War and peace in northern Sung China: Violence and strategy in flux, 960-1104 A.D.

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WAR AND PEACE IN NORTHERN SUNG CHINA:

VIOLENCE AND STRATEGY IN FLUX,

960-1104 A.D.

by

Shm-lung Tsang

Copyright © Shui-lung Tsang 1997

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1997 UMX Number: 9805806

Copyright 1997 by Tsang, Shul-lung All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9806806 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 2

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ® GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have

read the dissertation prepared by Shui-lunq Tsang

entitled WAR AND PEACE IN NORTHERN SUNG CHINA: VIOLENCE

AND STRATEGY IN FLOX, 960-1104

and recommend that It be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation

/ April 9, 1997 Dr< Jing-shen Tao Date

Date

April 9, 1997 Dr. Brian McKAigivt Date

Date

• ApriL. 9, 1 997 Dr .^-Chia-lin Pao Tao

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

April 9, 1997 Dissertationislerti Director Date Dr. Jing-shen Tao 3

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This disseilatioii has been submitted m paitial fiilfiDment of requitements for an advanced degree at The Univecsity^ of Arizona and is deposed in tfie Uniyasity^ Libraiy to be made available to borrowers under rules of the libraiy.

Brief quotations from ttus disseitation are aUowable w^out special pemdssioii, provided that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for peimisaon for extended quotation from or reproduction of tins manuscript in v^ole or in part nu^ be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED: PREFACE

Peace as the absence of war seems applicable to all human experience in any

times. However, it was given additional and specific meaning in different historical

periods, cultures, and civilizations. John Adams, he must "study politics and war, that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, and naval architecture, navigation, commerce and agriculture, in order to give their children a right to smdy painting, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry and porcelain."

According to him, war provided a positive peace. However, whether or not peace was positive usually depended on whether victor or vanquished. While the Roman eagle bearing the victory laurels in its claws symbolized a positive peace for the Roman, it also imposed slavery and oppression over others. In Medieval Europe, Peace of God as mandate justified the distribution of power among lords and overlord, between urban cities and rural country; it did not necessarily mean a positive peace of liberty, right, and well-being for its citizenry. Peace-keeping, medieval or modem period, is difScult and expensive. The Sung experience illustrates how the Chinese in the tenth and eleventh century engaged in strenuous efforts to prevent war, and is a historical lesson of how the peace was eventually destroyed.

I owe inestimate gratitude to Professor Tao Jing-shen. Without his inspiring and encouraging support in many ways, I could not complete my dissertation covering a relatively extensive period. The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Professor

Brian McKnight and Pao Tao Chia-lin for their assistance in the preparation of this 5

dissertation. I would like to express my great gratitude to Professor Allen Whiting for his

kind advice too. I owe much gratitude also to my teacher Mr. Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing. Though in

his retirement, he grants me immeasurable support in the study of Hsi Hsia. In addition, special thanks to £>r. Joe Eng for his English edition and Ohashi Tom for his romanization of my Japanese bibliography. I have greatly enjoyed discussion with Dr. Ho

Koon-wan and Ng Pak-sheimg during the passed years. Their opinions on my dissertation are particularly valuable.

I wish to thank my father. Honorary Advisor of Hong Kong Museum of Art Tsang

Wing-kwong, who has trained me in classical Chinese for years during my teenage, providing an indispensable knowledge for my advanced scholarship. I thank my mother

Siu Yim-timg, who, despite unsuccessful in training me to be a musician, has constantly supported me in the study 1 am interested. I have to thank Mei-Iing Woo for her love, and for reminding me there is life beyond the academy. I also thank my younger brother Emil

T. Y. Tsang, a pianist in Vienna, who set forth a voyage in the world of music providing an example of how much devotion should I engage in my own historical research.

There are innumerable people I should thank for moral, intellectual and emotional support during the past eight years. My gratitude goes to: Victor S. C. Cheng, Kasey

Lynn, George Wu, Dr. Ho Man-kit, Anna YO, Herman Lee and his family, Hui Wai-pui,

Asako Togari, Lau Sze-wan, Albert M. H. Chow, Boris L. K. Ting, Dr. Kwong Nai-heng,

Dr. Yuen Wing-kee, Jimmy Wu, Dr. Philip Lam and Annie Lam, Paul Lee, Dr. Chow

Kwok-wing, Mimi Ho, David Poon, Cynthia Ng, Yeimg Yim-ting, Pak Chi-kwong, Dr. 6

Chiu Yil-lok, Wong Cheung-wai, Cheung Chi-yi, Cheung Yuet-kiu, Macey Taylor,

Cheung Tze-Iexmg, Chang Ch'eng-chiu, Lee Man-yip, Dr. Lo Sze-hang and his family,

Yasmi K. W. Chong, Wong Kam-har, Cheung Ying, Lee YU-hung, Yiu Nga-sze, Chan

Miu-hong, Cheung Chi-wai, and Yuen Wai-lan.

And finally I have to thank Lilly Lau, Grandmaster of the Eagle-claw Martial Art

System. Her training has provided me strength and confidence to deal with the eight-year- long Ph.D. campaign. I also thank my physician Dr. Fok Po-k'ai, who has greatly reduced my suffering during the past two years. 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIAnONS 9 ABSTRACT 10

Introduction 12

PART ONE WAR UNDER CONTROL 38 Chapter 1 From T'ang to Sung: To War, and End It J8 The proliferation of violence. J9 The Ravage of War. 46 Civil War as an Obstacle of Political Reunification 50 Civil War and External Threats 55 Chapter 2 The Formation of Grand Strategy (969-979) 63 Grand Strategic Interests 63 Grand Strategic Goals 69 Grand Strategic Principle: Rational Use of Limited Violence. 71 Policies and Conunitments 78 Plan for Unification: First the South 84 Chapter 3 Sung-Liao Conflict and the Rise of Peace Propaganda. 90 The Bipolar System: A Military Equilibrium 90 The Rejection of Prolonged War. 101 The Desperate Search for Strategic Decision 113 Chapter 4 Sung Control on the Armed Force 123 The Soldiers 124 The Officers 130 Arms Manufacture and Horse Breeding 136 Logistics and Engineering Service 139 Administrative Control 145 Operation Control 147 Strategic Decision Making 150

CONCLUSION OF PART ONE 157

PART TWO ESCALATING CONFUCT 160 Chapter 5 The Origin of Hsi Hsia. 164 Central Asia: From Power Struggle to Equilibrium (7-lOth C.) 165 The Tanguts in the Pre-Hsi Hsia Period 178 The Hsi Hsia Issue in the Early Sung 186 The Sung Strategy against Li Chi-ch'ien 186 The Early Triumph of Indirect Approach .207 Chapter 6 War and Peace from 1038 to 1045 213 Li Te-ming's Invasion of Ho-hsiu Corridor. .213 The Vulnerable Sung Frontier. .217 Wei-ming YQan-hao's Victories on Battlefields .224 The Kuanan Crisis .229 The Strategic Illusion of Li YQan-hao .232 Tibetans as Players of International Politics .239 8

Chapter 7 Civilian in Command; The Strategy of Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen...^48 Civilian in Militaiy Command. 247 Theater Strategy: Offense or Defense. .259 Rebuilding the Shensi Defenses: The Role of Foits, Archers and Tribal Auxiliaries 26i Issue of Fort Shui-Io 278 Chapter 8 Increasing Attention to Military Affairs 285 Perceptual Changes 285 Ch'ing-li Reform (1043-45): A Response to Foreign Thereat 290 Military Aspects of Reform (1043-1067) 293 The Selection of Military Personnel 299 The Interdependence of CivilMnilitary Relation 305 The Civilian Strategists 309 The Example of Ti Ch'mg 316

CONCLUSION OF PART TWO 323

PART THREE THE RETROGRESSION OF THE SUNG EXPANSIONISM J25 Chapter 9 Reform and The Option of War. 327 Bureaucratism and Factional Politics 329 Economic Policies and Its Outcome. J38 Military Development. 354 Uncertainty in Foreign Relation 31\ Formulating an Offensive Grand Strategy 3iO Chapter 10 The Sung Army Strikes Back 398 Theater Strategy and Operation: The Scheme to Outflank the East Wing 398 Theater Strategy and Operation: The West Wing. .411 Conversion of the Southern "Barbarians" and the Sino-Viemamese War. 421 The Ling-chou Campaign, 1081 431 Right Wing Outflani^g 11: The Fiasco at Fort Eternal Happiness 438 Chapter 11 Wining Battles and Losing Peace 447 Pacifism after 1067 and the Defense of the YOan-you Era. 447 Sung Strategy in the 1090s .464 Triumph on Celestial Capital Mountam .475 The Second and Third ifei-Ho Campaign .494 Ominous Signs of a Catastrophic Collapse 505

CONCLUSION OF PART THREE 520

CONCLUSION 524

References 534 Glossary 567 Name 578 9

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

CPPM Ch'ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo. Yang Chung-Iiang CTS Chiu-Tang-shu. Liu Hsuen CWTS Chiu Wu-tai-shih- Se Chu-cheng HHSS Hsi Hsia shu-shih. Wu Kuang-ch'eng HCP Hsu Tzu-chi'1i t'lmg-chien ch'ang-pien. Li Tao HTS Hsin-Tang-shu. Ou-yang Hsiu, Sung Ch'i HWKC Han Wei-kung chi. Han Ch'i HWTS Hsin Wu-tai-shfh, Ou-yang Hsiu JLKI Ju-lin kung-i. Tien K'uang KHCPTS Kuo-hsieh chi-pen ts'ime-shu LCC Lo-ch'uan-chi. Chang Fang-p'ing LS Lian-shih. T0-t*0 MCPT Meng-ch'i pi-t'an- Shen Kua OYHCC Ou-vang Hsiu Ch'uan-chi. Ou-yang Hsiu SCPMHP San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-pien. Hsu Meng-hsin SHY Sung Hui-vao. Hsu Sung SKCSCP Ssu-k'u ch'flan-shu chen-pen SMCCI Sunp Ming-ch'en chou-i SMKCI Sai-ma Kiiang chou-i. Ssu-ma Kuang SPTKCP Ssu-pu ts'xinp-k'an ch'u-oien ^ Sunp Shih. To-t'o SSCW Su-shui chi-wen. Ssu-ma Kuang TCTC Tzu-chih t'ung-chien. Ssu-ma Kuang TPCCTL Pai-p'ing chih-chi t'ung-lei. Peng Pai-ch'uan WCCY Wu-ching chung-vao. Tseng Kung-liang WHTK Wen-hsien t'lmg-k'ao. Ma Tuan-lin 10

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on a critical factor in historical transformation of medieval China—the dilemma between war and peace. Not only this dissertation provides a brief and comprehensive account on conflicts, battles, and treaties, but it observes the attitude toward violence and the track of searching peace during Tenth and Eleventh

Century China as well. Borrowing the concept of peace by modem scholars studying grand strategy, strategic culture, and pacifism, I regard peace as realistic strategic option, institutionalized establishment, consent behavior mode, and multi-oriented culture.

My discussion begins with the exhausting campaigns of the Pang in Central Asia and the ensuing civil war during the Ninth and Tenth centuries, arguing the Sung non- active posture in external adventure as a conscious avoidance of excessive violence. The relative success of the \sung policy saw in the peace annexation of the Wu-Yueh

Kingdom and the conclusion of the Peace of 1005 between the Sung and Liao with modest cost. In addition, the early Sung rulers firmly controlled the military machinery and prevented war-making by internal and institutional causes.

Nevertheless, the existing institutionalized peace between the Sung and Liao did not create a norm of behavior and prevent violence proliferation. Unable to contain the

Tangut expansionism, the Sung was compelled to reinstate aggressive grand strategy, relieving constrain on its war machinery. Strategic imperative stimulated career military service of the Sung civil officials and gave room to the voice of pragmatic expansionism.

Sung military achievement ctilminated in the success of rearmament during the reform of II

Wang An-shih. However, the ensuing war eventually ravaged the Sung empire, its opportunity for a great leap toward a pre-modem world missed. 12

INTRODUCTION

Question: Sung China, from Peace to War

In the late twentieth century, it seems that peace was managed without general war and nuclear holocaust. Weapons have become too destructive, perceptions have changed, and a rational nation must first estimate the ultimate cost of war. The traditional wisdom of Marx and Clausewitz regards war as an extension of politics and "a carrying out of the same by other means''.^ However, the modem reality is that victory may always be pyrrhic and, thus, questionable. In sum, the waging of war is reafiBnned as one of the eternal human dilemmas.

This reality is by no means unique to our day and Lao Tzu(circa. 6th-century BC) has stated: "Arms are instruments of ill omen and there are spirits that detest them that one who has the way does not abide by their use."^ Lao Tzu's teaching found no contemporary application in his time of universal war and upheaval. Nevertheless, after a thousand years, despite its territorial dispute with the Khitans, Sung China (960-1127) exhibited a remarkably peaceful attitude and provided an early example for the practice of mutual recognition and coexistence. Such contemporary historians as Tao Jing-shen have regarded that the Peace of 1005 between the Northem Sung and Liao established a

- Clausewitz, Carl von.. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret ed. and trans., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 87. "Lao Tzu, Tao te Chine. (The Way and Its Power), translated with an introduction by Liu, D. C., (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1963), p. 89. 13

diplomatic equality in bilateral relations and provided long-term stability.^ It also

provided an indispensable condition for the economic prosperity of Eleventh century

China. Certainly, peace did not satisfy the appetites of irredentists w^o vehemently

criticized Sung inabili^ to regain territories ceded to the Liao by the Later Chin (936-

947) during the Five Dynasties (907-960).

Nevertheless, the Sung foreign policy changed radically after 1067. In its last fifty

years (c.1067-1127), the Northern Sung attacked almost all of its neighbors, namely the

Hsi Hsia, Ch'ing-t'ang, Vietnam, and finally the Liao. The peace oriented principle was replaced by power politics and expansionism. This dissertation asks under what circumstances did political and military changes during the tenth and eleventh-century in the Northern Sung provided for the peace. Under what circimistances were these conditions later nullified?

Approach: An Analysis of Strategy

This study of war and peace in Sung China is not only based on primary sources, but also incorporates the outcomes of previous scholarly researches. At the beginning, it is worth to examine the approaches of modem historians.

Prominent among Chinese scholars is the nationalistic approach with its origin in the Southern Simg and Ming dynasties and its heyday in Republican China. Nationalistic- minded scholars described Sung impotence, with its inability to regain the territory ceded

^ Tao Jing-shen, Sung-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chhi (Researches on Sung-Liao Relations), (Taipei: Lien- ching, 1984); also. Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations. (Tucson: The University of 14

to the Khitan as comparable to the humiliating century of the late Ch'ing and the early

Republic. According to this approach the Sung experienced failure not only because of its unsatisfactory military achievements, but also because its centralization and civil policy.

This approach has some problems, especially in its ignorance of considerable military success against the Khitan invasions during the early Northern Sung and the aggressive military adventures from the 1160s to 1220s. This approach merely explained selective facts rather than evaluate an entire and comprehensive historical period.

Also, historians evaluated the Sung achievement mainly on non-politico-military aspects. The Sung has been described as a dynasty lacking in vigor and impetus in political and military spheres, and being smug in economic prosperity and cultural effervescence. The Peace of 1005 provided an environment in which China enjoyed impressive economic growth, scientific-technological progress, socio-political stability and thus, was tremendously significant. Eventually China turned to an "inward" culture.

In the scope of macro-history, this explanation is agreeable. The Sung economic and cultural prosperity was more significant than its political and military "achievement".

Nevertheless, when we discard the Sinocentric ingredients from the term "achievement" such as victories over the "barbarians", territory expansion, and colonization of Central

Asia, seen in the historical description of the Tang military "achievement", we would find valuable heritage in the Simg experience in war and peace. Pursuit of long-term stability, comprehensive strategy consideration, and rational decision making prevailed in

Arizona Press, 1988). 15

most of the Northern Sung period and ought not to be overlooked.

Another approach focused mainly on China's neighbors and studies of the Liao and Hsi Hsia arose in China, Japan and Russia, inspired by the studies of steppe empires.

Indeed, studies of steppe empires by the western scholars defined several crucial aspects for comparative studies of the Liao and Hsi Hsia. Emphasis on their unique social and cultural phenomena and reconstruction of their historical experience relating their sedentary neighbors provided another angle for our imderstanding of how they behaved.

This approach gradually contributed to the revisionist study of the traditional Sinocentric interpretation. Nomadic peoples are no longer treated as "barbarians", nor do historians treat the empires of steppes only in comparison to the Roman and Chinese empires.

Military actions against sedentary empires were rooted in climatic alteration on grassland, demand of trading, fashion of warring, and the need of political consolidation.^ However, as violence outburst, strategic and cultural interactions complicated the nature of conflict.

Pragmatic strategic interests would compel nomadic leaders to adjust means to suit the ends, to which the original steppe tradition was not necessarily the predominant concern.

* Lattimore, Owen, Studies in Frontier History: Collected Paper. 1929-1958. (Paris: Mouton, 1962). Gsousset, Rene, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. (L'empire des Steppes: Attila, Gengis-khan, Tamerlan), Naomi Waford (tr.), (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970). Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Pei-ya yu-mu min-chu nan-ch'in kem the nomadic 16

Furthermore, during the long process of cultural interaction, semi-sedentary empires emerged. There has been only limited research on semi-sedentary nomadic regimes such as the socially and culturally dualistic Liao and Hsi Hsia. Whether and v^en they ought to be treated as steppe-originated or Sinicized empires is a long disputed question, because it is somewhat difficult to identify the origins of many aspects of culture. In short, the bellicose activities of Liao and Hsi Hsia are difficult to explained by simply saying that the Khitans and Tanguts were of steppe origin and were naturally aggressive.

Another approach views the relation between China and its northem neighbors, in terms of Conquest Dynasties. This hypothesis is put forward by such Japanese scholars as

Tamura Jitsuso.® To classify Liao, Chin, YOan and Ch'ing as Conquest Dynasties simplifies their explanation, but these dynasties did not have common steppe-origin. This approach has not been adopted outside Japan with the exception of Wittfogel and Feng,^ probably because of its rationalization of the Japanese aggression of China.

The international relations approach has been used by outstanding scholars in the exploration and explanation of the relations among the Sung-Liao, Sung-Hsi Hsia and

Sung-Chin. This is an integrated approach which not only focuses on diplomacy but also

tradition. Refer to Barfield, Thomas J., The Perilous FronO'en Nomadic Empires and China. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1989). ^ Tamura Jitsxizo. Chukoku seifiiku ocho no ken-kvu. (Dynasties of Conquest in China—Cultural Creation under the Liao, the Chin and the YOan), (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1985). His explanation was vehemently criticized by Chinese scholars. Refer to Sun Chin-chi, "Kuan-yO 'Cheng-fu wang-ch'ao', in Liao-chin Ch'ieh-tan Nu-chen shih ven-chiu (1982)1, pp. 22-23. Also, Sun Chin-chI, Kan chih-geng, "Lun wo-kuo li- shih shang nan-pei min-chu te kuan-hsi", in Liao-chin Ch'ieh-tan Nu-chen shih ven-chiu. (1982)1, pp. 26- 30. ® Wittfogel, and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society: Liao. in Transactions of the American Philosophical Society held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge New Series 36, (Philadelphia: 17

on political, social, economic and military aspect as well. The approach is especially valuable in explaining the foreign attitude. Sung decision making and the complex nature of tri-partite diplomacy. One possible omission of this approach would be a lack of focus on the military aspects attested by an enormous number of memorials recorded in Sung sources. An analytic approach with an emphasis more on the relation between military and non-military factors is needed.

Considering the shortcomings of the above approaches, this study employs an approach examining Sung strategy. Strategy approach is not obscure and introspective but systematic and integrated; the meaning of "strategy" will be defined in "Conceptual

Framework" below. In general, strategy is an integration of military strategy and grand strategy. The former concerns military factors while the latter concern non-military factors related to security. Such an approach focuses on the strategic interaction among hostile or potentially hostile states. In this sense, it has a similar scope as the international relation approach. Nevertheless, its concentration on the relation between military and non-military aspects related to security differs from the study of international relation approach. Nevertheless, rather than description of battles, it also differs from a traditional military history approach because it pays more attention to non-military factors such as political, economy, and cultural value.^ The examination of strategic interaction

The American Philosophical Society, 1949), pp. 1-35. ^ Other than grand strategy, there are other strategies focused on non-military factors such as national strategy and development strategy. The concept "national strategy", which emphasizes non-military factors without necessary relation to security, has been adopted by political historians for years. Its Chinese translation, Kuo-ts'e. was used broadly among Sung studies. Since the question of security was central in 18

concentrates on the strategic impact and response among states in war and peace. In

searching the origin of violence, strategy approach may not necessary be illuminative as

the approach of frontier history. Nevertheless, it has advantage in explaining the long

interactive relation between steppe and sedentary empires. The changing interaction

describes the rise and fall of various strategic approaches, their modification or deviation,

and their success or failure. It also shows how the perception of war changed along with

the decision-making for war and peace and war-making. Social and cultural differences

affect particular result of strategy analysis but do not restrict its eligibility as an academic

discipline.® Regarding its comprehensiveness, I employ this approach in the following

study.

Theme : The Cycle of War and Peace in Northern Sung China

This dissertation will examine the transition from peace to war in the international order

among the Northern Sung, Liao and Hsi Hsia during the eleventh-century. Among these

three powers, the focus will be on the Northem Sung not only because of the abundance

of historical sources but also because, for the majority of occasions, the Northem Sung

seized the initiative in diplomacy and military strategy. Even in the crisis of 1042, the

Northem Simg rapidly reclaimed the initiative through skillful diplomatic maneuvering

the Sung strategic concern, I consider that the concept "grand strategy" as sufficient to the contexts. " Development strategy" is a modem concept especially important in the Third World, with "modernization" or "development" as a nation's goal. I have not seen any comparable aspect in Sung China yet and would rather reserve this approach for further studies. ^Despite the differences among the Soviet Union, United States and China in both spheres, the perpetual fluctuations and interaction during the Cold War was the theme of continuing research. 19

and, therefore played the principal role in history and in this dissertation.

Having the building and collapse of a peace order as its object and strategic analysis as its approach, this study belongs to the discipline of the historical study of strategy. I will focus on several questions: What kind of interests created peace sentiment? What kind of interests and its ensuing peace sentiments allowed for the formation of a grand strategy for peace instead for war? Were the strategic means sufficient to bring a desirable peace? Were there any deficiencies in the Sxmg grand strategy of peace? Was this strategy effective in maintaining peace? Was the goal of such a grand strategy for peace sufBciently flexible for the altering strategic environment?

What adjustment in objective could have made it endure longer? If new grand strategy was needed, what ought to have been the objectives?

Part One (Chapter 1-4) describes how Chinese civil war in the late ninth century ended and the Sung-Liao equilibrium was founded during the early eleventh-century.

Professor Tao's studies of Sung-Liao relations in this period lays an indispensable foundation for this part of the dissertation. In addition, I will examine the peace of lOOS as an outcome of the military equilibrium achieved between the Sung and Liao.

Part Two (Chapter 5-8) addresses the escalation of conflict from the 1030s to the

1070s and will focuses on how the Hsi Hsia, a regional power, challenged the international order formed in 1005. The impact of the Hsi Hsia invasion during the 1040s was significant, particularly in the ensuing reconfiguration of Northern Sung political and military power. From the 1030s to the 1070s, the Northern Sung continued to engaged in 20

strenuous effort to maintain the peace. However, the reintroduction of power politics by

Hsi Hsia provoked the Sung with a different perception and attitude to the making of war and, paradoxically, this different understanding actually allowed a far more aggressive strategy. This has not received sufficient scholarly attention and a further explanation will be offered in this chapter.

Part Three (Chapter 9-11) will discuss a process in which the control of war- making was loosened after 1070. In the late eleventh century, K'aifeng exhibited a series of belligerent activities- Military leadership deliberately shifted to an offensive strategy.

The Hsi-ho campaign aimed to annex Ch'ing-t'ang while, at the same time, an offensive posture was taken against the Hsi Hsia. I suggest that the Sung aggression was the culmination of an unbroken military escalation during the eleventh-century rather than merely erratic war-making. The strategy of the offense represented a conscious, deliberate decision but it eventually led to a devastating war. Political dichotomy, financial reform, and technology advancement of the late Northern Sung accelerated such a transition.

Prior to its risky and disastrous renew of hostility against Khitan in the 1120s, K'aifeng had become a war-like regime.

Remarks on Historical Sources

This dissertation is written after a comprehensive examination of the Simg historical sources. Most of the historical facts of this dissertation refer to Hsfl Tsu-chih 21

t'ung-chien ch'anp-p'ien (HCPV Simy Standard History, and Sung Hui-vao.^ Among such

sources, HCP is noteworthy because the records fiwrn 1085 to 1099, ahnost one-fourth of

the total volume, are extraordinary revealing. It includes numerous pieces of diaries,

memorials, and original battle reports about the Sung-Tangut War that have rarely been

studied by historians. I also make use of private histories such as Tun^-tu shih-lfieh and

Lung-p'ing chi.^° They might have based on same ofGcial sources with HCP.

Nevertheless, they are able to provide alternative versions worth for examining the

validity of the ofScial records. In addition, I collected a large number of private material

sources from Pang and Sung anecdotes, pen-notes, and biography scripts on stone

tablets. Because HCP did not cover the year after 1104,1 decide this year as the end of

our major discussion. A brief examination is provided on the Sung-Tangut War that

ceased and renewed from 1104 to 1120 based on Sung Standard Historv. Ch'ang-oien chi-

shih pen-mo. and other scarce references.

Due to the complete destruction of the Liao Empire by the Jurchens and the Hsi

Hsia Kingdom by the Mongols, political and military accounts of these two "barbarian"

regimes rarely remained and modem scholars are compelled to employ Chinese sources.

Not being able to except fro the insufBcient of sources, this dissertation has tried to make

• Li Tao (1115-1184), HsO Tsu-chih fune-chien ch'ane-o'ien ( HCP ), hereafter as HCP. (Collected Data for a Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government), (Peking; Chung-hua punctuated ed., 1979-). To-t'o, Liao Shih (The History of Liao), hereafter as1^ (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1974). To-t'o, Sung Shih. (The History of Sung), hereafter as SS. (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1977). HsQ Sung (1781-1848) ed., Sung Hui-vao Chi-kao. hereafter as SHY. (Draft of Documents Pertaining to Matters of State in the Sung Dynasty), (Peking; Chung-hua, 19S7). Wang Ch'eng (d. ca. 1200), Tung-tu shih-lOeh. (Resume of Events in the Eastern Metropolis), (Taipei: Kuo-li chung-yang t'u-shu-kuan, 1991). Tseng Kung, Lune-o'ing chi (Historv of the Greatest Peace), 22

use of scarce references as much as possible. Since 1980, mainland historians have

collected a number of Khitan sources. Accompanied to the brief r.ian StanHarrf History. I

have made use of ni'fian-r .ian-wen and r.ian-tai shih-k'o wen-pien. Particiilar in the

latter, there are revealing references on a nimiber of biographies scripts on stone tablets of

Liao generals. Because of the absence of a Hsi Hsia standard history, historians during

the Ch'ing Dynasty such as Tai Hsi-chang and Wu Kuang-ch'eng provided Hsi Hsia chi

and Hsi Hsia shu-shih. Although still based mainly on Chinese sources, they included a

number of extinct records about the Sung-Hsia War. In addition, mainland archeologists

have found a number of sites of the ruins of Sung forts in Ch'inghai and Kansu and most of these discovery reports have been compiled and summarized in Li Chih-hsin,

Ch'inghai ku-ch'ene k'ao-pien. With nimiismatic evidence, these finds testify the Sung military actions in Tangut and Kokonor Tibetan territory after 1067.

Conceptual Framework: Meanings, Usages, and Relations of Terms

Before examining the Sung management of war and peace, it is necessary to survey the theoretical variants and to clarify concepts. An exhaustive review of all theories from Confucius to the 1990s cannot be provided here. Instead, this introductory chapter only gives a thematic review. This conceptual framework focuses on three aspects: (1) definitions and usage, (2) theoretical concepts, and (3) their applicability to the Sung experience.

(Taipei: Wen-hai, 1967). 23

1. War

The complexity and flexibility of war are among the most Ulusive phenomena to understand, frustrating mankind for millennium. Noted theorist of peace study, Anatol

Rapoport, wrote in 1989, "War has been able to survive as an institution because its methods and its supporting ideology were sufGciently flexible to adapt to social change." The meaning of war has varied in different cultures and historical periods, from Sun Tzu, Thucydides, to Old Testament. Quincy Wright gave two definitions in

1965. He said, "in the broadest sense war is a violent contact of distinct but similar entities" and it can "be considered the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force."^^ His first, and much broader conception can be applied to a gang-fight in present-day New York street or to tribal on the Mongolian Plateau in the twelfth century. His second, and narrower definition, is used in the analytic section dealing with contemporary war.

Nevertheless, war as a legal condition permitting the use of violence is suitable for the study of wars in Northem Sung China. In the Eleventh Century China whether or not two regimes were in war status required clear distinction. In 1041 the Khitans renewed their accusation that the Sung had waged its Yu-chou, (the present Beijing City) campaign in 979 without provocation and good reason. The Sung court officially replied,

"since there has been the clash at Shih-ling Kuan Pass, the Chi-men (the other name of

" Rapoport, Anatol, The Origin of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 488. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, second 24

Yu-chou) Campaign followed."^^ In fact, before the Yu-chou campaign was initiated, the

Sung emperor informed the Khitan emperor not to intervene in the Sung unification attempt "otherwise war will ensue."^* Thus, in a number of our cases from the late tenth to the mid-eleventh centuries, the term "legal condition" applies as a necessary part in our definition of war. However, even though not all armed conflicts had clear-cut legitimization during the chaotic Five Dynasties, we can include this period in the conception of war under the broader definition. In other words, for those cases during the

Chinese civil war from the late ninth to the mid tenth century, as background of our study, war is treated as the violent contact of "distinct but similar entities." When war becomes a form of international conflict among the Sung, Liao, and Hsi Hsia, a more strict definition is employed. In short, war as a governmental act ought to be distinguished from irregular pillaging incursion.

2. The Nature of War

Searching for the causes of war would be an attractive subject of study. Different hypotheses have been made based from the fields of psychology, political science.

edition, 1965) p. 8. Po-t'o, Sung Shih. (The History of Sung), hereafter as SS, (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1977), chaan 318, p. 10359. To-t'o, Liao Shih (The History of Liao), hereafter as (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1974), chOan 9, p. 101. This is also testified by the Sung controversy on whether or not it should post bounty for the head of the first Hsi Hsia emperor who declared independence in 1038. Critics immediately pointed out that the use of bounty ought to be restricted in the cases against rebellious generals, instead of that against foreign leaders. Otherwise it would provoke counter measure from the enemy. See Li Tao (1115-1184). HsO Tsu-chih fune-chien ch'ane-p'ien ( HCP ), hereafter as HCP, (Collected Data for a Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government), (Peking: Chung-hua punctuated ed., 1979-). chQan 123, p. 2913 25

sociology, philosophy and strategy.^^ The ultimate purpose would be that once the causes

of war are nullified, then we can achieve ultimate peace. If these causes are rooted in

human nature, then we are dealing with the inevitability of violence.^®

The causes of war are so complex and widespread that they may be found

wherever sought, regardless of the field of study, psychology, strategy, ideology, or

sociology.^^ Scholar may argue but creating peace by negating its causes is still in its

rudimentary study. Scholars have viewed war as consequence of political conflict among states, expression of profound psychological frustration-aggression, and problem of human society. However, there is no single consensus as to the inevitability of war.

Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will." "Violence, that is to say, physical force, is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object."^®

It raises a more essential question; why does the violent means became so indispensable to achieve the political end? This question can be answered in two perspectives, first by the destructive nature of war and secondly by the nature of animosity of human beings.

Refer to Wright, p. 717-743. Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and Wan A Theoretical Analysis. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). Blainey, Geof&ey, The Causes of War. (New York: The Free Press, 1973). Howard, Michael. The Causes of War. (London: Temple Smith, 1983). Brown, Seyom, The Causes And Prevention of War. (New York: SL Martin's, 1987). Creveld, Martin Van, The Transformation of War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). Karsh, Efraim, "The Causes of Wan Introduction", in Freedman, Lawrence fed). War. (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 65-68. Wright, p. 717-743. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, edited with introduction by Anatol Rapoport, (Middelsex, Baltimore and Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1968) I, p. 10. 26

War brings destruction. The absolute form of vulnerability means inabili^ for one

to avoid a complete physical destruction by the enemy. Since the physical existence of an

entity extincts, its collateral secular processions are no longer belong to him. Thus, a

country has no arm cannot define its political and economic interests. To avoid ultimate

destruction as Carthage by Rome and Hsi Hsia by Gengis Khan, a monarch or nation

would submit concession to the enemy as much as the latter's request. From this

Clausewitzist inteipretation we find rationality still in work, commingled with complex

emotional aspects, ambition, feamess and desperation.

Deeper psychological aspects have been examined by experts. They have

acknowledged that a state which desired to retribute its enemy for past humiliations is

likely to reject negotiation.^® Psychologists gave hypothesizes on the origin of aggression

focused on "profound human tendency to leam violence",^® death or "suicidal instinct"^^

and "frustration-aggression".^^ However, their hypothesis does not fit the findings by

anthropologists. Comparatives anthropology studied a few peaceful societies, namely the

Brown Seyom, p. 7. - ' Wilson, Edwin, O., On Human Nature. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 119. Freud considered that human beings are driven by the pursuit of pleasure while elimination of pain. Expressed through death instinct, the pleasure principle leads to suicide. However, for most individuals, Eros strongly resist the actualization of suicide. It turns out to be a displacement of the death instinct onto others in the form of interpersonal or intergroup aggression. See Freud Sigmond, Bevond the Pleasure Principle. (New York: Liveright, 1950). " This explanation suggested the importance of environmental influence rather than innate human instinct. Anger and hostility are incited by external interference, and one tended to remove or destroy the object or person blocking his goal-directed activity. See Berkowitz, Leonard, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962). As for external threat being a cause of war, Thucydides gave an illuminative maxim: "The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. " See Thucydides, Crawley, Richard (tr.). History of the Peloponnesian War. (London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and sons. New York: E. P. Dunon and Company, 1926), p. 16. Also, for similar idea. 27

Zuni Indians of the American Southwest, the Kung Bushmen of the Karahali Desert in southem Africa, the Arapesh of New Guines, the Semai of Malaya, and some others, cedling into question the theory of a strong innate predisposition to violence in the human species. As introduced by Seyom Brown in 1987, violence was virtually absent in these societies, and violation of social norms seems to be handled by public ostracism rather than physical punishment. Anthropological evidence shows no significant correlation among spatial dispersal and external threat and the existence of an internal peace order.^^

3. Peace

Peace as well as war may have two definitions. In the conception of St.

Augustine, peace is "tranquillity in order", and a more elaborated conception divided peace into positive and negative aspects. Some authors define a positive peace as one in which there is no exploitation of some individuals or groups by others; negative peace is merely the absence of war.^^ The distinction of peace between positive and negative aspects is indispensable to the present-day peace movement. Without such differentiation, the active pursuit of peace would lose its direction. What we look for is a positive peace rather than negative peace.

However, in theoretical analysis and historical research whether peace was positive or negative did not have clear definition. To different nations the meaning of

refer to p. 75-76. Michael Howard reinforced this pointed, see The Causes of War, p. 16-17. See Brown, Seyom, pp. 13-14. Augustine. The Citv of God. XDC 13, quoted from Wright, p. 864. " GIossop, J., Ronald, Confronting Wan An Examination of Humanity's Most Pressing Problem. (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, 1987), p. lO-l I. 28

peace varied according to its terms. To the Prussians the victory of 1871 brought peace and integration to the German nation; the same event marked traumatic military fiasco and himiiliating territorial loss to the French. Thus, a broader sense of peace, as suggested by Ronald Glossop, is applicable here, i.e. the absence, not necessarily the termination, of war. •^6

To use such a broader definition is analytically necessary, too. If peace does not mean the absence of war but simply the imposition of order and justice, then we must deal with a prevailing phenomenon in history and reality, a stage which is "neither war nor peace".^^ In the situation of "neither war nor peace", violent outburst may be likely but yet restrained. Order and justice may be preserved but yet perilous. If we are not able to identify this as a variant of peace, then "real" peace would be seldom seen, and we may found that the study of "neither war nor peace" as a new discipline.

In this dissertation the term "peace" refers to a legal and diplomatic condition, and only means the absence of war. It is a condition in which there is "no legal permission for two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force." When mentioning a political or grand strategic goal in a certain historical period, however, it may have a positive connotation as defined by a particular country or statesman. Since the concept of peace m this study does not necessarily refer to an "eternal peace" and the "termination of war" but only the "absence of war", it does not argue the "inevitability" of war. That is to

Glossop, p. 10. See Seton-Watson, Hugh, Neither War nor Peace: The struggle for Power in the Postwar World. (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, revised edition, 1963). In this book about the Cold War. the 29

say, I will not argue that the outbreak of Sung-Liao war and war between Northern Sung and Hsi Hsia was inevitable because of ethnic, economic and social reasons.

4. Pacifism

Not all sentiments for peace are pacifism. The absolute rejection of violence is the strict definition of pacifism. As defined by Anatol Rapoport, "Pacifism is usually understood as an unconditional rejection of war. A pacifist refiises to distinguish between a 'just' and an 'unjust' war or between an 'offensive' and a 'defensive' war. The pacifist's rejection of war is rooted in an internal aversion to violence. An extreme manifestation of this aversion is a refusal to justify even personal self-defense."^®

Reasons and attitudes of rejecting violence and war in particular range broadly according to different religious, philosophical and cultural backgrounds. From the fifth century B.C on, a series of great names appears on the list of influential peace advocates, such as Confucius, Sakamuni, and Jesus Christ. Religion and philosophy provided an ethical ground on the rejection of violence. In general sense pacifism can be classified into three categories, namely the Christian, Buddhist and Humanist pacifism. The first, also the most articulated, is Christian pacifism. As explained by Rapoport, "in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus advises against 'resisting evil.' In the biblical account of his life,

Jesus meekly submits to his tormentors (although he presimiably bad the power to destroy them) and even refiises to defend himself against false accusations. The Christian martyrs

author's usage of peace" had value judgment. -- Rapoport, p. 443. 30

are said to have followed his example."^® A more emphatic statement was made by

Stanley Hauenvas. When asked to discuss the philosophical rationale of pacifism, he simply refused to do so. This is because, he said, pacifism is "in and of itself' an integrity of Christian theology."^" Compared with the Christian belief. Buddhism takes firm stand against act of killing in its theology. Killing accretes extremely bad Karma Hamning one's next life through Samsara. Even without concerning religious sanction, Lao Tzu, an ancient Chinese Taoist, damned war as an act of massive slaughter. He argue, a king must not glorify victory. If so, he must enjoy slaughter. A king who exults in the killing of man cannot have his way under the heaven.^^ Confucians did not absolutely omitted war but insisted that violence ought not be used without righteovisness. Mencius asserted that a ruler having no pleasure in killing men could unite All Under Heaven.^^ To a certain extent, these statements are comparable to the principle of the modem humanists: humans should not kill each other. The further development of this attitude lead to abolitionism, a general distrust of the entire "war institution", such as the military profession, general staff, arm production, and even civil defense. In modem times, abolitionism is a consequence of the anti-nuclear movement,^^ but this general distrust toward war institution could have developed in any historical period, as well as Sung China. Both the

Ibid. Hauerwas, Stanley, "Pacifism; Some Philosophical Considerations", in Wakin, Malham M. (ed.), War. Morality and The Military Profession. (Boulder and London: Westview Press, second edition, I986)pp. 277-83. Lao Tzu. Tao-te-ching. p. 89. Mencius, Mencius. in The Chinese Classics. Legge, James (1815-97) (tr.), (Taipei: Wen-shih-che, 1972), p. 136. Also, refer to pp. 137,305,479. Rapoport, pp. 476-88. 31

modem abolitionists and Sung pacifists viewed the over-development of the military as a harmful element to human welfare and institutional stability. On the whole, their attitude of distrust war institution precluded any other strategic option as a viable consideration.^^

5. Strategy

The term "strategy", from the Greek word "strategike episteme" (general's knowledge) or "strategon sophia" (general's wisdom),^^ is used with a broad variety of meaning in many spheres of human life. First, in the broadest sense, strategy is a mode of thinking which stresses rational decision among a variety of means to achieve a desirable end. avoiding disadvantages while exploiting the advantages. As a mode of thinking, strategy by itself differs from religious faith, moral refinement, ideological pursuit, and emotional feeling, although in practice it is difficult for a strategist to extricate the influence from those ecclesiastical and ideological systems.^® In any situation that provides a variety of means and one is free to make a rational decision according to the circumstance, he is thinking in the mode of strategy. It is not necessarily military- oriented, nor does it require professional study. In this sense, strategy may be applied in a gang fight, football game, chess match, and election campaign. Therefore, strategy is an art of thinking, and a science of calculation.

•* Abolitionists view that the institution of war become extinct in one of two ways. It may extinct with humanity as a consequence of total destruction. Or war may become extinct by being abolished, as absolute monarchies having been abolished in Europe. Abolitionism, defined by Rapoport, "is a variant of pacifism dedicated to the liquidation of the institutions of war via general and complete disarmament, via closing all military training centers, academies, research institutes, think tanks, and the like." Rapoport, p. 481-82. Luttwak, Edward, Strateev: The Logic of War and Peace. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 239-40. Rapoport, p. 253. 32

Second, in a narrower sense, strategy is an objective logic ought to be analyzed by

experts. Edward Luttwak claims that strategy is objective; its discipline of study focuses on the understanding of paradoxical logic and achieving "harmony" among different strategy levels from the development of weapon at the technology level to policy setting at the grand strategy level.^^ As the importance of the study of strategy has increased in

Luttwak classified the vertical strategic level as the following: "We have seen how the sequence of action, culmination, decline, and reversal of the paradoxical logic pervades the realm of strategy. It conditions both the competition and struggle of entire nations and the most detailed interaction of weapons and countermeasures in exactly the same way, for the same logic is manifest on the largest scale and also the smallest, in all forms of war and in adversarial peacetime diplomacy as well. The dynamic contention of opposed wills is the common source of this logic that never changes, but the factors it conditions vary according to the level of the encounter. The technical interplay of specific weapons and counterweapons is subordinated to the tactical combat of the forces that employ those particular weapons, and the strengths and weaknesses of those forces derive from all sorts of intangible and material factors that are very different from the scientific and engineering limitations of weapons. Completely self-contained acts of combat are possible (indeed this defines "commando" raids), but usually the tactical-level moves of panicular units of the armed forces on each side are merely subordinated parts of larger actions involving many units, and this operational level governs the consequences of what is done and not done tactically. Again the factors conditioned by the logic are different; details of topography or disposition, for example, are now submerged, and it is the overall interaction of the respective schemes of warfare that matters. Events at the operational level can be very large in scale, but never autonomous; they are governed in turn by the broader interaction of the armed forces as whole within the entire theater of warfare, just as battles are merely parts of campaigns. It is at this higher level of theater strategy that the consequences of single operations are felt in the overall conduct of offense and defense those overriding military purposes that scarcely figure at the operational level, in which a bombing campaign might be launched by defenders while the aggressor is preoccupied with air defense, and in which an attack can serve to better defend a front while holding operations on some sectors often figure in offensive warfare. The entire conduct of warfare and peacetime preparation for warfare in turn subordinate expressions of national struggles that unfold at the highest level of grand strategy, where all that is military happens within the much broader context of domestic governance, international politics, economic activity, and their ancillaries. Because ultimate ends and basic means are both manifest only at the level of grand strategy, the resource limits of military action are defined at that level, and so is its true meaning: even a most successful conquest is only a provisional result that can be overturned by the diplomatic intervention of more powerful states or even repudiated by domestic political decision; by contrast, even a major military debacle can be redeemed by the political transformations it engenders, or undone by the newfound allies that weakness can attract in the usual workings of the balance of power. The five levels form a definite hierarchy, but outcomes are not simply imposed in a one-way transmission firom top to bottom because the levels interact with one another in a two-way process. Technical effects only matter insofar as they have tactical consequences, but tactical-level action depends in turn upon techm'cal perfonnance to some extent, just as many tactical events make up the operational level even as the latter determines their significance. Similarly, unfolding operations have their effect at the 33

the modem days, it is reasonable to distinguish its pure study from nonnative strategic research, focusing more on the nature and logic of strategy.^^ To be sure, the study of strategic logic has not reached a stage of maturity comparable to that of the pure mathematics and physics.

Third, strategy is a prescription of behaviors in potential or actual armed conflict.

In other words, this is a behavior norm telling a coxmtry or an army how to act, i.e. concentration of force, total mobilization, "indirect approach", avoid the strong while attack the weak, the use of deception, surprise attack, or "encircling city by rural country". There are a lot of principles defined by previous masters about how to win and avoid failure. Since they have constructed the behavior of the state and army, "strategy" is usually given normative meaning in professional terminology. We can say "Clausewitz's strategy", "Liddell Hart's strategy" and "Mao Tze-tung's strategy" in this sense. They can be different and even contradicted one another but they are all behavior-oriented.

Fourth, strategy is a discipline of integrative analysis to serve a nation's security and resolve conflict. According to the scale of arm conflict, Luttwak stratified strategy

level of theater strategy, which defines their purpose, while military activity as a whole affects what happens at the level of grand strategy even as the scope of such activity is determined at that highest level. " See Strateev: The Logic of War and Peace, pp. 69-70. Luttwak described the nature of strategic logic in such a way; "Just as the laws of physics governed the Universe long before there were physicists to study them, so are those who command power on the international scene subject to the logic of strategy. Whether the decisions of national leaders are made in wisdom or in folly, in criminal ambition or in benevolence, whether they are praised or condenmed, their Consequences are governed by that logic so long as the conflictual predicament obtains, disappointing all expectations of continuity, all hopes of unceasing progression. See Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace p. 58. The propriety of this description is the focal point of contemporary dispute as soon as his book was published in 1987. Severe criticism tovrard Luttwak was represented by Foster, Gregory D., "Review on Luttwak's Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace," in Strategic Review, no. 2 (1987), pp. 75-80. 34

into technology or weaponry level, tactical level, operational level, theater strategy

levei,^^ and grand strategy level. All are military strategy except the last one comprising

non-military strategic considerations, mainly, political goal, economic interests, social,

cultural and ideological value. Other experts may not consense in this five-level structure

but all includes military and non-military aspects. In the United States military strategy

is defined as: "The art and science of developing and using political, economic,

psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the

maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable

Luttwak suggested Theater strategy" as a level of strategy between "grand strategr" and "operation". This suggestion has not yet been accepted universally. The Joint Chief of Staff, U. S. Department of Defense dictionarv of Mih'tarv Terms. (New York: Arco Pubh'shing, 1988) does not include such a term. In the dictionary, words related to "theater" are defined with operational significance, such as "theater of operation". Another term "theater of war" is interchangeable with "area of war", which is defined as: "That area of land, sea, and air which is, or may become, directly involved in the operation of war." (P. 34.) Thus, the U. S. concept about "theater" is merely a geographical area where operation is conducted, instead of having substantial strategic ends and means. That the term is not applied by the U. S. defense institution dose not necessary indicate its theoretical redundancy nor fallacy. As a theoretical concept, "theater strategy" is reasonable to be distinguished from operational art. If the task of operational art is to conduct a campaign and achieve the desirable strategic goal, then this goal must be defoed by a consideration in higher strategic level. The failure of Operation Market Garden (1944) testified its necessity. See MacDonald, Charles, B., "The Decision to Launch Operation Market-Garden", in Greenfield, Kent Robert fed). Command Decision. (Washington D. C. rOffice of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1960), pp. 429-442. Further, it is important to note that the U. S army in Europe and Pacific did not involve ^quent military action. In most of the time their presence is the element of deterrence and dissuasion. The absence of prolonged, intense, and multi-front war allows the United State not to separate theater and operational strategy. Michael Howard had a evolutionary view on the structure of strategy. He wrote: "So, by the beginning of this century, war was conducted in these four dimensions: the operational, the logistical, the social, and the technological. No successful strategy could be formulated that did not take account of them all, but under different circumstances, one or another of these dimensions might dominate.. As in the American Civil War, victory was to go, not to the side with the most skillful generals and the most courageous troops, but to that which could mobilize the greatest mass of manpower and firepower and sustain it with the strongest popular support " See The Causes of War, p. 105. In this article, he established logistic and social dimension as "strategic". However, Howard did not elaborate the theoretical relation among these four dimensions. 35

consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat"^^

Fiith and to the narrowest sense, strategy means plans in General Sta£f or in the commander's mind, concerning with terrain, mobilization schedule, logistic transport, and other military aspects. Strategy means Clawsewitz's definition "the employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war" and it fits exactly the

Greek vocabulary "the art of generalship". In this usage, historians can analyze Romel's strategy in the Battle of Gazala, or Mongomery's strategy in "Market Garden". These five meanings are interrelated firom the broadest to the narrowest and only the last one is purely military oriented. War can be fought without strategy, as between primitive tribes and "barbaric" kingdoms; strategy can be employed without war.

In this study, the use of the term "strategy" depends upon the context. It is a mode of thinking stressing rationality and flexibility and not religious, ethical, ideological, or emotional. Using this criteria, strategy in Sung China can be distinguished from ideas of

Coniucianism, Buddhism and proto-nationalism. The term refers to its normative implementation when we mention a particular strategy, as Sung Pai-tzu's strategy and

Fan Chung-yen's strategy. It has five subordinate strate; Grand Strategy, Theater Strategy,

Operations, Tactics, and Technology.

In this dissertation I do not apply the absolute pacifist point of view to examine the Sung diplomatic attitude to the Liao and Hsi Hsia, nor do I impose ideology and

U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. S. Department of Defense Dictionarv of United States Military Terms, pp. 338-39. Clausewitz, p. 241. 36

morality as the central criterion to evaluate Sung success and failure. Rather, I will use an

integrated approach, to investigate a full range of relations between pacifism and strategic

concerns of Northern Sung China and its two neighboring powers.

6. Grand Strategy

The relation between peace sentiment and military strategy has to be balanced

under a discipline. This discipline is grand strategy. Grand strategy, as indicated

before, is the highest level of strategic consideration. As defined by John Collins,

"military strategy" and "grand strategy" are interrelated, but are by no means synonymous. "Military strategy is predicated on physical violence or the threat of violence. It seeks victory through force of arms. Grand strategy, if successful, alleviates any need of violence. Equally important, it looks beyond victory toward a lasting peace.

Military strategy is mainly the province of generals. Grand strategy is mainly the purview of statesmen. Grand strategy controls military strategy."^^

" A number of historical writings deal with this discipline, for examples, Luttwak, Edward, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century A. D. to the Third. (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Power Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. (New York: Random House, 1987). Hattendor, John B., England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy. 1702- 1712. (New York: Garland, 1987). Abshire, David M., Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy, (new York: Harper and Row, 1988). Wang Hsiao-p'u, Tang Tu-po Ta-shih cheng-chih kuan-hsi shih (A History of Political Relations among Tang, Tibet, and Ta-shih), (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1992). Johnston, Alastair 1., Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 199S). They have different focuses, for Paul Keimedy, the economic reasons for the rise and fall of the great powere; for Luttwak, die Roman security question; for Hattendo, the use of diplomatic and maritime maneuvering; for Abshire, the NATO's effort in war prevention; for Wang Hsiao-p'u, Tang political and military effort against Tibetans and Muslims in Central Asia; and for Johnston, cultural value and realistic strategy environment Nevertheless, all examine wars with both military and non-military factors. Collins, John M.. Grand Strategy: Principles and practices. (Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1973), pp. 14-15. 37

At the grand strategy level, the ends of the state are constituted by national security interests, objectives, policies, and commitments. Among all interests, survival is the essential. In the first chapter "Estimation", Sun Tzu indicates war is vitally related to a state's survival.^^ To actualize its interests, the state needs to set objectives, goals, aims, or purposes, may be short-, mid-, or long-range. To its objectives, the state needs to formulate certain policies. Commitment is the implementation of policies which, formal or informal, "pledge the parties concerned to the specific actions at specific times and places. Grand strategic means refer to the available resources: political, economic, social, geography and military and leadership.*®

Sun Tzu was probably the earliest military writer concerns the importance of a comprehensive estimation to a state's ability of waging war. According to Sun, the result of war is not only determined by military fectors, but also by non-military factors, pp. 2-3. Collins, p. 1-5. 38

PART ONE WAR UNDER CONTROL

Chapter 1. From T*ang (618-907 AD) to Sung (755-960 AD): To War, and End It

Scholars have viewed war as a human problem in four aspects. First, and most

conspicuous, war destroys human lives and society. Before nuclear weapons,

conventional warfare killed millions. From 1900 to 1990, an estimated 107,800,000

people were killed in war, of which only approximately 150,000 of them were killed by

nuclear weapons.^

Apart from the tragic loss of human lives, war also disrupted the economy. Some

Sung scholars estimated that military spending at the mid-eleventh century consumed

eighty to ninety percent of the central govenmient revenue.^ Joshua Goldstein has said

that in modem society, overall economic growth is reduced by about one-half a percent

for every 1 percent of gross national product devoted to military spending.^

Third, war tends to compound mutual hate and paranoia, an attitude easily leading to xenophobia and withdrawal. From this a serious of slights and misunderstandings against a backdrop of distrust or even hatred among countries or ethnic groups may lead to war. Further, war does not terminate these animosity; rather, it exacerbates them.^

What is significant is that hatred and distrust further complicates international relations

' Sivard, Ruth Leger, (ed.), World Military And Social Expenditures. 14th edition, (Washington: World Priorities, 1991), p. 20. - HCP, chQan 124, p. 2928. ^ Goldstein, Joshua S., "How Military Might Robs an Economy" New York Times. October 16, 1988, p. 3. * Hart, Liddell B. H., Whv Don't We Learn from History, pp. 62-64. 39

and deepen political and ideological conflicts;^ the aflennath of the W.W.I led to W.W.n.

The impact of war is not just its immediate destruction, but also it pernicious effect upon the universal order.

And last, this pernicious effect manifest itself in political instabilities, short-term strategies, diplomatic by force, and rule by egomanies. As pointed out by an Chinese philosopher of the Warring States, Li K'uei, winning a number of battles was the crucial cause of a kingdom's debacle,® and successful war-time experience did not necessarily translate to civil life. For leaders, unrestrained ambition, excessive reliance on the use of power, and an over-emphasis on short-term goals would ultimately jeopardize the nation.

This is but one rationale arguing for peace and the prevention of war. A similar evolution of thought occurred from Tang to Sung China.

^ Liddell Hart argued that even a complete mih'tary victory did not necessarily bring long-lasting peace. Rather, it can easily create further confrontation and antagonism among victors. In addition, trauma of the vanquished would become the fuel of the next violence outbreak. He said: "We leam from history that complete victory has never been completed by the result that the victors always anticipate—a good and lasting peace. For victory has always sown the seeds of a fresh war, because victory breeds among the vanquished a desire for vindication and vengeance and because victory raises fresh rivals. In the case of a victory gained by an alliance, the most common case, this is a most common sequel. It seems to be the natural result of the removal of a strong third-party check. The first lesson had always been recognized when passions cool. The second is not so obvious, so that it may be worth amplification. A too complete victory inevitable complicates the problem of makmg adjust and wise peace settlement. Where there is no longer the counterbalance of an opposmg force to control the appetites of the victors, there is no check on the conflict of views and interest b^een the parties to the alliance. The divergence is then apt to become so acute as to turn the comradeship of common anger into the hospitality of mutual dissatisfaction—so that the ally of one war becomes the enemy in the next." See Hart, Whv Don't We Leam from History, p. 63. ^ Ssu-ma Kuang applied this traditional maxim to the sudden collapse of the Former Ch'in during the second half of the fourth century. Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086), Tzu-chih thme-chien. (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government), hereafter as TCTC. (Beijing; Chung-hua, 1971), chflan 106, pp. 3348-49. 40

The Proliferation of Violence

Traditional Chinese historians have described the Northern Sung as a "weak" dynasty^ and this image was score by conspicuous military failures. The Northern Sung was incapable of regaining the "Sixteen Prefectures" ceded to the Khitan; it suffered a series of defeats in the 1040s by the Hsi Hsia; and its final downfall in 1126 was the result of an invasion by the more vigorous Jurchen. Unfortunately this image has been furthered by the destruction of the Southern Sung, a continuation of Sung rule in southern

China by the Mongols. Even in the seventeenth century when the Ming faced intractable

Manchu conquerors. Sung "weakness" became an inevitable analogy for a corrupted, incompetent, and ineffectual government futile in its attempt to resolve internal conflict.

To modem Nationalist minded scholars, the Sung experience in handling foreign affairs commenced a "century of humiliation" from 1840 to 1940, and marked the beginning of national misfortune. How China turned "Inward" starting with the Twelfth Century, became a theme of scholarly research, and historians agree that it was a consequence of over emphasis on domestic affairs and scholarly studies while despising military and scientific pursuit.®

In contrast, historians lauded the Sung predecessor, the Tang Dynasty, despite its

^ Sung as a weak dynasQr, refer to Ch'ien Mu, Kuo-shfli Ta-kane. (An Outline of Qiinese History), (Taipei: Taiwan Conunercial Pre^, seventh print, 1960), p. 373-95. Hucker, Charles O., China to 1850. (Stanford: Stanford Universi^ Press, 1978) p. 107. Cbao Tieh-han, "Kuan-yQ Sung-tai ch'iang-kan jo-chih' kuo-ts'e te kuan-chien," as an appendix in SSYCC. (first print in 1958, reprinted in 1980) v. 1, pp. 450-53. ® Fu Lo-ch'eng, T'an-hsing-wen-hua yO Sung-hsing-wen-hua", in Fu Lo-ch'eng, Han-Tane-shih lun-chi. (Taipei: Lien-ching, first print 1977, second print 1981), pp. 339-382. Liu, James T. C., China Turn Inward: Intellectual-twlitical changes in the early twelfth centurv. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988). 41

nomadic origins, as the heyday of Chinese civilization and, even, a fruitful outcome of

Sino-foreign interaction.^ Certainly, Sung military achievement did not match Tang

conquest. Nevertheless, the Tang could never solved a general dilemma: how to end war.

Despite brilliant victories, in the long term the Tang was never able to bring peace, and

bestow its fruit upon her people. As the Roman Empire, peace was merely a short respite

between periods of bloodshed. In order to maintain supremacy, Ch'ang-an inescapably

confronted one enemy after another and of times, several enemies on different fronts

simultaneously. After the glory of the K'ai-yOan (713-741) and Tien-pao(742-756), the

Tang army had to be ready for potential attacks from Tibet, Khitan, Saracen Islam and

Nanchao, an aggressive power newly founded in YQnan.^°

The prolonged multi-front war had tremendous impact to the empire's domestic

affairs. The Fu-ping militia system as the standing army evolved in the Northern

Dynasties (420-589) and Sui (581-618), became inadequate for these prolonged and

incessant threats, and the populace suffered from frequent conscription.^^ Overtaken by

' Ch'ien Mu (1960), pp. 271-99. About Tang foreign culture, see Hsiang Ta, Tane-tai Chang-an vO hsi-vtl wen-ming (Ch'ang-an And The Central Asian Civilization In Tang China), (Beijing: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1933). Han Kuo-p'an, Sui-Tane Wu-tai Shih-kang. (A Short History of The Sui, Tang, and Five Dynasties), (Beijing: People's Press, revised edition, 1977) p. 239-56. War in High Tang period, for general survey, see Ch'en Yin-ch'ueh, "Wai-chu seng-shuai chih lien-huan hsing chi wai-huan yQ nei-cheng te kuan-hsi", in Tang-tai chene-chih shih shu-lun kao. (Narrative Criticism on The Tang Political History), (Beijing: San-lien, 1957), pp. 128-59. Chang Ch'un, Tang Shih. (A History of The Tang Dynasty), (Taipei: Hua-kang, 1958), pp. 80-97. Ltt Ssu-mien, Sui-Tane Wu-tai Shih (A History of Sui, Tang and Five Dynasties), (Beijing: Chung-hua, 1961), pp. 185*210; Han Kuo- p'an, pp. 220-30. About the Tang struggle to defend Ho-hsi corridor from the Tibetan invasion, see Maeda Masana, Ho-hsi li-shih-ti-li ven-chiu. (Study of Historico-geography of Ho-hsQ tr. by Chen Chun-mou, (Beijing: Chung-kuo Chuang-hsQeh, 1993), pp. 78-81. See Pulleyblanks, Edwin George, The Background of An Lu-shan Rebellion. (London, New York: Oxford University Press, I955)p. 72. Chang Ch'un, p. 65-68. Lfl Ssu-mien, 1208-16. Ku Chi-kuang, Fu- ping chih-tu k'ao-shih (Examination and Explanation on The Fu-ping System), Shanghai: Shanghai an over-extended defense perimeter and an inefScient military conscription system, the

Tang dynasty began to decline.^^ The Tang left few references on how to manage the

transition between war and peace.^^ With no clear and appropriate approach to achieve

stable peace, the only alternative was to attempt one victory after another until the whole

empire was debilitated by unrelieved and violent war.

Waging war on many fronts led to the establishment of ten military commanderies

in the 720s and each military governor had almost unrestrained authority to recruit

soldiers.^" As could be expected, a large nimiber of recruits was of nomadic origin.^^ Not

People's Press, 1962), pp. 215-46. Ts'un Chung-mien. Sui-Tane shili (History of Sui and Tang) (Beijing: Chung-hua, new edition, 1982), pp. 201-225. Hamaguchi Shigekuni, Tuhei seido yori shin heisei e", in Shin-Kan-Zui-To-shi no kenkvu. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1966), v. 1, pp. 3-83. Sogabe Shizuo, "Liang shui-fa ch'eng-li te yu-la", Li Ming trans., in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v. 21, no. 3 (1960), pp. 10-14. In early eighth centiuy, the Tang military power began to shrink. Ominous signs were seen in several defeats or phym'c victories. The first is a war against Tibet from 722 to 748, lasting for a quarter of century. Gain and loss persisted in struggling for the control of the Rocky Fortress, a pivotal point at the upstream of Yellow River, costing the Tang more than thirty thousand casualties in its final victory. HTS. chQan 216a, pp. 6084-87. TCTC, chOan 214, pp. 6838,6844, chQan 215, pp. 6868,6871, 6877-79, chQan 216, p. 6896, Chang Ch'un, 93-94. LQ Ssu-mien, p. 198-99. Also, Tang exterted strenuous effort against the Tibetan in Central Asia around the Kirsmier Plateau, particularly focusing on a state, Hsiao Po-lu. The Tang won as a result of an exhaustive expedition. TCTC. chOan 215, pp. 6884-86. More than sixty thousand troops under An Lu-shan, then still a military governor assigned to crack down the Khitan uprising in southern Manchuria, encountered a heavy defeat in 751. TCTC, chQan 216, pp. 6908-09. The pernicious effect of failing in suppressing the Khitan was piled up by the fiirther fiasco in the south. When Nanchao, an autonomous regime in YQnan struggling for complete independence, the Tang abruptiy used force without concerning its value as a potential ally against Tibet. The ensuing defeat in 751 caused sixty thousand casualties. The campaign renewed in 754 became fiasco and lost seventy thousand soldiers. HTS, chQan 222, p. 6270-71. TCTC. chQan 216, pp. 6906-07, chQan 217, pp. 6926-27; Han Kuo-p'an, pp. 230- 33. The failure of establishing a long-term stable relation with Tibet, see HTS. chQan 216a, 6081-86; TCTC. chQan 24,6842-43, LQ Shih-mian, p. 197. In Tang practice, a princess bride actualized matrimonial alliance, rectified the large sum of annual gifts from China, and reduced the bilateral hostility. However, the diplomatic relation hinge on matrimonial lingkage was not steady as expected. See Hino Kaizaburo, "Todai no wahan koshu", in Tokvo Shieaku Ronshu. (Tokyo: San'ichi Sobo, 1984). Nunome Chofii, "Zui no Taigi koshu ni tsuite: Zui-To sekai teikoku no shihyo toshite no wahan koshu", in Todaishi kenkyu kai (ed.), Zui-To teikoku to hieashi Aiia sekai. (Tokyo: Kyuko shein, 1979). The establishment of ten military governors in 742, see TCTC. chQan 215, pp. 6847-51. Also, Pullybrank, The Background of An-lu Shan Rebellion, pp. 61-74, Wang Shou-nan, Tang-tai fan-chun va 43

only did the power of these ten military governors expand with the increase in these

"barbarian" soldiers, it also grew in financial independence and political autonomy.^^

These ahnost immediately provided the tinder for civil war. As aftermath of the shattering

revolt in 755 by military governor An Lu-shan (d. 757), the power of Pang central

authority was shrank drastically,^^ and the suppression of 757, 763, and 819 although

ostensibly successful, they did not slow the centrifugal force toward greater and greater

politico-military autonomy.^®

During the ninth and early tenth century, China experienced one of its most

traumatic phases. Its resource exhausted by civil war against unbridled military

governors, the Tang empire was shattered by a peasant uprising in the 880s.^® Finally,

the dynasty glorified for its brilliant military conquest, mature political institutions and

accomplished high medieval poetry, slid into extinction. During the final days, the

continuity of the dynasty lay in the hands of several powerfiil warlords and at the end in

905, sporadic civil wars renewed for half a century. The Kuan-chung Plain, where

chung-vang kuan-hsi chih ven-chiu (A Study On The Relation between Various Mih'tary Governors and The Tang Central Government), (Taipei: Chia-hsin sui-ni wen-hua chi-€hin hui, 1969) pp. 102-140. As a case study of this practice of militocracy, Mao Han-kuang, "Tang-mo Wu-tai cheng-chih se-hui chih yen- chiu—Wei-po erh-pai nien shih-Iun", m Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica. chQan SO, pt 2, (1979), pp. 301-360. Hino Kaisaburo, Tovo Shieaku Ronshu. chQan 1-2. Soldiers with nomadic origin in An Lu-shan's troops, TCTC. chflan 216, pp. 690S-06. Ethnic origin of An Lu-shan and other military background for the rebellion, see PuUeyblank, pp. 7-23,61-74. " Civil authority of the ten military governors, Wang Shou-nan, 312-370. For An Lu-shan Rebellion, see HTS. chQan 225a, pp. 6411-24. TCTC. chOan 217-22, pp. 6934-7144. HTS. chQan 210,5921-23. About Emperor Hsien-tsung suppression of unbridled military governors from 807-819, see Han Kuo-p'an, pp. 268-74. Wang Shou-nan, pp. 141-246. Chang Kuo-l^g, Tang-tai fan-chen ven-chiu (Study of Military Govemors in Tang ChmaXCh'ang-sha: Hu-nan chiao-yu, 1987). For Huang Ch'ao Rebellion, see HTS. chQan 225b, pp. 6451-64. Fang Chih-liu, Huang Ch'ao ch'i-i k'ao. (An Examination of The Huang Ch'ao Uprising), (Beijing: Chung-kuo se-hui k'e-hsQeh, 1983) provided factual examinations. 44

indigenous Chinese founded two dynasties, Han (206 BC- 220 AD) and Pang, was

relinquished as a civil war arena. This fact was acknowledged in 1137 when the Emperor

Tai-tzu of Later Liang (r.907-912) established a new dynasty to replace the Tang in

K'aifeng, a commercial city south of the Yellow River.^°

The foimding of the K'aifeng government did not immediately reassert political stability and social order and in the following Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms China still lay in shambles. Each dynasty, conceived in this madstorm, i.e. the Later Liang (907-

923), Later Tang (923-936), Later Chin (936-947), Later Han (947-951), and Later Chou

(951-960), were brief and transitory, imperial authority toppled with the death of the founder. These ephemera relied solely on military power which, in turn, relied on the allegiance of autonomous military govemors,^^ and a few high-ranking ofScers of the central army.^^ Building a government was an intractable task with the poor control over

Wu Ch'u-hou (d. after 1089), Ch'ing-hsiang tsa-chi, (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1985), chQan 8, p. 85. The reestablishment of capital in K'aifeng, refer to Wang Gung-wu, The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties. (Kuala Lumpur University of Malaya Press, 1963), pp. 7-50. Wu Ch'u-hou (d. after 1089), Ch'ing-hsiang tsa-chi, (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1985), chOan 8, p. 85. Military alliances among militaiy governors prevailed during the Late Tang and Five Dynasties. The Later Liang and the Later Tang expanded their power by collecting troops from their allies. The matrimonial alliance between Chu Wen with the Ch'en-chou commander, Chao Ch'iu, enabled K'aifeng being connected with the most effective army in Honan region. See Wang Gungwu (1963), pp. 59-60; about Ch'en-chou's military capacity, see HWTS. chOan 42, pp. 460-61. Another example for military alliance was the alliance among governors of Tai-yOan, Chen-chou, and Ting-choii, against the Later Liang. The alliance was built and consolidated through the Battle of Po-hsiang in 911. In 915, Wei-po, another powerftil militaiy commandery in Hopei, joined the alh'ance. It enabled Li Ts'un-hsQ to overcome the Liang power in the north of the Yellow River. Tao Mou-ping, Wu-tai shih-lQeh (A Short History of The Five Dynasties), (Beijing, People's Press, 1985), pp. 53-54,61-63. The emperors of the Five Dynasties engaged strenuous efforts in reinstating a sizable centrsil army, but their success had never been complete until the 950s. See Wang Gungwu (1963),pp. 47-84, 177-217, Li Ch'ang-hsien, "Wu-tai hsQeh-fim chi-chih ch'u-fan", in Chung-kuo shih ven-chiu. 3(1982) pp. 102-110. Also, see Hon Toshikatzu, "Godai Sochiu ni okeru kankun no haitan", in Tovo bunka kenl^ satzu kuvo. chQan 4, pp. 89-96. Kikushi Eihu, "Godai kankun ni okeru shikei shikun shi no teda", in Shikan. v. 70, pp. 45

military forces prevalent in most of these short-lived dynasties and empires rarely survived.

Deeply troubled by internal conflict, emperors of these dynasties had little opportunities and sufficient military strength to undertake China's reunification. Various warlords occupied South China in the first decade of the tenth century, most of whom proclaimed themselves kings. Thus, the so-called Ten Kingdoms became a collective term of this period of disintegration in Chinese history. Such kingdoms, as the Wu (902-

37),^^ Southem Tang (937-75),^* Southem Han (917-71),^® Ch'u,^® Former and Later

Shu (903-925,933-964),^^ and Wu Yueh (907-978),^® were relatively stable.

58-66. Tomita Yoshiaki, "Koryo shikei shinkun ko", Rvukoku shttanfigSS) v. 92, pp. 32-49. For a general survey of the development of the palace army during the Five Dynasties, see Chang Ch'i-fan, Wu- tai chtn- chun ch'u-t'an. (A Preliminary Study of The Palace Army in The Five Dynasties), (Kuangchou: Chi-nan University, 1993) pp. 1-40, 78-98. For general survey of the Wu Kingdom, see Pao Mou-ping, pp. 122-27; for biographies of its rulers Yang Hsing-mi and Hsfl Wen in official history, see Ou-yang Hsiu (1001-1072), Hsin Wu-tai Shih (New History of The Five Dynasties), another name. Wu-tai Shih-chi (Historical Records of The Five Dynasties)(Historical ofThe Five Dynasties), hereafter as HWTS. (Beijing: Chung-hua, 1974), chQan 61, pp. 747-62. For the rise and decline of the Southern Tang, see Tao Mou-ping, pp. 127-34. HWTS. chOan 62,765- 80. About the establishment of Southern Han, see Tao Mou-ping, pp. 139-14; the biography in official history, HWTS. chOan 65, pp. 809-19 provided more detailed information. The founding and collapse of the Ch'u Kingdom, see Tao Mou-ping, pp. 163-68, and HWTS. chOan 66, pp. 821-33. -''In Five Dynasties, there were two kingdoms established in Szechwan area. Wang Chien, the commander of the Tang relief force from Honan founded the Former Shu after the foil of the Tang. For an outline of the occurrence, see Tao Mou-ping, pp. 145-55. A more detailed biographical study of Wang Chien's life is available in Yang Wei-li, Ch'ien-Shu Hou-Shu shih (History of The Former And Later Shu), (Ch'eng-tu: Szechwan se-hui k'o-hsfleh yOan, 1986), pp. 15-71. For Wang's biography in dynastic history, see HWTS, chOan 63,783-96. About the Former Shu's territory, refer to Wang I-fung,, "Ch'ien-shu chiang-yQ k'ao" (The Territories under the Former Shu) in Historical AnnuaL chQan 2, no. 4, (1937), pp. 97-120. Later Tang governor Meng Chih-hsiang founded the Later Shu, see Tao Mou-ping, pp. 156^, Yang Wei-li, pp. 126-63, and HWTS. chQan 64, pp. 797-807. The vicissitude of Wu YOeh, see Tao Mou-ping, pp. 134-37, and HWTS. chQan 67, pp. 835-44. Experience of Wu YQeh in diplomacy is significant, maintaining relation with K'aifeng for more than fifty years. See Worthy, Edmund Henry, "TJiplomacy for Survival: Domestic and Foreign Relations of Wu 46

Nevertheless, they could not avoid sporadic and spontaneous outbreaks of internal

violence.

The Ravage of War

The militocracy, which started &om the eighth century, now reached its peak and

historians pointed to one primary cause for the prevalence of violence for two hundred

years ~ the Tang replacement of militia by paid-recruited soldiers.^® The armies of

autonomous military governors would become instruments for political and economic

aggrandizement.^" Even in such regions as Hopei, if military govemors could not provide

considerable rewards, they were overthrown by unbridled soldiers.^ ^ It was common that

the changeover of regional command was accompanied by assassination, slaughters and

plundering.

The collateral damage was even more significant as fragile economies were

weakened and military dictatorships collected the tax a year in advance. The precedent of

the pre-collection of tax set in 925 when there was crisis of military supply occiured in

Yfleh, 907-978", in Rossabi, Morris (ed.), China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors. 10th-14th centuries. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Califitinia, and London, England; University of California Press, 1983), pp. 17-44. '' Wang Shou-nan, pp. 312-370. Wang Chung-no, Sui-Tang Wu-tai shih (History of Sui and Pang), (Shanghai: Shanghai People, 1990), pp. 505-26. ^°Miyazaki Ichisada, "Godaishijo no gunbatsu shihonka-toku ni shtnyo Rishi no baai", in Asiatica. (Kyoto: Dohosha, the first edition, 1957, the third edition, 1979), pp. 105-125. Wang Shou-nan, pp. 102- 40. Mao Han-kuang, "Wu-tai chih cheng-chih yen-hsQ yO cheng-ch'Qan chuan-i" in Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology. Acadetnia Sinica. v. 51, pL 2, (1980), pp. 233-80. Wang Shou-nan, pp. 141-246. Also, Lin Jui-han, "Wu-tai chun-ch'en chih I tan erh cheng-flmg tuo t'an- chu",in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v. 29, no. 11(1964 ), pp. 59-66. 47

the Later Tang anny.^^ As early as dining the Later Liang, the K'aifeng regime collected

20 percent in excess of regular land tax. Another 20 percent was added in 948.^^ An extraordinary rental rate of governmental land, 30 wen for each mou. in additional to the regular land tax, was collected by the Later Han govemment^^ At the end of Pang, rich and well-watered farmland in the Yangtze Valley suffered the depredation of warlords

Kao P'ing (d. 887), Lu Yung-chili (d. 887), Ch'in Yen (circa, late 9th c.), and Sun Yu (d.

892).^^ After their destruction, the Yangtze Valley was occupied by two military groups -

- under the Ch'ien family in the east, and Yang Hsing-mi (852-905), and, later, the Li

Family in the west. From the 910s, the economy recovered, but the tax rate was still high.

Under the Ch'ien, the tax burden of the people in the lower Yangtze valley was several times than the Pang and, in the far west, the Szechwan populace also suffered from excessively heavy taxes.^® This did not include those extraordinary taxes which were levied to meet emergencies.

In the Late Pang and Five E)ynasties, rampant plundering, wild-spread slaughters.

HWTS. chOan 14, p. 145. Ma Tuan-lin, (1254-1325), Wen-hsien Tune-k'ao (General Investigation on Important Writings), hereafter as WHTK. (Taipei: Hsin-ch'ihg, 1959), chQan 3, p. 53. HWTS. chOan 30, p. 335. 35 TCTC. ChQan 254, pp. 8265-68, chQan 255, pp. 8270-71,8290,8303,8318, chQan 256, pp. 8335-36, 8346, ChQan 257, pp. 8348-58,8361-66, 8381, chQan 258, pp. 8388,8392, 8405, 8412,8417, 8421-22, chQan 259, pp. 8424-26, 8429-31. 3^ Wang I-t'ung, "Wu-cht ping-huo hsi-lu" (Military Devastation during the Five Dynasties), in Historical Annual, v. 2 no. 3 (1936) pp. 203-205. Wu Jen-ch'en (1628-1689?), Shih-kuo chun-ch'iu (Chronicle of Ten Monarchs), in Shih-k'u ch'uen-shu chen-oen., hereafter as SKCSCP. ser. 3, v. 147-54, (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1972), chQan 87:12b-13a. According to Kung Ming-chih (1090-1182 or 1186), Chune- Wu chi-wen, (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1986) chQan 1, p. 24, a tax rate as three tou for each mou remained for a certain time after being annexed by the Sung. As an aftermath. Sung Tai- tsung delegated a transportation intendant who reduced the tax rate to one ^ for each mou as most of the parts under the Sung rule. 48

and rapacious warlordism were the theme dominating life. Northern Hopei suffered from

Khitan invasion, its population reduced drastically to an extremely small niunber. The

three prefectures Hsing, Ming, and Chih under the Chao-i Military Governor, were

considered a relatively rich area in South Hopei. However, as a result of massive

plundering by Li Ch'uan-hsiao (d. 894ys troops, agricultural activities in these prefectures

were terminated completely for three years.^^ Honan, a central metropolitan area, once

recorded less than one hundred families remaining after the pillages by Huang Ch'ao and

Ch'in Tsung-ch'uan (d. 889).^® Only Yung-chou, a prefecture south of Loyang, was the

exception with two hundred thousand surviving families.^® Conflict between governors

of Chao-I and Ho-yang further compounded the destruction of productivity in this central

area of the Yellow River Valley.^" In 895, farming and weaving ceased completely in

Yen-chou. an important prefecture of Shantung.^ ^

Added to this uiu-emitting litany of desperation was a persistent threat of death.

One particular heinous of the general carnage example was the massacre at Mo-join

Mountain perpetrated by the troops of Military Governor Li Han-chih and, afterwards, Li

Han-chih was called Li Mo-ytin.^^ During the war with the Southem Tang, the Wu Yueh army burned the Sheng-yiian Buddhist Temple, with several hundred unarmed refugees.

HWTS , chQan 42, p. 455-57. HWTS. ChQan 45, p. 490. " HWTS. ChQan 43, p. 476. " HWTS. chQan 42, pp. 454-457. Lu Chen f957-1014\ Chiu-kuo Chfli (History of Nine Monarchs). in YOeh-va-t'ang ts'ung-shu v. 10, (Taipei: Hua-wen, 1965) chQan 2, p. 12a. TCTC. chOan 260, p. 8482. '-HWTS, chQan 42, p. 455. 49

including scholars, merchants, and a nximber of pretty young ladies/^ The brutality of the military even endured through the early Sung. During the campaign against the Southem

T'ang, the Sung expeditionary force under Ts'ao Han ( 930-992) butchered all the residents in Chiang-chou, which is the present day Chiu-chiang of Kiangsi Province.'"*

Despite being a ghost story and not authenticity, Ch'ien Hsi-pai " Yfleh-niang chi" described the pitiable life of a women in the Five Dynasties who lost two husbands during the civil war and committed suicide after being abused by a group of bandits.''^

Cannibalism was another horrifying aspect of the spectacle. After the ravages of the Huang Ch'ao Rebellion (875-883), most of towns and prefectures in central and south

China suffered insufficient grain. In the rebels laid siege of Ch'en Prefecture, which at the same time the headquarters of Chung-wu Army in Honan. Threatened by the shortage of food, the rebels established a mill house, called Mo-chuang Tsai, to grind up captives and feed the army.''® Shortly thereafter Liu Shou-kuang, a warlord in Hopei, attacked his brother Shou-wen in Yu-chou, the present day Beijing. After one hundred days resistance, the residents became desperate. People killed and cooked each other; horses ate their tails. To fill the daily troops rations, the commander fed the starvelings wheat, and then butchered them to feed the others.^^ One horror noted in Feng-hsiang, a prefecture west of Ch'ang-an, was a father ate his own son. When he was asked to share,

Shih-kuo chun-ch'iu. chQan 17, p. 15a. " HCP, ChQan 17, pp. 370-71. Ch'ien Hsi-pai, "YOeh-niang chi", in Liu Fu (circa, late 11th century), Ch'ine-shuo kao-i, (Shangai: Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1983), especial collection chQan 3, pp. 218-23. HWTS. chQan 42, p. 461. 50

he said: "This is my own son, bow can you eat him!" According to the same source, the

price of human meat in Feng-bsiang was one hundred wen a chin while dog-meat was

five hundred wen a chin.

