalists score higher on measures sko, Nacoste, & Moe, 1983; Iyengar & Westwood, 2014; Rokeach, of symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002; Sears & Henry, 2003), 1960). When comparing the standard model with findings rooted a measure that infuses both negative affect toward African Amer- in a dissimilarity perspective, it becomes clear that the prediction icans with the belief that African Americans violate American that nonfundamentalists or nonreligious people will not be preju- values. However, in these same samples, fundamentalists, com- diced is an anomaly to perspectives rooted in dissimilarity. pared with nonfundamentalists, score lower on measures of neg- 4 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

ative affect toward African Americans. By examining the associ- item taps into participants’ views of the Bible. They are asked, ation between fundamentalism and prejudice toward a large “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your variety of groups, it might be possible to come to clearer conclu- feelings about the Bible?” and chose one of three responses: “1. sions about prejudice among both religious fundamentalists and The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, the nonfundamentalists. word for word. 2. The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. 3. The Bible is a book The Current Studies written by men and is not the word of God.” The item is reverse scored so that a higher number indicates a more literal interpreta- In the current studies, we examine how fundamentalism predicts tion of the Bible (M ϭ 2.10, SD ϭ .73), which is a common feature prejudice toward a range of groups who are similar to fundamen- in fundamentalist belief systems (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, talists and dissimilar to fundamentalists, in order to test the bound- 1992). The second item we employed was the “feeling thermom- aries of tolerance for fundamentalists and nonfundamentalists eter” for Christian Fundamentalists and was used to capture par- alike. In Study 1, we directly compare the predictions from the ticipants’ positive feelings toward fundamentalists. For this item, selective prejudice and religious values conflict models. Following participants rated Christian Fundamentalists between 0 and 100, this, in Study 2, we directly test the effects of religious differences where higher scores indicate more “favorable and warm” feelings against the effect of the style in which people hold onto their toward the group (M ϭ .49.11, SD ϭ 27.55). These two items were beliefs. Finally, in Study 3 we attempt to solve some anomalous correlated (r[5032] ϭ .53, p Ͻ .001), and so they were standard- patterns of results from Studies 1 and 2, expand our measures of ized and averaged (M ϭϪ.01, SD ϭ .87). Previous research has prejudice, and test potential mediators of the effects. demonstrated that this two-item scale correlates highly with more complete measures of religious fundamentalism (see Brandt & Study 1: Finding Tolerant Fundamentalists and Reyna, 2014). To measure religious fundamentalism in the MTurk Prejudiced Nonfundamentalists sample, we used Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) short religious In our first study we analyze data from the 2012 American fundamentalism scale (e.g., “God has given humanity a complete, National Election Studies (ANES) and from a community sample unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally ␣ϭ ϭ ϭ collected with Mechanical Turk. The ANES includes a measure of followed;” .95, M 2.78, SD 1.61). For each of the 12 religious fundamentalism and measures of prejudice toward 23 items, participants respond on a 7-point scale ranging from social groups. In our community sample, we included an estab- strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). lished measure of religious fundamentalism and measured preju- To measure prejudice in both samples, we used the feeling dice toward the 23 groups included in the ANES to replicate the thermometers included in the ANES toward the 23 social groups ANES results. Additionally, we included measures of religious and available in the survey. This is the same type of feeling thermom- political dissimilarity to determine what groups are similar and eter used to measure affective reactions toward religious funda- dissimilar to fundamentalists. These measures allow us to focus on mentalists described above. The groups included in the analyses the most similar and dissimilar groups to test the selective preju- here are: atheists, gay men and lesbians, liberals, feminists, Mus- dice and religious values conflict models shown in Figure 1. Both lims, illegal immigrants, Asian Americans, labor unions, Hispan- models predict that fundamentalism will be associated with prej- ics, Whites, people on welfare, middle class people, African Amer- udice toward groups dissimilar to fundamentalists and with toler- icans, Mormons, working class people, poor people, rich people, ance toward groups similar to fundamentalists (i.e., both models the military, big business, Catholics, tea party, conservatives, and predict different slopes). The religious values conflict model dif- Christians. This measure of prejudice is an explicit measure; fers by predicting that people both high and low in fundamentalism however, it has surprising predictive power, even for groups that will show a religious intergroup bias (i.e., a difference between might inspire socially desirable responding, like African Ameri- similar and dissimilar groups among low and high fundamentalists, cans (Payne et al., 2010). Its explicitness should work against the but in different directions). possibility of identifying robust effects. A key benefit of this measure is that is allows us to efficiently capture perceptions of the Method large number of groups necessary to fully test the two hypotheses. The MTurk sample was randomly assigned to complete one of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. Participants and procedure. Participants from the ANES two additional measures for each of the target groups (this was This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. sample were 5,225 participants who were recruited for the 2012 done to reduce the burden of completing all of the measures). Half ANES time series (2,493 men, 2,541 women, Mage range ϭ of the participants (n ϭ 118) rated each group on “the extent to 55–59). The ANES recruits a representative sample of eligible which you see them holding political or social beliefs different voters and conducts interviews either face-to-face or via the Inter- from your own” on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all different from net. Participants were also recruited from Amazon.com’s Mechan- me) to 100 (very different from me; for prior use see Brandt et al., ical Turk (N ϭ 241; Mason & Suri, 2012) to replicate the results 2015). The other half of the participants (n ϭ 123) rated each in the ANES, to collect additional measures, and to more precisely group on “the extent to which you see them holding religious measure religious fundamentalism (155 men, 86 women; Mage ϭ beliefs different from your own” on a scale ranging from 0 (not at 31.4, SD ϭ 10.6). All analyses were conducted using the available all different from me) to 100 (very different from me). Finally, we data for the measures included in the analysis, and so the sample included several demographic measures as covariates (noted where size varies slightly from analysis to analysis. they were coded differently in each sample), including age (ANES: Measures. To measure religious fundamentalism in the 1 ϭ age group 17–20, 13 ϭ age group 75 or older, mean centered; ANES, we used two items (see Brandt & Reyna, 2014). The first MTurk: participants self-reported age; mean centered), gender RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 5

