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Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

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Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs September 29, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33946 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Summary All of the Navy’s aircraft carriers, but none of its other surface ships, are nuclear-powered. Some Members of Congress, particularly on the House Armed Services Committee, have expressed interest in expanding the use of nuclear power to a wider array of Navy surface ships, starting with the CG(X), a planned new cruiser that the Navy had wanted to start procuring around FY2017. Section 1012 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) makes it U.S. policy to construct the major combatant ships of the Navy, including ships like the CG(X), with integrated nuclear power systems, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a notification to Congress that the inclusion of an integrated nuclear power system in a given class of ship is not in the national interest. The Navy studied nuclear power as a design option for the CG(X), but did not announce whether it would prefer to build the CG(X) as a nuclear-powered ship. The Navy’s FY2011 budget proposes canceling the CG(X) program and instead building an improved version of the conventionally powered Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer. The cancellation of the CG(X) program would appear to leave no near-term shipbuilding program opportunities for expanding the application of nuclear power to Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers. A 2006 Navy study on the potential for applying nuclear-power to Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers concluded the following, among other things: • In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost. • The total life-cycle cost of a nuclear-powered medium-size surface combatant would equal that of a conventionally powered medium-size surface combatant if the cost of crude oil averages $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel over the life of the ship. • Nuclear-power should be considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants. • Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation for a contingency, and in terms of operational presence (time on station) in the theater of operation. Congressional Research Service Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 Background ................................................................................................................................1 Nuclear and Conventional Power for Ships ...........................................................................1 Nuclear and Conventional Power in Brief........................................................................1 Nuclear Power for a Surface Combatant..........................................................................2 U.S. Navy Nuclear-Powered Ships ........................................................................................3 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program .................................................................................3 Current Navy Nuclear-Powered Ships .............................................................................4 Earlier Navy Nuclear-Powered Cruisers ..........................................................................4 Initial Fuel Core Included in Procurement Cost ...............................................................5 Section 1012 of FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181).................................5 CG(X) Cruiser Program ........................................................................................................6 The Program in General ..................................................................................................6 Reactor Plant for a Nuclear-Powered CG(X) ...................................................................6 Proposed Cancellation of Program ..................................................................................7 Construction Shipyards .........................................................................................................7 Nuclear-Capable Shipyards .............................................................................................7 Surface Combatant Shipyards..........................................................................................8 Recent Navy Studies for Congress.........................................................................................8 2005 Naval Reactors Quick Look Analysis......................................................................8 2006 Navy Alternative Propulsion Study .........................................................................9 Potential Issues for Congress.....................................................................................................10 No Apparent Near-Term Shipbuilding Program Opportunities .............................................10 Assessing Whether Any Future Ship Classes Should Be Nuclear Powered...........................10 Cost ..............................................................................................................................10 Operational Effectiveness..............................................................................................13 Ship Construction .........................................................................................................14 Ship Maintenance and Repair........................................................................................17 Crew Training...............................................................................................................17 Port Calls and Forward Homeporting ............................................................................17 Environmental Impact...................................................................................................18 Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................18 FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454).....................................................18 House ...........................................................................................................................18 Senate...........................................................................................................................19 FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)........................................................................19 Senate...........................................................................................................................19 Prior-Year Legislative Activity..................................................................................................19 FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) ...............................................19 House ...........................................................................................................................19 Senate...........................................................................................................................21 Conference....................................................................................................................21 FY2009 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5658/P.L. 110-417) .............................................22 House ...........................................................................................................................22 Senate...........................................................................................................................23 Compromise .................................................................................................................24 Congressional Research Service Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) .............................................24 House ...........................................................................................................................24 Senate...........................................................................................................................26 Conference....................................................................................................................26 FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163).............................................28 Tables Table 1. Unrefueled Cruising Ranges and Transit Distances.........................................................2 Table 2. Earlier Navy Nuclear-Powered Cruisers.........................................................................5 Contacts Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................29 Congressional Research Service Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Introduction
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