During this tumultuous period of fiily years from 907 to 960, local administration

ceased to exist for all practical reasons and legal cases were handled in the Cavalry and

Infantry Court of each prefecture. Because the legal system was surrogated by them, the

military arbitrarily claimed the lives and properties of the people as they wished.

Probably as an influence of nomadic custom, the cruelty of legal punishment was pushed to the extreme; slicing and other dead penalties were wild-spread."*®

Civil War As An Obstacle of Political Reunification

Constant civil war and the absence of efiBcient administration made reimification a daunting task. The first central government rebom in K'aifeng, a new capital beside the

Yellow River, was challenged by a half dozen dissident groups. Chu Wen (851-912), originally a rebel general following Huang Ch'ao, later defected to the Pang and became the military govemor in this area. He usurped the Tang throne in 907 and started to concentrate a superior military force centered on a powerful bodyguard, which he later expanded to be his Imperial Guard. An improved economic became critical in the supportive of this military expansion, and as the most prosperous commercial city and

HWTS. chflan 39, pp. 424-425. HWTS. chQan 40, pp. 431-32. McKnight, Brian, Law And Order in Sung China. (Cambridge, England, and New York; Cambridge University Press, 1992). 51

military logistics center in central China, K'ai&ng consistently provided financial support

for its military governors at the eve of the Tang. From 888 to 907 Chu Wen demonstrated a series of what might be called classic reunification campaigns.^" These early successful campaigns manifested the important role of finance and logistic warfare at the dawn of premodem period. Chu dominated the Yellow River basin from 897 to 912 and founded the Later Liang Dynasty. Serious internal strife prevented him from conquering all of

North China, and especially the city of Tai-yuan, an ultimate stronghold of Li K'o-yimg

(856-908). his adversary in Sansi.^^

With an army composed by pugnacious nomadic warriors, Li expressed enthusiasm in the Pang restoration movement at an early age. In the long run, however,

Li's strenuous efforts in launching persistent offensives against Chu only heightened the disintegration and exhausted his own force. Fortunately, Pai-yuan had been buffered next to the now toppled Pang government and protected by the Pai-hang Mountain Range, an almost insurmountable geographical barrier with a few, predictable, strategic corridors. In

908 Li Ts'un-hsu, the successor of Li K'o-yimg, won a stunning battle over Chu's army.

' ~ Started from the relief battle of Loyang in 888, Chu Wen conquered Honan, Shantung, a large part of Sansi, the southern half of Hopei, and the Southeast comer of Sansi in the following twenty years. In most of these campaigns he carefully combined diplomacy and operational warfare, receiving brilliant successes. After 907 his unification campaign encountered stout resistance from the warlords of Sansi and Hopei. Militar>' defeats in 908 and 911 marked an end of his effort of China's unification. See Wang Gungwu, pp. 7-84; Tao Mou-ping, pp. 32-56; HWTS. chOan 1-2, pp. 3-15; TCTC. chOan 257-266, pp. 8377-8668. Hostility between Chu Wen the Li K'o-yung broke out in 884 and the confi'ontation was heightened after Chu Wen's completion of conquering Honan in 897. K'aifeng's attempt for conquering Tai-ytian in 901 failed. Surely Chu Wei bad contribution in reinstating an effective central political authority, destroying the eunuch's political domination, and establishing a military officer corps that provided elite in various imperial commission service. This transformation was crucial for the Sung military establishment and political centralization policy. See Wang Gungwu, pp. 85-104. TCTC. chOan 261, pp. 8500-01. 52

when the latter laid siege of Lu-chou, a prefecture on the gateway toward Tai-yOan.^^

Continuous military victories of Li Ts'tm-hsxi in 911 and 915 shook Chu domination and, in 923, he marched into K'aifeng.^^

Among Five Dynasties warlords, Li Ts'un-hsfl, or Emperor Chuang-tsimg of the

Later Pang (885-925), was the most significant, he was an heroic leader, brave, romantic, skillful in cavalry, and inexorable in war. However, he also abetted the cruelty of the days. In the Battle of Hu-liu Po (918) when he wrestled the Liang, both sides lost two- third of soldiers.^'* This was true butchery.

Li Ts'im-hsii's regime represented a central military power which simply overwhelmed other dissident groups. He combined his warriors from the Gobi Desert with the picked men from the various forces of Hopei military governors, and surrendered

Liang Imperial Guard. This force of approximately 150,000 however terrifying was still unable to unify the country, and achieve internal stability. The problem was not just the strength quality nor quantity.

The Later Pang period marked an increase in the influence of "barbaric" warfare.

Just as the Vikings struck the West, the Sha-t'o warriors, the pugnacious soldiers

-- HWTS. chQan 5, p. 41:TCTC. chOan, 266, pp. 8688-95. " The Battle of P'o-hsiang, see TCTC. chOan 267, pp. 8728-36. The Wei-po Campaign in 915, see TCTC. chQan 269, pp. 8790-96. The final destruction of Liang in 923 was an outcome of a high risk-talcing surprise attack, see TCTC. chQan 272, pp. 8891-8899. For modem scholar's evaluation of Chuang-tsung's skills in cavalry warfare and strategic approach, see Fang Chih-liu, "Chin-wang Li Ts'un-hsQ mieh Liang chih chan chi ch'i chun-shih mou-lQeh", in Nan-tu hsOeh-fan fNan-vane: Nan-yang Shih-^ chuan-k'o hsQeh-hsiao) v. 11, no. 4 (1991): pp. 29-33. Li's army was totaled 60,000 but not included the tribal auxiliary from Khitan and other ethnic groups. After accommodating the nomadic tribal army, the number of troops would become more than 70,000. The size of the Liang troops was not record. TCTC. chQan 270, pp. 8833-42. 53

originated &om the Ttirks, exemplified the value of the warrior. Being brave dying for a

cause were the ultimate desiderata for a soldier.^^ In the "barbaric" tradition, most of the

wars hereafter during the Five Dynasties were a series of forced marches into bloody combats followed by plundering.^® Li Ts'm-hsil's empire and the short-lived regimes founded by his generals had an overwhehning military superior over other independent kingdoms.^^ Their combat capability was unchallenged, but their effectiveness in large- scale operations remained in doubt. In 925 the Later Tang army overran the Former Shu kingdom in Szechwan. However, a serious military revolt resulted in assassination of

Emperor Chuang-tsung. The Later Tang army became demoralized, and, tragically, unable to conquer the South. China remained disintegrated.^®

An army imbued with the values of "barbaric" warrior would have less respect for administration and law and more for drinking, gambling, plundering, and rapine. The eventual failure of the reunification by Li Ts'im-hsu originated from his being oblivious to the danger of promoting individual heroes.^' He maintained his rule for only three

For relevant cases, see CWTS. chOan 32, p. 749, chOan 56, pp. 755-59, chOan 70, pp. 925-28, HWTS. chQan 6, pp. 53-54, chOan 7, p. 71, chQan 8, p. 77, chOan 21, p. 257, chQan 25, p. 270, chQan 32, pp. 347- 50, TCTC. ChQan 272, p. 8910. Wang I-fung, (1936), pp. 201-234. When Li Ts'uen-hsQ overthrew the Later Liang, all Ching-nan, Shu, and Wu felt insecure, see TCTC. chUan 272, p. 8903. About the conquest of the Former Shu, see TCTC. chOan 273-74, pp. 8936-46. The ensuing political and military crisis and the death of Chuang-tsung, see chQan 274-75, pp. 8946-8983. Also, Pao Mou-ping, pp. 74-82, and Yang Wei-li, pp. 95-125. -- The emperor consciously promoted individual heroism, personally participating assault with his best troops. See TCTC. chOan 270, p. 8834. He admired those generals having the same style, as Shih Ching- t'ang and Wang Ch'img-k'o. As a result, his host consisted of warriors from Sha-t'o, Khitan, and Han soldiers had never become a well-coordinated force. The Hu-liu Po Campaign in 918 testified the shortcoming of his army. The absence of coordination resulted in a pyrrhic victory. Attempting to conduct a deep penetration into the Liang metropolitan, he falsely left his rear guard and rations behind 54

years after seventeen-years of prolonged war against the Later Liang. A military revolt triggered by merely a few soldiers who had lost in heavy gambling toppled the throne and the murder of the emperor in 925.®° Li Chih-yuan (b. 867, r. 926-33), an adopted son of

Li K'o-yung, grasped the opportunity to gain the soldiers' support and became the

Emperor Ming-tsung.®^

The adoption of fierce warriors by military leaders emerged a common phenomenon in the Five Dynasties. In the vernacular fiction produced in later periods, this relation between adoptive father and son was highly romanticized, when it fused with

Confucian concepts of loyalty and filiality. Unfortunately, as a historical phenomenon, it actually reflects the mutual distrust among militocrats. When central authority suffered from disorder, superior and subordinate was the rational, quasi-legal relationship of not enough. In the well-known story, "Thirteen Emperor's Guards," Li K'o-yung, had thirteen adopted sons, all fearless fighters; in historical record he had more than these. Oaken brotherhood was another form of adoption — although no one need play a father's role. In diese supranormal ways, the social linkage among militocrats was barely bound.

The death of Ming-tsimg in 933 reinitiated another thirteen-year cycle of turmoil, and now the central government that had been plagued by persistent military coups and

unsupported by the main-body. The Liang anny slaughtered his rear guards and forced him to accept a battle. Li defeated the enemy eventually but in an extremely high cost, losing two-third of his troops. About Shih Ching-t'ang as his favorite, see HWTS. chflan 7, p. 77; about Wang, p. 71. About the Hu-liu-po Campaign, see TCTC. chflan 270, pp. 8833-8841. " HWTS. chflan 49, p. 556. " TCTC. chflan 274-75, pp. 8963-78. TCTC. chflan 266, p. 8690. Also, see Lin Jui-han, "Wu-tai hao-ch'ih, pao-nfleh, yi-yang chih fung-ch'i" in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v. 30, no. 3 (1965), pp. 4-9, and no. 4 (1965), pp. 17-22. 55

civil wars faced serious financial shortages. The taxation system was almost completely usurped by the militocracy and systematically plundered.®^ In 934 the central treasury was looted to the demands of troops under the usurper the Prince of Lu (885-936).®^

Provincial control also became aggravate. A number of military governors in succession attempted to overthrow the central government, supported by their own rabble of looters and pillagers. Most failed confronting the central army but one succeeded only to provoke Khitan intervention.

Civil War And External Threat

In North China Plain, Khitan incursions seemed to be an even more serious problem than internal strife. Extensive civil war offered the BChitan opportunities for military intervention. The first was the prolonged civil war between the Chu and Li families lasting for two generations from 884 to 923. In 936 the Khitans seized the second strategic opening which occurred during the succession crisis and civil war in the

Later Pang. In their southern campaign the Khitans demonstrated their military strength along the Yellow River, receiving the whole of the northern segments of Hopei and Sansi

" WHTK. chOan 3^, pp. 50-54. HWTS. chOan 26, pp. 280-81. Wang I-t'ung (1936), pp. 203-07. HWTS. chQan 49, p. 556. When the Prince of Lu marched toward Lo-yang, he promised every soldier a reward of 100 kuan for each. At the same time the emperor emptied its revenue to buy a temporary service from its Imperial Guards and promised every soldier a further reward of200 kuan for each after the suppression of the rebel prince. However, estimating that the emperor had insufficient money to pay, most of the Imperial Guards surrendered to the Prince of Lu shortly after receiving die first payment from the emperor. Taking over the capital, the prince immediately discovered the emptiness of the imperial coffer. One advisor suggested a "coercive collection" of cash from the mass people, which fiilfllled a small portion. Furthermore, the prime ministers confiscated Lo-yang's property and collected fore-payment of the first five-month rentals from residence. Even under such organized pillages, the prince managed to pay one-fifth of the reward promised 56

as prize. In mid-940s the dispute bet>veen the Later Chin imperial authori^ and military governors provided sufBcient pretext for the next Khitan invasion. Although the Khitans were unable to occupy North China for long, the prolonged confinntation between

K'aifeng and Tai-ytian allowed a Khitan influence to persist until 979.

In 916 the Khitan federation became a pastoral empire, shrinking wide-ranging nomadic boundaries down to more regularized boundaries of a mix-economy. This immediately opened the path marching into Hopei. The First Emperor of the Liao, Ye-Iu

Ah-pao-chi (872-926), made himself a consistent patron of any rebellious force in Hopei, while pressed territorial demand to the imperial court with sizable military force.

Initially he formed an alliance with Li K'o-yvmg and after consolidating his own power and seeing Li engaged in central China with other warlords, Ah-pao-chi tumed against the Li family. Thereafter the Khitans infiltrated into the corridor between P'ing-chou and

Ying-chou, a strategic gateway connecting Manchuria and North China.®® Both Liu

Shou-kuang and Chou Te-wei (d. 918), the two military governors of Yu-chou from 908

to his soldiers. See TCTC. chQan 279, pp. 9109-9119. " Wang Chi-lin, "Liao Tai-tsung chih chung-yflan ching-ying yO Shih-Chin ch'ing-wang", SHCK. v. 6, (1974), pp. 29-90. The author emphasized the early Khitan strategy on north China and its relation with the rebel generals in Hopei, Liu Shou-kuang (d. 913), Chang Wen-!i (d. 922), Wang Ch'u-chih (d. 922) and Wang Tu (d. 928). Hsing l-fien, "Ch'i-tan yQ Wu-tai cheng-ch'uan keng-tieh chih kuan-hsi", in Shft-huo. chQan 1, no. 6 (1971)9, pp. 296-307 analyzed four military coups during the Five Dynasties, examining co- relative occurrences with the Khitan invasions. For a general survey of Ah-pao-chi's invasion of Yu-chou, see Yao Ts'ung-wu, Liao-Chin-shih chiane-vi (Lecture notes on the history of Liao and Chin), in Yao Ts'une-wu hsien-sene ch'Oan-chi (Collected works of Mr. Yao Ts'ung-wu), (Taipei: Cheng- chung, 1972) v. 2, pp. 1-3. For the Khitan success in a breakthrough against the Chinese traditional perimeter around Yu-kuan (the present San-hai-kuan Pass), P'ing-chou and Ying-chou. See TCTC. chQan 269, pp. 8812-14. 57

to 918, were proved unable to stem the flood of Khitan invaders.®^ In 926, Ah-pao-chi

once revealed his territorial demand on the area north of the Yellow River before the

Later Tang emissary.®® Due to the two ignominious defeats when intervening the

rebellions of Ting-chou in 922 and 928, the attempt of overrunning Hopei was postponed.

From 929 on, the Khitan shifted its strategic offensive toward the northeast comer of the

present Sansi Province. Yiin-chou, a prefecture of crucial strategic importance in tenth

century as well as in today imder a name of Ta-t'ung city, became the new target of the

BChitan ambition.

In the mid-930s the Khitan military force became sufficiently powerful to actually intervene in the succession of the Li as imperial family of the Later Pang Dynasty.

Patronizing the son-in-law of Ming-tsung, Shih Ching-t'ang (892-942), the Second

Emperor of the Liao, Ye-lu Te-kuang (902-947), destroyed the mainbody of the Later

T'ang in 936^° and Shih was enthroned as the first emperor of the Later Chin, the third empire of the Five Dynasties. In retum for this support, the Khitan occupation of the prefectures in north Hopei and Sansi, plus seven prefectures aroimd Yu-chou, was

Yu-chou was under attack during the incumbents of the two military governors. Ah-pao-chi exploited considerable political credibility from the local unrest of Yu-chou under Liu Shou-kuang, one of the notable brutal military governor. Numerous Han Chinese immigrated to the Liao River Valley, enabling an economic development. This occurrence provided the Liao the earliest experience in building a multi­ ethnic empire. Chou Te-wei, a master of battlefield, consistently underestimated the strength of the Khitans and ignored long term defense engineering projects. As a consequence, the Khitans overran the peripheral area of Yu-chou and besieged the city for more than 200 days. Despite the te,porary relief of the city due to the arrival of Li Ts'un-hsQ's army, the fall of Yu-chou had already become a matter of time. See TCTC. chOan 269, pp. 8808-14. TCTC. chOan 275, p. 8989. Wang Chi-lin, pp. 42-60. The Khitans encircled the Chin army of an equal size at Fort Chin-an (south of the present Tai-yflan 58

sanctioned. These prefectures ceded to the Liao by the Chin were customarily called "The

Sixteen Prefectures of Yen YQn Region".'^

However, hostilities did not cease and the son of Shih Ching-t'ang, Emperor Ch'u-

ti of the Later Chin (b. 914, r. 944-46), renewed the confrontation with the Liao in 944.

Meanwhile as ambition and antagonism grew, Te-kuang desired to become an emperor in

K'aifeng. From 944 to 947 the both sides fought ferociously, receiving enormous

casualties along the Yellow River.^^ In Ssu-ma Kuang's account, "China was exhausted

by the consistent (Chitan invasions during the recent years, with numerous deaths among

the frontier communes. Also, the Khitan people started to loathe the war, suffering from

significant loss of manpower and cattle."^^ Finally, Ch'u-ti was betrayed by his army.^^

The Khitan main-body followed the defecting troops, marching into K'aifeng. In 947, Te-

Kuang ascend the throne and proclaim his rule on China. Nevertheless, inflicted such damages to North China that the Khitan eventually that reasserting local control faced insurmountable difficulties. The Second Emperor of the Liao withdrew from China a few months afrer his formal establishment of his dynastic rule in K'aifeng.^ ^ Soon China was thrown into chaos and the internal power struggle began again. After 951 the successors

City), completely annihilating it See TCTC. chOan 280, pp. 9141-60. The term " Sixteen Prefectures of Yen-YOn region" is a slightly misleading description to the Khitan occupation in China. The land ceded to Liao Tai-tsung by the Later Chi did not include Ping-chou and Ying-chou, two prefectures taken by Ah-pao-chi earlier. About the territorial relinquishment, see TCTC. chOan 280,9154. For the Battle of Ch'ih-ch'eng and the main battle at Shan-chou in 944, see TCTC. chOan 284, pp. 9266- 9268. For the Battle of An-yang and the Chin victory at Yang-ch'eng in 945, see TCTC. chQan 284, pp. 9280-83, and pp. 9288-90. TCTC. chflan 284, p. 9293. Refer to HWTS. chOan 40, pp. 592-93, TCTC. chOan 285, pp. 9311-9319. 59

of Te-kuang renewed the old game of confrontation against China. This time the Liao supported the Liu family in Tai-yOan, to establish a buffer state, the Northem Han.

Sporadic Khitan incursions, associated with jointforce campaign with the Northem Han troops, were still a serious menace to the security of North China.

Why did China's soldiers fail in all attempts to expel the Khitans? A traditional explanation emphasizes the superiority of Khitan cavalry forces and this explanation has also been applied to the Simg inability to regain the lost Yen Yun territory. However, a more important reason is that they were never able to fight the Khitans in fiiU strength.

Despite Li K'o-yung and Li Ts'un-hsii being among the most capable military leaders, they did not dare trigger a prolonged two-front war, with their chest bared to the Later

Liang in Honan and their back exposed to attack by the Khitans who constantly probed for an advantage from internal Chinese strife.

The remaining fourteen years from the fall of Later Chin (946) to the founding of the Sung (960), saw the climax to chaos of a bipolar system. One pole was posited in

K'aifeng and two short lived dynasties established after the Khitans seceded from North

China. The Later Han (947-950), lasting only four years, was too short in duration to achieve any great task. Nevertheless, the K'aifeng government was in recovery, both economically and military. Though once surrendered to the Khitan, the central army at

K'aifeng survived with sufficient number and well equipped. After the ravages of Khitan invasion it was still able to halt cease any potential threat from rebellious military

''5 TCTC. chQan 286, pp. 9334-35,9342-56. 60

governors and the southern autonomous regimes. The other pole was the Khitans who conquered the whole Manchuria, Southern Mongolian and Northern Hopei and Sansi.

The replacement of Han by the following Later Chou (951-959) created a new member, the Northern Han (951-979), of the Liao camp.^®

Armed conflict broke out persistently between the two camps. In 954 the second emperor of the Later Chou, Shih-tsung (b. 921, r.954-59), dramatically defeated the combined force of the Khitans and the Northern Han at Kao-p'ing, one of a few fields suitable for main battle on Pai-hang Moimtain.^^ The victory provided time for Shih- tsung to repair his military machine. Furious at the serious disarray at the putset of the battle caused by undisciplined Imperial Guards, he had two generals decapitated and reorganized the central army under two separated elite force, the Imperial Guard and

Palace Corps.

From 955 to 959, he conducted four campaigns against two southem kingdoms, the Later Su and Southem Pang. These campaigns concluded with great success when the four prefectures on the Ts'inling Moimtain Range and another fourteen north of the

Yangtze River were brought completely under control. All these had strategic importance to the Sung reunification in the next decade.^^ In 959, Shih-tsimg launched a northem expedition against the Liao. With a capable Palace Corps commander, Chao K'uang-yin

(b.926, r.960-975), the Chou force rapidly gained the critical Kuanan region, with two

After the usurpation, a prince of the Later Han founded the Northem Han kingdom at Tai-yflan with 12 prefectures. See HWTS. chOan 70, p. 864. TCTC. chflan 290, p. 9452. CWTS. chQan 114,1512-14. TCTC. chOan 291, pp. 9502-10. 61

prefectures and three passes, from the Khitans^^ Unfortunately, a mortal illness stopped

Shih-tsimg's efforts at reunification; after six months of Shih-tsung's death, Chao K'uang- yin usurped the throne with the support of his soldiers.^° It was his rule that inaugurated the Sung Dynasty.

Survey from the eighth to tenth century clearly shows a cycle of war, violence proliferating from the frontier to the very heartland of China. Essentially, Tang failure lay in its unrestrained outward expansion and the high cost of maintaining supremacy in central Asia. This aggressive strategy was not compatible with its obsolete military conscription system. One of the inevitable consequence was the recruitment of soldiers of nomadic origin. This was the same as occurred in the Late Roman Empire and, in long run, it also increased a cultural dichotomy between metropolitan and peripheral regions.

This trend continued to the extreme when militocracy and violence proliferated throughout the vulnerable heartland of China. Finally it introduced a general period of chaos marked by political collapse, social unrest, and minority strife. To end the chaos, the central government had to deal with not only the growing social dichotomy between warriors and victims, but also the political and military confrontation between K'aifeng and its northern enemies.

In 960 AD, China remained in such chaos and to terminate the devastating turmoil was by no means easy, because of a series of interlocking issues. The frequent outbreak

TCTC. chQan 292, pp. 9527-89. CWTS. chOan 119, pp. 1580-81. TCTC. chflan 294, pp. 9596-97. CWTS. ChQan 120, pp. 1596-97. 62

of violence during the Late Tang and Five Dynasties were the consequence of a complex interaction between domestic and external tensions: the militocracy, the expansion of pastoralism, and socio-political disintegration. To create a new environment of peace and prosperity, it would be necessary for a new ruler to create a sophisticated balance between domestic and foreign policy. 63

Chapter 2. The Formatioii of Grand Strategy (960-979)

The experience of war during the Late Pang and Five dynasties reshaped the

Chinese perception of violence. From the eighth century on, war had widened the social

gap between warriors and the masses. It had unnecessarily disturbed socio-economic

prosperity, drastically jeopardized political stability, and eventually engendered external

threat. It led to a sober reevaluation of violence as a dubious solution of conflict. S Since

a number of Chinese and American scholars such as Edmund Worthy, Hsii Kuei, Fang

Yu-chin, Ma Po-huang, and Ng Pak-sheung have contributed to the chronological study

of the early Sung unification strategy, this chapter followed a vertical dimension of

analysis from the Sung grand strategic interests, goals, principles, policies, to

commitments.

Grand Strategic Interests

A different war experience creates a different strategy. In the Sung, the major

concern was that it would not only be a military strategy but also a grand strategy for the

long term. The grand strategy as defined by John Collins is that the only vital interest of a country is survival. The circimistances of960 dictated that the survival of the Sung meant

imperial security, dynastic continuation, the continuance of Han Chinese culture and

values, and, inevitably, the integrity of territory and people.^

- in John Collins theory, the concept of survival includes "independence, territorial integrity, traditional life styles, fundamental institutions, values, and honor intact." See Grand Strategy: Principles and practices. p.l. 64

Imperial security in the premodem China was of the highest coacem. As the political leader of the state and commander of the army, the emperor was the sole figure who could manipulate both the civil and military resources of the empire. Chao Kuang- yin seems to have had an unique appreciation of imperial presence and security; that is, his own safety did not depend on how he was guarded but depend on his power. He enjoyed walking the avenue alone visiting his friends privately.^ However, his attitude in the "cup of wine" event seems in vivid contrast. The emperor ostensibly promoted high ranking officers who were all his oath brothers and good friends but actually removed Jill from the palace armies.^ Apparently, to him, power was nothing personal.

Apart from the personal security of the emperor, dynastic survival was also a paramount issue. Each of the Five Dynasties could not long survive and the dynastic continuation was of utmost interests. Theoretically, as John Collins has explained, there are grades of survival in the consideration of grand strategy. Living under a "negative peace" was better than extinction. For example, if the son of Shih Ching-t'ang had not antagonized the BChitan, the Later Chin would have survived longer under Khitan supremacy. Nevertheless, in 960 Chao K'uang-yin expressed his eagerness in establishing a long-lasting dynasty.^ One and a half century after the death of Chao K'uang-yin, the

~ In another occasion, he rejected a gift from an officer, a sword hidden in a wood staff. The design of this weapon, the officer explained, was to "prepare for any unexpected event" However, Sung Pai-tzu considered, "if I must have to use this, how worst the situation become?" See Ssu-ma Kuang, Su-shui Cht- wen. (Records of Rumors from the Man of Su River), hereafter as SSCW.fBeiitne: Chung-hua, punctuated version, 1989), chQan 1, p.5. Also, HCP. chOan 1, pJO. - SSCW. chQan 1, p.11, and HCP, chQan 2, p.49-50. * SSCW. chOan 1, p. 11. HCP. chQan 2, p.49. 65

Sung moved to south China in the aftennath of the Jurchen invasion. Its territory shrank,

its population reduced; its imperial honor was humiliated by submitting tribute to the

Jurchens but it survived for more than a century. Even in the worst case, the grand

strategic interest was still preserved.

The preservation of indigenous Han Chinese culture and value does not seem to

have enter into the consciousness of the rulers of the Five Dynasties and Sung Tai-tzu. In

other words, it is not clear whether these rulers viewed their struggles against the Khitan

as an effort to defend the Chinese tradition. Though many rulers of the Five Dynasties

were non-Haiu^ nevertheless, rituals and symbolism of the K'aifeng regime were still

Chinese even under their rule.® Regardless of the ethnic origin of the rulers dtaring the

Five Dynasties, they still played the role as Chinese emperors and preserved Chinese

' Liang Tat-tzu, Chu Wen, and his two sons who succeeded his throne in 913 were indigenous Han Chinese, while the founding father of the Later Tang regime in Ho-tung, Li K'o-yung, belonged to a descendant group of the Western Turks, known as the Shato. Li Chih-yQan, Emperor Ming-tsung of the Later Tang, was an adopted son of Li K'o-yung, originating from an unknown nomadic tribe even without a surname before his adoption. Li Ts'un-hsu passed the throne to his innate son, Wen-ti (r.934) but his adopted son. the Prince of Lu, who was bom in a family in Hopei and was thus likely a Han Chinese, usurped the throne and became Emperor Fei-ti (r.934-36). Shih Ching-fang, a descendant of a "nomad of the west", and Ye-lQ Te-Kuang, the Khitan conqueror, were two "barbarian" emperors. Liu Chih-yflan, the founder of the Later Han, and his son and successor Emperor Yin-u (948-SO ) were again Shatos, while Kuo Wei and his adopted heir Ts'ai Yung as Emperor Shih-tsung, were Han Chinese. HWTS chQan I, p. I; chQan 4, p.31; chQan 6, p.S3; chQan 7, p.71; chQan 8, p.77; chQan 10, p.99; chQan 11, p.I09, and chQan 12, p. II7. TCTC. chQan 278, p.9095. During the Five Dynasties, the throne passed throu^ eight families, with four Han and four non-Han. Fifteen individuals proclaimed emperors, in which seven of them were Han Chinese-Chu Wen and his two sons, the Prince of Lu, Kuo Wei, Ts'ai Yung and his son, the child emperor-and eight were non-Han—Li Ts'un-hsu, Li Chih-yQan and his son, Ye-IQ Te-kuang, Shih Ching- t'ang and Shih-ch'ung-kuei, Liu Chih-yQan and his son, yin-ti. ^ In an earlier occasion, Ye-IQ Te-kuang rejected an suggestion from a Han official, that he should appointed Han Chinese as generals and ministers because he was not only a Khitan emperor but also had become the emperor of China. TCTC. chOan 28S, p.9319-20. When Te-kuang marched into K'aifeng in 946. the court proposed a welcome ceremony according to Chinese rituals. Te-kuang refused to anend by the reason of military imperative. However, this was probably more because he was reluctant to identify himself a Chinese emperor. TCTC. chQan 285, p.9325. 66

rituals and institutions and Sung Pai-tzu continued such a role.

Territory and people were crucial to Chao K'uang-yin. Shortly before the departure of the expeditionary army to conquer Szechwan, the emperor was precise in expression of his strategic interests and told Commander Wang Ch'uan-pin ( 908-976),

"All booty, money and silk, is to be distributed to soldiers as reward. What I want are territory and people."^

Conflicts of interest would likely trigger the outbreak of violence, while its resolution might reduce the chance of war. During the Five Dynasties, the interests of territory and people persistently 3delded to imperial security and dynastic survival and temporary coexistence was pursuable. Regional peace between Ch'ien and Yang families in the lower Yangtze Valley was a remarkable example. Considering the long-term benefit of a matrimonial alliance with the Ch'iens, Yang Hsing-mi rejected an apparent opportimity to take Hang-chou in 902.® The Uighurs of Kan-chou and the Han Chinese regime in Sha-chou also signed a treaty, maintaining the security of the trading route through the Ho-hsi corridor.® Even the peace between the Khitan and the Later Chin could have been restored in 945, the Khitan empress dowager had said, if the young Chin emperor "had changed his mind." Ssu-ma Kuang recorded the following remarkable

^ Being unfamiliar to, and thus, seriously misunderstood these strategic interests, Wang Ch'Qan-pin and his subordinates committed a disastrous plundering after the capitulation of the Later Su Kingdom. Looting jeopardized social order, and peasant rebellions followed. Taking this lesson. Sung Tai-tzu appointed Ts'ao Pin (933-918), a well disciplined general, to conquer the economically abundant Yangtze valley. HCP. chQan 6, p. 146-49. - HWTS. chOan 67, p.839. TCTC. chOan 263, p.8584. ^ About the peace between Kan-chou and Sha-chou, refer to Chapter 5. 67

dialogue between the Khitan emperor and his mother

"The Khitan have invaded China frequently during the recent year and China was

exhausted in such an intense warfare, costing an enormous number of lives of the frontier

keeps. The BChitan also suffered huge losses in manpower and cattle and its people were

tired. The Empress Dowager Shu-lti asked the Khitan emperon Is it possible to make a

Han Chinese become the ruler of the Hu people? (The Emperor) replied; "No, it cannot

be.' The Empress Dowager then asked: 'Then, why do you want to become the ruler of the

Han?' (The Emperor) replied: 'The Shihs have disgraced my benevolence and this is

intolerable.' The Empress Dowager then said: "Even though you occupy Han territory,

you could not live on it. If you encounter any misfortune, repentance would be too late!'

Later, she talked to her subjects and said: 'How can the Han sleep well? I only know from

history that the Han have sought peace from non-Han () but I have never known the case in which non-Han cried for peace from Han. If the Han people change their mind,

why can I not offer peace?"

The words of the Khitan empress dowager suggested that there was no important conflict of interest between Khitan and China. The Khitan emperor Te-kuang revealed that if the Later Chin had sent one more peace delegate, the war from 945-946 could have

been prevented.

By the year of960, neither the dissident groups in China nor Khitan had a plan to overthrow the Sung, and the imperial security was consolidated after the suppression of 68

uvo rebellious military governors and the replacement of all high rank officers of the palace army. The conflict of interests among Sung, Khitan, and the dissident groups was seen only on the level of disputes about territory and people. This conflict presented itself in two different forms. First there was the territorial dispute in Yen Yim and Kuanan issue between Sung and Liao and second there was the Sung reimification attempt. The first issue was a complicated one as both Sung and Liao considered that they had lost territory to the other party. The historical fact was that the Later Chin ceded the sixteenth prefectures to the Liao, but the Later Chou re-conquered Ying-chou and Mo-chou, which altogether were customarily called the "Kuanan region". Throughout a period of rapid dynastic change, there was no sanctioned authority competent to solve these territorial disputes. Thus the only available stand became a pragmatic one.

Another conflict lay in the struggle of dissident groups to retain control over their own territories and people. Despite the traditional animosity between Pai-yiian and

K'aifeng since Late Pang times. Sung Pai-tzu spared the Northern Han for as long as a decade as Liu Chun (or Liu Ch'eng-chun - 967) declared that he was not interested in the throne in K'aifeng.^^ As a sharp contrast to this, Hsu Hsiian prime minister and delegate

-- TCTC. chflan 284, p.9293. -- TCTC. chQan 284, p.9294. " In the commentary ofHCP. Li Tao quoted an extinct source, shih-kuo chi-nien. (Chronicle of the Ten Kingdom); "In the seventh year of Tien-hui reign (964), the Sung emperor sent a certain named Kai Liu of Ying-chou (the present day Ying-fai), and gave such a message to the (Northern Han) emperor "Your family has long been treacherous to the Chou but this should not affect our relation. \^y dont you change your mind and release the people of the region who have suffered from the war? Khitan was not such reliable as expected. If you really want to clann the throne, why don't come down from the Tai-hang Mountain and we made a individual duel in the valley of Huai and Lo rivers?' The emperor (Liu Chun) replied: "Please thank and tell Mr. Chao: Our family was not inclined to rebellion. What we desire is the 69

of the Southern Pang to the Sung in 974, unwittingly persuaded Sung Pai-tzu not to

attack simply for the reason that the Southern Pang monarch had "committed no crime."

Despite being initially impressed by the forth righmess and rhetoric skills of Hsu Hsfian,

Sung Pai-tzu eventually became enraged. He impatiently toyed with the handle of his

sword and spoke out loudly, "It needs no more discussion. What crime did chiang-nan

necessarily commit? The only fact is that those Under the Heaven were of one family.

Does anyone allow strangers to sleep next to him?"^^ The unsuccessful negotiation of

Hsu Hsiian was rooted in his neglect of Sung basic interests of territory and people. It is

that the territorial dispute with the Khitan, despite its complex nature, could afford a

negotiable solution. Sung Pai-tzu had no need to eliminate the Liao empire in order to

retake the sixteen prefectures and a Khitan withdrawal was enough to achieve this goal.

Means to actualize such a Khitan withdrawal varied. On the contrary, K'aifeng must

annihilate the dissident groups in South China to acquire their territory and people.

Grand Strategic Goals

Grand Strategic goals, in terms of objectives, aims, and purposes, define "what a country wants to do".^^ As to its real significance, Liddell Hart has stated, "The object in

war is a better state of peace-even if only from your own point of view... History shows

continuation of sacrifice in ^mily temple. My territory, soldiers and horses are not worth one-tenth of yours. How I dare to march deep into your territory? If you are looking for a decisive result, please come through Tun-po Pass, and I battle you outside the (Tai-yQan) walled-city.' Hearing this, the Sung emperor smiled and said, 'I have nothing to lose even leaving him alive.' During the life of the emperor (Liu Chun), the Sung emperor had never launched any northern expedition." HCP. chQan 9, p.205-06. - HCP. chflan 16, pJ50. 70

that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy ... there has been a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and identify it with the military aim."^^ Unlike a military strategic goal, which is always in pursuit of victory, grand strategy seeks a better state of peace regardless of obtaining a military victory or not.

Ssu-ma Kuang records the dialogue between Sung Tai-tzu and Prime Minister

Chao P'u (922-992), circa 960, in which the emperor said, "During the recent decades since the late Pang those Under Heaven have suffered from radical change under ten different imperial families. Armed conflict has been unceasing and enormous number s of people have died. What were the causes? I have decided to pacify All Under Heaven and lay down a long-term plan for the country. What is the True Way?" Chao P'u replied; "It is the benevolence of Heaven, Earth, Spirits and Himian beings whom Your Majesty have in youi" concern! Since the late Tang and Five Dynasties, war has never ceased and the state has never been secure. This was not for any other reason but that the military governors have become so powerful that the lord was weak while the subjects were the stronger."^®

In this passage. Sung Pai-tzu revealed his two goals: pacification and domestic stability^^ and his remarkable policies, consolidation of central authority, reinstatement of

Collins, p.3. -- Hart, Liddell B. H., Strategy. (New York: Praeger, 1967), p.351. SSCW. chOan 1, p.I l.HCP. chOan 2, p.49. HCP. chQan 23, p.528; chOan 25, p.571. 71

civilian government, and restoration of unified empire served these goals.

Grand Strategic Principle: Rational Use of Limited Violence

Confronting the Khitan at the Shan-yOan battlefield in 1004, a Sung Commander,

Kao Ch'iung (935-1006), exhibited his sense of sarcasm by asking Feng Ch'eng ( 958-

1023 ), a civilian ofQcial: "Sir, you have made your ministry through excellent composition. Now the horsemen of the enemy are spreading out before us like this. Why don't you compose a poem to repulse them?"^® Kao Ch'iung's purpose seemed not to carr>' any deep meaning of strategy and was merely concemed with the gravity of the situation. Nevertheless, it is a critical question in grand strategy that how a non-violent solution can achieve the strategic goal of a state. How much violence is enough?

Although early Sung strategists did not systematically explain their grand strategic principle in the war of unification, it is discernible in practice. This principle was the rational use of limited violence.

This principle had three significant aspects. First, we see no strict prohibition of the use of violence. The first reason for this is the military imperative of the 960s. As

Whether unification a goal or merely a policy of the Sung has been a question among Chinese historians. Some historians suggested the recovery of the "sixteen prefectures" a goal of the Sung "national strategy" (kuo-ch'e), while others opposed. This debate focused on the study of the Sung-chin alliance against the Liao turned out to be inconclusive. See Wu Ching-hung, "Sung-Chin kung Liao chih wai-chiao", in Tung- fane tsa-chih. chQan43, no. 18, (1947), p.45-52; also in Sune-shih ven-chiu-chi. (1980), v. 12, p.l69-183. HsQ YQ-hu, "Sung-Chin hai-shang lien-meng te kai-kuan", in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v. 11, no. 12 (1955), p.384- 88, also, in SSYCC. v. 1 (1958), p227-41. Chang Tien-you, "Sung-Chin hai-shang lien-meng te yen- chiu", in Chune-kuo ii-shih hsueh-hui shih-hsueh chi-k'an. no. 1 (1969), p.223-67, also, in SSYCC. v. 12 (1980). p. 185-245. Tao Jing-shen, Sune-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu, pp. 24-25, and Two Sons of Heavens, pp. 87-97. HOP. chQan 58, p.l287. 72

analyzed above, the concliision of the Five Dynasties created a bipolar intemational system, in which both Sung and Liao were great military powers. Although the experience of war had provided an atmosphere of temporary coexistence, conflicts of interests were not resolved in the territorial dispute between the two. There were also the struggles of dissident groups to retain their political independence. The use of military power was not necessarily the ultimate solution, but it was surely the most urgent one.

In addition, the Sung armed force, by its nature, was a war institution. It was created by and for the need of war. This army overthrew the previous dynasty that was ruled by a child-emperor, and enabled its most capable ofiBcer as emperor. In this new society, the promotion and reward of everyone largely depended upon his merit, more explicitly, how many he killed on the battlefield. Although the two early Sung rulers had exerted considerable effort to transform the K'aifeng militocratic regime to a civilian government, it would still be difficult to discard violence as the first recourse.

Furthermore, the absence of absolme pacifism in the early Sung was rooted in traditional Chinese thought. In Chou legal documents, war was viewed a judicial instrument to punish wrongdoing. Despite the commonality of a sentiment for pacifism in

Confucian, Taoist, and Moist classics, all these ancient wisdom permitted the use of violence in extraordinary situations or for a specific purpose. In Han thoughts, war belonged to the yin category, one of the two indispensable elements of the cosmological order. War and punishment rarely happened in peaceful times but they were inevitable in times of disorder. Thus the cycle of war and peace was congruent with the dynastic cycle. 73

Under this presumption, war can be postponed, shortened, and reduced but never absolutely prevented.^®

The second significant aspect of grand strategic principle was well-explained in

Edmund Worthy's The Founding of Sung Thina.^^ The unification strategy of Sung Tai- tzu differed from that of Chou Shih-tsung in the constant employ of political and diplomatic strategies to assist the military one and the evidence is ample. The elimination of the Southem T'ang was partially a consequence of the establishment of an alliance between the Sung and Wu-Yueh. Acting on solely military strategy, the Sung could have taken Nanking even without the participation of the Ch'ien family.^^ However, alliance with Wu-Yueh enabled the Sung to use only half of the supposed required resources^^ and opened the path of the peaceful annexation of Wu-Yueh, a creditable and non-violent success.^'' Surrendered kings and their families were treated comparably better than the last ruler of other dynasties. Some of the Ch'ien descendants even became respective scholars and officials. Meng Hstian-chieh, the royal heir of the Later Su, became one of

Sung Tai-tsimg's captains and was present in the last Tai-ytian campaign and the siege of

About ancient Chinese perception on war and peace, see Appendix 2. Worthy, Edmund Henry, "The Founding of Sung China, 950-1000: Integrative Changes in Military and Political Institution", (PhJ). dissertation, Princeton University, 1975.) pp. 66-70. The Sung emperor sent fifty thousand sets of mQitary uniforms. This number is a reference of the size of Wu-Yueh army. Nevertheless, the Wu-Yueh army only involved in minor battles of the campaign, see HCP. chQan IS, pJ29-30, chOan 16, p335, andp338. Wei Tai, (ca. 1050-1110), Tune-hsien oi-lu. ^otes du Pavilion Oriental), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated ed. 1983), chQan 1, p.l. ^*Chou Pao-chu , "Kuan-yfl Pei-Sung chien-li he t'ung-i te chi-ke wen-fi", in Honan ta-hsueh hsueh-oao se-hui k'o-hsueh pan. chQan 32, no. 4 (1992)7, p. I-7. 74

Yu-chou in 979.^^

In those cases where militaiy power proved insufQcient, the non-military approach became centrally important Liddell Hart has regarded this approach as strategic indirection—avoiding frontal attack and relying solely on the military consideration—and instead employing outflanking and non-military strategies. According to Hart, these indirect approaches are the key to decisive victory.^® The second siege of Tai-yuan in

969 vividly exemplifies the employment of the indirect approach by Sung Tai-tzu.

Estimating the possibility of Khitan intervention, he delegated elite forces to two captains. Ho Chi-chun ( 7921-97I) and Han Chung-pin (d. 974). Instead of confronting the Khitan directly, he ordered Ho and Han to surprise the enemy by ambuscades in mountainous terrain. This approach resulted in complete success, and two Khitan relief forces advancing on Pai-yuan were wiped out. Then Sung Tai-tzu faced a costly and prolonged siege of the city. Inspired by a civilian, he employed "millions of invisible troops", the Fen River, to flood the city. After this proved not so effective as originally expected and with his army suffering from diseases, he withdrew and employed another indirect approach; economic blockade. He systematically removed the populace on the periphery of Tai-yuan to Hopei and Honan. In 979, when the Northern Han finally capitulated, there remained only thirQr thousand households supporting an army of thirty thousand soldiers. It seems that by the last day of the Tai-yiian regime, every household

" ^ chOan 479, p.13881-82. Hart, Liddell B. H., Strategy, (New York: New American Library, 1974). Earlier versions in different titles. The Strategy of Indirect Approach. (London: Faber and Faber, 1946), and. The Decisive Wars of 75

had to support a soldier.^^ This is indisputable evidence of the success of the economic siege.

The third significant aspect of the grand strategic principle was the prevention of excessive violence. K'aifeng could not exclude violence as a mean to achieve unification, but assuredly wanted to limit the damages. War as violence occasions excessive and irrational acts. Nevertheless, pillage, arson, starvation, attack on innocent people, and abuse of captives can be prevented with a well disciplined army. The early Sung army did not proliibit all these undisciplined excess of violence, but it is clear that their early leaders had intended to adopt some restrictions.

The form of restriction can be varied.^® The first altemative is to have a limited goal. With a more limited goal, it is more likely a country would reevaluate its means when achievement becomes too costly. The early phase of war between the Sung and the

Liao is such an example. Although it was a large-scale war, it involved limited interests— the sixteen prefectures and bilateral diplomatic status. When violence became prolonged and it was too costly to attain the goals, the opportunity for negotiation then emerged.

Another form of restriction on violence is the limited deployment of forces. As pointed out by a Chou strategist Wang P'u (d. 1184 ), it would be unwise for the Chou to

History. (New York: Praeger, 1967). " HCP, chQan 10, p.225. Henry Kissinger classified "limited war" into four categories: (1) wars between secondary powers; (2) wars involving either the Western power or the Soviet bloc against powers which are clearly outmatched and under circumstances in which outside intervention is not likely; (3) conflicts which began as struggles between a major and a minor power but which may evolve the prospect of spreading; and (4) minor conflicts which began between the major powers. Kissinger, Henry A., "The problems of limited war", p. 100. According to the above principle, the Sung-Liao conflict should belong to the fourth category. 76

employ a large anny against the Southern Tang. Small scale but constant incursion

would prevent the aimy fiom being exhausted, while harm could come to the economy and social stability of the enemy.^^ A Sung strategist Ch'ien Jo-shui incorporated this idea into the policy of centralization. He argued that the employment of more troops in the metropolis with fewer troops on the front was crucial to imperial security. A smaller size of military force led by well-selected officers would serve the strategic goal better.^®

Restricting the scale of violence can be an effective variant for preventing its excess. During the siege of Nanking, Commander Ts'ao Pin consciously rejected the option of a vigorous assault, enforced a strict discipline on his soldiers, and surrounded the city until its eventual capitulation.^^ Whether or not this approach would bring less damage is controversial in the opinions of modem critics. For example, starving a city under siege can hardly be regarded as more humane than mass slaughter. Nevertheless, in the late tenth century, Ts'ao Pin gained an impressive victory not only in his takeover of the Southern Tang capital but also in the prevention of pillage, arson and massacre.

Another attempt in the early Sung can be regarded as restricted violence and this was the use of violence in a short duration. The Conquest of Szechwan by Wang Ch'Oan- pin was impressive in its short duration taking only 66 days. But it is ill-famed in

" CWTS. chOan 128, p.l679-8I; HWTS. chOan 31, p. 341-42. HCP, chflan 46, pp. 999-1001. " HCP. chQan 16, p351-53 Walzer, Michael, Just and Uniust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977), chapter 10, "War against Civilians: Sieges and Blockades", p.I60' 175. " HCP. chQan 5-6, pp. 135-47. 77

history because of the rampant corruption within bis army. Wang was capable in operational art; whenever he faced a stronghold, he would immediately conduct an outflanking movement through difBcult terrain attempting to penetrate into the enemy's territory as far as possible.^^ The quick conclusion to violence, thus, is of the highest priority. In modem times, Wang Ch'iian-pin's style of conducting warfare might more properly be described as Blitzkrieg rather than limited violence and with modem logistics and technology even a short war can be fierce. In medieval days the burden of war laid upon society consisted mainly of human levy, transportation, and food and a short period of violence meant less harm to an agricultural society. Even though the Sung had a professional standing army and no longer demanded compulsory military conscription, commoners were still obliged to provide transport. From 982, post units took over the obligation of the aimual transport of tax revenue to K'aifeng from Szechwan, Kuangtung,

Hunan and Shensi^^ but the transport burden for military purposes never ceased. In 963, more than 40,000 households fled when they heard the rumor of war imminent with

Khitan.^® Li Fang (925-996), Chang Ch'i-hsien ( 943-1014 ), Wang Ytt-ch'eng ( 954-1001

), Chao P'u, and Tien Hsi (940-1003) discussed the important social and economic needs opposing prolonged war^^ and political stability became indispensable to pacification.

HCP. chaan 5-6, pp. 135-47. Also, §S, chQan 255, pp. 8920-21. HCP.ch0an23.514. "®HCP,chQan4, p.112. HCP. chQan 21, p.483; chOan 21, p.484; chOan 30, pp. 674-75, chOan 27, p.614-I5. 78

Policies and Conmiitmciits

Dnring the forty-five years from 960 to 1005, China crossed the threshold from war to peace. In this transition the newly founded Simg deliberately manipulated the use of a modicum of violence to achieve a considerable outcome. The predominant peace sentiment in political considerations of this period evolved into an indirect approach in strategy. The idea that using violence of a short and vigorous duration to bring about long term peace was, at that moment, logical, feasible and indispensable. A stable and effective political mechanism would enable this vigorous and decisive use of violence to destroy the military foundation of political divisiveness and ultimately achieve general pacification. Chao P'u, Sung Tai-tzu's consultant and, later, the prime minister, advocated such a synthesis.

Chao P'u contributed to the building of the new dynasty by politically suppressing the militocracy, and provided the strategic blueprint for indirection which led to unity. In traditional terms, Chao P'u regarded the main cause of the chaos as an unrestrained militocracy and then formulated a policy called "strengthening the trunk while weakening the branches" by posterity. This policy was further refined to "emphasizing the civil while despising the military". The over all effect of this policy enabled Chao K'uang-yin and his younger brother Chao Kuang-i to reassert internal stability. The policy also enabled the

Sung to launch eight campaigns firom 964 to 979 against dissident groups, mostly in

South China. Aiter eliminating these autonomous regimes, the Sung was allowed to deal with its northern menace in full strength. 79

"Strengthening The Trunk While Weakening The Branches" was a political

principle inherited from the Five Dynasties.^® At the dawn of the Sung, provincial

military revolts were not likely to succeed without foreign intervention or with the central

military machine being exhausted by civil wars and coup d'etate. Discussing the way of

pacifying the country and achieving political stability, Chao P'u proposed a general

argument blaming the disastrous civil wars and breakdown in internal integrity during the

Five Dynasties on provincial autonomy. He suggested that the solution would be "slightly

taking away their authority, controlling their finances and logistics, and incorporation

their elite soldiers" into the Sung army.^® Ironically, Chao P'u did not imdertake these

tasks and the completion of the making of the policy was achieved not in his incumbency

as Prime Minister.

The centralization process was accomplished without bloodshed and the first large scale removing of military governors occurred in 969. In an imperial banquet. Sung Pai- tzu aimounced the retirement of five military governors who had become aged, and

"Nteh Ch'ung-ch'i criticized the exa^eration on the Sung efforts in diminishing the power of military governors. He pointed out that none of these provmcial military powers in the early Sung had its strength to challenge the central authority. Also, see Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, Tun Sung Tai-tzu shou ping-ch'Qan" in Yen-ching hsueh-pao, chQan 34, also in his Sune-shih ch'une-kao (Examination on The Sung History), (Beijing, Chung-hua, 1979), v. 1, pp. 263-282. Wang Gungwu suggested Chu Wen, the earliest ruler of the Five Dynasties who adopted the policy of political centralization and military governors had been weakened ailer the Khitan invasion in 946. See The Structure of Power m Nordi China during the Five Dynasties. In addition, Li Ch'ang-hsien examined a large number of cases significant to the central- provincial relation. In this research m 1982, he found that the central government of the Five Dynasties exhibited a great deal of efficiency in overcoming provincial military autonomy. Li Ch'ang-hsien "Wu-tai hsueh-fan chi-chih ch'u-t'an" pp. 102-110.)Sun Fang-chien, and Sung Hsing-you , the brothers occupied Ting-chou Prefecture and the Wolf Mountain, were obvious exception to this, until in 961, when the central government disposed the army encircling the Wolf Mountain. This act mark the end of the semi- independence of the Sun brothers. SS, chQan 253, p.8871-73. SSCW. chQan l,p.Il-12. 80

removed two incompetent governors/" From that time, the central government gradually regained territories from military governors through their death, retirement, and removal and replaced them with civil administrators. The remaining military governors, in many cases, served as temporary intendants or commanders far from their own prefectures.

Under these circimistances, the power of military governors shrank significantly and their politico-military capacities no longer compared to their predecessors in the Tang.^^ Even the military governors who remained independent could no longer gain leverage from their local autonomy. The success of these policies can be testified by the ability of Sung

Pai-tsung to dismiss Chang Yung-te (928-1000) and Shih Shou-hsin (928-984) in his early reign.

Parallel with this increasing consolidation of political power, there was also a prodigious growth of the central army. Following the precedent of Chou Shih-tsimg,

Sung Pai-tzu and Sung Tai-tsimg persistently recruited selected warriors from the various circuits into chin-chQn units. In the last year of Sung Tai-tzu's reign (976), the

Palace Army numbered only approximately 193,000 soldiers. However, after two decades in about 996, the size of the Palace Army had grown to 358,000 soldiers.^^ As a corollary result of these efforts, the Simg provincial troops, Hsiang-chfln. originally under military . governor's command and not recruited by the central authority, remained as auxiliaries. In

" HCP. chQan 10, p232-34. Also, SS, chQan 255, p.8910-12. *• HCP. chOan 6, p. 152; chQan 18, p.410. Also, see Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i, p. 275-79. " HCP. chaan 18, p.415. SS, chQan 255, p.8917. Wang Tseng-yfl, Sune-ch'ao ping-chfli ch'u-fan (A Preliminary Study of The Sung Military System) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1983), p.15-17. 81

many cases, second-class units even developed into logistic corps/^

It was inevitable that the civilian ofBcials were employed as an institutional

balance to the militocracy for the stabili^ of the regime. Under the rule of Sung Pai-tzu,

a few civilian officials such as Chou Wei ( 923-999 ) even dared to retain their civil authority from being intervened by military governors/^ In 962, an imperial edict

regularized governors as the highest administrative officials in all counties/^ At the

beginning of Sung Tai-tsung's reign, the central authority started to put prefects in charge of "branch-prefectures", subordinate prefectures within a military governor's domain and civilian officials were appointed directly from K'aifeng/^ With the reapportion of local control, the intendant system was also established in various circuits/^ At the begiiming of the Eleventh Century, the central government established more Intendants with various flmctions in a circuit, e.g. Judicial Intendant, Pacification Intendant, and Transportation

Intendant.^® The Intendants functioned as representatives of the central government and effectively supervised political, economic and military activities at the provincial level.

" Sung-ch'ao Ping-chfli ch'u-fan, p.66-72. In approximately 960, Chou was appointed to be a prefect under Military Governor Fu Yen-ch'ing, father-in-law of Chao Kuang-I, Sung Pai-tzu's younger brother. Chou Wei insisted a formal reception ritual to the governor, and made use of his authority in legal enforcement See SS, chOan 304, p.lOOSS. HCP, chQan 3, p.76. ^ • HCP. chQan 18, p.410. Lo Wen Winston, "Sung Tai Chung-yang tui ti-^g shih-cheng chih lu te ch'O-hua", in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v. 49, no. S, (1974), p.23-26. According to Lo, Sung Tai-tsung first exhibited his intent to divide the country into ten circuits in 993. Further, he increased the number of circuit to fifteen in 997. Nevertheless, the establishment of this system could be earlier. In 969, Tai-tzu ordered three circuits, Szechwan, San-nan and Ching-hu, to provide hospitality and transport to candidates of civil service examination on their way to the capital. HCP. chQan 10,232. Another record in 977 ordered Szechwan to be divided into two circuits, each supervised by a transportation intendant HCP. chOan 18, p J98. Winston Lo, p. 24. The initial task of Chuan-vtta-shih. was military logistic service. However, its functions expanded 82

Among them, the role of rhiian-vfin-«;hili or Transportation Intendant, was critical. One

crucial duty of Transportation Intendants was to collect the taxes and transport them to

the capital. In this way, the central government regained the control of national revenue

that had once relinquished to the military governors.^ ^

Only an undercurrent in the late Five Dynasties,®^ civilism increased its influence

prodigioiisly with the vigor and enthusiasm exerted of the early Sung rulers. The

emphasis on the civil service examination by Simg Tai-tzu and Simg Tai-tsung

demonstrated their intent that the institutionalization of the Sung civil administration was

indispensable to pacification. In a Sung scholar record, scholars in broad coats appeared

more conunonly on the main avenues, commingled with soldiers in armor. This greatly

impressed the seniors who said: "As these fellows come out. All Under Heaven will

become pacified."^ ^ The intent to achieve standardization in an institution imbued with

prodigiously to overall provincial supervising. Chuan-vOn-shih also involved in local administration and security. See WHTK. chOan 61, p.556-57. Also, Hsu Huai-lin, "Pei-Sung chuan-yOn-shih chDi-tu lOeh - lun", in Sung-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (Chengchou; Honan Jen-min, 1984) p.287-318. Also, WHTK. chQan 61, p.556-57. Cheng Shih-kang, "Pei-Sung te Chuan-yOn-shih", in Sung-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (1984), pp. 319-345. HCP. chQan 6, p.l52. Five Dynasties did not leave many academic heritage to the Sung. Nevertheless, in such a period of turmoil and militocracy, scholarship barely retained. The Sung official history praised Liu Wen-shou (908- 97I)as the only Confucian scholar studying ancient rituals. His disciple, Yang Huei-chih became a famous calligrapher and scholar. SS, chQan 262, pp. 9071-73. Chang Ch'ao (893-972), an official historian, had a private book collection for several ten-thousand volumes. SS, chQan 263, pp. 9086-91. Tou Yi (913-66) was an expert of law and institution, compiling the Sung Legal Positorv. SS. chQan 263, pp. 9093-94. Chia Huang-chung (940-96), in an age of five, started reading and writing. His &ther provided him vegetarian food only, and said, "Have meat after building your scholarship." In his age of 15, Chia Huang-chung past the civil service examination and obtain the chin-shih degree. During the early Sung, he was selected to serve in the Han-lin Academy and later appointed to be the Vice Prime Minister. Emperor Tai-tsung highly praised his mother as comparable to the mother of Mencius, a Chinese stereo-type of perfect mother who emphasized the education of her child. §S, chQan 265, p.9160-6I. " WHTK. chQan 30, p.283. 83

pragmatism characterized the two emperors' policy when they reinstated the examination system.^" Despite its well understood use to replace the aristocratic recruitment system, the Pang did not fully utilize the examination as an effective channel for social mobility.

According to a Sung scholar, there were no more than twen^ candidates a year selected as officials during the Pang. To avoid the resentment of failed candidates and their joining together in dissension, the Sung consciously and gradually increased the numbers of chin-shih recruited, and this scholar stated that this was a consistent policy to achieve social stability. His description was further testified by the examination in 977, in which Sung Pai-tsimg unexpectedly passed 109 chin-shih candidates, and again in 992, when the emperor granted 302 chin-shih degrees.^®

With the increasing importance of scholarship, the Imperial Library also grew and at the beginning of Sung Pai-tzu's reign, the central collection numbered 12,000 chuan.

After conquering the Later Shu and the Southern Pang, the Sung Imperial Library acquired their book collections approximating 30,000 chOan. In the reign of Sung Pai- tsung, the government bmlt a new library to meet the needs for the growing book

Pragmatism prevailed in the early Sung examination policy. Although Sung Tai-tzu unprecedentiaily anended as examiner of the highest degree examination, he never graded the papers himself. Instead, he always gave the highest scores to the candidate who submitted the paper the first In 97S there were two candidates submitted their papers simultaneously. Sung Tai-tzu made them engage a boxing competition to determine who should be the chuane-vQan. See Wang Ming-ch'ing (1127 -after 1214), YO-chao hsin-chih (New Notes from the Residence with the Old Mirror), (New Notes from the Residence with the Old Mirror), in HsOeh-chun fao-vOan. Pai-pu tshmg-shu chi-ch'ene. c. 403, v. 3967-68, chOan 4, p. 19a. An examination of this event, refer to Araki Toshikazu, Sodai kakvo seido kenkvu. (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1969), pp. 318-19. His successor. Sung Tai-tsung, exhibited more vigor and enthusiasm towards Coniiician values. Nevertheless, flexibili^ and pragmatism were still prevalent in his practices. He consciously increased the passing rate of chin-shih and produced more qualified personnel for local administration. -- Wang Yung (d. after 1227) Yen-i i-mou lu. (Secret Writing on the Politics of Monarchs), (Beijing: 84

collection.^^

Plan for Unification: First The South

The blueprint of Sung unification was first drafted by Wang P'u, a strategist of the

Later Chou Dynasty, and may have been modified by Emperor Shih-tsung, Chang Yung- te, Chao P'u, and Sung Pai-tzu himself. Their wisdom can be summarized into four

Chinese words, hsien nan hou pei. i.e. "First the South, Afterward the North". In this, strategic priorities were well-defined. The Southern Pang, Later Su, Later Han, and several warlords occupying Himan, Hupei, Chekiang and Fukien were to be aimihilated first, while the annexation of the Northern Han and the recovery of the lost territory to the

Khitans was postponed. In other words. Sung China should deal with internal unification first and resolve territorial disputes with the Liao later.

The rationale of this strategy is clear. The attack on the southern regimes promised to be effective and decisive and among them, only the Southern Pang could prolong its resistance. As Wang P'u pointed out, this kingdom had too long a perimeter to protect itself along the Huai River dividing North and South China. Neither the mobilization system nor the mobility of the Southern Pang forces could effectively react to small-scale incursions, sporadic and spontaneous, occurring along the border for two thousand li. With Southern Pang resources exhausted, it would not be difScuIt for

Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1981), chQan 1, p.l " WHTK. ChQan 30, pp. 284-85. -^Ch'en Lo-shu, "Sung-ch'u san-kuan k'ao", in Ch'en Lo-shu, Chiu-shih-chi (Writing for Truth-seeking), (Kuangchou: Kuang-tung Jen-min, 1984) chQan 2, p.l-I4. About book collection for particular purpose. 85

K'aifeng to destroy it in one or two decisive actions.^^

In contrast, the Northern Han was well-protected by the Tai-hang Mountain

Range; its small but capable army successfully repelled the army &om K'aiieng many

times during the Five Dynasties. Logistics were difficult in such mountainous terrain so that despite the military superior of the Chou and Sung, it was markedly imlikely that that the Northern Han could be conquered in one quick and decisive military action. Wang

P'u in 952, Chang Yung-te in 960, Chang Hui ( d. 964) in 963, and Chao P'u in approximately 963, all suggested a long terai strategy against the Northern Han.®° As for the Khitan and their considerable military capability, the same three advisors suggested avoiding any unnecessary confrontation. Under the historical circumstances this was a rational strategy.

Their views also exhibited the same careful and sophisticated balance between

see Ch'ing-shuang tsa-chi. chQan 3, pp. 28-29. " CWTS. chOan 128, p.1679-81: HWTS. chOan 31, p. 341-42. '^Chang Chia-ch'O. Chao K'uang-vin cfauan (A Biography of Chao KHiang-yin), (Nanking: Chiangsu Jen- min, 1959), pp. 27-64, Ma Po-huang, "Sung-ch'u chOn-shih hsing-tung te ching-chi mu-ti chi ch'i ch'e- IQeh". in Teng Kuang-ming, Ch'eng Ying-mou (ed.), Sune-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chih, 1982), pp. 350-373. Hsu Kuei, Fang Yu-chin, "Fing Sung Tai-tzu hsien-nan-hou-pei te t'ung-i chan-iOeh", in Teng Kuang-ming and Li Chia-ch'Q (ed.), Sune-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (Chengchou: Honan Jen-min, 1984) pp. 517-34; and Ng Pak-sheung, "Chung-Tang yi Wu-tai chih chun-shih ch'uan- t'ung yQ Pei-Sung chih t'ung-i chan-lQeh", (Hong Kong: Master Thesis of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1987). HCP. chQan 4, p.89. Chang Yung-te reminded the emperor with the outstanding capabiliQ^ of the Han army and the possibility of Khitan intervention. See^ chQan 255,8916. HCP. chQan 1, p.21. Furthermore, Tai-tzu visited Chao Pu privately in a snowy night. The emperor asked the prime minister about reunification strategy. Chao Fu advised, "Tai-yQan is crucial to the north and west defense. Even though we can take the city in a single action, we would still have difficulty to deal with the Khitan incursions. Why we cannot spare it until the suppression of the other usurpers (in the south)?" See HCP. chQan 9, p204. The actual date has never been recorded accurately due to the private nature of this discussion. After incorporating this dialogue into his chronicle, Li Tao wrote: "Henceforth (the Sung) use force against Ching-hu, and then took Szechwan." It seems that Li Tao had acknowledged that this event might take place prior to the Ching-hu campaign in 963. 86

domestic and external priorities. Like the Later Chou, the Sung bad to prepare for war as

a means to achieve political unification, but the war machinery could not jeopardize

internal stability. In Wang P'u's memorial, he reminded the Chou emperor not to launch a

large-scale campaign against the Southern Tang. Another advisor of Sung Tai-tzu's,

Chang Yun, strongly recommended that the emperor not attack Pai-yflan until there was

a recovery from the ravages of war in Lu-tse, a commandery recently returned to Sung

control.®^

It was probably under their influence that Sung Pai-tzu's grand strategy of

unification appeared to be one of indirection, in which the importance of economic

warfare and skillful diplomacy became vividly discernible. In 964, he clearly indicated that a series of southern campaigns were to assert control over the most prosperous area of China, while the northern expedition against the Northern Han and Liao should be postponed until there was economic prosperity.®^ This acknowledgment of the need to place the economy as the highest priority was based upon Wang P'u's principle of

"exerting only a modicum of efforts to take as much advantages as possible."®^ This principle was, indeed, influential to most strategists during the Northern Sung .

Sung Pai-tzu's reunification strategy allowed a wide latitude for diplomatic maneuvering, because war was too expensive when its political ends could be better served by diplomatic negotiation. Specifically the Later Shu, Southern Han, and Khitan

-• HCP. chQan 4. p. 89. Wang Ch'eng (d. ca. 1200), Tune-tu shfli-lOeh. (Resume of Events in the Eastern Metropolis), (Taipei: Kuo-li chung-yang t'u-shu-kuan, 1991), chQan 23, p. 407-08. Also, Tune-hsien oi-lu. chQan 1, p.l. 87

could be deal with by a combinatioii of diplomacy and military threat as suggested by

Wang P'u. The year 974 is notable in that Sung Tai-tzu accepted to a Khitan proposal of peace. As an outcome of this temporary reconciliation, no direct military conflict occurred between Sung Liao during his reign.In the tomb tablet of a Khitan general

Ye-lu Chung, his contribution of initiating the peace proposal was praised.^^ In a Sung anecdote. Sung Pai-tzu explained that he was simply conserving national revenue for his private coffer either as redemption for lost territory or in preparation for a full-scale war.®® Undeniably, Tai-tzu maintained a strategic flexibility in both domestic and foreign policies.

With a cautious and flexible strategy, the Sung military machine operated smoothly and effectively. In 960 and 961, Sung Pai-tzu crushed two military governors of the Later Chou, who moimted ill-timed insurrections against the Sung.®^ After a short respite from 962 to 963, Sung Tai-tzu seized the opportunity for military intervention in the succession problem of the Military Governor of Wu-p'ing, in present-day Hunan. On the way to Wu-p'ing, the Sung force made a sudden attack on Military Governor of Nan-

" CWTS. chQan 128, p.l680; HWTS, chUan 31, p. 342 HCP. chaan 15, pJ28. Kuo Ch'i (circa. late 10 c.), "Ye-lfl Chung mu-chih", in Hsiang Nan, Liao-tai shih-k'e wen-oien. (Shih- chia-chuang: Hopei chiao-yO, 199S), pp. S6-61. Wang P'i-chih (b. 1031), Min-shui yen-fan lu (Banquet Conversation beside the Min River), with Ou- yang Hsiu, Kuei-t'ien lu, (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated ed., 1981), chQan 1, p. 3. Ye Meng-te (1077- 1148), Shih-lin ven-vtt fBanouet Conversation with Shih-Iin), (Beijing, Chung-hua, punctuated ed., 1984), chQan 3, p.33. About the Imperial private cofTers, also see SHY, v. 146, p.567S. The two Later Chou loyalists were Military Governor Li Chun (d. 960) and Li Ch'ung-chin (d. 960). As an impetus general, Li Chun was crushed by the Sung central army quickly. See HCP. chQan 1, p. 18-22. Li Ch'ung-chin did not resist more than a month, despite an imperial relative of the Later Chou and experience captain. See HCP. chQan 1, pp. 27-28. 88

p'ing, present-day Hupei.^° These actions enabled the Sung to acquire Hupei and Hunan

As a result of this breakthrough south of the Yangtze, the Sung launched two campaign ';

in 964 and 970, against the Later Su and the Southern Han. Ch'eng-tu, the Capital of the

Later Su Kingdom, fell in only sixty-six days;®® Kuangchou, the only urban city and

political center of the Southern Han, eventually capitulated.^®

Once between 964 and 970, Sung Pai-tzu turned to the north against an alliance

between the Later Su and Northern Han. The first siege of Tai-yuan was the result of the

pursuit of a minor incursion; the siege was lifted by a Khitan relief force.^^ In 969 Sung

Pai-tzu took personal command of the campaign with a well-designed operation plan to crush any potential Khitan intervention. He succeeded in the early stages of the campaign and two Liao relief forces were severely beaten.^^ However, his Imperial Guards and

Palace Corps suffered heavy casualties and disease during the prolonged siege of Pai-

yiian and he released his forces to return to K'aifeng.^^

In 974 the Sung emperor renewed his southern campaign, completely encircling

Nanking, the capital of the Southern Pang. This offensive was joined by the Wu-Yiieh, a

militocratic regime in Chekiang. The siege prolonged into 975, with the final capitulation of the desperate ruling family of the Lis.^^ Wu-Yfleh submitted its territory in 978.^^

" HCP. chQan 4, pp. 81-87. Also, SS, chQan 257, pp. 8961-62. HCP. chOan 5-6, pp. 135-47. Also, SS, chOan 255, pp. 8920-21. " HCP. ChQan 11-12,249-60. Also, SS, chQan 258, pp. 8991-92. • - HCP. chQan 9, pp. 207-12. HCP. chQan 10, pp. 217-21. "^HCP. chQan 10, pp. 221-26. HCP. chQan 15-16, pp. 324-52. Also, SS, chQan 258, pp. 8979-80, and p.8992. HCP. chQan 19, p. 427; also, Chune-wu chi-wen. chQan 3, p. 75. 89

Sung Tai-tzu passed the rest of the reunificatioii campaign to his younger brother and probable murderer Kuang-r® ^o, as the Emperor Pai-tsung (b.939. r.975-997) pursued the same political and military goal. In 979 Sung Tai-tsimg climaxed the eighty- year confrontation between Tai-yilan and K'aifeng with complete military success. He again defeated the Khitan relief force in Shih-ling Kuan, urged his palace army to assault

Tai-yuan, and later destroyed the wall of the city after the capitulation of the Northern

Han. In the year of979, there were only two major military powers remaining in the arena—the Liao and the Sung.

The death of Tai-tzu was a sudden and mysterious event At the mid-night only his younger brother Kuang-1, later Emperor Tai-tsung, was before his deathbed. Shortly prior to the emperor's death, a shadow of axes reflected on the window paper. See HCP. chOan 17, pJ77-78. This record was based on Wen-ying (middle of the 11 cent), Hsfl Shane-san veh-lu. (Continuation of the Record by A Man from Hsiang Mountain), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1984), p.74. For clues by modem scholars, see Chang Yin-lin, "Sung Tai-chung chi-t^mg k'ao-shih", in Wen-shih tsa-chih. chOan 1, no. 8(1941)7, pp. 26-31. Miyazaki Ichisada, "Sotaiso hisatsu setsu ni tsuite" in Asiatica. chOan 3, pp. 126-143. Chiang Fu-ch'ung, "Sung Tai-tzu chih peng pu yfl nien erh kai-yflan k'ao", in Ta-lu tsa-chih shih-hsueh tsunc-shu, (Taipei: Ta-lu tsa-chih, 1967), ser. 2, chOan 2, p.I67-70. Wang Po-ch'in, "Sung-ch'u erh-ti ch'uan-wei wen-t'i te fo- shih", in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v. 32, no. 10 (1966)5, pp. 15-22. Wang Jui-lai, "Chu-ying hu-seng shih-chien hsin- chieh" in Chune-kuo-shih ven-chiu. no. 2 (1991), p.85-89. 90

Chapter 3. Sung-Liao Conflict And The Rise of Pacifism (979-1005)

In 979, the Sung compelled the Khitans onto battlefield. In a twenty-five-year war both sides su£fered numerous casualties and collateral material damages. These tremendous losses were of no real political consequence due to the lack of decisive strategic outcome. Scholars in the late ten century commonly doubted whether war was an effective way to resolve conflict. Among them, Li Fang, Chao Fu, Li Chih, Lu Meng- cheng, Chao P'u (922-992), Chang Chi (933-996), Tien Hsi and Chu Pai-fii saw war as risky and military victory as pyhrric.^ Lao Tzu's teaching about arms being "instruments of ill omen" were cited by Emperor Tai-tsimg and his high ranking officials.^ In particular, Lu Meng-cheng pointed to the flaws of the military aggressions of Sui and

T'ang,^ In fact, neither the Sung nor the Khitan could achieve quick military success.

The Bipolar System: A Military Equilibrium

Compared with the military establishment of the previous ephemeral dynasties, those of the Sung and Liao were certainly more effective war-making machines.

Nevertheless, their comparable military strengths made war less decisive; and it ultimately strengthened the bipolar system.

Both empires employed a huge standing army. The large population of a reintegrated Stmg China provided a broad base for labor conscription, and its wealth

• HCP, ChQan 21. p. 483; SS, chQan 287, p. 9656; SS, chQan 266, p. 9196; SS, chOan 263, p. 9147; HCP. chOan 27, pp. 614-15; HCP. chQan 31, pp. 701-03; HCP. chQan 51, pp. 1109-10; HCP. chQan 44, p. 933. "^ chQan 266, p. 9176, SS, chQan 287, p. 9658, SS chQan 256, p. 8935, and HCP. chQan 34, pp. 758-59. 91

enabled the empire to support a large number of troops. At the very beginning, the palace army of Sung Tai-tzu, niunbered only one 190,000. Pai-tsung, the second emperor, absorbed many enable troops fix)m various regions of the state into his Emperor's Guard and Palace Corps, and the central army grew i^idly. As a consequence of the expansion of military force. Sung Tai-tsung was able to deploy a standing army of nearly 100,000 soldiers in the northern border of Hopei.^

Similarly, the military strength of the fChitan empire was very close to that of the

Sung. According to a Sung minister. Sung Ch'i (917-996), the average number of Liao troops which could be used to invade China was a little over 100,000.30,000 of them, well- trained, were directly imder the command of the Khitan emperor, while the others were composed of the subordinates of various princes, nobles and tribal leaders of Hsi, Po-hai,

Ta-Tars, Shih-wei, Jurchen, Tanguts, Sa-to, Tu-yun and Han Chinese. Moreover, the

Empress Dowager Hsiao maintained her own autonomous branch of the military, with a strength of some twenty thousand picked men.^

Despite such awesome forces, the operation of both military machines was strictly restricted by the seasons. Rainy and hot seasons in spring and summer would largely reduced the combat ability of the Khitan cavalry, their bows loosened by heavy rain and

^ SS, chOan 263, p. 9147. ^There was over one hundred thousand soldiers in the Expeditionary Anny during the siege of Tai-yQan in 979. See Tseng Kung f1019-1083'>. YOan-fene Lei-kao (Classified Draft of Tseng Kung's Collected Writings), (Shanghai; Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1936) chOan 49, p. 2a. Despite the defeat at Sorghum River (979), Sung Tai- tsung managed to place eighty thousand troops on the fivntal position in the Battle of Man-ch'eng (979). There was another legion on the right wing, of which the number of troops had no record. Also, HCP. chQan 20. pp. 462-463. Also, see SS, chOan 260, pp. 9025,9300. -HCP. chaan 27,605. SS, chOan 264, pp. 9125-9126 92

their horses hobbled by the muddy terrain.^ Their southern campaigns were rarely more than four months, from October to January.^ Regular logistics did not exist before the reign of Liao Sheng-tsung (b.970, r. 983-1031) and provision obtained by maraudous pillages depended on situation.^ Labor conscription impelled to the extreme and Lu Tien witnessed during his emissary to Khitan that a scholar with chin-shih degree was barely exempted from being conscripted to port his luggage.^ Such limitations on military operations lessened their political impact On the contrary, the Sung were held back by cold weather as much as the BChitan were by the heat The appalling heavy snow storm at the end of986 and the beginning of987, associated by a full-scale Khitan invasion, destroyed almost the whole

' About muddy terrain along the Sung-Liao border, see Yen Ch'in-heng "Pei-Sung tui Liao t'ang-li ts'e-shih chih yen-chiu", in Chene-chih ta-hsfleh hsfleh-pao. 8 (1963), pp. 247-257. Summer as a disadvantage campaign season for the Liao, see L^ chQan 12, p. 13S, chOan 78, p. 1267, chQan 83, p. 1301. The Khitan bows were loosened by heavy rain, see HCP. chQan 49, p. 1078. During the war against the later Chin, the average duration of the Khitan southern campaigns was four months. Refer to chQan 4, pp. S3-S8. During the early Sung-Liao war, the Khitan campaign season even slightly shortened. The campaign in 979 encountered a disastrous defeat, the army withdrew shortly thereafter. Another in 980, even though a victory, ended within two months. See chQan 9, pp. 103-04. In 986, Liao Sheng-tsung organized a winter offensive lasting three months. See 1^ chQan 11, pp. 125-27, and chQan 12, 129. The longest southern campaign occurred in the winter 988-989, taking five months. See LS. chQan 12, pp. 131-33. Again in 999, a four-month incursion was initiated by the Liao, see LS, chQan 14, pp. 154-55. Other operations, refer to LS. chQan 14, p. 156. HCP. chQan SO. pp. 1082-83. LS. chOan 14, p. 157 and chQan 14, p. 158. The well-known southern campaign in 1004-1005 was concluded with a peace within four months. See 1^ chQan 14, p. 160. ^ The earliest record of the Liao regular supply unit was found in 986 when Emperor Sheng-tsung ordered Ye-lQ Hsiu-ko to prepare equipment and food for the oncoming southern expedition in the autumn. See LS, chQan 11, p. 122. Meng Kuang-yao, Ta-ts'ao-ku oien". in She-hui k'o-hsueh hsi-han. n98n3 denied Ta- ts'ao-ku as institutionalized but sporadic practise in particular occasion. Lo Chi-tzu and Liu Ch'ing, "Ta- ts'ao-ku pien' pien" in She-hui k'o-hsueh shi-han. (1985)5, pp. 53-55 disagreed with Meng. They saw the practice an rudimentary but inevitable way to secure the supply of the Khitan force, which had not established regular logistic system before Emperor Sheng-tsung. Fei Kuo-ch'ing, "Liao-ch'ao te 'ta-ts'ao-ku' wen-t'iin Ch'en Shu ed. Liao-Chin shih lun-chih. (Shanghai: Shanghai Ku-chi, 1987) v.l, pp. 90-97 found a number of evidence before 982 suggesting that the Liao army undertook maraudous pillage as a way to maintain food supply, of which the success or failure of a battle hinged on. ° Lu You (1125-1209), Chia-shih chiu-wen (Old Memory of my Ancestors), with Yao K'uan (1105-62), Hsi-ch'i tsung-vO (Melanges of the West Stream), (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1993), chQan I, pp. 193-94. 93

force under General Liu Ting-jang, a senior veteran with meritorious service to the founding of the dynas^.^° As both empires, in most cases, avoided mounting offensive campaigns in unfavorable seasons, predictabili^ of each other's action increased.