(Ϫ1 ϭ women, 1 ϭ men), race/ethnicity (Ϫ1 ϭ non-White, 1 ϭ test which model best describes the data, we subtracted the feeling White), education (ANES: 1 ϭ less than high school, 5 ϭ graduate thermometer ratings for groups similar to fundamentalists from the degree, mean centered; MTurk: 1 ϭ some high school, no diploma, rating for groups dissimilar to fundamentalists. We regressed this 8 ϭ doctoral degree, mean centered), and income (ANES: 1 ϭ difference score on fundamentalism that was centered Ϯ1 SD from under $5,000, 28 ϭ $250,000 or more, mean centered; MTurk: the fundamentalism midpoint and the demographic covariates. The 1 ϭ under $25,000, 5 ϭ more than $250,000).1 intercept in these equations represent the difference in feeling thermometer ratings for people relatively low or high in funda- Results and Discussion mentalism. This is the same difference between the endpoints of the solid and dashed lines in the top panels of Figure 4. If the Preliminary analyses. The first step in our analyses was to estimates of intergroup bias are significantly different from zero, it determine the groups that were seen as most similar and dissimilar suggests that there is evidence for some degree of religious inter- to fundamentalists. We correlated the two dissimilarity measures group bias. in the MTurk sample with fundamentalism while controlling for The outcome of these regression analyses revealed similar re- the demographic variables. Positive partial correlations suggest sults in both the ANES and MTurk samples. People who are both that people who score higher on fundamentalism see the group as relatively high (ANES: b ϭ 28.37, SE ϭ .48, 95% CI [27.43, ϭ Ͻ ϭ ϭ more dissimilar. Negative partial correlations suggest the opposite. 29.31], dˆyw .94, p .001; MTurk: b 25.19, SE 3.62, 95% ϭ Ͻ The partial correlations between fundamentalism and both political CI [18.06, 32.32], dˆyw .74, p .001) and low (ANES: ϭϪ ϭ Ϫ Ϫ ϭ Ͻ and religious dissimilarity are in Figures S1 and S2. On both b 11.59, SE .49, 95% CI [ 12.55, 10.62], dˆyw .38, p measures, four groups (atheists, gay men and lesbians, liberals, .001, MTurk: b ϭϪ17.04, SE ϭ 2.12, 95% CI [Ϫ21.21, Ϫ12.86], ϭ Ͻ 2 feminists) had positive partial correlations with fundamentalism, dˆyw .50, p .001) in fundamentalism show medium to large and so these four groups were classified as dissimilar to funda- effects that are evidence for a religious intergroup bias, but in mentalists. There were many more negative partial correlations, opposite directions. The bottom panels of Figure 4 compare the reflecting, perhaps, the reality that there are many more religious absolute values of these estimates in both samples and for people people in the United States than nonreligious people. To maintain relatively high and low in fundamentalism. It is clear that the an equal number of groups classified as similar or dissimilar, we estimates are different from zero, with the 95% confidence inter- chose the four groups with the most negative partial correlations vals not even approaching zero (where zero indicates no differ- (Catholics, Tea Party, conservatives, Christians) to classify as ence). The clear evidence of religious intergroup bias at high and similar. low levels of fundamentalism is consistent with the religious Primary analyses. The partial correlations between funda- values conflict perspective and directly contradicts notions that mentalism and the feeling thermometers, our measure of prejudice, people low in fundamentalism will not be prejudiced. That said, it are in Figures 2 and 3. These two figures reveal that people scoring is also interesting to note that the estimate of intergroup bias is higher on fundamentalism have more negative views of dissimilar larger for high fundamentalists than low fundamentalists (ANES: groups and more positive views of similar groups. z ϭ 24.47, p Ͻ .001; MTurk: z ϭ 1.94, p ϭ .052). We will come We combined all groups categorized as dissimilar to fundamen- back to this pattern in Study 3. talists and regressed this combined measure of prejudice on fun- Additional analyses. Additional analyses show that as the damentalism and the demographic covariates. In both the ANES partial correlation between fundamentalism and political or reli- (b ϭϪ8.46, SE ϭ .30, 95% CI [Ϫ9.05, Ϫ7.87], ␤ϭϪ.39, p Ͻ gious dissimilarity gets less negative and more positive, the partial .001) and the MTurk (b ϭϪ5.29, SE ϭ .82, 95% CI correlation between fundamentalism and the feeling thermometer [Ϫ6.90, Ϫ3.68], ␤ϭϪ.40, p Ͻ .001) samples, the association was becomes less positive and more negative (Figure S3). We simply moderately negative, suggesting that people high on the funda- correlated the partial correlations between fundamentalism and the mentalism scale expressed more prejudice toward these groups feeling thermometers in both the ANES and MTurk samples with than people scoring low on the fundamentalism scale (see Figure the partial correlations between fundamentalism and perceived 4, top panels). Similarly, we combined all groups categorized as political and religious dissimilarity from the MTurk sample. For similar to fundamentalists and regressed this combined measure of both samples, the fundamentalism-feeling thermometer partial cor- prejudice on fundamentalism and the demographic covariates. In This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. both the ANES (b ϭ 14.19, SE ϭ .24, 95% CI [13.71, 14.66], ␤ϭ This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 1 .67, p Ͻ .001) and the MTurk (b ϭ 7.96, SE ϭ .80, 95% CI [6.38, In all of the studies, although the individual correlations for the ␤ϭ Ͻ association between fundamentalism and prejudice change depending on 9.53], .54, p .001) samples the association was strongly the covariates, the overall pattern of results (i.e., the cross-over pattern) positive, suggesting that people low on the fundamentalism scale does not change whether or not the covariates are included. expressed more prejudice toward these groups than people scoring 2 We calculated a type of within-subject d-score based on Morris and high on the fundamentalism scale (see Figure 4, top panels). DeShon’s (2002) Equation 8 that uses the estimated means of individuals high and low in fundamentalism for groups similar and dissimilar to fundamental- Different slopes for groups similar and dissimilar to fundamen- ^y talists are both predicted by the selective prejudice model and the ϭ dif ists. The equation is: dˆyw In religious values conflict model. The key distinguishing feature is ͑SDy1ϫ͙2͑1Ϫr͒͒ϩ͑SDy2ϫ͙2͑1Ϫr͒͒ ^ whether both people low and high in fundamentalism show reli- this equation ydif is the difference between the estimated means for groups gious intergroup bias, like the pattern of results predicted by the similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists. The denominator is the average standard deviation of the prejudice measures for similar and dissimilar religious values conflict model, or if only people high in funda- groups corrected for their intercorrelation. This strategy for calculating mentalism show religious intergroup bias, like the pattern of re- effect sizes based on estimated means is similar to the approach used by sults predicted by the selective prejudice model (see Figure 1). To Brandt et al. (2015). 6 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

