Witney W. Schneidman. Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of 's Colonial Empire. New York: University Press of America, 2004. xvii + 293 pp. $33.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-7618-2812-9.

Reviewed by Daniel Byrne

Published on H-Diplo (September, 2005)

Witney Schneidman studiously examines 1961, Adlai Stevenson voted for a United Nations policy towards the decolonization of General Assembly resolution calling on Portugal Portuguese Africa and leaves the reader struck by to move Angola towards self-determination. Un‐ the fact that, like the decolonization of Portuguese surprisingly, the staunchly imperialist dictator Africa, Schneidman's monograph was unfortu‐ Antonio Oliveira Salazar refused to heed this call. nately delayed in arriving. Luckily, Schneidman Thus, Kennedy was left struggling to defne his de‐ was prodded by the renowned historian Piero colonization policy in the light of the Bay of Pigs Gleijeses to transform his nearly two-decade-old disaster which ironically occurred on the same dissertation into a published book. While sufer‐ day as the vote on Angolan independence. ing from some of the difculties of translating a Like the presidents before and after him, dissertation into a monograph, Schneidman main‐ Kennedy found himself straddling between his tained the strength of his research within an en‐ hopes to support national liberation movements during critique of United States foreign policy. In and his eforts to sustain alliances which provided doing so, Schneidman adds to a growing historiog‐ essential bases and international support for the raphy on the U.S. response to decolonization in United States. Stubborn allies, nebulous national‐ the postwar period--a response which was no‐ ist movements, challenges from the Soviet Union, tably confused, conficted, and adrift. China, and Cuba, and a strongly Eurocentric poli‐ Schneidman begins his examination with the cymaking hierarchy all contributed to the consis‐ Kennedy administration's seemingly bold chal‐ tent difculty Kennedy and his advisors had in or‐ lenge to Eisenhower's lackluster policies on decol‐ ganizing a coherent response to impending crises onization. In a move to reconnect the United in Portuguese Africa and elsewhere. In addition, States with the Third World and specifcally U.S. goals for developing Africa through an "evo‐ emerging African nations, Kennedy openly chal‐ lutionary" process of decolonization clashed with lenged Portugal's presence in Africa. On April 20, both Portuguese desires to retain their colonial H-Net Reviews possessions and nationalist demands to have im‐ confict with a 1966 quote from Defense Secretary mediate, unconditional independence. Robert McNamara, who stated that "the United Schneidman does an excellent job of showing States has no mandate on high to police the world how the United States attempted to develop rela‐ and the inclination to do so. There have been clas‐ tions with non-communist nationalists in Guinea- sic cases in which our deliberate nonaction was Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, but failed to do the wisest action of all" (p. 90). the same in Portugal. As long as Salazar and his While accepting the ideas behind this deliber‐ supporters maintained power, it seemed impossi‐ ate inaction, President Johnson, Secretary of State ble for Kennedy to develop avenues of decoloniza‐ , and National Security Advisor Walt tion. By May 29, 1963, President Kennedy told Por‐ Rostow attempted to recapture the rhetorical plat‐ tuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira that his form of self-determination and decolonization by 1961 decisions had been "precipitous" (p. 52). announcing "a Johnson doctrine for Africa" on With the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforcing the es‐ May 26, 1966. Schneidman believes that the sential nature of the Azores base agreement, speech "was an eloquent, nonconfrontational tes‐ Kennedy accepted a policy defned by its ambigui‐ timony of American sensitivity toward self-deter‐ ty. As a result, Lyndon Johnson would inherit a mination in Africa" (p. 95). Like Kennedy before policy toward African decolonization as conficted him, Johnson hoped to capture with rhetoric that as the one Kennedy had inherited from Eisenhow‐ which he refused to press in his policies towards er. Portugal: namely the perception of the United The Johnson administration initially attempt‐ States as a leader of the movement for decoloniza‐ ed to keep some attention on the question of tion and self-determination. Having heard much Africa and the decolonization of Portuguese of the rhetoric before, African nationalists across Africa, but U.S. covert intervention in Congo fur‐ the continent and political spectrum met the ther weakened U.S. credibility among African na‐ speech with an increasing degree of skepticism. In tionalists. Equally, by working with Belgian and the fnal years of the Johnson administration, mercenary forces to crush the Simbas, the United even after the death of Salazar in 1968, the States had shown what it perceived to be the lim‐ rhetoric failed to meet the reality of continued, if its of African development outside the U.S. sup‐ limited, United States support for Portugal. ported "evolutionary" independence process. By In the second half of his work, Witney Schnei‐ 1965, Vietnam began to take the administration's dman focuses on the Nixon administration and focus away from Africa. Schneidman believes that the powerful and negative infuence of Henry U.S. decolonization policy was "a policy in search Kissinger on United States policy towards the de‐ of direction" (p. 78). His descriptions of the battles colonization of Portuguese Africa. In his frst year between senior policymakers and regional spe‐ as National Security advisor, Kissinger helped to cialists in the State Department echoes the repeat‐ revamp U.S. policy in Africa through National Se‐ ed dogfghts over decolonization among ofcials curity Study Memorandum 39 (pp. 114-118). Dur‐ of the regional bureaus during the postwar peri‐ ing this review, Kissinger diminished, diluted, or od. Africanists within the State Department, led deleted the opinions of regional experts and rank‐ by Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen ing State Department ofcials. Discounting intelli‐ Williams, found themselves outweighed by senior gence reports that nationalist movements in ofcials who were unwilling to overturn an al‐ Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique as well liance with Portugal to gain the support of the as those challenging white minority-rule in African continent. Schneidman highlights this Rhodesia and South Africa were growing,