Solid performance by the soldiers of both empires established a different perception of strategy. In the Five Dynasties a forced march and deep penetration would quickly topple a militocratic regime, and loyalty frequently switched from one to another warlord. The years from 954 to 986 saw a watershed in the development of military operational arts that made counterofifensive became highly probable, to which the growth of morale and loyalty were flmdamentally important The Later Chou Emperor Shih-tsimg's victory at Kao-p'ing

(954) marked the beginning of this trend.^^ The successful Khitan prevention of a domino downfall of political control in Yu-chou area pre-empted an equivalent development on the

Liao side. as shown by the failure of the Sung to retake the territory even supported by the local indigenous Han Chinese.^^ Ethnic identity, strengthening military discipline, and

-- HCP. chOan 27, pp. 625-26. chQan 83. p. 1301. - • In 954, Emperor Shfli-tsung of the Later Chou turned an entire fiasco to a victory at a crucial moment. When the soldiers on the right wing of the battle formation started to give up the battle, his Imperial Guard in the central position stood with the Khitans and Northern Han attack, and eventually won the day by a cross counter-attacked by Chang Yung-te and Chao K'uang-yin. See TCTC. chOan 291, pp. 9504-05. " According to the official records of the Liao, the Sung in 979 almost overran Yu-chou, politically bolstered by the local Han Chinese. However, Ye-IQ Hsfleh-ku, a capable Khitan general, suppressed an insurrection of the Han residents in the city. 1^ chOan 83, p. 1304. In 986, Sung Tai-tsung's wish of precipitating a dommo-like conquest in the western fiont encounted a great disappointment The Sung received &r more difficulties in obtaining the prefectures than expected. Although the official history recorded a lot of glowing reports about the heroic performances of the "frontier residents", not many prefectures and counties were taken unopposed. The garrisons of Huan-chou (the accurate present day location unknown, approximately between YOn-chou and the Sung boundary at Tai- chou, the present day Tai County), Shuo-chou (the present day Shuo County) and Flying Fox Pass (the present day Lai-ydan County) surrendered after bloody battles and the Sung captured Tueh-chou (the present day Tueh County), and Ytln-chou, two nearby prefectures, by forces. The surrender of Hui-chou (the present day Hui County), occurred after the Khitan commander was murdered. Only the capitulation of Ying-chou (the 94

consolidated political order were all relevant to the prodigious growth of morale in both

armies.

In comparing the military strength of the Sung and Khitan, some historians pointed

to the inferior Sung cavalry and claimed that this made it impossible for the Simg to be

victorious despite good strategy.^* This is a valid judgment especially true to some dramatic

Sung defeats, but it is a valid judgment only for the iixmiediate failings and does not explain

ultimate causes of Sung failure. The lack of Sung cavalry is insufficient to explain Sung

defeat and it is clearly discernible with a comprehensive review of compelling historical

evidence. According to the tradition explanation, the Khitans should have been masters of

the open Hopei plain. To the contrary, failure is the record of some Khitan campaigns

started with high expectation of overwhelming cavahy superiority. Cavalry was consistently regarded as a critical component of the armed force in the early Sung as emphasized by evidence.^^ The victory in 1001 testified to the successful employment of cavalry by the Sung. After several ambuscades in the Lamb Mountain, a crucial strategic

point on the border. Sung cavalry commanded by Yang Yen-chao, Yang Chih, Pien Min,

present day Ying County), and Ning-ch'iu CounQr (the present day Ning-ch'iu County), were smooth transition. However, since Ning-ch'iu was just eighteen U fix>m die Flying Fox Pass, the defenders' decision could be a result of the battle occurring in the pass. HCP. chQan 27, pp. 609-612; SHY, v. 175, military 8, pp. 6887-6889. ' ^ See Li Chen, Chune-kuo li-tai chan-chene shih (War History of China in Dynastic Sequence), (Taipei: Li- ming wen-hua shih-yeh, 1976) chQan 11, pp. 255-256. Also, see Yang Shu-sen," LQeh-Iun Liao-tai chun- shih-chia Yeh-la Hsiu-ko: Chien-shuo Sung b'ang-ch'ih kung-Liao chan-cheng chih pai" in Ch'en Shu ed. Liao-Chin shih lun-chi (Collected Essays of the Studies of Liao-Chin History), (Shanghai; Shanghai Ku-chih chu-pan sse, 1988), v. 1,99-110. According to Sung Ch'ang-lien, the insufficiency of horses seems not to have been a serious problem in the early stage of the war. See Sung Ch'ang-Uen," Pei-Sung te Ma-cheng", Ta-lu tsa-chih. 25( April, 1957),10-12. 95

and Li Chi-hsOan fell upon the Khitan main body and cut it to pieces. The Khitans lost twenty thousand casualties including fifteen commanders of noble ranks who were captured.^®

Regarding the Khitan cavalry superioriQr, it would be necessary to note that this was not an assured superiority guaranteeing an easy destruction of Sung forces on open battlefields. It is true that the Khitan easily crushed the Sung host when the Sung engaged without significant available reinforcement, proper coordination,^® re-supply,^® the ability to resist attack from more than one direction,^® and discipline in retreat.^ ^

Nevertheless, it was not easy to confront well-equipped Sung units at full-strength on open

Ch'eng Kuang-yfl, Sung Tai-tsung tui Liao chan-chene k'ao (Examination on the War of Sung Tai-tsung against the Liao), (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1972), 235-37. HCP. chaan 50, pp. 1082-83. The Liao ofBcial history claimed this campaign ended earh'er due to the muddy terrain. This was obviously an euphemistic description. ^ chOan 14, p. 156. Also, in the late autumn of the year, a fiill scale Khitan invasion, launched as a nemesis of Sung Tai-tsung's Yu-chou campaign, was crashed shortly after its crossing of the boundary. Squeezed by three Sung legions in Man- ch'eng (the present day Man-ch'eng County) (979), two in fix>nt and the third cutting off their rear, the Khitans "ignominiousiy fled", with " countless weapons and casualties" lost LS, chQan 9, p. 103, chQan 74, p. 1234, and chQan 83, p. 1300. A further Sung virtory by clever employment of cavalry force, the Battle of Yen- men Pass (the present day Tai County) (980), see HCP. chQan 21, p. 473. - For example, the Sung army in the Battle of Tiled-bridge Pass (the present Hsiung County) (980) launched four counter-attacks to the Khitan main-body, without coordination by a Supreme Operation Conductor. All failed. Only after the battle. Sung Tai-tsung appointed a Supreme Operation Conductor of Kuanan region. See chQan 83, p. 1300, HCP. chQan 21, pp. 480-482. ^' The Banle of Kao-yang Kuan (the present day Kao-yang County) (999) and Wang Tu (the present day Wang-m County) (1003) are examples for this lacking in coordination, in which the Liao force concentrated their troops and defeated the vanguard of the Sung. HCP. chQan 45, p. 972, chQan 46, pp. 985-86; chQan 54, p. 1190. The Battle of Ch'i-kou kuan (about ten kilometers in the northwest of the present day Hsin-ch'eng County) (986) was of such case. See HCP. chQan 27, pp. 612-14. LS, chQan 83, p. 1301. This is the case in the Battle of Sorghum River (979). Sec Tsang Shui-Iung, "Sung-Liao Kao-Liang Ho chan-1 k'ao-lun" Ta-lu tsa-chih. chQan 80, no. 3 (1990), pp. 106-117. This situation also occurred at the end of the Banle of Ch'i-kou Kuan, which provided the Khitans an opportunity to hack the back of the Sung Expeditionary Force. See HCP. chQan 27, pp. 612-14. ^ chQan 83, p. 1301. 96

terrain; in fact, such a Khitan victory never occurred. And, the obstacles to Khitan victory

compounded in unfavorable terrain where the Sung used it to their advantage.

Cavalry campaign did not always resulted in decisive victories. Both the Sung and

the Khitan held their mainbody in reserve >^en in defense. As seen in the Battle of the

Sorghum River (979),^^ and Tiled-bridge Pass (980), judicious commitment of the

reserve on both sides greatly reduced the impact of initial onslaught. It also increased the

uncertainty of battle to whatever side on the offensive. Among fifteen Khitan invasions

from 979 to 1004, only four were indisputably successfiil,^^ with three ending in

insignificant results,^^ and the remaining eight ending in failure.^® The Sung were

defeated in all four of its offensive.^^

"The Battle of the Sorghum River exemplified the two extremely different results from the employment of reserve force. The huge size of the Sung and Liao armies enabling the both to place considerable operational reserves. Particularly by this reason, the Khitans deflated the advantage of the first deployment of the Sung. Failing to anticipate the direction of the Liao counter-attack. Sung Tai-tsung urged his reserve to join the siege of Yu-chou city shortly prior to the engagement This was the tactical reason for the Sung fiasco. See Tsang Shui-lung, "Sung-Liao Kao-Liang Ho chan-I k'ao-lun", pp. 106-117. - -Suffering fnsm the heavy loss of military force in the Battle of Man-ch'eng, the Khitan emperor Giing-tsung (948-982) conducted a campaign personally in 980. His objective was Hsiung-chou, a cruci^ prefecture on the corridor of the eastern Ho-pet border, commonly known by its former name Tiled-bridge Pass. The Khitans eventually won the day after four counter-attacks launched by the Sung bad been hacked away. Nevertheless, Liao Ching-tsung's victory was minimized by the advancing remforcement of the Sung, the well-trained Imperial Guards and Palace Corps under the personal command of Sung Tai-tsung. Eventually, the Khitans abandoned the battlefield and rapidly disengaged. LS, chOan 83, p. 1300, HCP. chQan 21, pp. 480- 482. They were the battles of Tiled-bridge Pass (980), Noble House (between the present day Ho-chien County and Jen-ch'iu County, HopeO, (986), Pao-chou (1002) a minor defeat, and Wang-tu (1003), see HCP. chQan 27, pp. 621-622, pp. 625-26.1-S, chQan 83, p. 1300-02., HCP. chQan 52, p. 1134, chOan 54, p. 1190. -- In the following two battles. Tang River (988), and Kao-yang Kuan (999), both sides claimed themselves victors. Refer to HCP. chQan 29, pp. 657-58, chaan 45, p. 972, and chQan 46, pp. 985-86; LS, chQan 12, pp. 131-33, chQan 14, pp. 154-55. Also, the Battle of Shan-yQan (1004) ended in a peace treaty chOan 58-59, pp. 1239-1312; LS, chQan 14, p. 160. The reference for the Battle of Shih-ling Kuan (at the middle way between the present day Hsin County and Yang-ch'Q County, Sansi) (979) see HCP. chQan 20, p. 447, LS, chQan 84, p. 1307; the Battle of Man- 97

This extremely low rate of success on the o£feiisive was, in part, a consequence of unfavorable geography. In actuality, the Sung-Liao border was a natural strategic barrier between the two empires despite the commonly accepted but inaccurate description. On the eastern front in Hopei, the Sung and Liao were separated by numerous swamps in the lower reaches of the Pai-kou River. In 980, alarmed by the defeat at Tiled-bridge Pass, Sung Tai- tsung hastened the completion of a large-scale fortification project Assigned to rebuild the eastern Hopei defenses. General Ts'ao Han ( 924-992) first consolidated the perimeters of

Hsiung-chou, Pa-chou (the present day Pa County), P'ing-jung Chun (near the present day

Pa County), P'o-Iu Chun (about 25 kilometers southeast of the present day Yung-ch'ing

County) and Ch'ien-ning Chun (the present day Ch'ing County). Afterwards, General Ts'ao built a regional transportation system centered on a network of canal. Later, a branch of the canal extended firom Mo-chou (the present day Wen-an Coimty) to Hsiung-chou (the present day Hsiung County),^® assuming much of the transport burden of the Hopei populace.^ ^

ch'eng (979), HCP. chQan 20, p. 462, LS, chQan 9, p. 103, chflan 74, p. 1234, and chQan 83, p. 1300; the Battle of Yen-men (980), HCP. chOan 20, p. 473; the Battle of Tang-ch'ing (between the present day HsQ- shui County and Yung-ch'eng County, HopeQ (982), HCP. chQan 23, p. 521; the Battle of HsQ River (989), HCP. chQan 30, p. 682; the Battle of Tzu-ho-ch'a (belonging to Fu-chou, its accurate location unknown)(995), HCP. chQan 38, p. 825, the BatUe of Hsiung-chou (995), SS, chQan 273, p. 9329; and Lamb Mountain (1001), see HCP. chQan 50, pp. 1082-83. LS chQan 14, p. 156. The Battle of the Sorghum River (979), refer to footnote 20,22,35, and 44; the Battle of Ch'i-kou Kuan (986), Ch'en Family Pass(north of the present day Tai County, its accurate location unknownX986), and Noble House, refer to HCP. chOan 27, pp. 621-22,625-26. The latter was counted as an offensive according to ^ chQan 83, pp. 1301-02. For more detail, see Tsang Shui-lung, "Hsiang chan-lQeh fang-yQ te kuo-tu: Sung-Liao Ch'en-chia ku chi chiin-tzu-kuan chan-i yen-chiu", in Journal of Chinese Studies. New Series No. 5 (1996), pp. 81-111. Hsiung-chou was a crucial prefecture on the corridor of the eastern Ho-pei border, commonly known by its fomier name Tiled-bride Pass or Wa-chiao Kuan. --HCP. chQan 21, pp. 482-483. 98

On the central fiont, the founding of Pao-chou (the present day Pao-ting city), a prefecture at the Junction of the Hsu River and the main north-south transport axis, provided a strategic gateway in the western Ho-pei.^° Later, Pao-chou acted as a post for the legions deploying on the frontier. The Sung high command over the Hopei frontier regularly headquartered at Ting-chou with a complement of one hundred thousand troops and it was a traditional military regional center. This force at times in three sub-legions was a formidable body defending the Tang River, the primary gateway for Khitan penetration into Hopei. No successful Khitan invasion of the western border protected by Tai-hang and Lu-liang

Mountains was recorded in the late tenth century and it was considered the strongest part of the frontier.

Because of the rebuilding of Sung defenses, (Chitan invasions failed in 981 and

982.''^ and the repulsed Liao army settled back to refortify their own border. According to the Sung record, the Sung garrison at Ho-tung captured Ku-chun castle, built by the Khitan in 981. In 984, Sung Prime Minister Sung Ch'i stated that the Liao provincial defense

--HCP. chQan 21, pp. 488^89. ^ - Reportedly, over ^iity thousand Khitan cavalrymen were caught in a trap by Sung General Yang Yeh (d. 986), in Yen-men Pass in 981. See HCP. chOan 21, p. 473. SS. chOan 272, p. 9303. "In 982, Liao Ching-tsung initiated a four-pronged campaign. With their commander nearly captured at Man- ch'eng, all four corps of the Liao were defeated. Initially, the Liao emperor decided to have his imperial guards proceed to Man-ch'eng, while another force marched towards Tang-cb'ing Pass. Moreover, two other forces advanced to Yen-men and Fu-chou 1 (the present day Fu-ku County), a semi-independent regime of China with its high strategic importance in the left front. Reportedly, the Liao troops killed in Yen-men numbered some 3,000, with 36 castles destroyed, 10,000 common people taken alive and 50,000 bulls and horses captured. In Fu-chou, the Sung governor achieved a victory, with 700 Liao soldiers slaughtered and over one hundred tribal leaders prisoner. On the east. General Ts'ui Yen*chin (922-988) sent a report from Tang-ch'ing Pass, revealing that the enemy had left 2,000 casualties. No record of the field in Man-ch'eng was stated by the Sung, but according to the imperial guards of the Liao were ambushed. With a sharp counter-attack conducted by General Ye-IQ Hsieh-ch'en (d. 999), the Khitans finally prevented a complete debacle. See LS, 99

headquarters had started to fortify several counties close to the border.^^ Hsiao Ta-Ian

(d.l004), Khitan Supreme Commander finm 999 to 1004, was well-known for military

fortiiication.^^ The culminative effect was to influence the Khitan to adopt the Han Chinese strategy based on the attack or defend of walled political centers.

The development of siege warfke is an highly specialized subject, and more complex than simple battle. Generalization would be inappropriate but it can be stated that neither the Sung nor Liao could defeat a well-fbrtified city within 10 days.^^ Afterwards, the attackers would inevitably faced a counterattack &om a relief force, and thus the success of siege generally depended on the victory over the enemy's reinforcement, as exemplified by the Siege of Tai-yuan (979) and the Battle of the Sorghum River (979). Catapult, crossbow, siege tower and burning oil were the best of siege technology of the days.^® In

chQan 9. p. I OS and HCP. chQan 23, p. 521. The result of the battle suggests that the defense perimeters of the Sung had become formidable. ' - HCP. chQan 24. pp. 556-557. HCP. chQan 58. p. 1290. The siege of Yu-chou in 979 throw light for our searching for the usual duration of siege in the late ten century. According to the official statement, the emperor's reason for abolishing the siege was that the siege had been prolonged more than ten days. "It has exhausted our soldiers and over-extended our supply line." Despite its dubious reliability as a reason for giving up the siege and the defeat of the Sung Imperial Guard besides the Sorghum River was its only cause, the emperor suggested a plausible duration of siege. In his words, it seems to be that a siege prolonged to more than ten days was an acceptable excuse for its abolition. This was further manifested by Li Yen-O's successful resistance in Ying-chou prefecture in 1004, that the Sung garrison withstood the Khitans for more than ten days until the enemy's retreat. See HCP. chQan 58, p. 1279. The resistance of Tai-yflan against the Sung attack extended for more than two months in 969, and again in 979. It is probably because Tai-yQan was a city on the Tai-hang Mountain Range and took it exceptionally longer time to seize. See HCP. chQan 10, pp. 218-226, chQan 20, pp. 446- 452. Catapults were employed in the siege of Yu-chou in 979. Sung Tai-tsung ordered a general of the imperial bodyguard, Chao Yen-chin (circa late 10th c.), to produce 800 catapults. Refer to HCP. chQan 20, p. 456. The Sung army employed a large number of crossbows in the siege of Pai-yQan in 969, HCP. chUan 10, p. 222; Siege tower was conunonly in use, especially in the siege of Tai-yQan in 979. See HCP. chQan 20, p. 450, and SS, chQan 275, p. 9370; According to Hu San-sheng (1230-87), burning oil was an invention of Tsan-ch'eng, a Southeast Asian country. It was used originally for naval battle but adopted in 100

this technology, the Sung exhibited fax mote confidence than the Khitan in laying siege to the larger prefectural town and cities, such as Pai-yOan (969,979) and Yu

10th c.), and Ho Ch'eng-chu (circa late 10th and early 11 c.), the Khitan were consistently defeated. AH Khitan attempts to seize larger walled towns in prefectures or commanderies failed with a few exceptions/" The utterly astonishing failure of the Siege of Ying-chou in

siege warfare by Wu Kingdom. The Khitan procured this from the Wu. See TCTC. chQan 269, p. 8814, commentary by Hu San-sheng. Ch'ine-hsiang tsa-chi chQan 8, p. 86 recorded a joke about the Shan-yQan campaign in 1004 in which two scholars without military experience was decried as capable in the use of catapults and burning oil. Despite merely being a joke, it still indicated that catapult and siege oil were two important siege and defense equipment. See HCP. chQan 20, pp. 220-25, chQan 20, pp. 448-451, and pp. 456-57. Walled towns of the Sung taken by the Liao during the war can be classified into five categories as follow: fort, pass, county, commandery and prefecture. (1) Forts: Fort Stone of the Wolf Mountain Town (999) (the present day location unknown). LS. chQan 14, p. 154, chQan 78, p. 1268; Junior Fort Wolf Mountain, (the present day location unknown) 1^ chQan 12, p. 132. (2) Pass: Great Wall Pass (988), (approximately 10 kilometers northwest of the present day HsQ-shui County), ^ chQan 12, p. 132. (3) County: Shu-ch'eng County (986-87) (approximate 30 kilometer northeast of the present day Ho-chien County, chQan 12, p. 129; Wen-an County (986-87), (the present day Wen-an County), chQan 12, p. 129, Hsin-lo County (988) (the present day Hsin-lo County) LS, chQan 12, p. 132, Man-ch'eng (988), chQan 12, p. 132. (4) Commandery: The capture of Tung-li Commandery (1004-05) (the present day Chun County ), LS, chQan 78, p. 1268, chQan 81, p. 1283; The capture of Te-ch'ing Commandery (1004-05), chQan 85, p. 1314; Prefecture, Tueh-chou (988), chOan 12, p. 133,1-chou (989) (the present day I County),1^ chQan 12, p. 133, Shen- chou (986-87) (approximately 15 kilometer south of the present day Shen County), LS, chQan 11, p. 127. Ch'i-chou (988, 1004-05), (occasionally called Fu-yin because of its ofGce in Fu-yin County, the present day An-kuo County) chOan 12, p. 132, LS, chOan 85, p. 1314. About Yang Yen-chao, see HCP. chQan 45, p. 964, SS, chQan 272, p. 9306; about Wei Nun, see SS, chQan 279,9482; about Ho Ch'eng-chu, see ^ chQan 273, p. 9329. The obvious exception is the siege of I-chou. Records about the fall of I-chou varied. See chQan 12, p. 133, HCP. chQan 28, p. 631. For Actual exammation, see Pak-sheung, "I-chou shih-hsien nien-yQeh k'ao: chien lun Nan-Sung chih Ch'ing p'ien-ch'uan Pei-Sung li-shih te t'e-se", in Yang Yien-t'ing (ed), Sung-shih lun-wen-chi: Lo Ch'iu-ch'ine lao-shih vune-hsiu chi-nien chun-hsi, (Collected Papers on Sung History: Special Edition for Remembering The Retirement of Mr. Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing), (Hong Kong: Chinese Historical Research Society of Hong Kong, 1994), pp. 1-19. The fall of Shen-chou, Ch'i-chou, Te-ch'ing chun and Tung-li chun were the result of poor fortification. Li Pao recorded a event in which a Sung officer. Ma Chih-chieh (995-1019), successfully prevent the &11 of Po-chou, the present day Liao-ch'eng 101

1004 left approximate 30,000 Khitan casualties/^ During the ensuing southern campaign, the Khitan seems to have purposely avoided laying siege to the larger Sung cites/^

All these factors, namely, the parity in strength, improved military morale, restricted time for campaigns, improved defenses, increased experience in active defense operation, and inefBciency of siege engineering, heralded the coming of an age of military equilibrium. An age of relative military parity means that the risk of offensive incursions was too great, and such factors as technology, morale, tactics and operational arts, and weather and terrain of the theater, reduced the probability of decisive outcome in battle. War would lead to no significant outcome to either Sung or Liao. Even though councils tired their utmost to break the deadlock in iimovative operation plans and strategy, evolving several remarkable new tactics, all was futile.

The Rejection of Prolonged War

The first decade of Sung Tai-tsimg's reign saw a gradual transition in strategy fi-om the offense to the defense. In 979, he conducted the last siege of Tai-yflan and eventually took it. This campaign marked a victorious end of the confirontation between K'aifeng and

County, by hastening its fortification shortly after the Sung defeat at Noble House (986). HCP. chQan 27, p. 626. HCP, ChQan 58, p. 1279. The debate about whether or not the Liao force should attack Ta-ming Prefecture in 986 testifies the Khitan reluctance to attack large city. In a meeting, most Khitan generals suggested to seize the city "because the Wei City (the informal name of Ta-mmg Prefecture) is not well-fortiffed". Ye-IQ San-pu (circa late 10th c.) opposed and said: "To attack is easy. However, we would have difficulty to forbade our soldiers fi'om plundering after taking such a large city. In addition, there are many strong posts in the vicinity. If they (the Sung) dispatch relief forces and (the people) in the city uprise, how can we withstand it?" Accepting his argument, the Khitan emperor gave up the idea of laying siege. See, I^ chQan 84, p. 1310. 102

Tai-yiian for almost a century/^ Shortly after the fell of the Northern Han in 979, the Sung subordinated the strategic significance of the prefectures ceded to the Khitans. However,

Tai-tsung's abrupt declaration of war against this powerful enemy ended in the failure of the siege of Yu-chou. Although led by the c^)able general, Ts'ui Han (930-992), the Sung palace's army fled in rout before the Khitan cavalry along the Sorghtmi River/^ In the late autumn of the same year, a full scale Khitan invasion crashed besides the Hsu River bank to avenge Pai-tsung's Yu-chou adventure/^ In the next year, 980, a Khitan victory ended in dubious result'' ® During the early st£^es of the war, from 979 to 982, neither of the two sides lost territory, nor could one of them inflict a decisive defeat on the other.

This stalemated war of attrition caused the Chinese to pursue a different strategy. In response to the new circumstances combined with a renewed appreciation of classic military doctrine, winning without battle became the keynote of the discussion of national

* ^Liu Chi-wen, the remaining heir of the Liu fonily who sought asylum from the Khitan, died in an age of thirty two. See Wen-hsiu (circa, late 10 c.), "Liu Chi-wen mu-chih", in Liao-tai shih-k'e wen-oien. pp. TI­ TS. * Mn the evening of the day, Ye-lO Hsiu-ko (d. 998), a great Khitan captain, led is horsemen wheeling upon the rear of the Sung Palace Corps and cut their route of withdrawal. His sudden onslaught greatly shocked the Sung emperor. Consequently, the retreat of the Sung became entirely a rout One of his legs hit by hostile arrows. Sung Tai-tsung desperately struggled to get away with his guards in darkness. LS, chQan 9, p. 102, chQan 83, pp. 1299,1302, chOan 84, p. 1307. Some douto about the battle remain m the Sung sources, probably because the emperor bad hurt his leg in combat Some scholars even doubted the occurrence of the battle. See Sung Ch'ang-lien," Kao-liang Ho chan-i K'ao-shih", Ta^lutsa-chL 39.10(1969)32. However, more recent scholars considered that the battle did occur. Refer to YQ Kuang-tu, "Liao-Sung Kao-liang Ho chan-i chi ch'i chan-ch'ang" in Beiiing wen-wu vO k'ao-ku. no. 1, (1983), pp. 247- 57. Ho Koon-wan "Sung Tai- tsimg Chien-chi Hsin-k'ao", in Chune-kuo wen-hua ven-chiu-suo hsOeh-pao (Hone Kong; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990). Ho indicated Aat die injury of Sung Tai-tsung is important to explain the Sung emperor's behaviors in court politics. Also, see Tsang Shui-lung, "Sung-Liao Ka^Liang Ho Tsan-I k'ao- lun". chQan 9, p. 103, chQan 74, p. 1234 and chQan 83, p. 1300. LS, ChQan 83, p. 1300, HCP. chOan 21, p. 480-482. 103

defense debate in the early Sung. In another regard, this discussion only voiced the consensus agreeing on the awfiil toll to be exacted by a prolonged war.

With the resumption of a classical grand strategy, the policy of "subduing barbarians with barbarians" was renewed and its goal was to weaken the power of the steppes without the use of military might This approach meant exploitii^ the divisions among varying political and economic interests within a tribal kingdom to create a equilibrium among nomads and China. The Han Dynasty served as an exemplary model in successfully manipulating diplomatic relations with the northern Hsiung-nu. In the sixth and seventh centuries, the Sui and Tang employed this policy of dealing with the barbarians to bring

Mongolia and Eastem Turkistan under control. This approach became the Sung response once more deference to the prolongation of an indecisive and fatally debilitating war against the Khitans.

Unfortunately, until 986, all attempts to subvert Khitan influence among its neighbors ended in disappointment In 982, Sung Tai-tsung issued an edict to the King of

Po-hai, a Liao vassal state in eastem Manchuria, caUing for an alliance against Khitan who would be caught between them. Sung Tai-tsung promised the Khitan lands north of the

Great Wall but receive no support for his proposed Sung-Pohai anti-Khitan alliance.^ ^

Then, Sung Tai-tsung attempted to draw the Kingdom of Ting-an, at the Khitan rear, into

HCP. chOan 22, p. 493. 104

an alliance when its tributary envoy came to court Regretfully, this diplomatic maneuver

was also rebuffed/®

In return, the Khitans made similar diplomatic attempts at subverting Sung allies.

The Khitan courted the Tse Family in Fu-chou 1 and the Wang Family in Feng-chou^°.

Both families carefully aligned themselves with the Sung camp to retain inheritable

prefectural governorship located in the extreme northwest of the Simg-Liao. These Khitan

attempts failed and, in fact, Wang Ch'eng-mei, Governor of Feng-chou, renewed his loyalty

with two minor victories over the Khitans. Finally, just prior to the campaign of986, Sung

Tai-tsung sent an edict to the King of Koryo urging joint operations against the Khitan. The

Koreans refused such opportunism seeing no need to enrage the Liao.^^ Both sides. Sung

HCP. chQan 22, p. 504. ' - The Tse Family originated from a Tangut tribe immigrated to the boundary of the northern Ordos and the Ho-tung highland. During the Late Tang, the kinsmen of the tribe settled in YQn-chou, Tai-chou (the present Tai County), Fu-chou 1 and Lin-chou, (the present day Shen-mu County). Consistently swearing loyalty to the Sung, this family provided sufficient military measure for local defense and provided a number of capable commanders. In 994, Sung Tai-tsung made Tse Ytt-ch'ing (959-996) as Military Governor of the Permanent Security Conunandery. Tse YO-ch'ing soon honored his respective postion by a major victory at Tzu-ho ch'a. In this battle, he ambushed and heavily defeated 30,000 fOiitan soldiers and numerous Tanguts. Seeing the Khitans in desperation, the Tanguts turned to attack their recent allies in order to exploit advantges. As a result, the 30,000 Khitan troops su£fered from a sixty to seventy percent casualty. HCP. chQan 36, p. 785, chQan 37, p. 806. WHTK. chOan 322, p. 2532, SHY, v. 195 geography 21, p. 7648. About the origin and expansion of this local authority of Fu-chou, see Hatachi Masanori, "Wu- tai Pei-sung te Fu-chou Tse-shih" (The Tse Family of Fu-chou during the Five Dynasties and Northern Sung), Cheng Liang-seng (tr.), in Shih-huo. chOan 5, no. 5 (1975)8-9, pp. 29-49. For bibliographical information, see Ch'ang Cheng. Yane-chia-chiane shih-shih k'ao (Clarification of historical facts relevant to the Yang Military Family), (Tientsin: Tientsin Jen-min, 1980), p. 250-76. Tai Yine-hsin. Tse-shih chia- chu shih-lOeh. (A Short History of the Tse Famity), (Hsi-an: San-Ch'in, 1989). Feng-chou, approximately 50 kilometers south of the present day Fu-ku County, was a traditional residential area of a tribe from Ho-hsi, Chang-ts'ai. Khitan appointed its leader, Wang Chia as a general of imperial guard. In 969, Wang Chia shifted his loyalty to the Sung. After bis death in two year later. Sung Tai-tzu appointed his son Wang Ch'eng-mei ( d. 1012) as Supreme Commander of the Han and non-Han Soldiers of the Heavenly Virtual Army, and Prefect of Feng-chou. See HCP. chQan 10, p. 233. SHY, v. 196, geography 21, p. 7651-54. "SS, chOan 487, p. 14038. SHY, v. 197, barbarian 2, p. 7678. 105

and Liao, seemed to lack the patience to employ diplomatic maneuvering against the other; both seemed solidly entrenched. Diplomatic manetivoing was a course of strategic action which demanded caution and subtlety. To Simg Tai-tsung, it seemed as simple as the issuance of an edict

The reversion to extensive civil strife prevalent since the ninth century became manifest in the pacifism.^ ^ Pacifism was articulated in a propaganda of indirect strategic approach, Taoist political thought, self-a£5rmation and socio-economic considerations. In short, this pacifism presented a flexibility to adapt to a variety of political and military circumstances. When the offense ended in failure pacifism promoted the defense; when war tended to prolong, the school of pacifists could inveigh.

At the very beginning of the Sung, it was the pacifists who were the chief protesters against the aggression into foreign lands. Prime Minister Fan Chih (911-964), probably the first remonstrator against Sung Pai-tzu's ambitions, noted the cost and the burden of supply

the point of view of the nationalistic minded Chinese scholars in modem times, pacifism differed fitim the "advocating of surrender" only slightly. More scholars customary named them "the party of peace", as a counterpart of "the party of war". See Wang HsOn^hua and Chin Yung-kao, "Sung-Liao ho-chan kuan-hsi Chung te chi-ko wen-f i" (Issues about the cordial and hostile relations between the Sung and Liao), in Wen-shih. chOan 9, p. 83-113. Ch'en Fang-ming, "Sung-chhi mi-ping-lun te chien-fao, 960-1004", in Sune- shih Yen-chiu Lun-wen Chi, chQan 9, pp. 63-98. Labadie, John Richard," Rulers And Soldiers: Perception And Management of The Military m Northern Sung China, 960-ca. 1060", (PhJ3. dissertation. University of Washington, 1981) chapter 2. Moreover, in Wang Gung-wu "The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbors" in Morris Rossabi (ed) China Among Equals. (Beilceley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 47-65, the function of pacifism as self rhetoric is mentioned. Nevertheless, before the defeat in 986, pacifism had neither a brief proposal to pursue a treaty nor was purely a self-affirmation after defeat Only a few of peace supporters pomted to the necessity of sending peace delegation. Also, the supporters of the peace, nevertheless, did not fit the common criteria of a political clique. Some peace advocators such as Chao Pu and Chang Ch'i-hsien were politically rivals. Also, Wang Ming-sun, "Sung-ch'u te f^-chan-lun", hi Teng Kuang-mmg and Ch'i-hsia (ed), Kuo-chi Sune-shih ven-fao- hui lun-wen hstlan-chi. (Pao-ting: Hopei Ta-hsfleh, 1992), pp. 478-89, suggested the existence of strategic consideration in the Sung pacifism. 106

the Ho-tung campaign. Li Kuang-tsan (ciica. 960) questioned the value of regaining the lost territories." Taking it would bring no gain, losing it would be no real shame."^^ Supporters later voiced the same sentiment but could not influence decision-making imtil the reign of

Sung Pai-tsung (976-999).

In 980, when the eastern army of the Sung was defeated at the Tiled-bridge Pass,

Grand Secretary Li Fang advised against the proposal of retaliation. Instead, he recommended the concentration on training, improvement of arms and accumulation of financial resources. Fundamentally, Li Fang's advise was not against violence, nor did he challenge the political validity to regain the ceded territory. He considered war as costly and devastating and argued for cautious planning, good training, and adequate supplies to guarantee military success. This was the proper solution in the eyes of the civilian bureaucracy in the early days of the Sung.

Some even started to view the risk and cost of war as a problem not only causing suffering for the Chinese but also for the Khitans. In 980, Chang Ch'i-hsien (943-1014), re-emphasized classic political doctrine, "to consolidate the fundamental" to illustrate the hazards of a war of attrition. According to Chang, the main problems of the Sung were the upkeep of an excessively large standing army on the northern frontier and the burden of the necessary supply and transport placed on the people. Chang Ch'i-hsien asserted that it was the people who was the essence of a country and not mere territory. In consideration of the

"HCP. chOan 10, p. 224-25. 107

difficulties for "pacifying the countiy", he reminded Sung Tai-tsung that the price of aggression was as costly for Khitan as much for Sung. "Considering that the enemy would also like to favor their interests and avoid disaster, how could they invade and commit suicide?" As the outcome of invasion would always be in contention, he argued that the immediate external threat would not detemiine the eventual outcome. Chang Ch'i-hsien concluded that the key to winning the war was in superior socio-economic resources rather than military capability.^® Temporary peace was definitely an indispensable step leading to the final victory. Chao Fu reinforced Chang Ch'i-hsien's opinion in 987. "Although the

[Khitans] have different customs, their concern as human beings, being afi^d of danger and needing security, being wearied by fatigue and enjoying comfort, would be the same."^^ Foreseeing that the difficulty for the Khitan to sustain a prolonged war would be no less than the burden of China, Chao Fu advised Simg Tai-tsung to send a peace delegation.

These critiques could not influence defense policy until the full-scale military conflict against the Khitan attrited into prolonged stasis. According to the records of Li

Tao, the popularity of the pacifist critique resulted firom inconclusive battles. "Recently, as the Khitan had broken the peace treaty and sent a relief force to Pai-yOan, His Majesty personally oversaw the campaign to regain the territories lost to the Khitans in Fan-yang

^•"HCP. chOan 21, pp. 482-483. SHY, v. 196, barbarian 1, p. 7676. Also, Chao Ju-yu (1140-1196) ed.. Sung ming-ch'en chou-i another title, Kuo-ch'ao chu-ch'en chou-L hereafter as SMCCI. (The Collected Memorials of Northern Sung Officials), (in SKCSCP. ser. 6, v. 101-116), chflan 129, pp. la-2a. " S^ chQan 265, p. 9151, SMCCI. chflan 129, pp. 2a-4a. chOan 21, p. 484-85. 108

(fonnerly Yu-chou). However, this war of attrition seemed endless and, with no hope for peace; most critics recommended releasing the people."^^ In another remonstrance in 980,

Pien Hsi criticized Sung Tai-tsung for the prodigious effort wasted in the Yu-chou campaign of979 which result in nothing. In the conclusion of his memorial, Tien Hsi remonstrated, stating that prolonged war should be avoided by all means.^^ He gave the same opinion against the Vietnam campaign in 981.^°

Some civil officials acknowledged that the increase in force would be too costly. As an experienced provincial govemor, Chang Ch'i-hsien advised against conscription south of

Yangtze River as the region had yet to recover from the war leading to reunification.®^ A similar opinion was offered by the prefect of the Westem Capital Lo-yang Ho Ch'eng-chu

(946-1006), who said that the burden of transport on the people of Szechwan was a disaster disrupting farming in the entire area.®^ Even Sung Tai-tsung himself, aware of the expense of traiKport, had his servants send only the usable part of each tsin of rattan from south

China. When the northem campaign was re-initiated in 986, former Prime Minister Chao

P'u tried to dissuade Sung Tai-tsung by describing peasant hardship in southwestern Honan

Province. Over 60 percent of the peasantry had started to sell their lands and mortgage their oxen, ruining production. Poor farmers sold wives and children, the poorest committed

SS, chOan 287, p. 9656. Also, HCP. chOan 28, p. 635. HCP. chOan 23, p. 528. HCP. chOan 22, p. 488. Also, see Tien Hsi, Hsien-p'ine-chL (Collected Works of Tien Hsi"), (in SKCSCP. ser. 4, V. 228-229), chOan 1, p. 17. "HCP.chQan22.D.496. " HCP. chOan 22, pp. 508-09. "HCP, chOan 23, p. 514. 109

suicide. Therefore, Chao argued that it would be extremely dangerous to renew the full- scale war with the Khitans before internal peace and economic growth were achieved.^^

Chao P'u's metaphor for the war against Khitans as "shooting down a bird with pearls, while killing a rat with a catapult" became significant. What it would lose is much more than what it could gain. Chao P'u further stated; "Among what it could gain there are some things difficult to procure, while apart from what it would lose there are still other reasons to be concerned."®'* On another occasion, Chao P'u considered that temporal victory was attainable but did not translate into long-term security.®^

War was considered as created by the military. Chang Ch'i-hsien considered the sporadic outbreaks of violence were more likely the consequence of occasional aggressions committed by "frontier officers" rather than legitimate imdertakings of the strategic imperative.®® Tien Hsi overtly criticized these officers as "merely looting sheep, horses and miscellaneous booty as merits."®^ He quoted Sun Tzu's The Art of War. concluding that "those who do not know the disadvantages of waging war would not know the advantages of waging war."®® Chao Fu even suggested the employment of

" HCP, chQan 27, pp. 614-15. " HCP. choan 27, pp. 614-15. SMCCl. chOan 129, p. 9b. Private anecdotes recorded that Sung Tai-tzu once asked Chao p'u to review a plan provided by General Tsao Han for the reconquest of Yu-chou. After studying this plan, Chao P'u agreed in its military feasibility. However, the prime minister argued whether the Sung could appoint any general capable as Ts'ao Han as successor if armed conflict prolonged to the next generation. See Sung Min-ch'iu (1019-79), Ch'un-ming fui-ch'ao lu (Record of the Author's Time Spent in Retirement in the Village of Ch'un-ming at K'aifeng), in Pai-ch'uan hsfleh-hai. Pai-pu-ts'ung-shu chi-ch'ene. case 6, v. 59, chaan 1, p. 13. Also, Wang Kung, Sui-sou tsa-iu. in chih-pu-chu tsai ts'ung-shu. Pai-pu-ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng, case 245, v. 2408, p. 5b. "^chflan 265, p. 9151. HCP, chQan 22, p. 498. SMCCI. chOan 129, pp. 4b-6b. HCP. chOan51.DP. 1109-10 no

civilians in command^^ and this reflected his general distrust of military ofBcerdom as an institution of war.

Sung Pai-tsung apparently took keen interest in domestic affairs. With ofBcials, he asserted the wish to brii^ peace to the world rather than to achieve military conquest. He enjoyed showing an inherent kindness of building an image of the Sage King in ancient classics. Once with close officials, he confided his alarm whenever reading the Lao-Tzu (or

Tao-te-ching). "Arms are instruments of ill omen and there are spirits that detest them that one who has the way does not abide by their use."'° After the victory at Tang-ch'ing in

982, Sung Pai-tsxmg forbade the generals on the northern border &om coimterattacking.

Even small-scale pre-emptive forays into Khitan lands, bane of Khitan build-up and invasions, were forbidden without special permission.^^ This was tantamount to an undeclared, unilateral armistice.

Without an agreement with the Khitans, such an armistice based solely on the hopeful expectations of the Sung was unlikely to bring an ultimate peace. Sung Tai-tsung knew this and used a pacifist stance with an ulterior political motive. Regardless gaining the peace or not. Sung Tai-tsung sought to concentration the power over internal affairs in his hands.

HCP, chQan 28, p. 636. ^°Lao Tzu, Tao te Chine, p. 89. '•HCP. chflan 23, p. 528. Ill

The ascension of Sung Tai-tsung is a historical mystery about which there still remain many questions.^^ His early reign was very unstable and in 979 some generals even supported the ascension of Te-chao (d. 979) when Tai-tsung fled fiom the battlefield of the

Sorghum River^^ The concentration of power over internal affairs was to further consolidate his rule v^e fighting a prolonged war meant to lose more authority to the military.

During the last decade of the tenth century. Sung Tai-tsung encouraged effective civil management and showed impatience with the arrogance of his generals. There was the case of illegal cutting of Ch'in-chou's forest and timber smuggling involving some high- ranking generals and imperial relatives such as Wang Ch'eng-hsien (circa late 10th c.), the son-in-law of Sung Tai-tzu, and Shih Pao-chi (954-1010), the son of Shih Shou-hsien (928-

984) who was Sung Tai-tzu's "Oath Brother" sworn to fraternal allegiance. To make an example and punish corruption. Grand Treasurer Wang Jen-tsan (917-982) was demoted.^^

Eunuch Chiang Shou-chun (d. after 983), Army Inspector on the northern border, was arrested for offering a large loan to Generals Ts'ao Han and Ts'ui Yen-chin (circa late 10th c.) without permissions^ Even Ts'ao Pin, the Military Counselor, was investigated on the suspicion of plotting sedition in 983.^® Shortly thereafter, Ts'ao Han was charged for illegal

Sung Tai-tzu iiad a son, Te-chao. Traditionally, Tai-tzu should have chosen Te-chao to be his successor. There have been many speculations about how the replacement came about, which became the attractive theme of various historical myths. See Chapter Two, footnote 76. ' ^ SSCW. chQan 2, p. 36. HCP. chQan 20, p. 460. HCP. chQan 23, p. 512. ' ^ HCP. ChQan 23. p. 525. HCP. ChQan 24. p. 537. 112

tax collection and fiscal extravagance.^^ Sung Pai-tsung suspected his younger brother

Ping-mei, the disaffected Prince of Ch'in (d. 984), as a threat to the throne and forced him to commit suicided® At the end of the year. Sung Tai-tsxmg could say, "Recently, internal and external affairs have been handled in such a way that neither civil officials in the central government nor in the provinces dare disobey the authority [of the court]. I am [always] heartened when I ponder this."^®

At the same time. Sung Tai-tsung appointed new military personnel using a different kind of criteria. In the Spring of984, he personally inspected his officers from

Commander-in-Chief of the Palace Army to lieutenants of companies. He carefully examined their service records one-by-one to personally promote and demote.®" In a remarkable reversal, he made obedience and management capability the most important standard for advancement in the military. What Sung Pai-tsung pursued was a systematic, effective, and imified command structure rather than an autonomous and military inclined to uncontrollable warring.®^

From 979 to 986, measures of pacification and centralization were implemented.

Pacifism in the early Sung voiced the social and economic demands of a classical propaganda slogan, "to give rest to the common people". But it also enabled Sung Tai-

HCP.ch0an24.p. 546. '®HCP, chaan 25, p. 572. '-HCP, chQan 24, p. 555. HCP.ch0an25. p. 573. ° ^ Certainly, whether or not his means could serve his end is questioned. According to Tien Hsi in 986, the Sung regional commanders could not employ bodyguard by the reason of preventing them &om aggrandizement However, as an undesirable result, their command efficiency drastically reduced. See HCP. chOan 30, pp. 675-676. 113

tsung to place control over the political and military firmly in his grasp. Ultimately,

however, neither the ideology of a pacifism nor the experience of a unilateral armistice

could bring peace to China. This allowed military opportunists the chance to gain the

Emperor's favor.

The Desperate Search for Strategic Decision

With the firmly established civil man£^ement and the consolidation of his own

personal power. Sung Tai-tsung had the satisfaction of shifting his attention back to

external affairs early in the reign era Yimg-hsi (984-987). He had gained no firesh ideas

from civilians other to "build up strong defense against invasion and do not pursue the enemy". Even this defensive strategy was invariably criticized by pacifists arguing that long

indecisive war would only be prolonged. In this dilemma, the high blown, over-optimistic

proposal of "unworthy people" were heeded. Military opportunists such as Ho Huai-p'u (d.

986), Ho Ling-t'u (948- after 986), Liu Wen-yu (944-989), Hsieh Chi-chao (circa late 10th c.), and even the Emperor's private physician Hou-mo-ch'en Li-yung (d. 987) became Sung

Tai-tsung's favorites. None of these sycophants were civil officials.®^ In standard dynastic

AH of them were milhaiy professionals except Hou-mo-ch'en Li-yung, an imperial physician. Being a favorite of Sung Tai-tsung, he started his military service in the early 980s and even became military inspector in Ho-tung border. Ho Huai-p'u and his son came from a military clan related to the imperial &mily. Liu, with a similar background, was a resident of Pao-chou, where the Chao clan originated. See SS, chQan 242, p. 8607, chQan 463, pp. 13S40 and 13S4S. A mistake was made by Peng Po-ch'uan (circa, early 13th Century), Tai-p'ing chih-chi t'ung-lei fA Record of Various Items Pertaining to Political Pacification), hereafter as TPCCTL. (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Chu-pen sse, 1966) chflan 3, p. 266, in which Ho Ling-t'u was states as Ho Huai-p'u's father. 114

history, scholars described them as a clique of "unscrupulous servants", who advised the

Emperor to gamble.

The biography of Ho Ling-thi in Simp Shih exemplifies how historians belittled these "unworthy people". His &ther Ho Huai-p'u was the elder brother of Empress Hsiao- hui (d. 958) and the uncle of Sung Pai-tzu's eldest son Te-chao. He served the Later Chou,

Sung Tai-tzu, and Sung Pai-tsung for years. Therefore, Ho Ling-t'u was a family intimate of Tai-tsimg's since childhood and was promoted fix)m the lowest grade to mid-rank in only eight years.® ^ Authors of the ofiGcial history were disgusted by his behavior. "With his former service to ingratiate him in the House of Prince of Chin's (i.e. Simg Pai-tsung), he misled the Emperor with the advantages of focusing on external affairs and over- exaggerated the probability of taking Yu-chou, Chi-chou, [and the other ceded prefectures].

The Emperor was so highly encouraged by this counsel that he launched the Ch'i-kou campaign. After defeat, critics accused Ho of an over-fondness of strategy and his recklessness." ®''

According to the persuasion of Ho Ling-t'u, the political situation of the Liao in early 986 was very close to chaos. Liao Ching-tsung had died in 982 and it was rumored that civil affairs were now controlled by the Empress Dowager Hsiao (d. 1009). With strong support of the military. General Han Te-yang (941-1011), the empress's favorite, became

- ^ Ho Ling-t'u started to be a kune-feng kuan in 979 and became Chhing-i Shih. prefect of Hsiung-chou in 986. See SHY, v. 175, military 8, p. 6886. SS, chOan 463, pp. 13545-13546. -'SS,chQan463,p. 13540. 115

powerful. And it was Ho Ling-fu's counsel that as internal chaos would debilitate Liao

military will, the Sung had a prime opportunity to seize ceded northern prefectures.^^

The second stage of the Sung-Liao war was renewed in the spring of986 when

Sung Pai-tsung launched a four-pronged offensive.^^ The attack exercised the military

principle of deception with "making sounds of attack in the east, while advancing in the

west", a stratagem of both East and West®^ The Sung gained a stunning victory at the

Flying Fox Pass defeating 20,000 Liao troops and taking their commander alive.

Nevertheless, this victory could not make up for the ignominious defeat of the main Sung

body on the east at Chi-kou Kuan. The disastrous fiasco was a series of mistakes - over-

•--HCP. chOan 27, p. 602. According to the plan of Sung Tai-tsimg, the Sung expeditionary army was to be divided into four corps. The first corps, with more than 100,000 Sung soldiers under General Tsao Pin, encamped along the Pai-kou River of the eastern &ont, its right wing extending to the eastern seacoast The second corps, a strong mounted force conmianded by General Mi Hsin (circa late 10th c.), was deployed in the upstream of the river. Tien Ch'ung-chin (929-997), the commander of the third corps, led his troops over the Western Mountain in order to squeeze the Khitans with the support of General Pan-mei's (921-987) fourth corps in the extreme left wing. HCP. chOan 27, pp. 608,612. Explaining his attempt. Sung Tai-tsung said; "In order to deceive the enemy, [Ts'ao and Mi] may not engage until Pan Mei and Tien Ch'ung-chin have completely overrun the land behind the mountain in no more than two months. Then they should join their forces and march to Yu-chou. After [taking the city], they should hold the strategic positions [in the mountains north of Yu-chou] and regain all the territories lost in the Five Dynasties." See HCP. chOan 27, pp. 612,617. SHY, v. 175, milit^ 8, pp. 6887-89. For comparison, it is worth while to cite a great British captain, John Churchill Marlborough, who evolved a similar plan, "The Grand Design", in 1703. He places his well-trained British Expeditionary Army in the south of the Meuse River, in order to deceive the French. Simultaneously, two Netherlands generals and his colleagues launched a real attack to take Antwerp. However, the plan &iled for the same reason of Sung Tai-tsung's defeat-the absent of punctilious timing. Although Winston Churchill blamed the errors of the generals of the United Provinces, Marlborough, who made such a complicated plan, should share the responsibility for the fiasco. See Winston S. Churchill, Marboroueh. His Life And Times. (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1935) v. •Ill, pp. 109-233. Correli Bamett, Marlborough. (London: Eyre Methuen Limited, 1974), pp. 70-72. Another comparable plan would well be the "Schlieffen Plan", a production of the German General Staff prior to W.W.I, manipulated the same strategic deception by an outflanking maneuver. With a small proportion on the southern fi'ont to deceive the French, the main forces of the German array intended to outflank the enemy in Belgium. This powerful right wing aimed at the ports on the seacoast of British Channel. Saying "let the last soldier in the Right wing clean up the Channel". See Hart, Liddell, B. H, Strategy, p. 151-163. 116

optimistic estimation on the operation plan, the failure of Supreme Director of Operation

Ts'ao Pin to actualize the plan, and ill-suggestions given by his subordinates.^ °

After the defeat, the Liao seized the strategic momentum away fit)m the Sung in two ensuing engagements: the battle at the Chen Family Pass in late 986 and the battle at Noble

House in early 987.®® From the winter of988 into the spring of989, the Liao Empress launched a five-month campaign penetrating deep into the Hopei region, and capturing I- chou prefecture and several important fbrts.®° The Liao army was finally driven out with a

Sung minor victory beside the Pang River near Ting-chou, the Sung headquarters in

Hopei. Again, in the next year, the Liao main body reappeared to the north of Ting-chou.

This time it was the Khitans who were routed ignominiously when a patrolling Sung squadron swept down upon the Khitan headquarters.®^ As a partial consequence of this victory, the northem enemy did not again threaten the Sung for the remainder of Sung Tai- tsung's reign. At the same time, the increasing demand for the recovery of agricultural economy urged the Liao southern command to reduce firequency of campaign, and Southem

Capital Intendant Ye-lu Hsiu-ko focused more on social and economic stability. He forbade his subordinates from conducting incursion and even retumed horses and cows to the Sung when those cattle swept across the border occasionally.®^

HCP,chQan27,p.613. " HCP. ChQan 27, pp. 621-622,625-26. LS, chOan 83, pp. 1300-02. Ng Pak-sheung, "I-chou shfli-hsien nien-yQeh k'ao: Chien iun Nan-Sung chih Ch'ing p'ien-tsuan Pei- Sung li-shih le fe-se", pp. 1-9. Reportedly, the Sung killed 10,500 Liao soldiers and captured more than 10,000 horses. HCP. chOan 29, p. 656. " HCP. chQan 30, pp. 682-83. " LS, chQan 83, p. 1302. 117

The death of Sung Tai-tsung in 997 inaugunkted the third and last phase of the

Sung-Liao War. Emperor Chen-tsung (b. 968, r. 998-1022), third son of Sung Pai-tsung, had far less military experience than his father and uncle.^* However, he exerted himself in strenuous efforts to learn strategy and military administration, assisted by such enable advisors as K'ou Chun (962-1023), Pi Shih-an (circa late 10th and early 11th c.), and Li

Yun-tze (circa late 10th and early 1 Ic.).'^ In this period the Simg councils poured over all defensive strategies, i.e. active defense, perimeter defense, and defense-in-depth.®®

Eventually, there came to be the consensus that defense was no less costly as offense to the utter frustration of the Sung decision makers. Emperor Chen-tsimg and his advisors were compelled to relinquish both all-out war and total pacifism as acceptable strategies.

In similar fashion, the Khitans also hungered for some decisive strategy, suffering frustration that was no less painful than that of the Sung. The first Khitan effort to break into the Hopei heartland in 999 triggered a four-month engagement, defeating the Sung

Sung Tai-tzu and Sung Tai-tsung were soldiers and officers when they served in the Palace Corps of the Later Chou. However, Sung Chen-tsung had never been in a battle before ascending the throne. He learned the profession from tutors and military advisors. See Liu Li-yen, "Sung-Liao Shan-yOan-chih-meng hsin- fan", in SSYCC. v. 23, pp. 71-189. About K'ou Chun, sec Ch'ien Chun-hua, "Kou Chun yO Shan-yOan-chih-meng", in Li-shih chiao-hsOeh chQan 3, (19S4}3, pp. 25-29. Ho Koon-wan, "Politics and Factionalism: Kou Chun (962-1023) and his Tung Nien" (Tucson: Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arizona, 1990). Wang Hsiao-po, K'ou Chun nien- p'u (Chronological Biography of K'ou Chun), (Ch'eng-tu: Pa-Shu shu-se, 199S). For Pi Shih-an, SS, chOan 281, pp. 9517-23. So far, there was no specific study about Li YQn-tze, to whom Emperor Chen-tsung entrusted as his outstanding intelligent service and field command capability. His biography, refer to SS, chQan 324, p. 10479. Also, Wu Ch'u-hou, Ch'ine -hsiane tsa-chi chQan 3, p. 27 recorded hikorical study as a favorite pursuit of Sung Chen-tsung. He might acquired some military knowledge from history. Labadie, John Richard, "Rulers and Soldiers: Perception and Management of the Military in Northern Sung China (960 -ca. 1060)", (Seattle: PhJD. dissertation ofUniversity of Washington, 1981), pp. 43-46. 118

vanguard biit losing their own rear guard shortly thereafter.^^ The Liao army captured and

subjugated two Sung captains, K'ang Pao-Jui and Feng Ts'ung-shun.^^ In 1000, the Sung

concentrated its cavalry on the border and heavily punished the Khitaa invaders, following

an accurate intelligence. According to a tomb tablet of a Liao ofBcer, the Khitans barely expelled the Sung counter measures after the defeatIn 1002 the Khitans changed the season for campaigning and surprised the Sung in the summer. This simimer campaign temporarily interrupted Sung defense construction but it was a minor setback to the

Sung.^°° They inflicted the Sung a minor defeat, but any further breakthrough was prevented by unfavorably hot rainy season. In 1003 the Liao army launched another summer campaign toward Ting-chou and this time they encircled and eliminated the Sung vanguard at Wang-tu, a county north of Ting-chou.^°^

The Khitans defeated a Sung body and annihilated another in Kao-Yang Kuan, a crucial junction connecting Ting-chou and Kuanan theaters. In return, the Sung army heavily defeated their rear guard composed by nearly ten thousand men on their way back to Yu-chou, with a large amount of booty retaken. HCP. chOan 46, p. 987. In the account of the SS, chQan 446, p. 13 ISO, K'ang Pao-jui was killed in the Battle of Kao-yang-kuan. In the names of the two captives were recorded as K'ang Chao-jui and Sung Shun, see chQan 14, p. 154. According to Sung Fu-kuei (circa, mid-11 c.), "Feng Ts'ung-shun mu-chih", in Liao-tai shih-k'e wen- pien. pp. 169-72, JC'ang Pao-jui and K'ang Chao-jui was the same person. The editor of Liao-tai shih-k'e wen-pien also identify Feng Tsung-shun with Sung Shun, see p. 171. " Unknown author, "Keng Yen-yi mu-chih", in Liao-tai shih-k'e wen-pien. pp. 159-166. Liu Li-yen, "Sung-Liao Shan-yOan-chih-meng hsin-fan", p. 107-108. The Battle of Wang-tu, see HCP. chflan 54, p. 1190. SS, chQan 279, p. 9471-72. Also, Hsiang Tsai- (circa. mid-11 c.), Li Chih-shun mu-chih oi Liao-tai shih-k'e wen-m'en, pp. 187-90 seems to record the life of an ofHcer under Wang Chi-chung. The tomb tablet indicated that Li Chih-shun was a Sung officer captured by the Khitans, when a Sung Sub-division, or pien-shih, was defeated fiom 999 to 1005. This is likely the occurrence of the Battle of Wang-tu. 119

The captured Sung vanguard commander Wang Chi-chung (circa early 11th c.)

acted as an intermediary bridging negotiations between the two states.^°^ In 1004, Liao

Empress Hsiao mounted a full-scale southern campaign to regain the Kuanan region

apparently by force or negotiation.^"^ Kuanan was ceded tc the Liao by the Later Oiin but

retaken by Chou Shih-tsung in 959. Nevertheless, according to the Sung accoimt, Liao

Empress Hsiao lost approximately 30,000 soldiers in the failed attack on Ying-chou, Sung

headquarters in Kuanan RegioiL^°^ MeanwMe, Emperor Chen-tsung led his palace army

toward Shan-chou, a crucial port downstream on the Yellow River. Encountering the Sung

mainbody beside the Yellow River, the Liao was astonished with another misfortune when

its Commander-in-Chief Hsia Ta-Ian (before 970-1004) was ambushed and killed on

reconnaissance. Seeing that the high morale of the Sung Imperial Guards and the

approach of a force from Ting-chou to her rear, Liao Empress Hsiao agreed to sign a peace

•" About Wang Chi-tsung, see Chiang Fu-ch'ung, "Sung Chen-tsung ytt Shan-yflan-chih-meng" in Ta-iu- tsa-chih. chQan 22,8(1961)4, PP- 26-30, 9(1961)5, pp. 27-34, and 10(1061)6, pp. 32-36. When Ts'ao Li-yung arrived the Khitan camp, he rejected the Liao territorial demand and insisted only military compensation to be negotiable. Shortly thereafter, a Khitan reception officer informally revealed the Liao goal as regaining the territory, and said: "If we cannot achieve the goal, we would be regret to see the people at home." HCP. chflan 58, p. 1290. HCP. chQan 58, p. 1279. The record of the Liao described that Hsiao was ambushed by the Sung crossbowmen, see chQan 85. p. 1314. However, in the Sung record, the Khitan supreme commander was shot down when he was attacking the phalanx commanded by Li Chi-lung, see HCP. chflan 58, p. 1286-87, and p. 1290. Shen Kua provided another version in MCPT. supplementary, chQan 3, pp. 1002-03. It seems to be agreeable that the Sung killed Hsiao in an open battle. In the passage of I^ there is a crucial phrase, "taking Yang-kuan, Yen-tui, and Chiao-yen from the Sung" between the phrase "conducting a reconnaissance of the terrain" and "being ambushed by crossbowmen". The unknown location of the three places seemed to be small forts of the Sung near Shan-yQan. 120

treaty in early 1005 and withdrew. In the account of Yao K'uan (1105-62), the Sung

Imperial Guards stored their arms in Shan-chou before returning to K'aifeng.^°^

According to the treaty of 1005, both Sung and Liao recognized each other's territorial boundary as they existed with the stipulation that there would be no further defense fortification. The Sung accorded an annual gift to the Liao of200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels of silver. These gifts were ostensibly to subsidize Liao military costs but in reality they were used for the most part to make up the Liao trading deficit.

The two emperors emulated firatemal relations, regularly exchanging embassies

According to the "oath letters" of 1005, the Treaty of Shan-yQan stipulated (1) the establishment of fnendly relations between Sung and Liao; (2) annual payments (sui-pi) to the Liao, numbered two hundred thousand bolts of silk and one hundred thousand taels of silver; (3) the demarcation of border based on the current figure; (4) the agreement that both sizes would repatriate fugitives from justice; (S) the agreement that neither size should disturb the farmland and crops of the other; (6) the agreement that neither size should construct fortifications and canals in addition to those already in existence along the border; and (7) the pledge of a solemn oath with a religious sanction in case of contravention. Tao, Jing-shen, Sune-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu. pp. 24-25, and Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations, p. 15. Yao K'uan n 105-621. Hsi-ch'i tsune-vO (Melange with the West Stream), with Lu You (1125-1209), Chia-shih chiu-wen. (Memories of my Ancestors), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1993), chQan l.p.31. ~ The economic namre of the annual payment lessened the potential harm to the Sung dignity. The Khitans liked to call this annual payments &om the Sung "tribute" informally and internally, but they refrained fi-om imposing such a term in formal and international vocabulary. In fact, the annual payments were not to be sent to the Liao court by a Sung envoy with official letter. Thus, it would be inappropriate to see it as a "tribute". The annual payments were delivered by a local Sung official to the border near Hsiung-chou and received by a Khitan official on the other side. To describe this as a tribute was more or less an exaggeration by the Khitans. See Tao, p. 16. In the second month of 1005, the Sung court issued an ordinance to local officials at Hsiung-chou, Pa-chou, and An-su Commandeiy, the present day HsQ-shui County, to reestablish posts for trade with the Khitans, and restricted the bilateral trading in only these locations. According to the researches by Japanese scholars, 50-60% of the silver taels in the annual payments returned to the coffers of the Sung government through bilateral trading, and the one hundred thousand bolts of silk equated to the annual production of only one prefecture of the Lower Yangtze Valley. See Tao, p. 16. Hino Kaisaburo,, "Godai, Hoku-So no saihei, sashi, no suii" in Tovo shigaku 5 (1952), pp. 19-41 (pp. 392-503.) Hino Kaisaburo, "Godai, Hoku-So no saihei, sashi, to Zaisei", in Tovo Shigaku 6 (1952), pp. 1-26. Hatachi Masanori, "Pei-Sung yO Liao te mou-i chi ch'i shui-tseng", Cheng Liang-seng (trans.). Shih-huo. chQan 4, no. 9, (1974)12, pp. 32-47. Chang Liang-ts'ai, "Sung-Liao chien te kuo-ch'ang mou-yi" (Commercial activities in the trading towns between the Sung and Liao), in Li-shih yen-chiu editory group (ed) Liao-Chin shih lun-chih (Shenyang: Liaoning jen-min, 1985), pp. 211-226. 121

every year. By mostly the e£forts of Ho Ch'eng-chu, the Sung regularized the rituals of reception. The principle of this regulations stressed the equal status of the two states. Ho emphasized the non-provocative nature of these ritual, "must following the middle way to make it durable." In addition, a new diplomatic language of equality was in use. The

Khitans addressed the Sung "southern dynasty", and seemed expected the Simg called them "northern dynasty".^^^ The Sung also refrained from emplojdng the terms which imposed the images of "barbarian" in geographic nomenclature along the border.^^^

After having experienced more than one hundred years of civil strife and foreign war, China now crossed the threshold stepping from war into peace. The peace of

- -' The fictitious kinship relationship was seen in a Liao record in which the Sung envoy to negotiate peace who request that the empress dowager of the Liao be addressed as "junior aunt" by the Sung emperor. In the Sung record, nevertheless, it was Wang Chi-chung who conveyed the request of the Khitan emperor to become the "younger brother" of Sung Chen-tsung. Hiis relation was applied in every generations down through the two dynasties. See Tao, Sune-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu. pp. 26-28, and Two Sons of Heaven, pp. 16-17. -- Regular envoys were sent in two yearly events. New Year festival and celebration of the other emperor's birthday. Envoys for negotiation of specific issues were called fan-shih. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, pp. 18-19. •" HCP. chQan 60, p. 1342. Tao, Sung-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu. p. 29-31, and Two Sons of Heaven, p. 18. In fact, the Sung emissary, Ts'ao Li-yung employed this term in his negotiations at Shan-yQan. HCP. chQan S8, p. 1290. Other occasions on the use of this terms, see Tao, Sune-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu. pp. 29-31 Tao, Sung-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu, p. 34. Historians evaluated the Sung strategic situation prior to the peace differently. Wang HsOn-hua and Chin Yung-kao underestimated die Sung fighting-edge and overlooked the Khitan frustration on the uncertainty of war. See Wang and Chin, "Sung-Liao ho-chan kuan-hsi chung te chi-ko wen-t'i", pp. 83- 113. In historical records, however, the Khitans exhibited extreme caution toward the considerable Sung military strength on the Shan-yOan campaign. Its emissary discovered the Sung equipment improved gradually. After the treaty was signed, the Khitans immediately withdrew. At the same time a Sung captain, Yang Yen-chao, suggested an annihilating battle against the Khitans in withdrawing. See HCP. chQan S8, pp. 1287-1297. Also, see Wang Min-hsin, "Liao-Sung Shan-yOan-chih-meng ti-chieh te Pei-ching", (I), (II), and (III), in Shu-mu chi-k'an, chQan 9,2(1975), pp. 35-49,3(1975), pp. 45-56; and 4 (1975), pp. 53- 64. Liu Li-yen highlighted the military pariQ^ of the Sung and Liao but criticized the Sung recognition of the Khitan occupation of Yen YQn region and the agreement on prohibition of fiuther defense fortification. See "Sung-Liao Shan-yQan-chih-meng hsin-fan", pp. 121-122. Nevertheless, territorial dispute was essential in the Sung-Liao conflict and no accessory given by scholars indicated the probability of a peace 122

1005 was a treaty based on diplomatic equality and military equilibrium. This was a

consequence of an ironic fact that both sides had suffered fiom tremendous losses, and

yet had not been able to bring a decisive result. None of the two emperors. Sung Chen-

tsung and Liao Sheng-tsung, was ambitious leader. It marked the Sung failure for

regaining the lost territory, but it also prevented the Khitans to seize the Kuanan Region.

It brought peace in a low cost and served the Sung goals calling for imperial security,

dynastic survival, and domestic stability. Despite leading to an incomplete unification,

the peace of 1005 exemplifies a rational and "acceptable" coexistence.

between Sung and Liao excluding the term of bilateral territorial recognition. In addition, it seems necessary for the Sung and Liao to agree in the bilateral prohibition of defense fortification. In strategic perspective, it is problematic to regard "defense" fortification as strictly for "defensive" purpose. Any defensive equipment enhancing the chance of survive for an unit of offensive aim, such as the armor of a battleship or the anti-missile system of a nuclear country, is offensive. Because of this, there is a school of modem pacifism searching for the possibility of "non-provocative defense", but the study is still inconclusive. See Rapoport, The Origin of Violence, pp. 473-76. 123

Chapter 4. Sung Control of the Armed Forces

By the second half of die tenth century, the return of the army under central

authority was indispensable to peace. Scholars searching for a turning point in history

view the central control over the armed force a striking occurrence.

Traditional historians described the early Sung effort in reasserting control over the armed force as following two fundamental principles— "strengthening the trunk or central authority while weakening the branches or provincial autonomy." According to these principles, writers have explained how successfully the Sung restored central authority in the military, political, fiscal, and judicial spheres and how these policies, unfortunately, became responsible for the weakness of Sung rule. In the traditional view, early Sung policy was described as "emphasizing the wen, i.e. civilism, while despising the wu, i.e. militarism." Nevertheless, to avoid over simplification, one must not ignore two fimdamental factors: the reality that the Sung was founded by military men and the menace of Khitan as a threat to the dynastic rule in K'aifeng.^ Also, the Khitan threat never allowed the Sung emperor to pre-empt the priority of dynastic stability.^ All vital concerns pointed to the necessity of peace and peace was actually established in 1005.

Nevertheless, strategic envirormient of Sung China did not create the idea of the total

- Liu Tzu-chien, James, "LQeh-lun Sung-tai wu-kuan-ch'Qn tsai fung-chih chieh-chi chung te ti-wet", in publication committee (ed.), Aovama Hakushi Icoki kinen Sodai shi so. (Collection of Essays on Sung History: Special Anniversary Volume Presented to Dr. Sadao Aoyama on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday), (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1974), pp. 477-87; also, in Liane-Sune shih ven-chiu hui-oien (Collected Studies of Sung China), (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1987), pp. 173-184. - The experience of Emperor Chen-tsung illustrates this. He was raised in the palace and had no career in military service. However, after his ascendancy, he had no alternative other than leading the war against 124

abolition of war, nor did it despise military virtue. The Sung way of controlling its armed

force under peace was paradoxically the promotion of military professionalism.

This chapter examines components of the Sung military professionalism and will

not follow the conventional textbook sequence which usually deals with the two

aforementioned predominant themes. Rather, I will look at a vertical structure of the Sung army from the bottom to the top. The first and second sections are to examine the roles of soldiers and officers, which constituted the major parts of the armed force. The third and fourth sections observe the manufacture of arms and the logistics and engineering service.

The fifth section discusses the administrative organization of K'aifeng's military power.

The sixth and seventh sections center on two almost unexplored areas, field command and the strategic decision making of the early Sung, suggesting that there was an efficient control of the armed force.

The Soldiers

Different socio-economic environs from Tang to Sung provided different models of manpower mobilization. The changes in the agricultural society reflected the transition from T'ang to Sung and from imperial-tenancy to firee farmers. Soldiers of the Pang fii- ping militia were imperial tenants, providing rotational military service for their exemption of a considerable portion of rent and tax. Society was organized in these households providing rent and tax, conscript labor, and military service. One necessary

Khitan. As a consequence, he devoted into the art of war for several years. See Liu Li-yen, "Sung-Liao Shan-yQan chih-meng hsin-fan", pp. 93-94. 125

premise, nevertheless, was that there be stifficient land as state property and accessible to

the mass. As the Tang became unable to offer arable land to the increasing populace in

the eighth century, the fu-pinp militia system collapsed and Ch'ang-an turned to recruiting

regularly salaried soldiers. The replacement of fu-oing with salaried soldiers v/as symptomatic of socio-economic change.^

The fi^quent outbreaks of civil war in the Late Tang and the Five Dynasties

required a professional standing army. Complex and specialized tactics relying on the

efficient use of long-range weapons such as catapults and crossbows became difScult to

employ by farmer-soldiers without training. Although Sung scholars cried out for the re­

establishing of the militia system on a general scale, they did not achieve any great

success." Certainly, the Sung did not completely abolish the idea of mobilizing state tenants as a militia force and actually managed to establish some. However, the Sung militia forces comparable to fu-pine were not the standing army but Tenant-Archers and

Tribal Auxiliaries.^ These could only exist in the frontier areas where the state owned a great amount of land such as Shensi and Ho-tung.

^ Traditional criticism tracing the Sung military weakness to its paid-recruited soldiers was climaxed by Ch'ien Mu, Kuo-shih ta-kang. pp. 380-81. Also, Teng Kuang-ming, "Pei-Sung te mu-ping chih-tu chi-ch'i yQ tang-shih chih-p'in, chih-jo ho nung-yeh seng-ch'an te kuan-hsi" in Chune-kuo shih ven-chiu. 4(1980), pp. 61-77. Since the 1950s, a number of scholars have evaluated the Sung military establishment with a more in-depth view. For example. See Lo Chiu-ch'ing "Pei-Sung ping-chi yen-chiu", in New Asian Journal. 3(1957)1, pp. 167-270; Labadie, John Richard," Rulers And Soldiers: Perception And Management of The Military in Northern Sung China, 960-ca. 1060"; and Wang Tseng-yQ, Sune-ch'ao ptne-chih chWan. Recent scholars who attempt to explain the Sung recruitment system by emphasizing socio-economic conditions are represented by Ko Chin-fiing, "Sung-tai Jung-ping ch'eng-yin hsin-shuo", in Hu-oei ta-hsQeh hsOeh-pao. philosophy and social science edition, no. 6, (1987), pp. 87-95; and Wang YO-chi, "Pei-Sung 'Jung-ping' shih", in Wen-shih-che. no. 2 (1989), pp. 48-65. * See Lo Chiu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chi yen-chiu". ^ For more details about the systems of Tenant-Archer and Tribal Auxiliary, see Chapter Seven. 126

As a consequence, soldiers of the Sung chin-chfln or Palace Army and hsiang-

chun or Supplementary Army were not state tenants, nor were most of them recruited

from farmers. Their livelihood relied on the state employment and most of them would

have no where to go if disbanded. Therefore, the Sung rulers were extremely cautious

when reduction of forces was due to the financial constraints.

The connotation of the name "Palace Army" highlighted the role of the standing army of the Sung as imperial servants, despite only a portion of the troops actually being stationed at the capital. The Sung Palace Army was a heritage from the Five Dynasties.

One important organ of the chin-chfln system, known as the Imperial Guard, was founded by the first ruler of the Five Dynasties, Chu Wen.®

When extensive service as the emperor's body guard characterized the Sung military system, discipline and administration became important. At the beginning of the

Sung, there were more than 10,000 Imperial Guards "as fierce as tigers and leopards."^

The early Sung rulers, such as Chao K'uang-yin, enforced strict discipline in the Palace

Army. He designed his soldier's uniform with a vivid martial outlook® and physical

' For a general survey of the development of the palace army during the Five Dynasties, see Ch'en Fu- liang, Li-tai ping-chih (Military Establishment in Previous Dynasties), in Pi-chi hsO-pien (Taipei: Kuang- wen, 1969) chOan 8, p. 1; Chang Ch'i-fan, Wu-tai chin-chfln ch'u-f an. (A Preliminary Study of the Palace Army in the Five Dynasties), (Kuangchou: Chi-nan ta-hsueh, 1993), pp. 1-38; for its transition &om the Five Dynasties to the Sung, see pp. 78-118. About Chu Wen's experience in constructing his central army, see Wang Gungwu, (1963.) pp. 47-84. Also, see Hori Toshikazu, "Godai Sosho ni okeru kingun no hatten", in Tovo bunka kenkvuio kivo. v.4, pp. 89-96. Kikuchi Hideo, "Godai kingun ni okeru jiei shingunshi no seritsu", in Shikan. v.70, pp. 58-66. Tomita Yoshiaki "Ko-Ryo jiei shingun ko", in Rvukoku shidan (1988). V.92, pp. 32-49. ' HCP. chQan 2, p. 51. • Feng Ch'eng (1049), HsO mo-k'o hui-hsL (Continuation of The Scattered Illumination from the Ink-guest ), YOan-wei pieh-ts'ang, (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1981) chQan 8, p. 5a. 127

training was the center of daily life of the soldiers.^ Some sources suggest that a

vegetarian diet was required. No sale of wine and meat was allowed in the vicinity of the camping area and a soldier could never go out of his camp without permission. Music- playing was also prohibited in the later period.'^^ In Li Tao's account, Sxmg Tai-tzu once explained the reason for his strict enforcement of martial law over unbridled soldiers. The first Sung emperor was alarmed by the fall of Emperor Chuang-tsung of the Later Pang who, despite ascending the throne through a twenty-year war beside the Yellow River, failed to enforce discipline and was overthrown shortly by his soldiers. Simg Tai-tzu proclaimed: "If any soldiers dare to violate the military ordinance, the only thing I bare to deal with this is my sword!"^^ All combat imits undertook harsh daily training and were frequently inspected by the emperor.

Accompanied by strict discipline, there was a fairly regular salary. The units of the palace army were classified in five grades according to their capability. Soldiers of

Grade One units received 1 kuan or 1,000 cash in each month. The monthly salary of

^ According to the Sung regulation, a Palace Army soldier who earned more than 500 cash a month should participate daily military training, while who earned from 300 to 500 a month should concentrate either formal training or logistic service. See SS, chOan 195, p. 4853. A number of historical sources, including official documents, anecdotes, collected works of scholar, recorded stria discipline of the camp-life, especially the prohibition of selling meat and wine outside the camp. See Chang Fang-p'mg (1007-1091), Lo-ch'Qan chi (Collected works of Chang Fang-p'ing), hereafter as LCC. in Shih-k'u ch'Oan-shu chen-nen. here after as SKCSCP. ser. 1. (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), chflan 18, p. 14b; Shen Kua (1029-1093), Mene-ch'i ni-fan. (Notes Taking in Meng-ch'0> (Peking; Chung-hua, punctuated ed., 1975), chOan 25, p. 259; Wang Yihg-lm (1223-1296), YO Hai (The Jade Sea), (Taipei: Hua-wen, 1964), chQan 141, p. 2707; HCP. chOan 74, p. 1693; and Hsfl mo-k'o hui-hsi. chQan 8, p. 5a. -HsQ Sung (1781-1848)ed., Sune-hui-vao chi-kao. hereafter as SHY. (Draft of Documents Pertaining to Matters of State in the Sung Dynasty), (Beijing: Chung-hua, 1957), v. 165, law 2 p. 6487. -- chQan 12, pp. 274-75. 128

soldiers in Grade Two and Three units were 0.7 and 0.5 kuan.^^ Relatively low salaries of

0.4 and 0.3 kuan a month were given to the soldiers of Grade Four and Five units, who

were responsible for only half-time regular training and half-time labor service.^* Food

and provisions were provided by the ofBcials. Awards were distributed at seasonal events and the Triennial Celestial Sacrifice was one in which a soldier received more than his annual salary. Rewards were given in commensurate with merit in battles and particular service at the front.^^ According to some mainland Chinese historians, there was

"contradiction" between strict discipline and high reward in the early Sung army.^®

Nevertheless, Sung Tai-tzu in 971 demonstrated that strict discipline seemed to be higher in priority by disbanding an entire detachment which rioted to unlawfvilly claim of reward.