Figure 2. Study 1: Forest plot of all partial correlations controlling for demographic covariates between fundamentalism and the feeling thermometers in the American National Election Survey data. Positive estimates indicates that people scoring higher on the fundamentalism scale rated the groups more positively than people scoring lower on the fundamentalism scale.

relations were strongly correlated with the fundamentalism- gious fundamentalism (in particular in the ANES sample), which political dissimilarity (ANES: r[22] ϭϪ.96, p Ͻ .001: MTurk: suggests that the effect might be easier to detect among religious r[22] ϭϪ.95, p Ͻ .001) and the fundamentalism-religious dis- fundamentalists. similarity (ANES: r[22] ϭϪ.82, p Ͻ .001: MTurk: r[22] ϭϪ.78, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. p Ͻ .001) partial correlations, indicating that as fundamentalism This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Study 2: Content or Style of Belief? was more strongly correlated with prejudice (i.e., low scores on the feeling thermometers), the more fundamentalism was correlated Across two data sets, including a national sample, there is with the perception that target group was dissimilar. This suggests evidence that people both high and low in fundamentalism can that the association between fundamentalism and prejudice closely show prejudice toward people with dissimilar beliefs. One problem tracks the similarity and dissimilarity of the target groups. It is with these studies is that measures of fundamentalism conflate consistent with the religious values conflict model, which builds both the content and the style of the religious belief. A person will on work that suggests that target group similarity is an important receive a high score on a religious fundamentalism scale if they are determinant of prejudice. both highly religious and hold onto their beliefs rigidly. More Taken together, the results of Study 1 provide support for the problematically, a person can receive a low score if they are religious values conflict model: both those high and low in reli- religious without rigid beliefs, not religious without rigid beliefs, gious fundamentalism express prejudice toward dissimilar groups. and not religious with rigid beliefs. This raises the question as to However, the results of Study 1 also suggest that the absolute whether the effects we’ve observed are due to differences in intergroup bias effect appears to be larger for those high in reli- religious belief or differences in the style in which those religious RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 7

Figure 3. Study 1: Forest plot of all partial correlations controlling for demographic covariates between fundamentalism and the feeling thermometers in the Mechanical Turk data. Positive estimates indicates that people scoring higher on the fundamentalism scale rated the groups more positively than people scoring lower on the fundamentalism scale.

beliefs are held. It is important to address this question because the (Duriez, 2003, p. 79). By using this scale, we will be able to pit the selective prejudice hypothesis is based, in part, on the premise that content of the belief against the style of belief. the style in which religious fundamentalists hold onto their beliefs is responsible for the prejudice that they show (e.g., Brandt & This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. Method Reyna, 2010). The religious values conflict hypothesis, however, This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. is more focused on the content of people’s beliefs and whether Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited target groups are perceived as holding onto beliefs with a similar from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (N ϭ 299; 196 men, 103 content. women, Mage ϭ 33.7, SD ϭ 11.0). All analyses were conducted To determine if the content of people’s beliefs or the style in using the available data for the measures included in the analysis, which those beliefs are held are most responsible for prejudice, we and so the sample size varies slightly from analysis to analysis. swapped out the religious fundamentalism scale for the postcritical Measures. Participants completed the short 18-item postcriti- beliefs scale (Duriez, Soenens, & Hutsebaut, 2005). This scale cal belief scale to assess the content and style of participants’ consists of two dimensions. The first dimension captures the religious beliefs (Duriez et al., 2005). This measure consists of content of people’s religious belief and disbelief, whereas the four subscales that vary on a dimension of religious belief to second dimension captures the style in which people hold that disbelief (referred to by Duriez et al. (2005) as the inclusion and belief, ranging from literal and rigid to symbolic and flexible. This exclusion of transcendence) and on a dimension of a literal to latter dimension, in particular, has been linked with closed- symbolic style of religious belief. The four subscales are ortho- mindedness and a difficulty “dealing with alternative opinions” doxy (literal, religious belief: “God has been defined for once and 8 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

