Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology 1975, Vol. 32, No. 1, 92-101 Choosing to Suffer as a Consequence of Expecting to Suffer: Why Do People Do It? Ronald Comer and James D. Laird Clark University In three previous studies, most subjects who anticipated having to perform an unpleasant task (e.g., eat a worm) and who were then offered a choice of that or a neutral task chose the unpleasant task. It was hypothesized that this "choosing to suffer" effect was produced by the subjects' attempt to make sense of their anticipated suffering, through one of three kinds of change in their conception of themselves and the situation: (a) they deserved the suffer- ing, (b) they were brave, or (c) the worm was not too bad. Subjects antici- pating a neutral task did not change on these measures, while subjects eating a worm changed significantly, indicating that anticipated suffering did cause the predicted reconceptualizations. Changes in these three kinds of conception predicted subject's choice or not of eating the worm, indicating that these changes produced the subsequent choice. Finally, subjects who saw them- selves as either more brave or more deserving also chose to administer painful electric shocks to themselves, while subjects who had changed their concep- tions of the worm did not, indicating that these conceptual changes can affect behavior in situations different from that which initially caused the conceptual changes. In a few more or less unrelated studies, a man & Radtke, 1970). Clearly then, some- particularly paradoxical bit of behavior has thing happens during the interval between a been observed, that subjects often "choose" subject's assignment to a negative event and to suffer as a consequence of having expected his subsequent choice which influences most to suffer. For example, when subjects were subjects to choose to perform the negative assigned an unpleasant task (e.g., eat a cater- event though they no longer must. pillar) and given a short time to wait in this Foxman and Radtke (1970) proposed an state of "negative expectancy," approximately "anxiety adaptation" hypothesis, in which the 80% chose this unpleasant task when given subjects were presumedly becoming more the opportunity to perform a neutral task accustomed to feeling anxious and hence did instead (Aronson, Carlsmith, & Darley, 1963; not mind choosing the caterpillar. This expla- Foxman & Radtke, 1970). Moreover, such nation suffers from being rather vague about "negative expectancy" subjects tend to shock the mechanisms involved and, indeed, could be themselves more during the expectancy period taken as no more than a description of what than do other subjects (Walster, Aronson, & happened: that a previously noxious stimulus Brown, 1966). became less so. In addition, it does not really Neutral expectancy control subjects who make a great deal of sense to posit some were assigned to perform a neutral task be- mechanism, similar presumedly to sensory have as common sense suggests: No neutral adaptation, such that not only does the stimu- expectancy subject in any of the studies has lus lose some of its potency, but, in fact, ever chosen a negative task. In addition, sub- "reverses" and now becomes positive. In the jects who are given a negative expectation, other two studies of this sort (Aronson et al., but given no period of time alone to await 1963; Walster et al., 1966), the explanations the negative event, also do not choose the offered were post hoc (in fact opposite predic- negative event (Aronson et al., 1963; Fox- tions had been made by Walster et al.), tenta- tively offered hypotheses drawn from cogni- Requests for reprints should be sent to James D. tive dissonance theory and, indeed, both of Laird, Department of Psychology, Clark University, these authors confess to uncertainty and dis- Worcester, Massachusetts 01610. satisfaction with their own explanations. 92 CHOOSING TO SUFFER AS A CONSEQUENCE OF EXPECTING To 93 The present study represents an attempt were simply trying to make sense of their im- to understand these effects of negative expec- pending suffering and, somehow, the sense tancies in terms of the kinds of cognitive they made of it led them to then go on and changes which might be expected to occur in choose to suffer when the opportunity to subjects in these situations. The theoretical escape suddenly became available. Of course, perspective adopted here has been called "self- it in fact made no sense for them to try to perception theory" (Bern, 1972) and "self- make sense of their suffering since their as- attribution theory" (Kelley, 1967). However, signment to the negative conditions was it is clear that cognitive dissonance theory clearly described as due to chance. They (Festinger, 1957) could as easily encompass "ought" to have thought merely that it was the results reported here. The use of the self- unfortunate that they