A career soldier with outstanding service could be made an officer at the regular

'' A kuan. or min. is a string of one thousand cash, conunonly used in the calculation of money during the Sung. •'Refer to SS, chQan 194, pp. 4841-42, chQan 195, p. 4853. According to Wang Tseng-yQ, only four units in the palace army were classified as Grade One, namely the Solar Supporter, Celestial Military, Dragon Defender, and Transcendent Defender, altogether called The Upper Four Corps. Wang suggested that soldiers in the units as Sage Supporter and Transcendent Warrior would likely receive 0.7 kuan a month; while the Incited Military corps was regulated as a units that each soldier was paid 0.5 kuan monthly. See Sung-ch'ao ping-chih ch'u-fan. pp. 217-18. An exceptional case was seen in a report from the Supreme Court, or Ta-li Shih in 1006, revealing that a considerable number of soldiers received lower than 0.2 kuan a month. This report suggested that an unexceptional punishment should be given to the low income soldiers, if any of them escaped from construction and engineering, or hao-tsai duty, on the frontier. The emperor approved but at the same time increased the soldiers' monthly salary of this grade to 0J kuan. See HCP. chQan 64, p. 1424. chQan 194, p. 4841. Wang Tseng-yfl, pp. 228-33. Lo Ping-liang, "Sung-tai chih-chOn cheng-ch'e mac-tun t'an-hsi" (An Analysis on The Dilemmas in The Sung Army Administrative Policy), in Honei hsfleh-k'an. no. 3 (1993), pp. 9^100. In an imperial celebration in 971, a palace army unit called "The Inner Palace Detachment From Szechwan" attempted a riot asking for a higher award equivalent to Sung Tai-tzu's most favored Imperial Dragoon. The emperor immediately suppressed the riot, disbanded the whole detachment, and had forty soldiers and officers beheaded. HCP. chQan 12, pp. 274. 129

Grand Inspection or tui-tuo-tzu. The aged, disabled, and incompetent were demoted and taken out at the same event A semi-retirement system was conducted within the army and the aged and disabled were taken out of their original units. Those with prior meritorious service were placed in the units of Excessive Personnel or sheng-vQan and received half of their regular salary.^®

The military force of the early Sung was capable. Its strength was distinguished not only in the reunification campaigns from 964 to 979, but also in the early stage of the

Sung-Liao War. From 954 to 986 this army defeated the Khitans at Kao-ping in 954, at

Chia-shan in 969, at Shih-ling Kuan Pass, at Sha-ho and Man-ch'eng in 979, at Yen-men in 980, and at Tang-ch'ing in 982. Before the fiasco of986, this army had only lost two battles, at the Sorghum River (or Kao-liang River) near Beijing in 979 and at Tiled- bridged Pass in 980.^® The incompetence of the chin-chfin was notorious in the later Jen- tsung reign (1023-67) because of the lack of training rather than a more profound problem in its recruitment. With the burden of frequent conscription relieved, the transition from the systems of levy and obligation to recruitment and regular pay marked a significant social progression.

WHTK. chflan 153, p. 1325. Wang Tseng-yQ, pp. 235-42. In previous studies the Sung victories over the Liao were downplayed by scholars. However, from 979 to 986 the Sung did defeated the Khitans more then five times while only lost two. The Battle of Kao-ping was fought before the founding of the Sung, see TCTC. chQan 291, p. 9503. Also, HCP recorded the victorious account of the Sung in Chia-shan in chQan 10, pp. 220-21. For the Sung victory at Shih-ling Kuan and Sha-ho, refer to Po-fo chQan 84,p. 1307. About the Battle of Man-ch'eng, see HCP. chQan 20, p. 462-463. chQan 9, p. 103; chQan 74, p. 1234, and chQan 83, p. 1300. The Sung victory at Yen- men, refer to HCP. chQan 21, p. 473. For another encounter at Tang-ch'ing, see ^ chQan 9, p. 105 and HCP. chQan 23, 521. Among the two defeats of the Sung, the Battle of Tiled Bridge Pass was an indecisive one. See 1300, HCP. chQan 21, pp. 480-82. recorded the Battle of the Sorghum River in chQan 9, p. 102, chQan 83, p. 1299, chQan 84, p. 1307. 130

The early Sung success in enhancing the effectiveness and discipline of its soldiers was manifested in two roles given to the military system which may have been beyond its capability. First, by regular salary, the Sung absorbed unemployed, wicked, and violent members of society, placing them under military discipline. This policy succeeded remarkably in diminishing the frequency, scale, and impact of peasant rebellion.^° Another significant role of the Sung military system was its fixed integration with the legal system. Penal registration for military service was wildspread and applied as judicial punishment. A convict was registered as a soldier of the hsiang-chun instead of being locked in jail. The idea was that the military discipline was a powerful deterrence during the period of penal service of the convicted, and prevented him from committing further offense.^^ Both roles given to the armed force, as hostel for vagabonds and as rehabilitation center for criminals, were a pioneering innovation in the tenth century and, thus, controversial. From these extraordinary roles we find the Sung rulers seeing its military machine as effective instrument to remodel human behavior, increase political and social stability, and, ultimately, diminish the danger of revolt, coup d'etate and civil war.

The Officers

The Institutional vicissitudes occurring within the military hierarchy from Tang to Sung saw a radical transition from medieval nobility toward despotism. Both Sung

Peasant and military revolts did not dis^pear in the Sung history. However, there was an undeniable fact that it successfully separated military and peasant revolts. See Teng Kuang-ming, (1980), pp. 64^5. Brian McKnight, Law and Order in Sung China (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 131

Pai-tzu and Sung Tai-tsung had experienced the life as an officer for more than ten years

before ascending the throne. The management policy of these former mib'tary men in

Sung China also exhibits rationality, standardization, and sophistication.

The preponderance of the Sung officer corps originated from an officer corps of

the late Pang which imdertook imperial commissions in a broad variety. As a result, most

of the Sung officers were titled "commissioners," although commission offices had

become actual rankings after a long process of formality during the Five Dynasties and early Sung. In numerous cases, a commissioner was delegated to undertake different

tasks. For instance in 979, Commissioner of the Western Upper Gate Pien Jen-lang (628-

688) was assigned to supervise the siege engineering at Pai-yuan. After the fall of the city. Emperor Pai-tsung made him act as Brigadier of the Pai-yuan garrison, having the

Leisure Stable Commissioners Wu Tsai-ch'ing (circa, late 10 c.) and Arm Munitions

Storehouse Commissioner Chia Hsi (circa, late 10 c.) as Patrolling Inspectors.^ ^ Some other capacities, for example, the Huang-ch'eng shih, or Imperial City Security

Commissioner, remained as the Chief of Imperial City Constables most of the tenth century.^''

Press, 1982) chp. 12. See Saeki Tomi, "Sodai no Kojosi no kenkyu," Toho Gakubo. 14(1938). Tomonaga Shoku, "To Godai sanpan shishin ko—Socho bunban kanryo kenkyu", in committee of Sodai shi kenkyu kai (ed) Sodai no sakai to bunka. (Tokyo: Kyuko Shoin, 1983), pp. 29-68. Chiu Yfl-Iok, Tang-Sune pien-ke-ch'i chih chOn- cheng chih-tu (Politico-military institution during the Tang-Sung transition), (Taipei: Wen-shih-che, 1994). " SS, chQan 275, p. 9380. About the Imperial City Constable, refer to Saeki Tomi, "Soo-tai no koioshi ni tsu-i-te ", in Saeki, Studies in Chinese History. (Kyoto: Dohosho, 1969) pp. 1-42; Ch'eng Min-sheng," Pei-Sung te fan-shih chi-ko Huang-ch'eng Ssu" in Honan ta-hsOeh hsOeh-pao. no. 4, (1984) pp. 37-41. 132

Power and salary varied in different ofBces and the Sung ofiBcer corps formed a large complex and integrated uni^, divided into ranked and non-ranked officers. The former was further classified as commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers.

An officer promoted from ordinary soldier was non-ranked officer. A non-ranked officer who rose through eight pre-rankings or chieh-ch'i. firom Diploma Officer or kei-kune-chu to Acting Lieutenant of the Three Detachments or san-oan chieh-chih could become a ranked officer. Ranked officers ranged fi-om Acting Lieutenant of the Three Detachments to Irmer Commissioner of Foreign Ministry, approximately 60 rankings before the 1070s.

Non-commissioned officers, or Junior Commission Officers from Acting

Lieutenant of the Three Detachments to Courier of the Inner Palace or nei-tien ch'ene- chih. mostly Grade Nine, formed a solid foundation to the Sung military hierarchy. This stratum, consisting of three detachments during the Five Dynasties, was formalized in the

Sung. A career in the Three Detachments, namely, Elite Palace Guards, Edict Couriers and Provision Servants, were upward channels in the officer corps. As a precedent, the

Sung emperors personally officiated over the examination and the promotion ceremony.

Higher in hierarchy above the Three Detachments were the various

Commissioners and their Deputy Commissioners, which formed the rest of low-ranking officers. These offices originally held by eunuchs serving in the Tang imperial palace, became regular military functionaries in Sung China. As their attribute as an imperial servant remained, their reliability was boldly highlighted in the early Simg. A majority of the Deputy Commissions were selected from distinguished Three Detachment officers. 133

Through extensive service they were customarily promoted to be commissioners within forty-five years. However, meritorious deeds would make promotion much quicker. In many cases, an additional office such as Prefect would be given to a distinguished conmiissioner up to or higher than Grade Seven. This made the commissioner a mid- ranking officer.^^ His salary, originally twenty-five kuan a month, would be adjusted to compensate for his second office. For example, an office of Prefect or ch'ih-shih would bring him an additional one hundred kuan a month.^^

A group of mid-ranking officers was called Heng Pan, or Horizontal Array, distributing the ranks from 49 to 60, and were mostly Grade Five to Six officers. Some of them were holders of second offices such as Militia Trainers or Defense Commissioners.

The position of Regional Supervisor and Military Governor were opened for those who rose to high-ranking officers. Military Governor, in a general sense, was the most prestigious position to a soldier. Nevertheless, to meritorious military governors, the office of prime minister represented an extraordinary brilliance, while those promoted to

Military Counselor could finally participate in strategic decision making.^^

In this system, remaining dulled in high decision making was the usual outcome of such Sung officers. Some capable officers, such as Hu-yen Chan (1000), Tang Chin

(928-979),^° were deeply devoted in tactics and combat skills. Others distinguished

Ho Koon-wan, "Sung-ch'u san-ch'ao wu-chiang te liang-hua fen-bsi—Pei-Sung fung-chfli cbieh-ch'eng te she-bui liu-tung hsien-hsiang hsin-tfan", Shih-huo Fu»k'an. v. 16, no. 3-4 (1986)12, pp. 19-31. The monthly salary of a prefect is absent in §S, chQan 171, p. 4104. However, we can deduce the number from the record after 1078 in p. 4111. 2"' Ho Koon-wan (1986), pp. 115-116. SS, chQan 260, pp. 9018-19, cbQan 279, pp. 9488-89. 134

themselves by their ability in military administration, such as Ts'ui Han (929-992) and

Wang Ch'ao (after 1005)."

Among the early Sung officers, Kao Ch'iung (935-1006)'s behavior can be

recognized as the stereotype. In 979 Sung Tai-tsung's Imperial Guard was defeated by the

Khitan at the Sorghum River and his own foot was wounded by a hostile arrow. Kao,

then a commander of a detachment, deceived the enemy as if he were the Sung emperor

in order that Sung Tai-tsimg could escape in the night Again, during the crucial winter

campaign against the full strength of Khitan in 1004, his bravery and wisdom were again

remarkable. In reply to Prime Minister Kou Chim (962-1023)'s question whether the emperor should across the Yellow River, he simply answered: "As a mere military man, I would serve to the death!"^° These words expressed the epitome of military professionalism: a brave warrior has nothing to fear. Nevertheless, the answer begs the question and avoid the responsibility of strategic estimation and political decision.

Lucrative private enterprise and economic wants effectively reduced the political ambitions of high ranking officers. In the Sung Standard Historv. military talents of a large number of high ranking ofGcers are juxtaposed with their profitable commercial activities. In Ssu-ma Kuang's record about the incident of "Cups of Wine," Sxmg Tai-tzu promoted his meritorious generals as military governors shortly after the Sung establishment, reassured them lifetime friendship, and encouraged their enjoying music, heavy drinking, and sumptuous life. In return, these generals gave up their command in

SS, chOan 260, pp. 9026-28, chflan 278, pp. 9464-66. 135

the palace army and refrained fix)m jeopardizing the rule of Sung Tai-tzu.^^ The reliability of Ssu-ma Kuang's account on this political masquerade is not unquestioned.^^

However, more important, this record describes the Simg toleration of the enrichment of generals.^^ In a dialogue between Sung Tai-tsung and Chao P'u, the emperor did not see private business as incompatible with the military profession. Instead, he considered their activities as supplementary to the regular income.^^ In fact, eventually some of these generals, such as Shih Shou-hsin and Mi Hsin (927-994) became extremely rich.^^ Valor, loyalty, skill in tactics, and personal heroism in combat, and, perhaps, administrative ability, characterized the Sung ofiGcers. Surely, in the sense of balancing economic interests and political stability, modest extracurricular involvement in business run by officers were tolerated unless they overtly and severely offended the imperial order.

The way of the Sung to reshape its officers' behavior, of comse, is not without criticism. Traditional historians accused the Sung for emphasizing civil affairs and

HCP, chQan 58, p. 1285. SSCW. chOan 1, pp. 11-12. Controversy among recent scholars about the occurrence of such a dramatic event hinges on the reliability of Ssu-ma Kuang's account Refer to Hsd Kuei and Fang Chien-hsin, Tei-chiu shih ping-ch'Qan shuo hsien-yi", in Wen-shih. v. 14, (1982)7, pp. 113-116. Liu Li-yen, Tei-chiu-shih-ping-ch'tlan hsin-shuo chih-yi", in Ta-Iu tsa-chih. v. 80, no. 6 (1990)6, pp. 25-33, HsQ Kuei, Tsai-Iun pei-chu-shih-ping-ch'aan— chien-ta Liu Li-yen hsien-sheng", unpubh'shed paper of the Second Conference of the Sung Studies, Taiwan, (1995) 12. As James Liu explained, a certain toleration towards such kinds of activities were indispensable as a trade-off for political stability. Also, this is a way to define the mUitary officers as members of the ruling class. See James T. C. Liu, "LQeh-Iun Sung-tai wu-kuan-ch'(in tsai fung-chih chieh-chi chung te ti-wei". HCP. chQan 24, p. 562. Also, for a comprehensive survey of the private conunercial activities of the Sung officials, refer to Ch'Qan Han-sheng, "Sung-tai kuan-li chih shih-ying shang-yeh", Shih-vO-shuo chi- k'an. V. 7, pp. 199-254, pp. 1936. On illegal trading of some early Sung officers, refer to SS. chQan 250, pp. 8810-12,8817, chQan 257, p. 8957-58, chQan 259, p. 9007, chQan 260, pp. 9015,9023. Nevertheless, there was a sharp contrast that some other officers in comparable positions were praised by "no remaining money after death" by the Standard History, refer to chQan 259, pp. 9000,9006,9010, chQan 260, p. 9027. 136

despising the military. However, Sung policy toward military ofiGcers did not seem to suggest such a discrimination. The above description suggests that martial arts and tactical skills were emphasized and the problem of illegal trading was not likely to severely corrupt the ofBcers corps. The problem, if any, was more likely rooted in the role of military ofGcers as mere tactical instruments. As they were no longer trained to become strategic decision makers, their service was restricted to the technical and tactical. Lacking a broader view in strategy, they could not, as I will discuss, effectively defend peace. In this sense. Sung rulers expressed their distrust of its war machine and warriors.

Arms Manufacture and Horse Breeding

Accompanying with the growth of regional autonomy after the mid-Pang, military governors of the various commanderies established their own autarchic arsenals.

To prevent outbreaks of internal violence, the Later Chin court in 937 imposed a prohibition of unauthorized arms manufacture in circuits and restricted the arm production of these established regional arsenals according to the annual orders of

K'aifeng. Under the pretense of quality control, Chou Shih-tsung closed all regional arsenals in 952 and concentrated all the skilled workers at K'aifeng.

Wang P'u (922-982), Wu-tai hui-vao (Documents Pertaining to Matters of State of the Five Dynasties), (Shanghai, Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1978) chOan 12, p. 207. Wang Ch'in-jo (962-1025), Ch'e- fii vOan-kuei (The Magic Miror in the Palace of Books), (Beijing, Chung-hua, 1960), chaan 160, p. 1937. Ch'i Yung-feng, "Wu-tai fan-chen ptng-chih he Wu-tai Sung-ch'u te hsQeh-fim ch'uo-shih", Ho-pei hsfleh- k'an. (1994) 4, pp. 75-81 considered that this prohibition laid indispensable foundation of the centralization poh'cy. 137

The Sung manufacture of munitions was highly systematized.^^ At the beginning of the S\mg, aims manufacture was mainly the task of the Grand Arsenal, which produced high quality arms for the unification campaign. As the demand of weapons increased, it was divided into the Southern and Northern Arsenals, "producing armors, uniforms, spears, swords, blades, heavy equipment, arrow holders, leather caps, crossbow targets, and Mattress Crossbows, totaling 32,000 products annually." In addition, there was the

Bows and Crossbows Armory producing bows, crossbows, arrows, totaling 16,500,000 products a year. Under the Southem and Northern Arsenals, there were fifty-one divisions such as Wood Works, Horse-Armor Works, Heavy Crossbow Works, and

Sword Works. At the early Sung, 3,741 personnel including officers and smiths worked for the Southem Arsenal, while 4,190 personnel served the Northem Arsenal.^® The Bow and Crossbow Armory was established in 976 with 1,042 smiths. Its branch arsenal, the

Arrow Works of the Bows and Crossbows Armory, had 1,071 personnel concentrating on the manufacture of extraordinarily long arrows and arrows for crossbows. Furthermore, there were two arsenals strictly for the manufacture of siege machinery,, namely, the

Eastern and Western Broad Preparation Arsenals.*^

The founding of the Sung Imperial Stables was the concern of the cavalry. Prior to

For general survey, refer to Shiba Hiroshi, "Hoku-So no heilci kogyo", in Tokyo University of Education and Ajia kenkyu kai Sodai shi kenkjubu fed>. Tovo shieaku ronso fThe Studies in Oriental History), (Tokyo: Fumaido Shoten, 1960), v. S, pp. 1-69. Chang Te-tsung, "Sung-tai te chOn-ch'i seng-ts'an", in Teng Kuang-ming and Wang Yta-hai (ed), Sune-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (K'aifeng: Honan Ta-hsQeh, 1993), pp. 181-201. Yflan-feng lei-kao. chflan 49, p. 308. SHY. V. 187, geography 3, pp. 7354-55. SHY. V. 69, institution 16, p. 2719. SHY. V. 75, instimtion 30, p. 2981. 138

1004, the Sung followed the practice of the Tang and Five Dynasties, employing eunuchs

as Flying Dr^on Commissioners or fei-luny shih and in 1000 the Acting Intendant of

Imperial Stables. After 1004 the authority of the Imperial Stable was assimied by the

Bureau of Military Afiairs/^

The duties of the Imperial Stables were highly specified. Before Simg Tai-tsxmg

initiated the last Tai-yOan campaign, he purchased 1,700,000 horses from the ordinary

citizenry. The elimination of the Northem Han and the first Yu-chou campaign in 979

added a additional 40,000 mounts to the Imperial Stables that could not be stabled in

K'aifeng and provincial Imperial Stables were established as a result. In the lOIOs, there

were six supplementary Imperial Stables in the environs of K'aifeng and twelve in various

prefectures in Honan and Hopei. In addition, there were two special stables in the capital

for the care of sick horses. The total number of horses the Imperial Stables reached

200,000 cared for by 16,000 military personnel.^^

Promotion or demotion of these ofiBcers and men depended on the increase or

reduction in the nimiber of the horses. In 1008, the "Punishments and Rewards in the

Service of Imperial Stables" promulgated that a ten percent reduction in the number of

horses would result in a fine of one month's salary for the acting intendant More than ten

percent resulted in the fiirther punishment of beating by bamboo rod. A bolt of silk was to

be given to the responsible soldiers for the new birth of horse and a general increase in

VQ-hai. chOan 149, pp. 2820-24, SS, chOan 198, pp. 4928, WHTK. chQan 160, p. 1389. " YQ-hai. chQan 149, pp. 2820-24, WHTK. chQan 160, pp. 1389-90. For general survey, see Sung Ch'ang- Uen," Pei-Sung te Ma-cbeng", Sogabe Shizuo, "Sodai no basei", in Sogabe Shizuo, Sodai seDcei shi no kenkvu. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1974), pp. 64-144, and Tu Wen-yO, "Sung-tai ma-cheng yen-chiu". 139

horses always brought rewards at all levels. Starting from 1029, annual inspection

replaced the previous triennial inspection and punishments and rewards were mooted out

at the same time. Stables in Ta-ming, Hsiang-chou and five other prefectures were for the

special purpose of horse breeding and after 1063 each site was responsible for four

hundred a year.**

Mature horses were graded fixim one to four and distributed to various cavalry

units in the spring of every year and horse replacements to the cavalry was according to

strategic priorities. In 1044 and 1054, K'aifeng repeatedly asserted that Shensi, Hopei,

and Ho-tung had a higher priority over other circuits. The usual time from the third to the

ninth month was the time for horse breeding. At the beginning of the eleventh century,

the Imperial Stables and Cavalry managed 9,890,000 mou of land devoted exclusively to

horse-breeding.*^

At the beginning, the Sung bought horses from the general market, but by late

tenth century, Tibet became its major trading partner. K'aifeng encouraged Tibetan

merchants to sell their living stocks in the capital with a good price and, in this manner,

procured approximately 5,000 horses a year.*®

Logistic and Engineering Service

The hsiang-chfln or the Supplementary Army highlighted Sung reliance on a centralized logistics service. The Sung military logistic and engineering service had three

Chune-kuo-shih ven-chiu. 2(1990), pp. 22-35. WHTK. chflan 160, p. 1390. SS, chOan 198, pp. 4927-32. 'Mbid. 140

inter-related missions: food transportation, irrigation, and fortification. Defense depended

on food supply and fortification; navigable rivers and canals provided access to obtaining

food, timber, and manpower. In many cases, these tasks were assigned to the hsiang-

chun.

In the Simg army system, the Supplementary Army enjoyed a considerable role.

At the beginning of the Sung, chin-chQn- numbering 193,000, and haang-chfln.

numbering 185,300, were almost equal. From about 1017 to 1021, the hsiang-chOn.

niimbering 480,000 soldiers, even exceeded that of the chin-chun which had 432,000

soldiers.^ ^

The emergence of such a sizable non-combat force reflected an important socio­ economic change. Accompanying the collapse of the Pang, imperial tenancy and traditional labor conscription were dif&cult to retain. After taxation reform in the eighth century, labor conscription was largely combined in the land-and-household tax which was collected according not to productivity but to the wealth of the tax payers. As a result, the Sung government became less capable of conscripting the mass into compulsory service.

The exemption of labor conscription was congruent to a process through which the hsiang-chfin was gradually defined as a logistics and engineering corps. As described by Ko Chin-fang, from 961 to 975, Sung Tai-tzu had started to replace mass labor with the hsiane-chfln in the following tasks: road building, logistics transport, construction of

WHTK. chQan 160, pp. 1389-90. SS, chQan 198, pp. 4932,4936. tombs for imperial ancestors, and office maintenance. In 989, Sung Tai-tsung further exempted the conscription of the masses in seventeen prefectures in Honan firom food transport to Hopei. Sung Chen-tsung set the precedent in which Supplementary units took charge of the fortification of Pei-chou and Tien-hsiung Commandery as a means of taking relief to the communities. Irrigation also became a routine task for the hsiang- chOn. Ko Chin-fang indicated that the emergence of the hsiang-chOn in Sung China paralleled the increase in paid-recruited public service. Paid-recruited labor and paid- recruited military personnel of the logistics and engineering service were two aspects with the same significance. It was that the govenraient could no longer exploit the manpower of the communities under the medieval taxation system. Instead, it was more effective to hire them with money.

The role of the Supplementary Army as a replacement to the laborers conscripted from the masses had two serious limitations. First, technology in the tenth and eleventh centimes had not yet allowed a complete emancipation fi'om labor conscription. Second, strategic imperatives repeatedly compelled K'aifeng to mobilize its large poptilation in critical emergencies. K'aifeng did not seem to enjoy any advantage in the technology for mass transport. The Sung army did not own large capacity transport vessels nor was it more capable than its predecessors of transporting food firom the interior to the frontier over land. Utilizing the canal system to the utmost extent, K'aifeng procured six million shih of rice from South China. Hopei was another region which benefited from canal

WHTK. chQan 152, pp. 1328-29. 142

navigation, and after 980 Kuan-nan and the vicinity of Pao-chou received regular supply/® However, in mountainous Ho-tung and Shensi, expensive groimd transportation was the only option. Wagons deteriorated in the mountainous terrain; horses and donkeys consimied excessive food. Human porters became a bitterly acceptable alternative.

In the account of Sung Ch'i, Simg cavalry could carry food for ten days.^°

According to an accurate estimation by Shen K'uo (1033-1097), a famous Chinese scientist during the eleventh century, it took 300,000 laborers to supply an expeditionary force consisted of 100,000 soldiers. Shen K'uo calculated that the minimimi consumption of a man was two shene a day, while his maximimi load was six tou (sixty sheng).^^ It was an extraordinary hardship to carry both equipment and rations for five days. Thus, if a community provided one soldier, then these two persons could sustain eighteen days.

Including his return, the maximum operational range of this soldier would be the distance of a nine-day-trip. Mobilizing two laborers to carry the food for every soldier would extend the duration of a one-way campaign up to twenty-six days or a two-way campaign for thirteen days. If the campaign were longer, the only alternative was to increase the proportion of porters to three porters to one soldiers to enable a penetration into the enemy territory for thirty-one days. With the return, the maximimi penetration was sixteen days. Thus, an expeditionary force of 100,000 soldiers required 300,000 transport laborers for a half-month campaign. The populated and hospitable Hopei theater might

Ko Chin-fang, "Sung-tai Jung-ping ch'eng-yin hsin-shuo". HCP. chQan 21, pp. 482-483. HCP. ChQan 27, pp. 607-08. One shene is equivalent to 0.718 kg. One tou was the culmination of ten shene. 143

allow K'aifeng to procure food fix>m the vicinity of the battlefield. But, in the Ordos

Desert, a travel distance of sixteen days would likely be the maximum range of Sung projection of power.

Transport units needed to be guarded. Shen K'uo considered that employing

30,000 out of 100,000 soldiers to guard the 300,000 unarmed laborers was a barely acceptable rate. However, it meant only 70,000 soldiers remained for the attack. This was the optimum rather than a realistic scenario, the scientist stated. OfBcers were exempted from carrying food, while those on the duty for water ration and firewood gathering carried half. In addition, the carrjdng of soldiers and laborers falling ill, injured, and death must be shared by others. Shen K'uo recorded: "If pack animals are used, then a camel can carry three tan,^^ a horse or mule can carry one tM and five too, and a donkey can carry a tan." Despite the ostensible advantage that pack animals could carry more, Shen

K'uo remarked that they were less controllable in military action. Also, the use of pack animals depended on the geography of the theater. Traveling in the desert increase the death rate of pack animals and resulted in the heavy loss of their cargo. Therefore, compared with human power, the use of camels, horses, and donkeys did not seem to have higher priority.^ ^ Shen K'uo's calculation clearly indicated that massive conscription of transport laborers was still irreplaceable in providing logistic service on large scale operations.

A tan is equivalent to 71.86 km. See Shen Kua, Mene-ch'i pi-fan chiao-chene (Pen-note of The Dream Springs), commentary by Hu Tao-ching„ (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated ed., 1957, reprint 198'^, chQan 11,419-20. Also, Shen Kua, Shen Kua, Hsin chiao-chene Mene-ch'i pi-fan. (Newly Revised Pen-note of The Dream Springs), 144

As technology remained rudimentary in transportation, it was inevitable that

K'aifeng would rely on the easily available pool of conscription labor rather than any more costly alternative. Sung China had 4,132,576 households in 997,8,677,677 households in 1021, and 10,162,689 households in 1029.^^ It was inconceivable that

K'aifeng could lay aside such an impressive figure in its strategic consideration. Truly, the hsiane-chun assumed the responsibili^ for numerous routine works and K'aifeng could even exempt the conscription of mass laborers in some large engineering projects.

For example, to dredge a old waterway around Hua-chou (the present day Hua County) in

1027, one option was to conscript 28,000 laborers to finish within a month. Another option was to mobilize 20,000 soldiers and finish in seventy days. Emperor Jen-tsung preferred to employ only soldiers.^® However, military construction required a short duration to projects; otherwise, the border defenses would be weakened and unable to counter enemy attack. According to Lo Chiu-ch'ing, the Sung army in Shensi usually spent ten days to complete a fort and the construction rarely extended to more than twenty days.^® In 1085, Hsu Hsi (d. 1082) constructed Fort Eternal Happiness or Yimg-Io ch'eng (south of the present day Yfl-lin Coimty, Shensi) in ten days, mobilizing more than

100,000 laborers and soldiers.^^ In 1082, the newly established Hsi-Ho Circuit evolved a plan for construction and fortification, involving 600,000 laborers, almost equivalent to

hereafter as MCPT. (Peidng: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1957), chQan 11, pp. 126-27. " WHTK. chOan 11, p. 113. " SHY. V. 192, geography 14, p. 7537. Lo Chiu-ch'ing, "Sung-Hsia tsan-cheng chung te ^-pu ho pao-tsai", Chune-chi hsOeh-pao. 6(1967)2, pp. 223-243. HCP. chQan 329, pp. 7921, 7925-26, also see Chapter 10, footnote 131. 145

the total Supplementary Army.^® Obviously, the hsiane-chfln was still unable to meet all the demands of logistics and engineering and labor conscription could not completely precluded in war time.

Administrative Control

In the redefining of military professionalism, the administrative compartmentalization of armed force units was also noteworthy. Unlike most of the rulers in Five Dynasties, the early Sung achieved centralization closely associated with the concept of compartmentalization.^® Sung Pai-tzu and Pai-tsung persistently absorbed elite warriors from circuits into chin-chOn imits. In the last year of Sung Tai-tzu's reign

(976), the Palace Army numbered only an approximate 193,000 soldiers. However, in about 996, after two decades, the size of the Palace Army gradually grew to 358,000 soldiers. As a culminate result, the hsiang-chOn. provincial garrisons originally under the military governor's command and not selected by the central authority, were downgraded as supplementary forces. In many cases these second-class units were used as logistics

SHY. V. 186, military 28, p. 7264. Whether the rulers of the early Five Dynasties had this attempt is a question and one focal point of the debate is a dubious term, shih-wei ch'in-chfln. or the Imperial Guard. According to Hon Toshikatzu, during the Later Liang Dynasty (907-923), shih-wei ch'in-chOn had already dominated the security of the capital and the palace and no compartmentalization was seen. However, his opinion was vastly disagreed by Professor Kikushi in 1956, who insisted that the term shih-wei chin-chfln could not be tantamount to the term tsai-ching chu-chOn. for a certain units in fC'aifeng, as the Left and Right Dragon-Tiger Army, were not units of the Imperial Guards. In 1988, Tomita Yoshiaki agreed with Kikushi that there were more than one command hierarchy existed in the Liang capital. Nevertheless, the existence of such units other than the Imperial Guard was for the convenience for rapid military re-deployment rather than a mam'festation of the compartmentalization policy. Refer to Hon Toshikazu, "Godai Sosho ni okeru kingun no hatten", in Tovo bunka kenkvuio kivo. v.4, pp. 89-96. Kikuchi Hideo, "Godai kingun ni okeru jiei shingunshi no seritsu", in Shikan. v.70, pp. 58-66 Tomita Yoshiaki "Ko-Ryo jiei shingun ko", in Rvukoku shidan (1988)v.92, pp. 32-49, also in Chiukoku Kankei Runchoku Shirvo. v. 3a, 30(1988), pp. 658-666. 146

corps.

The Sung implemented compartmentalization vertically and horizontally in its

military hierarchy. Vertically, the basic unit of the Sung army was the company or tu,

each consisting of one hundred soldiers. Five tu formed a Battalion or vine, which in

many cases was equivalent to a chih-hui. Each vine or chih-hni was led by a Battalion

Commander, or chih-hui'-shih.^° The division, or hsiang. and Army, or chfln. were

superior imits above of battalion, in general terms, but in most of the Sung they were only

administrative. Neither hsiang nor chun were units for strategic deployment. The absence

of large units in strategic deployment demonstrated the Sung intent of

compartmentalization. K'aifeng rarely assigned an entire army for a specific mission.

Instead, in common practice, the court selected a ntmiber of battalions firom various

armies to form a task-force for campaign or a defense garrison. The Sung claimed that the

principle of division of power necessitated such a complex system.®^ Moreover, starting

with Emperor Shih-tsimg's reform in the ephemeral Later Chou Dynasty, the Palace

Army was separated imder two administrative hierarchies, the Imperial Guard and Palace

Corps. In the early Sung, the Imperial Guards were further divided into two forces, the

Infantry and the Cavaby, which with the Palace Corps constituted the administrating

system for the standing army. Each of the "Three Headquarters" had its own commander.

Tseng Kung-liang (997-1078) and Ting Tu (990-1053), Wu-chine chune-vao. hereafter as WCCY (Essentials of the Military Classics), in edition committee of Chung-kuo pine-shu chi-ch'ene (ed), Chung- kuo ping-shu chi-ch'ene. (Beijing and Shenyang: Chieh-fang-chOn, Liao-sben shu-se, 1987) v. 3-5, chQan 1, p. 43, chQan 2, p. 82. " Wang Tseng-yQ, pp. 24-29,32-33. 147

These large bodies were compartmentalized horizontally. In spite of its formal

name "Palace Army" units of the Sung central army were not stationed only in the capital.

Instead, they functioned as the standing army of the state; most had responsibility in

national defense and expedition. Two thirds of this force was based at to ensure the

defense of K'aifeng. The remaining one-third was rotated among the various circuits,

according to strategic imperative.®^

Operation Control

When military operations were initiated, the emperor designated a Supreme

Director of Operation, Director of Operation, and Army Supervisor. In many cases, a

Battle Formation Organizer was appointed to undertake the actual tactical deployment.®^

Shortly before the departure of a supreme director of operation, the emperor

would give him operation plans, usually accompanied by a map.®^ As for campaigns

launched by forces in specified areas, the emperor would explain the plan to the various

Wang Tseng-yO, pp. 32-60. Historians tended to explain the success or failure of the early Sung expeditions with the supreme command of the emperors. As Lin Jui-han considered. Sung Tai-tzu and Tai-tsung differed in the arts of supreme command. Sung Tai-tzu delegated full authority to his field commanders, while Tai-tsung restricted his generals by very detailed instruction. See Lin Jui-han, "Sung Tai-tzu Tai-tsung chih ya- chiang ji Tai-tsung chih chih-shu", in Kuo-li Taiwan ta-hsfleh li-shih-hsi hsOeh-pao. v. 5, pp. 53-71. Lin Jui-han did not mention that the situation of the Sung-Liao border changed from the 960s to the 980s. In the 960s and 970s the Sung enjoyed a temporary peace with the Liao and K'aifeng merely intend to hold the northern perimeter. The escalating violence between Sung and Liao after 979 complicated the situation and might compelled the Sung to employ a complex and sophisticated operational planning. Thus, their different ways of operational control did not necessarily reflect fundamental differences in talents or capability. Instead, such differences could be outcomes of altermg strategic agenda. HCP. chOan 4 p. 82, chOan 5, pp. 135-137, chOan 20, p. 458, chOan 27, p. 617, chflan 29, p. 656. Even Chen-tsung used to discuss strategy with his ministers and advisors before atlas. See HCP. 49, pp. 1068-69, 1078. 148

commanders individually.^^ Due to the reasons of secrecy, the emperor usually would not

reveal the plan earlier. The Second Yu-chou Campaign (986) is a typical example. Sung

historians foimd nothing mentioning the plan before the operation was initiated. Sung

Pai-tsung revealed the plan to his ministers later and only x^en the expedition faced

imminent defeat. This suggests that operational plaiming in the early Sung was

exclusively a military affairs and was available for civilians as a reference only after it

had been undertaken.®®

Caution in selecting field commanders was vitally important. The Supreme

Director of Operation was the person who received the plan from the emperor and, thus,

responsible for any liability during the conduct of the operation. Wang Ch'uan-pin, a

skillful tactician but incompetent administrator of the Szechwan expeditionary army in

964, brought disastrous disorder to the territory.®^ Ts'ao Pin, the Supreme Commander of

the second Yu-chou campaign in 986, exhibited his inability to reject bad-advice from his

subordinates and execute the plan strictly according to the Emperor Tai-tsung concept.

He was blamed for the ignominious fiasco, while his subordinates received graded

punishments.®®

Despite the strict obedience demanded to adhere to the operation plan, amendment

The conquest of the Later Shu exemph'fies this precedence. Sung Tai-tzu designed the Sung offense as a two-pronged attack and showed Commander Wang Ch'Oan-pin a map of northern Szechwan at the banquet for Wang's departure. In another occasion with a map of the upper reach of the Yangtze, the Emperor discussed the necessary coordination between naval and ground force with General Liu Ting-yang. See HCP. chaan 5. p. 135-137. SHY, v. 175, military 7, pp. 6868-6869. HCP. chOan 27. p. 617. "HCP. chQan6. p. 147. " HCP. chQan 27, p. 619. SHY, v. 175, military 8, pp. 6875-6876. 149

in tactical conunand was not intolerable. Apparently, a commander was strictly

prohibited from shifting initial points, time schedule, and numerical strength of forces

and the service of Li Chi-lung was illustrative. During the Man-ch'eng campaign in late

979, the Sung commanders accepted the opinion of Li Chi-lung, changed the battle

formation composed by Emperor Tai-tsung, and defeated the Khitan heavily. This battle

illustrated that the generals had a certain flexibility in employing tactics. Despite his

deviation from the emperor's plan, Li Chi-lung received no pimishment but was actually

promoted. In his life-time service, Li consistently relied more on his own tactical

judgment rather than imperial edicts and had a record of disobeying order four times.®®

Emperor Tai-tsung was never infuriated by his behavior imtil 996. Li selected a different route at his own convenience instead of following the operation plan made by the emperor. Hearing this, the emperor removed Li from his headquarters as soon as his returned from the campaign.^"

It was doubtful that any specific agent, in particular, supervised military operations. Presumably, the Army Supervisor played this role but it seemed that his essential task was to watch for any unlawful behavior within the army.'^ Unlike the Tang employment of eunuchs as army supervisors. Sung army supervisors were mostly military. As efficient legal instruments surveilling the generals, army supervisors seemed

" See HCP. chQa 27, pp. 625-626, chQan 29, pp. 657-658. HCP. chOan 40, p. 851. '^For example, the aborted defection of Military Governor of Ting-chou Sun Hsing-you was a result of a secret memorial sent by his supervisor. See HCP. chQan 2, p. 52. 150

not very active in controlling military operations.^^ Evidence even suggested that they executed tactical actions too frequently to maintain a supervisory role. Supreme army supervisor was usually second to the supreme commander and their extensive service on the frontiers underlined their role in sharing military command. As a consequence, they were frequently involved in tactical command rather than operational control.^^

Eunuchs also frequently emerged in early Sung military activities and both commissioners and eimuchs acted as the private agents of the emperor. In some examples, eunuchs acted as commissioners^* and, in spite of this, their role in the control of military operation was still unclear. The defense of Ting-chou in 988 was the only one case in which several eimuchs urged the generals to follow strictly the emperor's plan.

However, this attempt was rejected by both the commander and the army supervisor.^^

Strategic Decision Making

As with the emperors in the later period of the Roman Empire, the emperors of the

Five Dynasties were master of soldiers and the personal command of the early Sung emperors was a continuation of this tradition. Although an early Sung emperor might be less interested in leading personal combat, his military role did not drastically reduced.

Li Ch'u-yOn, a fovorite of Sung Tai'tzu, was an obvious exception. Li, as an Army Supervisor, received the plan directly from the Emperor and seemed to take all the charges during the Ching-hu Campaign. This might be caused by the deteriorating health of Military Governor of Eastem San-nan Circuit, Supreme Director of Operation Mu-yung Yen-chao. See HCP. chOan 4, pp. 83-85. During the unification campaigns and the Sung-Liao War, numerous army supervisors fought battles and even engaged close combats. Refer to HCP. chOan 5, pp. 137-38, chflan 10, p. 220, chflan 16, p. 333, and chQan 29, p. 657-658. Duties of Army Supervisors seemed to include the approval of enemy's capimlation, see HCP. chflan 6, p. 145. Ch'ai Te-keng, "Sung Huan-kuan ts'an-yO chfln-shih k'ao", in Fu-ien hsOeh-chih. v. 10, no. 1-2(1941)12, pp. 181-225. 151

Not only did he lead military planning, but he, himself, was the highest decision maker.

During the early age from 960 to 998, Emperor Sung Tai-tzu and Sung Tai-tsung demonstrated their capability in operation planning. According to the Sung historical records. Sung Tai-tzu personally evolved the plans for suppressing the Rebellion of Li

Chun and Li Ch'ung-chin in 960.'® He was also the author of the plans for the Ching-hu campaign in 963, the conquest of Szechwan in 964,^' and the conquest of the Southern

Tang from 974 to 975.^® The Second Tai-yiian Campaign in 969 again testifies to his talent in organizing a military operation. According to his plan, the mainbody of the expeditionary force would move towards Tai-yiian protected by several mobile forces on the perimeter. One body under Han Ch'img-pin deployed around a mountain near Ting- chou to block the potential Khitan intervention force. The vanguard of the whole force under Ho Chi-chiin occupied Shih-ling Kuan Pass, another possible gateway of the

Khitan reinforcement leading to Tai-yiian. In the early phase of the campaign, both Han and Ho sent reports of victories, defeating two Khitan relief forces. It was only because of a bout of sickness from contagious disease that the Sung emperor finally ordered a withdrawal.^®

HCP, chOan 29, p. 657-658. HCP, chaan I, pp. 13-18,25-28. SHY, v. 175, military 7, p. 6867. The conquest of Szechwan in 964 was designed as a two-pronged campaign. With one body attacking the in the east, another broke through the difficult terrain in the north part of Szechwan. The operation only lasted sixty six days, completely terminating the resistance organized by the Meng fwily. HCP. chOan 5, pp. 134-147. SHY. V. 175, military 7, p. 6868. HCP, chOan 15, pp. 324-330. SHY, v. 175, mUitary 7, p. 6870. Refer to HCP. chQan 10,220-222. SHY, v. 175, military 7, p. 6871. Sung Tai-tsung captured Tai-yflan four years after Chao K'uang-yin's death. HCP. chQan 20, pp. 442-447. SHY, v. 175, military 7, pp. 6871- 68T2. 152

Confionting the Khitans and Northern Han, Simg Tai-tsung devoted greatly

energy and enthusiasm in becoming an astute campaign organizer. In Li Tao's records, it

was Emperor Tai-tsung who conceived the possibility of a strategic surprise on the

Khitan by penetrating into the area near Yu-chou shortly after the conquest of Tai-jrOan.

This sudden attack almost toppled Khitan domination in the Yen Ytin region. Another

remarkable Sung victory at Man-ch'eng in the late autumn of979 again taught the

Khitans a lesson in which an appropriate operational plan was the key of success.®"

Throughout the rest of his life. Sung Tai-tsung generated operation plans for other major campaigns, namely the Second Yu-chou Campaign in 986, the Defense of Ting-chou in

988, and the P'ing-hsia Campaign in 996. However, historians considered that he success was no match for his elder brother.®^

Prime ministers could have been the source of imperial military advice, but, in fact, not many ministers from 960 to 986 actually played this role. Lack of military talent could be one important reason, as in the case of Fan Chih, Wang P'u, and Li Fang.®^

Another reason would well be the institutional compartmentalization, in which the prime minister was supposed to handle domestic affairs only.®^ From 983 to 985, Prime

Minister Sung Ch'i exceptionally served as Sung Tai-tsung's military advisor because of his particular familiarity of the Yen YQn region and the Khitan military tradition.®^ The

®'' HCP. chQan 20, pp. 458-463. " Wang Tseng-yO, pp. 327-31. " See HCP. chflan 4, pp. 81-82. HCP. chQan 1, pp. 23-24. " Ch'ien Mu, "Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch'Oan'*, Chung-kuo wen-hua ven-chiu hui-k'an. vol. 2, (1942), pp. 145-150; Wang Jui-Iai, "Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch'Qan", Li-shih ven-chiu. 2(1985), pp. 106-120. However, the emperor did not seem to follow the prime minister's blue-print in his northern campaign. 153

prime minister's participation in operational planning was inaugurated as a precedent by

Lu Tuan and K'ou Chun but not until the end of the Tenth Century.®^ The military role of civil ofBcials increased during the eleventh century, accompanied with the military

inexperience of the succeeding Sung rulers. Being the highest decision makers. Sung

Chen-tsung acquired some knowledge of strategy and enthusiastically engaged in military administration from 999 to 1005. Sung Jen-tsung retained his power in the highest decision making but could no longer take an active lead in strategic planning. Later, theater strategy and operations plans were proposed by civilian commanders and Chapter

Seven will discuss this changeover.

In most cases, the Bureau of Military Affairs gave advice to the emperor and the head of the bureau functioned as a close advisor of the emperor. Among Chao P'u's meritorious service to the Sung, policy making and operational planning were remarkable and these were mostly achieved during his incumbency as Military Counselor.®® The

Second Yu-chou Campaign in 986 was another example. During the campaign. Emperor

T'ai-tsung once convened six extraordinary meetings at the Military Bureau within a day.

Overtly denying his responsibility for the fiasco to the prime minister and other civil officials, the emperor expressed regret for his own deceit before a few high officials of

Shortly before the initiatioii of the Second Yu-chou Campaign in 986, Sung Ch'i was demoted as a result of internal power struggle. Wang Jui-lai, pp. 110-111. Chapter Seven will discusses the origin of Sung civilian command. As a remarkable political figure of the early Sung, Chao Pu's administration consistently received complaints and criticisms from rivals. See Chiang Fu-ch'ung, "Sung Tai-tzu shih Tai-tsimg yO Chao P'u te cheng-cheng", Shih-hsfleh hui-k'an. vol. 5, (1973), pp. 1-14. Ho Koon-wan, "Lun Sung Tai-tsung ch'ao chih Chao P'u" (unpublished Master Thesis of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1979). Chang Ch'i- fan, "Chao P'u chao-m'en shih-chi k'ao-pien", An-hui Shih-ta hstteh-oao. 3(1981), pp. 109-114. 154

the Bureau. This group of officials included Wang Hsien, Chang Ch'i-hsien, and Wang

Mien. This entirely different attitude toward different officials strongly suggests that the latter were very likely his most intimate circle of advisors. He had no need to give an euphemistic explanation to them.^^

However, it seems that the Bureau of Military Affairs never became the final decision maker. It assisted rather than represented the emperor in such a decision. In an ample number of cases, the emperor's intent and the preference of the Bureau were in opposition. Preparing the campaign against Li Chfln's Rebellion in 960, Wu Ping-chao held an almost completely contradictory approach against Sung Pai-tzu. Ostensibly expressing admiration towards Wu, Sung Tai-tzu actually conducted the campaign according to his own plan.®® Chang Ch'i-hsien was another demonstrative figure among

Sung T'ai-tsung's advisors. In 986, he was expelled from the Bureau.®® On certain occasions Simg T'ai-tzu did listen to the senior veterans, as in the cases of Chang Hsiin and Chang Yung-te in 960. However, both cases involved more of the setting of strategic priorities rather than operational planning.^°

"HCP,chQan 27, p. 618. According to Wu, the Sung should allow Li ChOn's main-body entering the Yellow River basin from the southern comer of Sansi. Since the rebels left the mountain, Wu insisted that it would not be difficult to crush them with the well-trained Imperial Guards. His idea was ostensibly admired by the emperor. However, as a sharp contrast. Sung Tai-tzu considered to diminish the political impact of the rebellion and ordered a rapid blockade of the passes through the southern Tai-hang Range. Strictly according to the emperor's plan. General Shih Shou-hsin successfully prevented Li ChOn from penetratmg into Honan. Eventually the Sung Imperial Guards suppressed the rebellion within two months. See HCP. chOan 1, pp. 12-18. HCP. chOan 27. p. 620. During the two meetings, the Emperor focused on the question whether Northern Han or the Later Shu should be his next target and did not seem to discuss operational matters. See HCP. chOan I, p. 21; and chQan 4, p. 89. 155

Intelligence sources were indispensable for generating a proper and sophisticated operations plan. Evidence suggests that military intelligence activity during the early

Sung was directly under the emperor and several important agents of the Simg were recruited by the emperor, himself. Their original occupations included physician,^^ schoiar,^^ renegade ofBcials, and military officers fixjm the kingdoms in South China.®^

Sung Tai-tzu also made use of ambassadors as a source of intelligence. The case of Lu

Huai-chung and Lu Tuo-hsun clearly reflects that the duties of an ambassador were by no means purely diplomatic. They were assigned to collect data on geographic and climatic conditions, demographic density, political and social stability, and the most important the number of garrison soldiers along their route.

During military operations the emperor had to update his knowledge about the situation at the front. For this purpose, K'aifeng engaged in huge efforts in road construction and maintenance, utilizing a post-station system in which professional soldiers were couriers. Reports from commissioners were another important channel of information. In early the Sung, jimior commissioned officers were selected from the sons of meritorious families or proven veterans and some played the role as personal courier of the emperor. Riding skill was an important qualification of a commissioned officer. From among the ordinary commissioners of the Early Simg, Li Chi-lung distinguished himself by his ability to ride four to five himdred ILa day. In pre-modem times, riding speed

" HCP. chQan 5, p. 134. " HCP. chOan 15, pp. 321-322. SHY, v. 175, military 7, p. 6870. " HCP. ChQan 5, p. 134. HCP. chQan 4, pp. 81-82; and chQan 14, p. 299. meant efficiency of communication.

- HCP. ChQan 16, pp. 354-355. 157

CONCLUSION OF PART ONE

From 755 to 960 China suffered fix>m the havoc of civil and external war.

Excessive violence disrupted the economy and people's lives, jeopardized political stability, and invited Khitan invasion. The creation of a bipolar system at the end of the

Five Dynasties further complicated the proliferation of violence and, to a certain extent, confused the search for peace. Pacification and preparation for war were undertaken simultaneously at the dawn of the Sung. And, despite taking careful precautions to abstain from violence, K'aifeng could not exclude its use in unification and was concerned in an abstemious but effective use of violence. K'aifeng rapidly overran warlords and regional regimes in South China while it refrained from antagonizing the

Liao. To several regimes with no comparable strength, the Sung offered relatively acceptable terms for their surrender.

In the long-term, K'aifeng relied on political stability and economic development which, in its anticipation, would eventually enable the Sung more sustainable endurance in international conflict. In the short-term, the Sung exploited every military means to include short bursts of violence, such as the sudden pre-emptive attack in 979 and the deceptive outflanking penetration in 986. When it became discemibly clear that Khitan rule in North China was unlikely to be toppled by such limited measure, co-existence began to be accepted as an option. The peace of 1005 marked the end to upheaval since

755 and was established as a result of military parity and at a relatively low cost. The

Sung experience of war and peace from 960 to 1005 underlined the predominant role of rationality in strategy decision making. K'aifeng achieved unification of most of China,

precluded the potential danger of prolonged violence, and maintained a consistent and

desirable strategic direction.

The early Sung rulers had a clear imderstanding of the hazards of a militocracy

and despotism inevitably emerged. The early Sung emperors successfully reshaped the

armed force as a dependable operative instrument, politically neutralized, and rarely

involved in strategic decision making. The Sung armed force was under a systematized

administration, largely separated &om the masses. Historians may criticize K'aifeng for

gaining less social support from the communities as compared with the T'ang but it was similarly an advantage that the mass populace was less adversely affected by war.

There were some failings in Sung grand strategy. First, the Sung grand strategy against Khitan was highly dependent upon socio-economic performance, which did not favor a prolonged confrontation. The establishment of the Supplementary Force and the well-developed canal and road system were insufficient to allow the Sung to rely solely for the logistic supply on the professional military. The people was generally free from the military draft but still obliged to labor conscription. Social stability and economic development could have supported a prolonged war, but it was similarly difBcult to preclude the former being adversely affected by the latter. This was the basic reason that

Sung T'ai-tzu's strategy "South the first. North the second" was not completely successful.

Second, Sung Pai-tsxmg was largely responsible for this failure by his 159

precipitating attack against the Khitan in 979 and again in 986. Memorials by civil

officials from 979 to 986 did not suggest there was a formidable socio-economic

foundation to support such a war, nor did the record of the first six battles firom 979 to

982 indicate any favorable advantage of offensive action. Sung Pai-tsxmg relied more on

such operational aspects as surprise attack, deception, deliberate execution, and battle

formation. Indeed, he achieved his military goal on some occasions, with the assistance of outstanding conmianders, as in the victories of 979,981 and 982. Theoretically, a long-

term grand strategy relying on economic and political development was not necessarily

incompatible with quick and decisive military operation. However, his easy transition

from an impetus conqueror in 979 to a pacifist patron after 982 and then again an

ambitious aggressor in 986 was not motivated by any strategic imperative but, rather, dictated by the internal power struggle. This vacillation might have also created distrust by the Khitans and precluded any peace negotiation during his reign.

Third, for the most part, early Sung strategy planners largely presumed that there would be sporadic outburst of violence occurring in the area adjacent to the Liao but they failed to anticipate the possibility of a two-fi:ont-war against Khitan and Tangut at the same time. The Tangut independence movement was an unexpected variable in the grand strategy of the early Sung. As a restilt of this strategy omission, the situation deteriorated in the 990s and I will discuss the unique nature of this issue in Chapter Five. 160

PART TWO THE ESCALATING CONFLICTS

According to Quincy Wright, the complexity of war is to some "a plague which

ough to be eliminated; to some, a mistake which should be avoided; to others, a crime

which ought to be punished; and, to still others, it is an anchronism which no longer

serves any purpose. However, there are some who take a more receptive attitude toward

war and regard it as an adventure which may be interesting, an instnmient which may be

useful, a procedure which may be legitimate and appropriate, or a condition of existence

for which one must be prepared. To people of the latter type war is not a problem."^ A

country suffering from prolonged war has two alternatives: one, to increase its economic

resources to sustain its military machine or to avoid unnecessary conflict. In Sung China,

Kaifeng government developed a model of warfare which inevitably yield to economic

priority when victory was incomplete. However, the well developed Ordos model of

mobile warfare was quite different. Terms need to be modified to allow for the abstemious use of violence.

In Chapter Five, we must trace the origin of violence from the mid-Tang to observe the escalating conflict and confrontation between Han and Non-Han ethnic groups. This time Sung problems are seen not only in the prospective of the increasingly intractable obstacles to peace but also of Chinese difficulties to isolate themselves from an enlarged world order. Altering political geographic conditions did not favor the Sung 161

in reasserting control of Central Asia, Ordos Desert and the Ho-hsi corridor. Neither did economic, political and strategic interests of the Sung allowed a complete isolation. At the early tenth century, K'aifeng had reached a relatively favorable peace with Khitan but by no means the Sung could establish a pacific and secure world order. It could not preclude possible danger posed by its neighbors &om the steppe. The Tangut

Independence Movement was not a continuation of violence prolifered along the Silk

Route from the eighth century. Rather, conflicts suddenly escalated in a relatively tranquil world order. In the tenth century, thanks largely to the loosed Tibetan control on Ho-hsi and Ordos region and the Sung non-aggressive foreign policy, K'aifeng seemed to be satisfied by the tributes, mostly horses, from the Tibetans and Uighurs. The latter, who received considerable economic benefits in trading, exuviate confrontation as a necessary way to obtain commodities from China. Nevertheless, the Tanguts who differed from

Khitans in its military disparity with Sung China on the one hand, and differed from

Tibetans and Uighurs in its scarcity of natural resources on the other hand, employed violence as an instrument to seek political independence. Military conquest became a significant tone in their atitude looming the order the northwest frontier China.

Eventually the Tanguts succeeded in their development efforts and foimded the Hsi-hsia empire, a prodigious aggressive regional power. In 1002 the Tangut capture of the western gate of the Sung, Ling-chou(SO kilometers south of today's Yin-ch'uen City), together with the Khitan invasions which renewed in 999, challenged the wisdom of

^ Quincy Wright, A Study of War, p. 3. 162

K'aifeng. The aggravate situation stimulated the Sung employment of several military talents. Through a series of plots including secret agreement between K'aifeng and Liang- chou, false surrender of the Tibetans to Hsi-hsia, and the agile move of Te-ming toward reconciliation witht the Sung, violence was finally restrained by a thirty-year peace from

1005. Nevertheless, the root of a steady peaceful relation—a bilateral understanding of the devastation and indecisiveness of war— was still equivocal in the early Sung-Hsia relation.

Chapter Six will make a transition from the reconfigtiration of power in the northwest frontier China in the early eleventh century to the estasy of Hsi-hsia's invasion in 1040s. 1 will delineated the striking onslaught to the Sung by a young, ambitious Hsi- hsia ruler, Li Yiian-hao. The renewal of the full-scale armed confrontation in 1039 revealed the vulnerability of the western frontier, and more important, psychological unreadiness of the Sung. The chapter also observes the long-tem impact of Yiian-hao aggression on the Sung-Hsia relation and the ensuing issue of the Sung-Liao relation. The

Ch'ing-tang Tibetan regime, a growing power in eastern Ch'inghai, is observed as its increasing influence to the strategic triangle constructed by Sung, Liao and Hsi-hsia.

Chapter Seven focused on the Sung adjustment on strategic and political gesture after 1039. Under the wartoned atmosphere the Sung court inevitably enhanced military priority and redefined civil-military relation. One important aspect of this transition is the prevalent practice of civilian-in-command. In traditional explanation on the Sung military 163

"weakness", civilian-in-command has been viewed as an important cause.^ The service of

Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i did not support such an assumption. Fabian strategy or the avoidance of decisive action as an attractive form of indirect strategy seized attentions of

Sung strategists such as the prominent political figures Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i.

This chapter will analyze the ingredients of their strategy and discussed its relation to its earlier pragmatic version applied in the 1000s. This chapter will also observe how indirect approach was maintained as a strategic principle compatible with the predominant defensive strategy. However, there was an undercurrent which began to be felt in the

1040s in which pragmatic interests ran counter to the defensive strategy promoted by the

Confucian statesmen. This tension foreshadowed a bigger conflict after the 1060s.

Chapter Eight will analyze the Simg grand strategy with broader socio-political phenomena— the altering perception of war, the changing role of the military in domestic reform, the modifying qualification policy of military personnel, the more affirmative socio-political identity of civilian strategists, and the increasing scholarly attentions to the art of war. Finally, I observe the emergence a striking military figures such as Ti Ch'ing.

Considering all these aspects, this chapter suggests that a reconfiguration of power between civil and military functionaries and a change of strategy became inescapable in the following decades of late eleventh century.

"Lin Tien-hui, Sune-shih shih-hsi. (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1978), pp. 1-33. 164

Chapter 5 The Origins of Hsi-hsia

This chapter discusses the gradual change in political geography from the disintegration of the Tang rule in Central Asia during the eighth century to the rise of

Hsi-hsia in the early Eleventh Century. At this time. Central Asia, consisting of the Tarim

Basin, Ordos Desert, and Ho-hsi corridor, and today's Kansu, was an arena of various contending ethnic groups, such as the Tibetans, Uighurs, Tu-yu-huns, Tartars, Sodiums, and Tanguts. Certainly, a transition imdertaken by various groups for more than two centuries from the collapse of Pang to the Tangut conquest of Ho-hsi is difficult to generalize, and due to the lack of materials source some particular facts still remain obscure. Nevertheless, for the purpose of providing a necessary background for the rise of

Hsi-hsia and the Sung response, one must focus on three remarkable trends. The first is the drastic shrinking influence of the Han Chinese in the Tarim Basin, Ordos Desert and

Ho-hsi corridor after the second half of the eighth century, while ethnic heterogeniety in such areas increased. Second, from the beginning of the tenth century, the Tibetans, who were the formidable adversaries of the Pang, evinced an increasingly amiability toward the Chinese empires of the Five Dynasties and Sung China. This important change from enemy to friend underlined the direction of improving relations between Tibetans and the

Chinese, affecting the strategic balance in the following one hundred years from 960 to

1060. A third aspect of the Pang-Sung political transition was the change in ethnical attitude of the Tanguts from political allegiance to China to outright animosity. 165

Central Asia: From Power Struggle to Equilibrium (7-lOtli C.)

The period from the sixth to the eighth century in the history of Asian civilization saw an intensifying competition between great powers. In the west, the Byzantine

Romans, assisted by their Turkish ally in central Asia, underwent a twenty years struggle with the Persian empire in Asian Minor and Syria. Islamic believers, from 629 to the following decade, prodigiously expended their power from the Arabian Peninsula to

Syria, conquering Persia in 651.^ In the east, two newly founded empires. Tang China and Tibet, almost simultaneously asserted their claim of supremacy over central Asia.

Initially, Turks and Roman descendants in Byzantine were friends, while the Chinese,

Tibetans, and Muslims did not fully acknowledge the desire and strength of their rivals.

An age of power politics in Central Asia began.

During its early days, the Tang empire cautiously refrained and maintained itself in a defensive posture. However, radical change occurred in 630 and the second emperor.

Tang Tai-tsimg conducted a successful coimter attack against the Turks capturing the

Khan of the Eastern Turkish Khaganate. In the afrermath, hostility between the Western

Turkish Khaganate and the Tang erupted, which concluded in the complete Tang colonization of the Tarim Basin.^

^Shen Chung-mien, Sui-Tane Shih. (History of Sui and Tang) (Beijing; Chung-hua, new edition, 1982), pp. 15-17. On the changing strategic environemnt of the Byzantme Empuv, see Treagoid, Warren, Byzantium and Its Armv. 284-1081. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 8-32. Whittow, Mark, The Making of Bvzantium. 600-1025. (Berkeley, Unversirty of Califonua Press, 1996), pp. 177-78. Mn 640 the Tang directed its offensive at Kao-ch'ang, a crucial city state at the eastern gateway of the Tarim basin, previously submitting its loyalty to the Turks. At the time, the Tibetans and Muslims, though gradually expanded their military powers, had not yet reached the Tarim basin; and the western Turkish 166

During the mid-seventh century, except for Tibet, the whole area east of the

Kashmir was under Tang political influence and military domination. North of the Tien-

Shan moimtain range, the natural line between the Tarim and Chingarie, the defeated

Western Turkish Khaganate was divided under two khans, usually Tang puppet rulers.

South of Tien-Shan, the Tang assumed overlordship over the city states previously under

Turkish protection and soon established a three-level political control system of directly

controlled prefectures, military commanderies, and "loosely controlled prefectures" (or

chi-mi chou). Two colonial headquarters, Ah-hsi and Pei-t'ing, were established in the

Tarim and Chingarie basins.^

In a broader sense, these two colonial headquarters were asted as strategic

reinforcement under the command of the Military Governor of Ho-hsi.® In Ho-hsi

Corridor (in the western portion of the present Kansu province), the Tang firmly

khaganate suffered fix)m internal intricacy. As a consequence, the Tang took strategic initiative, expanding its direct control from the Ho-hsi corridor to the eastern segments of Tarim and Chingarie basins. Wang Yung-ch'ing, "Tang mieh Kao-ch'ang chi chih Hsi-chou, Ting-chou k'ao-lun" in Wang Yung-ch'ing, Tang-tai ch'ien-ch'i hsi-pei chOn-shih ven-chiu. (Beijing: Chung-kuo se-hui k'o-hsOeh, 1994), pp. 106-119. 'On the direct-control level, the Tang established various prefectures in the eastern Tarim basin. It renamed Kao-ch'ang as Hsi-chou (the present Tu-Iu-fan County), refering to "prefecture of the west". In two or three years afterward, a series of political, economic, and social institutions was firmly established emulating the interior China. More prefectures, I-chou (the present Ha-mi City) and Ting-chou (approximately 100 km northeast of the present Wu-Iu-mu-ch'i Ci^), were founded one at the gate way of the eastern Tarim and another at the previous Western Turkish capital. Two Colonial Headquarters, namely An-hsi and Pei-t'ing, were established in Hsi- chou and Ting-chou to confirm the Tang domination in the Tarim and Chingarie basins. The Tang also founded "loosely controlled prefectures" prevalently in the subjugated tribes, recognizing their chieftans as prefects. Both ethnic physiognomy and administrative structure in these "loosely controlled prefectures" remained according to their non-Han customs. Between the direct-controlled prefectures and loosely-controlled prefectures there was a middle layor constructed by four military commanderies under the An-hsi Headquarters. As branch offices of the colonial headquarters, these commanderies were established at the capitals of four largest city-states in the Tarim with Han Chinese officers as administors. See Wang Hsiao-p'u, Tane Tu-do Ta-shih chene-chih kuan-hsi shih (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1992). ^See Wang Yung-ch'ing, "Lun Tang ch'ien-ch'i Ho-hsi chieh-tu-shih" in Tane-tai ch'ien-ch'i hsi-pei chfln- 167

established provincial control with five Pang prefectures, Liang-chou (today's Wu-wei

County), Kan-chou (today's Chang-I County), Su-chou (the present Chiu-ch'uen County),

Kua-chou (northwest 120 kilometers of the present Ytt-men City) and Sha-chou (the

present Tuen-huang County). While Liang-chou and Kan-chou were political and

economic centers,^ Sha-chou functioned as an outpost of Chinese culture.

Geographically the Tarim basin was a desert dotted by separate, small pieces of grassland. However, as a recent scholar has explained, the Tibetan demand for salt fi-om the Tarim, religious afBnity with central Asian merchants, and economic need of a semisedentary economy stimulated Tibetan aggression toward Ho-hsi and Ch'inghai.®

From the late seventh century, Tibet emerged as a formidable rival of Tang supremacy.

An atmosphere of war was first felt in the 660s, when a Tibetan army of unknown size joined forces with the Turks on several occasions against the Pang.® During these days the Four Commanderies were manned with but a small number of conscript laborers and all of its military actions relied on the allegiance of local non-Han ethnics. Unable to deal with the alliance of Tibetans, Turks, and several disaffected city states, the Pang abolished and reestablished the Four Commanderies three times during the seventh century accompanied with the resolution and escalation of conflict.^® Eventually in 692,

Empress Wu (624-705) reconquered the whole Tarim basin and established permanent

shih ven-chiu pp. 45-46. ^ Maeda, pp. 66-68. ® Wang Hsiao-p'u, pp. 20-42, pp. 50-54, pp. 243-256. "Wang Hsiao-p'u, pp. 47-50, pp. 54-55. •°Wang Hsiao-p'u, pp. 68-118. Li Pi-chung''An-hsi shih-chun k'ao-pien" (Study of the Four Commanderies 168

garrisons for the Four Commanderies of thirty thousand soldiers. Until the An Lu-shan

rebellion, the Four Commanderies were never given up but, the defend budget was

increased.

On the eastern the Tibetan presence in Ch'iag-hai impacted more as a threat

to Tang security, with it proximi^ to Ch'ang-an. During the 670s, there were ominous

signs of the growing menace of Tibetan power. The fiasco of the Tang expeditionary

army at the battle of Ta-fei-ch'uan in 670 gave the Tibetans an opportunity to assert

domination in the eastern part of Ch'inghai. In 678, they again defeated the Tang army

reportedly of 180,000 men.^^ Entering the eigth century the war became even more

ferocious with the fall of Rocky Fortress (or Shih-pao), a nearly insurmountable strategic

stronghold in eastern Ch'ing-hai. This marked how precarious the Tang position had

become. Through a series of hard fought battles for a decade, Ch'ang-an regained all

lost territories. In 730, both sides agreed upon a demarcation line in Ch'ing-hai. However,

Tibet renewed its aggressions in 737. Both empires mounted two sets of full scale attacks

and counterattacks, concluding with the Tang triumph in regaining Rocky Fortress with

an extremely high cost. During the 740s and 750s, Tang military supremacy peaked as its

zenith.

of the Ah-hsi Colony) in Tane-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (Hsi-an: Shensi Jen-min, 1983), pp. 386-403. ^^Wang Hsiao-p'u, pp. 110-118. Also, Pan Hsiao-wei, T'ang ch'ien-ch'i cbQn-shih pu-chu tc yen-pien" (Alteration of armed force deployment during the early Tang), in An-ch'ing shih-chuan hsOeh-oao (social science edition), (1985)3, pp. 37-44. ^^Ibid., pp. 42-25,68-70. K'ang Ts'ai-yOan, "Tang HsOen-tsung shih-ch'i Lung-you ti-ch'tt te kuo-fang" (The national defense of the Lung-you region during the reign of Tang HsQen-tsung), in Chune- loio li-shih hsOeh-hui shih-hsfleh chi-k'an. hereafter as SHCK. chOan 22, (1990), pp. 31-54. 169

As the astonishing An Lu-shan Rebellion broke out in 755, most Tang forces were recalled to the east and the Ho-hsi corridor became desperately vulnerable. In 764, the Tang military governor abandoned his headquarters, Liai^>chou, followed by the fall of Kan-chou and Su-chou in 766 and Kua-chou in 776. Sha-chou prolonged resistance for more than ten years, with its final collapse recorded in 787. After 755 the Tang central government had difSculties communicating with its remaining colonies in central Asia, and military aids from the Uighurs, a powerful steppe empire on the Gobi Desert, became indispensable..^"' Due to the loss of Ho-hsi corridor, contact between Ch'ang-an and its colonies in Central Asia crossed the southem Gobi Desert through Uighur territories. This frustrating sitxiation was further exacerbated by endless Uighur demand. In 790, Pei-t'ing, one of the two colonial headquarters in central Asia, surrendered to Tibet.^^

In 782, the Tang and the Tibetans inaugurated a negotiation for demarcation, resulting in the peace treaty signed at Ch'ing-sui Coimty (retaining the similar name until today under Kansu Province). The Tang recognized the Tibetan occupation of Ho-hsi and

Lung-you,^® which was ratified by a formal assembly at Ch'ang-an half a year later. After this, large scale conflict between the two diminished. What was not acknowledged was that the treaty was tantamount to relinquishing those prefectures and strongholds in the

The Uighurs founded their khaghanate on the Gobi during the Tien-pao reign (742-7S6). Becuase having far less population than the previous power dominating the same region, namely the Hsiung-nu, Hsien-pei and the Turks, the Uighurs relied on the Sodiums, or in Chinese the Nine Sumamed Tribes, to build up their economic base. During the An Lu-shan rebellion, the Tang sought military support from the Uighurs, it inaugurated their deep involvement in Tang China's political and military strives. Refer to HTS. chQan 217-18, pp. 6111-51. " Maeda, pp. 167-76. According to the Tang geographic concept, Lung-you refered to the area of the southem segment of the 170

west still resisting retaining resistance, such as the Four Commanderies of An-hsi and Sa-

chou.

From 784 to 787 the Tibetan attitude could be described as devious and

opportunistic gaining considerable profit fix)ni the Pang when their interventions could

suppress the insurrection of rebel military governors. When the Tang could yield no

further concessions, the Tibetans would turn to bolster the rebels. For this. Tang generals

distrusted the Tibetan entirely. As the militocracy started to be regarded as a source of

internal strives. Tang civilian officials relied more and more on diplomatic negotiation.

This internal Tang vulnerability was known to and exploited by the Tibetans, planting the seeds of mutual suspicion. In 787, the peace was violated by the Tibetans.^'

In the aftermath, the Tang for most of the time fix)m 790 maintained the Uighurs in its anti-Tibetan camp,^® and successfully drew its previous rival Nan-chao into the war.

Thus, both sides operated in mutual hostility. The Tang had to face the menace from the obstreperous military governors from the east and Tibetans from the west, while the

Tibetans were under attack by the Tang from the east, the Uighur from the northeast, and

Nan-chao from the southeast. Finally all four powers collapsed in military exhaustion followed by ensuing rebellions, upsurpations and internal disintegration.

After the fall of Ho-hsi and Pei-t'ing, Tibet concentrated its effort in penetrating

present Kansu and the eastern part of Ch'ing-hai. HIS, chQan 216, pp. 6092-97. Fu Lo-ch'eng„ "Hui-ku-ma yfl Shuo-feng-ping—Tang-ch'ao yfl Hui-ku wai-chiao kuan-bsi te fao-lun", in Han-Tang shih lun-chi (Collected Studies on The History of Han and Tang), (Taipei: Lien-ching, first print 1977, second print 1981) pp. 305-318. 171

into the Ordos Desert. In 786, the Tibetan army occupied Yen-chou 2 or Salt Prefecture, today's Ting-pien and Yen-ch'ih counties, Shensi^^ and reached the Horizon Mountain

Range, a natural barrier separating the Tang Metropolitan and the Ordos Desert They mounted a vigorous attack toward Ching-chou, Pen-chou (the present Pin County Shensi) and Ning-chou (the present Ning County, Kansu) and in 788 captured thirty thousand refugees with their cattle. In return, the Tang encircled some Tibetan strongholds in this area, engaging in a huge effort in boundary fortification. The result of this effort laid an indispensable cornerstone to the Sung perimeter 150 years later.^°

As violence proliferated along the Silk Route, Tang financial authorities placed increasing reliance on the canal system connecting with the Lower Yangtze agrarian center. In late eight century, Liu Yen 715-780, the Tang financial expert, evolved a plan to reorganize the transportation system through the Grand Canal, which could be more effectively connect with the coastal area in south China.^^ It was Chu Wen ( 851-912) who moved the capital to K'aifeng and assassinated the Tang emperor. From this time on the central government engaged most of their efforts in civil war, consistently kept a distance away firom the turmulous Central Asia. Coorelatively, the political and military balance in the Ordos Desert and Ho-hsi corridor was largely neglected. In addition, the

It ought to be distinguished fixtm Yen-chou I, today's Yen-an, disptte their geographical vicinity and pronounciation affinity. Maeda, p. 177. Ch'Qan Han-seng, Tane-Sune ti-kuo vO vQn-ho. (Cannals And The Tang-Sung Empire), (Shanghai: Chung-yang yen-chiu yflan li-shih yO-yen yen-chiu shuo, 1944), also in Ch'Qan Han-sheng, Chune-kuo ching-chi shih ven-chiu (Studies of Chinese Economic History), (Taipei: Hsin-ya yen-chiu-shuo, 1991), pp. 265-391. 172

Uighurs after 884 became a considerable menace along the route between Kan-chou and

Ling-chou and increasing Tangut raid made tra£5c throi^ Ling-chou almost impossible.

By the early tenth centruy, the communication line between China and central Asia had

disappeared.^^

The socio-political outlook in these areas shifted radically after 755 and there is

ample evidence to suggest that many tribes became the basic socio-political commimities.

Tse-erh, administrators of a tribe, took the place of Tang Coimty Administrators.^^ Also,

the diminishing Tang influence in Ho-hsi and central Asia was accompanied by an

increasingly tendency toward heterogeniety. In Ho-hsi during the seventh and the first half of the eighth century, a distinctly Han physiognomy survived despite sporadic

Tibetan invasions still.^^ After the Tibetan conquest of Ho-hsi in 755, the Han Chinese in this area became the minority and intemiarried with various nomadic groups. The emergence of "Hun-mo" illustrates this trend of ethnic heterogeniety. This was a group believably originated from the slavery communes of the Tibetans, who intermarried with

Han Chinese and seized political domination in the vicinity of Liang-chou.^^ Another

" Maeda, pp. 298-300. After the Tibetan conquest, a gradual cbangover from the Chinese to the Tibetan political structure occurred. The Tibetan established Military Governor, Acting Military Governor, Khri-Don (Commander of ten-thousand household). Supreme Regional Commander, Army Supervisor, and Tse-erh. Among these officers, Tse-erh was the most commonly seen in scattering documents. According to Maeda, the original Tibetan word for Tse-erh, "rtse", means "chief in command". Despite its intrinsic military nature, Maeda indicated, a "rtse" was responsible to civil, taxational, and judicial af&irs. The prevalent establishment of Tse-erh suggested a change from county-viliageous to tribal organization. See pp. 185-190. Maeda, pp. 95-123. Accompanied by the retreat of the Tang forces during the An Lu-shan rebellion, Tibetan population prodigiously increased in Liang-chou. According to HTS. this group originated from the slavery communes under the Tibetan empire. During the forth decade of the ninth century, the Tibetan empire fell 173

example would well be I-cbou, in 850 there remained only thirty households of Han

Chinese intermingled with Tibetans, Uighurs, Pu-yti-huns, Lungs, and Chung-yOns.^^

After the decline of Tang rule in Central Asia, Tibetan domination in the Tarim

and Ho-hsi still did not present long term menace to the Tang. Tibetan rule in Ho-hsi,

Ordos and Tarim basin retained less than a century until the whole empire was sliced into

pieces. Essentially, the Tibetan military superiorly seemed imable to achieve an

equivalent administrative efficiency. Thus, insecurity became a serious problem of the

Silk Route from the Tarim basin into the China heartland. During the ninth century, drastic and dramatic disintegration of the two powers, Tibetan and Uighur empires, necessitated a reconfiguration of power in Central Asia. Marauding tribes spread following a devastating rebellion which destroyed the entire Tibetan political

in disorder. The Hun-tno group seized the control of the Liang-chou prefecture and became the rulling class. In scattering documents, their origin were recorded differently and, to modem scholars, the ethnical complexity of the Hun-mo tribes is still of some obscurity. In Chang I-ch'ao report in 861, Hun-mo was described as the descendants of the indigenous Han Chinese who adopted the Tibetan lifestyle. See Stein Document, No. 6342, in Maeda, p. 195. However, in HTS. Hun-mo was identified as the general term referring to Tibetan's "slavery tri^". According to the Tibetan tradition, memebers of the noble class must provide themselves a certain number of guards in expedition. Thus, it inaugurated a custom that Tibetan nobles usually enslaved captives as their own warriors. "Those who settling around the Tibetan headquarters were the most capable and were equipped with the best horses." See HTS. chOan 216, p. 6108. Also, a few young scholars as Hu Hsiao-p'eng suggested in 1991 that the term "Hun-mo" might originate from Tu-yQ-hun's language, but later the "Hun-mos" bacame a stipportive power of the Chinese "Celestial PaciHc Army". Hu Hsiao-p'eng, "Kuan-yQ Pang-mo Wu-tal Sung-ch'u Liang-chou chih-li cheng-ch'Qan te chi-ko wen-f i" (Issues about The Autonomous Regimes in Liang-chou during the Late Tang, Five Dynaties and Early Sung). Hsi-pei shih-ta hsfleh-oao fLan-chouV (1989)1, pp. 90-95. Therefore, it was likely that the Hun-mos were originally slavery-soldiers, comprising Tibetans, Han Chinese, Tu-yQ-hun, and other minorities. After the rebellion m 843, a large number of nobles were killed, as described in HTS: "numerous slaves had lost their masters". They reorganized a tribal system, maintaining a close relation with the Chinese garrison. This might te the reason that the Han Chinese seem to have played important role during the Hun-mo era of Laing-chou. Maeda, pp. 284-94. 174

establishment in Ho-hsi.^^

Disintegration was further heightened by another chaotic event. The main-body of

the Uighurs, who initially established their rule in the Gobi Desert, suffered a disastrous

defeat by an ethnic minority. Struggling for their lives and riding westward, one group of

Uighurs struck into the east Tarim basin, where they founded the Hsi-chou Uighur

regime. In some records this group of Uighurs was called the "Yellow-headed

Uighurs".^® Another group entered the Ho-hsi corridor and settled around Kan-chou.