Figure 4. Study 1: Top panels: Estimated feeling thermometer means for people higher and lower in fundamentalism for groups similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists. Higher scores indicate more positive :p Ͻ .001; Bottom panels ء .feelings. Coefficients are unstandardized betas with standard errors in parentheses Difference between groups who are similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists for people higher and lower in fundamentalism. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

for all and therefore is immutable;” ␣ϭ.82, M ϭ 2.69, SD ϭ This creates one measure for each of the two dimensions, in which 1.46), external critique (literal, religious disbelief: “Faith turns out higher scores indicate more religious belief and a more literal to be an illusion when one is confronted with the harshness of approach to religious beliefs and the zero-points of the scale life;” ␣ϭ.89, M ϭ 3.99, SD ϭ 1.73), second naiveté (symbolic, indicate no clear preference for religious belief or for a particular religious belief: “The Bible holds a deeper truth which can only be style of belief. These two measures were negatively correlated This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its alliedrevealed publishers. by personal refection;” ␣ϭ.65, M ϭ 4.33, SD ϭ 1.35), (r[296] ϭϪ.28, p Ͻ .001). This article is intended solely for the personal use ofand the individual user and is not torelativism be disseminated broadly. (symbolic, religious disbelief: “Each statement Following the postcritical belief scale, participants completed about God is a result of the time in which it was made;” ␣ϭ.61, feeling thermometers and measures of both political and religious M ϭ 4.73, SD ϭ 1.17). Following the method described in Shen, dissimilarity for the 23 target groups used in the prior study. As in Yelderman, Haggard, and Rowatt (2013), we converted the four Study 1, we included several demographic measures as covariates, subscales into two scales, each assessing one dimension. We used including age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and income that the following formula: were measured and coded the same way as the demographic covariates used in the MTurk sample in Study 1. Religious belief vs . disbelief ϭ ͑orthodoxy ϩ second naiveté͒

– ͑external critique ϩ relativism͒ Results and Discussion

Literal vs . symbolic ϭ ͑orthodoxy ϩ external critique͒ Preliminary analyses. The individual partial correlations, controlling for demographic covariates, between religious belief – ͑relativism ϩ second naiveté͒ and the feeling thermometers for all of the individual groups are RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 9

shown in Figure S4 and the same partial correlations between people low in fundamentalism will not be prejudiced. In this study belief style and the feeling thermometers are shown in Figure S5. where we could measure religious belief and religious style sep- As in the previous study, we focused on the groups most similar arately, the estimate of intergroup bias is larger for people with and dissimilar to people with religious beliefs. We correlated the low levels of religious belief rather than for people with high levels two dissimilarity measures with religious belief. Positive partial of belief (z ϭ 2.48, p ϭ .01). correlations suggest that people who score higher on religious Style of belief. There was a small negative association be- belief see the group as more dissimilar. Negative partial correla- tween belief style and the feeling thermometers for groups dissim- tions suggest the opposite. The partial correlations, controlling for ilar to people with religious belief (b ϭϪ1.05, SE ϭ .49, 95% CI demographic covariates, between religious belief and both political [Ϫ2.01, Ϫ0.10], ␤ϭϪ.13, p ϭ .03), suggesting that people with and religious dissimilarity are shown in Figures S6 and S7. On more literal belief style were slightly more likely to express both measures, the same four groups as Study 1 had positive partial prejudice toward these groups than people with a less literal correlations with religious belief (atheists, gay men and lesbians, approach to religious belief. There was also a small, negative, and liberals, feminists) and so these four groups were classified as clearly nonsignificant association between belief style and the dissimilar to people with religious belief. There were many more feeling thermometers for groups similar to people with religious negative partial correlations and so, as we did in Study 1, we chose belief (b ϭϪ0.19, SE ϭ .39, 95% CI [Ϫ0.95, 0.57], ␤ϭϪ.02, four groups with the most negative partial correlations (Catholics, p ϭ .63), suggesting that belief style does not play a clear role in Tea Party, conservatives, Christians) as similar to maintain an prejudice toward these groups. equal number of groups classified as similar or dissimilar. Using the same analytic strategy as we did above, we tested if Primary analyses. We regressed the feeling thermometers for there was evidence for religious intergroup bias for people with groups similar and dissimilar to people with religious beliefs on more or less literal approach to belief. The outcome of these the measure of religious belief, the measure of belief style, and the regression analyses revealed that for people with a symbolic ap- demographic covariates. The estimated means of the feeling ther- proach to belief, there is a small effect, suggesting a modest mometers for both measures are in Figure 5 (top panels). Results amount of religious intergroup bias (b ϭϪ7.94, SE ϭ 2.15, 95% are discussed first in terms of content and then in terms of style.3 CI [Ϫ12.18, Ϫ3.70], d ϭϪ.23, p Ͻ .001). For people with a Content of belief. There was a medium negative association ˆyw more literal approach, there is an even smaller and clearly nonsig- between religious belief and the feeling thermometers for groups nificant effect (b ϭϪ3.13, SE ϭ 3.94, 95% CI [Ϫ10.88, 4.63], dissimilar to people with religious belief (b ϭϪ2.27, SE ϭ .32, d ϭϪ.09, p ϭ .43). This suggests that people with a literal 95% CI [Ϫ2.90, Ϫ1.63], ␤ϭϪ.40, p Ͻ .001), suggesting that ˆyw people with more religious belief were more likely to express approach to belief and disbelief dislike people who are both prejudice toward these groups than people with less religious relatively similar and dissimilar to people with religious beliefs. belief. Conversely, there was a strong positive association between The bottom-right panel of Figure 5 compares the absolute values religious belief and the feeling thermometers for groups similar to of these estimates for people with relatively literal and symbolic ϭ people with religious belief (b ϭ 3.71, SE ϭ .26, 95% CI [3.20, styles of beliefs and shows that they are largely similar (z 1.07, ϭ 4 4.22], ␤ϭ.67, p Ͻ .001), suggesting that people with less p .28). religious belief were more likely to express prejudice toward these The results of Study 2 provide strong evidence for the religious groups than people with more religious belief. values conflict model. Both those high and low in religious belief Using the same method as in Study 1, we tested the key express prejudice toward dissimilar groups. Moreover, there was distinguishing feature between the selective prejudice and the some evidence that this effect was actually larger for those low in religious values conflict models, whether both people low (Ϫ1 SD) religious disbelief, which is contradictory to the selective prejudice and high (ϩ1 SD) in religious belief show religious intergroup bias model. Whereas in the ANES sample from Study 1, participants high (see Figure 1). We subtracted the feeling thermometer ratings for in religious fundamentalism demonstrated a stronger intergroup bias, groups similar to people with religious belief from the rating for the results of Study 2 suggest that, in some cases, those low in groups dissimilar to people with religious belief and regressed this religious belief (and, thus, low in religious fundamentalism) may also difference score on religious belief that was centered Ϯ 1 SD from demonstrate greater absolute intergroup bias. Finally, these results the scales zero-point, the measure of style of belief that was highlighted the stronger effects of content of belief relative to style of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. centered on its zero-point, and the demographic covariates. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

