Witney W. Schneidman. Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire. New York: University Press of America, 2004. xvii + 293 pp. $33.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-7618-2812-9. Reviewed by Daniel Byrne Published on H-Diplo (September, 2005) Witney Schneidman studiously examines 1961, Adlai Stevenson voted for a United Nations United States policy towards the decolonization of General Assembly resolution calling on Portugal Portuguese Africa and leaves the reader struck by to move Angola towards self-determination. Un‐ the fact that, like the decolonization of Portuguese surprisingly, the staunchly imperialist dictator Africa, Schneidman's monograph was unfortu‐ Antonio Oliveira Salazar refused to heed this call. nately delayed in arriving. Luckily, Schneidman Thus, Kennedy was left struggling to define his de‐ was prodded by the renowned historian Piero colonization policy in the light of the Bay of Pigs Gleijeses to transform his nearly two-decade-old disaster which ironically occurred on the same dissertation into a published book. While suffer‐ day as the vote on Angolan independence. ing from some of the difficulties of translating a Like the presidents before and after him, dissertation into a monograph, Schneidman main‐ Kennedy found himself straddling between his tained the strength of his research within an en‐ hopes to support national liberation movements during critique of United States foreign policy. In and his efforts to sustain alliances which provided doing so, Schneidman adds to a growing historiog‐ essential bases and international support for the raphy on the U.S. response to decolonization in United States. Stubborn allies, nebulous national‐ the postwar period--a response which was no‐ ist movements, challenges from the Soviet Union, tably confused, conflicted, and adrift. China, and Cuba, and a strongly Eurocentric poli‐ Schneidman begins his examination with the cymaking hierarchy all contributed to the consis‐ Kennedy administration's seemingly bold chal‐ tent difficulty Kennedy and his advisors had in or‐ lenge to Eisenhower's lackluster policies on decol‐ ganizing a coherent response to impending crises onization. In a move to reconnect the United in Portuguese Africa and elsewhere. In addition, States with the Third World and specifically U.S. goals for developing Africa through an "evo‐ emerging African nations, Kennedy openly chal‐ lutionary" process of decolonization clashed with lenged Portugal's presence in Africa. On April 20, both Portuguese desires to retain their colonial H-Net Reviews possessions and nationalist demands to have im‐ conflict with a 1966 quote from Defense Secretary mediate, unconditional independence. Robert McNamara, who stated that "the United Schneidman does an excellent job of showing States has no mandate on high to police the world how the United States attempted to develop rela‐ and the inclination to do so. There have been clas‐ tions with non-communist nationalists in Guinea- sic cases in which our deliberate nonaction was Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, but failed to do the wisest action of all" (p. 90). the same in Portugal. As long as Salazar and his While accepting the ideas behind this deliber‐ supporters maintained power, it seemed impossi‐ ate inaction, President Johnson, Secretary of State ble for Kennedy to develop avenues of decoloniza‐ Dean Rusk, and National Security Advisor Walt tion. By May 29, 1963, President Kennedy told Por‐ Rostow attempted to recapture the rhetorical plat‐ tuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira that his form of self-determination and decolonization by 1961 decisions had been "precipitous" (p. 52). announcing "a Johnson doctrine for Africa" on With the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforcing the es‐ May 26, 1966. Schneidman believes that the sential nature of the Azores base agreement, speech "was an eloquent, nonconfrontational tes‐ Kennedy accepted a policy defined by its ambigui‐ timony of American sensitivity toward self-deter‐ ty. As a result, Lyndon Johnson would inherit a mination in Africa" (p. 95). Like Kennedy before policy toward African decolonization as conflicted him, Johnson hoped to capture with rhetoric that as the one Kennedy had inherited from Eisenhow‐ which he refused to press in his policies towards er. Portugal: namely the perception of the United The Johnson administration initially attempt‐ States as a leader of the movement for decoloniza‐ ed to keep some attention on the question of tion and self-determination. Having heard much Africa and the decolonization of Portuguese of the rhetoric before, African nationalists across Africa, but U.S. covert intervention in Congo fur‐ the continent and political spectrum met the ther weakened U.S. credibility among African na‐ speech with an increasing degree of skepticism. In tionalists. Equally, by working with Belgian and the fnal years of the Johnson administration, mercenary forces to crush the Simbas, the United even after the death of Salazar in 1968, the States had shown what it perceived to be the lim‐ rhetoric failed to meet the reality of continued, if its of African