The rebellion was utterly devastating. In 843, a Tibetan noble, Lun-k'ung-rye proclaimed himself the Prime Minister, attacking his political rival, Shang P'ei-p'ei, then the supreme commander of San-chou (today's Hsi-ning). The two armies wrestled with each other for five years around Ch'inghai and Kansu. Violence prolifered from Ch'inghai to Ho-hsi in 849, as Shang Pei-p'ei retreated to Kan-chou. On the way of pursuing his rival, Lun-k'ung-rye pillaged the western half of the corridor. In Ssu-ma Kuang's account, Lun slaughtered all male adults, mutilated all women and aged people, and burnt all houses around the eight prefectures of the region. His soldiers played a game of killing babies with spears. See TCTC. chOan 249, pp. 8043-44. Lun-k'ung-rye "plundered various prefectures, including San, K'uo, Kua, Su, I, and Hsi. Whenever his army cross through, people were enslaved or killed." See HTS. chQan 216B, pp. 6105-07. The name of the "Yellow-headed Uighurs''appears in only two passages of Sung sources and controversy arose about their origin and location. In the past, most scholars regarded them as descendants of the Uighurs spreading westward after the crisis of 839, who reestablished power in western Ch'inghai and eastern Tarim basin, autonomous from Hsi-chou and Kan-chou Uighurs. Li Fu-fung, "Sa-li Wei-wu-eh pu-chu k'ao" (An Examination of Sari-Uighurs) in Pien-cheng kune-lun. chQan 3, no. 8 (1943), pp. 33-40 considered the Yellow-headed Uighurs as descendants of Kan-chou Uighurs named after their hair color since losing Kan-chou to Hsi Hsia in 1028. Tan Ch'i-hsiang (ed) Chune-kuo li-shih ti-fu chi. (The Historical Atlas of China) (Shanghai: Cartographic Publishing House, 1982) v.6, pp. 38-39 position the Yellow-headed Uighurs in the present Ch'inghu'. However, Tang K'ai-chien suggested in 1984 that the Yellow-headed Uighurs should be identical to Hsi-chou Uighurs rather than Kan-chou Uighurs, because it is unlikely that the Yellow-headed Uighurs were an independent Uighur groups distinguished from that in Hsi-chou and Kan-chou. According to the two reports provided by the emissaries from Fo-linand YQ-f ien, the Yellow-headed Uighur was the next country of YQ-tien on their way eastward. Therefore, it is quite fit the geographical location of hsi-chou Uighur. Tang K'ai-chien, "Chieh-k'ai Huang-fou Hui-ku chi Ts'ao- t'ou Ta-t'an chih-mi— chien fan Sung-tai te Ch'ing-hai-Iu (Unveiling The Myth about The Yellow-headed Uighun And Grass-headed Tartars), Ch'iaghai se-hui k'e-hsQeh ^i-nmg), (1984)4, pp. 77-85. Nevertheless, Ch'en Shou-chung gave another explanation in anthopology approach, regarding Kan-chou Uighurs as the Yellow-headed. He reminded that there was a custom of steppe minority respecting a tribe closest to the khan family line with the color of yellow. Being the closest tribes of the Khan, to Ch'en it was well to identify the Kan-chou Uighurs as Yellow-headed Uighurs. Ch'en Shou-chung, "Lun Ho-hsi Hui-ku" (On The Uighurs in Ho-hsO> in Ch'en Shou-chung, Ho-Iung Shih-ti k'ao-shu, (Research on Historical Geography of Ho-hsi and Lung-yu), (Lan-chou, Lan-chou University Press, 1993) pp. 82-95.1 slightly hesitate to agree with Ch'en because the only two passages mentioning the name of Yellow-headed Uighurs 175

They became the ancestors of the Kan-chou Uighurs of the coming Sung Dynasty.^^

The biith of a local Han regime in Tun-huan in 851, the Kuei-I ChOn Returning

Allegiance Commandant, heralded a partial reassertion of the Tang authority^ in the Ho- hsi corridor. Expelling the Tibetan official, a Han general, Chang I-ch'ao, swore loyal^ to the Tang throne as a way to consolidate his rule, w^ch, in actuality, was autonomous.

The delighted Tang court reinforced his Liang-chou garrison by three thousand troops drawn from the Celestial Pacific Army (Tien-p'ing-chiin) in Shantung. The descendants of these soldiers commingled and intermarried with the Tibetans, complicating the ethnical heterogeniety of the east part of the Ho-hsi corridor.^" The successor of Chang I- ch'ao, Chang Ch'eng-feng (d. 914), proclaimed emperor in 905, purporting a conquest of the entire Ho-hsi corridor. His effort was strongly resisted by the Uighur regime in Kan- chou. The rise of Kan-chou Uighurs, associated with the independence of Hun-mo in

Liang-chou and the return of Sha-chou (Tun-huan) in allegiance to the Tang, created a strategic triangle of geopolitical equilibrium from the ninth to tenth century. The replacement of Changs by the Ts'ao clan from 920-1052 did not interrupt this trend.^^

Sha-chou and Kan-chou were enemies at the beginning, but from the tenth century on

were dated 1081 and 1083 and the khaghanate of the Kan-chou Uighurs had no longer existed after 1028. For the two reports by the emissaries in 1081 and 1083, see SHY. chOan 197, barbarians 4, pp. 7708-09. TCTC. chOan 248, p. 8032, HTS. chOan 217B, p. 6133. Also, Maeda, pp. 209-220. Ch'en Shou-chung, "Lun Ho-hsi Hui-ku", pp. 87-88. Wu-tai hui-vao. chOan 30, p. 467. HWTS. chOan 74, p. 914. SHY, v.. chQan 195, Geography 21, p. 7654. However, Sha-chou as an extreme western outpost of China seems not to be completely undermined by its close relation with the Uighurs. Ostensibly it is still a prefecture under the central authority. A document dated in approximate 860s revealed a diplomatic ultimatum from a local lord of Sha-chou to the Hum-mo in Liang-chou, in which the former persuaded the latter to join an alliance with the 176

Liang-chou became the major adversary of the Uighurs.

With the growth of Uighur power, the Liang-chou camp seems to have been

reinforced by a distinctly more dominant Tibetan presence. Tibetan tribes, dispersed by

rebellious force in 843 and Hun-mo domination, reorganized during the tenth century into

the Six Valleys Federation. The name Hun-mo suddenly disappeared from tenth century

documents. The actual ruling ethnic group was identified as the so-called "Six Valleys"

Tibetan tribes.^^ Furthermore, a crucial figure, P'an Lo-chih emerged as the political

Uighurs, or they would be treated as hostil power. Stein No. 309. Maeda, pp 204-5. Another document in 865 described a stringent blockage by the Uighurs, suffering the communication line of the Chang clan to the Tang court Stein, No. 5139. Quoted from Maeda, pp. 224-26. A series of fractricidal battles were undertaken between the Chang clan and the Uighurs. In a military song composed by the Tun-huang regime in 906, the Changs clearly expressed their agreesive, "destroying Kan-chou and then sitting over the entire five prefectures [in Ho-hsi]". See "Lung-ch'Qan shen-chien-ke"(Song for the transcendant sword, the Dagon-springs), in Stein, No. 2589. Apparently Kan-chou Uighurs were regarded as an obstacle of their blue-print for Ho-hsi unification. War between Sha-chou and Kan-chou was unquestionably devastating so that in 911 the mass people in Sha-chou organized a peace delegation to Kan-chou. In the letter atributed to "myriad commoners", the people demanded a long peace by recognizing the khan as "father" and "Heavenly Khan". Pelliot, No. 3633, from Maeda, pp. 236-238. As Chang Ch'eng-feng's death in 914, Ts'ao 1-chin (d. 940), an administrative official of Ste-chou was supported by the local populaces as Military Governor of the Returning Allegiance Commandery. He immediately abolished Chang's antagonism and proposed a matrimoniai alliance to Kan-chou. He married a daugthers of the khan, and let his elder daughter also marring the khan. In a letter by his son Ts'ao YOan-te (d. 942), the khan was addressed as "my dear brother", while in another document the two prefectures were described as an inseparated region under "the same family". Pelliot, No. 2992 and 2155, from Maeda, pp. 236-38,308-10. Also, Ch'en Shou-chung, p. 89, Kao Tzu-hou, "Ts'ung liang-chien Tun-huang wen-shu k'an Ho-hsi Hui- ku", in Hsi-pei shih-ti. (1985)2, pp. 73-79 higlighted the historical significances of the Kan-chou Uighurs. The first is an untitled document believably a letter in about 938 from Ts'ao YQan-te to the Uighur Khan, Jen-ya. In this document Ts'ao addressed the Khan as "my younger brother, Shun-hua Khan " and proclaimed as "Elder brother, the Great King." The second document was a memo in about 945 from Ts'ao Ydan-te to the Uighur Khan, Jen-yfl, to whom Ts'ao informed that his delegation to Kan-chou was robbed. This unexpected incident seems to be a clandestine action committed by the Uighur agents. As suggested by Kao, several significances of this couple of docments are worth our attention. First, the year of the Uighur Khan's death was about 955 to 961, instead of926 as Feng Chia-sheng indicated. The first document reveal an important visit of Ts'ao YQan-te to Kan-chou in 937, which laid indispensable foundation of the bilateral armistic and peaceful relation. Considerable msecurity along the Silk Route still existed in the mid-tenth century, the historical place of the Kan-chou regime under Jen-yQ was important Premodem historians have difHculty to identify the actual geographical location of the "Six Valleys", nor did they name them. Roughly speaking, from the activities of this Tibetan federation, their locations mi^t be the vicinity of Liang-chou. Maeda, pp. 328-351. Hu Hsiao-p'eng, p. 92. Ch'en Shou-chung 177

leader of the Six Valley Tibetans in the late tenth century. Despite some confusion in events during this transitional period, there was no question that the Tibetans again became the dominant ethnic group after their previous slaves, the Hun-mo, enjoyed political dominant for half of a century.

Although the emergence of the Six Valleys Federation seems to suggest a partial reassertion of the Tibetan domination in Ho-hsi, the situation did not completely reverse to the second half of the eighth century. Instead of mutual hostility, the Tibetans evinced an increasingly amiable attitude toward the Chinese empire. This important change underlined a consistent direction in the following one hundred years from 960 to 1060— an improved relation between theTibetans and the K'aifeng government as a strategic counterbalance to the alliance of Khitans and Tanguts. Changes of the economic structural in Ho-hsi from 755 to 1000 occurred which were congruent to this increasing cordial relationship. Horses became the most important commodity the Tibetans exported

indicated that these valleys were identical to the present Ku-lang, Huang-yang, Cha-mu, Chin-t'a, Hsi-ying, and Tung-ta valleys. See Ch'en Shou-chung, "Kung-yOan pa sh3t-chi hou-ch'i chih shih-i shih-chi ch'ien- ch'i Ho-hsi li-shih shu-lun", in Ch'en Shou-chung, Ho-lune shih-ti k'ao-shu. pp. 58-81. Due to the extreme lack of sources, it is almost imposible to prove any transitory relation between Hun- mo and the Six Valleys Tibetans. So far all explanations are hypothetical. For example, Maeda considered the Six Valleys Tibetans were descendants of the Hun-mo, while Hu Hsiao-p'eng suggested that the Liang- chou regime was founded not only by the Hun-mo but the Pang garrison, without clearly stated what was the role of the Six Valleys Tibetans. See Maeda, pp. 311-20. Hu Hsiao-p'eng, pp. 90-93. The basic facts were the following; In 933, Acting Military Governor of Liang-chou Sun Ch'ao (circa. 10th c.) delegated his general To-pa Ch'eng-ch'ien (in some other sources as Ch'en-hui circa. lOth c.) to submit tribute to the Later Tang. According to Ch'eng-ch'ien, Sun and the five hundred Han Chinese households living in the walled city of Laing-chou were descendants of the Celestial Pacific Army, with Chinese lanuage and lifestyle survived. After the death of Sun Ch'ao, the court assigned a local, Che-man Chia-shih as Acting Military Governor. The court soon discovered that there were still indigenous Chinese housholds undertaking agrarian cultivation within an area of more than thirty li around the Liang-chou walled city. Outside this area there were all Tibetans. SHY. chOan 195, georgraphy 21, p. 7654. This passage suggested that the Tibetans in approximately the 930s agam became the dominant ethnic group in Liang-chou. 178

to K'aifeng and in 994,995,996, and 998, and Liang-chou delivered horses as tribal gifts

to the Sung emperor. At the beginning of the 11th century, Liang-chou had

appondmate 25,000 households and 128,000 population.^^ In the early Sung memorials,

the Tibetans were rarely mentioned as a menace to China. Instead, the Six Valley Tibetan

Federation was considered an amicable power providing the only source of horse to the

Sung cavalry force.

The Tanguts in the Pre-Hsi-hsa Period

Another aspect of the Tang-Sung transition is the change in allegiance of the

Tangut from an ally to enemy. Chinese scholars classified the Tanguts, or Tang-hsiang as

a sub-group of the Chiang,^^ who originated from the area west of Lake Koknor (Ch'ing-

" According to Maeda's acount, agricaultural economy flourished in the first half of the Eighth Century, associating the Tang Central Asian supremacy. As Tibetan overruning the region after 755, agriculture was replaced by semisedentary stockbreeding economy. Agrarian activities remained as a relic of the Han Chinese culture rather than a central part of military logistics. More stabilzed tribal relation was established in the Hrst decade of the Eleventh Century, every year the Tibetans sent tribal delgation to K'aifeng, exchanging silk, and miscellaneous goods with horses. Maeda, pp. 430-435. According to the report by the tribute delegation under Tse-p'u Yu-Iung-po (circa, late 10th c.) fi'om Liang-chou, the city had 25,693 households, including 300 Han Chinese households, and 128,192 populace. HCP. chOan 43, pp. 920-21. A controversy about the ethnic origin of the Hsi Hsia imperial family arose among Hsi Hsia specialists and the question has been complicated by a few profound questions. First, the surname of the Hsi Hsia imperial family, To-pa, could be traceed to Chiang, Hsien-pei, or Tu-yO-hun, the descendants of Hsien-pei intermingled with the Chiang and it became difficult to conclude the ethnic identification despite its self appellation as descendant of Hsien-pei. In addition, Hsi Hsia after the 1030s adopted considerable Tibetan rituals and institutions which confused the search of its ethnic origin. Tang Chia-hung, "Kuan-yQ Hsi Hsia To-pa-shih te chu-su wen-f i", in Szechwan Ta-hsOeh hsOeh-Dao. (1955)2; also, in Pai Pin (ed), Hsi Hsia- shih lun-wen-chi. pp. 26-48 considered the self-appellation of the Hsi Hsia emperor in 1038 reliable, tracing back the Tangut origin to the Hsien-pei dominated Northern Dynasties (420-589). His conclusion was agreed by Wu Tien-ch'ih, Hsi Hsia shih-kao (A Preliminary History of Hsi Hsia), (Ch'eng-tu; Szechwan jen-min, reprint,1983), pp. 2-3,8-10. Wang Chung, "Lun Hsi Hsia te ch'ing-ch'i" (On the Rise of Hsi Hsia), in Li-shih yen-chiu (1962)5, pp. 20-32; also, in Pai Pin (ed), Hsi Hsia-shih lun-wen-chi (Collected Essays of The History of Hsi Hsia), (Yin-ch'Qan, Ning-hsia ryan-min, 1984), pp. 1-25 put 179

hai).^® In the beginning, there were eight tribes, namely the To-pa, Hsi-feng, Wang-Ii,

P'o-chao, Yeh-ch'ih, Fang-tang, Mi-ch'in and an unknown tribe. Historian Pang K'ai- chien suggests that the Tanguts were subjects of the Pu-ya-hun. The first Tangut migration occurred during the transition of the Northern dynasties to the Sui, moving firom the west to the east of the Lake Koknor (or Ch'ing-hai), and the northwest of

Szechwan. The reason for this sizable migration was evidently because of the disastrous war between the Tu-yu-hun and the Sui empire during the Ta-yeh Reign. As a result of the complete destruction of the Tu-yu-hun kingdom in the ealry Tang, the Tanguts transferred their loyalty to the Ch'ang-an govemment^^

forward a hypothesis in 1962, suggesting the ancestor of Hsi Hsia being a Hun-mo's general. One hint is the reverse of Hsi Hsia's imperial family name to Wei-ming, originating from the word Hun-mo. His opinion was reinforced by Hu Hsiao-p'eng in 1989. A third opinion was represented by Li Fan-wen, "Shih- lun Hsi Hsia Tang-hsiang-chu te lai-yflan yQ pien-ch'ien" (A Preliminary Study on The Origin And Transformation of The Tanguts During the Hsi Hsia Era), in Li Fan-wen, Hsi Hsia Yen-chiu lun-chi. (Collected Studies of Hsi Hsia), (Yin-ch'Qan: Ning-hisa jen-min, 1983) pp. 1-37, also, in Pai Pin (ed), Hsi Hsia-shih lun-wen-chi. pp. 49-79 and Shih-Wei-min, Tang-hsiang-chu To-pa-pu te ch'ien-yi chi-ch'i yO Tang, Wu-tai chu wang-ch'ao te kuan-hsi" (The Emigration of Tangufs To-pa Tribe And Its Relation with The Tang and Five Dynasties), in Pai Pin (ed), Hsi Hsia-shih lun-wen-chi. pp. 80-107. Li and Shih indicated that Hsi Hsia was founded by Tanguts and the To-pa was an indigenous Tangut family. Also, Tang K'ai-chien, "Sui-Tang shih-chi Tang-hsiang pu-Io te ch'ien-yi" (Emigration of Tangut Tribes During the Sui And Tang period), in Hsi Hsia wen-shih lun-ch'une (Yin-ch'Qan), chQan 1 (1992), pp. 151-170. The disput on the Tanguts place of origin hinged on the interpretation of a passage from Wei Cheng (S80-643), Ling-hu Te-pin (583-666), and Chang-sun Wu-chi (d. 659), Sui-shu (Sui Standard History), (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1973), chQan 83, pp. 1145. Conventional view regarded the earliest Tangut activities as originated from the eastern part of the present Ch'inghai and the northwest boundary of the Szechwan provinces. See Tang Chia-hung, "TCuan-yQ Hsi Hsia To-pa-shih te chu-su wen- t'i", in Hsi Hsia-shih lun-wen-chi. p. 28-29. However, according to Sui-shu. the living area of the Tanguts was recorded as, "neighboring Lin-fao in the east, while sustaning the Yeh-hu in the west." The location Lin-t'ao is indisputably a the valley of the Tao River. However, If, "Yeh-hu" refers to the realm of the Western Turkish Khaghnate as its usual meaning, then the passage would indicate the earliest active zone of the Tanguts to be the entire present day's Ch'inghai province, not merely the eastern part of it For Tangut migration tracks from Chinghai to Shenshi, see Tang K'al-chien, "Sui-Tang shfli-chi Tang-hsiang pu-Io te ch'ien-yi", pp. 151-153. Shih Wei-min, pp. 83-84, Tang K'ai-chien, pp. 152-56. 180

The Tanguts remained in allegiance to Ch'ang-an throughout most of the Tang dynasty and because of overwhelming Tang military strength and the Tangut economic dependency. During the Cheng-kuan era (627-49), a number of the Tangut tribes demanded that they migrated even further because of the iminent Tibetan threat.^° The

Tang court approved and moved them to the southern Ordos around Ch'ing-chou, today's

Ch'ing-yang County. After the An Lu-shan rebellion in 755, more Tangut tribes settled in the southem Ordos, distributed widely around Ch'ing-chou, Ling-chou and Hsia-chou, approximately 40 kilometers west of today's Heng-shan county. After the Tang court return to Ch'ang-an, the government forcibly repositioned a considerable proportion of the Tanguts at Hsia-chou, a prefecture whose name became the name of the state of Hsi- hsia. From this time on, those Tanguts who stayed in Ch'ing-chou were called Tung-shan

Tanguts, while those moved to Hsia-chou were called the P'ing-hsia Tanguts.^^ Unlike the first migration proposed by the Tanguts, Tang authority took the initiative.

Apparentiy, separating the tribes would prevent the growth of the Tangut military power and threat to Tang influence in the Ordos.^^

It seems the environment of the Ordos Desert did not compare to their previous

The accurate dates of the Tangut migration to Ch'ing-chou are very difiRcuIt to juge. Wu Tien*ch'ih considered the time as "after the death of Tai-tsung" (649), while Shih Wei-min claimed the K'ai-yQan reign (713-41) of HsQen-tsung. Tang K'ai-chien pointed out that CTS chOan 198 did not clearly record the migration of the Tanguts under the K'ai-yOan regin but commingled this event with other incidents. Thus, he suggested the year in approximately 638. See Wu Tien-chih, p. 4, Shih-Wei-min, pp. 86-88, Tang Ka'i- chien,, "Sui-Tang shih-chi Tang-hsiang pu-lo te ch'ien-yi", pp. 157-59. " CTS. in Shih-Du pei-vao v. 666-75, chQan 198:3a.Wu Tien-chih, p. 13. Shih Wei-min, pp. 86-91. Tang Ka'i-chien, "Sui-Tang shih-chi Tang-hsiang pu-lo te ch'ien-yi", pp. 157-64.0kazaki Seiro, Taneuto kodai shi kenkvu (Historical Study of Predynastic Tangut), (Kyoto: Nal^ura Press, 1972), pp. 41-51. Shih Wei-min, pp. 90-91. 181

realm around Lake Koknor and small scale of violence such as cattle raids occinred

sporadically/^ The situation was exacerbated by the Pang inability to reassert military

supremacy on the periphery of the empire, and by the degenerating competence of

administrative ofBcials. Unfair trade, corruption, and other forms of economic

exploitation of the Tang ofBcials consistently diminished Tangut allegiance^ ^ and from

847 to 860, conflicts escalated and subsided/^ Being aware of the need to arm themselves better, the Tanguts started to steal metals and weapons from the metropolitan areas/® When Tang central authority was endangered by increasing rebel strength in the

Historians have consented in that the eastern Ch'inghai was much more economically lucrative than the soutem Ordos. The former was an perfect place for semi-sedentary life, while the latter was barely suitable for stockbreeding and salt production. The scarce commodities of the Tangut tribes living in the southern Ordos were horses, lambs, salt, white carpet, bows, and koumiss. See Shih Wei-min, p. 93,and Maeda, pp. 357-64. pp. 480-87. Historians have emphasized the sufTeiringof the Tanguts as its orignai cause of hostility toward the Chinese dynastic empire. In Shih Wei-min' words, the Tangut revolt represented "their willingness of indiscriminating coexistence, normal and positive economic interaction with other ethnics, denouncing ethnic diversity, economic isolation and exploitation." More elaboration, see Shih Wei-min, pp, 92-95. Also, Okazaki, pp. 51-66. It was evidently the Tang mistreatment of the Tanguts Jeopardized the political stability on the Ordos. The Tang government in 714 promulgated a law statue that prohibited private trading of silk, texture, pearl, gold, and iron. See Wang P'u, Tang Hui-vao. in Wang YQn-wu (ed), Ts'une- shu chi-ch'eng. hereafirer as TSCC. ser. I, v. 813-28, (Shanghai: Commericial Press, 1936), chQan 86, p. 1581. In 787, the authority imposed further prohibition on catties and weapons. See CTS. chOan 221. p. 6217. In order to exchange fo^ and metal, smugling flourished among the Tangut tribes. In the eyes of a number of the Tang officials, such unlawfiil activities created them chances for exploitation. In an imperial edict in 850, Emperor HsQen-tsung (r. 847-59) confessed that he would replaced the cupid and possessive generals, ceasing all trading prohibition except that of arms. See Tang HsQen-tsung, "Fing Tang-hsiang te- yin" (Virtual Words for Pacifying The Tanguts), in Sung Min-ch'iu (1019-79) (ed) Tang ta-chao-ling-chi. (A Great Collection of The Tang Imperial Edicts), in SKCSCP. ser. 12, v. 3oi-35, (1982), chOan 130, pp. 28a-33b. Shih Wei-min, pp. 92-95. In 714 the Tang court nnposed a prohibition of iron trade with the Tanguts. In Tang-IO shu-I. weapons and the goods "that ought not to be possessed by common housholds" were also obliged. See Chang-sun Wu-chi, Tang-IO Shu-I. (Law and Commentary of the Tang), (Commerdal Press, place and date unknown), chQan 8, p. 70-71. As a semisedentary ethnic people, the Tanguts had a huge demand for arms. Despite its pugnacious tradition, the Tanguts were rudimentary armed. "Afraid of the well-equiped Tang army, they exchanged armors with excellent horses, and bows and arrows with excellent lambs." See HTS. chOan 221, pp. 6217. 182

870s, Po-pa Ssu-lamg(

County of Shensi), and proclaimed himself prefect/^ Sui-chou 1 (today's Sui-te Cotmty) and Yin-chou, about 50 kilometers northwest of the present Mi-chih County, Shensi, were given under his control after the Tang recovery of Ch'ang-an in 881, joined by a force composed of Shato, Tanguts, and some other minority groups. By this meritorious service, Po-pa Shih-kung gained the imperial surname, Li, and, in an unprecedented appointment, was made Military Governor of Ting-nan-chiin, or Disaster Suppression

Army.

Obviously the award of imperial surname symbolized a closer political bond between the Tang ruler to the Tanguts. In reality, the degree of affiliation given by Li

Shih-kung to Ch'ang-an is a question. During the days of peril, Tangut military strength made considerable contribution to the continuity of the Tang throne. In return, the Tang aegis provided an indispensable legitimacy to Tangut expansion. In 888, the Tangut overran neighboring Fu-chou 2 (the present Fu Coimty, Shensi, distinguished from Fu- chou 1, the present Fu-ku County), Fang-chou (the present Huang-ling County, Shensi),

Tan-chou (the present Yi-ch'uan County, Shensi)and Yen-choul (the present Yen-an

City). With no other alternative, the Tang court appointed Li Ssu-kung's brother, Shih- hsiao, as Military Governor of Pao-ta Commandant, with these four prefectures under his control. As a result, the Tangut military force rapidly enlarged to a body of approximately

'^HTS. chOan 221. n. 6218. 183

thirty thousand cavalry/^ Ssu-kung died in his position in 895. Another younger brother,

Ssu-chien, (Avas supported by his peers as their military governor/^

The fall of theTang dynasty posed a new strategic question to the Tangut local authority in Hsia-chou. The poor economic conditions in the southern Ordos and rudimentary armament of the Tangut tribes would not permit any futile military show of independence. However, Hsia-chou's geographic placement surrounded by the Shatos in

Ho-tung, the Khitans in the Northern Ordos, Military Govemor Li Mou-cheng in western

Shensi, and Chu Wen in Honan and Eastern Shensi, strongly suggested the possibility of conflict. Agil political maneuvering clearly marked the diplomatic maturity of the Hsia- chou leadership. When Li Jen-fu (d. 933) became military govemor raised by his peers in

910, he joined the Liang camp to counterbalance the hostile alliance of Shatos and

Khitans. In 909, Li K'o-yung ordered his captain general Chou Te-wei to attack Hsia- chou with a force numbering 5000 soldiers. Li Jen-fii withstood for almost a month up to the approach of the relief force and his firm resistance appeased Chu Wen to a slight degree. However, when the Khitan menace to the southern Ordos became evidently discernible and the Liang regime came to an end, Li Jen-fu shifted his loyalty to the Shato emperor, Li Ts'mi-hsii.^° With the deteriorating relations with the Khitans after the 920s, the Later Tang emperor appreciated Hsia-chou's agility. In this way, the Tangut

Shfli Wei-min, pp. 97-98. HTS. chQan 221A. p. 6218. CWTS. chOan 132, pp. 1746-47. 1S4

maintained relations with the central authority to legitimize their rule in the Ordos.^^

However, superficial cordiality did not undermine suspicion between Shato and

Tangut for some time, when rumors about a collusion between Tangut and Khitans

travaled throughout north China. The death of Li Jen-fu in 933 provided the Later Tang

court a chance to reassert direct control by appointing An Ts'ung-chin, a general with

Sordian origin, as Hsia-chou's military governor. Armed conflict occurred in 933 and this

became an important landmark to Tangut relations with the central authority. A battle

between Li I-ch'ao (936), the son of Li Jen-fu, and An Ts'img-chin resulted in a complete

Tangut victory, testifying to their considerable military strength. It also led to the

abolishing of the pretense of Tangut allegiance and consolidating the Hsia-chou local

autonomy. From this time onward, the central authority could only maintained a chi-

mi. or "loosed control" relation with the P'ing-hsia Tanguts. Later, the Shato imperial

authority had Li I-yin (967), the successor of Li I-ch'ao, assigned as governor.®^ From the

940s on, the central government, frustrated by internal power struggle and Khitan threat, had no other alternative than to yield political autonomy to Hsia-chou. Whenever there

Shih Wei-min, pp. 98-102. Defending Hsia-chou, Li I-ch'ao skillfully manipulated psychologically warfare, as well as military strategy. When the Later Tang army arrived, he refused to obey the imperial edict but still refined from antagonizing the Tang force too early. He managed to withstand by the walled city, harrassing the supply link of the Later Tang. The Standard History recorded; "Meanwhile more than ten thousand Tangut cavalry harrassed the food supply, leaving no wood and cattle collectable from the open plain." Then, Li I- ch'ao and his brothers attented before the Tang troops, saying: "Hsia-chou is merely a poor prefecture unable to produce gems, cash, nor any commodity for the court's revenue. We do not wish to abandon this territory only because it was inherited from our ancestors. To conquer our land will not enlarge the military achievement of the court." This speech dramatically diminished the figthing edge of the Tang soldiers. Finally the emperor decided to release the communes from massive conscription. See CWTS. chQan 132, pp. 1748-49, also, TCTC. chQan 278, pp. 9083-85. 185

was a transfer of power occurred, the court immediately ratified the position of Hsia-chou

autonomy.

Some activities of Han leaders also abetted the rapid growth of Tangut power in

the Ordos. In 944, Li I-yin mounted the first large-scale operation against the Khitan with about 40,000 Han and non-Han troops, combined as counterattack to the Khitan invasion of Hopei/^ Li I-yin entered into secret collusion with Li Shou-cheng, a disaffected general in Ho-chung prefecture, 20 kilometers west of the present Yung-chi County, against Kuo Wei in K'aifeng.^^ Although hostility had long existed between Khitan and

Chinese dynastic empires under Kuo Wei, Li I-jdn's support of Ho-chung did not contradict the appropriateness of his preveious attack on the Khitans. The most favorable strategy for Tangut expansion was neither a dominant Khitan supremacy nor a stabilized

K'aifeng government, despite the lack of historical record to authenticate Li's actual consideration.

At the dawn of the Sung, it is clear that the Hsia-chou regime had become a political power of diplomatic maturity and considerable military strength. Unlike the warlords in central China, Tangut local autonomy was not exhausted by devastating civil war, with only three batdes undertaken in 903,933 and 944 during the first half of the tenth century. Every time the modest but sophisticated use of armed force enhanced its political and diplomatic leverage. More remarkable, it was not likely that the Hsia-chou

See CWTS. chOan 132, p. 1749. In the dyanstic history written by Sung scholars the name of I-yin was changed to be I-ch'ing, lest it would offend an imperial ancestor, Chao K'uang-yin's father Chao Hung-yin. TCTC. chOan 284, p. 9266. 186

leaders shared the same negative understanding of violence with K'aifeng. Thus, in the early Sung pacification movement, the Hsia-chou issue should be distinguished from the cases of Hang-chou and Ch'Oan-chou, and, even to a certain extent, it should be treated as a more dangerous enemy to the Sung than the Khitan empire. With its inexperience of the devastation and indecisiveness of prolonged war, Tangut leaders could hardly accept coexistence as a solution. Despite Hsia-chou's military strength lagging far behind the

Liao, this Hsia-chou confidence in the uses of violence inevitably gave the Simg an entirely new problem to solve.

The Hsi-hsia issue in the Early Sang

It seems that the Sung was not aware of the necessity to deal with Hsia-chou in a new accomodation. As early as the Later Chou, Li I-yin was enfeoffed as commandery prince of Lung-hsi (Lung-hsi chun-wang), a title first held by Li Jen-fu. The Chou effeoffed him as Prince of Hsi-p'ing in 954and upon his death in 967, the title of Hsia

King was bestowed on Li I-yin.^® In 967 and 979 the Tangut continued their cooperation to the Chou and Sung against the Northern Han and Liao,^^ receiving a series of high feudal ranks. However, this ostensibly cordial relation between Hsia-chou and K'aifeng

" CWTS. chUan 132, p. 1749. =«^chQan485, p. 13982. When Liu ChOn, the ruler of the Northern Han invaded Lin-chou (about 10 kilometer north of the present Shen-mu County) in approxmately 960, Li I-yin assigned a subordinate conunander to assist the Sung relief force. In 976, Li Kuang-jui participated the third Tai-yQan campaign under Sung Tai-tzu, succesfiilly taking Wu Pao, a crucial fort in the western bank of the Yellow River. Again, the Hsia-chou ruler in 979, Li Chi-chOn, had two of his uncle, Kuang-yOan (d. 981) and Kuang-hsien commanded a combined force by Han and non-Han soldiers, crossing the Yellow River to attack the Noerthem Han. See SS. chQan 485, pp. 13982-83. 187

seriously misled the early Sung rulers. On the surface, Hsia-chou was wooed by K'aifeng against its northern rivals, but, in actuality, not all the nobles of the Li willingly gave up territory. In K'aifeng, underestimation of Hsia-chou was further compounded by the increase of centralized power. Therefore, when the Sung faced an ambitious Li Chi-ch'ien and forced to consider using force in the Ordos, it suddenly found itself in a dilemma in which neither peace nor war coud evolve an suitable solution.

During the early 980s a succession problem occurred in Hsia-chou. After Li I- yin's death in 967, his son Kuang-jui (d. 978) ruled for eleven years.^® Kuang-jui died in about 978 and his heir Chi-chun (d. 981) did not long survive, leaving an infant son in

981. Shortly thereafter his brother, Li Chi-p'eng (962- 1004), assumed the military governorship, acknowledging that he was far from gaining a consensual support of all his kinsmen. The unsolved discord caused Li Chi-p'eng to make a radical decision and submit all his territories to the Sung court.^®

In 981 the Emperor Pai-tsung had reason to be pleased by the surrender of Hsia- chou. It followed his ghastly elimination of the Northem Han and the following peaceftil annexation of the Wu Yueh kingdom, Chang-chou, and Ch'uen-chou. However, the

Emperor was not fiiUy aware of the complexity and difScult nature of the issue. When he asked how Li Chi-p'eng subdued the Chiang (Tangut) people, Li answered that these

Sung Tai-tsung, whose name was Kuang-yi, ascended the dirone in 975. In order to avoid using the similar first name with the emperor, Li Kuang-jui changed his name to K'o-jui. See SS, chflan 495, p. 13982. " HCP. chOan 23, pp. 519-520. 188

pugnacious people could never be subdued, but only loosely controlled (chi-mi).®° The emperor appreciated Li Chi-p'eng's surrender, flushed by sinocentric cultural eminence and political virtue, and ordered all Li's relatives sent to K'aifeng, as a sign of introducing direct control over the territory.®^

Shortly thereafter Li Chi-p'eng handed over his command to the Simg. His cousin,

Li Chi-ch'ien ( 963-1004), declared his disobedience and fled northward with his followers to the P'ing-hsia pasture lands. Barely eluding capture, he founded a base in the

Ti-chin Marsh, three himdred li northeast of Hsi a-chou.®^ He reestablished his tribal connection and reorganized a force struggling for independence.®^ Now, the complexity of the Hsia-chou issue was uncovered. Unlike Hang-chou and Ch'uen-chou, Hsia-chou autonomy could not be undermined by mere deterence.

Following the traditional wisdom,"using barbarian against barbarian", Prime

Minister Chao P'u, as on other occasions, demonstrated his outstanding ability to define the principal strategy of the Sung. In 988 he persuaded the emperor to return all of Li

Chi-p'eng's territory and honor him with an imperial surname.®^ The Prime Minister

" HCP. chOan 25, p. 575; SS, chflan 485, p. 13984. " HCP. chOan 23, p. 520; SS, chOan 485, p. 13984. "HCP, ChQan 25, p. 586. SS, chOan 495, p. 13986. At the beginning of Li Chi-ch'ien's enterprise, he had only rudimentary armed troops, far inferior in number. In the autumn of984, Sung Patrolling Inspector Ts'ao Kuang-shih (d. 985) obatained reliable intellegence from the Hsia-chou administration, onslaughting Li Chi-c'ien's headquarters by light cavalry. Reportedly Ts'ao had five hundred Li Chi-ch'ien's followers beheaded, four hund^ camps blistered, and Chi-ch'ien's mother and wife taken alive. Chi-ch'ien escaped along and renewed his independence movement shortly afterward. See HCP. chQan 25, p. 586; SS, chQan 485, p. 13984. From 988 to 994 Li Chi-p'eng was called Chao Pao-chung in the Sung official documents. In the purpose of subjugating Li Chi-ch'ien, the court also honored him a name Chao Pao-chi. HCP. chQan 29, p. 653, and chuan 32, p. 718; ^ chQan 485, p. 13984. 189

suggested that this might necessitate a suppression of Li Chi-ch'ien's peers. However,

aiter he return to Hsia^chou, Li Chi-p'eng sided with his cousin. Infuriated, the emperor

launched a vigorous attack on Hsia-chou in 994 and Li Chi-p'eng was taken alive.

A four-fold strategy was used by Li Chi-ch'ien to withstand the Sung. First, he

established a marriage alliance with the Khitans in 989. In 986, when the Liao empire

faced the most vigorous attack ever undertaken by the Simg, Li Chi-ch'ien submitted in

loyalty to the Liao and petitioned for an imperial bride. Three years later in 990 when he

married the Liao princess, he was enfeoffed as the king of Hsia (Hsia kuo wang).

Although the Liao court never sent troops to assist Li Chi-ch'ien, this eneofiftnent

enhanced Li's political advantage in negotiating with the Sung. This alliance was also

strategically important to Khtian in time or space, providing a second theater in the Ordos against the Sung.®® In addition, Khitan from 986 to 989 demanded an economic recovery

The Sung records about the capture of Lt Chi-p'eng was of something equivocal. Li Tao described, "Chao Pao-chung soon adaiowledged Li Chi-lung's army in advancing, to dissolve (Chao) Pao-chi's revolt. He encamped his mother, wife and close subordinates outside the city, sent a letter to explain his reconciliauon with Pao-chi, and cried for a Sung withdrawal by fifty excellent horses as gifts. The enraged Emperor immediately delegated an eunuch ordering Chi-lung to shift his attack to Pao-chung. As a result, Chi-Iung marched toward the (Hsia-chou) territory. At the same time, Pao-chung was betrayed by Pao-chi. In the purpose of seizing (Pao-chung's) army, (Pao-chO tied up his conomander of bodyguard, Chao FCuang-hsiang and assaulted Pao-chi's camp at night Astonishingly awaken from sleeping, Pao-chung ride an excellent horses stniggling back to the city alone, without wearmg his official uniform nor his hebnet. All provision were taken by Pao-chi. Since Pao-chung's commander Chao Kuang-tzu was sent by Pao- chung for submittion of tribute, he had secretly sworn loyalty to (the emperor) for a long time. The emperor appointed him as an kung-fene-kuan and later the Vice Ceremonial Commissioner or li-oin fli- shih. In actuality Chao Kuang-tzu became a spy informing K'aifeng with every Pao-chung's activity. Being aware of Chao Pao-chung's collusion with Pao-chi, Chao Kuang-tzu distributed all his private possession to his soldiers and oathed for allegiance. As soon as Pao-chung returned, Kuang-tzu had him incarcerated, opening the gate to welcome the imperial aimy." HCP. chflan 35, pp. 775-76. In the above passage the author did not mention the location of Li Chi-ch'ien. If Li Chi-ch'ien was close enough to attack the camp of Li Chi-p'eng, it would be dubious that Li Chi-lung could march into Hsia-chou without any contest with Li Chi-ch'ien. Similar record was found also in SS, chOan 485, p. 13985. Tu Chien-lu, Hsi Hsia vO chou-oien min-chu kuan-hsi shih. (Lanchou: Kansu wen-hua, 1995), pp. 107- 190

from the extraordinarily devastation.

Second, he appealed to the Tangut people as an liberating leader, offering

protection against the oppressive Sung border administration, which created their

opportunities for boundary pillage. In his early days of guerrilla warfare, Li Chi-ch'ien gained a considerable number of partisans among the tribes of the northern Ordos. To reafSrm his ties with the Tanguts, he married a lady from the Yeli family, an influential clan of the Nan-shan Tangut that had long settled in the vicinity of the Sung frontier. The support Li Chi-ch'ien received from the Tangut tribes was evident. In 996, his mobile force emerged near Ling-chou numbering ten thousand cavalry. By 1001, a more prodigious figure, fifty thousand soldiers, was employed in the last attack on this city.®^

Third, in spite of his consistently growing military strength, he still avoided open battle with the Sung.®® Instead, he persisted in showy gestures for reconciliation following minor demonstrations of force. While pleading for forgiveness of the Sung emperor, he simultaneously pressed his claim to recover the traditional realm. This strategy, utilized by his ancestors, Li I-ch'ao and Li I-yi, had now reached a mature stage.®® After fleeing from Hsia-chou in 994, Li Chi-ch'ien delegated a Han Chinese

111. Okazaki, pp. 173-219. The number of Li Chi-ch'ien's soldiers in 996 was based on a report by Ts'ao Ts'an, see chQan 485, p. 13987. Sung strategist Sung Ch'i considered that the Hsi Hsia issue would have been resolved in a single battle, if the tanguts left the mountainous terrain and lined up in battle formation. HCP. chQan 35, p. 768. In fact,during the Hsia-chou campaign in 994, Li Gii-ch'ien fled and did not conduct a single battle with the Sung expeditionary force. HCP. chQan 35, pp. 775-778. In 987, Li Chi-ch'ien gathered a force defeating the Sung Hsia-chou garrisons of thirty thousand soldiers under An Shou-chung but did not succeed in taking the walled town. When Li Chi-p'eng was assigned as govemer of Hsia-chou, Li Chi-ch'ien created an atmosphere of reconciliation in 988. In return, the court 191

advisor, Chang P'u (d. 1004), to test K.'aifeng's intentions. In addition, a gift of fifty horses was sent to Wang Yii-ch'eng, a famous Sung scholar who drafted imperial edict for his enfeofOnent previously. This was probably another testing for the Sung political atmosphere.^° To the Sung, this was a tenuous allegiance, lapsing frequently and just as the frequently renewal by force. The high maneuverability of cavalry was the key to his guerrilla warfare. Whenever he encoimtereda Sung attack, Li Chi-ch'ien first agilely disengaged and then utilized his horsemen to cut off the Sung supply.

Last, he decided that the only target of his attack would be at the extreme left wing of the Sung perimeterat Ling-chou,^^ a prefecture separated from the interior by a desert that took a Sung army five to seven days to cross.'^ As a result of the Liao-Hsia alliance, the Simg perimeter against the two enemies, Khitan and Tangut, had to be extended from the Po-hai Bay to Ling-chou, more than one thouand kilometers. This was obviously a difficult task for the Sung to wage effective action at its extreme northwest comer. However, Ling-chou was an agricultural and commercial center on the upper reaches of the Yellow River. The fall of Ling-chou to Li Chi-ch'ien's hand in 1002 provided him with a prominent economic and political base.'^ Furthermore, it cut off the

then offered Li Chi-ch'ien the Regional Supervisor of Yin-chou. However, in about 990, Li Chi-ch'ien renewed his antagonism to K'aifeng and jeopardized the posftioii of Li Chi-p'eng and bloodshed outburst reoccured. At the beginning, Li Chi-p'eng seems to have superior strength, but Chi-ch'ien was finally able to lay siege of Hsia-chou. When Sung relief force advanced, he agilely promised allegiance again. By these tangling acts, he procured a position approximate to Li Chi-p'eng and an imperial assigned name, Chao Pao-chi. See SS, chQan 485, p. 13986. HCP. chQan 36, p. 793. HCP, 37, pp. 813-14. HCP. ChQan 39, p. 833. See Sung Ch'i's memorial in HCP. chQan 35, p. 769. Ling-chou provided am agrarian base for Hsi Hsia with well developed canal and irrigation system. See 192

Sung connection with the Ho-hsi coiridor, the main source of the Sung flnnnal purchase of horses to mount its cavahy.

Similarly, the Sung central authority was compelled to evolve a strategy to deal with the new situation in 994. In the beginning, completely destroying the Tangut independence by force was at the one end of the Sung strategic range, while ratifying

Tangut political autonomy lay at the other. Before 994 the former meant the use of force to coerce Hsia-chou, and the latter meant no use of force. Nevertheless, Li chi-ch'ien's escape in 994 and the Sung occupation of the Tangut power base at Hsia-chou left the

Sung army without a target to attack. In addition, Li Chi-ch'ien became an ally of the

Sung enemy, the Liao. Therefore, a comprehensive strategic analysis was needed.

The Sung Strategy Aganist Li Chi-ch'ien

In the late 990s, the Simg completed the equivalent of a strategic estimate for decision making functionery. Although available historical texts do not include a comprehensive report prepared by the Military Bureau, several crucial memorials and imperial edicts enable us to appreciate K'aifeng's analysis of strategic conditions.In the strategic analysis, the advanced state of Sung technology was manifested. Despite a considerable resource of iron, Hsia-chou's ability in mining was still a question and consequentially its military equipment remained rudimentary.^^ As pointed out by Chang

Maeda, pp. 389-428. It also facilitated state-building and muti-economy by its natural resources. See Ch'ien Po-ch'flan, "Hsi Hsia tui shih-ch'ou-chih-lu te ching-ying clii-ch'i cb'iang-sheng in Hsi-oei min-chu ven- chiu. v.2, (1993), pp. 40-51. ^ In some mainland historian's explanation, iron production of Hsia-chou was an economic cause of the 193

P'u, Li Chi-ch'ien's advisor, Li Chi-ch'ien's anny was merely equiped with feeble bows and short arrows.^^ The dreadful crossbow of 2 shih still demonstrated the Simg

technological advantage over the Hsi-hsia.^^ In Li Tao's record on the Salt Lakes

Operation in 966, the historian said:

"Before revealing the plan to the generals, the Emperor held a drill outside the

Political-eminence Chamber (Ts'img-cheng tien). He had the army foraied battles arrays, assimilating assault and close combats as in a real battle. Then the Emperor ordered to practise with unusually large number of stalwart crossbows. As encoimtering formidable enemies during the campaign, the army deployed in battle formation rapidly and orderly, with ten thousand crossbowmen salvoing simultaneously. The (Tangut) brigands threw in disorder at once, having no chance to demonstrate their combat skills. Through sixteen

rise of Hsi Hsia. See Chin Pao-hsiang, "Hsi Hsia te chien-kuo ho feng-chien hua", in Pai Pin (ed) Hsi Hsia shih lun-wen-chi. pp. 108-27, especially p. 110. The evidence provided by Chin was only relavent to the eleventh rather than the tenth century. It is true that in 1040 Hsi Hsia established iron mines in Hsia-chou, seventy to eighty Hwcst of the Yellow River. During the war in the 1040s, hyperformidable armour able to sustain the Sung crossbow shooting emerged in the Tangut army. However, in the ninth century, Hsia-chou did not seem to be able to mine, othewise the Tang goverment would have no need to impose a prohibition of iron-and-arm trade as a way to prevent the growth of the Tangut power. During the tenth century, the question how large the iron mine contributed to the Hsi Hsia independent movement is still inconclusive. In about 99S, Sung Tai-tsung invited Chang Pu, Li Chi-ch'ien's advisor and emissary, to attend a drill in which the Sung imperial guards demonstrated their ability to use the two-shih crossbows. Thereafter, the Emperor asked, "Do the chiane people dare to withstand these?" Chang answered:"The barbarian tribes had feeble bows and short arrows only. Seeing these strong men, no one would dare to fight but flee awav!"SS. chaan485,p. 13987. Crossbowman was an important type in the Sung army. In 995 Pai*tsung held a drill in the imperial palace, ordering the guards to demonstrate the aits of crossbow achery. He paid special attention to the crossbowmen who could shoot 20 times continuously with large bows of 1.5 shih. Seeing combined tactics by cavalry and infantry units, the Emperor impressed and said: "This is merely a drill participated by several hundred man in the palace, how dire the whole formation composed by more than thirty thousand soldiers in the real battle?!" HCP. chOan 38, p. 823. Half a year later, Ae Emperor seriously considered the option of organizing a task force to relief Ling-chou. See HCP. chQan 39, p. 833. Another drill with the same context undergone prior to the operation in 996 was also success. HCP. chflan 40, p. 852. 194

encounters, the army approached the base of the brigands."^^

Even tactics exhibited an advantages for the Sung. The Tangut force under Li Chi-

ch'ien remained a tribal organization and was not trained to fight regular battles. As

indicated by an ex-prime minister and highly respected strategy advisor. Sung Ch'i, the

Hsi-hsia army was not a formidable enemy; a single battle determined their fate.^® Even

Chang P'u consented to the fact that Li Chi-ch'ien would be unwilling to withstand the

Sung standing army in open battle.^® The Sung tactical array included crossbow archers,

regular infantry, auxiliary foot archers, heavy cavalry and light horse units. Of these

tactical ingredients, the well-trained crossbow archer was paramount Emperor Tai-

tsung's idea ws that Sung legions should drastically reduce the enemy attack with

incessant crossbows salvos and followed by a counterattack by infantry and cavahy

^^HCP.chQan4Q. p. 852. Sung Ch'i's memorial in 994 was remarkable. He indicated that the Tanguts were mere 'lesser tribes' and never a formidable enemy. "If," the strategist anticipated, "they leave the mountain in battle-formation, we can destroy them completely in a single battle." However, he reminded, it required cunning strategic skills to seek such a decisive battle. "A deep penetration would be difficult in maintaining supply link, while an exhausive pursuit would have no discernible target" The best alternative, thus, was to strengthen the defense perimeter with sizable forces and prepare for an eradicating battle which would come eventually. An unsucessful attack would shrink Li Chi-ch'ien's reputation and power and demoralized his followers. Such Tangut frustration would be further aggravated by that "no city and walled town could be used as permenant power base and ration center". Only under such condition and associated with proper intelligence, the Sung imperial army should covertly launch a muti-pronged attack encicling the adversary. HCP. chQan 35, p. 769. For similar opinion by another official, see HCP. chQan 44, p. 949. SS. chOan 485, p. 13987. Also, Li Tao recorded: "The emperor ordered several hundred Imperial guards practising crossbow archery at Political-eminence Chamber. Chang Fu was invited to attend the drill. Prior to this, as Li Yen-hsin (circa, late 10 c.) returned, the emperor sent Li Chi-ch'ien three stalwart bows of one shih and six tou. Li Chi-ch'ien anticipated the gift from the Emperor as merely deterrence instruments but not equiptable weapons. Now, seeing all these imperial guards could mount and shoot without difficulty, Chang was utterly astonished." HCP. chQan 37, p. 810. 195

u]iits.^° The Sung cavalry force, despite being underestimated by traditional historians, defeated Li Chi-ch'ien in 984.®^

In contrast, on the operational level, the Sung had to confront a series of obstacles.

As mentioned, because Li Chi-ch'ien's army was an army of irregulars, inferior in number, and rudimentary in equipment, he would avoid any open battle. It was difficiilt for the Sung to define an operational target in the Ordos after their occupation of Hsia- chou in 994. This became even more serious as the majority of Li Chi-ch'ien's army were mounted, with high maneuverability and thus almost impossible to find and fix. Victory or defeat hinged on proper intelligence, only obtained from Tangut secretly sworn to loyalty to K'aifeng. In 984 with the cooperation of Yun Hsien ( 923-994) and Ts'ao

Kuang-shih, the feasibility of penetration by light-horse units was proved. Nevertheless, even this successful penetration could not prohibit Li Chi-ch'ien from fleeing away, again.®^

Muti-pronged operations, then seemed to have the priority. Should the Sung have encircled Li Chi-ch'ien's army and forced him into open battle, the Sung would have had the advantage in technology and tactics. However, the unfavorable geography in the

Ordos Desert prevented effective coordination among the various battlegroups. During

In a meeting with his prime minister in 995, Sung Tai-tsung revealed his newly evolved tactics. He said: "Recently I have the supply units for Ling-chou divided into three bodies. Each transportation labor has a bow and a number of arrows for self-protection. In addition, I distributed abattis forchu-mat and crossbows of high grading soldiers. Whenever the brigands (Li Chi-ch'ien's army) comes, we protect our men with abattis, shot with the crossbows, and reserve infantry soldiers in array [for counterattack.] Could the officers have obeyed the discipline strictly, how possible could they be defeated?" HCP. chQan 39, p. 833. " HCP. chOan 25, p. 586; SS, chflan 485, p. 13984. 196

the Salt Lake Operation of996, only two of the five Sung battlegroups approached the two Salt Lakes defined as the target, with the rest losing their direction in the desert or returning too early.^^ In such an unfavorable terrain, conducting a simultaneous attack from different directions was by no means a easy task.

One intractable question for the Sung, however, was in its logistic transportation on ground, mainly food supply, which still relied on the back of humans and beasts for transport. Certainly, this problem was not to be solved by any premodem civilization.

According to Chuang Chuo (circa. 1067-1143?), there was only one harvest for wheat in a year and people built under-ground granary to store their surfeit.®^ Therefore, to procure provision in hostile area was difScult. The security of supply units in movement was a further impediment, which largely prevented the Sung army from penetrating deeply into the Ordos. During the tenth-century military rations had to be transported by conscript labor with no combat ability. For small amounts, the question would be moot. However, for the more than fifty thousand troops necessary to fight Li Chi-ch'ien in the Ordos, it

" See HCP. chQan 25, p. 586; SS, chOan 485, p. 13984. " Acknowledging disadvantages in conducting operation. Sung Tai-tsung in the sununer of 996 questioned the advocates of offense. See HCP. chOan 39, p. 833. However, as the situation in Ling-chou aggravated, the Emperor decided to attack and seize the Black and White Salt Lakes, the only vital economic base of Li Chi-ch'ien since he had lost of Hsia-chou in in 994. The Sung expeditionary army was divided into five temporary battie-groups. The first, based at Hsia-chou under Wang ^'ao, advanced from the east, which was associated by the second under Fan Ting-chao departing Yen-choul from the southeast. Meanwhile a third penetrating banle-group under Chang Shou-en from the northeast set out Lin- chou. The fourth battle-group under Ting Han marched out Ch'ing-chou from the west, who should cover the right frank of the fifth departed Huan-chou under Li Chi-lung from the northwest No oflical source revealed the total strength of all the five battie-groups. Li Chi-lung arbitrarily deviated from his assigned route, joining with Ting Han during the initial phase. The two generals lost in the desert, retruning without any contest with the enemy. Official historical source did not indicate why Chang Shou-en did not battle the Tanguts. HCP. chQan 40, pp. 850-51. Chuang Chuo (circa. 1067-1143), Chi-le pien (The Chicken's ribs, or Odds and Ends of Information), 197

was a significant burden. To protect such a slow and vulnerable body demanded

considerable forces of both foot and horse and this sizable escort, in return, required an

extraordinary food supply.This paradox determined the frequency and depth of Sung

penetration into the Ordos. In 995,Emperor Tai-tsung and his officials considered that

any large scale offensive was too risky and costly.How to effectively secure the supply

line of the expeditionary army into the Ordos Desert, as well as the garrisons of

Lingchou, became the crux of the problem.®®

As supply links were so vulnerable, K'aifeng's options would not be many.

Operations were seriously limited in space and time and vigorous strategic offensive

became unlikely. Thus, the remaining options at the theater strategy level were an active

defense or a perimeter defense. Should the Simg spend more effort to enhance its ability

to project power into the Ordos, or should it turn to strengthen its extensive border

defenses was pivotal question. Different strategic goals required different budgets and

plans for military establishment. For the former, the Sung ought to have increased its

(Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1983), chOan 1, pp. 16,34. Shen Kua, Mene-ch'i oi-fan chiao-chene chaan 11,419-20. Liang Keng-yao,"Pien-liang yOn-shu wen-fi yQ Pei-Sung ch'ien-cb'i tui Hsi Hsia cheng-ch'e te chuan- pien" (Issues on Food Transportation along The Frontier And The Alteration of The Early Sung Policy toward Hsi Hsia), in Shih-huo v26, no.7-8, (1987)7, p. 38-47. The price of rice in the city after 996 raised prodigiously to ten kuan (thousand) a tou. HCP. 42, p. 891. From another passage in HCP. chOan 60, p. 1335, which indicating the average profit of merchants shipping rice to Shensi, we knew the price of rice in Ling-chou was among the highest, worth one thousand for one tou. Losing rate was high during the operation. According to Li Chih, Ling-chou in 997 received only 60,000 of a total 400,000 shih at its departure. HCP. chOan 42, p. 985. Tien Hsi gave more enumerated description on the deficient logistic transport in 997. He said: "The recent food delivery [to Ling-chou] has cost more than 100,000 lives of the commoners. We eventually delivered 70,00-80,000 shih to the city out of a total of250,000 shih. " See HCP. chflan 41, pp. 873-74. 198

proportion of cavalry units in the Shensi theater.®^ For the latter, it ought to have

established a perimeter with a certain number of strongholds, well-protected and

supplied. By the 990s, cavahy advocates did not win the debate partially because of the

death of Ts'ao Kuang-shih, a capable light-horse commander who defeated Li Chi-ch'ien

in 984, and also because of the higher priority to employ cavalry xmits in Ho-pei theater.

The option of the perimeter defense would inescapably involve Ling-chou and whether the Sung should include Ling-chou within the defense perimeter. Actually, this

was tantamount to a choice between two concepts of the term, "defense"— namely, using

as much energy as possible to protect all the territory of the realm or concentrating effort to protect those territories which were economically and geographically favorable.

Unquestionably, the first approach put political sovereignty as its main concern.

According to the logic of theater strategy, the second approach was apparently more realistic.®®

Shensi, a highland of harsh climate and difficult terrain, became the main theater of the war. plains followed only the valleys of the Wei, Ching, Ma-ling, and Lo Rivers.®®

This watershed became the geographic boundary separating the four frontier circuits, from east to west, namely the Fu-Yen, Huan-Ch'ing, Ching-Yiian and Ch'in-Feng. The

The development of cavahy in the Shensi theater was once supported by Sung Ch'i. In 994 he submitted a memorial mentioning that there were friendly tribes along the route of500 li between Tung-yQan ChOn (later Huan-chou and the present Huan County) and Ch'ing-kang Pass (northwest of the present Huan County). They could provide hospitality to merchants as well as the Sung army. Thus, he suggested the employment of more Ugbt-horse units in this area. HCP. chOan 3S, p. 769. Luttwak, Strategtv: The Logic if War and Peace, pp. 126-27. This Lo River transversing Fu-yen circuit should be distinguished frvm the one in Honan, a southern branch of the Yellow River under the similar name. MCPT. chQan 3, p. 126. 199

Ch'in-ling Mountain Range and its extent averaged two thousand meters over the sea..

Their broken nature made movement outside the valleys and ofif the major roads,

generally following the valleys, nearly impossible. A network of major roads, following

the main river valleys, connected the most important Sung prefectures, Yen-chou 1,

Ch'ing-chou, Wei-chou (the present P'ing-Iiang County) and Ch'in-chou (the present

Pien-sui City). However, even on the major roads, movement of men and supplies

between the prefectures was slow.^° Considering that mountainous terrain was

unfavorable for cavalry, it is fair to regard the four circuits as the natural perimeter for the

Sung and much easier to defend than Ling-chou.

If Ling-chou could not be excluded, then the Sung perimeter had a gap of more

than 150 kilometers of direct distance from Huan-chou (the present Huan County, Kansu)

to the northwest,®^ or almost 300 kilometers from Wei-chou northward up to the Yellow

River. The geographic condition of Ling-chou prevented the Sung from conducting an

active defense and transporting sufficient supplies to the stronghold. The creation of a

Wang Yao-ch'en in 1042 indicated that it took almost ten days for a Sung relief force &om Ch'ing-chou to Yen-chou. In addition, according to Han Ch'i in 1043, regular units usually cost four days from Lung- chou to Ch'in-chou and six days from Wei-chou to Fort Shui-lo. See HCP. chOan 132, p. 3143, chOan 149, pp. 3065-66. In Sung Ch'i's memorial in 994, it took the Sung cavalry force from Huan-chou approximately five to seven days to approach Ling-chou. See HCP. chOan 35, p. 769. In Chang Chi's memorial in 996, the distance from Huan-chou to Ling-chou was more or less 700 H. HCP. chflan 39, p. 835. From Ling-chou to Huan-chou there were some smaller forts and depots. Ch'ing-ytlan Commandery was located one hundred kilometers southeast of Ling-chou. Between Lmg-chou and Ch'ing-ytian there were two forts. Fort Fu-lo (the present junction of Sweet Water River and Bitter Water River, Kansu) and Yao-te (south of the present Wu-chung county, Kansu). About the present day location of these forts, refer to Ch'en Shou-chung, "Pei- Sung shih chung-yQan fung hsi-yO te chi-t'iao tao-lu te fan-sho" in Ho-lune Shih-ti k'ao-shu. p. 225-237. After 995 a few Sung officials, as Cheng Wen-pao (953-1013) and Ho Liang, conceived the necissity of instantaneous fortification to secure the route. See Ho Liang's memorial, HCP. chQan 44, p. 949. However, these forts were vulnerable before the similar obstacle, namely the threat of starvatation, and the 200

military colony was theoretically feasible but, in actuality, fanning was vulnerable to the

Tangut cavalry.^^ Despite strenuous e£forts spent on the defense of Ling-chou, this salient was by no means safe without the protection of mountainous terrain.^^

From 998 to 1005 debate continued in court with advocates of a peaceful solution argiiing that the abandonment of Lin-chou would not hamper the integration of the Sung perimeter.®^ However, at the grand strategy level, the Sung could not allow the abandonment of Ling-chou. Ho Liang ( ca. late 10th century) indicated that the loss of

Ling-chou would jeopardize the Sung in three aspects. First, the economic resources of the city would enhance Li Chi-ch'ien's military capacity, and make the Hsi-hsia issue intractable. Second, it would undermine the balance of power in central Asia, creating an opportunity for Li Chi-ch'ien to unify the various "barbarian" regimes. Third, it would endanger the Sung-Tibetan horse trading route. Thus, under unfavorable conditions in

consequential difficulty to place sizable garrison. Farm land around Ling-chou was cultivated by the military in approximately 995. The Sung regional command created several thousand mou arable land by draining water from the Yellow River. WCCY. chQan 19, p. 945. " In 996, Chang Chi pointed out that Ling-chou was no longer a secure place because of the Tangut revolt. He further discussed the difficulties for reh'eving Ling-chou. In the memorial, he summarized these problems in four sectors. First, Ling-chou was a stronghold of the western front durmg the Tang dynasty because of the surounding alligiance Tangut tribes. The Tangut rebellion undoubdy threw the encicled city into panick. Second, the logistic transport fiY}m Huan-chou to Ling-chou was extremely difficult especially to cross the desert for seven hundred li. Water, food, and hospitality were all lacking. Third, the storage of food in Ling-chou had been depleting, preventing the city from resisting any longer. Fourth, massive conscription in interior China for restoring the supply of Ling-chou would jeopardize social stability. See HCP. chaan 35, pp. 835-838. Chang Chi's memoriaL HCP. chflan 39, pp. 836-37. HCP. chOan 44, pp. 947-48. As another advocate of the defense ofLing-chou, Liu Tsung (955-1015) argued that the abolition of Ling-chou would not contribute to the emancipation of the communes. On the contrary, without Ling-chou the court had to fortify YQan-chou, Wei-chou and the various prefectures in the vicinity, that efforts "would cost ten times than that of the defense of Ling-chou." HCP. chOan 50, p. 1099. 201

operations and logistics, neither Sung Tai-tsung nor Sung Chen-tsung could order the

retreat from Ling-chou.

When Li Chi-ch'ien lay siege to Ling-chou in 996, food, escorted by troops, was

transported through the Han-hai Desert Unfortunately, due to mishandled tactics beside

the P*u-Io River, the Sung lost a food supply worth 400,000 shih. The aggravated

situation in Ling-chou compelled a reluctant Emperor Tai-tsung to take a radical action

in 996. He organized the Salt Lake Operation, a five-pronged campaign targeted on the

two salt-lakes, which were the only natural trade resource for the Tanguts. Li Chi-ch'ien

abandoned the salt-lakes to the Simg expeditionary army but in return harassed its supply

line. The Sung expeditionary forces won several tactical victories,®^ but its ultimate strategic goal, the withdrawal of Li Chi-ch'ien's army from Ling-chou, was not achieved.

98

The Sung fiasco under Commander Pai Shou-yung (circa. lO-l 1 c.) beside P'u-Io River was a result of a series of tactical errors. The Emperor criticized: "However, all the commanders and the officers were too pompous and presumptuous to follow my instruction. As the enemy suddenly stormed, our army had failed to position heavy equipments in the right place. Shortly thereafter, panick wildly spread out within the conscriptive labor and immediately ensued in a fatal disarray. Evidently the defeat was not due to any fallacy of the plan but an aberration to my original instructfon." HCP. chfian 39, p. 833. According to Fan Ting-chao and Wang Ch'ao's reports, the Sung battle-groups under the Hsia-chou (Wang Ch'ao) and Yen-chou (Fan Ping-chao) fivnts defeated Li Chi-ch'ien's amry in the Black and White Lakes, with 5,000 enemies beheaded, two thousand captives. Among the hostages there were 27 chieilans ranking Masters and Cottunanders." The Sung army alw captured 2,000 horses and more than 10,000 equipments of diferent sorts. HCP. chOan 40, pp. 850-52. Several perilous moments occurred when the Sung army retreated. Two Sung corps lost their routes in the Ordos desert, one retreated in front of the Tanguts, and two others could not stay any longer after occupying the Salt Lakes. At this moment Li Chi- ch'ien launched a counterattack against the Sung body under Wang Ch'ao. Wang and his peers survived thank for a strict military discipline. HCP. chflan 40, pp. 851- 852. Apparently the Emperor and General Li Chi-lung shared a different understanding to the plan. Li Chi- lung gave more priority in chosing a much viable route toward the salt lakes. However, this decision gave up the last Sung opportunity for reinforcing Ling-chou. HCP. chQan 40, p. 851. 202

Even the emperor's acknowledging the strategic value of Ling-chou could not enhance its priority. Considering the unwavering Khitan threat on the eastern &ont from

998 to 1004, the Sung hardly had a free hand to wrestle with Li Chi-ch'ien. Rather, it had to avoid any lavish effort, depleted on the western front, to provide more effort exerted on the east to withstand the Khitan invasion. In short, Shensi was a minor theater which

K'aifeng could not afford extensive and constant military engagement. Even in late 1001, the gravest moment determining the fate of Ling-chou, the Sung could only concentrate slightly more than 100,000 troops in the theater.®® As a result, Ling-chou fell in 1002.^°°

Like this Sung military failure, economic boycott did not succeed either.

Economic warfare against Hsi-hsia was at first proposed by Cheng Wen-pao ( 953-1013), the fiscal intendant of Shensi. According to him, a prohibition of the sale of green salt, the only lucrative commodity of Hsi-hsia's export, would cut the lifeblood of Li Chi- ch'ien's regime. However, as economic interaction conveyed mutual profits, the embargo was two-edged impairing the commercial activities of the Tangut people loyal to the

Sung. As a result, thousands of marauding Tanguts and Tibetans attacked the Sung prefectures. Sung Pai-tsimg immediately ceased the boycott and had his top strategic

In late 1001, Emperor Chen-tsung appointed Wang Ch'ao as Supreme Director of Operation of the Western Front," with sixty thousand infantry and cavalry soldiers to relief Ling-chou. HCP. chQan SO, p. 1103. Ten days later, the Emperor in addtion appointed Chang Ch'i-hsien as Theater Commander (ching- laeh-shih). Secretary Tseng Chih-yao ( 947-1012) reminded Chang ch'i-hsien with the necessity to clarify the authority of field comand. He said:"Now there are 100,000 soldiers on the western front, and Wang Ch'ao has already been their director of operation. Do you think it is possible to make him obey a central official?" HCP. chOan 51, p. 1108. At the same time, the emperor assigned Sun Ch'Qan-chao leading a force consist of twenty thousand soldiers and laborors fh>m Ho-tungto fortify Sui-chou 1. However, this force with particular task was not likely to stay in this theater for long. HCP, ChQan 51, p. 1118. 203

advisor Ch'ien Jo-shui appointed as commisisonerto alleviate the situation. However, as military confrontation escalated from 995 to 1001, the green salt boycott was renewed sporadically.^"^

It is the nature of a trade war that the country relying the more on trade is more adversely afTected. On the surface, it would seem that Hsi>hsia economy would not be as sustainable as the Sung. However, by the 990s the gradual deteriorating social order in the western half of the Sung domain made embargo a highly dubious policy. From 965 to

1000 Szuchwan suffered from three large-scale rebellions, namely by Ch'uen Shih-hsiung

(d. 966) in 965-66, Wang hsiao-po (d. 994) and Li Shun (d. 994) from 993 to 995,"^

Miyazaki Ichisada, "Sei-Ka no koki to sei-haku-en mondai", in Asiatica. v. I, (Kyoto: Dohosha, first edition in 1959, third edition in 1979), pp. 293-310. Liao Lung-sheng, "Sung-Hsia kuan-hsi chung te ch'ing-pai-yen en-fi", in Shih-huo. vJ. no. 10, (1976) 1, pp. 14-21. Ch'Qan Shih-hsiung was originally a military officer of the Later Shu. Surrendering to the Sung force in 964, Ch'Qan and his colleagues soon discovered the covetousness of their new masters. Unwilling to see their homeland being pillaged, Ch'Qan organized his peers in an uprising. It costed the Sung army twenty months to suppress the rebels. Sec HCP. chQan 6-7, pp. 148-183. In 993 Szechwan suffered fix)m an unanticipated drought that caused numerous free peasants becoming refugees. The government, instead of offering partial exemption of tax, imposed new tax on tea. Wang Hsiao-po, a bankrupted tea merchant, revolted with one hundred followers. His men eliminated the Sung adminstration and local defense in several counties, and once defeated the imperial garrision. When Wang was stained in a battle in early 994, his position was succeeded by Li Shun. Li Shun seemed to have more distinguished military talents than Wang, gaining several victories during the spring. Shortly thereafter his men prodigiously grew in numbers and overran the whole teritorry of Szechwan. Li Shun immediately proclaimed as "King of the Great Shu". According to the leader's slogan, "equality of wealth", Li Shun's followers re-distributed food, lands, horses, and wagons to the poor. Numistic evidence suggests that they even attempted to establish a coinage system. Greatly astonished. Emperor Tai-tsung immdiately appointed his eunuch-general Wang Chi-en ( d. 999) to crack down the uprising with a sizable force. Without acknowledging the gravity of reinforcing the northern pernneter along moutains, Li Shun was drawn into a decisive open battle wnth the Sung imperial army. Outside Ch'eng-tu, Li Shun encountered a cataclysmic fiasco, losing the lives of30,000 men including himself. Several Li Shun's follower's managed their resistance in other prefectures up to 99S. The study of Wang Hsiao-po and Li Shun was first led by Chang Yin-lin, "Sung-ch'u Wang Hsiao-po Li Shun chfli-luan", in Ch'ine-hua hsfleh-oao. v. 12, no. 2, (1937), also in SSYCC. v.l, (first edition in 1958, second edtion in 1980), pp. 251-71. Mainland historians have made a huge effort on the studies of such an illustrative event of peasant uprising, summarize in Chou Pao-chu and Ch'en Chen, Chien-mine Sune-shih (A Short History of Sung), (Beijing; People's Press, 1985) pp. 43-45. 204

and finally by Wang Chfin in 1000. Uniest caused by conscripted labors and drudgery for logistic transportation and boundary fortification in Shensi also alanned K'aifeng.^°^ To that end, demands for emancipation restrained K'aifeng rulers from frequent military action and rigid trading restrictions.

In spite of unpropitious social and economic conditions, the Simg had more political reasons to maintain a rigid posture on the western front as long as possible.

When Chang Chi, a famous pacifist of the early Sung, urged Sung Tai-tsung to abandon

Ling-chou in 996, he was peremptorily rejected by the Emperor: "I do not imderstand a single word in your memorial".Such a sioprisingly impolite response to a memorial by a Sung emperor was scarcely seen. Although inadequate reference did not allow an interpretation of the emperor's motivation for this rude reply, there were sufficient political reasons for the Emperor to repudiate a peacefiil solution. First, the Tangut shifting between the Sung and Liao had increased K'aifeng's suspicion.^°^ Second, Hsia- chou independence might set an anomalous precedent from China's practice of "loose control". If K'aifeng failed to pimish Li Chi-ch'ien, its incapability to subdue an unbridled tribal leader would be made manifest. Li Chi-ch'ien's rapacious territorial appetites, represented in even greater relief by the deteriorating siege of Ling-chou, brought a third barrier to any peace solution. Thus, pacifism was not as much a favored policy as that

Liang Keng-yao, "Pien-Uang yOn-shu wen-tfi yU Pei-Sung ch'ien-ch'i tui Hsi Hsia cheng-ch'e te chuan- pien". HCP. chQan 39, p. 838. The memorial by Ho Liang, HCP. chQan 44, p. 948. HCP. chaan 44, p. 948. Also, memorial by Li Chi-ho, SS, chQan 257, p. 8970. 205

on the eastern firont

Now it is possible to make a comprehensive conclusion on the situation of the

western &ont at the end of the tenth century. By its unique nature of war, the violence

along the western fix)nt was a war against minority independence. Li Chi-ch'ien, the

capable Tangut leader, carefiiUy manipulated violence as a way to open the path for

political independence. The Sung confronted an adversary who had not suffered from a

prolonged, devastating and indecisive war during the whole tenth century, and thus

lacked a profound abrogating perception towards war. Peace and diplomatic negotiation,

determined by the nature of this conflict, became merely an apparatus to gain time for

more war preparation. The Simg had the indisputable superiority in nimiber of troops.

However, problems amalgamated at the various strategy levels. Simg technology and

tactical advantages were not operative in the environment of military engagement.

Economic and social conditions did not serve its political imperative. The Sung fought a two-front war and in the over-all K'aifeng strategic consideration, Shensi was of secondary importance. Thus, it became impossible to concentrate a suf5ciently large military effort to seek a decisive victory, neither was it large enough to secure a stable peace.

The Early Triumph of Indirect Approach

This chapter should have concluded with the above paragraph if Li Chi-ch'ien had not been slained by a Sung conspiracy and if two strategists, namely Li Chi-ho (963-

1008), and Ts'ao Wei( 973-1030), had not served the Sung so well. As repeatedly seen in 206

history, indirect strategy has usually flourished in a theater not receiving sufficient

attention or prioriQr. An insufficiency of manpower and resotirces has always compelled

plaimers to think. From 996 to 1004, a changeover of K'aifeng strategy occurred in

gradual stages. Prior to 996, despite unfavorable factors nullifying superior technology

and tactics, the Sung army eagerly sought the opportunity to eliminate Li Chi-ch'ien in a

single battle. However, after 996, generals on the westem front were required to

accomplish as much as possible with limited efforts. Only through an indirect strategy

could the Sung reconcile what was militarily feasible and what was the political

imperative.

Thus, the Sung strategic solution relied more and more on political and diplomatic

maneuvering rather than on military activities. In certain respects, it was a continuation of

the traditional wisdom, "using one barbarian against another barbarian" accompanied by

its corollary policy, "loosed control". The fundamental reason of this strategy was the

realization of the unequal distribution of wealth and bitter resentment among the nomadic

tribes. In traditional practice, if the central government enfeoffed a powerful tribal leader and bestowed considerable economic reward, this relationship would strengthen his leadership status. This so-called "loose control", or in Chinese chi-mi was by its nature mutually profitable. Considering the economic gap between the steppe and interior China, such aids were indispensable in preventing raids and armed conflict. With a regular economic distribution from China, the domestic stability of the khagnate could be secured especially in the khan's power to redistribute the largesse to his subjects. This was the 207

Chinese key to achieve certainty in foreign afifars. Whenever a hostile power emerged on the steppe, the Chinese central government could have a filial subject to pit against the non-af51iated one. At least the court could use the filial subject as a buffer until some counterpart emerged to re-enact the chi-mi relation. If the "barbarian" leader had too strong a political ambition to be "loosely controlled", then the court, such as the early

Sung, had to employ the so-called policy of "using one barbarian against another barbarian". In this situation, an offer of an impressive title to a lesser chieftain and certain reward would create suspicion or even trigger an outburst of violence between the lesser chieftain and the khan. The dispute over pastoral land was also a usual cause of steppe war. Thus, "loosely control" seemed to be the normal practice with which China preferred to create a stable, unified steppe empire. However, as steppe antagonisms became clearly discernible, the strategic interests of China tumed to the disintegrating situation of the

Gobi, Ordos, Ch'inghai and Manchurieu

An opportunity of employing such an indirect strategy emerged when Li Chi- ch'ien's army approached Liang-chou in early 1004. Now the Tangut independence leader was compelled to confiront not only Sung China, but also Tibet. The Sung diplomatic and strategic principle, "using one barbarian against another barbarian" was first mentioned by Wang Yu-ch'eng and then by Chao P'u, Chang Ch'i-hsien and Ho Liang.^°® P'an Lo- chih, the Six Valley Tibetan chieftain in Liang-chou, became the focal point of the Sung strategy. When Li Chi-ch'ien siezed Ling-chou in 1002, he menaced the Tibetan route for 208

horse trading to K'aifeng.^"^ Partially, because of economic reasons and ostensibly

because of the security of the Six Valleys, P'an Lo-chih made a distinct gesture in favor

of the Sung. In 1003, the Sung court accepted Chang Ch'i-hsien's suggestion and

enfeoffed P'an Lo-chih as Great Chieftain of the Six Valleys, Military Governor of So-

fang Commandery, and Supreme Patrolling Inspector of the Westward of Ling-chou.^^°

Thus, P'an Lo-chih pretended to surrender to Li Chi-ch'ien in 1004 and then followed

with a surprise attack. Incredibly enough Li was fatally wounded.

Nevertheless, Sung indirect strategy did not seem to have a defined long-term

goal. On the eastern front, the Sung objective was clear, namely, the recovery of the lost

territory from Khitan. When this became unlikely, the Sung turned to maintain peacefiil

relationship without fiirther relinquishing territory. However, on the western front neither

Sung Tai-tsung nor Sung Chen-tsimg ever expressed what might be the favorable

condition to end the war. Lack of a clear picture for what should and could be achieved

on the western front is vividly reflected in Sung Pai-tsxmg's behavior. His straddling any

strategic aim from a reintroduction of the previous "loosely controlled" order to the

complete elimination of Li Chi-ch'ien's influence failed to give direction to his

commanders. Nor did Sung Chen-tsung's attitude toward the Hsi-hsia reflected any strategic consistency. When Pan-lo-chi proposed a crossing attack to recover Ling-chou

-o® HCP. chflan 44, p. 951, chOan 49, pp. 1076.1079, chOan 51, p. 1122. Maeda provided a chronological chart on the horses tribute, see pp. 430-36. In 1001 the Sung assigned P'an Lo-chih as Defense Comissioner of Yen-chou, now promoted him to the rank of military governor, see HCP. chOan 49, p. 1079, SS, chOan 492, pp. 14155-56. HCP. chflan 56, p. 1228, SS, chOan 485, pp. 13988-89, and v.493, p. 14156. 209

in 1004, Chen-tsung's reply lacked enthusiam.

Even though the Sung had outstanding miitary strategists, it could not gain the strategic initiative on the western front in such an indecisive atmosphere. The death of Li

Chi-ch'ien marked an end to the Sung plot aimed at the elimination of Li Chi-ch'ien's clan. In lOOS the Sung turned its attention to preventing P'an Lo-chih from too powerful.

The Sung reply to his report of victory was indeed extraordinary, saying that the Sung army woiild prefer waiting until Li Chi-ch'ien's corpse was buried.^^^ On his death bed,

Li Chi-ch'ien urged his son Ah-i-k'o to surrender in good faith to Sung Chen-tsimg, "if one request was rejected, then cry out one hundred times".^^^ Initially, Chen-tsimg urged ah-i-k'o to return Ling-chou and send a son as hostage. However, as a result of anxiety toward the imminent expansion of the Six Valley Tibetans, the K'aifeng ruler allowed

Ah-i-k'o to keep all his territory. Ah-I-k'o was given a Chinese name, Chao Te-ming

(980-1031), with his title, King of Hsi-p'ing^^^ and the Hsi-hsia survived.

Sung Chen-tsung's toleration of the Hsi-hsia occupation of Ling-chou was not compatible with the strategic principle of "using one barbarian against another barbarian".

Despite the Sung repeatedly insisting that the manipulation of the balance of power among barbarian tribes was the way to ensure China's security, the feasibility of that idea hinged on maintaining a balance of power in Ho-hsi. However, the irony was that the strategic triangle in Ho-hsi comprised by Liang-chou, Kan-chou and Sha-chou, could not

-^=See HCP. chOan 56. pp. 1228,1236, 1240. Also, SHY. v.l95, geography 21, p. 7670. SS, chaan 282, p. 9555. HCP. chOan 56, p. 1228, chOan 63, pp. 1402, 1413, 1419-20, chOan 64, pp. 1424, 1428. 210

be maintained without an immolested route through Ling-chou to the interior of China.

Any interdiction of the trading route would precipitate general economic decline of the

Tibetan and Uighur kingdoms. The mere absence of Li Chi-chien did not mean that the strategic balance destroyed by his ovemming Ling-chou could be recovered.

