THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS No.3 DECEMBER 1989 The National Security Council Staff: Structure and Functions By Christopher C. Shoemaker A National Security Affairs Paper Published on Occasion by THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY Arlington, Virginia THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS BY Christopher C. Shoemaker FOREWORD The National Security Council (NSC) is the body established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies. To assist the NSC, the Act also authorizes a staff. Since its inception, the role of the NSC Staff has ranged from that of a purely administrative body to that of an organization charged with major, overarching responsibilities of national security, depending on the management style and personal preferences of the President. In this paper, which was presented at the 1989 AUSA Annual Meeting, it is suggested that "organizational discipline" must be brought to the NSC Staff if it is to fulfill its essential role. The functions which the NSC Staff must perform are identified. If the recent Iran­ Contra Affair is symptomatic of institutional weaknesses in the national security process, then the observations and recommendations in this paper merit careful reading and consideration. I �0)� JACK N. MERRITT General, USA Ret. Executive Vice President LAND WARFARE PAPER NO.3, DECEMBER 1989 The National Security Council Staff: Structure and Functions by Christopher C. Shoemaker Lieutenant Colonel (P) Christopher C. Shoemaker, Field Artillery, served on the staff of the National Security Council from 1979 to 1982 and is currently assigned to the Office of the Army Chief of Staff. A 1971 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds a master's degree in internationalrelat ions and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Florida. He is a 1989 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He is coauthor of Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age (Praeger, 1984). The author originally wrote this paper as an individual study project while a student at the U.S. Army War College. Chapters V and VI appeared in the September 1989 issue of Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, under the title, "The NSC Staff: Rebuilding the Policy Crucible." The Paper represents the personal opinions of the author, and should not be taken to represent the views of the Institute of Land Warfare, the Association of the United States Army or its members. Inquiries regarding this and future Land Warfare Papers should be directed to: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201, telephone 1-800-336-4570 or (703) 841-4300. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I Introduction ....................................................................................1 CHAPTER II The Rise of the NSC ................................ ......... ............................3 National Security - An Operational Definition..................................................... 3 National Security - Institutional Management...................................................... 5 Conclusion.......................................................................... 14 CHAPTER III The Functional Requisites. ..................................... ... ....... ........ IS The Functional Requisites ................................................... 15 Conclusion... ........................... o ................ ......oo··· ...... ..........32 CHAPTER IV The NSC Structure ....................................... o ... ......... .... ............34 PD-2 and the Caner NSC ....................................................34 NSDD 2 and the Reagan NSC............................................. 39 Grading the Structures .....oo· ··· ······.. •oo .............. ..... ...............43 Conclusion.......... ..........oooo•····· ....................ooooo o··················49 CHAPTER V A Prescription For The Future ...... ... ... ..... ..............................51 The Role of the Assistant to the President. ............... 0 ........................... 0 ..............0 0 ....... 51 The National Security Council Staff.................................... 55 Articulation of the Structure ............................................... .57 Conclusion. ......o •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.59 CHAPTER VI Concl usion .....................................o ••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••60 ENDNOTES . .o ..................................o ..........o ....................o.•o·········oo•···o 62 AN AUSA INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER In 1988 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) established within its existing organization a new entity known as the Institute of Land Warfare. Its purpose is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defen se or national security issue. Publication as an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the Paper, but does suggest that the AUSA believes this Paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defen se issues. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS By Christopher C. Shoemaker CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On November 3, 1986, the Beirut newsmagazine, AI Shiraa, reported that the United States had been secretly selling weapons to Iran, notwithstanding a formal arms embargo that had been in effect since the Tehran embassy seizure seven years before. This story was the tip of a policy and procedural iceberg that, when fully surfaced, would precipitate a major crisis for the Reagan Administration. As the details of the issue were gradually revealed, it became apparent that, apart from serious questions of judgment, the Iran-Contra affair demon strated some major problems within the staff of the National Security Council, problems that called into question the nature and function of that organization. For the first time in its often controversial history, the NSC Staff was subjected to serious public scrutiny, and calls for major reform arose from many quarters. Even those favorably disposed towards the Administration began to ask how one small staff could wield so much power, even in the face of what was apparently determined opposition from the Departments of State and Defense. For students and practitioners of national security policy, the fundamental procedural and structural questions posed in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair warrant serious attention. Since its inception in 1947, the National Security Council Staff has assumed an increasingly significant role in the formulation of national security policy in the United States. What began as essentially an administrative and clerical support group of the National Security Council has evolved into what, without exaggeration, has become the single most powerful staff in Washington, eclipsing other departmental staffs which, by statute and custom, should have been dominant in their respective fields. This rise in power has been most often ascribed to the powe1ful personalities who have headed the NSC Staff. However, personalities, even those as strong as Brzezinski and Kissinger, do not alone explain the remarkable bureaucratic clout of the NSC Staff. Indeed, during the Iran-Contra affair, the NSC Staff was headed by persons not noted for personal flair. In order to understand the sources and implications of NSC Staff power, it is necessary to look beyond personalities and examine the functional roles played by the Staff as an institution. Only then does it become apparent that, regardless of the strength or weaknesses of the members of the National Security Council, the NSC Staff will continue to play a dominant role in the formulation of national security policy into the next century. What follows is an effort to outline the functional requirements of the NSC Staff, to identify certain features of NSC Staff decision-making, and to explore mechanisms, both formal and informal, by which the NSC Staff executes its various functions. Such an examination is important, for heuristic as well as pragmatic reasons. From a scholarly perspective, much has been written about decision-making within the immediate circle 1 of the President, with both a conceptual and an anecdotal flavor. There is room, however, for a more rigorous look at the role of the NSC Staff, a look which will help modify or amplify to some extent, wisdom on the subject. From a policy perspective, a more thorough understanding of the functional requirements of the NSC Staff can help a new administration avoid replowing old ground and taking years to discover what its predecessors already knew. To the extent that this effort succeeds in these objectives, it will be useful. 2 CHAPTER II THE RISE OF THE NSC A meaningful discussion of the National Security Council Staff must begin with a review of the conceptual basis of national security, as well as a discussion of the formation and evolution of the NSC and its Staff as institutional bodies.l/ For in its roots we find both the underlying rationale that commands its existence