The outcome of these regression analyses revealed that people 3 ϭ ϭ We also tested for interactions between belief content and belief style who are both relatively high (b 19.03, SE 3.59, 95% CI when predicting the feeling thermometers and the difference score. None of ϭ Ͻ ϭϪ ϭ [11.96, 26.10], dˆyw .54, p .001) and low (b 30.10, SE the interaction effects approached statistical significance (all ps Ͼ .39) Ϫ Ϫ ϭϪ Ͻ 4 2.65, 95% CI [ 35.33, 24.88], dˆyw .85, p .001) in A reviewer suggested that an alternative strategy for analyzing the religious belief show medium to large effects that are evidence for postcritical belief scale is to treat each subscale separately to assess its a religious intergroup bias, but in opposite directions. The bottom- unique contribution to explaining variance in the outcome (see, e.g., Saroglou, 2002a). These results are reported in detail in the supplemental left panel of Figure 5 compares the absolute values of these online materials. In short, we find that the same pattern that we see in the estimates for people relatively high and low in religious belief. It analyses with the religious belief scale above also emerges for the ortho- is clear that the estimates are different from zero, with the 95% doxy and the external critique subscales (representing literal religious confidence intervals not even approaching zero (where zero indi- belief and disbelief, respectively). These same effects do not emerge for the second naiveté and relativism subscales (representing symbolic religious cates no difference). The clear evidence of religious intergroup belief and disbelief, respectively), suggesting that the religious intergroup bias at high and low levels of religious belief is consistent with the bias we observe is most clearly driven by both religious and nonreligious religious values conflict perspective and contradicts notions that people with literal belief styles. 10 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

Figure 5. Study 2: Top panels: Estimated feeling thermometer means for people higher and lower in religious belief or higher and lower in a literal approach to belief for groups similar and dissimilar to people with religious belief. Higher scores indicate more positive feelings. Coefficients are unstandardized betas with standard errors p Ͻ .04; Bottom panels: Difference between groups who are similar and dissimilar to people ء .in parentheses with religious beliefs for people higher and lower in religious belief or higher and lower in a literal approach to belief. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

belief; however, the latter analyses using the individual subscales nonfundamentalists alike show prejudice. Fundamentalists may (summarized in Footnote 4) do suggest that the literal subscales are selectively show prejudice, but so do nonfundamentalists. more strongly associated with prejudice than the symbolic subscales Although the effects of belief style were small, they were not

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its alliedwhen publishers. compared in a head-to-head regression analysis. irrelevant. In Study 1, religious intergroup bias was larger among

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. people high compared to low in fundamentalism. In Study 2, a Study 3: Mechanisms for Intergroup Religious literal approach to religion did predict slightly more prejudice and Prejudice when put head-to-head in a regression equation (see Footnote 4), The first two studies found that people both high and low in the literal subscales of both belief and disbelief were the primary religious fundamentalism (Study 1) and religious belief (Study 2) predictors of prejudice toward dissimilar groups and tolerance toward express prejudice toward groups with dissimilar political and re- similar groups. This combination of results suggests that there may be ligious attitudes. This is largely consistent with the religious values room for an integrative perspective where both belief dissimilarity and conflict model, which predicts that people will be prejudiced the style of belief play a role. When people treat their religious belief toward people with dissimilar views and tolerant toward people and disbelief in a literal style it appears much more likely to lead to with similar views. When the content of belief was directly com- bias and prejudice than when people take a more symbolic and less pared with the style of belief in Study 2, the content of belief strident approach to both religious belief and disbelief. Notably, this played a much stronger role than the style of belief. We believe significantly extends the selective prejudice perspective to also in- that the evidence so far demonstrates that fundamentalists and clude the selective prejudice of nonreligious fundamentalists. RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 11