Without Ling-chou, the Sung perimeter had to retreat more than 100 kilometers.

Foreseeing the fall of Ling-chou in 1002, Sung general Li Chi-ho envisaged that confrontation in the future might occur along Liu-p'en Mountain, a natural boundary separating Sung and Hsi-hsia. This vision gave impetus to his persistent request for establishing and solidifying the perimeter around the Subduing Barbarian Commandery

(the present Ku-Yiian County, Kansu), the sole stronghold on the only viable route from

Ling-chou to the interior passing through the Liu-p'enMountain. The successful fortification of Chun-jimg protected the whole Ching-Yuan circuit, composed by Wei- chou, Ching-chou (approximately the present Ching-ch'uen County, Kansu), Yi-chou (the present Hua-t'ing County, Kansu), and Yuan-chou (the present Chen-YOan Coimty,

Kansu).^^^ Similarly, Ts'ao Wei, as the Pacification Intendent (or An-fu-shih)of Ch'in- chou boundary, extended the defense perimeter along the southern bank of the Wei River, so as to create a strategic outpost \^ch was utilized by Wang Hsao's Hsi-ho campaign after a half of century.^^® Ts'ao Wei founded another outpost in Fort Lung-kan, called Te- shun Commandery later (the present day Lung-te Coimty), which became an extreme

HCP. chQan 50, pp. 1090-91. ' Refer to Chapter Ten of the dissertation. 211

important salient in the Sung-Hsia war in the 1040s. By this seemingly unpretentious effort, Li and Ts'ao actually redefined the Sung defense perimeter in the Shensi theater on more favorable terrain dominating several pivotal points for defensive warfare and counterattack in the future.

More important was an integrative idea and attitude devised by Li and Ts'ao to handle "boundary affairs" (pien-shih), combining economic, political and strategic interests. This effected only those tribes having considerable strength as suggested at an early phase by Ho Ch'eng-chu.^^® Unlike the previous practice, Ts'ao Wei actualized a new interpretation of the concept. For among the scattered Tangut and Tibetan tribes, mere political recognition was not sufScient to create squabbles between "barbarians" and increase mutual distrust. In Ts'ao Wei's idea, the Simg government should offer packaged protection to small Tibetan and Tangut tribes along the border, including trade, fortification engineering, and formal political recognition of the chiefs as Sung officers.^^® Associated as auxiliaries, tribes strengthened the Sung perimeter.

Although the above strategy was not completely successful, especially considering the fall of Ling-chou, they provided the essence of inspiration for the next generation.

In a broader respect, those ideas on how to handle "boundary affairs" set forth an extremely cautious and sophisticated application of the indirect strategic approach, which

Refer to Chapter Six and Seven. HCP. chQan 47, p. 1010, chOan 63, p. 1404. --- The Tribal auxiliary force was founded by Ts'ao Wei. See Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen- chiu", (A Study of Military System in Northern Sung China), New Asian Journal. 3(1957)1, pp. 167-270. See Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, p. 214. Li Hua-jui, "Pei-Sung Fan-ping Se-chih shih-chien k'ao" Chune-kuo-shih 212

provided the rationale for the Sung empire to safeguard its western &ont and relative

interests at a minimum cost They defined the use of indirect strategy compatible to the

Sung non-aggressive policy, not antagonizing the pacifists nor arguing for a higher

strategic priority of the eastern fiont This marked the first acceptance of the principle of

"avoid exertion in huge efforts" as the primary assumption of strategic planning for the

western front. This behavior set the mode for the Northern Simg military strategists— to convincingly caution and prevent the rulers and politicians of the devastating use of force.

ven-chiu. 4 (1990), p. 33. HCP. chQan 50, p. 1092. 213

Chapter 6. War and Peace from 1038 to 1045

Contrary to the Sung rulers expected, the Hsi-Liang Incident and Li Chi> ch'ien's death did not return the Ho-hsi Corridor to tranquillity for long. On the western fi-ont, the peace of 1005 was a paradoxical one. After missing the opportunity to eliminate the Hsi Hsia in 1005, the Sung and Hsi Hsia seemed to co-exist in serenity. However, this was merely a forlorn hope for the Sung.

The renewal of armed conflict between the Sung and Hsi Hsia provides an analysis of the strategic aspects of the war from 1038 to 1045. Section A delineates the background of Hsi Hsia aggression after the peace of 1005, while Section B focuses on the poor war preparation of the Sung in Shensi. Section C has specific interest in the operation warfare of Wei-ming Yuan-hao. The diplomatic and political impact of these battles on the Sung-Liao relation reflected in the Kuanan Crisis is the topic of Section D.

Section E offers a marcoscope exploration of the limitations of Wei-ming Yiian-hao's military success and a grand strategy evaluation on the Sung, Liao and Hsi Hsia from

1042 to 1045. Section F provides a brief account of the emergence and growth of a fourth player of international power politics, the Koknor Tibetan Kingdom.

Li Te-ming's Aggression Against Ho-hsi Corridor

In the records of Sung scholars, Li Te-ming was known for his ostentatious obedience and conscious self refrain from antagonism. "For more than thirty years, there was only farming and no war making on the frontier, with rice and corns flourished like a 214

host of clouds."^ Sung records tend to describe Li Te-ming as having an undeviating

allegiance to the Sung and bitterly contrast his fealty with the bellicose attitude of his son

Wei-ming YQan-hao. Li Te-ming acknowledged that the communes needed to be

emancipated from the devastating war and appreciated that the Sung annual reward

enhanced the life of his people.^

There is no problem in regarding Wei-ming YQan-hao as Sung antagonist.

However, evidence does not identifying Li Te-ming as an unwavering loyalist of the

Sung. Contrary to his supposed loyalty toward the Sung, Li Te-ming did not conceal his ambition toward the minority regime of Liang-chou, Kan-chou and Sha-chou.^ Hsi Hsia

Generals Su Shou-hsin (d. 1016) and Chang P'u were seemingly assigned as commanders against Liang-chou and fCan-chou. In Tibetan records, Su was repeatedly described as originally a Liang-chou resident who served the Tangut army as officer.'' In 1007, Li Te-

Fan Chung-yen (989-1052), Fan Wen-chene-kung chi [Collected works of Fan Chung-yen], in Shih-pu ts'ung-k'an ch'u-pien. (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1965), v.45, chaan 9, p. 76 ' In Li Tao's account, Li Te-ming once advised YQan-hao; "A prolonged war can only exhausted our force but gained nothing. For thirty years our tribes have been wearing silk cloths. This is the benevolence of the Son of Heaven of Holy Sung and we ought not betray it." However, Wei-ming YQan-hao rebutted, "Wearing fur coats and breeding cattle are natural customs ofournomadic people. A monarch ought to pursue power. What one can do with these luxury silksl" HOP. chOan 111, pp. 2593-94. Also, SS, chQan 485, p. 13993. About the different attimdes of the father and son, also see Wu Tien-ch'ih, Hsi Hsia shih- kao. pp. 27-30. Pai Pin, YQan-hao chuan. (A Biography of Wei-ming YQan-hao), (Ch'ang-ch'un: Chilin chiao-yQ, 1988), pp. 25-27. Li Fan-wen, "Lun Hsi Hsia yO Sung te kuan-hsi", in Li Fan-wen, Hsi Hsia Yen- chiu lun-chi. (Collected Studies on Hsi Hsia). (Yin-ch'um: Ning-Hsia jen-min, 1983), pp. 56-57. For a Sung forecasting of Wei-ming YQan-hao's attitude, see Su Shih (1037-1101), Tung-po chih-lin, (Recollections), with Ch'ou-ch'ih oi-chi (Notes Written at Ch'ou-ch'ih), (Shanghai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta- hsQeh ch'u-pan se, punctuated ed., 1983) vJ, p. 115. Also, MCPT. chOan 9,389-390. ^ Recent scholars have paid more attention to Li Te-ming's bellicose activities toward Ho-hsi. See Maeda (1964), pp. 450-53, pp. 466-67, pp. 494-50L Wang Chung, "Lun Hsi Hsia te hsing-ch'i", pp. 7-10. Chu Ch'i-yQan, ChQeh-ssu-lo— Sung-tai tsang-chu cheng-ch'Qan (ChQeh-ssu-lo~ A Tibetan Regime during Sung China), (Hsi-ning: Ch'ing-hai jen-min, 1988) p. 88. Ch'ien Po-ch'Oan, "Hsi Hsia tui shih-ch'ou-chih-lu te ching-ying chi-ch'i ch'iang-sheng", in Hsi-nei min-chu ven-chiu. (1993) v.2. pp. 40-51. * There was no biographical source about Su Shou-hsin. In HCP. SHY, and ^ Su was introduced as a 215

ming personally conducted a full-scale offensive against the Tibetan kingdom in Liang-

chou, in retaliation of his father's death. This campaign was aborted with the Uighur

intervention from Kan-chou.^ Afterwards, Su Shou-hsin emerged as an active agent

conducting a number of incursions harassing the trading route through Liang-chou.^ Su

was defeated in 1013 by P'an Lo-chih's brother, Shih-to-tu (c.a. early 11 c.), who was elected as the ruler of the Six Valleys. Despite never clearly recorded, a tremendous change seemingly occurred in 1015 when Su Shou-hsin drove the Tibetans out of Liang- chou and completely interdicted the trading route of Kan-chou to interior China.^ After his death in 1016, Liang-chou fell in the hands of the Uighurs and his son Su Lo-Ii (c.a. early 11 c.), continued the struggle.®

native of Hsi-Liang (Liang-chou) and a captain (chQn-chiao) under Li Te-ming. See SHY, v. 197, Barbarian 4, pp. 7702-03. Summarized report is also seen in HCP. chOan 85, pp. 1951-52, and ^ chQan 490. pp. 14116. ' Wu Kuang-ch'eng, Hsi Hsia Shu-shih. (hereafter as HHSS). (in 1007). Chang Ch'i-hsien indicated that Hsi Hsia once took Liang-chou in 1007 or 1008, with Vice Military Governor Che-pu YU-lung-po (ca. early 11th century) and all locals subjugated. See HCP. chOan 68, p. 1538. ^ See SHY, p. On the sporadic hostility between Su Shou-hsin and the Uighurs, See SHY, v. 197, Barbarian 4, pp. 7702-03, v. 195, geography 21, p. 7658. Su Shou-hsin's strength was recorded as containing seventy soldiers and fifty horses. In Li Tao's account, Su Shou-hsin's troops were recorded as "seven thousand soldiers and five thousand horses." Refer to HCP. chflan 85, pp. 1951-52. This is probably a mistake on the duplication of SHY from "thousand" to "ten". An invading host with merely seventy men could inflict no menace to the Uighurs. From these hints, it seems reasonable to consider Su Shou-hsin a crucial figure for Hsi Hsia's effort to control the Silk Road. Maeda, pp. 450-53,494-501. ' It seems that a radical change occurred in Ho-hsi's political geography by 1015 and 1016. As we have already discussed, Su Shou hsin raided Kan-chou, getting the opportunity at the death of the Uighur's Precious Princess. However, according to an Uighur delegation arriving K'aifeng in early 1017, the Khan, Yeh-lo Wu, and his adversary, Su Shou-hsin, were all death one year before. The emissary informed the Sung court that Yeh-lo Ko, the son of old khan, had ascend the ttone, while on the opposite side Su Lo-Ii, an adopted son of Su Shou-hsin, assumed the prefect of Liang-chou. See SHY, v.197, Barbarian 4, p. 7703. In 1016, the Yeh-lo Ko laimched a counter attack toward Liang-chou, killed 200 soldiers of the Su family and took the prefecture. Su Lo-Ii did not succeed twice in regaining Liang-chou by 1017. From 1016 to 1028 Liang-chou was primary under the Uighur controL See HHSS. chflan 10, p. 122. 216

Apparently the Uighurs were much more formidable. In 1008, Li Te-ming deputed his fathers favorite, Chang P'u to vanquish the periphery of Kan-chou and was defeated by the Uighur Khan, Ye-Io-wu (d. 1016).' In the aftermath Wan Tzu (c.a. early

11 c.), another Hsi Hsia general, was assigned to launch a surprise attack on Kan-chou, encountering humiliating fiasco.^" Li Te-ming's frantic attempt led to his third offensive, again engineered by Chang P'u in 1009, with an army numbering 20,000 troops. Without exception this campaign was reported as unsuccessiul.^^ It seems to suggest that the considerable military strength of the Uighurs was still an obstacle to the ambitious Hsi

Hsia.

In the second decade of the eleventh century, Li Te-ming's offense started to pay­ off. The Six Valleys Tibetans were completely defeated and the blockade of the Ho-hsi corridor suffocated Uighur trading. After 1011, the Uighur emissary to K'aifeng turned to a new route through Chimg-ko City, the present day Lo-tu County, Ch'inghai.^^ As a prince-commander, Wei-ming Yuan-hao eventually succeeded in a surprise onslaught on

Kan-chou in 1028, overthrowing Uighur domination of the eastern Ho-hsi corridor for one and a half century. Kua-chou and Su-chou capitulated as a consequence. Hsi Hsia accomplished its annexation of the whole Ho-hsi conidor except Sha-chou, resisting up

- HCP, chQan 68, pp. 1520-21. See HCP. chQan 68, p. 1528. SS, chQan 490, p. 14115. '' HHSS. ChQan 9, pp. 107-08. "SS. chOan 490, p. 14116-17. SHY, v. 197, Barbarian 4, pp. 7702-03. In HCP the year of Hsi Hsia annexation of Kan-chou was not clearly recorded. Li Tao placed the event in the passage at Wei-ming YOan-hao's succession in 1032. See HCP. chQan 111, pp. 2593-94. According to ^ chQan 485, p. 13992, Wei-ming YQan-hao surprised Kan-chou in 1028. 217

to 1052.^*According to Wei-ming YOan-hao's design, the Sung empire was his next target.

The Vulnerable Sung Frontier

When Li Te-ming died in 1032, Wei-ming Yuan-hao ascended the throne as King of Hsi-p'ing and replaced his Chinese surname Li with a Tangut one, Wei-ming. In late

1038, he proclaimed himself as emperor and informed the Sung court in early 1039, asking for recognition. Wei-ming Yuan-hao's envoy declined the Sung emperor's edict and gifts on his departure.^^ Hostility broke out.

The incident immediately threw the Sung court into utter astonishment. Horse carriages of the prime ministers rushed toward the Imperial City. As criticized by Fu Pi

(I004-I083), Supervisor of the Imperial Advisory OfSce, no one in the decision-making process could have foreseen the outburst even though evidence had been ample and ominous.^® The central authority merely closed the border trading center at Pao-an

See HCP, chQan 131, p. 3115, SS, chQan 485, p. 13994.. Li Tao recorded a fiili translation of Wei-ming YQan-hao's letter in Chinese, see HCP. chQan 123, pp. 2893-94. The Sung Military Bureau did not express a united response to the attitude of the Hsi Hsia envoy. Two councilors, Wang Te-yung (987-1065) and Ch'en Chih-chung (991-1059), suggested to have the envoy decapitated, while two others, Sheng Tu (ca. early 11th century) and Chang Kuan (ca. late 10th- early I Ith century) opposed. Finally the Sung court let the envoy leave with all their gifts returned. HCP. chQan 123, p. 2894. In Fu Pi's memorial dated late 1039, he explained the forseeability of the outbreak with six indicators. First, prior to his succession, Wei-ming YQan-hao had advised Li Te-ming not to obey K'aifeng. Second, Wei-ming YQan-hao had exerted huge effort in intelUgence collection from merchants and dismissed palace maidens, with especial interest in the Sung geography and court life. Third, the Sung failure of suppressing his grandfather Li Chi-ch'ien might encourage the young Tangut ruler. Fourth, a Sung emissary observed a strong uncomfortable feeling of Wei-ming YQan-hao when he bent his knee to receive the imperial edict. This might indicate that the Tangut King had already proclaimed himself as emperor in his own court. Fifth, Wei-ming YQan-hao recruited a defected Sung military officer, Cheng Mei (ca. mid 11 th cenniry) and several scholars who had failed the Sung civil service examination and employed them 218

Commandery (present day Cbih-tan County), took away all the official positions and titles previously given to Wei-ming Yuan-hao, and posted a bounty for his head.^^

Officials in the Bureau Military Affairs discussed whether the Sung should have the

Tangut envoy beheaded. The lapse in protocol hinged on a traditional exemption of death of enemy envoys. Others put forward a plot to assassinate the envoy and have it appear as an accident.^® Nevertheless, they still lacked a plan for war.

Sung officials at Yen-chou should have known Yiian-hao's intent. Shortly before the break of relations and outbreak of war, Wei-ming Yuan-hao's uncle, Chao Shan-yu

(1038) attempted to defect to the Sung, but Sung commanders did not offer hi'm asylum.^® The ofBcials in Shensi remained stupefied in procrastination without increasing its defense effort. Some particular army units under brave officers were of high morale, such as the men under Kuo Chun (1040), Hsu Huai-te (ca. mid 11th c.) and Shih

Chi (ca. mid-1 Ic.). However, the general undoing of the Sung army was easily proved.

Chang K'ang (994-1056), a civilian commander reported that there were an average of

as political and military advisors. Last, Wei-ming YQan-hao had recently renewed the matrimonial alliance with the Liao. With all these aspects, Fu Pi concluded that Wei-ming YQan-hao had had a plan to antagonize Sung China for sometime. HCP. chQan 124, pp. 2925-27. Also, SMCCL chQan 131, 7a-30a. HCP. chQan 123, pp. 2896,2913. HCP. ChQan 123, pp. 2894, chQan 124,2926. Chao Shan-yQ, Commanders of Hsi Hsia Left Wing Army, was an essential remonstrator of Wei-ming YQan-hao's aggressive attitude toward Sung China. Because of Wei-ming YOan-hao's execution of several dissident chieftains, Shan-yQ started to seek asylum from the Sung. He paid Li Shih-pin (ca. mid 11th century), a Sung tribal auxiliary commander precious gems for arrangement, but Li merely received the bribe and reported nothing to the superior. When Shan-yQ rushed into the Sung boundary with 32 kinsmen and relatives, the Sung commanders, Kuo Ch'Qan (ca. late lOth-mid 11th century) and Li Wei (979-1041), doubted his motivation. They sent back Chao Shan-yQ following the rule of extradition. Having just crossed the border, Chao Shan-yQ and his relatives were slaughtered brutally by Wei-ming YQan-hao horsemen. HCP. 122,2880. Pien K'uang(I005-1063), Ju-lin kune-i. in HsQ Wen-yQan, Sung Tien shu-mi- shih K'uang nien-p'u. (Chronological Biography of Sung Military Counselor Tien K'uang), (Taipei: 219

only about one hundred skillful warriors within a battalion of three to four hundred

soldiers. Among the various Qrpes of soldiers, crossbowmen were the ones whom the

Sung commanders reUed upon the most and they represented China's advanced military

technology. Disappointingly enough, his inspection of crossbowmen in Wei-chou

revealed that only ninety of350 soldiers in a crossbow battalion could use the high-

standard crossbow.^° Su Shim-ch'in (1008-1048) described the soldiers in K'aifeng as

"fond of trading, drinking and gambling," "spending their whole days in downtown

selling needlework and embroidered pictures, and by no means looking like soldiers from

what they wear and what they do."^^ Ou-Yang Hsiu also criticized palace army soldiers

on duty in the forbidden city for hiring bearers for their coverlets and porters to carry

home the monthly rice supply instead of carrying by themselves.^^

No actual warfare experience was a serious deficiency in both officers and

soldiers. Despite being better equipped and having superior physical surrounding, the

metropolitan recruits, especially those from K'aifeng, were over-indulged urban

inhabitant. On battlefield, these units fix)m the east, customarily called the "eastern army,"

were the most fragile part of the battle formation. In most encounters, the vulnerability of

the "eastern army" attracted the Hsi Hsia attack and immediately resulted in Simg

Taiwan Commercial Press, 1988, pp. 78-125), hereafter as JLKl. chOan 2, p. 107. HCP. chQan 128, p. 3027. -- Su Shun-ch'in (1008-10481. Su-hsQeh-shih wen-chi. (Collected Works of Su Shun-ch'in), (Taipei, Taiwan Commercial Press, 1965) chQan 10, p. 62-63. "Ou-yang Hsiu, Ou-vane Hsiu ch'Qan-chi. (Collected Works of Ou-yang Hsiu), (OYHCO. (Taipei: Shih- chieh, 1961), p. 421. 220

defeat.^^ The lack of real battle experience of ofiScers was also critical. As Yang K'ai stated, the strength of a military force did not depend on v^ere it came firom; rather, it hinged on the capability of officers. Under incapable officers, even the Shensi local militia would be as indolent as the "eastern army."^^

The majority of officers whom the court trusted had no war experience. Ko Huai- min (1042), from a military family and regarded as a "famed general" by the prime minister and his civilian friends, was delegated as the Vice Commander of Ching-Yuan

Circuit and was actually only an apprentice to the profession. Kao Chi-lung (ca. early

1 Ith century) and Chang Ch'ung-chun ( ca. mid-11 c.), two regional commanders in

Huan-Ch'ing circuit, praised for their administrative ability, had never fought a battle.^ ^

Liu P'ing (d. ca. 1040), a chin-shih degree holder from a military family, was among the most capable commanders in Shensi. However, his impetuousness, a serious shortcoming in his personality, put his battlegroup in jeopardy in 1039.^® Kuo Chuen, Jen Fu (d.

1041), and Wang Kuei (d. 1041) were excellent warriors, skillful in combat on horseback.

Wang killed two Hsi Hsia generals in individual duel in 1041.^^ However, they demonstrated no distinguished tactics nor operational arts. Chao Chim (ca. mid-llth

HCP. chQan 125, p. 2958. Hsia Sung (984-1050), Wen-chuane-chi (Collected Works of Hsia Sung), in SKCSCP. ser. 1, c. 83, chQan 14, pp. lOb-lla, 13b-14a. HCP, chQan 125, p. 2958-60, chflan 126, p. 2996. -- HCP. chQan 126, p. 2995. About Ko Huai-min's family, see SS, chQan 289, pp. 9699-9703, about his admiration by civilians, refer to SS, chQan 290, p. 9713. Also, Fan Chu-yQ (1041-1098), "Chien-chiao ssu- k'ung chuo-wu-wei shang-chiang-chOn Kuo-kung mu-chih-ming'', hereafter as "Kuo K'uei mu-chih", in Fan Chu-yQ, Fan Tai-shih chi. (Collected Works of Fan Chu-yQ ), (SKCSCP. ser. 1,19, chQan 40, la-20b), 2a-b. Prime Minister Ch'en Chih-chung, one admirer of Ko Huai-min, was known in evaluation of individual's capability. See Ch'ine-shuang tsa-chi. chQan 2, p. 16. HCP. chQan 126, p. 2994. Mm-shui ven-fan-Iu. p. 13. 221

century) was famous for his individual archery skill, but poor in general coordination. As a consequence of an error in communications in the relief of Fort Fortress-gate (Sai-men)

(1040), he attacked his own vanguard commanded by his son.^^ Chao Shun (mid 11th c.), the son of Chao Chim and the writer of a book about logistics in the Shensi theater, was probably one of the most capable officers of the day; in 1039, he was still a low ranking officer commanding an outpost^®

By 1038 the Sung Shensi perimeter was desperately vulnerable and war preparations were extremely instifScient Ostensibly, the mountainous terrain of the theater seemed to stand in favor of the Sung defenses. Nevertheless, neither a passive perimeter defense nor an active mobile defense was selected as the Sung strategy. The

Shensi theater was divided into five circuits: Yung-ch'ing Commandery (present day

Xian), Fu-Yen, Huan-Ch'ing, Ching-Yuan, and Ch'in-Feng. The high coirunand was headquartered in Yung-ch'ing Commandery and the heartland of Shensi shared no conmion border with Hsi Hsia. The others were all frontier circuits: Ch'in-Feng with the

Tibetans and Fu-Yen, Huan-Ch'ing and Ching-yuan with Hsi Hsia. Huan-Ch'ing, a salient well protected by moimtains, was the safest among the three, while Ching-ytian guarded the main route from Ling-chou to interior China. It became the most intensified war zone and was relatively well fortified since the days of Ts'ao Wei and Li Chi-ho. Fu-

SS, chQan 325, p. 10506-08. -- HCP. chQan 128,p. 3027. Interviewed by Emperor Jen-tsung in 1041, Chao Shun made a commander of ten thousand soldiers, in charge the defense of the Lung-kan salient. However, in 1039 he was still a low rank officer. See, HCP. chQan 132, p. 3123. 222

Yen was the most viilnerable. According to a report from Chang Ch'Qan, the transportation intendant of Shensi, most of the walls of prefectural towns in Fu-Yen circiut seldom reached the required height.^"

Smaller forts along the boundary did not have sufficient manpower and eqmpment to ensure their own security. According to Chang K'ang, 500,000 garrisons and 200,000 auxiliaries were distributed to nearly 60 points in Ching-yuan circuit. Strong points, such as prefectures and commanderies, were protected by five to seven battalions, approximately 1,800 to 2,500 soldiers, while small forts had only one or two battalions, approximately 350 to 700 soldiers.^^ These forts could be used as posts for border patrols and bases for saboteurs and skirmishers, but were futile in resisting any full-strength attack by the Hsi Hsia.^^ Li Shih-pin (ca. mid 11th century), a pompous conunander of

Yen-chou tribal auxiliary on whom the Sung headquarters relied, eagerly accepted bribes.

But When Wei-ming Yuan-hao initiated his offense in 1039, Li's thirty-six forts were all overrun on the first day of the war.^^

Difficulties for military movement and transportation in this area impeded logistic as well as rapid deployment of reinforcement, critical to an active defense. The division of power in theater command was also an inherent fault to this strategy. In the early Sung, there were only two or three regional commanders in a circuit, namely, the Director of

HCP. chQan 126, p. 2995. HCP. chOan 128, p. 3026. " HCP. chOan 128,pp. 3026, 3029,chQan 132,pp.3141-44, andchOan 139,p. 3338-41. SHY, v. 185, military 27, p. 7259-60. -- SSCW. chflan 12, p. 219, HCP. chQan 126, p. 2969-70. 223

Operation, Brigadier or Chien-hsia. and Military Supervisor. Commanders at the prefectural level were not involved in theater command. However, in 1040, the ten to fifteen commanders in each circuit were in charge of regional security and now shared authority in theater conomand. None was superior to the other.^* Consensus was extremely difficult to reach in theater command and a decision making procedure did not exist for all practicality.

The defeat in the winter of 1039 exemplified the disadvantages of an active defense. 9,000 soldiers and a number of capable officers of the Sung, with their captain

Liu P'ing, were ambushed on their way to relieve the headquarters at Yen-chou.^^ Having

Liu act as Vice Supreme Commander of both Fu-Yen and Huan-Ch'ing Circuit was essentially unreasonable. Indeed, it would have been appropriate in peace time to employ such a high ranking officer in the routine patrol of this extended border, but, ironically, it was not inappropriate in war time. If Liu had employed a perimeter defense, he would have had too long a border to defend, more than three hundred kilometers from the extreme east, the bank of Yellow River, to the watershed between Huan-Ch'ing and

Ching-Yiian circuit. If he were to conduct an active defense, he would have lack sufficient depth for defense. He had no secure base behind the frontier from where he could easily project his force at the critical time and place. The main road finm Fu-Yen to

Huan-Ch'ing extended along the border and, although protected partially by a mountain,

HCP, chflan 128, pp. 3025-26. "^chQan325,pp. 10499-10504.Also,SSCW.chQan4,pp.78-79,chflan II,pp.212-216,chflan 12,p. 240. 224

its security of movement was unpredictabe. Whenever Liu was encamped at Huan-Ch'ing and Fu-Yen circuit was attacked, he had no alternative other than rushing toward Yen- chou through that one viable route, and this is i^^t occurred in 1039.

Wei-ming YQan-hao's Victories on Battlefields

The Wei-ming YOan-hao's offensive was first initiated with the rapid overrunning of Platinum (Chin-ming), Fortress-gate, and other smaller forts. Surprise was complete, and the Hsi Hsia army broke out into the east-west route connecting Fu-Yen and Huan-

Ch'ing circuits. When Liu P'ing first received the report about the fall of Fortress-gate, he impetuously led a relief column firom Pao-an Commandery toward the fort located in the extreme northwest comer of Fu-Yen circuit. Approaching Fortress-gate, he was astonished with yet another report that Wei-ming Yuan-hao was laying siege on Yen- chou, headquarters of Fu-Yen circuit Liu precipitately turned southeast and forced-march toward Yen-chou. His battlegroup advanced in a long colimm with its cavalry and infantry units separated. At Three River Pass (San-ch'uan-k'ou), a pass in the vicinity of

Yen-chou, the Sung army was ambushed. The vanguard consisting of four battalions was quickly annihilated even before they could send a message to Commander Liu.

Liu's main-body engaged the Hsi Hsia army at the river running along the pass.

Liu's force crossed the river and solidified a bridgehead in a half moon battle formation.

Then Liu urged his infantry units still struggling to join firom behind. After repulsing many Hsi Hsia attacks, a tactical conmiander (Cuo Chun counterattacked and broke into the Hsi Hsia formation. Defeating the heavy infantry and capturing their shields, Kuo 225

Chun was slained before the His-hsia speaimen. The Hsi Hsia struck back forcing Liu to step back a hundred paces. Seeing this as an ominous sign of defeat, Huang Te-ho (d.

1041), an eunuch and Military Supervisor over Liu's battlegroup, ordered a retreat. Liu

P'ing immediately sent his son to stop Huang and his son fled with the eunuch. Liu P'ing and his guards formed a line to block the route with their swords but the rout eventually occurred in the evening. The mainbody was in disarray and its commanders formed in a circle on a small hill. Liu P'ing and Shih Yuan-sun(ca. mid 11th century), his deputy from a splendid military family, withstood the Hsi Hsia over night. The dawn came with fined defeat and the two commanders were captured. The Hsi Hsia host immediately tumed against Yen-chou and its vanguard penetrated to the periphery of Fu-chou. Fan Jung

Supreme Commander of Fu-Yen Circuit, was barely able to conduct a disorganized resistance. Fortunately the heavy snow storm of that night and the following days prevented all options of siege engineering as well as vigorous assault and Wei-ming

Yuan-hao abandoned the siege.

As the consequence of the defeat at the Three River Pass, Han Ch'i (1008-1075) and Fan Chung-yen (989-1052), two important Simg civil officials in the military command, inaugurated a debate on theater strategy in 1040. While Fan suggested rebuilding the perimeter defense, Han proposed a counter offensive. Han argued that the main problem of the Shensi theater was not the insufficiency of troops, but the fragmentation of troops into many small units as fort garrisons. The unfavorable result of

JLKI. chQan 1, p. 81, SSCW. chOan 11, pp. 213-16. HCP. pp. 2966-70. §S, chOan 325, pp. 10499- 226

this was the failure of the regional command to concentrate their force at critical time and place. Therefore, he urged the theater command to form a body of picked men and mount a large scale campaign in the coming year.^^ His plan was selected by the throne. In early

1041, the Huan-Ch'ing command launched a campaign of reprisal against two Hsi Hsia forts. Fused Gold or Chin-t'ang and White Panther or Pai-p'ao. Commander Jen Fu and

Wang Kuei destroyed the two forts completely, burned all the rations, and wiped out forty-one tribes in the vicinity.

Meanwhile Wei-ming Yuan-hao was planning his next campaign, chosing Han

Ch'i as the person to hoax. In the spring of 1041, he sent a delegation to negotiate peace, but actually mobilized his force. Han Ch'i was not such a gull to believe Wei-ming

Yiian-hao's show of peace. Realizing that a showdown was impending, Han Ch'i contrived to select soldiers of the first quality fi-om various fort garrisons. This reorganized body of 18,000 was placed in reserve in Wei-chou and preparations for the counterattack were hastened.^® Jen Fu, Wang Kuei, and Chu Kuan (ca. mid-11th century), three brave brigadiers, were appointed by Han Ch'i to handle the field command. Unfortimately this force became the next victim in the battle of Good Water

Valley, a Cannae of China.^° When news of an approaching Tangut force came to Han

Ch'i, he ordered the three generals, Jen, Wang and Chu, not to engage forward and

10504, chQan 349, p. 11055. ^•'HCP, ChQan 131, pp. 3098-3099. See HCP. chflan 131, pp. 3093,3097. " HCP. chOan 131, p. 3100. "About the Battle of Cannae, refer to Livy, The War with Hannibal, tr. by Aubrey De Selicourt, (London: 227

outflank the enemy through the corridor of Liu-p'an Mountain.^ ^

The roads extending to Hsi Hsia territories were also mountainous and the only easy movement to Ling-chou beyond the border was a valley from Liu-p'en Mountain and

Pien-tu Mountain. It was the historic invasion route for the armies entering Shensi from the northwest. Both Tibetans and Tanguts made use of it in their campaigns against the

Tang and the Sung. Li Chi-ho, a general in early Sung times, built the Chen-jung

Commandery on the watershed. On the northwest of Chen-jung Commandery, there was a route toward a Sung salient out of the Liu-p'en Mountain centered at Fort Lung-kan, the present day Te-shun County. This was not only a crucial salient in the Sting defenses against Hsi Hsia, but also a lucrative trading venue with Tibetan and Tangut tribes.*^ This salient was the arena for Sung military tragedy in 1041.

Probably aware of the considerable strength of the Sung force, Wei-ming Yuan- hao did not penetrate into Ching-Yuan circuit after he advanced to the Chen-jung

Commandery. Instead, he turned westward and entered the Lung-kan corridor. Whether it was a "retreat" or "attack" was difBcult for Jen Fu to guess Wei-ming Yuan-hao's motive for this maneuver. Politically, Wei-ming YQan-hao was transgressing into Sung territory, but this minor intraction seemed more plausible as only his preference of a decisive battle at Lung-kan salient rather than Chen-jung Commandery. This maneuver greatly enticed the overtly aggressive Sung captains to follow him into the Lung-kan salient. In the

Cox. & Wyman Ltd., first published 1965, reprinted 1977), pp. 145-151. HCP. chQan 131, p. 3100. Lo Chiu-ch'ing, "Sung-Hsia tsan-cheng chung te iw-pu ho pao-tsai", Chune-chi HsOeh-pao. 6(1967)2, 228

narrow canyon at Good-water Valley, Wei-ming Yiian-hao offered a prologue to battle

with a small portion of his force, rudimentarily armed to deceive his opponents. The Sung

battlegroups, flushed with their anticipated success, crowded into the valley—where they actually pushed themselves into a Tangut trap.

Entering the corridor of Good-water Valley, Commander Jen was startled when he became aware that his force had fallen into a trap. His colimms extending along the valley were quickly cut to pieces by the Tanguts. Jen immediately engaged in individual combat as if a soldier as there was no way to deploy his troops. He hacked down a number of Hsi

Hsia soldiers in bloody combat, but was mortally wounded by a Tangut spearman. From that moment, the battle became a massacre, and a majority of officers and soldiers were lost. Wang Kuei was shot down by arrows on his way to relieve Jen. Only Chu Kuan and his crossbowmen could sustain themselves and struggled away.^^

In the first two battles, the Hsi Hsia army astonished the Sung with its high quality of weaponry. A considerable portion of the Sung units was just barely protected by paper armor; Wei-ming Yuan-hao's heavy cavalry wore iron armor. According to the report of Wang Yao-ch'en (1002-1058), a Sung military observer, the Hsi Hsia usually employed heavy cavalry called "iron hawks." On the initial onslaught, they would be followed by foot archers at close range. Wang indicated that the effect of combining the

223-243. More details about the battle, see SSCW. chQan 12, pp. 224-226, SS, chUan 325, pp. 10506-10, 10512- 13, ChQan 485, pp. 13996-97. HCP. chOan 131. do. 3100-3101. JLKI. chQan 1, pp. 81-82. 229

two was an " iiresistible" tactics/*

The Kuanan Crisis

The disaster at Good-water Valley astonished the Sung. Han Ch'i shed tears in front of the masses comprised of the relatives of the casualties. Its political impact was even greater. The Sung failure to subdue the Hsi Hsia, the "petty baibarian," induced

Khitan aggression. Emperor Hsing-tsimg of the Liao renewed his territorial demands on the Kuanan area and prepared to retake it by force. However, advised by a Chinese official, Chang Chien (962-1053), the Liao attempted to procure Kuanan through diplomacy. From 1041 to 1044, both the Simg and Liao exercised an extraordinary use of diplomatic negotiation.

The resolution of the Kuanan issue from 1041 to 1042 provided an example of armed suasion and war prevention in eleventh-century China. In the autumn of 1041, half a year after the Good Water Valley debacle, intelligence from the Hopei frontier indicated that there was an impending Khitan invasion. At the beginning of the next year, the Liao concentrated a force which emerged in YQn-chou at the same time that Liao emissaries

Hsiao Ying (circa mid 11th century) and Liu Liu-fu (ca. mid 11th century) arrived in

K'aifeng. Before their arrival. Sung intelligent agents had obtained a copy of their State

Letter and the court had precise knowledge of their demand. A consensus was quickly reached to reject absolutely any relinquishing of territory, with the conditional allowance

" Report by Wang Yao-ch'en, see HCP. chOan 132, p. 3149. 230

for a matrimonial alliance and preference on the increase of annual payment^^ In the summer of 1041, the negotiation skills of Fu Pi's mission to the Liao court prevented a war with the Khitan. He did this with an increase of the payment by 100,000 taels of silver and 100,000 bolts of silk, half of this as the "annual revenue of Kuanan" and the rest as the price to restrain the aggression of the Hsi Hsia.*® Fu Pi also reported that

Khitan had established a naval force menacing Sung Ch'uang-chou coast^^

From the view of grand strategy, both sides could be credited in 1041-42. The

Sung gathered a number of capable ofBcials, including Lfl Yi-chien (979-1004), Han

Ch'i, Fan Chimg-yen, Fu Pi, Ou-yang Hsiu, Chang Fang-p'ing (1007-1091) and Yu

Ching (1000-1064) in the core of decision making. Prime Ministers and Military

Councilors regularly held joint meeting and opinions from Imperial Advisory Officer became influential.''® The most grave and urgent situation that the Sung had to avoid was a two-front war simultaneously waged against Liao and Hsi Hsia. Any relinquishing of territory to the Liao would not only jeopardize the defenses in Hopei but would also likely induce equivalent political ambitions of the Hsi Hsia. As it happened in previous dynasties, the matrimonial alliance was felt to be "disgraceful" and found not necessarily as stable as expected.^ ^ In the final accounting, the increase of aimual payment would be

Tao Jing-shen, Two Sons of Heaven, pp. 57-62. HCP. chaan 137, pp. 3268,3294. *^Fang Ch'Qeh (b. 1066), Fo-chai oien (A compilation made at Fo-chai Village), (Beijing: Chung-hua punctuated edition, 1983), chOan 10, p. SS. " Tao, "Pei-Sung Ch'ing-Ii kai-ke ch'ien-hou te wai-chiao cheng-ch'e", p. 64-66. During the negotiation between Fu Pi and Liu Liu-fu in 1042, Fu Pi doubted that a matrimonial alliance would not be as stable as expected, "which vitally depend on the affection between husband and wife to which we have no reason to guarantee. Furthermore, such affection is Innited by the lifetime of this 231

deleterious to the imperial revenues but could prevent all of the unacceptable alternatives.

How the Liao dealt with Simg empire also demonstrated a typical example of armed suasion. Liao Hsing-tsung only mobilized and deployed the troops but never actually used them, gaining 100,000 taels of silver and bolt of silk from the Sung, exemplify in Sun Tzu's classic teaching: "subdue the enemy without fighting a battle".

Liao Ching-tsung may have erred twice for the long-term and short-term. First, despite the considerable benefits from the fiscal exploitation of the Sung, it may have cost the

Liao the trust of K'aifeng. This short-term gain created siispicion and harmed the stability of the bilateral Sung-Liao relationship. The second question concerned the acceptance of a half of the increasing payment that committed the emperor to restrain Hsi Hsia aggression. This commitment needed a clear understanding of the Hsi Hsia position and personality of Wei-ming Yiian-hao. Struggling for autonomy from the fall of the Pang up to 1005, the Tangut regime had no external threat in 1039. As a self proclaimed emperor,

Wei-ming Yiian-hao called his empire the "Western Dynasty," presuming the Liao as the

"Northern Dynasty" and the Sung the "Southem Dynasty."^® Unaware of Hsi Hsia's strength and Wei-ming Yuan-hao's ambition, Liao Hsing-tsung impulsively promised the

Sung emissary that the subjugation of Hsi Hsia required merely a minimum effort as if

couple." See HCP. chQan 137, p. 3286. Also, Tien K'uang envisaged the potential crisis of the matrimonial alliance between Liao and Hsia. Wei-ming YQan-hao married the elder sister of Liao Hsing-tsimg but treated her indifferently. Despite the mortal illness of the princess, Li had never visited her. This jeopardized the relation between Liao and Hsi Hsia. See JLKI. chOan 2, pp. 106, 115-16.. HCP. chQan 177, p. 4282. HCP. ChQan 138, p. 3332. JLKI. chQan 2, p. 106. SS, chQan 485, p. 13998. 232

"straightening a finger"

The Strategic Illusion of Wei-ming Yfian-hao

As Liddell Hart indicated, a military victory was illusive if it could not carry a good and long-lasting peace. "Victory in true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one's people, is better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick result can be gained or if a long effort of economically proportioned to the national resources."

Despite its two defeats of Sung forces, Wei-ming Yuan-hao had not achieved a quick and decisive result. As the war prolonged, problems in the social stability of the Hsi

Hsia appeared. The Hsi Hsia population was far less than the Sung and it had to support approximately 500,000 soldiers.^^ As the relations with the Simg lapsed, the supply of tea, indispensable to the Hsi Hsia daily meal, shrank. People suffered from frequent conscription and their living standard were degraded even more. Rumors and resentment spread and a folk-song described the rapidly declining quality of life as "incomparable in ten aspects" to Te-ming's reign. And, as if heavenly portent, natural calamities, especially the drought in early 1040, decreased the cattle herd.^^

As support remained low, it was difGcult for Wei-ming Yflan-hao to transform his army into a regular force. Several offensives against the Sung were inevitably conducted

Report by YQ Ching, see HCP. chOan 139, pp. 3354-55. Also, Ju-lin Kune-i. chQan 2, p. 8. Hart, Liddell B. H., Whv Don't We Learned from History, p. 63. " SS, chQan 485, p. 13954-55. " SS, chOan 485, p. 13997-98. 233

as pillaging campaigns, with booty as the considerable rewaid for soldiers. However, the

nature of pillaging had intractable restrictions for Wei-ming YOan-hao's operational

depth. As pointed out by Wang Yao-ch'en, Hsi Hsia soldiers were very fierce in the early

stages of campaign. However, sated with considerable booty and physically exhausted,

they could no longer be relied upon to perform in battle. As Wang indicated, the problem

of the Hsi Hsia army was not in penetrating into the Sung, but in maintaining order and

discipline in withdrawal.^ ^

Wei-ming Yuan-hao's success on the battlefields proved to be no larger threat nor

could he occupy any Sung prefecture in Shensi. During the summer of 1041, Wei-ming

Yuan-hao shifted his attack to the Sung salient in the northeast of Ordos, laying sieges on

Lin-chou, Fu-chou and Feng-chou. The Tse and Wang families resisted as fiercely as they

had done diuing the Simg-Liao war and Sung garrisons demonstrated their advanced

skills in defensive warfare.^® Wei-ming Yuan-hao captured Feng-chou but failed to take

the other two prefectures.^^ When the Sung relief force arrived, the tide of the battle

turned in favor of the Sung. Chang K'ang, a civilian commander, inflicted successive

defeats on the Hsi Hsia host at Fort Glass (Liu-li-pao), Fort Pine-nut (P'o-tzu-tsai) and

Rabbit-hair Valley, (Tu-mao-ch'uan, near the present day Fu-ku Coimty).®® To Wei-ming

HCP. chQan 132, p. 3143. Also, about the difficulties of Hsi Hsia in sustaining a prolonged war, see the memorial of Chang Fang Fing in SMCCI. chQan 133, pp. 7b-l la. " HCP, chOan 132, p. 3154, chQan 133, pp. 3160,3163,3179-82. The fall of Feng-chou, see HCP. chOan 133, pp. 3168-69. " HCP. chQan 133, p. 3172, and chQan 136, pp. 3246-47. SS, chQan 289, p. 9697, chQan 324, pp. 10488- 89. Han Ch'i, "Ku K'e-sheng-shih Mei-chou fang-yQ-shih tseng Shui-chou kuan-ch'a-shih Chang-kung mu- chih-ming", in Han Ch'i, An-van g chi fCoUected Works of Han Ch'O, SKCSCP. ser. 4, v. 230-232, chQan 47, pp. 16-23. 234

Yuan-hao, even victory on the field was not now a guarantee.

In 1042, Wei-ming YOan-hao launched his first offense to capture territory and

claimed that he would stand on the bank of the Wei and capture Ch'ang-an City.^^ Sung

Vice Director of Operations of Ching-ytian Circuit Ko Huai-min employed an

inappropriate strategy. After mobilizing an active force numbered twenty thousand

soldiers, he did not follow the Sung tactic of active defense—first, allowing the enemy to

penetrate and then striking at its most vulnerable spot, the rear, two flanks, or supply

Iine.®° Instead, Ko confironted the Hsi Hsia army in full strength at an outpost on the

border. Fort Ting-ch'uen. Wei-ming Yuan-hao butchered 9,400 Sung soldiers with Ko and ten subordinate commanders, including Chao Shun (d. after 1042), Liu Ho (d. 1042) and Ts'ao Ying (d. 1042), a grandson of Ts'ao Pin.®^ Afterwards, Wei-ming Yuan-hao

Wang Kung (1048-after 1104), Wen-chien chin-lu. (Records of Recent Witness and Hearing) in Chih- pu-chu tsai ts'ung-shu. v. 23, pp. 13-14. Before the invasion, Wang Yao

penetrated into and pillaged the Ching-YQan Circuit.®^ Rapidly responding to this crisis.

Fan Chung-yen, then Pacification Intendant and Supreme Director of Operations of

Huan-Ch'ing Circuit, led a force to interdict Wei-ming YQan-hao. With a capable civilian commander, Ch'ung Shih-heng (985-1045), and 3,000 tribal auxiliaries as vanguard,®^ this action threatened the Hsi Hsia host at its rear. Meanwhile, another civilian commander, Ching Pai (ca. mid 11th century), inflicted a defeat of the Hsi Hsia vanguard at the crossroads Junction at P'an-yuan, ^proximately thirteen li to Wei-chou. This battle marked an end to Wei-ming YQan-hao's invasion.®*

Wei-ming Yuan-hao's most serious failure was in diplomacy with the Liao in

Commercial Press, date unknown), chQan 33, p. 347. ^~The defeat of Ting-ch'uan was a consequence of a series of mistakes in operational arts and tactics. Learning that the invasion of Wei-ming YQan-hao was impending, the Pacification Intendant and Director of Operation, Wang YQan, dispatched Vice Director of Operation Ko Huai-min. Ko concentrated a force about 16,000 to 19,000 men, and marched toward Chen-jung Commandery. He stopped over night at the vicinity of Chen-jung Commandery and passed it toward the border with a portion of his force. The remaining body in Chen-Jung Commandery firmly guarded the stronghold for three days and advanced to join their superior. Chao Shun insisted the advantage to stay at Chen-jung Commandery but was rejected by Ko. As a result, the entire force was further divided into four bodies marching toward Fort Ting-ch'uan through different routes. One of them was slowed skirmishing with the vanguard of Hsi Hsia and the rest reached Ting-ch'uan encircled by the Hsi Hsia main-body. Because Ting-ch'uan was not spatial enough to protect the whole force, the majority of Sung troops contonted the enemy outside the wall. The Sung central formation stoutly resisted but the east wing under Ts'ao Ying collapsed as stormed by Hsi Hsia elite soldiers. Chao Shun hacked back a part of the enemy in the evening by outstanding cavalry tactics, the Sung commanders reached no decision on the way to retreat at the midnight meeting. To prevent a complete fiasco, Chao Shun proposed to retreat tlvough the Lung-kan corridor instead of the predictable path toward Chen-jung Commandery. However, Ko Huai-min decided to return Chen-jung Commandery. As the commander left, the morale of the force collapsed and could no longer withstand the ambuscade and cross-attack by the enemy. All commanders were killed except a few officers including the younger brother of Chao Shun, Chao YQ, who led the rear guard and escaped from the Lung-kan corridor. SSCW. chOan 4, p. 80-81. HCP. chQan 137, pp. 3300-C3, chOan 138, p. 3310. Military Observer Wang Yao-ch'en concluded the defeat with four mistakes; not staying at Fort Wa-f ing but marching forward; passing Chen-jung Commandery instead of holding it; crossing the moat of the border and fighting without coverage; and failing in conduct a stalwart resistance at the last moment See HCP. chQan 138, p. 3328. " HCP. chOan 138, p. 3312-33. HCP. chQan 138, p. 3310. Pan-yQan's location, WCCY. chQan 18, pp. 905-06. SS, chQan 326, pp. 10517-18. 236

1043, which overestiinated a common interest in joint military action against the Sung and was rejected.^^ In fact, the Liao could gain the "revenue of Kuanan" without a fight, while he seized nothing other than the booty^ gained through three bloody and costly battles. After the Sung-Liao reconciliation in 1042 and the failure of forming a Liao-Hsia military alliance, Wei-ming YOan-hao was the one who faced the perils of a war on two- fronts. Moreover, he still could not prevent tribal conflicts and boundary disputes with

Khitan and nor could he achieve a quick reconciliation with the Sung.

Enraged by his inability to actualize Hsi Hsia subjugation to the Sung, Liao

Hsing-tsung planned to use force against Wei-ming YOan-hao. In 1044 the Liao emissary arrived in K'aifeng, demanding that the Sung not accept any peace condition with the Hsi

Hsia.®^ As peace was more in the Sung interests, the Sung court hastened to have P'ang

Chi (988-1063), the Pacification Intendant and Supreme Director of Operations of Fu-

Yen Circuit, restarted negotiations with Wei-ming Yuan-hao.®® Afterwards, Yfl Ching,

Sung emissary to the Liao court, reminded Liao Hsing-tsimg that the Sung-Liao reconciliation in 1042 did not include any terms of military obligation. He also informed the Khitan emperor that a Sung-Hsia peace negotiation had already been undertaken and

K'aifeng had no reason to cease if Wei-ming Y\ian-hao accepted all Sung terms.^^ As a result, the Khitan emperor initiated his River Bank campaign against the Hsi Hsia without

LS, chQan 19, p. 229, chOan 115, p. 1526. " LS, chOan 115, p. 1526. HCP. chOan 152, p. 3711. HCP. chQan 151, p. 3677-83. Also, Tao Jing-shen, Sung-Liao Kuan-hsi shDi ven-chiu. p. 82. SSCW. chQan 5, pp. 88-90. HCP, chOan 152, p. 3705-06. HCP. chQan 153, p. 3723. The earlier negotiation of P'ang, see HCP. chQan 138, pp. 3330-33. 237

the Sung political support or military cooperation.

In order to prevent a two-firont war, Wei*ming YOan-hao had no alternative than to subjugate himself. He released a Sung spy fixim a dungeon, who had been dispatched by Sung General Ch'ung Shih-heng, to cany a message of reconciliation. Aware of the opportunity to re-built the relationship, P'ang Chi hastened the negotiation process.^® At the beginning of 1045, peace was established. The Sung offered recognition of Wei-ming

Yuan-hao as the King of Hsi Hsia, with an "annual reward" of75,000 taels of silver,

150,000 bolts of silk, and 30,000 chin of tea.^^ The increase of annual payment to the neighboring power marked a Sung diplomatic retreat but, among the three coimtries, the

Sung grand strategy was still the most flexible and rational. It was consistently attuned to the danger of a two-front war and eventually prevented it. It also prevented the enhancement of the international status of the Hsi Hsia nation. Militarily, the Sung lost three battles but politically and diplomatically, K'aifeng achieved its desirable goal.

Liao Hsing-tsimg, who had succeeded in the earlier Kuanan issue, failed in his second attempt of armed suasion to draw the Simg to his camp against the Hsi Hsia.

" HCP. chOan 151, pp. 3671-82, also, p. 3691. Sung anecdote and pen-notes slightly differed about the details of the spy activities by Ch'ung Shih- heng. Refer to SSCW. chQan 5, pp. 88-90, chOan 9, p. 175. HCP. chQan 135, p. 3236. SS, chOan 335, pp. 10743-44 Tung-hsien oi-lu. chQan 8, p. 94-95 Shen Kua, Pu Mene-ch'i pi-fan. chQan 2, pp. 312-13.1 evaluated their reliability in 1984. See Tsang Shui-Iung, "Ch'ung Shih-heng fan-chien-chi k'ao", as appendix one in Tsang Shui-lung, "Pei-Sung Ch'ung-shih chlang-men chih hsing-ch'eng", (Hong Kong; Master thesis for The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984). Miscellaneous rewards were counted in this record. In details, 130,000 bolts of silk, 50,000 taels of silk, 20.000 chin of tea were Regular Annual Rewards, while 10,000 taels of silver, 10,000 bolts of silk, and 5,000 chin of tea were rewards on the birthday of the Sung emperor. In addition, a new year gifts included 5,000 taels of silver, 5,000 bolts of silk and 5,000 chm of tea, a special gift in winter for 5,000 taels of silver and 5,000 bolts of silk, and a bnlhday gift to the King of Hsia for 2,000 taels of silver vessels, 1,000 238

Therefore, his River Bank campaign ended with an ignominious failure. Defeat was signaled in the rejection of Emperor Hsing-tsung to reconcile with Wei-ming YQan-hao.

Instead, he personally led a force deep into the Hsi Hsia territory up to the great bank of the Yellow River. After the Liao expeditionary army, superior in number, was exhausted marching through the desert, Wei-ming Yiian-hao concentrated his smaller but well- supplied army and offered a battle. The Khitan force was routed, with severe casualties and loss of horses.^^ With this stunning victory, Li Yuan-hao immediately pledge for peace with Khitan.

From 1038 to 1045, Wei-ming Yuan-hao won four brilliant battles over Sung and

Liao and the military strength of the Hsi Hsia could not be ignored. As a tactician, Yiian- hao's military talent was unquestioned, but he failed in almost £ill spheres of grand strategy—political, diplomatic, social and economic. He was imable to transform his operational successes into strategic victory. In 1045 Wei-ming Yiian-hao still claimed the emperor of his domain, but internationally, he returned to his previous status—a king submitting to both Sung and Liao simultaneously. He gained considerable "annual reward" from the Simg, which should have palliated domestic economic and social tension if used them properly. Instead, Wei-ming YQan-hao built a luxury palace in the

Celestial Capital or Tien-m mountain.^^ The end of war seemed not to have palliated the

bolts of cloths, and 2,000 bolts of silks in various styles. See HCP. v.l52, p. 3706. The Liao River Bank Campaign, refer to chQan 19, pp. 230-31, chQan 93, pp. 1374-75, chQan 115, p. 1526. MCPT. chOan 25, p. 247-48. HCP. chQan 177, p. 4282. SS, chQan 485, pp. 13999-14000. HCP. chQan 162, p. 3901. This record did not indicate the actual time of the construction, commingling with others about the assassmation of YQan-hao in 1048. Though the construction must have been 239

internal strife of the Hsi Hsia and even his own imperial safety was not guaranteed. In

1048, Wei-ming Yiian-hao was assassinated by his son.^*

Tibetans As Players of International Politics

When Hsi Hsia and Sung wrestled each other and the Khitan's intervention complicated the strategic triangle, a fourth player, the Tibetan Chfleh-ssu-lo regime, emerged. Chueh-ssu-Io regime claimed to be a continuation of the Tibetan empire during the T'ang period.^ ^ After the collapse of the Tibetan empire, disunity of previous Tibetan domain in Ch'inghai and Kansu had continued for more than a century. In circa. 1010, a

Tibetan merchant from Ho-chou (about 20 kilometers to the present day Timg-hsiang chu

Autonomic County) discovered an imperial Tibetan descendant in Kao-ch'ang who was bom in Mo-yil, probably the present day Ho-song-yii Temple in Tibet.^® Admiring the magnanimous twelve-year-old adolescent, the merchant, Ho-lang Ye-yien (circa, early

11 .c), brought him back to Ch'inghai. Shortly thereafter, acknowledging the political value of this imperial descendant, a local Tibetan leader Sung-ch'ang-shih (circa, early lie.) installed the boy as the supreme chief at Fort I-kung, thirty five kilometers

undertaken earlier than the year of 1048, it was not likely to occur before 104S. Tien-tu Mountain Range, the geographical boundaiy between Hsi Hsia and the Sung Ching-yOan Circuit, was too close to the front to be a place for pleasure. Considering this, it was likely that the Tien-tu Palace was built after the peace of 1045, and the Sung "annual rewards" took a portion of the spending. Other records about his extravagant life, see Wu Tien-ch'ih, Hsi Hsia shih-kao. p. 51-52. This palace was taken and demolished by Sung Commander Li Hsien in 1081, see Chapter Ten. SSCW. chQan 11, p. 208-09. HCP, chflan 162, p. 3901. Many contemporary historians in mainland China regarded ChQeh-ssu-lo a regime name after its founding father rather than merely the name of the person. See Chu Ch'i-yOan, preface, p. 1. Chu Ch'i-yOan, pp. 27,30. 240

northwest of the present day Ch'un-hua County, Ch'inghai^^ and intent to establish

Statutes Ordinance or wen-fa.^° According to the Tibetan dialect in Ho-chou, chfleh means Buddha, and shih-ln means "son". Therefore, the heir of the Tibetan Buddhist

Empire was called ChQeh-ssu-lo (997-1065), the Son of Buddha.^®

Prior to 1014, Li Li-chun (after 1032), an influential Tibetan prelate, seized the

Son of Buddha and installed him at Chung-ko City, the present day Lo-tu County,

Ch'inghai.®° With Chueh-ssu-lo, Li Li-chun abandoned his ecclesiastical position and returned to be a secular leader, proclaiming Prime Minister or lim-Du.°^ Li Li-chun arranged the marriage of his own daughter with the Son of Buddha and established an alliance with the Uighurs in Kan-chou. Struggling for breaking the Hsi Hsia blockage of trade route to China after the fall of Liang-chou, the Uighurs expressed extraordinary enthusiasm to such an alliance. Li Li-chun dispatched escorts to guard the Uighurs tribute

''' Tan Ch'i-hsiang p. 20 regarded the place as near the present day Hsia-ho County, Li Chih-hsin, Ch'tng- hai ku-ch'eng k'ao-pien (Examination of the Ruin Castles in Ch'inghaO, (Hsi-an: Hsi-pei ta-hsQeh, 1995), pp. 168-72 relocated the place according to the result of field examination and textual examination. Statue Ordinance had extraordinary meaning reflecting the central role of customary law in the Kolcnor Tibetan culture. It was a general obligation for cooperation applied to tribal chieftains participating a sacrifice sworn to heavenly deities. See Chu Ch'i-yQan, p. 243. ^ chQan 492, p. 14160. Chang Fang-p'ing, "Ch'in-chou chou ChQeh-ssu-Io shih, in Chang Fang- p'ingC 1007-91), Lo-ch'Oan chi (Collected Works of Lo-ch'flan), hereafter as LCC. in SKCSCP. ser.1, c.85, chQan 22, p. 20. Meng-ch'i pi-fan. chQan 25, p. 822. TPCCTL chflan 16, p. 1207. For, the approximate date of this event, see Chu Ch'i-yQan, p. 45. Traditional historians located Chung- ko City at the middle way between Hsi-ning and Lo-tu and Chu Ch'i-yQan regarded the present day location of Chung-ko City to be Fing-an County. Nevertheless, Sung Hsiu-fang in 1993 and Li Chih-hsin in 1995 indicated the essential error of Ming historians regarding Mo-ch*uan as Lo-tu County. If so, both Sung and Li pointed out, the mileage from Mo-ch'uan to Ho-chou would not fit the Sung record. Field survey and textual evidence suggested Chung-ko CiQr instead of Mo-ch'uan City to be the present day Lo- tu County. See Li Chih-hsin, pp. 42-47,66-69, Sung Hsiu-fang, "Sung-tai Ho-Huang Tu-po ti-ch'Q li-shih ti-li en-t'i fan-fao", in Tsane-hsOeh ven-chhi ts'une-k'an. v. 5, (UnknoMm: Hsi-tsang jen-min, 1993), pp. 181-203. " SHY, v. 197, barbarian 4, p. 7703. HCP, chQan 85, p. 1958, chQan 87, pp. 1965, 1974-75, and 1979. 241

to K'aifeng through the Tibetan realm.^^ In 1014, ChQeh-ssu-lo intended to improve

relations with the Sung but was treated indifferently. K'aifeng merely enfeoffed him with

the beginning ranking as a Palace Guard acted as Patrolling Inspector or tien-chih ch'unp shun-chien shih.^^ In 1015, Chiieh-ssu-lo, Li Li-chun, and Wen Pu-ch'i (1032), another powerful Tibetan leader, sent K'aifeng a prodigiously large tribute—horses worth

7,600,000 kuan. Sung Chen-tsung returned them equally impressive gifts including silk coats and 7,000 taels of gold. Afterwards, claiming his military strength with reaching

100,000 soldiers, Li Li-chun proposed an alliance with K'aifeng in terms of the suppression of Hsi Hsia.®^ However, this proposal could not cease the distrust of K'aifeng toward Chung-ko. Experiencing the revolt of Li Chi-ch'ien, the Sung realized the ambition of Li Li-chun and rejected his demand of recognition as tsan-p'u which meant

Emperor of Tibet. Greatly disappointed, Li Li-chun mounted a large-scale attack to

Ch'in-chou in 1016 but was severely defeated by Sung General Ts'ao Wei at Three

Capitals Valley or San-tu-ku. In the ensuing year-long confrontation, Ts'ao Wei destroyed the military capacity of Li Li-chun to the extent that according to a Sung intelligent report in 1022, the Chung-ko regime became no longer a menace of frontier China.®® As a result

SS, chQan 490, p. 14116, chOan 75,1949-52. " SHY. v. 199, bi^arian 6, p. 7805, Yang Chung-Hang (1244-1271). Tzu-chfli fune-chien ch'ang-oien chi-shih-pen-mo (Topical History from the Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror), hereafter as CPPM. (Taipei: Wen-hai, 1969) chOan 26, p. 781. SS, chOan 492, pp. 14160-61. SHY, v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7806. ^ chQan 258, p. 8986, chOan 492, p. 14160, HCP. chOan 86, p. 1979, chOan 87, p. 1996, and CPPM. chOan 26, p. 788, SHY, v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7805. HCP. ChOan 88, p. 2012-13 SS, chOan 258, p. 8986, chQan 310, p. 10172-72. LCC. chOan 22, p. 21a, Sung Hsiang (996-1066), "Cheng Shih-chung Ts'ao-kung hsing-chuang", in YOan-hsien Chi, in KHCPTS. chOan 33, p. 345-46. CPPM. chOan 26, p. 791-95. Wang An-shih(l021-1086), "Ts'ao-wu-wei-kung hsing- 242

of military defeat, the power of Li Li-chun shrank and the Son of Buddha speed up his path for independence.

Supported by Wen Pu-ch'i in circa. 1023-24®^, the Son of Buddha escaped from the control of Li Li-chim and moved to Mo-ch'uan City, the power base of Wen Pu-ch'i and the ruin castle near Hsia-ch'uan-k'ou of the present day Ch'inghai.^® The Sung designated the Son of Buddha as Great Chief of Mo-ch'uan, Captain General for the

Pacification of the Famess or Ning-yuan ta-chiang-chun, and Regional Supervisor of Ai- chou.®' Living in Mo-ch'uan did not seem better to the Son of Buddha who was imprisoned by Wen Pu-ch'i in a dimgeon after the coup d'tate in 1032. Released by a loyalist, Chiieh-ssu-Io rushed into an army, gained support from the soldiers, and crushed down Wen Pu-ch'i.'° From this time on, Chueh-ssu-lo became the actual ruler of the

Tibetans in Ch'inghai.

Having secured independence from Li Li-chxm and Wen Pu-ch'i, Chileh-ssu-lo re­ established his rule at Ch'ing-t'ang City, the present provincial capital Hsi-Ning. Despite the gradual growth of Chueh-ssu-lo's power, his strategic ally the Uighurs in Kan-chou, were toppled by Hsi Hsia. In 1035, a large scale armed conflict occurred between Hsi

Hsia and Ch'ing-t'ang and the Sung appointed ChQeh-ssu-lo as Acting Military Governor

chuang", in Wang An-shih. Lin-ch'uan hsien-shene wen-chi (Collected Works of Wang An-shih), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 19S9), chOan 90, pp. 928-30. About the Sung intelligent report, also see CPPM. chflan 26, p. 795. Refer to Chu Ch'i-yQan, pp. 40,50. Li Chih-hsin, pp. 42-47, aJso, Sung Hsiu-fang, pp. 182-88. - - HCP. chQan II1, p. 2587, LCC. chOan 22, p. 2Ib. On the accurate date of this appointment the two sources contradicted with each other. Chu Ch'i-ydan considered the former as more correct. See p. 50. SS, chQan 492, 14161. LCC. chQan 22, p. 21b-22a. CPPM. chQan 6, p. 797. 243

and Regional Supervisor of the Secured Obedience Commandery or Pac-shun-chfin

chieh-tu kuan-ch'a liu-hou. At the same time, Wei-ming YOan-hao delegated his general

Su Nu-erh (circa, early 1 Ic.)®^ to lead 25,000 soldiers to conquer Ch'ing-t'ang. Chueh-

ssu-Io concentrated his force, defeated the Hsi Hsia host, and hostaged Su Nu-erh at Fort

Buffalo or Fort Mao-niu, twenty five li north of the Ch'ing-t'ang City. This initial defeat

enraged Wei-ming YOan-hao who mounted an immense campaign, laying a month-long

siege against the Fort Buffalo. The King of Hsi Hsia eventually took the fort through an

ill-famed false proposal of peace followed by a massacre. The Son of Buddha withstood

stoutly for several months at the front, dispatching General An Tzu-Io (circa, early 1 Ic.)

to interdict the rear of the invaders. Lack of provision and unfamiliar with the terrain, the

Hsi Hsia expeditionary army collapsed beside the Chung-ko River. Wei-ming YOan-hao

barely defeated An Tzu-lo and struggled away with a small portion of his force.®^

Probably being the longest campaign in eleventh century East Asia, the campaign of the Chung-ko River in 1035 lasted more than two himdred days. Breaking the mastery of Wei-ming Yuan-hao in military operation, the Son of Buddha consolidated his domestic power and greatly enhanced the international status of Ch'ing-t'ang. As the

Sung-Hsia war began, many o£5cials and commanders such as Wu YQ (1004-1058), Liu

P'ing, Fan Jung, Chang K'ang, and Shih Yen-nien (994-1041) considered a cordial

There was possibly a kinship relation between Su Nu-erh and Su Shou-hsin, the previous governor of Li Te-ming in Liang-chou. Su Shou-hstn had a son, Su Lo-Ii. Whether or not Su Nu-eA and Su Lo-li were the same person was also unknown. " HCP. chQan 117, p. 2765-66, SS, chQan 492, pl4I61, chOan 485, p. 13944. TPCCTL. chQan 7, pp. 571- 72. 244

military cooperation with Ch'ing-t'ang indispensable to the Sung security.®^ K'aifeng

promoted Chueh-ssu-io to be the Military Govemor of the Sectired Obedience Army and

increased his salary to 1,000 bolts of silk, 1,000 chin high-rated tea, and 1,500 chin

ordinary tea.®^

In 1039, Sung Jen-tsung dispatched emissary Lu Ching (circa mid-11th century)

to Ch'ing-t'ang urging military cooperation. According to the report of Lu, Chfleh-ssu-lo

led 45,000 soldiers to Liang-chou but the attack was unsuccessful due to the consolidating Hsi Hsia defense. Despite such a disappointment, the Son of Buddha

promised K'aifeng with a fluther attack.®^ Liu Huan (1000-1080), a low ranking official,

voluntarily took a successive mission to Ch'ing-t'ang and received horrifying ordeal on his way. Almost losing his life in starvation, Liu Huan survived with a few medical piles in his pocket, that provided the minimum nutrition. After this, he shaved his head as if a

Buddhist mendicant, begging food from believers all the way. At his arrival, Chiieh-ssu- lo summoned all respective Tibetan leaders in parade and swore loyalty to K'aifeng. In return. Sung Jen-tsimg additionally enfeoffed Chueh-ssu-lo as Military Govemor of Ho- hsi.®® Required by the emissary of Chueh-ssu-lo in 1059, Sung Jen-tsung ordered to move the seat of the envoy closer to the imperial throne and next to that of the Hsi Hsia

" HCP, chOan 127, p. 3004, chOan 128, p. 3028, SS, chOan 324, p. 10485, chOan 325, p. 10501-02. HCP. chflan 122, p. 2887-88, LCC. chQan 22, p. 22a. SHY, v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7806. " ChQan 492, p. 14162. HCP. chQan 127, p. 3004, SS, chQan 324, p. 10493, chQan 492, p. 14162, Mene-ch'i oi-t'an. chQan 25, p. 8 22, Ju-iin kune-i. chQan 1, pp. 83-84, Min-shui-ven-fan-lu. chQan 2, pp. 16-17. 245

emissary. This signified the enhancing international status of Ch'ing-t'ang.^^

As the weight of Ch'ing-f ang in inter-state relations increased, the Liao empire improved relations with Chtieh-ssu-lo. During the surrogacy of Li Li-chun, the Liao court accepted tribute from Chung-ko City. After the Liao-Hsia alliance lapsed in 1044, Ch'ing- t'ang became a strategic partner not only of Sung but of Khitan as well. In 1058, the younger sister of Liao Tao-tsimg married Tung-chan (d. 1086), the third son of Chueh- ssu-lo. The significance of amicable ties between the Khitans and Tibetans extends beyond the realm of diplomacy into military-security a£fairs. Although both parties never joined force in any campaign, this matrimonial alliance suggested the possibility of a

Tibetan attack on the Ho-hsi corridor and posed a definite threat to Hsi Hsia.®® From the victory besides the Chung-ko River to 1058, the strategic importance of Ch'ing-t'ang was well regarded. Through a series of accords and alliances, Ch'ing-t'ang elevated its international status and created a strategic tetragon with Sung, Liao, and Hsi Hsia.

Upheavals from 1039 to 1045 juxtapose different strategic cultures of the Sung,

Liao, Hsi Hsia and Chiieh-ssu-lo regime, constrast the priority of military strategy and grand strategy, and illustrate the conflict between long-term and short-term strategic goals. Inheriting the warfare of the military governors during the late Tang and Five

Dynasties—rapid switching alliance, false surrender, betrayal, and sudden attack, the early

Hsi Hsia rulers maximized the use of stratagems and the efficacy of violence. During the reign of Li Te-ming such characteristics of the Tangut strategic culture did not deviated

SHY. v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7806. 246

that was testified by his frequent transgression against the realm of Uighurs and Tibetans

in Ho-hsi. Through a series of offense, Wei-ming YQan-hao finally proclaimed regional

hegemony. The retrogression of power politik in Ho-hsi induced Khitan ambition

focusing on the territory of Kuanan. Without using one single arrow, the Liao employed a

strategy of deterrence exploiting K'aifeng with additional aimual payment that neutralized

its territorial claim. Dealing with the two enemies, K'aifeng carefully manipulated the

grand strategy of balance of power to serve its goal of standstill. At the same time,

Chueh-ssu-Io maintained high flexibility to do whatever that would enhance the

international status of his state. Interaction of these four powers reflects difference

preferences on the use of violence. The mastery of Wei-ming Yuan-hao in conducting

war was founded on his skills in tactics and operations. Despite managing high efflcacy

of violence, he ignored the shortage of grand strategic resources restraining the frequency

and duration of violence. Also, he overlooked a fact that there was no zero-sirai conflict of interests between the Sung and Liao. Merely the Tangut military victories had proven

to be insufficient to draw the Khitan intervention which would have caused a structural collapse of the Sung. As a result, the Tangut military efforts were neutralized by the

reinforced Sung-Liao relations and the growth of the Koknor Tibetan power. On the opposite direction, nevertheless, the impact of the Tangut offensive and the Khitan exploitation exhilarated the Sung anxiety on national security and provoked suspicion.

These suspicion and anxiety fostered the growth of strategic realism after the 1060s. At

LS, chQan 16, p. 183, chQan 20, p. 238. SSCW. chOan 12, p. 245. 247

this point, the dilemma of long-tenn and short-temi strategic objectives remarkably unveiled. The increase of annual payment equitable to the tax of the Kuanan region unquestionably served the short-teim benefit of the Liao state. Nevertheless, whether or not this income favored the long-term interests of the Khitan was uncertain. Defining the relations with deterrence and exploitation instead of equality and norms, the Kuanan crisis increased the insecure atmosphere overshadowing the Sung and generated potential animosity. After examining some crucial strategic aspects, the Simg civilian control of the military, the reorganization of tribal auxiliaries and its perimeter fortifications, are to be discussed in Chapter Eight, whereas Chapter Nine examines the increasing military priority of the Sung. 248

Chapter 7 Civilian in Command: The Strategy of Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen

The Chinese experience against the Hsi Hsia from 1039 to 1045 provides a paradigm

of Fabian strategy; it is a conscious rejection of unfavorable battle conditions comparable

to the Roman stratagem against Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Fabian had never

defeated Hannibal as had his successor Scipio The Africanus. However, he prevented

further disaster and enabled Rome to recover from the crisis after Cannae.^ Similarly,

Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen did not even inflict a single defeat over Hsi Hsia but

successfully defended Sung China.

This chapter focuses on the defensive strategy of the Sung after 1040 which is

inextricably linked with the contributions of Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen with the

following concerns. First, Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i were representative figures of the

Sung practice of civilian command. Their success and failure very much affected the

evaluation of such a significant policy. The first section of this chapter examines the Sung

practice of civilian command and argues its practicability. Second, exaggeration did exist

in records and their military achievement demands objective evaluation; strategy

innovations traditionally attributed should be re-examined. This section evaluates their

contribution and also traces the origin of their policy and strategy. The third section

examines three crucial establishments of the Shensi defense: forts, archers, and auxiliary system. Although Han and Fan did not inaugurate these systems, they made use of them

^ Livy, Aubrey De Selincouit tr. Betty Radic ed. and intr.. The War with Hannibal. (London: Penguin Bool^ first print in 1965, reprinted in 1968,1970, 1972,1974, 1975, and 1977), pp. 153-65. 249

to the maximum. The fourth section deals with an illustrative event, the Issue of Fort

Shui-lo, which reveals a dilemma in the Sung defensive strategy. The rebuilding of the

Shensi defense hinged on the success of recruitment of archers and tribal auxiliary.

However, such policies demanded more of commitment to territorial expansion, likely to turn into an offensive strategy.

Civilians in Military Command

Civilian command was by no means an innovation of Fan Chung-yen and Han

Ch'i's. In the Five Dynasties and early Sung there were numerous civilians with military talent, distinguishing themselves with personal combat and meritorious service in military command. In Sung China, the term "literati", "elite", "scholar", and "civilian commander" occasionally brought unnecessary confusion about a person's social identity.

The stereotype of scholar-ofBcials devoting their career in studies and the practice of

Confucian teaching became inadequate to describe Sung scholars who were at the same time financial experts, scientists, strategists, and painters. Shen Kuo and Su Shih were well-known scholar-scientists and scholar-painters. In the account of Robert Hartwell, financial service became an official career in Sung China^ and the following discussion suggests that military service was not an exception.

As a continuation of the tumultuous Five Dynasties, Sung China provided mid- eleventh century China with a considerable number of civilians able to assume military

- Hartwell, Robert, M., "Financial Expertise, Examinations, and the Formulation of Economic Policy in Northern Sung China", in Journal of Asian Studies. vJO, no. 2 (1971)2, pp. 281-314. 250

duties. They consisted of a number of experts in archery and crossbow, such as Hsin

Chung-p'u, Ch'en Shih-ch'ing (1016-1064), Ch'en Yao-chih (d. after 1032), Chou Chan

(circa mid-11th century) and Hsu Chiang (1037-1111).^ During the suppression of the Li

Shun rebellion, Ch'en Shih-ch'ing shot down several hundred rebel soldiers in battle.^

Others acquired sword playing and close combat techniques. The well-known early Sung civilian commanders Liu K'ai (947-1000) a pioneering literature refomier and civilian- strategist and Chang Yung (946-1015) exemplify such talents. Private anecdotes confided that Liu had committed rape, homicide, arson, and cannibalism before becoming a civilian commander. Even after being appointed as govemor, he still retained his proclivity for hvunan liver.^ Chang Yimg demonstrated chivahrous behavior when still a layman.® Chang Chih (circa early I Ith century), a civilian commander who conducted a stout resistance in Fu-chou I against Li YOan -hao in 1041, had a prior record of killing more than thirty bandits in single combat as a police officer in a small county.^

Some scholars had particular penchant for military technology. Wei Pei (919-999) increased the range of the "mattress crossbow" or ch'nan^-tTu-ln from seven hundred gu

^ Wen-ying, YO-hu ch'tne-hua. (Elegant Sayings with Jade Glass), (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1984), with Wen-vine. Shane-shan ve-lu. chQan I, p. 10. SS, chQan 307, p. 10132. SS, chQan 284, p. 958S. ^ chQan 300, p. 9968. SS, chQan 343, p. 10908. 'SS ChQan 307, p. 10132. ^ Ch'ing-shuaae tsa-chi. chQan 6, pp. 63-64. YQ-hu ch'ine-hua. chQan 3, pp. 29-30, Chang Shih-cheng (1015-after 1073), Chuan-vou tsa-lu (Miscellaneous Notes Collected during the Exhausting Journey), with Yang Yi (974-1020), Yane Wen-kune fan-vOan (Hearsays of Master Yang), (Shanghai; Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1993), pp. 19-20. Chiang Shao-yQ (d. after 1145), Sune-ch'ao shih-shih lei-vOan (A Collection of Famous Words and Deeds in the Northern Sung Dynasty), (Shanghai; Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1981), chQan 74, p. 986. ® Ch'un-chu chi-wen. chQan 3, p. 35. Chuan-vou tsa-lu. pp. 20-21. 'SS, ChQan 301, pp. 1003-04. 251

to one thousand Yang Chieh and Kuo Chih were also remarkable military

technologists in the mid-eleventh century.^ To amateurs of wes^nry manufacture, the

technology was especially attractive. Chang K'ang emphasized the tactical employment of crossbows as the key to victory. In 1041, he deceived Hsi Hsia invaders by having his crossbowmen and an inferior infantry unit switch banners and gained a victory. He and

Ou-yang Hsiu, though not an expert in technology, advocated the massive employment of crossbows.

Logistics were essential to military operations and some early Sung civilians in logistic service gave valuable advice to their commanders. In 970, Transportation

Indentant Wang Ming proposed and commanded an assault against Ho-chou. Later, he participated in the planing of the battle at Kuang-chou.^^ Liu K'ai manifested his talent in military command as Transportation Intendant under General Mi Hsin, and was being fully aware of Khitan deception during the northem expedition in 986.^^ Similarly, the advice from Transportation Intendant Shuo Hsiang (d.lOOO) allowed Commander Tien

Ch'ung-chin to extricate from a Khitan trap in 987.^* Another Transportation Intendant

Lei You-chung (947-1005) participated the suppression of rebellion in Szechwan.^^

® ^ chOan 270, p. 9277. ^ For their technology innovation, see Chapter Nine. " Han Ch'i, "Ku K'o-sheng-shih Mei-chou fang-yQ-sbih tseng Sui-chou fuan-lian-shih Chang-kung mu> chih-ming", in An-vane Chi. chOan 47, p. 19a. Also, §S, chOan 10489. HCP. chOan 136, p. 3247. Ou-yang Hsiu, chOan 13, pp. 79,126-27. SS, chQan 270, p. 9266. HCP. chQan 27, p. 613. Also, Chang Ching (970-1018), "^u yu-ching shih Liu-kung hsing-chuang", in Liu K'ai. Ho-tune hsien-sene chi (Collected Works of Liu K'ai), (in SPTK. ser.l, v.44), chQan 16, p. 100. SS, chQan 277, p. 9420-21. Lei You-chung's father Lei Te-hsiang (918-992) and elder brother Lei You-lin (b. before 947) contributed to the Sung reasserting of provincial control. See Ch'ine-shuane tsa-chi. chQan I, p. I. SS. 252

Some scholars devoted their life to the study of the arts of war and were qualified to

be military advisors and commanders. Despite holding a chin-shih degree, Pien Ching

was best known for his knowledge of strategy, astronomy, and "studies in miscellaneous

subjects" or cha-chia chih-hsueh. It was Pien Ching who led the final assault in the suppression of the Rebellion of Wang Tze (d. 1048) in 1048.^® Pien K'uang distinguished himself as an expert of financial accounting and military strategy, compiling the "Accountancy Record of the Ching-te Reign" or Chine-te hui-chi-Iu.