development outside the U.S. sup‐ limited, United States support for Portugal. ported "evolutionary" independence process. By In the second half of his work, Witney Schnei‐ 1965, Vietnam began to take the administration's dman focuses on the Nixon administration and focus away from Africa. Schneidman believes that the powerful and negative influence of Henry U.S. decolonization policy was "a policy in search Kissinger on United States policy towards the de‐ of direction" (p. 78). His descriptions of the battles colonization of Portuguese Africa. In his frst year between senior policymakers and regional spe‐ as National Security advisor, Kissinger helped to cialists in the State Department echoes the repeat‐ revamp U.S. policy in Africa through National Se‐ ed dogfights over decolonization among officials curity Study Memorandum 39 (pp. 114-118). Dur‐ of the regional bureaus during the postwar peri‐ ing this review, Kissinger diminished, diluted, or od. Africanists within the State Department, led deleted the opinions of regional experts and rank‐ by Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen ing State Department officials. Discounting intelli‐ Williams, found themselves outweighed by senior gence reports that nationalist movements in officials who were unwilling to overturn an al‐ Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique as well liance with Portugal to gain the support of the as those challenging white minority-rule in African continent. Schneidman highlights this Rhodesia and South Africa were growing, 2 H-Net Reviews Kissinger boldly stated "the Whites are here to how the United States engaged in an effort to pre‐ stay" (p. 119). From this fawed conception, vent a permanent communist presence in the gov‐ Kissinger set off to undermine Africanists in the ernment of Portugal. During Carlucci's extended State Department and to strengthen U.S. support stay in Lisbon, a growing conflict between Carluc‐ for the Portuguese government regardless of its ci and Kissinger emerged as Carlucci's network of continued colonial wars in Africa. As a result, the contacts revealed that communist strength, while United States gained a new Azores base agree‐ significant, was not the decisive factor in the ment by December 1971 and the increasing enmi‐ emerging Portuguese government. Kissinger's ty of the majority of Africa. After nearly two growing paranoia of Soviet deception and person‐ decades of inaction and ambiguity in United al distaste for the appointed leaders led him to States policy, the Nixon administration had made challenge Portugal's status in NATO and to begin a clear policy statement that the United States undermining the very military which he had as‐ would stand with Portugal and its determined ef‐ sisted only a few years earlier. Schneidman paints fort to stop decolonization. a vivid scene of efforts by Carlucci and European The Nixon administration's confidence in Por‐ leaders attempting to convince a hardened tugal's abilities to thwart nationalist victories in Kissinger that the Portuguese socialists would win its colonies began to collapse with the February the elections, be committed to NATO, and not be a 1974 publication of General Antonio de Spinola's "Trojan horse" (pp. 170-180). Despite the instabili‐ book, Portugal and the Future. Noting the contin‐ ty of the Nixon-Ford Administration and ued failures to secure victories in its colonial Kissinger's doubts, Schneidman shows that Car‐ wars, Spinola argued that Portugal must come to lucci succeeded, along with many European gov‐ a political solution with the various nationalist ernments and political parties, in funneling aid movements. Schneidman clearly shows how this and support to "acceptable moderates" and in as‐ realization sent shockwaves through Portugal and sisting them in their electoral victories in galvanized the military to launch a coup which 1975-1976. overthrew the last vestiges of Salazar on April 25. However, Ambassador Carlucci's success in More importantly, Schneidman carefully reveals moderating the Portuguese revolution failed to be how Kissinger, now Secretary of State as well as repeated in Africa. While Kissinger's doubts and being National Security Advisor, misread the coup efforts to undermine the Portuguese revolution and revolution that was taking place in Portugal. failed to prevent Carlucci from continuing his ef‐ Discounting embassy assessments that the United forts, Kissinger's prolonged antagonism toward States could work with the leftist government, Africanists in the State Department allowed him Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union would to dominate policy towards the fnal decoloniza‐ gain a foothold both in Europe and Africa if the tion of Africa. Additionally, the Nixon administra‐ United States did not take countermeasures. As a tion's active support for Portugal had severed result, Kissinger fred the politically appointed most of the ties which U.S. officials had with na‐ ambassador, Stuart Nash Scott. On the counsel of tionalist groups. As a result, Kissinger's deep fears the legendary Vernon Walters, Kissinger sent of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Africa came Frank C.