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Kissinger boldly stated "the Whites are here to how the United States engaged in an efort to pre‐ stay" (p. 119). From this fawed conception, vent a permanent communist presence in the gov‐ Kissinger set of to undermine Africanists in the ernment of Portugal. During Carlucci's extended State Department and to strengthen U.S. support stay in Lisbon, a growing confict between Carluc‐ for the Portuguese government regardless of its ci and Kissinger emerged as Carlucci's network of continued colonial wars in Africa. As a result, the contacts revealed that communist strength, while United States gained a new Azores base agree‐ signifcant, was not the decisive factor in the ment by December 1971 and the increasing enmi‐ emerging Portuguese government. Kissinger's ty of the majority of Africa. After nearly two growing paranoia of Soviet deception and person‐ decades of inaction and ambiguity in United al distaste for the appointed leaders led him to States policy, the Nixon administration had made challenge Portugal's status in NATO and to begin a clear policy statement that the United States undermining the very military which he had as‐ would stand with Portugal and its determined ef‐ sisted only a few years earlier. Schneidman paints fort to stop decolonization. a vivid scene of eforts by Carlucci and European The Nixon administration's confdence in Por‐ leaders attempting to convince a hardened tugal's abilities to thwart nationalist victories in Kissinger that the Portuguese socialists would win its colonies began to collapse with the February the elections, be committed to NATO, and not be a 1974 publication of General Antonio de Spinola's "Trojan horse" (pp. 170-180). Despite the instabili‐ book, Portugal and the Future. Noting the contin‐ ty of the Nixon-Ford Administration and ued failures to secure victories in its colonial Kissinger's doubts, Schneidman shows that Car‐ wars, Spinola argued that Portugal must come to lucci succeeded, along with many European gov‐ a political solution with the various nationalist ernments and political parties, in funneling aid movements. Schneidman clearly shows how this and support to "acceptable moderates" and in as‐ realization sent shockwaves through Portugal and sisting them in their electoral victories in galvanized the military to launch a coup which 1975-1976. overthrew the last vestiges of Salazar on April 25. However, Ambassador Carlucci's success in More importantly, Schneidman carefully reveals moderating the Portuguese revolution failed to be how Kissinger, now Secretary of State as well as repeated in Africa. While Kissinger's doubts and being National Security Advisor, misread the coup eforts to undermine the Portuguese revolution and revolution that was taking place in Portugal. failed to prevent Carlucci from continuing his ef‐ Discounting embassy assessments that the United forts, Kissinger's prolonged antagonism toward States could work with the leftist government, Africanists in the State Department allowed him Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union would to dominate policy towards the fnal decoloniza‐ gain a foothold both in Europe and Africa if the tion of Africa. Additionally, the Nixon administra‐ United States did not take countermeasures. As a tion's active support for Portugal had severed result, Kissinger fred the politically appointed most of the ties which U.S. ofcials had with na‐ ambassador, Stuart Nash Scott. On the counsel of tionalist groups. As a result, Kissinger's deep fears the legendary Vernon Walters, Kissinger sent of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Africa came Frank C. Carlucci III with a team of trained diplo‐ to fruition as many of the nationalist groups mats and spies to help shape the direction of the turned to the East for aid and weapons. As the Portuguese revolution. Portuguese revolution continued, the African na‐ In a chapter that takes the reader away from tionalists prepared themselves for immediate in‐ the liberation wars in Africa, Schneidman details dependence and sought to negotiate the rapid de‐ parture of Portuguese forces. In an efort to recon‐