"Accountancy Record of Ching-you Reign" or Chine-vou hui-chi-lu. and a number of military reports.^^

Scholars active in military service even included legalists. For example, Ch'ung

Shih-hang demonstrated a typical Legalist employment of reward and punishment.

During the construction of Fort Pure Springs or Ch'ing-chien-ch'eng, a well digger reported being unable to reach water even at one hundred and fifty ch'ih. Chung Shih- hang questioned: "How is it possible that no water exists undergroimd?" He then announced a reward of one hundred wen for every bucket of stones. Through several rocky layers, the well diggers reached pure and sweet water. As governor of Fort Pure

Springs, he announced an archery competition in which the target was a small silver piece. Those who hit the target coiild take home the silver piece. As recorded, everyone in the fort including monks, Taoists, and women practiced archery.^^ Pragmatism was the

chQan 278, pp. 9456-60. SS,chaan 303, p. 10053. SS, chOan 292, pp. 9781-83. SSCW. chOan 9, pp. 169-171. Fan Chung-yen, "Tung-yen-yOan-shih Ch'ung-chOn mu-chih-ming" in Fan 253

center of Ch'ung Shih-hang's personality^ and behavior and as he described himself, his heart was made of iron.^^ Though a Confucian, Fan Chung-yen admired Ch'img Shih- hang as the military imperative increased in the priority of pr^matic interests. Most prior historians have not attended the complexity of Sung civilian participation in military service. These civilians consisted of martial arts experts, technologists, civilian strategists, logistic and financial specialists, and even legalists. Although Confucian reformists provided the indispensable justification of a unified civil-military relation, not all those civilians contributed were "Confucians".

Civilian participation in military affairs was even institutionalized. Traditional historians viewed the power of the prime minister in Sung China as being separated among the Military Bureau and the Three Treasures.^" Recent scholars have indicated that the shrinking authority of the prime minister was a result of the civil war during the later Tang and Five Dynasties. There were many occasions during the Sung-Liao and

Sung-Hsia Wars to amend prime ministerial authority due to the imperative need to find consensus between the Prime Ministers and Commissioners of Military Bureau. Joint meetings were hold and prime ministers took charge over military bureau during crisis.^^

During the reign of Sung Tai-tsung and Sung Chen-tsung, civilian even started to

Wen-cheng kune-chi. (Collected works of Fan Chung-yen, in Shih-nu tsHme-kan ch'u-oien k'o-oen. hereafter as SPTK. (Taipei; Taiwan Commercial Press, minimal edition in 1965), ser 1, v. 44. chQan 13, p. 113. SSCW. chQan 9, p. 172. Ch'ien Mu, "Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch'aan", Chtmg-kuo wen-hua ven-chiu hul-k'an. vol. 2, (1942), pp. 145-150. Also, in SSYCC. v. 1, p. 455-62. Wang Rei-lai, "Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch'flan", Li-shih ven-chiu. no. 2, (1985), pp. 106-120. Ch'ih Ching- te, "Sung YQan-feng kai-chih ch'ien chih tsai-hsiang chi-k'ou yQ san-shih", in SSYCC. v.7, (1974), p. 607- 22, "Sung-tai tsai-shu-fen-Ii-chih chih yen-pien", in SSYCC. v. 15 (1984), pp. 35-62. 254

participate in operational planing. Sung Tai-tsung demanded that each prime minister draft his own plan for the Salt Lake Operation.^^ As Kao Ch'iimg sarcastically related,

Feng Ch'eng could not compose a poem to commemorate repulsing the Khitans. Yet, even Feng Ch'eng submitted a plan for a defense in depth in 1003.^^ K'ou Chun authored his own plan for the Shan-yOan Campaign which was ignorant of the Kuannan defense but manipulated a classic Fabian strategy, chien-pi ch'ine-ve.^* As hostilities erupted in

Shensi after 1038, Chang Fang-p'ing (1007-1091) suggested combining the office of the

Prime Minister and the Military Bureau to improve coordination. His suggestion was accepted as a war-time precedent and Sung Jen-tsimg permitted his prime ministers and vice-prime minister to act as military counselor and vice-military coimselor until the end of war in 1045.^^

The institutionalization of civilians in theater command was also a gradual process.

Long before the Sung-Hsia War from 1038 to 1045, the early Sung emperors had established such a precedent. According to Wang Yao-ch'en in 1043: "Pang rulers initiated the precedent by allowing the Military Governors of Lung-yu, Ho-hsi, and Fan- yang, and the Four Commanderies of An-hsi and Ling-nan to act as Theater Commanders of their own regions. In the fifth year of the Hsien-p'ing Reign (998-1003), the Emperor appointed Chang Ch'i-hsien to be Theater Commander of Pen-Ning, Huan-Ch'ing, and

" HCP. chQan 39, p. 834. " SS, ChQan 285, p. 9609-10. For the strategy of K'ou Chun, sec Ho Koon-wan, "Politics and Factionalism; Kou Chun (962-1023) and his Tung Nien", pp. 141-73. The Sung ^lure to foresee the Khitan offense in Kuanan region, refer to Liu Li-yen, "Sung-Liao Shan-yQan-chih-nieng hsin-fan", p. 98-112. HCP. ChQan 137, pp. 3281-83. SS, chQan 318, p. 10354, LCC. chOan 20, p. 4-8. 255

Ching-Yflan Circuits, and Governor of Pen-chou, with the garrisons of Huan-Ch'ing, and

Ching-YOan Circuits, and Yung-Ch'ing Commandery, under his command. In the same year, the Coxirt delegated Regional Supervisor of Teng-chou Ch'ien Jo-shui as Theater

Commander of P'ing-tai Circuit or Ping-tai ching-ltieh-shih. Governor of Ping-chou." In

Wang's description, the appointment of Chang Ch'i-hsien and Ch'ien Ryo-shui were the two earliest practices of civilians as field commanders.^® It is noticeable that at the beginning Theater Commander was not necessarily superior to the Supreme Director of

Operation and Chang Ch'i-hsien was not yet have a full conunander. As soon as he accepted the assignment, a fiiend reminded him that General Wang Ch'ao had been designated as the Supreme Director of Operation of the same theater. This person urged

Chang to clarify whether or not he could give orders to Wang Ch'ao. Regretfidly, the reply from K'aifeng was disappointing and Wang Ch'ao had been dispatched with all the best troops. As discussed in Chapter Five, in Sung tradition a supreme operation conductor received a map and plan directly from the emperor. Chang Ch'i-hsien soon discovered that what a theater commander could do was very limited if he were not involved in the operation.^^ During the Shan-yOan Campaign from 1004 to 1005,

Emperor Chen-tsung entrusted Hsiang Min-chimg (948-1019) with full authority in

Shensi by sending him a secret edict and Hsiang Min-chung maintained a stricted

Precedent earlier than these can be found in Sung Tai-tsung's delegation of Chao Ch'ang-yien (945- 1009), his military advisor, as Commander-in-chief to suppress the Rebellion of Li Shun. Unfortunately an ominous fortune-telling changed the emperor's mind. Chao Ch'ang-yien had an odd shape at his nose which was considered a "face of rebel". In addition, the fact that he had no child as rescue alarmed the central authority. Despite his departure. Sung Tai-tsiug dispatched a eunuch to replaced him. See HCP. chOan 36, pp. 793-96. 256

discretion in accepting such a commission.^^ According to Wang Yao-ch'en, there was no

like appointment until after the outbreak of the Sung-Hsia War.

During the Sung-Hsia War, K'aifeng established a theater command headquarters in

Yimg-ch'ing Commandery, the former Ch'ang-an, and divided the Shensi defense into four circuits, each with a Pacification Intendant and Supreme Operation Conductor.

However, the Theater Command Headquarterss was not a permanent establishment.

Occasionally, the Sung assigned all four Pacification Intendants simultaneoiisly as

Theater Commander of their own circuit, i.e. Ching-Yflan, Huan-Ch'ing, Fu-Yen and

Ch'in-Feng. In this division of power, the actual command of Shensi as theater did not perpetuate and the ofiBce of "Theater" Commander" became merely nomenclatural.

Nevertheless, with the offices of Theater Commander, the power of each Pacification

Intendant increased. The three-in-one position. Theater Commander, Pacification

Intendant, and Supreme Operation Conductor of Cavalry and Infantry Force or Ma-ou- chun tu-Du-chu in a circuit, provided a civilian ofBcial with unchallengable authority. The highest ranking military officers of the circuit could only serve as his deputy.

Wang Yao-ch'en said:

"Since the use of force in Shensi, Hsia Shou-pin (circa, early 11th century), Hsia

Simg, and Ch'en Chih-chung, all Ex-Prime Ministers and Ex-Military Counselors,

took the position of Theater Commander, Pacification Intendant, and Pardon-

suppression Commissioner or rhan-t'an-shih of Shensi. Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-

See HCP. chQan 51, pp. 1107-09. 257

yen were only their deputies. Shortly thereafter. Governor of Yen-chou Chang

Ch'uen, Governor of Wei-chou Wang YOan (d.l044). Governor of Ch'ing-chou

Chang K'uei (988-1052) were scholars fiom the Imperial Academy with their

authorities restricted to their own circuits. When Hsia Sung and Ch'en Chih-chimg

were dismissed and theater command was divided into four circuits, their deputies,

usually military ofGcers, automatically became vice theater commanders. Now Han

Ch'i, Fan Chung-yen, and P'ang Chi were Supreme Operation Conductor of the Four

Circuits in Shensi, Theater Commander, Pacification Indentant, and Pardon-

suppression Commissioner of the Frontier. It is ridiculous that there are nine persons

still retaining their theater commandership in their own circuits. 1 hereby suggest

removing the office of Theater Commanders from all those Operation Conductors

and Vice Conductors commanding only one circuit while still delegating them as

Pacification Intendants of the Frontier."^®

It is clear that during the Jen-tsimg period, Pacification Intendant and Supreme

Operation Conductor were political and military chiefs of a circuit while the authority of theater commander fluctuated. It could be the centralized and highest command of the whole Shensi region, or it could merely enhance the power of each Pacification Intendant in the separate circuits. In 1048, K'aifeng also established four Pacification Intendant and

Supreme Operation Conductors in Hopei without the additional office of theater

SS, chQan 282, p. 9555. HCP. chQan 139, pp. 3344-45. The origin of division of power in the four circuits, also refer to Chang Fang-p'ing's criticism in LCC. chQan 21: 5a-6a. SS, chOan 3IS, p. 10345. Su Ch'e (I039-1112), Lung- ch'uan pieh-chih. (Special Notes Written at Lung-ch'uan), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1982), 258

commander because the Sung and Liao were not in war. In 1059, Sung Jen-tsung designated all Pacification Intendants of Eastern Huai-nan, Western Huai-nan, Chiang* hsi. Eastern Chiang-nan, Western Chiang-nan, Hu-kuang, and Fu-chien to act as

Brigadier of Cavalry and Infantry forces of the region also.^° Regardless of the way in which it was practiced, the employment of civilians as commander of a theater or circuit became regularized from the 1040s to the end of Sung.

When a civilian was delegated with military commission such as theater commander or Supreme Director of Operation, he became a military officer with rank commensiirate with his authority. However, as there were temporary in nature, he retained his permanent rank in the civilian bureaucracy. In 1041, Theater Commander of Shensi Fan Chung-yen rejected a Military title as Regional Supervisor because retaining his civilian identity contribute more in gaining the trust of the barbarian tribes.^ ^ The impermanent nature and political considerations were rationale for allowing theater commanders to retain their civil titles and identity.

Civil officials not in a theater command position would be transferred to the military. Sung Chen-tsung inaugurated this precedent by recruiting Liu K'ai and five others from civil bureaucracy and appointing them as governors of border prefectures and commanderies.^^ After this, the Sung government allowed the conditional transfer between the civil and the military. A civilian could transfer to the military with

chQan 2, pp. 86-87. Yen-i i-mou-lu. chOan 5. p. 51. ^^SS,ch0an314, p. 10721. HCP. chaan 28, p. 637. 259

recommendation as to his military talent; some coiild volunteer on occasions. A military ofBcer whose father or grandfather had served as a civil ofBcial was qualified to transfer to the civil bureaucracy after passing a law examination. An imperial servant transferred m rank commensuate to his original. For example, Han Ch'i was a Scholar of Imperial

Academy in the civil hierarchy and became Regional Supervisor in the military hierarchy during the Sung-Hsia War. In other cases, minister, vice minister, and Intendant of the

Three Treasure were interchangeable with Regional Supervisor.^^

Historians may criticize the incompetence of some civilian commanders such as Fan

Yung and Hsu Hsi,^" who were responsible for the defeats at Yen-chou (1040) and Fort

Eternal Happiness (1082). They may also doubt the contribution of these civilian commanders as exaggerated. Indeed, a civilian commander could overstate his military merit with impressive literary skills, the hyperbole would find an audience with better connection among the literati. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of civilian transfer to military service reflects the actual civilian participation in military affairs and it complicated the socio-political identity of civil ofiicials.

Theater Strategy: Offense or Defense?

Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i, two Confiician reformists of the mid-Northem Sung, were highly praised by the Sung people for their tremendous deeds of merits in the war against the Hsi Hsia. "Whenever Master Han was present with in the army, the Western

For Han Ch'i's transference, see SS, chQan 312, p. 10223, and chQan 314, p. 10721. For other ranks, see Hung Mai, June-chai sui-oi. chQan 4, p. 465. ^ chOan 334, 10721-24. HCP. chOan 330, pp. 7955-56. 260

Pirates have their hearts and bones grew cold; Master Fan was present with the army, the

Western Pirates feared and broke their gall."^^ Historians wrote: "(Han) Ch'i and Fan

Chung-yen were with the army for a long time and their reputation became tremendous in

the public consciousness. The Court leaned on them so as to become stable. Thus, All-

Under-Heaven called them "Han-Fan*."^® Several modem scholars considered Fan Chung-

yen not only a paramount statesman but also a capable field commander.^^ However, other historians, conscious of the short-term significance of operational warfare, downplayed the military role of Han and Fan. One opinion viewed the contribution of

Han and Fan as an exaggeration and Li YOan -hao as the real master of battlefield.^®

Therefore, we ought to examine the efBcacy of their strategy.

There were three schemes of strategy, namely defense-in-depth, counter-offensive, and perimeter defense, after the defeat at Yen-chou in 1040 which underlined the vulnerability of Shensi. The defense-in-depth strategy placed the greatest importance on the quantity of force as it had the disadvantages of dispersing forces throughout various circuits. Advocates suggested abolishing vulnerable forts along the border and preferred a

K'ung P'ing-chung (circa late 11th century), Tan-iuan (A Collection of Hearsay), in Pai-ou ts'unc-shu chi-ch'ene. ser. 18, Pao-ven-fane mi-chi. c. 2, chOan 3, p. 15a. SS, chQan 312, p. 10223. Tang Ch'eng-yieh, Fan Chune-vien ven-chiu (A Study of Fan Chung-yen), (Taipei: Kuo-li pien-i-kuan, 1977), pp. 171-199. Ch'en June-chao. Fan Chune-ven ven-chiu CA Study of Fan Chung-yen), (Hong Kong: San-lien, 1987), p. lOS-24. Li Hsien, "Lun Fan Chung-yen chai yU-Hsia chan-cheng chung te kung-hsien", in Teng Kuang-ming and Li Chia-chu ed., Sung-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (Unknown place in Honan: Honan Jemin, 1984), pp. 535-562. Ts'ao Sung-lin, "Sung Jen-tsung tui Hsia chan-cheng te li-shih chiao-shun", in Chung-kuo se-hui-k'o- hsOeh-yOan Sung-Liao-Chin-YQan-shih yen-chiu-shih ed., Sune-Liao-Chin-shih iun-ts'une. (Beijing: Chung-hua, 1991), vJ2, p. 201-217. 261

concentration of force in the head-prefecture of a circuit^' However, following Fang

Jung's approach in the battle of Yen-chou, it was contended that the threat could be

deterred by merely concentrating troops in the head prefecture. Ofifensive-minded

supporters argued that the Shensi garrisons together far out-numbered the Hsi Hsia. They

proposed a quick resolution to the Hsi Hsia threat with an all-out attack, a continuation of

early Sung doctrine on short-term violence and Simg Pai-tsung's theater strategy in the

late 990s. The perimeter defense strategy seemed to contradict concentration of forces

and only defend the perimeter, even building more forts at critical junctions.

Nevertheless, its feasibility depended on a different source for its units and did not result

in the further division of regular forces. Militia and tribal auxiliaries rather than the standing army constituted the main strength of the garrisons on the perimeter. Their massive employment allowed more standard army units to be deployed behind the front­ line as reserve and thus reduced the burden of logistic transport. This was the strategy of

Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen.

At the beginning of the war, Han Ch'i was an offensive advocate. He proposed a counteroffense following the strategic principle of concentration of forces. He advised the

Emperor Jen-tsung in 1041 and said: "Although Yiian -hao mounts all-out attacks, his host consists of no more than forty to fifty thousand soldiers. Previously, we divided our troops equally among the various circuits and allowing our numerically superior to become inferior on each of the particular battlefields and by no means able to withstand

"HCP,chaan 123, p. 2912. 262

the enemy. If we concentrate the force on one single finnt and advance blowing oiir

trumpets, we will catch the arrogant and exhausted pirates. Victory is assured."^" It would

be fair to state that Han Ch'i had a positive goal, acknowledging that only the elimination

of the enemy's force would ultimately lead to Sung victory. However, one obvious

shortcoming in his advice was the ignorance of the quality of his soldiers. He had only

quantity as his concern. However, Fan Chxmg-yen acknowledged that his soldiers were

unqualified to mount any ofiFensive. According to Wei Tai, Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen

had different strategic estimates and employed different strategies at the early phase of

the war. Wei Pai records:

"Han Ch'i, The Duke of Wei, Vice Theater Commander, intended to launch an attack

against P'ing-hsia from all the five circuits. Fan Chung-yen, then Governor of

Ch'ing-chou, rebuked this firmly. At the time, Yvin Shu, Co-govemor or t'une-p'an

of Ch'in-chou and Secretary of Theater Headquarters or chine-lfleh p'an-kuan.

attended the office of Fan to urge a joint attack. Master Fan said: 'Our force has been

defeated recently and morale is low. Now it is time to defend carefully and watched

for further opportimity. How can we penetrate to the depth with such lightly-

equipped soldiers? Under the current conditions, I see only the omen of defeat

instead of any opportunity for victory.' (Yiin) Shu sighed and said, "I'm afraid that at

this point Your Excellency is not comparable to Master Han. Master Han has said

^ chQan 312, p. 10222. The standard history also revealed that Emperor Jen-tsung, himself, initially preferred the offensive option which was challenged by the prime minister. Being advised by Han Ch'i, the emperor made the final decision to mount attack. The memorial of Han Ch'i, see Han Ch'i, Han Wei-kune chi. here after as HWKC. in Kuo-hsfleh chi-nen ts'ung-shu. hereafter as KHCPTS. (Shanghai: Commercial 263

that whenever the use of force becomes necessary, one should not heed the pressures

of the outcome. Now I see Your Excellency is being too cautious and not

comparable to Master Han.' Master Fan replied: "Whenever an operation is mounted,

the lives of ten thousand soldiers hang on it. Chung-yen cannot see any reason for

getting rid of them.' Failing to settle an agreement with Fan, (YOn) Shu immediately

retumed. The Duke of Wei mounted an attack which resulted in the defeat at Good

Water VaUey.""

After the defeat, Han Ch'i acceded to agree with Fan Chimg-yen's defensive strategy.

From 1041, there was no fundamental contradiction in strategy between the two and the term "strategy of Han and Fan" was coined. Together, Han Ch'i and Fan Chung Chung- yen undertook the rebuilding of the Sung perimeter.

The evolution of Fan Chung-yen's defense strategy was a gradual process. At the beginning of war, he proposed a plan for defense-in-depth and accelerating the reinforcement of the garrisons of Pimg-chou, present day Ta-li County; Hua-chou 2, present day Hua County, and Yung-ch'ing Commandery to 3,000 soldiers each. In the same memorial, he elaborated the difficulties in launching deep penetration into the

Press, date unknown), chQan 11, p. 170. Tune-hsien oi-lu. chQan 7, p. 82. In this record, Han Ch'i seemed to have made two mistakes, over­ taking the risk with the lives of ten-thousand soldiers and mounting offensive solely without the cooperation from Fan Chung-yen. Nevertheless, there is some factual deflation exist in this account Before 1041 Fan Chung-yen was Governor of Yen-chou instead of Ch'ing-chou. Good Water Valley was not in the Hsi Hsia territory. Despite the idea of launching an offense, the Battle of Good Water V^ley was still a defensive operation. The original offeivsive campaign in Han Ch'fs mind did not ever occur, which was distracted by Li YQan-hao's attack upon Ching-YQan Circuit In response to this attack, Han Ch'i preferred an ambush rather than a penetration into Hsi Hsia territory. Therefore, strictly speaking, the defeat was not a result of his employment of offensive strategy. See Tune-tu shih-leuh. chflan 69, p. 2a. SS, chQan 312, p. 10222. 264

Ordos and suggested a deliberate rejectioii of battle/^

After he had taken the governorship of Yen-choul, he acknowledged the importance

of perimeter defense. Without a solid perimeter, the Hsi Hsia could menace his

headquarters and its communication lines between circuits driving the Tanguts and

Tibetans to their side. Previously, the Fu-yen perimeter had three obviously

vulnerabilities, the poor fortification of Fu-chou 2, the absence of a stronghold northeast of Yen-chou, and a low density of defense fortifications along the route firom Yen-chou to the front.''^ After the Hsi Hsia offense in 1040, Fort Constant Peace or Ch'eng-p'ing-tsai,

Fort Eternal Peace or Yung-p'ing-tsai, Fort Frontier-gate or Sai-men-tsai, and Fort

Platinum were either abandoned or captured. Yen-chou and Fu-chou 2 became extremely insecure. Fan Chung-yen retook and rebuilt these forts^^ establishing Fort Pure Springs on the main route to the northeast.^ ^ His successor P'ang Chi fmished the fortification of

Fu-chou 2 and built Fort Proclaimed Amnesty or Chao-an-tsai, Dragon Security or Lung- an-tsai, making a total of eleven forts in 1042.

In 1042, Fan Chung-yen served as Pacification Intendant of Huan-Ch'ing Circuit, where the front-line was drawn along difficult terrain advantageous to the defender but complicating logistics and reinforcement There was a number of salients on both sides and the local tribes shifted their loyalty frequently. Fan Chung-yen built Fort Great

*' For other memorials insist the same opinion, see SMCCI. chOan 132, pp. 18b-21a and 21a-23b. Also, the memorial of Hsia Sung partially agreed with this approach. HCP. chOan 127, p. 3012. "Refer to the memorial of Fan Jung in HCP. chOan 125, p. 29S3-S5. Also, the memorial of Han Ch'i, in HWKC. chOan 10, p. 164. SS, chOan 314, p. 10270, OYHCC. chflan 3, p. 51. Also, HCP. chOan 128, pp. 3036-37. OYHCC. (HK) chflan 3, p. 51. SS, chOan 335, p. 10741, HCP. chOan 128, p. 3043. 265

Obedience or Ta-shu-ch'eng, and Fort Little Waist or Hsi-yao-ch'eng in two of these salient to protect Huan-chou and Ch'ing-chou. ^^^th Fort Great Obedience, the Sung reasserted control on the Rear Bridge Valley or Hou-ch'iao-ch'un, a valley extending from the northwest of Ch'ing-chou to Hsi Hsia territory/®

Han Ch'i made a similar contribution. In Ching-Yiian Circuit, Han Ch'i followed the precedent laid down by Li Chi-lung and Ts'ao Wei and strengthened the fortification of

Subduing Barbarian Commandery and the Lung-kan salient. He elevated Fort Lung-kan into the Virtue Obedience Conunandery or Te-shun-chun, to consolidate the defense outside Liu-p'en Mountain.

Despite the conscious rejection of engagement into decisive battles, the Sung commanders did not avoid small-scale encounters. Skirmishes continued, while combats to defend fortifications were vigorous. During the construction of Fort Horse Post in

Huan-Ch'ing Circuit, cavalry under Fan Chung-yen's own son. Fan Ch'un-yu (1024-

1063), firmly withstood the Hsi Hsia force for several days to protect construction.^^

Employment of deception was prevalent. In the effort to recover Fort Platinum in 1040,

Fan Chung-yen's subordinate Chou Mei (before 1002 - after 1042), commanding only

SS, chOan 311, p. 10199-10200. In the biography of Ti Ch'ing in SS, Ti Ch'ing also constructed Fort Bridged Pass or Ch'iao-tzu-ku, Fort Flourished Forest or Feng-lin-tsal, Fort The New or Hsin-tsai and Fort Elder Son or Ta-iang-tsai, their present day location unknown. See SS, chQan 290, p. 9718. The construction at Ch'iao-tzu-ku seemed to be identical to Fort Chao-an. In the biography of Fang Chi, it said: "In the northwest of Platinum, there is Hun-chou Valley, a very fertile area, of which to its egress there is the corridor through Bridged Pass the pirates come and go. He ordered his subordinate Ti Ch'ing built Fort I>roclaimed Amnesty near the pass with ten thousand men, and employed ^rmers cultivating the land to support the troops." SS, 311, p. 10199-10200. It is clear in this passive that Fort Proclaimed Amnesty and Bridged Pass were the same fort. The former was its formal name while the latter refer to its geographical location. SS, chQan 314, pp. 10271, 10276. OYHCC. chOan 3, p. 52. '•'SS,ch0an314. p. 10276. 266

2,000 men, faced a Hsi Hsia relief force of more than 3,000 soldiers. Attacking ay night,

he had his men each carry torches to create the impression of a large force/^ For security

reasons, the actual construction site for the fort remained a secret until the troops were

mid-way. Fan Chung-yen unfolded his plan for Fort Great Obedience only when his men

had approached the vicinity of the Rear Bridge Valley.*®

Scholars may argue why the Sung did not rebuild the Great Wall. Indeed, the

different nature of Liao and Hsi Hsia from the previous steppe empires, the pacifist

rejection of placing a burden on the people, and the traditional doctrine "placing defense

on Virtue rather than di£5cult terrain" or ch'ih-te du ch'ih-hsien. were important.

Nevertheless, complete isolation from the "barbarians" did not seem to be the goal of the

Sung.^° Fan Chimg-yen had a far more positive strategic goal. In late 1042, he submitted

a memorial discussing the possibility of employing an elastic defense. In this memorial

he proposed that he and Han Ch'i formed a joint theater command with a headquarters in

Ching-Yuan Circuit. Fan Chung-yen would still retain his command in Huan-Ch'ing

Circuit and Han Ch'i in Ch'in-Feng. If there were an emergency in any of these circuits,

the other circuit could immediately respond. Further, Fan Chung-yen stated that if Hsi

Hsia dared not to attack, he and Han Ch'i could then gradually take over the Horizon

Mountain or Heng-shan as a means to ultimate Hsi Hsia suppression.^^ Thus, to Fan and

chOan 128, p. 3036-37. " OYHCC. chOan 3, p. 52. Chiang Tien-chien, Tei-Sung Shensi-Iu ydan-pien pao-tsai", in Chiang Tien-chien, Pei-Sune tui-vO Hsi Hsia pien-fang ven-chiu lun-chi. (Studies on the Northern Sung Defense against Hsi Hsia), (Taipei; Hua- shih, 1993), pp. 19-22. HCP. chQan 134, pp. 3200-04, SS, chflan 314, p. 10272. For Han Ch'i's opinion, see HWKC. chQan 1, 267

Han, defense was a transition to offense.

The Horizon Mountain Range drew a natural boundary between the Ordos Desert

and interior China. As the indigenous populace was Tanguts, their scattered distribution

and political disunity prevented any nation-building by a local power. Any outsider

controlling the area could draft upon its populace to swell the ranks. The idea of taking

the Horizon Mountain Range was devised &om some earlier commanders. After

suppressing the revolt of Li Chi-p'eng in 994, Sung commander Li Chi-Iung advised Sung

Pai-tsimg not to abandon Hsia-chou, the Tangut power base north of the Horizon

Mountain Range. Rather, he suggested a series of fortifications along the mountain range.^^ However, Sung Tai-tsung did not grasp this opportunity to reassert control over the Horizon Mountain Range. In 1039, Vice Supreme Operation Conductor of Fu-Yen and Huan-Ch'ing Circuit Liu P'ing criticized the policy of Sung Chen-tsung. Sung Chen- tsung had not only accorded Li Te-ming the territory of Ling-chou but also had recognized the lordship of Te-ming over the Horizon Moimtain Range. Liu P'ing suggested that K'aifeng prepared a month-long campaign with 200,000 soldiers to seize

Hung-chou (approximately fifty kilometers in the southwest of the present day Ching- pien County) and Yu-chou 2 (approximately fifty kilometers in the west of present day

Ching-pien County), two prefectures on the Horizon Mountain Range. After controlling the area, Liu P'ing stated, the Sung could construct a nimiber of forts on advantageous

pp. 186-88. SMCCI. chQan 133, p. 31b. " HCP. ChQan 35, p. 778. 268

terrain and built a nature perimeter separating the Ordos Desert and interior China.^^ Liu

P'ing did not actualize his plan largely because of his defeat in the Batde of Yen-chou.

Chang K'ang also pointed out the outstanding combat capability of the tribes along the

Horizon Mountain Range and proposed an offensive.^^ Neither he nor Fan Chung-yen could undertake the offensive as peace was reinstated between Sung and Hsi Hsia in

1045. Nevertheless, with the renew of animosity in the 1060s, overrunning the Horizon

Mountain Range thematized Sung theater strategy.

Rebuilding the Shensi Defenses: The Role of Forts, Archers and Tribal Auxiliaries

To understand the strategy of Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen, one must note the multiple roles served by forts along the border. During the 1000s Li Chi-ho and Ts'ao

Wei had started to consolidate the Shensi defense by fort building and Han and Fan were not the earliest theater commanders to stress the utility of forts. As instruments for a prolonged war, these forts were strong points for resistance, but also centers for agriculture and trading. Only when their economic performance was productive or at least self supporting, could the Sung prevent the tremendous draining of resources in a prolonged war.

"Fort" was a collective term for ch'ene. pao. and tsai. From circa. 1056 to 1063, the

Sung managed 112 forts along the Sung-Hsia border. The total number of forts increased to approximately 355 from circa. 1094 to 1097.^® Among them, gao means "Smaller

" HCP. chQan 125, p. 2957. ^ chQan 325, p. p. 10501-02. Also SMCCI. chQan 132, pp. la-3b. HCP. chOan 128, p. 3028. " YOan-fene lei-kao. chQan 30, p. 212. HCP. chQan 520, 12384. 269

Fort" under ch'eng and tsai which mean "Larger Fort".®® A Larger Fort consisted of

standing army soldiers augmented by militia and tribal auxiliaries, and commanded by a

Governor of Fort or Chih-ch'eng, or a Master of Fort or Chih-tsai. The all-around length

of a Larger Fort varied fix)m five to nine hundred qu, while that of a Smaller Fort was about one hundred to two hundred gu.®^ Most of them were built of soil and some were especially pasited on a cliff of mountains. It took laborers more than ten days to accomplish the construction. Water supply entirely depend on the success of wells.®® The failure of well construction meant entire abolition of a fort-building enterprise, as in case of Fort Lo-wu in 1071.®®

A fort was built always with arable land in its vicinity. Sung theater command stressed self-sufficiency of fort garrison, or, at least, a considerable reduction of official expenses in food supply and maintenance. The construction of Fort Proclaimed Amnesty exemplified the relation among military construction, fanning, and supply. Historians recorded: "In the northwest of [Fort] Platinum, there is Hun-chou Valley, a very fertile area. Its egress is the corridor through Rear Bridge Pass through which bandits come and go. He [P'ang Chi] ordered his subordinate Ti Ch'ing to build Fort Proclaimed Amnesty near the pass manning with 10,000 men, and employing farmers to farm the land and support the troops."

Chiang Tten-chien, "Pei-Sung Shensi-lu yOan-pien pao-tsai", p. 10. HCP. chOan 328, pp. 7895-96. - ^ P'ang Chi regarded tower, stone and arrows, food, and water supply as four indispensable elements of a fortified construction, see SMCCI. chOan 133, pp. 20a-2Ib. " HCP. chQan 220, p. 5356. SS» chflan 330, pp. 10622-23. " SS, chQan 311, pp. 10199-10200. 270

Residents who simultaneously provided manpower for cultivation and local defense

were organized as Tenant-Archers, a kind of militia force who were also ofBcial

tenants. The economic foimdation of such a militia system was the huge amount of

official property in Shensi, uncultivated, abandoned, donated, and confiscated land.

Different from the usual practice in official tenancy, K'aifeng accepted military service

instead of seasonal rent from recruited tenants. General Ts'ao Wei established such a

system in 1002, assigning 200 acres to each Archer,®^ exempting their atmual rent and tax

and mobilizing them to serve as the vanguard of a standing army called to action. He

settled a number of archers around a fort, organized them into battalions, and provided

regular training. Archer households responsible for 200 acres of official land provided

one armored soldier and those responsible for an additional 100 acres also provided a

horse. Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i promoted more or less the same system in the

• For origin and general description of the Tenant-Archer system, refer to HCP. chQan 63, pp. 1404, 1419, SS. chQan 190, p. 4712. SHY. v.l73, mib'tary 4, pp. 6806-20. Ogasawara Shoji, "Sodai kyusenshu no kenkyu (zenpen)", in Yamazaki Hiroshi (ed), Chueoku no shakai to shukvo. ^okyo: Fumaido Shoten, 1954), pp. 177-328. Also, Wang Tseng-yQ, pp. 74-75. Wei Pien-an, "Pei-Sung Kung-chian-shou t'un-t'ian chih-tu k'ao-shih, in Ho-nan ta-hsOeh hstleh-pao. philosophy and social science edition, 4 (1988), pp. 55- 60. Li Hui, "Shih-lun Sung-tai hsi-pei fun-fian te chi-ke wen-fi", in Chune-kuo she-hui-chine-chi-shih ven-chiu. 1(1988), pp. 20-27. Liu Yi, "Sung-tai tui Tu-po chu-ti te fu-ti k'ai-fa", in Kan-shu she-hui k'o- hsfleh. 4( 1991), pp. 85-90. On the meaning of Archer, Wei Pien-an pointed out that Archer was a general term for militia and there were three kinds of Archers, namely, Tenant-Archer or Pun-f ien kung-chian- shou. Archers of County or hsien-i kung-chian-shou. and Pao-yi Archer. Among the three, Tenant-Archer was the one commonly referring to the militia force m Sung-Hteia War. Archer of County was a police force under the sheriff of a county and rarely participating military actions. Pao-yi Archer was a subsidence of the militia system of the Five Dynasty and remained inactive for long time in the Northern Sung. " Two passages of historical texts seems suggesting a discrimination between Han and non-Han ethnic in the ofHcial quota of land distribution. According to HCP. the official in 1002 assigned an archer 200 acres. Differing from this, by 1074, the Sung administration in Ho-chou only allowed each archer of non-Han origin for 100 acres. Wei Pien-an clarified that the land allowance in 1074 was according to the rule of Tribal Auxiliary instead of Tenant-Archer. In other words, discrimination in land allowance did not necessarily because of ethnic origin but more because of different types of armed force. Scattered and seemingly contradicting references on rental rate upon the Archers occasionally confused modem scholars. Wei Pian-an indicated the different strategic aims of the establishment of Archers 271

1040s.

The success of the Tenant-Archer system was limited in the agricultural respect but was impressive in its military results. Farming was disrupted by frequent military action and levy service. Moreover, people enrolled as archers were originally roving gangsters from the interior and undisciplined. Abandonment of land and failure to obligate themselves to military conscription were their common behavior. In fact, the constant penlon the extreme frontier diminished the profit of farming which demanded a secure environment. Local landlords would illegally occupy a limited measure of fertile land from archers and, as an afrermath, archers did the same to Tibetan tribes and Converted

Households. All these ensued in serious land disputes and ethnic conflict.®'' Despite its poor economic prospects, the military contributions of the Archers were universally applauded. Fu Pi judged that the efficacy of the militia force was due to familiarity with the terrain, local custom, and enemy strength. As the tenant-archers were protecting their own families and owed allegiance to the local commanders, Fu Pi envisaged that their performance on the battlefield would be excellent Even Hsia Sung, the political rival of

Fu Pi, had the same opinion.®^ K'aifeng even mobilized the Archer units from Shensi to other theaters. In 1080, as Vice Supreme Operations Conductor of the Ching-YOan between the administration of Shensi and Ho-tung. For the former, military service and not agricultural output was the major orientation of the policy. Nevertheless, in the case of the latter, production of grain and the consequential improve on provision was the government's concern. Therefore, the Shensi administration only charged military service and posted a heavy rent onto land-occupation over official quota. Li Huei and Wang Tseng-yQ acknowledged the different rate of tenancy between the archers in Shensi and Ho-tung but did not address the general exemption of rent in Shensi. " Chiang Tien-chien, "Pei-sung Shensi-lu yflan-pien pao-tsai", pp. 27-28. HCP. chQan 125, pp. 2958-60, chQan 150, pp. 3641-48. Also, Wen-chuane-chi. chQan 14, pp. lOb-1 la, I3b-I4a. 272

Circuit Han Ch'uen-pao was assigned especially to conduct a campaign against the Lu- chou Man tribes in southern Szechwan and he mobilized unit of Archers fix)m Shensi. To compensate them for their extraordinary service, (C'ai&ng awarded them the same salary of the Palace Army.®®

Not only was the role of forts centered in agricultural activities, but a portion of them also flmctioned as trading posts among Hans, Tanguts, and Tibetans. As a result, the

Sung could supply the garrison easier. Regardless in war or peace, the Tanguts and

Tibetans consistently demanded tea, silks, and other consuming goods, while the Sung needed horses from its neighbors to mount its own cavalry force. Han merchants vigorously responded to the official tender of land for building trading posts and residential areas whenever a new fort was established.®^ Once K'aifeng even imposed a prohibition against Han emigrants from the interior and set the maximum quota for each fort as one hundred Han households.®® According to the calculation of Chiang Tien- chien, in 1077 the commercial tax from all forts in Shensi was 6.17 percent of the total revenue of the region, numbering 43,967 kuan.®^ There were several forts which had a particularly strong performance in trading. Not only did Fort Pure Springs enable the

Sung to cultivate the land northeast of Yen-chou 1 to the vicinity of the Hsi Hsia border, but it also provided a center for trading. On one hand Ch'img Shih>hang hired a number of trading agents and on the other hand offered large loans to merchants, receiving a ten-

" SHY. v.173, military 4, p. 6810-6811. HCP. chOan 149, p. 3606. " SHY. v.194, geography 19, p. 7613. " Chiang Tien-chien, "Pei-Sung Shensi-lu yOan-pien pao-tsai", p. 32-35. 273

fold profit within a year.'° The Virtue Obedience Commandery was another typical

trading center which was even "more prosperous than an interior prefecture."^^ The

officials collected rents finm residents and alcohol tax from dealers, which supported

local military expenses.'^

Tribal auxiliaries were pivotal to the security of forts. The establishment of forts

extended the Sung perimeter and dispersed its standing army. Only the massive

employment of auxiliaries from local tribes prevented any further division of the Sung

army. Since local residents were mostly Tibetans and Tanguts, the organization of the

Sung Tribal Auxiliary was a new form of an old strategy, "using barbarians against

barbarians", which exploiting political influence rather than diplomatic maneuvering.^^

Usually the Sung appropriated the land through the voluntary relinquishment of the tribes

asking protection. Then the theater or circuit command built a fort which crystallized the

claim of K'aifeng on the territory of the vicinity and provided a protective base for the

tribes. Such protection was indispensable especially to those who had recently shifted

their allegiance from Hsi Hsia,. In Ou-yang Hsiu's account, several hundred thousand

tribal households returned to farming after Fan Chung-yen had retaken Fort Constant

Peace and Eternal Peace.^^ The construction of Fort Little Waist and Fort Gourd or Hu-

lu-tsai shortly before the peace of 1045, protected the route from Huan-chou to Subduing

Fan Chung-yen, "Tung-yen-yOan-shih Ch'ung-chOn mu-chih-ming", p. 112. SHY. v. 185, military 27, p. 7247. SHY. v. 194, geography 19, pp. 7612, 7614-15. Chiang Tien-chien, Tci-Sung Shensi-lu ydan-pien pao- tsai", p. 36-37. ' ^ Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pci-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu", p. 214. Lo Chiu-ching, "Sung-Hsia tsan-cheng chung te fan-pu ho pao-tsai", pp. 223-243. 274

Barbarian Commandery and cut ofTHsi Hsia communications with two powerful tribes,

Ming-chu and Mi-tsang. With these forts the two tribes quickly swore loyalty to the

Sung. Ssu-ma Kuang also pointed out that the relative securi^ of the Huan-Ch'ing circuit during the 1040s was because of the considerable strength of the Tribal Auxiliary

Forced®

A tribal household under Sung rule was called a Converted Household or shu-hu. or otherwise would be referred to as a Barbarian Household shene-hu.^^ Fan Chimg-yen in

1042 established the legal obligations of the Converted Households in Huan-Ch'ing circuit.

"Those who commit private revenge after reconciliation causing body injury are

obliged to pay a fine of one hundred lambs and two horses. The dead penalty is to be

inflicted if the victim was killed. Local office accepted civil cases such as debt

reparation. Kidnapping innocent individiials as hostage for unsettled disputes is

obliged with a fine of fifty lambs and one horse. When marauding horsemen sweep

across the border, tribes which fail to answer conscription are fined two lambs for

every absent household and the chief is hostaged. When marauders mount a large

attack, seniors and adolescents defended the fort and officials provide support.

Those households which fail to report are fined two lambs. If an entire tribe fails to

OYHCC. cfaOan 3, p. 50. SS^ ChQan 314, pp. 1027-72. SMCCL v.l33, 17a- 20a. Wen-kuo wen-chene Ssu-ma kune chLfCollected Works of Ssu-ma Kuang), in SPTK. ser. 1, v.40, chQan 33. p. 284. WHTK. v.152, military 4, p. 1327. 275

respond, its chief is hostaged."^®

From this passage, it is obvious that the Sung provided a legal code defining the obligations of the auxiliary service. In 1065, K'aifeng admonished the Shensi theater commander to settle civil disputes and re-examine false accusations related to tribal households.^®

If a tribe belonged to the Sung category of Converted Households, its original chief was designated as Supreme Unit Master or tu-chOn-chu. Leaders of smaller tribes with more than one hundred households and individuals with meritorious service were designated as Unit Master or chtin-chu. while leaders of tribes with less than one himdred households assumed the position of commanders.

The completed separation of administration and command characterized Sung tribal auxiliary system. As permanent garrisons, tribal auxiliary units were not re-deployed in rotation as were most of the Palace Army units. OfBcials redistributed land to each auxiliary household and the promotion and demotion of officers was strictly within their own units. Unlike Han officers, who could aspire to the rank of Military Govemor,

Commissioner of Imperial City Constable or Hnanp-ch'eng-shih, Prefect, and Garrison

General or Chu-wei-chiang-chOn were the highest ranks achievable by a Tribal Officer or fan-kuan. The inheriditary nature of command was of added significance for the tribal auxiliary system. In the collected works of Ou-yang Hsiu, there is a draft for an official

'®^chQan314,p. 10271. WHTK. ChQan 156, military 8, p. 1362. SS, chQan 191, pp. 4750-51, chdan 258, p. 8988, chQan 491, p. 141147. Tune-tu shih-leuh. chQan 27, p. 454. WHTK. chQan 152, military 4, p. 1327. For a general survey, see Ku Chi-ch'en, "Sung-tai fan-kuan 276

appointment letter ratifying the succession of Niu Wan-c (circa, mid-1 Ith century) to his father Niu Nu-o (d.ca. mid-11th century), a capable tribal officer recruited by Ch'ung

Shih-heng.^^ The principle of such an allowance, the Sung officials explained, was to follow the minority custom, in which people respected blood kinship of nobility.®^

The combat ability of tribal auxiliaries was of concern to Sung strategists. In many cases, they served as the Sung vanguard.®^ Fan Chung-yen acknowledged: "The westem barbarians regard the Tribes along the mountain boundaries as a mighty force, while the

Han people admire the Converted Households and Archers in the mountain boundaries as battle proved. Both sides have acknowledged the importance of this populace along the border to their military strength."®^ During the reign of Emperor Sung Jen-tsxmg, there were ten forts with a total of 14,595 tribal auxiliaries. Nevertheless, Fan Chimg-yen disagreed with the Sung paying the tribal auxiliaries as a replacement of the Palace Army in Shensi. First, he estimated that the tribeil force would become uncontrollable without the army as a counterbalance. Second, a sudden increase of salary would jeopardize discipline, especially of mid-ranking officers and, third, monthly payment did not inappropriate for the short duration of their service since battle occurred rarely more than once a year. Fourth and last, increasing cash money among the Converted Households would encourage illegal trading and exacerbate the deficit. Thus, Fan Chxmg-yen insisted

chih-tu k'ao-shu", in Chune-kuo-shih ven-chiu. no. 4, (1987), pp., 33-42. OYHCC. chQan 9, p. 75. "" WHTK. chQan 156, military 8, p. 1362. " Tung-tu shih-leuh. chOan 86. p. 1312. SS. chOan 491. p. 14147, chQan 335, pp. 10742, 10409. HWKC. ChQan 12, p. 187. SMCCI. chQan 133, pp. 17a-20a. 277

that the military role of Converted Households should be restricted to auxiliary service.^^

Despite the intent of preserving native custom, interaction between Han and non-

Han ethnic became inevitable. Minorities sold their lands to Han residents for hard currency to invest in trading.®® Some violated the law by selling or mortgaging their land, unaware that they were governmental possessions.®^ Enhancing the military role of the

Tribal Auxiliaries was soon reflected in the Sung institution. In 1017, a number of tribal auxiliary units and regional garrison were promoted into the Palace Army and designated fan-lo battalions.®® Under a different administrative hierarchy, they were deployed as in the Sung suppression of Nimg Chih-kao (d.), a Kuangsi rebel. In this campaign, the fan- lo cavalry distinguished themselves in a decisive flanking movement at the Battle of

Kuei-jen-p'u.®® After 1072, a large number of newly subjugated tribal populace was organized into battalions as Archers. A battalion consisted of250 Tribal Archers, each cultivating 100 mou of ofBcial land. More significantly, this new organization employed

Han Archers as officers who fraternized with the tribal officers. On each soldier's left ear, a tattoo, "Tribal Soldier", marked his identity to prevent his being idlled by friendly units.®°

Tension escalated between tribal and Han ofBcers after 1060. According to the practice inaugurated by Ts'ao Wei and followed by Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen, a tribal

WHTK. chQan 156, military 8, p. 1362. Ibid. K'aifeng imposed prohibition against such illegal commitments in 1091, see SHY, v.180, military 17, p. 7039. " ^ chflan 187, p. 4593, HCP. chOan 135, pp. 3224-25. " SHY. v.176, military 10, p. 6910, v.l98, b^arian 5, p. 7798. HCP. chQan 174, pp. 4192 and 4199. 278

auxiliary unit was to obey the command of the Han officer who recruited and reorganized it. This practice fixed the order of tribal officers in battle regardless of their official ranking. Nevertheless, through meritorious service, a large number of tribal officers reached the top of the middle rankings after the 1060s and it became ridiculous that they still had to submit obedience to low-ranking Han officers. Li Tao recorded the promotion of 124 tribal officers after a victory, to include eleven Commissioners of Imperial City

Constable.®^ However, as the number of mid-ranking tribal officers grew prodigiously, it became correspondingly difficult to recognize official rank rather than command structure, placing a majority of Han officers under tribal superiors. K'aifeng policy fluctuated back and forth after the Wang An-shih Reform. In 1082, Emperor Shen-tsimg ordered a recognition of the ranking of tribal officer and urged his subjects to perform the relevant rituals. After his death, a conservative K'aifeng reinstated the recognition of the previous command structure.®^

Issue of Fort Shui-lo

As forts and tribal auxiliaries became more crucial to Sung defense, external priority came to challenged domestic needs. The issue of Fort Shui-lo gives an insight into this nascent undercurrent.

Fort Shui-lo was located in the Lung-kan salient between Ching-YOan and Ch'in-

Feng Circuit at the extreme northwest comer of the Shensi perimeter. It did not share a

WHTK. chQan 156, military 8, p. 1362. HCP. chOan 351, p. 8408. SHY. v.180, military 17, pp. 7038-39. WHTK. v.I56„inilitary 8, pp. 1362-63. 279

common boundary nor did it protect any crucial gateway extending into Hsi Hsia territory. Tibetan tribes and a semi-sedentary flow of life were the physionomy and

pattern of the vicinity. It is curious that such a fort, without strategic significance, could ignite a half-year-long debate in K'aifeng about its destiny.

The issue began in late 1043 when a Tibetan tribal leader declared his land and allegiance for the Sung demanding protection as encouraged by Sung officer Liu Fu (d.

1047). Reportedly, there were Barbarian Households along the valley for two hundred IL where silver and copper were valuable mineral resources. A few Han emigrants shared their handicrafts and trading knowledge with these tribes and enabled a self-supporting economy.®^ The relatively dense population of the valley promised a conscription of

30,000 tribal auxiliaries and subjugating these tribes would open a route from the Virtue

Obedience Commandery to Ch'in-chou, connecting the two salient together. The optimistic tone of the report might include bias, exaggeration, and erroneous information.

Flushed by this easy success. Theater Commander Cheng Chien delegated Liu Fu to accept the lands and build a fort. In 1043, Liu Fu served as a Guardian of the Left of the

Forbidden City, Supervisor of Fort Wa-t'ing and Acting Master of Fort Ching-pien.^'

Shortly thereafter, at the beginning of 1044, Han Ch'i supervised the theater and denounced such an act Having five-years command experience in Ching-YQan Circuit,^^

Han Ch'i's opinion was unquestionably the most authoritative. As a result, the Court

" HCP. ChQan 144, pp. 3846-47. " HCP. chQan 144, p. 3486. " SSCW. chQan 12, pp. 231-235. HCP. chQan 145, pp. 3512-13, chQan 149, p. 3604-08. HWKC. chQan 13, p. 197. 280

recalled Cheng Chien and aborted the action. Unwilling to give up the ongoing fort construction. Commander Cheng supported Liu Fu by assigning him his assistant Timg

Shih-lian (circa mid 11th century) and sped up the engineering. Even though Ching-Yuan

Command ordered an unconditional end to construction, Liu and Tung utterly rejected the order. What then occurred was the arrest of Liu and Tung by Vice Director of Operation

Ti Ch'ing ensuing in a riot of Tibetan Barbarian Households and unidentifiable roaming armed itinerants

A broad discussion took place in K'aifeng on the incident, involving Fan Chxmg-yen,

Yu Ching, Sun P'u (998-1057), Ou-yang Hsiu, and some others. Despite his fame and reputation. Fan Chxmg-yen did not, nor could anyone, know the geography of Ching-

Yuan Circuit better than Han Ch'i. All those who served the central authority and were unfamiliar with Ching-Yiian Circuit supported the building of Fort Shui-lo, while all theater supervisors and commanders, Han Ch'i, Yfln Shu, and Ti Ch'ing, denied the necessity. There was no reformist-conservative conflict in this dispute and both groups were reformists representing different levels of strategy analysis. Fan Chung-yen, YU

Ching, Sun P'u, and Ou-yang Hsiu emphasized two pivotal points in grand strategy: the political necessity of enhancing morale of the military and the imperative to recruit tribal auxiliaries. Han Ch'i and YOn Shu focused more on theater strategy and questioned to what extent the fort-building would improve the communication between Ching-Yilan and Ch'in-Feng circuits. They doubted whether or not it would benefit the Shensi defense

HCP. chQan 146, pp. 3627,3642-44, chQan 147, pp. 3556-57. SSCW. chQan 12, p. 230. 281

and not be over ambitious adding of territory and wondered how the fort, itself, could be

defended.

Fan Chung-yen pointed out that Liu Fu and Tung Shih-lien did not purposely foment

any of the unrest and should be punished leniently. He considered Liu Fu a model among

the front-line commanders and "worthy of special consideration by the Court." Therefore

the Court should downplay the event but still relieve Liu Fu and Tung Shih-lien lest Yfln

Shu and Ti Ch'ing be accused of false charge. Fan Chung-yen concluded, all military

officers would then admire the virtue of the Emperor. Yu Ching concurred: "If Fu and

Shih-lien enraged their general and the Court failed to protect, then who would struggle

for merit afterwards?" Ou-yang Hsiu even argued; "An officer may suspect that the Court

would favor the civil ofScial. Supposed there is conflict between a civil official and

military officer. The officer would never respect the central judgment even though his

own were false. This is due to the fact that the Court is run by civil officials, who may be

intimate with each other and despise the military. Now, although Fu initiated the dispute,

he was not without reason and actually achieved. If we punish Fu, then the military along

the frontier would become disaffected."®^

Another reason for reconciliation was the tribal riot. Sun P'u considered that any

more punishment of Liu Fu would further incense the tribes. Ya Ching also indicated:

"The Tibetan relinquishing of land was intended to improve trade as encouraged by Fu.

Without Fu, no one could hold onto their land." Ou-yang Hsiu fiirther argued: "These

HCP, choan 147, p. 3556-58. 282

tribes were subjugated through the reputation and prestige of Fu. Now suddenly Fu is

imprisoned with chain and cangue. How can it be more horrifying to those who have

recently surrendered?" He concluded that if the Court punished Liu Fu, "it would become

impossible to recruit those Barbarian Households along the border."^^

Nevertheless, in mid-1044, Han Ch'i enumerated the disadvantages in building the

fort with thirteen reasons. Disregarding the redimdancies, his opinion could be

summarized in three points. First, sharing no boimdary with Hsi Hsia, the fort could

neither threaten Li Yiian -hao nor it defend the Sung any better. Thus, this was an aggrandizement with no merit in the war against Hsi Hsia. Second, a recently completed road between Ch'in-Feng and Ching-Yuan circuits made it unnecessary to extend the mountainous Lung-kan corridor from Fort Shui-Io to Ch'in-chou. The fort still did not provide enough security to transport as it was too close to the area of Barbarian

Households. Third, Han Ch'i considered that, the road through Shui-lo to Ch'in-chou was too narrow in actual defensive operations. It was mountainous, interdictable, and unable to facilitate massive reinforcement from Ch'in-Feng Circuit. Rather, having a viable route from Ch'in-chou to Virtue Obedience Commandery would give the opportunity to Li

Yuan -hao to invade Ch'in-Feng Circuit and did not seem to the advantage of the Sung.®®

Undeniably the opinion of Han Ch'i was rooted in a sober study of the theater.

Nevertheless, considering the morale of the military and the response from the tribes, the

Court permitted a continuation of construction and released Liu Fu and Tung Shih-lien

For the opinion of Sun Fu, see HCP. chQan 148, p. 3575; the opinion of YQ Ching, see HCP. chOan 148, 283

from jail with a slight demotion. Liu Fu was appointed to be Master of Fort Shui-lo and

his position was excepted and inheritable by the next generation. However, the concept of extending the route to Ch'in-Feng Circuit remained due to its controversial strategic value, however controversial.^"®

The resolution of Fort Shui-lo question illustrated a process of rational decision making in mid-eleventh century China. It was the elite ^^o discussed the issue from the various legal, political, and strategic angles. The debate testified to the superiority of grand strategy over theater strategy and gave more weight to a consideration of the sentiment of ofScers and tribes. Although the issue did not lead to an immediate changeover of the Sung foreign attitude, it highlighted the importance of external factors in decision making. Nevertheless, the issue of Fort Shui-lo also suggests a dilemma of the strategy of Fan Chung yen and Han Ch'i and its difGculty to balance all the different priorities. The recruitment of tenant archers and tribal auxiliaries was crucial to the rebuilding of the Shensi defense, but such policies inevitably led to territorial expansionism and the commitment to an offensive strategy. Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen carefully balanced the priorities of a defensive strategy against pragmatic interests of territorial expansionism despite their initial disagreement. Not all their successors could manage such a difScult equilibrium. The issue of Fort Shui-lo marked an early precedent for an aggressive Sung foreign policy after 1067.

pp. 3576 and 3591; for the opinion of Ou-yang Hsiu, see HCP. chOan 148, pp. 3576-78.3590-91. HCP, chQan 149, pp. 3604-08. HCP, ChQan 148, pp. 3574-77,3590-91, chOan 150, pp. 3626-33, chOan 151, pp. 3670, 3685-87, SHY. v.97, institution 64, p. 3829. 284

During the six-year armed conflicts against Hsi Hsia, Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen made outstanding contribution to the defense of the Sung but were never a menace to enemy morale. The strategy of Han and Fan illustrates the "forgotten aspects of war" in

Michael Howard's theory in which war is fought not only battle-by-battle, but also through the implementation of policies, logistics, and social support Despite the absence of victory in. any open battle, Han and Fan rebuilt the Shensi perimeter according to a perception different from the pacifists. The prevention of excessive violence and over-use of national revenue were still concerns of Han and Fan. Nevertheless, the increase of resotirces was the theme of a transition which led more initiatives in strategy.

As the Sung relied more on military manpower from the tribal auxiliaries, external priorities became inevitably more important than domestic need. Certainly, this change in priorities had not yet occurred during the rule of Emperor Sung Jen-tsimg. But, in the end, Han and Fan managed to balance domestic reform and military development tempering Confucian ideology with pragmatism.

Howard, pp. 101-115. 285

Chapter 8 Increasing Attention to Military Afiidrs

The peace of 1045 had given the Sung respite for more than two decades and the

Hsi Hsia challenge only served to further dramatize the urgency of military affairs. The crisis was momentarily resolved largely by diplomatic skills and the psychological trauma of military defeat "not by a menacing enemy but instead by a trivial barbarian tribe" provided an impetus for reform. Certainly, the drive for reform did not immediately alter the long standing Sung foreign attitudes and only broi^t moderate change. In the long-term, however, the influence of the war was far-reaching. The restoration of peace did not allay mutual suspicion and the revived perception of an armed force as indispensable. War preparation became the norm and the increasing attention on military affairs was manifest in the following aspects; first, a broad discussion on the schemes for military reform; second, adjustments on the policy toward military personnel; and third, the increasing power of Shensi and Hotung theater command. Non-governmental efforts, such as scholarly studies on military classics, accelerated an interest in the art of war and the image of Ti Ch'ing exemplified the return to the admiration of military heroism.

Perceptual Changes

Scholars and officials in the mid-eleventh century made subtle and serious re- evaluation of the pacifist ideas of war and peace. The concept of war as devastation and peace as the desired strategic objective did not change. However, the trust of K'aifeng toward Liao and Hsi Hsia lapsed and the meaning of annnal payment altered. Annual payment, which at the beginning of the eleventh century referred to an acceptably modest 286

cost for peace, became transformed during the mid-eleventh century into concession symptomatic of Sung military incompetence. In actuali^, the ever increasing Sung annual payment threatened to jeopardize Sung tide with Liao and Hsi Hsia. OfScials started to perceive that concessions did not necessarily stabilize relations. Instead, the strategic balance was regarded as paramount and to achieve it, an effective military instrument and well-defined grand strategy, previously denied by the pacifists, was now considered indispensable.

The elite regarded the Sung pacifism of the 1030s as undermining long-term strategy and the military establishment and, correspondingly, this ignorance of war preparation reserved very few strategic options when a crisis finally occurred. Theater commanders were compelled to conduct disastrous all-out attacks and diplomatic concession became a consequence of military defeat To prevent such a strategic dilemma, Simg reformists reinstated the principle of Sun Tzu who asserted that the art of war was of vital importance to a state. Deviation from fundamental strategy was not made in basic interests and goals but only in means. Dynastic survival, territorial integrity and universal betterment were still Sung interests and pacification was still its goal. However, alarmed by the exploitative nature of the Treaty of 1042, the elite in the reign of Emperor

Jen-tsimg (1023-63) re-examined the negative perception of violence. The conclusion was that despite hazarding the national revenue, the economic attrition that led to strategic equilibrium was still to be preferred in some circumstances, especially compared to a quick but uncertain military adventure. 287

The Khitan and Hsi Hsia power politics from 1038 to 1042 altered the Sung attitude toward the two countries and suspicions increased. Han Ch'i was an embodiment of change after the Kuanan crisis. When all members of the Joint Committee of Prime

Ministers and Military Coimselors preferred a quick reconciliation with Hsi Hsia, Han

Ch'i strenuously reprimanded them. Han Ch'i considered the ability of K'aifeng to subdue

Hsi Hsia as a prerequisite of the Sung-Liao equilibrium; otherwise, the stability of the

Sung-Liao relations would be jeopardized . Sung-Hsia reconciliation as a result of Khitan intervention would hazard the triangular strategic balance.^ By the same reason, Yu

Ching rated the rejection of peace as the best option in 1043.^ Sim P'u (998-1057) who served in the Imperial Advisory 0£5ce, gave similar advise and considered Hsi Hsia as untrustworthy. Peace had only one advantage— the relief of financial burden of the state.

In addition. Sun considered that peace brought four pernicious ramifications; first, encouraging the Khitan, second, discouraging the Sung, third, providing an opportunity for Wei-ming Yuan -hao to attack the Tibetans allied with the Sung, and fourth, nullifying K'aifeng's efforts for reform brought on the crisis.^ Yeh Ch'ing-ch'en (1000-

1049) in 1049 reviewed the Sung-Liao relations and pointed to the exploitative nature of the Kuanan Treaty.^ In 1043, Fan Chung-yen also suspended the peace proposal of Li

Yiian -hao as a plot for gaining time to aimex the Tibetan Ch'ing-t'ang regime.^ In short.

' HCP, chOan 142, pp. 3408-09. - HCP, chtlan 139, p. 3354. ' SS, chOan 295, p. 9840. * HCP. chOan 166, pp. 3988-89. - SMCCI. chOan 133, pp. 30a-31a. 288

K'aifeng trust toward the Khitans and Tanguts lapsed as a consequence of the Kuanan

crisis.

The perception of war had started to change and some scholars considered war as indispensable to secure peace. When K'aifeng was compelled to decide in 1040 among three options--o£fense, defense and peace, Tien Ching explained the relation between war and peace as a dialectic. Peace was difficult to reach without the means to wage war and deterrence was necessary to restrain violence. ® Han Ch'i even suggested regarding "peace and benevolence as circumstantial; war and defense as normal. Repair the armor, sharpen the weapons, fortify the capital, and plot counter-measure.".^ Reminding with the possibility of a Khitan invasion to Hopei, he proposed the secret appointment of two

Theater Commanders of Eastern and Westem Hopei ostensibly as mere Transportation

Intendants.®

Fan Chung-yen urged preparation for a prolonged war. From 1040 to 1041, he used the word "ch'ih-chiu" again and again in memorials.^ In pacifist terminology,

"k'uang-ju ch'ih-chiu" had a negative connotation. However, in the usage of Fan Chimg- yen, "attrition" was a neutral word without any prestmiptive negation to be avoid by a state. In a memorial. Fan Chung-yen severely criticized the pacifist fear on prolonged war. He said:

* HCP. choan 129, p. 3062. ' SS, chQan 312, p. 10223. HWKC. chflan 12, p. 185-86. ' HCP. chDan 142, p. 3414. HWKC. chflan 12, p. 185. ' HCP. chflan 127, p. 3012, SS, chflan 314, p. 10270. Also, SMCCl. chflan 132, pp. 5b-7a. 289

"Some people may wonder why the Court has no intent to end the war when the

imperial force has been defeated once and again. In fact, the recent defeats were the

consequence of the long peace in which generals were not acquaintant with their soldiers

and the soldiers knew nothing of war. This is not that China had insufficient power to

deal with the Four Barbarians, nor that the quality of our soldiers irrevocably

degenerated. This is only because we have forgotten war and over-indulgence in eternal

peace."

"Some people may say: 'War cannot be prolonged. A prolonged war would hazard

people's living and the state revenue.' I do not agree with this. Unquestionably, the

consequences of violence, long and short, are di£ferent in war among states and neither

imperial glory nor gain give sufficient rationale to prolong violence. However, war

against barbarians as a means of defense has never ceased in history. This is the ultimate

reason for the government to impose a regular tax on the output of mountains and

marshes."^"

In another memorial. Fan Chung-yen indicated that a state ignoring preparations

for war in normal times would lose its right in times of emergency to demand any of its

servant to die as his duty.^^ Insisting the necessity and feasibility to fight a long war

against Hsi Hsia, Fan Chung-yen argued for "increasing resources and reducing

expenses".^^ Further, Ou-yang Hsiu emphasized the economic aspect of war and said:

HCP. Chaan 139, p. 3353. SMCCI. chOan 133, pp. 33a-34b. " SS,chaan314,p. 10272. " HCP. chDan 139, p. 3353. 290

"Regardless of being on the offense or in the defense, the strength of an army depends on

its finance."^^ Fu Pi criticized the financial policy of K'aifeng in 1039 and urged the

central authority to utilize its reserve revenue for the war.^^ Thus, the Ch'ing-li Reform,

in the short term, and the Wang An-shih Reform, in long term, were a partial

consequence of these voices.

The Ch'ing-li Reform (1043-45): A Response to Foreign Threat

Traumatic defeats provided the impetus for reform and military affairs drew the

attention of the elite. During the Jen-tsung and Ying-tsimg (r. 1064-67) period, a number

of Sung scholars and ofBcials proposed reforms on various scales. Among these, the

Ch'ing-li Reform was the best known because of the support and participation of Fan

Chung-yen.

Sung Jen-tsung urged Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen to achieve peace in 1043.

Territory and people were still crucial to the Sung and K'aifeng firmly rejected the

territorial demands of the Liao. The Sung were eager to restore social stability which

degenerated in the early 1040s due to the lack of local security and reliable military

establishment. Ominous signs indicated that some bandit activities in Southeast China

could enlarge in scale to full rebellion, such as in the cases of Wang Lim, Chang Hai and

Kuo Miao-shan. One remarkable incident occurred in which there was no garrison and a

county prefect opened the gate and prepared a banquet of reception for brigands. This

" OYHCC. chOan 5. p. 81. HCP, chQan 124, p. 929-30. Also, SMCQ. chOan 131,14a-17b. 291

alarmed the Sung court. Unlike others insisted that this prefect to be given the death

penalty. Fan Chung-yen stressed improvement of local defense rather than severe

punishment.^^

The Ch'ing-Ii Reform aimed to improve government efSciency by carefully

selecting ofQcials. It meant the reduction of opportunities for candidates merely having a

family background, long service career, and talent in poetry. In the "Memorial for Ten

AfFarirs", Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen urged that K'aifeng improve the examination of

candidates official's capability and form a mutual recommendation system. Han and Fan

stated in the "Memorial for Ten Affairs" that the root for incompetence was the

bureaucratic system centered in the institutions of Promotion by Career Service, ormo-

k'an. and Grace and Protection, or en-vin.. The system of mo-k'an provided an

opportimity for promotion for each civil ofiBcial every three years, and each military

officer every five years. Such a system was necessary to a bureaucratic hierarchy in

which talent and merits could not be distinguished easily by the performance of daily

routine works and varying services differing in nature. However, this system did not

encourage innovation. When promotion became a certainty, the avoidance of failure was

high in priority to one's career. Protection was a privilege for nobles and officials, and

accorded each middle or high ranking official the nomination of a brother, son, grandson,

or even family servant as a low-ranking civil official or military officer. In addition,

irregxilar entry into the services under Imperial Grace was reserved for the brother and

" SS,chQan3I4,p. 10273. 292

sons of ofBcials and officers with outstanding merit or killed in battle. The en-vin system

purported to prevent competition among descendants of imperial servants and the sons of

laymen in the civil service examination. It reduced the ensuing bias and corruption in the examination system. However, its disadvantage became discernible when combined with mo-k'an. Altogether they produced a large number of ofiScials or officers who relied upon a career solely on the system and not ready to be challenged on competence.

Han and Fan suggested that Prime Ministers and Military Counselors were to recommend regional commanders, pacification Intendants, and transportation Intendants, for their moral standards and capability. In addition, they proposed a gradual reinstatement of the Tang militia system in order to improve defense. The problem of compulsory local service, which disrupted vUlage life and occasionally caused the bankruptcy of middle-class farmers, was also to their concern. Only with an efficient government, strong defense, and stable society could the Sung cope with external threat.^®

Unfortunately, the actual accomplishment of this reform was restricted by the short-lasting incumbentcy of Fan as vice prime minister^^ and by the conservatives who plotted against some other reformists such as Su Shun-ch'in(1008>1048), Fu Pi and Ou- yang Hsiu.^® Also, the urgency of reform was diminished by the restoration of peace in

" HCP. chQan 143, pp. 3435-44. About the life of Fan Chung-yen, see OYHCC. Also, Lhi, James T.C., "An Early Sung Reformer Fan Chung-yen," in John King Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, first print, 1957, new edition, 1967), pp. 105-131. Su Shun-ch'in was charged by his misbehave at the annual banquet of Memorial Office. At that event. 293

1045. Nevertheless, the echo of refonn reverberated through the middle of the eleventh century, especially during the late Jen-tsung period when Han Ch'i and Ou-yang Hsiu were administrators.

Military Aspects of Reform (1043-1067)

One of the seemingly radical and new forms of war specific to China after the mid-eighth century was its break with the early Tang military system. The former depended on a permanent army of professional soldiers, maintained by regular taxation in kind and money on the population. In principle, by using a continuous line of defense around Sung territory, it had been expected that peace would reign within the Empire and that there would be no reason for bearing arms, and that violence would be illegal and resource to justice would be the normal means of the resolving litigious questions whatever they concerned. The impact of the Sung-Hsia war in the 1040s incited criticism of this prevailing system and the return of the Tang farmer-soldier was seen as a solution.

From 1038 to 1067 there were ample schemes about military reform. As generalized by

Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing in his study of the Sung army system, there were three problems during the period: 1 the excessive amount of soldiers, in Chinese words, vimg-ping 2. the paid-

some younger scholars including Su composed poems which exhibited disrespect sentiment against Confucius. In addition Hsia Sung, a rival of the reformists, plotted a conspiracy against Fu Pi. He falsely accused Fu Pi as a traitor making secret commitment with the Liao during his negotiation in 1042, and produced a fabricated letter as proof. The case was not established due to the insufficient and dubious evidence, but it affected the political career of Fu Pi. Ou-yang Hshi was also embattled in a sexual taboo with his niece. See Liu, James, T.C., Ou-vane Hsiu ti chih-hsOeh vO ts'une-cheng. (Hong Kong: New Asian Research Center, 1956), pp. 178-81,210-14. 294

recruited nature of soldiers, and 3. the lack of training.^^ Nevertheless, the effect of

reform remained inconclusive. Since the separation of farmers and soldiers became

socially irrevocable, the Sung could not replace soldiers recruited for pay with militia and

only managed to employ militia as auxiliaiy to the standing army in several border

circuits. Improvement of training, rather than fundamental change of the source of

military manpower, was regarded as having more vital importance.

The excessive number of soldiers drastically denigrated their quality. Soldiers that

were aged, unhealthy, and physically below standard were prevalent in the 1040s. This

was a consequence of the degeneration of Sung Tai-tzu's military establishment. At the

beginning of the dynasty. Sung Tai-tzu employed less than 150,000 soldiers.^° At the

peak of the war of imification, the number of soldiers increased to 378,000, in which

193,000 belonged to the Palace Army.^^ Sung Tai-tzu limited the size of the Imperial

Guard and Palace Corps and strengthened their training. The Emperor, himself, one of the

most capable ofiicers in the army, conducted the drill and taught combat skills on

occasions after 960.^^ Therefore, the problem of "excessive soldiers" did not exist during

those days. As the war against the Khitans intensified and Sung-Hsia conflict erupted

during the reign of Sung Tai-tsung, the size of the Sung armed force doubled to 666,000,

of which 358,000 were Palace Army soldiers. Sung Chen-tsung recruited 500,000

soldiers at the beginning of his reign, and despite the peace of 1005 the total amount of

" Lo Chiu-ching, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu" in New Asian Journal, v. 3, no. 1, (1957) pp. 169-270. LCC. chflan 18, p. 2-4. " WHTK. chQan 152, p. 1328-29. 295

soldiers were still 912,000, including 432,000 Palace Army soldiers. The renewal of the

Sung-Hsia war in 1038 further enlarged the size of the Sung armed force and it crossed a

threshold of number of more than a million. EHiring the first half of the 1040s it reached a

prodigious total of 1,259,000.^^

The massive dismissal of soldiers, disbandment of certain units, and

reorganization of the armed force became the universal proposal of both reformists or

conservatives.. In 1039, Sung Ch'i (998-1061) criticized "The Three Excesses" of the

Sung Government, "excessive soldiers", "excessive ofiQcials" and "excessive spending".

Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen held the similar position. Although Han an Fan did not

overtly explain the necessity of disbandment in the "Memorial for Ten Affairs", Han Ch'i

dismissed approximately 12,000 incompetent soldiers in early 1044.^^ This was the first

effective act of disbandment.^® Afterward, Yil Ching, Tien K'uang (1005-1063), and Yu

Chou-shun proposed disbandment in different occasions.^^ In 1045, Sung Jen-tsimg

formally accepted the proposal by Han Ch'i and ordered a general dismissal of

unqualified soldiers in various circuits.^® In 1049, P'ang Chi, then the Military Counselor,

and Wen Yen-po (1006-1097), the Prime Minister, disbanded approximately 60,000 and

-- HCP. chQan 3, p. 74, YQ-hai. chOan 145, p. " WHTK. chQan 152, p. 1329. SS, chOan 187, p. 4576. Sung Ch'i <'998-lQ61'>. Chine-wen-chi (Collected Works of Sung Ch'O, (in SKCSCP. special series. 1975, V. 244-51) ChQan 26, p. 14-17. HCP. chOan 125, p. 2942. HCP chQan 145, p. 3520. Chu Hsi (1130-1200), San-ch'ao ming-ch'ene ven-hsine lu-fWords and Deeds of the Prestigious Officials under Three Reigns), in SPTK. v. 16, chOan 1, p. 10. A number of Sung officials already suggested dismissal of incompetent soldiers during the Sung-Liao war. Refer to the memorial of Ho Ch'eng-chu, Wang YO-ch'eng and Chu-Tai-fii, in SS, chflan 273, p. 9328, ChQan 293, p. 9795, and HCP. chQan 44, pp. 932,938. See HCP. chQan 147, p. 3569, chQan 154, p. 3743, and chQan 163, p. 3931. 296

demoted 20,000 unqualified soldiers. They were supported by Yang Chieh, Ho Yen (cira mid 11th century), Pao Cheng (998-1061), Fan Chen (1007-1088) and Ssu-ma Kuang.^®

The disbandment movement did not achieve significant success. By the ascendancy of the Emperor Ying-tsung, there were still approximately 1,162,000 soldiers remaining, in which 663,000 men belonged to the Palace Army.^° There were two reasons for this failure. First, the potential threat firom Hsi Hsia still existed despite the peace of 1045. Sporadic armed conflicts along the border prevented any significant reduction of military budget and troops.^^ In addition, the nascent possibility of a revolt by cast-out soldiers compelled the central authority to exercise extreme reluctance in perpetuating disbandment. Unemployed veterans without skills of fanning and trade would likely join brigands and threaten the largely imarmed interior countryside.^^

The source of manpower for the Sung armed forces became another focal point of the reform. History reminded the Confiician elite that no ancient dynasty relied upon recruit-for-pay soldiers and the advantages of farmer-soldiers varied. Farmers and soldiers were inseparable in peace as well as in war, bonding social support to a nation's defense. In addition, it did not lay a serious financial burden on the imperial revenue and, presumably, they were more disciplined.^^ In the "Memorial for Ten Affairs", Han Ch'i

HCP. ChQan 154, p. 3744. HCP. chQan 167, p. 4023-28. WHTK. chQan 152, p. 1329-30. " See the memorial of Ssu-ma Kuang, Wen-kuo wen-chene Ssu-ma kune chi. chQan 33, p. 280. Refer to the memorial by Tien K'uang in 1045, HCP. chQan 154, p. 3743. Also, critics of Pang Chi and Wen Yen-po in 1052, HCP. chQan 167, p. 4023. In 1059, rumors and grudge feeling wild-spread against the disbandment of Ho-pei garrisons. See HCP. chQan 190, p. p. 4578. Optimistic estimation on the quality of farmer-soldier was common among Confucian reformists during 297

and Fan Chung-yen proposed a reinstatement of the fu-pine militia that embodied the

Tang military establishment^* In fact the central authoriQ'^ had recruited "Righteous and

Brave Militia" or i-vime in Hopei and Ho-tung in 1042 before Han and Fan proposed the

re-establishment of fii-ping. The "Righteous and Brave" was a militia force 189^30 men

in Ho-pei and 77,079 men in Ho-tung.^^ However, the central decision makers did not

reach a consensus on the re-introduction of fix-pine as a nation-wide conscription system.

In 1043, Han Ch'i re-introduced the same idea in modified form during his incumbency as

Prime Minister in 1064. He regularized the conscription system and put it into effect in

Shensi, Hopei and Ho-tung. One-third of male adults of local residence, totaling 156,873 men, were subject to conscription, and had their hands tattooed. These men formed battalions each consisting of 500 militia soldiers, subject to an annual month-long training.^® With this effort, regional militarization in Shensi accelerated.

In addition to criticism for being merely a regional conscription, scheme for the

"Righteous and Brave" militia system also received acrimonious criticism from conservative officials. Ssu-ma Kuang reprimanded the central authority for doubling the tax upon the peasants. "The Court has already collected tax firom the farmers to support

Jen-tsung, Ying-tsung and even Shen-tsung period. The optimism originated from the ancient practice of compulsory conscription described in Confucian classics, and the negative image on paid-recruit soldiers and their poor performanceperfomance during the Sung-Hsia War. Indeed, it would be no mistake to consider farmers as more obedience, but it seems over optimistic to expect high capability from them. Heavy weapons such as crossbow and catapults were common in Sung China, and complicated battle- formation became important element of operational warfare. Merely equipped by bows and arrows and taught with simple action such as advance and retreat, the training of militia was obviously incompatible to the contemporary arts of war. HCP,chOan 143, p. 3441. -- HCP. chflan 138, p. 3311-12. 298

the standing anny and now has unreasonably conscripted the physical bodies of the

farmers to comply military conscription." He also doubted the quality of the militia

units.^^ His argimient was a repetition of Yang Chieh's opposition against the entire

replacement of Palace Army by local militia as suggested by Hsia Sung in 1040. As a

civilian strategist with no faith in farmer-soldiers, Yang Chieh declared that militia with

insufficient training was not more capable than the standing army.^® Thus, the question of

whether the replacement of the standing army by farmer-soldiers was a remedy for Sung

military weakness or merely an unrealistic abeyance remained unsettled.

The crux of the problem was training. When Fan Chimg-yuen commanded Shensi,

he divided the garrisons of the Fu-yen Circuit into six bodies, each with 3,000 soldiers

and under a brigadier in charge of both training and operations.^® In this way. Fan Chung-

yen deviated from the principle of compartmentation of the Sung army system, in which

training, logistics, and operation command were separate. Compartmentation had some

advantages in administration, especially in preventing military revolt. However, Fan stressed military efficiency and combined the functions of training and operation command into one. This revision opened the path for further reforms in the era of Wang

An-shih (1021-86), when legions orchiang-oing became an universal establishment in

Sung China.''" Commanders of legions were not only commanders of combat but trainers

" HCP. chOan 203. p. 4915. " Wen-kuo wen-chene Ssu-ma tame chi. chOan 32, p. 275. Also, for his general opinion, see p. 271-76. " HCP. chQan 125, p. 2958-60. " OYHCC. chaan 20, p. 145. Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu", p. 235-42. 299

of soldiers as well. Thus, selection of capable ofBcers became a necessary premise of

building effective units.