In Study 3, our aim was to replicate Study 1 while addressing on fundamentalism are expected to be more likely to moderate the possibility of an integrative perspective, testing potential me- their response. Therefore, in this final study, we included a mea- diators of the effects we observe in Studies 1 and 2, and broaden- sure of social distance and a measure of explicit dehumanization. ing our assessment of prejudice. Recall, in Study 1 we found that people high in fundamentalism showed more religious intergroup bias than people low in fundamentalism, consistent with an inte- Method grative perspective. In Study 3, we included measures of strength Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited and certainty of religious beliefs with the expectation that people from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (N ϭ 282; 171 men, 111 relatively high on fundamentalism would have stronger and more women, Mage ϭ 33.0, SD ϭ 11.1). All analyses were conducted certain beliefs, and that when equated with the strength and cer- using the available data for the measures included in the analysis, tainty of people relatively low on fundamentalism, the levels of and so the sample size varies slightly from analysis to analysis. religious intergroup bias would be more comparable (cf. Hill et al., Measures. Participants completed the same religious funda- 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). We also included a measure mentalism scale as the MTurk sample in Study 1 (␣ϭ.95, M ϭ of the subjective ambivalence (i.e., attitudinal conflict) people 2.60, SD ϭ 1.57), feeling thermometers to the eight groups cate- have about their beliefs, although we did not expect people high or gorized as similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists from Study 1, low on fundamentalism to experience much attitudinal conflict. and the same demographic covariates as Study 1. Participants also In the prior two studies, we asserted that belief dissimilarity was completed a one-item measure of social closeness for each group driving the effects; however, this is a rather broad construct, and (see Brandt et al., 2015) where participants were asked “How belief dissimilarity can manifest itself in a variety of ways. The willing would you be to occasionally spend social time with a intergroup threat literature has identified a number of ways that person who is [insert group].” Participants responded ona1to7 groups might see each other as different (Cottrell & Neuberg, scale with the labels not at all, a little, some, much, and very 2005; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), including symbolic and value willing evenly spaced above the seven points. The final measure of threats, resource threats, and safety threats. These different threat prejudice was a one-item measure of humanness (Epley, Waytz, perceptions provide people with an index of the extent a particular Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008). Participants are asked to rate the eight group is similar or dissimilar and supportive or threatening to an groups ona0to100scale, where 0 indicates bacteria and 100 individual (Boyer, Firat, & van Leeuwen, 2015). It is possible that indicates human. Although not an identical measure, other recent symbolic, resource, and safety threats will all play a role; however, we suspect that symbolic threats will be the most consistent work has demonstrated that blatant dehumanization is both prev- mediator because value differences tend to be the most robust alent and predictive (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). predictors of prejudice (Brandt et al., 2015; Chambers & Melnyk, Based on prior research on intergroup threats (Brandt et al., 2006; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). 2015; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Crawford, 2014; Stephan & Other recent work shown that a “rights threat,” or the perception Stephan, 2000), we measured different types of dissimilarity and that a group threatens the rights of your own group or of other threat with one-item measures that assess symbolic (“To what groups, accounts for some of the variance of symbolic, resource, extent do you think the following groups violate your core values and safety threats. For example, when predicting prejudice toward and beliefs?”), rights (“To what extent do you think the following right-wing groups, Crawford (2014) found that resource threats groups limit the personal freedoms of people like you?”), resource predicted prejudice, but that this association diminished after con- (“To what extent do you think the following groups hold too many trolling for rights threats. A similar pattern was found for symbolic positions of power and responsibility in our society?”), and safety threats predicting prejudice of left-wing groups. Rights threats are (“To what extent do you think the following groups make our likely to play a prominent role in our case as well because of the society less safe and more dangerous?”) threats. Each threat was public debates over religion and religious rights in the United measured ona1to7scale with the labels not at all, a little, some, States (Advance America, 2015; Cook, 2015). much, and to a great extent evenly spaced above the seven points. We also expanded our measure of prejudice and tolerance To assess the strength, certainty, and conflict of participants’ beyond the affective prejudice indexed by the feeling thermome- views about religion, we used five items. We asked, “When ters. It may be the case that people who are both relatively high and thinking about your opinions and beliefs about religion, to what This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. low on fundamentalism are both willing to express their dislike for extent would you describe them as . . .” and completed the stem This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. dissimilar religious groups, but are less willing to express even with (a) central to how you see yourself, (b) important to you, (c) more extreme and blatant forms of prejudice. This argument is not a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions, (d) certain, typically made about explicit measures, such as the feeling ther- and (e) conflicted. Participants responded ona1(not at all)to5 mometer, which are used as the explicit foil in studies of implicit/ (very much) scale. These items were based on standard measures automatic prejudice (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; of attitude strength (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Priester & Petty, Nosek, 2005). Researchers often assume that people attempt to 1996; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Following past work (e.g., suppress their “true” prejudicial feelings on these explicit mea- Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), we planned to treat the items for sures. Nonetheless, even more blatant forms of prejudice and centrality, importance, and moral convictions as separate mea- intentions to discriminate may reveal a different pattern of results. sures; however, these three items were highly intercorrelated (all Specifically, one could predict that the support for the selective rs Ͼ .77; in comparison, certainty’s intercorrelations never exceed prejudice hypothesis is more likely with more explicit measures r ϭ .55) and so were combined to measure attitude strength (␣ϭ where religious fundamentalists are expected to be more willing to .92, M ϭ 2.74, SD ϭ 1.33). Certainty (M ϭ 3.28, SD ϭ 1.42) and express more blatant forms of prejudice, yet people relatively low conflict (M ϭ 1.96, SD ϭ 1.18) were treated as separate items. 12 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