3 H-Net Reviews nect with these groups, Assistant Secretary of peaceful, stable, western-oriented nations had col‐ State for Africa Donald Esaum urged Kissinger to lapsed and would lead to increased United States support Guinea-Bissau's early admission to the intervention and support for insurgencies in An‐ United Nations and to avoid aligning the United gola and Mozambique that cost millions of States with any of the several Angolan nationalist African lives. Schneidman correctly points out movements. Having been rejected on both counts, Kissinger's complicity in these decisions and the Esaum attempted to develop relations with the larger systemic failures of United States policy to‐ Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRE‐ wards decolonization. Nixon and Kissinger's will‐ LIMO). In an unauthorized visit to Mozambique, ingness to support undemocratic, white colonial Esaum promised to bring USAID teams into the governments that denied basic human rights to country quickly and assess the requirements. Es‐ their black inhabitants ultimately cost the United sentially trying to undermine Chinese and Soviet States much support in Africa and, ironically, promises of aid, Esaum's trip was mistakenly seen opened the door wider for Soviet, Chinese, and by Kissinger as disloyal. Kissinger was equally an‐ Cuban intervention. Ultimately, Schneidman con‐ gered by Esaum's open statements about the need fronts the legacy of these decisions and questions for change in South African apartheid. In Novem‐ Frank Carlucci's foreword to Schneidman's book. ber 1974, Esaum's unplanned promotion to Am‐ In the foreword, Carlucci wonders, "would Africa bassador to Nigeria highlighted the strength of have developed diferently had it [U.S. policy] Kissinger's resolve to support Portugal and South been otherwise?" Carlucci bluntly asserts "I doubt Africa. it â?¦ Africa can blame many of its problems on Kissinger's consistent disdain for the Africa colonialism and rightly so--but that doesn't excuse Bureau left him with little accurate intelligence or a lack of leadership in many countries in the post- understanding of the devolving situation in Ango‐ independence period" (p. xi). After reviewing the la. Relying on limited CIA contacts, Kissinger em‐ history of U.S. policy toward Portuguese Africa broiled the United States in another covert opera‐ during the ffteen years prior to independence, tion at the very moment when the Vietnam con‐ Schneidman fnds it impossible to come to Carluc‐ fict ended and U.S. aversion to interventionism of ci's conclusion. Having idly witnessed the assassi‐ any kind peaked. Equally, the inclusion of South nation of many of the leaders of the various na‐ African forces in the intervention to remove the tionalist movements and lacking contacts with communist-supported Popular Movement for the those that remained, U.S. policymakers squan‐ Liberation of Angola (MPLA) outraged African na‐ dered opportunities to develop relations with tions regardless of their position on the MPLA. Al‐ these leaders and created a growing distrust. though he had been warned of such a reaction by While certainly many of these leaders worked advisors such as Esaum, Kissinger still pressed with or were communists, the failure to compre‐ ahead with his demands for aid to the National hend their nationalist roots and their drive for in‐ Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNI‐ dependence left many U.S. policymakers unwill‐ TA) and the Front for the National Liberation of ing and ultimately unable to work with the Angola (FNLA) by arguing that Soviet and Cuban emerging nations of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and support for MPLA made them unacceptable part‐ Mozambique. Carlucci's own misunderstanding of ners in negotiations. Africa is highlighted by his role in Portuguese rev‐ olution combined with his lack of interest in the By the end of 1975, a full-scale civil war had colonial question which had triggered it. broken out in Angola. United States eforts to de‐ velop decolonization policies which resulted in Throughout his work, Schneidman provides an excellent and consistent theme of ambiguity

4 H-Net Reviews and inattention within United States policy to‐ policy once attacked by Senator Mike Mansfeld as wards the decolonization of Portuguese Africa. Al‐ "a policy of drift." though Nixon and Kissinger did choose to support Schneidman would have benefted greatly Portugal actively, their decisions were based on from a review of these new works and their new disinterest in Africa and a distrust of African na‐ documentary evidence as he revised his manu‐ tionalists. The tragic lack of interest in Africa or script. Although there is an unquestionable quali‐ the Africans helped facilitate further tragedy dur‐ ty in his own research and writing, Schneidman ing the collapse of colonialism by undercutting failed to connect his work directly with the broad‐ knowledgeable, engaged career ofcers who pro‐ ening historiography on United States decoloniza‐ posed alternative policies. Kissinger's disdain for tion policy. Despite this regretful defciency, the State Department led him to focus on his limit‐ Schneidman's book adds its weight to the develop‐ ed understanding and that of a small group of ad‐ ing argument and challenges historians to contin‐ visors who remained distant from the realities on ue to delve more deeply into the problems in Unit‐ the ground in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozam‐ ed States decolonization policy which have helped bique. The consequences of their decisions fos‐ to shape the post-colonial world in which we live tered decades of confict and should serve as a les‐ today. son to modern policymakers about dismissing pol‐ icy alternatives and intelligence that fails to ft se‐ nior policymakers' ideology and prejudices. Unfortunately, this consistent of lack of inter‐ est and understanding is found in the administra‐ tions preceding Schneidman's study as well as among some historians. Luckily, in the past decade and a half, several United States diplomat‐ ic historians have followed up on the pioneering work of William Rogers Louis, Robert McMahon, and Cary Fraser on the United States policy to‐ wards decolonization. From the Roosevelt admin‐ istration onward, United States policy has vacillat‐ ed between the rhetorical connections to self-de‐ termination and support of nationalist move‐ ments and the realities of inaction and tacit sup‐ port for European powers. This rhetoric encour‐ aged nationalists around the globe to press their demands for political freedoms and indepen‐ dence. Nascent independence movements drew strength from the language, but generally gained little substantive support from the United States. The consistent failure to match its words with its actions eventually earned the United States dis‐ may and enmity from nationalists across the globe. Whether looking at Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, or Guyana, a growing number of studies reveal a consistent inconsistency in U.S. policy; a

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Citation: Daniel Byrne. Review of Schneidman, Witney W. Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. September, 2005.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10888

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