would have to endure attribution language should be understood as this unpleasantness and, then, have leaped at representing the authors' preferences, rather the chance to avoid it. Obviously, however, than any suggestion that one or the other they did not follow this line of thought and perspective is more adequate in this context. action. In the self-attribution view, the experiences There is a clearly parallel phenomenon in we all have of our "inner, mental states" are the realm of other attribution. In a series of instead taken to be interpretations of our studies, Lerner and his associates have dem- behavior and the context of its occurrence. onstrated that subjects who are exposed to Feelings or awareness of our attitudes, emo- another person purportedly suffering, but tions, motives, etc. are seen, then, as informa- chosen for the suffering quite by chance, tion about our behavior or our behavioral dis- apparently are unable to "believe" in the ef- positions and not as causes of the particular fects of chance and instead treat the sufferer ongoing behaviors. These bits of "informa- as if he deserved his fate (Lerner & Simmons, tion" are presumed to have the same kinds of 1966). Since the root assumption of self- effects on subsequent behaviors that any attribution theory is that people understand other information might have. Thus, we might and know themselves in precisely the same assume that the sequence of events begins way in which they know others, it would not with an individual doing something, noticing be surprising to find that a similar failure to what he is up to and interpreting his behavior accept the workings of chance occurs with in the form of attributing some property to respect to self. himself and then subsequently acting in the There seems to be three major ways of ways in which he believes someone who pos- "making sense" of the negative expectancy sesses that property would or should behave. situation. One has already been mentioned; As an example, consider a man who is con- as suggested by Lerner's work, the person fronted by some intense frustration. He re- may conclude that he deserves his fate, that sponds with physiological arousal, a scowl, he is a bad person. A second alternative is clenched fists, and a harsh tone of voice. He that the person may attribute to himself some then becomes aware of these behaviors in a "positive" qualities, for instance, that he is a highly integrated way, which he experiences brave person or a person who is willing to simply as the feeling of "anger." At that sacrifice for the sake of science. This possibil- point, he may then try to inhibit his "angry" ity was implied by one of Walster et al.'s behavior or find an appropriate target, or (1966) dissonance explanations of the nega- assess his chances of winning a fight, or any tive expectancy phenomenon. A third possibil- number of other things. The point is that the ity is that an individual may not change his feeling of anger was a product of one set of conception of himself at all, but instead behavior, in this case mostly automatic, and change his conception of some aspect of the subsequently affected some other quite dif- external circumstances, particularly of the ferent kinds of behavior (Laird, 1974). negative task. For example, the negative task Applying this theory to the phenomenon may be seen as not as unpleasant as it first of negative expectancy, the general assump- seemed, so that, for instance, the subject tion is that the subjects in these experiments might have concluded that eating caterpillars 94 RONALD COMER AND JAMES D. LAIRD was really not so bad after all. This notion themselves as opposed to causes in their situ- has been involved indirectly in some of the ations. Individuals who tended to assign the dissonance explanations offered by Aronson causes of their behavior to themselves might et al. (1963). be expected to employ either the "deserving- The central hypothesis of this study was ness" or the "bravery" options in the negative that the paradoxical effects of expecting to expectancy situation, while people who see suffer on later choices were due to subjects the causes of behavior as residing more in changing their conceptual systems in one or situations might be expected to change their another of these three ways. The general form evaluation of the worm. of the study was, then, to introduce subjects The second group of hypotheses and expec- to a negative expectancy situation, measure tations in this experiment involved the rela- changes in their conceptions of themselves and tionship of subjects' attributions to their sub- the situation, and to relate these changes to sequent choice behavior. First, insofar as the their subsequent behavior. subjects' attributions are seen as the cause of The negative expectancy format employed the subsequent negative choice behavior, it was similar to that used by Aronson et al.