Results and Discussion dice/tolerance. As a first step, we conducted the same basic regression analyses that we used to test the effects of Predicting prejudice for groups similar and dissimilar to fundamentalism on tolerance, but with the measures of threat as fundamentalists. To replicate Study 1, we regressed the mea- the outcome variables. These analyses are in the top panels of sures of prejudice/tolerance on fundamentalism and the demo- Figure 7. Across all four measures of threat, we found that fun- graphic covariates (see top panels, Figure 6). For the feeling damentalism was significantly and positively associated with per- thermometers (b ϭϪ7.29, SE ϭ .79, 95% CI [Ϫ8.85, Ϫ5.74], ceived threat of groups dissimilar to fundamentalists and this effect ␤ϭϪ.50, p Ͻ .001), social closeness (b ϭϪ.52, SE ϭ .05, 95% ranged from medium to strong in size (␤s range [.35, .58]). CI [Ϫ.62, Ϫ.42], ␤ϭϪ.51, p Ͻ .001), and humanness Conversely, fundamentalism was significantly and negatively as- (b ϭϪ6.89, SE ϭ .81, 95% CI [Ϫ8.48, Ϫ5.29], ␤ϭϪ.46, p Ͻ sociated with perceived threat of groups similar to fundamentalists .001) measures, there was a significant medium negative effect for and this effect ranged from small to medium in size (␤s range groups dissimilar to fundamentalists. This suggests that people Ϫ Ϫ high on the fundamentalism scale expressed more prejudice, social [ .17, .41]). distance, and dehumanization toward these groups than people Next, we tested the multiple mediation model in Figure 8a for scoring low on the fundamentalism scale. For the feeling ther- the three measures of prejudice for both groups who are similar mometers (b ϭ 8.19, SE ϭ .81, 95% CI [6.59, 9.78], ␤ϭ.53, p Ͻ and dissimilar to fundamentalists. To test these multiple mediators .001) and social closeness (b ϭ .25, SE ϭ .06, 95% CI [.13, .37], we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012) with 5,000 ␤ϭ.24, p Ͻ .001) measures, there was a significant positive effect bias corrected bootstrapped samples and while controlling for the for groups similar to fundamentalists that ranged from small to demographic covariates. The results for groups dissimilar to fun- medium in size; however, this effect did not extend to the measure damentalists are in Table 1, and the results for groups similar to of humanness (b ϭϪ.71, SE ϭ 1.02, 95% CI [Ϫ2.72, 1.29], fundamentalists are in Table 2. These tables include all of the paths ␤ϭϪ.04, p ϭ .49). This suggests that people low on the of the model, as well as the indirect effect and the standardized fundamentalism scale expressed more prejudice and social dis- indirect effect. tance toward these groups than people scoring high on the funda- For groups dissimilar to fundamentalists, rights threat was a mentalism scale, but that it may be limited to measures that do not significant mediator for all three measures of tolerance. Funda- ask participants to directly compare the target to bacteria (i.e., mentalism predicted increased rights threat, and rights threat pre- explicitly dehumanize). That is, with the exception of the human- dicted decreased liking, social closeness, and humanness. Safety ness measure, we were able to replicate the results of Study 1. threat also played a role for both social closeness and humanness, Mediation analyses. By including the four measures of threat, and symbolic threats played a role when predicting the feeling we were also able to see if these measures mediated the associa- thermometers. For groups similar to fundamentalists, rights threat tions between fundamentalism and the three measures of preju- was a significant mediator for both the feeling thermometer and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Figure 6. Study 3: Top panels: Estimated tolerance means for people higher and lower in fundamentalism for groups similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists. Higher scores indicate more positive feelings, social closeness, p Ͻ .001; Bottom ء .and humanness. Coefficients are unstandardized betas with standard errors in parentheses panels: Difference between groups who are similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists for people higher and lower in fundamentalism. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 13

Figure 7. Study 3: Top panels: Estimated threat means for people higher and lower in fundamentalism for groups similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists. Higher scores indicate more threat. Coefficients are unstan- p Ͻ .01; Bottom panels: Difference between groups who ء .dardized betas with standard errors in parentheses are similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists for people higher and lower in fundamentalism. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

ϭ Ͻ humanness, safety threat was a mediator for both the feeling 19.45], dˆyw .58, p .001) and low (feeling thermometers: ϭϪ ϭ Ϫ Ϫ ϭϪ thermometer and social closeness, and symbolic threat was a b 17.84, SE 2.08, 95% CI [ 21.94, 13.73], dˆyw .50, mediator for the feeling thermometer. p Ͻ .001; social closeness: b ϭϪ.86, SE ϭ .12, 95% CI Ϫ Ϫ ϭϪ Ͻ ϭϪ Although there are inconsistencies across measures and target [ 1.09, .63], dˆyw .44, p .001; humanness: b 5.68, ϭ Ϫ Ϫ ϭϪ Ͻ groups, it appears that rights threat is the most consistent mediator SE 1.65, 95% CI [ 8.93, 2.43], dˆyw .25, p .001) on of prejudice. Even for social closeness for groups similar to fun- fundamentalism, we found small to large effects that show clear damentalists, where it was not a significant mediator, both the a- evidence of religious intergroup bias. This is consistent with the and the b-paths of the mediation model were statistically signifi- religious values conflict perspective and suggests that religious cant, suggesting that rights threat may also play a role in social intergroup bias can occur on more blatant measures of prejudice. closeness. After rights threats, safety threats were the most con- As in Study 1, the estimate of intergroup bias is larger for those sistent mediator, suggesting that concerns about the target groups’ high in fundamentalism than for those low in fundamentalism effects on the safety and well-being of society are important for (feeling thermometers: z ϭ 3.17, p ϭ .002; social closeness: z ϭ predicting prejudice. Finally, symbolic threats were only signifi- 3.10, p ϭ .002; humanness: z ϭ 2.44, p ϭ .01). cant mediators when predicting the feeling thermometers, a finding Mediation analyses. We also examined intergroup bias in consistent with Crawford (2014), but inconsistent with other work perceived threat by subtracting perceived threat toward groups This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. showing the power of symbolic threats (Brandt et al., 2015; Henry dissimilar to fundamentalists from perceived threat toward groups This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. & Reyna, 2007). similar to fundamentalists and used the same analytic strategy as in Predicting religious intergroup bias. In addition to looking the prior studies. The results of these analyses are in the bottom at the slope of fundamentalism on prejudice toward groups similar panels of Figure 7. For all four measures of threat and for both Ͻ and dissimilar to fundamentalists, we also examined the size and people high (dˆyw range [.46, .77], all ps .001) and low (dˆyw range extent of religious intergroup bias among people high and low in [.49, .73], all ps Ͻ .001) on fundamentalism, we found medium to fundamentalism. We regressed the difference scores on fundamen- large effects that show clear evidence of religious intergroup bias talism at Ϯ 1 SD of the fundamentalism midpoint and the demo- on the threat measures. The estimate of intergroup bias is only graphic covariates to assess the amount of religious intergroup bias larger for those high in fundamentalism than for those low in (see bottom panels Figure 6). For all three measures of prejudice/ fundamentalism for the measure of symbolic threat (z ϭ 1.97, p ϭ tolerance and for both people high (feeling thermometers: b ϭ .05). It does not reach significance for any of the other compari- ϭ ϭ Ͻ Ͼ 31.14, SE 3.64, 95% CI [23.97, 38.31], dˆyw .85, p .001; sons (zs range [.08, 1.25], all ps .21). ϭ ϭ ϭ social closeness: b 1.58, SE .20, 95% CI [1.18, 1.99], dˆyw Next, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012) .80, p Ͻ .001; humanness: b ϭ 13.77, SE ϭ .48, 95% CI [8.10, with 5,000 bias corrected bootstrapped samples and while control- 14 BRANDT AND VAN TONGEREN

Threat Mediators

a paths Symbolic b paths

Rights

c / c` Fundamentalism Tolerance

Resources

Safety

Difference Score Threat Mediators

Symbolic a paths b paths

Rights

c / c` Fundamentalism Intergroup Bias

Resources

Safety

Figure 8. Study 3: The two multiple mediation models tested. (A) Basic mediation model for tolerance toward groups similar and dissimilar to fundamentalists. (B) Basic mediation model for intergroup bias.

ling for the demographic covariates to test if the intergroup bias in To test if strength and certainty affected intergroup bias, we threat could explain the intergroup bias in tolerance/prejudice. We regressed the difference scores between the feeling thermometers, tested the basic model diagramed in Figure 8b and the results of social closeness measure, and humanness measure on Ϯ1 SD of these analyses are in Table 3. These results show that intergroup fundamentalism and the demographic control variables. We also biases in symbolic, rights, resource, and safety threats all help included mean centered strength, certainty, and conflict and then explain intergroup biases on the feeling thermometers and social tested if strength or certainty moderated the association between closeness measures. For intergroup bias expressed in terms of fundamentalism and intergroup bias. For all three measures of perceived humanness, symbolic threats and rights threats were the tolerance, there was a significant Strength ϫ Fundamentalism only significant indirect effects. These analyses show that multiple interaction (feeling thermometers: b ϭ 2.97, SE ϭ .82, 95% CI types of perceived threats and differences can contribute to the [1.35, 4.58], ␤ϭ.20, p Ͻ .001; social closeness: b ϭ .13, SE ϭ intergroup biases of both people relatively high and low in funda- .05, 95% CI [.04, .23], ␤ϭ.17, p ϭ .004; humanness; b ϭ 1.66, mentalism. SE ϭ .66, 95% CI [.36, 2.96], ␤ϭ.17, p ϭ .01) and in separate Strength and certainty. One of the goals for this study was to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. models, a significant Certainty ϫ Fundamentalism interaction see if those scoring high and low on fundamentalism differed in This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. (feeling thermometers: b ϭ 2.54, SE ϭ .79, 95% CI [.99, 4.09], the strength and certainty of their views about religion and if these ␤ϭ ϭ ϭ ϭ differences could be used to understand the stronger intergroup .15, p .001; social closeness: b .11, SE .05, 95% CI ␤ϭ ϭ ϭ ϭ bias observed among high compared with those scoring low on [.02, .20], .12, p .02; humanness; b 1.52, SE .63, 95% ␤ϭ ϭ fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism was positively corre- CI [.28, 2.76], .14, p .02). lated, while controlling for the demographic variables, with ϭ Ͻ ϭ strength (pr[275] .41, p .001) and certainty (pr[275] .14, 5 ϭ Addition analyses showed that there was a significant quadratic effect p .02) of their views about religion. It was marginally positively of fundamentalism explaining 10% of the variance in conflict (p Ͻ .001). 5 correlated with belief conflict (pr[275] ϭ .11, p ϭ .07). This The peak of the estimated quadratic effect was near the midpoint, suggest- suggests that when using the religious fundamentalism scale, peo- ing that people both high and low in fundamentalism do not experience ple scoring high on the scale have increased certainty and strength much conflict, whereas people in the middle of the scale do experience some conflict. This also explains the marginal linear partial correlation: the in their views about religion. Because conflict did not clearly mean of fundamentalism is below the midpoint and so the linear effect is distinguish people high and low on the fundamentalism scale, we capturing the tendency for people at the midpoint to score higher on do not focus on this variable. conflict than people below the midpoint. RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VALUE CONFLICT 15

Table 1 Study 3: Mediation Models for Groups Dissimilar to Fundamentalists

Outcome variable: Feeling thermometer, groups dissimilar to fundamentalists

c-path c=-path b (SE) b (SE) ءءء(Ϫ3.37 (.91 ءءء(Fundamentalism Ϫ7.17 (1.78