The Selection of Military Personnel

In traditional Chinese political theory, it is important to select virtuous and

talented individuals in responsible positions. Success is commensuated with proper

personnel selection and failure always accompanies the selection of incompetent

personnel. This perception was prevalent in the explanation of military defeat by Sung

scholars.

In the well-known "Memorial for Ten Affairs" Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i

restated this principle in personnel administration, especially in the "Clarification on

Promotion and Demotion", "Restriction on Promotion by Luck", and "Selection of

Administrators". In the conventional explanation, these policies seemed to be for the civil

service.''^ Nevertheless, ample evidence suggested that they were also military-oriented.

Not only did Fan and Han share these opinions, but a number of scholars and ofiBcials

held the same stand.

Many ofBcers promoted through mo-k'an and en-vin were not baptized in battles.

This was why Shih Yuan -sun and Ko Huai-min, even though being raised in military

families, became victims in 1939 and 1042.^^ Long before the downfall of Ko Huai-min

'• HOP, chOan 143, p. 3431-38. Shih YQan-sun was the grandson of Shih Shou-hsin, a general and good fh'end of Sung Tai-tzu. His performance at the Battle of Yen-chou was not clearly recorded. Neither he fought bravery as Kuo Chun nor he cowardly retreated as Huang Te-ho. He seemed to be a tarnished vice commander under the high 300

at Ting-ch'nan, officials such as Fan Chung-yen, Tien K'uang, and Han Ch'i had

criticized his incompetence on different occasions. The cuhninative effect of this

criticism was insufficient to make the court remove Ko from the frontier and could only

force his transfer from one theater to another/^ As Ou-yang Hsiu concluded later, it was

not until the whole force under General Ko had been destroyed at Ting-ch'uan and his

dead body found on the battlefield that the court changed a personnel policy which

produced a continuous succession of "coward generals". To prevent a repetition, Ou-yang

Hsiu firmly denied the appointment of two inexperienced generals, Kuo Ch'eng-you and

Li Chao-liang (circa mid 11th century), as field commanders of Hopei despite the latter

being the son of a capable general, Li Chi-lung.*"

The increasing civilian concem in the quality of military persoimel had practical

reasons. T'ien K'uang, Acting Secretary of Shensi Theater Commander and Pacification

Intendant indicated the imperative of the proper selection of generals in 1041. He asserted

that "the lives of an entire force rely on its commanders" and Sung defeats were the result

of "placing eight himdred thousand soldiers of two circuits under incompetent

profile of Liu P'ing. He was criticized by civiUans as he "failed to sacrifice himself, being taken alive, and thus "humiliated the state." ^ chOan 250, pp. 8814-15. Ko Huai-min was the son of Ko Pa, a captain of Sung Chen-tsung during the Shan-yQan campaign. For more detail of his family background, see chQan 289, pp. 9699-9703. " Ko Huai-min was consistently criticized by Tien K'uang, Fan Chung-yen, Han Ch'i and Ou-yang Hsiu. See Even Kuo K'uei, then still a low-rank officer, overtly stated his incompetent before the prime minister Ch'en chih-chung. ^ chQan 290, p. 9723. Han Ch'i described that Ko had no experience of military administration, while his talent in strategy was not comparable to his civilian superior, see HCP. chQan 126, p. 2995. QYHCC. chQan 142, p. 3401. " SS, ChQan 252, pp. 8851-53, chQan 273, p. 9346. 301

generals"/^ In 1042, YU Ching criticized the military administration and declared:

"Victory or defeat of an army is determined by morale, while valor or panic depends on

the qiiality of the commander. Since the frontier has been invaded by Hao (Li YQan -hao)

the Brigand, we have fought three batdes. In the Battle of Yen-chou, our men stood

bravely. The performance of our force that had already fallen in the trap of the enemy in

Good-water Valley was not to be blamed. However, during the battle of Ting-ch'uan, our

troops were ignominiously routed without a fight""'®

Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen also pointed out the same. "In those units with

capable captains and lieutenants, not only were they trained better in the allotted time, but

also their performance was more effective in battle It is obvious that the morale of a

unit hinged on its officers."*^ A later scholar. Ma Mo(1020-1100), who reviewed the

various Sung battle records with Vietnam and other southwest minorities, reached the

same conclusion.''®

The elite of the Jen-tsung era considered political leaders responsible for the

selection of military personnel. Sun P'u cited the precedent during the reign of Chou

Shih-tsung in which Prime Minister Wang P'u (922-982) recommended that General

Hsiang Kung conquer Ch'in-Feng Circuit After the conquest, the emperor regarded the

military success to the political credit of Wang.^^ More scholars cited another precedent

HCP. chOan 13 Up. 3096. HCP. chOan 138, p. 3323. HCP, chQan 142, p. 3399. " ^ chOan 344, p. 10948. " HCP. chQan 145, p. 3515. 302

of Sung Pai-tzu, who delegated fourteen capable captains such as Kuo Chin and Li Han-

ch'ao as front commanders. This citation was prevalent in the mid-Sung memorials and

was even storied in private anecdotes.^" This precedent founded by the great imperial

ancestor enabled the reformists to justify their intervention into the military

administration.

Even legalist concepts of "Power and Instrument" occasionally appeared in the

policy discussions of military administration. Despite a Confucian scholar, Ou-yang Hsiu

stressed imperial authority, reward and pimishment, and reexamination on merit as three

instruments of a ruler. He indicated that the ability to recruit capable personnel reflected

the skills or shu of the emperor to manipulate his power or sMh. To improve the quality

of officials and officers, Ou-yang Hsiu suggested a cautious, moderate, and consistent

administrative policy; the increase of commimication between the court and the

provincial administration; distinct rewards and punishment; and an effective verification

of merit.

In addition, many Ch'ing-li elite suggested that the court broaden the recruitment

base to gain access to more capable personnel. Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen proposed a

process to validate merit before undertaking mo-k'an and officers who served on the

" HCP. chQan 45,974, chQan 50, pp. 1092-93, chQan 65, p. 1323, cbOan 65, p. 1464, chQan 132, p. 3136, chQan 138, p. 3319, chQan 157, p. 3798, chQan 163, p. 3926, chQan 205, p. 4965, chQan 259, p. 6320, chQan 309, p. 7491. LCC. chQan 18, pp. 8-9. SS, chQan 273, 9346, Kuei-t'ien-lu. chOan 1, pp. 3-4, 8-9, Shih-lin ven-vO. chQan 3, p. 34, SSCW. chQan 1, pp. 16-17, YQan-feng lei-kao. chOan 47, pp. 311-12. -• OYHCC. chQan 5, p. 88-89. 303

frontier should have higher priori^ in promotion.^^ Han Ch'i suggested that the central

authority promote capable persons from lower ranks to replace those incapable in the

higher rankings.^^ Pao Cheng had the same opinion. As he indicated in 1046, the problem

was not the lack of talent in All Under Heaven, but the lack of skills to mobilize them. He

suggested that the court not be bound by their identity such as civilian or military, high or

low social status, and only attend to their knowledge and character.^ ^ Pao Cheng

reasserted this same opinion in another memorial in 1049.^^ Ou-yang Hsiu noted that the

people was was multiple in nature talent and the criteria of capability should not to be

discriminatory. He criticized: "If the emperor now ordered his intimate servant to

recommend generals only from the high rankings, then low ranking officers with heroic

talent would be unemployed. Now if we test the generals with such martial arts skills as

archery and riding, then those with talent in strategy to conunand ten thousand people

would not be selected. Eremites assembled according to the imperial edict would be

treated as vagabonds and merely given such humble ranking as Secretary of County or

Acting Lieutenant of the Three-detachments." Ou-yang Hsiu urged an exemption to the

martial arts test in the selection of strategy experts and the abolition of referring onto

social class and ofBcial ranking in the evaluation of talent.^^

In 1040, the central authority directed ofiBcials in Shensi, i.e. Pacification

HCP. chOan 143,3431-33. " HCP. chQan 142, p. 3414. -^HCP. ChQan 157, p. 3811. " HCP, chQan 166, p. 3986. " HCP, chQan 136, p. 3255-56. 304

Intendant, Director of Operation, Transportation Intendant, Legal Intendant, Governors,

and Co-govemors to recommend those of military talent or intelligent experts from

among the clerks and commoners.^^ Some civilian ofBcials classified military talent into

very specific categories. For example, Yeh Ch'ing-ch'en discussed eight types of capable

commanders, namely (1) dignified and famous, (2) experienced in military

administration, (3) experienced in frontier service, (4) capable in training and discipline,

(5) well-behaved and wise, (6) energetic and valiant, (7) stem and determined, (8) simple-

minded and brave. Yeh considered the first three categories as excellent for theater

command, while the remaining were suitable as subordinates.^® These criteria were

modified later in an imperial edict in 1102.®®

Even some conservative officials were aware of the necessity to improve the

quality of officers and required a moderate change in the recruitment and promotion

system. Su Shen, a political rival of Ou-yang Hsiu, proposed an amendment in the

method of officer promotion in 1039, which was almost exactly as same with Ou-yang

Hsiu's memorial in 1042.®° Ting Tu (990-1053) cited the precedent of Emperor Chou

Shih-tsung, who employed a number of bandits as his bodyguards, suggesting a

HCP. chOan 127, p. 3004. - HCP. chaan 166, p. 3989-90. -'The edict urged conunanders and intendants of various circuits to recommend low ranking officers with administrative experience and military talent in three categories: (1) Those who had broad-viewed and subtle strategy thinking, and strict discipline were qualified to become field commanders; (2) Those who had outstanding frontal service and uncballengable dignity were qualified to be commanders of garrison; (3) those who had valor and ferocity far from ordinary people were qualified to lead vigorous assault. The imperial edict also urged each theater commander to recommend one candidate, while intendants of a circuit were to recommended another candidate altogether within a month. SHY, v. 118, p. 4692. The memorial of Su Shen in 1039, see HCP. chQan 125, p. 2952. SS, chQan 294, p. 9812. The one by Ou- 305

recruitment of cavalry soldiers fiom Shensi to strengthen the Imperial Guards. He also

reminded the emperor not to overlook war preparedness as peace was once so imperiled

imder the Khitan threat in 1042.®^

The increase of attention to military personnel administration was a general

tendency during the period 1038-1067. Emperor Jen-tsung, himself, demonstrated his

interest by interviewing and promoting Hsiang Chin, a tribal auxiliary ofScer and 130

lower ranking officers.®^ Stressing military education, the Emperor also compiled a military text book for ofiBcers in frontier service. The Transcendent Secrets of Military

Strategy or Shen-wu mi-lueh.®^ Although K'aifeng did not immediately change its strategy from defensive to offensive during the reign of Sung Jen-tsung, it became more ready to deal with any conflict with the Liao and Hsi Hsia.

The Interdependence of Civil-Military Relations

Despite the inveighing of modem scholars, the Sung government in many occasions denied a policy emphasizing the civil affairs and denigrating the military profession. For example, a number of the Southem Sung ofScials in II63 described the

Northem Sung policy as "treating civil and military hierarchies as a whole and never viewing any more important than the other."®^ Military ofiBcers did not receive as high a reputation as scholars, but it was not necessarily because of a discriminative

yang Hsiu, HCP. chQan HCP. chQan 136, p. 3255-56. " SS, ChQan 292, p. 9764. HCP. chflan 137, p. 3280. "SS, ChQan 315, p. 10298. 306

governmental policy. In the Northern Sung, this was partially true because of their lack of

education and civil administrative experience and there was ample substantiation. Only

three years after the establishment of peace with Khitan in 1005, Sung Chen-tsung

discovered the impropriety of employing a military officer as Governor of Pao-chou,

where the bilateral exchange of documents between Sung and Liao became frequent.^^ In

1016, the Military Governor of Ho-hsi Shih P'u (circa early 11th century) was found

improperly using official stamps In 1018, K'aifeng ordered Governor of Teng-chou, a

military professional, to yield his office to a civilian due to his inexperience in managing

natural disaster.®^ In 1034, a transportation Intendant suggested appointing military

professionals only as prefectural governors along the border and not in the interior areas.

One of his reasons was their inability to read statutes and ordinances.®®

In additional to deficiencies in administrative competence, the low education of

the officers was also reflected in their ignorance of strategy. Chao An-jen considered that

the military defeats in the Simg-Liao War were a result of the absence of an outstanding

strategist. All generals were merely capable in martial arts without any talent of

commanding ten thousand men. Ch'ien Jo-shui cited the examples of Ch'iieh Ku (cica 550

SHY. v. 95. institution 61, p. 3765. " SHY. v. 87. institution 47, p. 3447. " Shih P'u had three stamps as he held three offices at the same time— Military Governor of Ho-hsi, Regional Supervisor of HsO-chou, and Governor of Hsa-chou. Accordmg to Prime Minister Wang Tan, the stamp for Military Governor ought to be used on imperial memorials and miUtary communication. The stamp for Observe Commissioner ought to be used on tax-relate documentation, while the one for HsQ-chou Governor ought to be used on the memos to subordinate counties. However, Shih Pu sealed his memorial to Emperor Chen-tsung with the stamp for Observe Commissioner. See HCP. chdan 87, p. 1999-2000. " HOP. chOan 92. p. 2115. " SHY, v. 87, institution 47, p. 3422. 307

BC), a Spring-and-Autimm general, and Tu YQ (222-284), a Confucian classic

commentator and military governor of the Chin Dynasty, to explain the necessity of

education. He further suggested the employment of civilians with the knowledge of the

art of war in command positions.^^ Hsia Sung reinforced his opinion in an essay,

stressing the weight of a history knowledge to a commander.^" Ya Chou-shim cited the

words of an ancient politician. Yen Tzu (d. 500 BC), "Civil talent should be able to

gather the masses and the military virtue should be able to awe the enemy." He

concluded, "the task of a commander cannot be done without an integrated knowledge of

civil and military affairs."'^ In ofBcial letters, Ou-yang Hsiu used the phrase "with a

capability to synthesize civil and military service" as a convention to praise individuals.^^

Since the military had insufBcient education, civilians became the only source of

personnel with integrated knowledge and even ofQcers such as Wang Hsien in 1004.^^

Yang Chieh, a civilian strategist and military technologist during the Sung Jen-tsimg

reign, asserted that a scholar was not able to undertake significant duties without

acquiring civil and military knowledge.^ ^ In the mid-eleventh century, a few scholars

started to provide such education. Hu Ytian (993-1059) made the most significant step.

" HCP. chQan 45, p. 977-78. Hsia Sune. Wen-chuane chi (Collected Works of Hsia Sung), (in SKCSCP. ser.l, case 83, v. 1205-1216), chQan 13, p. 16b-17b. " ^ chaan 302, p. 10012. Three letters to Wen Yen-po, one lener to Fu Pi, and one letter to Wu K'uei, see OYHCC. chOan 11, p. 72-73, and p. 76-77. "JS, chOan 268, p. 9232. •".OYHCC., chflan 4, p. 32. 308

establishing an institute offering a study environment for specific professions in a broad

variety. He divided his students into different majors such as classical studies, the arts of

war, literature, and moral studies.^^ One of his best students, Peng Fu, failed in the civil

service examination, devoted himself to the study of the art of war, and finally became a

respected civilian commander. Civilian strategist Sun Mien (d. after 1053 gave Teng

encouragement and instruction in his military study.'® An earlier hermit scholar, Ch'img

Fang (d. 1015), also seemed able to provide such education. He was the master of Yang

Chieh^' and Prime Minister Li Ti (971-1047), who was glorified because of the victory at

Ch'in-chou.^® Ch'ung Shih-heng, a nephew of Ch'vmg Fang, became a famous general

during the war against Hsi Hsia.

An integrated civil-military relations were important to the Sung not only for

civilian strategists to accommodate the military, but also prevent excessive violence. In

this sense, civilian participation in military affairs during the mid-eleventh century did

not deviate very much from the early Simg tradition. Chang Ch'i-hsien recorded a story in

which happened in early Sung. A street-fight took place between Hsiang Kimg, at time

still a gangster but later to become a famous general, and a Confucian scholar and martial

art expert. The expert defeated Hisang Kung and spared him because as a Confucian he

Li Chien(1059-1109), Chi-nan hsien-shene shih-vou t'an-chi (Sayings of Master Chi-nan and His Master and Friends), in Pai-ch'uan hsfleh-hai. fPai-pu ts'une-shu chi-ch'eng. ser. 2, case 6, v. 55-64) p. 18b. Chung-Wu chi-wen. chQan 2, p. 33. " OYHCC. chOan 4, p. 32. Li Ti as a disciple of Ch'ung Fang, see Shao-shih wen-chien ch'ien-lu. chOan 7, p. 67. His contribution to the early mobilization for The battle of Three Capital Valley, see SS, chOan 310, pp. 10172, SSCW. chQan 8, pp. 145-46. 309

prefeired not to use violence to its extreme.^^ Under the rule of Jen-tsung, Ou-yang Hsiu

kept to his stance of limited violence in a forward to Mei Yao-ch'en's Commentary on

Sun Tzu. Ou-yang Hsiu considered that the use of violence did not necessarily bring

success in the political sphere and both Sun Tzu and Ts'ao Ts'ao were not able to unify

China. He praised his friend and commentator Mei, a Confucian expended extraordinary

effort in a scholarly study on The Arts of War. Mei Yao-ch'en had accurately explicated

the original meaning of Sun Tzu rather than ape the transmitted convention that it merely

promoted the use of violence. Under such a doctrine stressing the holistic relation

between the civil and the military, civilian participation in military affairs reflected the

application rationality, which encouraged the employment of strategy, emphasized

efficient administration, and improved logistics.

The Civilian Strategists

After 1042, studies in the art of war received more respective attentions from scholars; this was a slow but inexorable trend. At first, these studies did not draw many attentions from scholars and Hsu Tung's (972-1016) Hu-ch'ien ching was remarkable among a few works.®^ Prior to 1038, Yfln Shu (1001-1047) claimed to be the only

Confucian scholar devoting deep study to the art of war and promoting its utility.®^ Ma

Tuan-Iin accounted, "During the reign of Jen-tsung, All Under Heaven has been at peace

Chang Ch'i-hsien, Lo-vane chin-shen chiu-wen chi. (Memory of a Gentlemen from Lo-yang), in Chih- pu-chu-tsai ts'une-shu. in Pai-pu ts'une-shu chi-ch'ene. c. 245, v. 2399-2408, chQan 3, pp. 2a-b. " WHTK. chOan 221, p. 1789 " HsQ Tung (972-101^, Hu-ch'ien chine (Classic of the Tiger Seal), in YOeh-va-t'ang ts'une-shu. in Pai-pu 310

for a long time and people have become oblivioiis to military affairs. The revolt of YOan -

hao and his repeated defeats of our generals caused the Court to recruit more personnel

with military talent. Consequently, many scholars and ofBcials devoted discussions to

strategy. Most of the commentators of Sun Wu's works lived in such an era."®^ Mei Yao-

ch'en and Wang Hsi (circa. 1040s) were two of the eleven authoritative commentators of

SunTzu. Chang Tsai (1020-77) provided a scarce conmientary on the of Wei Laio Tzu. a

Warring States legalist classic emphasizings on the art of war.®* The Dialogue between

Tang Pai-tsxmg and Li Chine, one of the Seven Military Classics, was suspected to be a

fabrication by Yuan 1 (circa 1050s), a friend of Su Shun (1009-66).®^ Despite being a

military ofiBcer, Chao Shun demonstrated his literacy in writing the Chu-mi t'u-

chinglllustrated Guide of Rice Transportation, a comprehensive account of the logistics

of the Shensi theater.®® Li Tao and Hu San-sheng cited his work on numerous occasions

in HCP and the Commentary ofTCTC. In 1041, Emperor Jen-tsung directed Tseng

Kung-Iiang (999-1078) and Ting Tu to compile the Wii-chinp chimg-vao. a respected

military encyclopedia and wrote its preface on completion in 1044. The encyclopedia was

divided into two books. Book One or chien-chi concerning general rules of strategy,

selection of commanders, training, drill formation, tactical rules, battle-wagons and

ts'ung-shu chi-ch'ene. c. 512, v. 4990-93. " SS, chaan 295, pp. 9831-38. Ma Tuan-Iin, Wen-hsien thine-k'ao chine-chi-k'ao. (Investigation on Classics in General Investigation on Important Writings), (Shanghai; Hua-tung shih-ta, punctuated edition, 1985), chQan 48, p. 1109. " Wen-hsien fune-k'ao ching-chi-k'ao. chQan 48, p. 1112. " Wen-hsien t'une-k'ao ching-chi-k'ao. chQan 48, p. 1114. " chQan 323, pp. 10463-64. 311

cavalry weapons, march formation, recoimaissance, food and provision, signal

communications, camping, fighting at night, guards, hygiene, battle formations,

assessment of battle grounds, siege of towns, lake and river fighting, incendiary and

chemical weapons, defense of towns, weapons, machinery, battle-wagons, armors, martial

law, discipline, border defense of Hopei, Hotung, Shensi, Szechwan and some other

areas. Book Two or the hou-chi was an interpretation of strategy principles with a

chronological history of battles.®^

Ignominious defeats stimulated the recruitment of civilian-strategists and transfer

between the civil and military officialdom became so common a phenomena in the mid-

Northern Sung as to complicate the identity of the civil official. Ou-yang Hsiu described

how a large number of scholars made their ofBcial career through their knowledge of the

art of war gained in the hostilities between Sung and Hsia starting in 1038.®® As a

consequence, the role of civilian-strategists became more accepted and authenticated.

On several occasions during the 1040s, civilian-strategists were identified as

"martial-scholars" or hao-shih. "chivalrous scholars" or hsia-shih. and "poetic-brave" or

shih-hao.®^ Knowing the vicissitudes of dynastic fall and then of war against Hsi Hsia in

the 1040s, Shensi became a highly active arena for Sung civilian-strategists. Henceforth,

"Translation of items, refer to Herbert Franke's introduction in A Sung Bibliography. G^ong Kong: The Chinese University Press 1978), p. 235-36. "OYHCC. chQan 9, p. 99. "Wen-ying, HsO Hsiang-san ve-lu. p. 76. Shao Po-wen(1057-l 134), Shao-shih wen-chien lu (Premier Records of Hearing and Witness of Mr. Shao), (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1983), chOan 16, p. 173. SHY. v. 179, military 14, p. 6979. Also, Tsang Shui>lung, Tei-Sung chung-ye fo-pien yOn-tung te k'ai-tuan: Ch'ing-Ii ch'ao Shui-lo Ch'eng shih-chien fa-wei", in Sune-shih lun-wen-chi: Lo Ch'iu-ch'ine lao- shih vung-hsiu chi-nien chun-hsi. p. 36. 312

the tenn "Martial-Chivalry Within the Pass" was coined.^® Here the word hag does not

refer to wealth, but, rather, unrestrained behavior deviating from the ethical norms.

Unorthodox behavior with less concern for ethical niceties was probably a reflection of

their devotion to the art of war and a higher priori^ to pragmatic flexibility, central to

their concept of strategy. Once an early Sung civilian-strategist Chang Ch'i-hsien even

accompanied bandits to banquet during one sojourn of his youth and he defeated the

Khitans by a deception at the Battie of Fort Pu-teng (987).®^ Liu K'ai committed a series

of crimes, such as conflagration and rape, before making his career in the civil and

military service.®^ Their astonishing behavior was apparentiy not a result of an

imfamiliarity with Confucian teachings, but a conscious disregard of strict conduct a

necessity of being strategists or knights-errants. On other occasions, knight-errantry was

bynorymous with k[o or "guest".

When Chang Tsai was yoimg, he planned to gather a number of "guests" and overthrow

the Tibetan Ch'ing-t'ang Regime. Peng Fu (or Peng Yiian-fa 1020-1099) had the same

intent about Hsi Hsia.®^

During the war of unification and the Sung-Liao conflict, civilian strategists had

the opportunity to exhibit their talent. After the peace of 1005, the civil service

examination became the only path for scholars on their way to an ofScial career and

SHY. V. 179, military 14, p. 6979. Wang Ti(d. ca. 1154), Mo-chi (A Silent Record), (Beijing: Qiung-hua, punctuated edition, 1981), chOan 1, p. 12. " HCP. chQan 27, pp. 626-27. '' See Chuan-vou tsa-lu. pp. 19-20, Sune-ch'ao shih-shih lei-vOan. chflan 74, p. 986. About Chang Tsai, see Shao-shih wen-chien lu. chQan 13, p. 144. About Teng Fu, see Chune-Wu Chi- 313

ethical conduct was essential. Many civilian-strategists, without a record of ethical

probity, remained unemployed by the government Some became hermits, while a few

gained fame through poetry. The Stmg failures on battlefields fix)m 1039-42 were

partially a result of the failure to recruit two civilian-strategists, known as Chang Ytian

and Wu Hao. Despite only scarce reference of these two persons remaining in the

standard history, there is ample evidence in private anecdote and pen-notes to suggest that

their defection to Hsi Hsia generated the impulse for its invasion. At the beginning of

war, the two civilian-strategists composed and carved anonymous poems on a cliff at

K'ung-tung Mountain, a Taoist sacre mountain fifteen kilometers west of the present

P'ing-Iiang City. Written in obscure analogy and radical wording, these poems were to

draw attention from both countries. The Sung theater commander, still reluctant to recruit

them as staff, received a startling news of their defection to Hsi Hsia shortly thereafter

and this ensued in three defeats of Sung forces.®^

Learning from this lesson, Simg theater commanders turned to respect civilian

strategists.®^ In response to the defection of Chang and Wu, Fan Chung-yen

recommended that their best fiiend, Yao Tzu-tsung, join the staff of the Shensi Theater

Command®® and another civilian-strategist, YQn Shu, lauded Yao's talent and

wen. chOan 4, p. 79. " Yen-I vi-mou lu. chOan 5, p. 52, YQeh K'e f1183-12401. Ting-shih (Stories Noted at Home on a Small Stable), (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1981), cbQan 1, pp. 6-7. Ch'en Ko Gate 12th c.), Hsi-t'ang chi shih-chiu hsfl-wen (Notes Collected fix)m the Seniors by Hsi-fang), with Han Palo (1159-1224), Chien- ch'uan iih-chi (Day After Day Notes), (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1993), chOan 6, pp. 46-47 " Jung-tsai sui-oi. chQan 3, p. 543. HCP. chQan 144, p. 3843. 314

character.^^ Yao Tzu-tsung had broad social connectioii with the scholars in Shensi. One

of his best friends, Tung Shih-Uen, was famous for his chivalric behavior. In 1043 the

two served the Shensi Theater Command Headquarters and boldly supported the

construction of Fort Shui-Io, an aggressive move for territorial expansion.®® Cheng Chien

(992-1053), the Theater Commander of Shensi in 1043, recruited a number of "chivalric

scholars" as his staff. In his memorial in 1042, he stated: "There were numerous hao-hsia

in the Area within the Pass and ordinary laws were not enough to rehabilitate their

behavior. These were persons who were amenable to the tumoils along frontier China."®®

Han Ch'i noted that there were a nimiber of "brawlers" from the interior China in the

headquarters of Cheng Chien, attempting to seize arable land from the tribes.^°°

"Brawlers" is an obvious reference to those "brawling chivalrists".

Massive recruitment of these "brawling chivalrists" was not an unique

phenomenon in the theater command under Cheng Chien. It became a common practice

after 1043 and the case of Liu I was illustrative. Despite his criticism against Cheng

Chien of employing "brawlwranglers ", Han Ch'i favored Liu I (circa mid-l Ic.) who was

a hao-shih known for poetry and strategy. Through the recommendation of Han Ch'i, Liu

was honored by K'aifeng. After the incxraibency of Han Ch'i as conmiander of the Ching-

Both Fan and YQn considered that Yao had talent to serve the Han-Iin academy. See Hsfl Hsiang-san veh- lu, p. 76. Also, HCP. chaan 144, p. 3483. Tsang Shui-Iung, "Pei-Sung chung-ye fo-pien yOn-tung te k'ai-tuan: Ch'ing-li ch'ao Shui-Io Ch'eng shih- chien fa-wei", p. 20-45. " SHY, military 14, p. 6979. Cheng Chien maintained intimacy with tribes during his incumbent. On his departure for another office in 1044, tribal ofRcers demonstrated on the main avenue of ching-chou to stop him from leaving. See Chung-Wu chi-wen, chQan 2, p. 35. HCP, ChQan 149, p. 3606. 315

Yuan circuit, his successor YOn Shu relied more on Liu I and even invited him to live within his headquarters in 1041. Ti Ch'ing, who was a military professional and Yun's replacement in 1044, respected Liu I as much as his predecessors.^"^ Lei Chien-fu, Kuo

Ku, Ch'en Hsi-Iiang (d. after 1063), and Liu Ch'un were all examples of those who made a career of their studies of strategy and military service.^"^ As civilian strategists were recruited on a massive scale, there were even some who perpetuated hoax, fabrication, and bizarre behavior posing as knight-errants. Wen-ying gave accoimt about a hermit of apparent great intelligence who composed poem alike Chang Yuan and Wu Hao to astonish people. This hermit was immediately recruited by Tu Hsien (978-1057), the commander of Ch'ang-an and later found him "knowing nothing".^°^

The socio-political background of civilian commanders became more reliable with their growing importance in the Sung defense. Ch'img Shih-heng, one of the most successful civilian strategists in the 1040s, established a foundation for his descendants to serve Sung military development after 1067. His family generated several influential civilian-strategists, such as Ch'img 0(1026-83), Ch'img P'u (d. 1099), Ch'ung I (circa late

11th century), Ch'ung Shih-tao (1051-1126) and Ch'ung Shih-chung (1059-1126). The son of Ch'en Hsi-liang, Ch'en Chao(ca. late-l Ic.), mastered swordplay and the way of chivalry. Self-styled hao-shih. Chen Chao regarded Chu Chia and Kuo Chieh (circa 200-

150 BC), two chivalrists in the Han Dynasty as his heroes. Su Shih (1036-1101) was a

Shao-shih wen-chien lu chQan 16, p. 173. Also, SS, chQan 458, p. 13444. SS, chQan 298, chQan 9221-22, and p. 9464. Ou-vang en-chune-kung chi. chQan 9, p. 95 and p. 99. Hsfl Hsiang-san ve-Iu. p. 10. 316

friend of his and enjoyed discussing the history of war and dynastic vicissitude. A

grandson of the younger brother of Su Shih, Su YOan -lao (circa early 12th century), was

skillfiil in strategy and military plan and was probably influenced by the &mily

heritage.^°^ Ku Tzu-tuen(ca. mid-l Ic), a scholar "fond of discussing strategy", was nick­

named "General Ku".^°® Political and military emergency was at times the occasion to

highlight their role as military commanders rather than Confucian scholars. The son of

Fan Chung-yen, Fan Ch'un-jen, declared his Confucian scholarship before Emperor Shen-

tsung to prevent being identified as an expert in the arts of war.^°® Ch'img Shih-tao

exerted the same effort to declare his civil attributes during the reign of Emperor Hxii-

tsung (b. 1082 r. 1101-1125, d. 1135) but failed. Contemporaries and historians identified

him as a general rather than a schoIar.^°^

The Example of Ti Ch'ing (1008-57)

During the years of almost unrelieved Sung defeats from 1038 to 1045, the

victorious accounts of Ti Ch'ing on the battlefield seemed the exception to Sung policy of

"emphasizing the civil and despising the military".^"® Assimiing that the Sung had such a

predominant policy, the emergence of Ti Ch'ing was not merely fortuitous but also

He plotted a strategy and made great contribution to the suppression of a minority revolt in Szechwan. See SS, chQan 339, p. 10835-36. ran-vQan. ciiQan 2, p. 13b. ChQan 314, p. 10285. The image of Ch'ung Shih-tao, refer to Tsang Shui-lung, "Pei-Sung Ch'img-shih chiang-men te hsing- ch'eng", chapter 4; his generalship, refer to Ho Koon-wan, "Lun Ching-k'ang chih-nan chung te Ch'ung Shih-tao yQ Ch'ung Shih-chung", in Sune-shih lun-wen-chi: Lo Chiu-ch'ine lao-shih vung-hsiu chi-nien chuen-kan. pp. 46-69. Chiu YQ-Iok, pp. 245-58. 317

revealed the modificatioii of Sung policy \^ch gave more room to military development.

Unlike other generals, Ti Ch'Ing excelled in cultivating relations with civil-officials.

Admiration of Ti Ch'ing from civil officials was prevalent in private anecdotes, battle

history, and even his epitaph inscribed on tomb tablet This universal civilian admiration,

in a broad sense, indicated the increasing favor of Sung officials toward the military.

Pi-Ch'ing, a resident of Ho-tung, registered the Sage-defender Army or Kune- sheng chun and received the official tattoo circa 1033 . In 1039, an outbreak of hostilities between Sung and Hsi Hsia provided ample opportimity for Ti Ch'ing to demonstrate his outstanding mastery of the martial arts. Untying his long hair and donning a bronze mask, he was always the first to penetrate the Tangut array. Despite participating in none of the major encounters at Yen-chou, Good Water Valley, and Ting-ch'uen, he won high praise accumulating meritorious exploits in twenty-four skirmishes, minor victories and sieges.Theater Commander of Fu-Yen Circuit Fan Chung-yen taught him the military classics and appointed him to command a regular legion.^°^ In 1042, Fan Chimg-yen assumed the conunand of Huan-Ch'ing Circuit and Ti-Ch'ing remained one of the few well-known officers in Fu-Yen Circuit. The new Theater Commander and Pacification

Intendant Pang Chi launched a counterattack and assigned several officers including Ti

Ch'ing to regain all the territories lost in the first year of war. Ti Ch'ing constructed Fort

Proclaimed Amnesty near Rear Bridge Pass to block the approaches of the Tangut

109 Yd Ching, "Sung ku Ti Ling-kung mu-ming", in Wu-ch'i Chi. fSKCSCP. ser. 6, v. 243-44), chOan 19, p. 5a. HCP. chQan 125, p. 2945, chQan 129, p. 3056-57. SS, chOan 290, p. 9718. Shao-shih wen-chien-Iu. chOan 8, p. 83. Fan Chen (1007-1088), Tune-chai chi-shih. (Notes Written in the Eastern Studio), (Beijing: 318

invaders.^^° After the completioii of this mission without incident, K'aifeng expressed its

admiration of Ti Ch'ing and assigned him to replace Ko Huai-min who was killed in the

Battle of Ting-ch'uan. As a result, Ti Ch'ing became Vice Supreme Operation Conductor

of Ching-YOan Circuit at the begiiming of 1043 and Acting Theater Commander,

Pacification Intendant, and Supreme Operation Conductor at the end of the year.^^^ His promotion from ordinary soldier to a theater commander in five years was truly prodigious. After the peace of 1045, when his former colleague Ch'ung Shih-hang was striken by a mortal illness, Ti Ch'ing was regarded as the only well-known general rising from the war.

The career opportunity opened for Ti Ch'ing to serve in the Military Bureau. In

1152, a minority rebellion arose in Kuangsi in which a number of prefectural governors and commanders were killed and the uprising jeopardized the Sxmg rule in Kuangtung.^^^

After such capable civilian commanders as Ya Ching and Sun Mien had achieved no quick success. Vice Military Counselor Ti Ch'ing assimied personal command.

Enthusiastically endorsed by Military Counselor P'ang Chi, the Emperor Jen-tsimg authorized ftill power to Ti Ch'ing as supreme commander under no surveillance from civil ofScial nor eunuch. From the tactical point of view, Ti Ch'in insisted in deploying

Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1980), chQan 3, p. 28. Tune-tu shih-lOeh. chQan 62, pp. 4a-b. YQ Ching, "Sung ku Ti Ling-kung mu-ming", p. 2a-b. Chune-Wu chi-wen. chOan 3, p. 52-53. HCP. chaan 150, p. 3626-33. SS, chQan 320, p. 10403. Tung-tu shih-lOeh. chQan 62, p. 4b. SHY. V. 198, Barbarian 5, p. 7797-98. SSCW. chQan 11, p. 113, chQan 13, p. 256-59. Tune-hsien ni-lu. chQan 4, p. 40. YQ Ching proposed an invitation of Vietnamese intervention to this issue when the Sung suppression of the Kuangsi rebellion received no obvious progress. Ti Ch'ing rejected such a plan later. See ^ chQan 290, p. 9720, chQan 320, p. I04I0. Tune-tu shih-lQeh. chQan 62, p. 5a. HCP. chQan 173, pp. 4182-83. 319

500 elite tribal cavalrymen who had been promoted into the Palace Army. With this

demand fulfilled, Ti Ch'ing rapidly conducted secret march passing through the

mountainous terrain along the Kuangsi border and engaged the rebel leader Nung Chih-

kao (d. 1053) in battle at Kuei-jen-p'u in the vicinity of the present provincial capital

Nan-ning City. Seeing a potential crisis on his right wing at the beginning of the battle, Ti

Ch'ing ordered a cavalry charge on his left wing, pressing the attack with furious urgency.

Eventually, his cavalry outflanked and entirely encircled the rebels.^^^ Victorious in this

battle annihilating the rebels, Ti Ch'ing returned to K'aifeng in tritunph and was thereafter

promoted to be Military Counselor.^^^

With such an outstanding merit, the fame of Ti Ch'ing reached a zenith. Whenever

Ti Ch'ing appeared on the main avenue with an insouciant disregard for his fame, masses

of people and soldiers would aggregate. Emperor Jen-tsung advised him to remove the

tattoo through skin surgery as he was no longer an ordinary soldier. However, Ti Ch'ing

preferred keeping the tattoo as a spectacular evidence of how eminent position an

ordinary soldier could reach and thus improving the morale of the army.^^® He even

washed his face with liquor before going out before the mass in order to highlight the

tattoo.^^^

"'YQ Ching, "Sung ku Ti Ling-kung mu-ming", pp. 3a-4a. Peng Fu(1020-I099), Chene-nan Lu (Records about the Southern Campaign), in SKCSCP. ser. 7, (1981), pp. 5b-6a. HCP. chOan 173, p. 4183, chQan 174, p. 4190-93, SHY. V..176. military 10, p. 6922-23, chQan 198, barbarian 5, p. 7798. SS, chflan 290, p. 9719- 20, chQan 311, p. 10200. Sung-ch'ao shih-shih. chOan 16, p. 254. Meng-ch'i ni-fan. chQan 13, p. 141. HCP. chQan 174, p. 4197-98, p. 4207-09. Tune-tsai chi-shih. chQan 3, p. 28. SSCW. chQan 5, pp. (47- 49), pp. 91-93. HCP. chQan 172, p. 4153. Shih-lin ven-vQ. chQan 7, p. 103. 320

Ti Ch'ing's extraordinary public image caused the spread of rumors and

speculations. According to the principle of division of power, a Military Counselor was

not supposed to be as intimate with soldiers as was Ti Ching. Alarmed by the analogy

with the Incident of the Ch'en Bridge in which Sung Tai-tzu overthrew the Later Chou in

960, a number of civil ofBcials started to worry about the nascent opportunity for a

military coup against the throne. Although the initial probability of such a plot was small,

rumors were exacerbated by the imperial succession problem during the 1050s and the

central fact was that the Emperor Jen-tsung had no heir. There were stories about omens

surrounding the house of Ti Ch'ing, such as his dog having a strange horn.Once Ti Ch'ing

was supposed to have appeared in a yellow coat, costume reserved for the ruler.^^® Ou-

yang Hsiu and P'ang Chi advised Emperor Jen-tsung to dispatch Ti Ch'ing commission on

some distant place so that he would not become involved in any undesired incident.In

1056, Sung Jen-tsung dismissed Ti Ch'ing from his court and relegated him to the

appointment of govemor at Ch'en-chou. Ti Ch'ing set out in melancholy and died shortly

of unknown cause after assuming his prefectural incumbency.^^°

The meteoric emergence and sudden death of Ti Ch'ing provided the occasion for

self-conscious retrospective by all and legendization qxiickly joined with rumors rampant

before his death. People called him "Ti the Angel", a celestial agent who was incarnated

HCP. ChQan 172, p. 4153, chQan 183, pp. 4426-27,4435. SS, chtlan 290, p. 9721. Mo Chi. chOan 1, p. 16. HCP. chQan 183, pp. 446-27. Ou-yang Hsiu, chOan 4, p. 64, chQan 12, pp. 124-25. SS, chQan 266, P..9I88. HCP. chOan 185, pp. 4473-74. SHY, v. 106, institution 78, p. 4185. 321

to relieve the military crisis of the Sung and who returned to Heaven after accomplishing his mission. Another version of his legend described him as the incarnation of the True

Martial Deity orchen-wushen. a Taoist diviniQ^ worshipped at the monastery on Wu- tang Moimtain.^^^

On Ti Ch'ing's life, there were innumerable erroneous, exaggerated, and controversial accoxmts in private anecdote. One provided a detail accoimt of his victory over Hsi Hsia in approximately 1042 in which he exchanged the banners of a crack crossbow unit with an inferior infantry imit. When the deceived Tanguts vigorously attacked the crossbowmen, Ti Ch'ing ordered an heavy and unremitting fire severely defeating the enemy. In the Standard Historv. this subterfuge was conceived by the civilian commander Chang K'ang and Ti Ch'ing did not even participate in the battle.

At the outset of the battle of Kuei-jen-p'u, the rebels killed the Sung right wing commander and Ti Ch'ing "poured sweat drop like rain". However, a later anecdote described such a neurotic breakdown as a miraciUous sign for victory. Probably because a preponderance of private sources were exaggerated, they needed to be reexamined and a biographical study of Ti Ch'ing in accrued with strict historical discipline is still lacking. This task should be accomplished in the near future but the absence of a definitive biography of Ti Ch'ing does not prevent discussion. Ti Ch'ing

Meng-ch'i pi-fan. chQan 13, p. 141. Meng-ch'i oi-fan. chOan 13, p. 141. Peng Ch'eng (d. 1049), Mo-k'o hui-hsi. (Scattered Illumination from the Ink-guest), (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1981), chOan 10, pp. la-b. Sun Sheng (circa late 11th c.), Sun-kune fan-p'u (Notes of Master Sun), in Pai-ch'uan hsOeh-hai. Pai-pu ts'ung-shu chi-cheng. c. 5, v. 48, chflan 1, pp. 7a-b. 322

became a legendary figure not necessarily because he gained great victories and these accounts are reliable. Regardless of reliabiliQ'^, these accounts are true expressions of an unbound appreciation for a veteran hero. His popular image as an eloquent advocate of the

Sung, his indomitable energy on the battlefield, and his imperious demeanor in strategic command reflects the idealization of military hero. These accounts suggested the return of an admiration for military heroism and the hunger for victory.

Ti Ch'ing was eager in improving the status of soldiers. About his tattoo, he exclaimed, "How could I be here (the Military Bureau) without these few words on my face? I will never wipe them out in order to show that the state has such a respected position awaiting even the most humble." After the death of Ti Ch'ing, the Sung gradually reserved more career opportunities for the military. For instance. Sung Shen- tsung employed Kuo K'uei (1021-88), Ch'ung O, and Liu Ch'ang-chuo (circa late 11th century) as theater commanders and Kuo K'uei was even made Assistant Military

Counselor.

P'o-chai pien. chQan 2, p. 10. 323

CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO

Hsi Hsia was a late comer to power politics in central Asia. The widely scattered population, scanty land, and slender natural resources of the Tanguts prevented an early maturity as a proto-national state. The Tanguts remained in disunity during the long struggle between the Pang and Tibet for the control of Central Asia, but the strength of the Tanguts of Hsia-chou grew impressively in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. It was still a secondary power even after the subsidence of Pang influence and the Tibetan empire faded as a political power along the Silk Route. When such power players as

Tang, Tibet, Uighur, and the Sha-chou local regime became exhausted in devastating war, they shifted their attention to mutually beneficial trade and coexistence. Hsia-chou was eventually able to dominate the region and, during the tenth century, the deliberate use of military power was rewarded by a series of successes.. Although its strength was still far behind that of Sung and Liao, its aggressiveness complicated the international order of eleventh-century Asia.

Unaware of this undercurrent, Simg China lost its strategic initiative. Li Yiian - hao's onslaught against the Sung marked the end of the generation of peace and coexistence. The Hsi Hsia invasion would have had only modest effect but its impact upset the balance of the Sung-Liao relations. During the Kuanan Issue, Liao Ching-tsung heralded this retrogression of power politics and, at the same time, compelled K'aifeng to increase its annual gifts. With the high price of a tenuous peace bartered with the Hsi

Hsia in 1045, the Sung gradually discerned that this was only another variation of armed 324

coercion. The rapid depletion of Hsi Hsia resources in prolonged war against the Sung and the defeat of Liao Ching-tsung in his River Bank Campaign temporarily reinstated a military equilibrium. In the long term, nevertheless, uncertainty underlined the relations among the three states.

In response to the crisis. Sung policy rapidly reversed in directive. Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i, though Confucians, incorporated pragmatism in their defense strategy.

Permanent war readiness was stressed and a blueprint for counter-attack was devised. The tribal army reconstituted the main strength of Sung military power and the rise of Chueh- shih-Io provided the Sung a constant ally. These commitments secured the defense but inevitably complicated Sung strategy priority, in which the increasing importance of external factors lay as a potential challenge to the predominant domestic priority.

Sung-Hsia War also marked the debacle of Sung pacifism and complicated the

Sung perception of war and international relations. Ignominious defeats provoked a more realistic view of violence and mutual suspicion prevailed even after the peace of 1045.

Many Confucian scholars cried out that the relation between civil and military ought to be holistic, one integrated and interdependent, organic whole, while war preparation was indispensable for a state all times. In the effort of stmggling for military development, civilian officials and strategists provided an abundant pool of talent for command personnel. The same effort increased civilian attention to military affairs. Although the idea of domestic and military reform did not receive complete success, these agenda persistently influenced policies and strategy through the time of the next generation. 325

PART in THE RETROGRESSION OF THE SUNG EXPANSIONISM

Scholars of the 1990s have underlined the profound importance of "experience" in the culture of a state and the discussion of Part n supports this hypothesis. Hsi Hsia lack of experience of the ravages of war informed its warlike policy, which, despite gaining military victories, prohibited the Tangut state to be incorporated into the perpetual peace between Sung and Liao. In addition, the trauma of military defeat accelerated the Simg strategic defense and produced the momentum for a long-term military reform. Certainly, it was not probable that Sung strategy could change from defensive to offensive without a congruent socio-economic transformation, nor do I suggest that strategic decision making was exclusively empirical. Nonetheless, the experience of war in the 1040s was discernible as a factor in the change of strategy of K'aifeng after 1067. Ignominious defeats compelled the acceptance of war against "barbarians" and the Sung elite became concerned in strategic defense as an important affair of the state. As a consequence, military service was accepted as a bureaucratic career and distinguished military achievement eroded the assured predictability of ofGcial holding by literati.

Part III focuses on the revision of violence and power politics after 1067, and especially on the relation between war and the New Policies. Simg Shen-tsung and Wang

An-shih recruited military talent such as Wang Shao, Shen K'uo, and Ch'ung O from ordinary ofBcials, broadening the gateway of military command as a civil career. The political dichotomy between the Old Party and New Party during the reform necessitated 326

the reformists to pursue military success to consolidate its power. As a result, military campaigns mixed with the New Policies, although Wang An-shih presimied that conquest was a long term goal after achieving significant success in socio-economic reform. The dilemma was revealed in Wang An-shih's statement: "to encourage talent by conducting enterprise." The increasing recruitment and promotion of "talent" injected a new human factor to induce immediate change in the conduct of foreign affairs, to exacebate frontier conflict, and to lay a degree of uncertainty to domestic reform. On one hand, Wang An- shih was compelled to cautiously balance domestic and foreign interests. On the other hand, he was compelled to balance the priority of the betterment of the society against the financial interests of the govenmient. Some prominent acts such as the Green Sprout

Loan and Exemption Fee of Corvee had their initial goals to improve the betterment of the poor and only later benefited the state in a financial sense. The retirement of Wang

An-shih marked the departure of someone to execise such balancing power. Simg Shen- tsung, as well as most of the New Part leaders, exerted more enthusiasm in pursuing military victories. Parallel with this, the New Party converted a majority of socio­ economic reform programs for the betterment of people into financial oriented policies for the betterment of the state.

Associated with the fifteen-year-reform knoAvn as the New Policies, Prime Minister

Wang An-shih and Emperor Shen-tsung found new sources to finance military campaigns. After 1067, violence broke out and "creating frontier conflict" described the ambition of the New Party. Wang An-shih and his colleagues attempted to annex eastem 327

Ching-hai from the Kokonor Tibetans to expand the source for the import of horses, establish the Horizon Mountain to form a permanent defensvie line, overthrow the Tangut state, and eventually re-conquer the "lost territory" from the Liao. The first and the second objectives were largely achieved from 1071 to 1099. The third objective was nearly accomplished in 1081 but the military operation failed in the last stage. The fourth and last objective was the most controversial. The Sung deviated from its original plan, established an alliance with the Jurchens, and shifted its strategic target to the Khitans before destroying Hsi Hsia. Historians have argued whether this was a rational decision or an irrevocable error ensuing in fatal disaster. Nonetheless, I emphasize that power politics replaced co-existence as the mode of international behavior climaxing a decades long escalation of violence. After 1067, military development even continued during the period of the Old Party empowerment and the Sung defeated the Tanguts and hostile

Tibetan tribes in defensive operations. Before it fell in 1127, K'aifeng had gained considerable in victories, but at the cost of peace foreshadowing the failure of the medieval revolution.

Chapter 9 Reform and the Option of War

This chapter will observe changes and development of poltical, economic, and military sectors of mid-eleventh century China. The growth of the bureaucracy fostered factionalism and state entrepeneur. Poltical environment of the mid-eleventh century did not provide a stability that was necessary for foreign venture. On the contrary, imperial succession, the voice of radical reform, and individual and factional power struggle 328

created tension. This atmoshpere of tension demanded strong characters of political

leadership, who demanded new fiscal resources and military achievements to consolidate

their power. Wang An-shih and Sung Shen-tsimg reflected such characteristics. Despite

having an egotism to improve the living of the poor, the reformers eventually gave

priority to financial profits of the state. The economic reform of the New Polcies

provided the state with fiscal resource, particularly Avith a huge amount of cash. Hard

currency as a considerable portion of the state income and the impressive output of state

entrepeneur suggested K'aifeng became more able to wage war. Congruent with this effort,

military development was far reaching. Progressive technology, systematic arm

manufacture, and steady horse import fix)m Tibetans allowed the Simg army being equipped

much better. Diversification of field armies fiom prefectural garrisons gave credit on the

performance of military units. Such progresses encoiaraged Wang An-shih and Sung Shen-

tsimg in pursuing military success to undermine domestic unrest.

Compared with domestic factors, foreign environment was complicated by uncertain

variables. Khitan military might shrank by its unsuccessful effort against Hsi Hsia, while the Tangut domination in the Ordos and Ho-hsi was weakened by continual internal strives.

The annual payment firom K'aifeng became important consideration of BChitan and Tangut,

refi-aining them fix)m overt military confrontation with China. Nevertheless, as Liao and Hsi

Hsia had lost their ability to deter the Sung, they could not carefiiUy prevent conflict from

escalation. Territorial dispute and border conflict continued and no Khitan and Tangut

policy was seen to downplay the Sung suspicion Jn addition, the uneasy political platform 329

engendered aggressive rulers. Immature monaichs and surogate regency exhibited

belligerent attitude once in 1057 and again in 1065. At the same time, the antannae of the

Tangut military expansion in 1062 reached the Sung outpost at the extreme western flank

and the creation of a second theater seemed ominous. Accompanied with the disintegration

of the Chueh-ssu-lo regime, the Sung started to forestall an imminent jeopardy of a potential

Tangut out-flank overrunning. In short, according to the Sung point of view, the shrinlring

Tangut military power did not refrain from transggression. Therefore, derived by Wang An-

shih, the focal point of grand strategy of K'aifeng changed from dynastic survival to the

elimination of his two enemies.

Bureaucratism and Factional Politics

The decline of the medieval aristocracy and the rise of premodem bureaucracy

underlined the change from Tang to Sung China. The aristocracy of the early Tang as a

legacy of the powerful lineages of the Six Dynasties (222-589) monopolized high office

and social prominence. Political fragmentation and military upheaval during the Five

Dynasties caused the general collapse of the aristocratic power structure. Local elites,

who served the warlords and military governors during the chaotic period, found

opportunities to become civil servants of the imperial Sung government in the late tenth

century. The vast expansion of civil service examination provided access for educated

local magnates to become bureaucrats receiving regular salaries, exemption of corvee, and legal privileges. Both civil servants and military officers could use the privilege of

"protection" (yin) to obtain official ranking for their brothers, sons, and other male family 330

members belonging to lower generations. A combination of civil service examination and

"protection" generated numerous imperial servants and the total of civil ofScials swelled from 10,000 to 34,000 from the early eleventh century to the 1080s. As Robert Hartwell has indicated, one aspect of this growing bureaucratization was that financial expertise became a professional career during the eleventh century.This tendency was congruent with the growing military service of civil servants after 1038, as described in Chapter

Eight. As finance and defense were serious agendas among state affairs, fiscal and military achievements became crucial for an official making his career. Connections with the influential was another key of success. Historians have pointed out that geographic origins, educational background, class year, and matrimonial linkages created and consolidated different cliques and the relations among them were extraordinary complicated. Financial and military reform as well as imperial succession illuminate the distinctive feature of the Sung factionalism.

From the 1040s to the ascendancy of Sung Shen-tsung (b.l048 r. 1067-1085),

K'aifeng experienced an intricacy in court politics ^\dlich focused on the imperial succession problem. Among the Sung emperors, Jen-tsimg was known for his ill-health and his probable inability to conveiv a child, hi 1043 Fan Chung-yen was defamed by the calumny that he intended to dethrone Sung Jen-tsung.^ Although the scandal was apparently created by Fan's political rivals and the Emperor was not so gullible, the imperial succession problem became an open questioiL An empire without legal heir was ripe for conspiracy.

- Hartwell, Robert, "Financial Expertise, Examinations, and the Formulation of Economic Policy in 331

This issue became extraordinarily sensitive in the incumbency ofH Ch'ing at the Bureau of

Military Affairs, probably ensuing in the dismissal of Ti and possibly his mysterious death.

In 1062, Sung Jen-tsung installed his adopted son as heir and successor, later enthroned as

Sung Ying-tsimg in 1063.^

The Debate on the Legal Position of Prince of P'u, or P'u-I, illustrated the political dichotomy that existed during the mid-Northem Sung. This event was essentially ritual but became highly politicized after a serious debate. Sung Ying-tsung was the natural son of

Prince of P'u and adopted by Jen-tsung as imperial heir. After his ascendancy. Sung Ying- tsung intended to honor his natural father. Considering that such a posthumous honor would denigrate the father role of Sung Jen-tsung, Imperial Secretariat Wang Kuei (1019-1085) hesitated to draft the edict and Imperial Advisor Ssu-ma Kuang suggested a modification addressing the Prince as Senior Uncle of the Emperor, or wang-po. Ssu-ma Kuang traced the imperial authority of Sung Ying-tsui^ to his adoption by Sung Jen-tsung who therefore became the only legal father of the current throne holder. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ou- yang Hsiu repudiated such a suggestion of Ssu-ma Kuang as negating family. Ou-yang Hsiu criticized that it was nonsense to alter an innate kinship of father and son to become uncle and nephew simply for the reason of imperial succession. Vilifying the Prime Minister's intention to appease the Emperor, young scholars in the Imperial Advisory OfGce and

Northern Sung China", The Journal of Asian Smdi'es. 30:2 (1971)2, pp. 281-314. ^ HCP. chQan 150, p. 3637. ^ The installation of Ying-tsung as imperial heir, refer to HCP. chQan 188, p. 4542, chQan 195, p. 4727-28, chOan 197, p. 4769-74. The trial of Leng Ch'ing (d. 1050) by PaoCh'eng(lOOO-63)also reflected the unrest, see Mo-chi. chOan 3, p. 41-42. Pao Ch'eng, Tun yao-yan Leng Ch'ing teng shih", in Yang Kuo-shuen ed, Pao Ch'eng chi pien-nien chiao-Du. (Chronological Edition of the Collected Works of Pao Ch'eng), (He-fei: 332

Imperial Censorial OfiBce decribed Ou-yang Hsiu as "wicked and heretic" or chien-hsieh.

Aiter all critics except Ssu-ma Kuang were expelled &om the court, Ou-yang Hsiu shied away from the political intrigue deep rooted in the bureaucratic institution. An imperial censor was to impugn the prime minister in every possible means, regardless of right or wrong, to make his career.^ To protect his enlarged power, a prime minister, in return, tended to recommend his intimates as imperial censors and advisors and factionalism heightened as a result.^ During the 1060s, prime ministers preferred not to work with any one of talent who was not of the same aggreement. For example, the distrust of Han Ch'i of

Chang Fang-p'ing enabled Kuo K'uei, a military professional with a tamish political background, to administer the Bureau of Military Affairs.®

Emperor Ying-tsung died four years later, leaving a heir of twenty years old to be known as the Emperor Shen-tsimg.^ The ascendancy of such a juvenile emperor brought an exceptant atmosphere into the Sung court According to an anecdote, in the approximate year of 1067, the adolescent ruler wore armor when he visited Empress Dowager Ts'ao.

Realizing that the Emperor possessed an extraordinary military ambition, the Emperess

Dowager expressed her anxiety of his martial display.^ Emperor Shen-tsung soon

Huang-san shu-se, 1989), chaan3,p. 139-40. * HCP. chQan 207, pp. 5020-44. Ssu-ma Kuang, Ssu-ma Kuane chou-i. (Tai-yQan: San-hsi people's, puntuated edition, 1986), hereafter as SMKCI, chOan 20, pp. 217-21. Ou-yang Hsiu, "Fu-yi", preface, in OYHCC. pp. 977-96, Ou-vang Hsiu te chih-hsOeh vfl ts'ung-chenc. p. 234-38. - Ch'eng Kuang-yO, "Pei-Sung fai-chien chih-cheng yfl Pu-yi", Ta-lu tsa-chih. cbQan 23, no. 8, (1961), pp. 4-12, Ou-vang Hsiu te chih-hstteh vO ts'ung-cheng. p. 234-51. ' HCP. chQan 208, p. 5051. The role of Chang Fang-p'ing among the remonstrators of the reform of Wang An-shih remains unclear and seems worth for further study. Both Haa Ch'i and Wang An-shih disliked him but Su Shih compared him with Chu-ke Liang (181-234). See Po-chai pien. chQan 7, p. 41. ' HCP. chQan 209, p. 5073. ' Shao-shih wen-chien-Iu. chQan 3, p. 26. 333

discovered that any political transformation of his empire had to be preceded first by a

bureaucratic reform. To consolidate his rule and strengthen his military power, an emperor

had to e^point an able prime minister. Even though the power of prime minister had

increased during the Sung-Liao and Sung-Hsia war,^ ^ctionalism drasticaliy reduced the

consistency of policy. The refonn of Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i ended in 1043 as a result

of a series of scandal, fabrication, and false accusations. Ou-yang Hsiu exercised his duties

as Vice Prime Minister in the 1060s not without calumny and opprobrium, and even one

accusation of a possible incestuous relation with his daugther-in-law.^°

To undertake refonn in such a political environment was compounded by yet another difficulty. K'aifeng had already made use of many resources in the upkeep of an excessively sizable government and large army. Further, neither massive budget reduction nor a significant increase of resource was likely. When Prime Mnister Han Ch'i promoted the

Righteous and Brave militia in Hopei and Sansi in 1064, Imperial Advisor Ssu-ma Kuang remonstrated arguing social conceriL Conscription for militia service was a form of double taxation put on the backs of the peasants, who had already paid a tax for defense.^^ In 1068

Emperor Shen-tsimg appointed Ssu-ma Kuang to be in charge of budget reduction. Ssu-ma

Kuang immediately rejected the commission, saying that the budget could not be reduced significantly without a long-term cooperative commitment by the Emperor, Prime

Ministers, and Grand Treasurer.^^

- Wang Rei-lai, "Lun Sung-tai Hsiang-ch'Qan". -- HCP. chQan 209, pp. 5078-82, Ou-vang Hsiu te chih-hsQeh vQ ts'une-cheng. pp. 248-51. " HCP. chOan 203, pp. 4914-22. " WHTK. chaan 24, p. 232. SSu-ma Kuane chou-vi. chQan 24, p. 264. 334

Disappointing reality caused Emperor Shen-tsung to give priority to radical reform.

The ascendancy of Wang An-shih on the political platform was one of the most dramatic event in the Simg political history. Wang An-shih first succeeded as a prefect and was known as an expert of finance and Confucian rituals, hi I0S8, he composed a ten-thousand word memorial to Emperor Jen-tsimg, urging a general reform. Despite the finitless outcome of this memorial, Wang An-shih gained fame in the following service. During the

1060s, admiration of Wang An-shih travelled throughout central China. With Wang's growing reputation. Sung Shen-tsimg became impressed by Wang's unique interpretation of

Confucian classics illuminating a reinstatement of the ancient way of ruling.^^

The reform of Wang An-shih played a central role in the political transition after

1067. Among historians it is controversial to regard Wang An-shih's Reform as a

Confucian or Legalist movement.^^ Despite the inconclvisive nature of this debate, it was less disputable that Wang An-shih made serious study of the Confucian classics.

Uncaring of a severe appearance, Wang An-shih was described as looking like a prisoner

-- Early career of Wang An-shih, see Ts'ai Shang-hsiang, Wane Chine-kung nien-p'u k'ao-lOeh (An Examination of the chronological biography of Wang An-shih), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, first print 19S9, Shanghai; Shanhai Jen-mm, new version 1973), chflan 1-14, pp. 39-211. Williamson, H. R. Wang An Shih: A Chinese Statesman and Educationalist of the Sune Dynasty. (London: Arthur Probsthain, I93S), pp. 1-108. Teng Kuang-ming, pp. 16-28. On his "Myriad Word Memorial", see Wang An-shih, Lin- ch'uan hsien-shene wen-chi (Collected Works of Wang An-shih), (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1959), chQan 39, pp. 410-422; English translation, Williamson, pp. 48-84; a summarized version, see HCP. chQan 188, pp. 4S31-32. Williamson, H. R. Wang An Shih: A Chinese Statesman and Educationalist of the Sung Dynasty.. Hsiao Kung-ch'Qan, Chune-kuo chene-chih shih-hsiane-shih. (A History of Chinese Political Thoughts), (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yQan-hui, first print 1954, third print 1961), p. 456-60. Liu, James T.C., Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih n021-1086> and His New Policies. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). Teng Kuang-ming, Wang An-shih: Chung-kuo shih-ishih-chi te kai-ke- chia (Wang An-shih: A Refbrmer of Eleventh Century China), (Beijing, Jen-min, frist print, 1975, revised version, 1979). Ch'i Hsia. Wang An-shih oien-fa (The Reform of Wang An-shih), (Shanghai: Shanhai Jen- min, 1979). 335

or a funeral goer during his early age.^^ As an expert of Confucian Rituals, Wang An-

shih undertook a series of reform endeavoring an immense increase of state revenue and

military capabili^. A consensual description of Wang An-shih's priorities can be

pragmatism over ideology, capability over morality, and domestic reform over external

ventures.

In 1069 Simg Shen-tsung appointed Wan An-shih as Vice Prime Minister and initiated

the New Policies. Wang An-shih reorganized the Grand Treasure and promulgated several

economic reform programs such as the Green Sprout Loan in 1069, Equitable Transport

System in 1069, Public Service Act in 1070, Equitable Land-tax Measure and State Trade

Act in 1072. They were attacked severely by a considerable number of officials. His New

Policies in the military sphere, such as the establishment of legions, the Arsenal Board,

Mutual Security Militia Act, and Militia Mounts Measure, received a certain degree of criticism, but not the most vehement.^®

Among the remonstators. Wen Yen-po (1006-1085) held a firm stance against the reform. Conventionally classified as memebers of "Old Party" or chiu-tane. Han Ch'i,

Ssu-ma Kuang, Ou-yang Hsiu, and Chang Fang P'ing opposed particular reform programs because of ensuing executive problems and ramifications. Without experienced ministers as his colleagues, Wang An-shih assigned several capable financial and military experts as his assistant. Lii Hui-ch'ing (1031-1126), Tseng Pu (1035-1107), Chang Txm (1035-

1105), Ts'ai Ch'iieh (1037-1093), Wang Shao, Shen KHio, and Sse Hsiang (d. after 1078)

" P'o-chai pien. three chOan version, chQan 1, p. 65. 336

became conventionally classified as members of the New Party or hsin-tanp. Before

1074, the power struggle stood in the favor of the New Party, inexorably bolstered by

Emperor Shen-tsung. However, as the political dichotomy and power struggle

exacerbated. New Party's domination waned. In 1074, an internal power struggle within

the New Partys flared and, shortly thereafter, heightened. Tseng Pu started to discover an

immense executive problems in the ill-famed Imperial Trading Post or shih-i-wii When

he unfolded a report to the disadvant£^e of the New Party, Wang An-shih decided to

dismiss Tseng Pu. Tseng Pu's dismissal allowed Lix Hui-ch'ing to become powerful enough to challenge Wang An-shih. In 1074 Wang was assigned as governor of Nanking,

Lii Hui-ch'ing aggrandized supplementary appointment and gradually expanded personal

power. When Wang An-shih returned in 1075, he was astonished by the fact that he was no longer favored by the Emperor as before. Wang applied for retirement in 1076 and died in 1086.^^

Inter and intra-factional struggle only increased a trend toward political despotism. In such a delicately balanced political equilibrium, the Emperor became the only figure representing political certainty and consistency. From 1078 to 1085, Emperor Shen-tsung undertook a series of reform in political institutions without the assistance of Wang An-

Reform programs and criticisms on them, refer to Williamson, pp. 113-303, Ch'i Hsia, Wane An-shih pien-fa. pp. 100-226. The conflia among Wang An-shih, LQ Hui-ch'ing and Tseng Pu, refer to Liu, James T.C., "Wang An- shih, Tseng Pu yQ Pei-Sung wan-ch'i kuan-h'ao te lei-hsing", Ts'ine-hua hsOeh-pao. new version, chQan 2, no. 1, (I960), pp. 109-129; also, m Liane-Sune shih ven-chiu hui-piea. pp. 117-42. Different political concern between Wang An-shih and Emperor Shen-tsung, see Ch'i Hsia, Wang An-shih pien-fa. pp. 217- 26. 337

shih.^^ In addition, the Emperor reintroduced an ancient practice of political control-

delegating eunuchs with imperial commission. The functions of such etmuchs as imperial

commissioners, despite its common practice at the early Sung, was highly restricted during

the 1040s when the civil ofiScials dominated political sphere as well as military command.

Li Hsien (d. after 1082) and Wang Chung-cheng (d. after 1081), two favorites of Emperor

Shen-tsung, commanded the Shensi forces.^^ This tendency continued to the empowering

of Tung Kuan (1054-1126), another imperial servant under Li Hsien. Tung Kuan's steady alliance with Ts'ai Ching (1046-1126), a New Policy advocate and ill-famed surrogate,

allowed the rule of New Party for thirty years.

In short, the heightening of factionalism, despotism, and surrogacy highlighted

political change after 1067 and this complicated equation parallelled to escalating conflict

with neighboring powers. The reform influenced the strategic offensive in some of its aspects: the inexorable imperial support to reform, the silencing of domestic opposition, and the concentration of expertise in critical positions. Consistent support from the throne and a bitter power struggle opened the path for the New Party to undertake a series of radical policies aimed at "enriching the state and strenghtening the army." Nevertheless, political intrigues also questioned Sung military decisions to embark on more adventures. Should the

Sung ignite a foreign conflict before its reform was fiilly successful? Should K'aifeng undergo a war with the Tanguts in the absence of political harmony? An afBrmative answer would be unlikely. The equivocal effect of New Policies and an intensified power struggle

Ch'i Hsia, Wang An-shfli oien-fa. pp. 217-26. 338

seemed not to favor any aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, domestic politics supported an aggressive Sung grand strategy after 1067 in part-but only in part

Economic Policies and Its Outcome

In the interlude between the two Tangut Wars from 1045 to 1081, Sung China swept into an age of prosperity. Social specialization, increasing importance of currency, and the emergemence and proliferation of regional markets encouraged peasants to supplement their production by buying and selling and to eke out their income by speicalized intake in cottage industry and part time artisan activity. In the appreciation of historians, the economic achievement of Sung China from approximately 976 to I066was best described as tremendous, if not "revolutionary ".Arable land expanded from

295,332,060 to about 440,000,000 mou^° and the annual output of iron grew prodigiously from 32,500 to at least 125,000 tons in the eighty years from 998 to 1078.^^ Most of the iron was smelted in coke burning blast frimaces in North China.^^ The population increased from 19,930,320 to 29,092,185 from 1021 to 1066 and grew continuously to

33,303,889 in 1080.^^ Currency management exhibited modem characteristics and paper

SS, chQan 467, pp. 13638-40, 13642-43. WHTK. chflan 4, pp. 57-58. This is according to the calculation by Robert Hartwell, who based the figure of output upon the annual monopoly receipt tax reflected in WHTK and HCP. See Hartwell, Robert, "Market, Technology, and the Structure of Exterprise in the Development of the Eleventh-Century Chinese Iron and Steel Industry", The Journal of Economic Historv. chQan 26, no.l, (1966) 3; pp29-58. Ch'i Hsia suggested even a higher annual output, 150,000 ton, in his work with Ch'aio Yiu-mei, Sune-tai ching-chi shih (An Economic History of Sung China), (Shanghai; Shanghai Remin, 1988), chOan 2, pJ55. Hartwell, Robert, "A Cycle of Economic Change in Imperial China: Coal and Iron in Northeast China, 750-1350". Journal of Economic and Social Historv of the Orient, no. 10, (1967), pp. 102-159. -- WHTK. chQan.11, p.l 13-14. 339

money was introduced, backed by cash and, later, silver.^^ Did such remarkable economic performance actually accommodate the Sung military capacity, or did it merely reflect the indifference of K'aifeng?

To transform economic credit to military power, three elements are needed. First is an idea or perception of the economy as a strategic factor. In other words, a government must, in the first place, realize the link between economic development and strategic security. Second, the state must have an institution extracting surplus &om economic activities and utilizing this surplus in military means. Currency and taxation are common in this process of most civilizations. A government must be able to collect taxes from the communes and a more effective taxation mechanism would enable a state to wage war easier. Third, an adjustable economic policy must exist. Not only is the fluctuating tax rate pivotal to the military budget of the state, but also to the economic policy prevailing trade, banking, coinage, and state enterprise and monopoly as well. These three elements, namely perception, institution, and policy, are indispensable in the economic context of grand strategy.

Economy as an integral element of strategy was not an unusual phenomenon in classical Chinese military thought. Sun Tzu emphasized waging war as expensive and

Shang Yang stressed the equation of agrarian exertion versus military venture. Enriching the state, or fu-kuo. and strengthening the army, or chiany-oing. were two interrelated policies. In 964, when formulating the grand strategy of reunification. Sung Tai-tzu

Hartwell, Robert, "The Evolution of the Early Northern Sung Monetary System, A.D. 960-1025", 340

foresaw that the postponement of northern expedition would eventually allow the economic prosperity of South China to facilitate the Sung army retaking the territory from JChitan.^^ In mid-eleventh century, Ou-yang Hsiu emphasized the economic aspect of war, claiming that finance was the most important element of conducting war.^® Thus, it would not be wrong to say that Sung China exhibited a precocious awareness of viewing economy not only in relation to civil welfare but also as a crucial factor of international struggle.

The taxation system of Sung China exhibited extraordinary maturity. Despite accepting agricultural activities as flmdamental to its economy, K'aifeng did not choose an enhancement of the direct tax on farming to increase its state revenue. Instead, the government fostered several iimovative and interventionist approaches to the economy.

The taxation structure became complex and closely associated with state-run enterprise, govenunental conunercial activities, and coinage policy. The annual income of K'aifeng was calculated not according to a single counter such as dollars in the modem day. Instead, as taxes were collected in grains, silks, string money, silver, grass and fodder, and many other miscellaneous items, no single matrix could calculate its total. The annual income of

K'aifeng was either marked in di£ferent matrices, i.e. shih for grains, kiian for cash money, bolts for silk, tael for silver, for grass and fodder, or, in more common practice, in a total of such different items. At the begining of the dynasty, some evidence seemed to

Journal of the American Oriental SocieQr, no. 87, (1967), pp.280-89. Yang Lten>sheng, Money and credit in China: A Short History (Cambridge. Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1952), p.53. Tune-tu shih-lOeh. chQan 23, pp. 407-08. Also, Tune-hsien oi-hi. v.l, p.l. OYHCC, chQan 5, p. 81. 341

suggest an equivalent value of materials in each unit For example, before 977, the

government equated either a tael of gold or a bolt of high quality silk vath one thousand

cash or one However, market values of the various materials fluctuated according to different time and place and it became no longer meaningful to equate the value of a bolt of silk and a chin of tea.^^ Mthout sharing a similar ratio, merely a culmination of mutiple matrixes lacked financial meaning. For instance, the annual income of997 and 1021 showed a reduction of6,447,000 total. However, a comparison of annual income of these to years by items, suggested that the massive reduction occurred in 11,000,050 wei grasses and fodder, while cash demonstrated a growth of more than fifty percent, and tea more than tripled. In addition, salt started to be an important item of annual income. Therefore, the ostensible increase or reduction of the total did not necessarily represent the actual growth or depletion of the dynastic revenue. Some annual "totals" which have frequently been quoted by historians, such as the spending 120,343,174 in 1065, were numbers with no counter for a common dinoniinator.^° Respective military historians such as Wang Tseng- yu carefully avoid a comprehensive calculation of the Sung military budget.^ ^

The increase of the state income of K'ai&ng was not necessarily a result of the Wang

An-shih Reform. Before 1067, the complex structure of the Sung state finance was

" WHTK. chQan 4, p.55. Ch'uen Han-sheng, "Pei-Sung wu-chia te pien-tung", Chung-vane ven-chiu-vflan li-shih vO-ven ven- chiu-shuo chi-k'an. (Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1944, reprinted 1947) chOan 11, pp.337-394. Only items with more than one hundred thousand units were counted. WHTK. chQan 4, p.S7. This is an illustrative record about "total" with no united counter. In 1065, K'aifeng "received 116,138,405, while spent 120^43,174 and 11,521,278 in extraordinary items. In this year, there are 160,292,093 stored in various circuits." WHTK. chOan 24, p.231. Instead, Wang quoted contemporily comments by the Sung scholars such as Chang Fang-p'ing, Ts'ai Hsiang, Ch'en Hsiang, and some others. See Sung-ch'ao ptne-chih chHi-fan. pp287-94. 342

constituted of three axes: the taxation system, the monetary policy, and the state monopoly and enterprises. The ordinary agrarian tax rate, £q)proaxiinately five to ten percent of the land output according to five grades of households, remained consistant at the beginning of the Sung to 1067 and did not seem to show a proportional increase in the Sung state income. However, in actuality, the agrarian tax increased significantly fit)m 960 to 1067. In

1050, seventeen years before the ascendancy of Emperor Shen-tsung, Pao Cheng indicated that the Sung annual income increased fit)m 65,603,000 to 122,595,900 firom approximately

1005 to 1048. The reason for such prodigious growth, according to Pao Cheng, was not any increase of the tax rate but the common practice of che-pien. Che-oien was a supplementary taxation policy depending upon geographic location at the early Sung but later became an additional burden for all tax payers. Officials assigned tax payers in different regions to submit an equivalent value of rice, wheat, and silk according to the official exchange rate.

However, as a means make up for the cost of needed purchases, local officials of the mid- eleventh century tended to demand commodities that was lacking, rather than what the tax payers actually produced. Later, che-pien became a financial policy for increasing income, requiring scarce commodities of high value regardless of commodities easily avaible.^^

Also, revenue was increased by the practice of chih-vi. a transference of tax fit>m one place to another according to official demand. The proliferation of chih-vi allowed a circuit to concentrate rice, cash, silk, or other items in places with a particular need without transportation cost. In fix)ntier China it ironically had logstics meaning but in other regions

The original idea of che-oien. see SS, chQan 174, p. 4203 and WHTK. chOan 4, p.57. Criticism of che- 343

officials profited by transferring goods from a place with a lower market price to another with biger maricet price. A prohibition fiom the central govetment in 1091 indicated that farmers were required to transport their tax payment more than three hundred U away from their hometowns.^^

Another financial improvement of the mid-eleventh century was the increasing proportion of hard currency in the annual revenue.^^ In 997, cash in the sum of4,656,000 kuan was 5.75 percent of the "total" income. In 1021, it increased to 7,364,000 kuan or 9.89 percent of the "total" income.^^ According to the account of Ts'ai Hsiang, the among of cash in a certain year of the 1060s was 36,822,541 kuan. while the annual "total" was

116.138,405 in 1065.^® OflBcials increasingly came to prefer to calculate annual revenue in currency. Ch'en Hsiang (1017-80) summed up the complicated items of annual revenue in

1065 as slightly more than 60,000,000 kuan and Chang Fang-p'ing during the Chia-you period (1056-63) estimated the annual military spending as 50 kuan per soldier.^^

According to Robert Hartwell, the annual increment allowed the smelting of

9,174,238,000 cash in 1078, thirty times compared with to approximately 358,000,000 prior

pien as financial policy, refer to Pao Ch'ene chi oian-nien chiao-pu. chOan 3, pp.132-33. Later criticism in approximately 1118, see WHTX. chOan S, p.61. " WHTK. chOan 5, p.61. Ch'Qan Han-sheng, "Tang-Sung cheng-fii sui-ju yQ k'e-pi ching-chi te kuan-hsi", Shih-vtt-shuo chi-k'an. chaan 20a, (1948), pp. 189-221. Hino Kaisaburo, Tovo shieaka ronso. chOan 6, pp. 240-80, pp. 466-88. " WHTK. chOan 4, p. 57. Ts'ai Hsiang (1012-67), Tuan-mine Chi (Collected Works of Ts'ai Hsiang), SKCSCP. ser. 4, v. 236-237, chQan 22, p.8a. The income in 1065, WHTK. chQan 24, p.231. Ch'en Hsiang <'1017-80'). Ku-lineChi (Collected Works of Ch'en Hsiang), SKCSCP. v. 235-236, chQan 8, p.3a-4a. LCC. chQan 24, p. lb-2a. It is worth to note that the meaning of "military spending" in Sung China was slightly different from the modem era. It usually included salary and ration but did not seem to have been concerned with the cost of arm manufacture. See Wang Tseng-yO, p. 292. It did not seem to include the cost for purchase and breeding of horses. 344

to 755.^° In late-eleventh centuiy. Sung China gradualy increased the number of mints &om

11 to 26, enabling an annual output of5,499,234,000 cash.^^ The eagerness of K'aifeng to

hold more cash reflected its policy against inflation. From the 1020s, the authority of

Szechwan issued p^)ennoney called chian-chih. stimulating regional and intra-regional

trade between Szechwan and Shensi. From the outbreak of the Sung-Hsia War in 1038, annual spending of Shensi adminnistration tripled^ ° and the government relied more and more on printing more money

The Sung encountered two factors trying to generate revenues for defense. First, the size of the armed force expanded with the escalating conflict with the Tanguts. From the

970s to the IG40s, the Sung Palace Army enlarged four times from 193,000 to 826,000 troops. Consequently, budget reduction became a serious task in which K'aifeng engaged with strenuous effort. From 1064 to 1067 the figure of the Palace Army reduced to 663,000 soldiers and stabilized at an average 600,000 after 1078. The reduction of forces was limited partially because of the second factors of serious inflation. This inflation effected an increase in spending fixim 17 kuan to 50 kuan per annimi for a Palace Army soldier in the first eighty years of the Sung. By 1065 and including the hsiang-chun. the Sung government still supported a million soldiers, consimiing 83 percent of the govenmient's cash and 43 percent of its total yearly income. * ^

Hartwell, "Market, Technology, and the Structure of Exterprise in the Development of the Eleventh- Century Chinese Iron and Steel tadustry", pp. 29-31. " WHTK. chOan 9, pp. 95-96. This is according to the account of Grand Treasuer Wang Yao-ch'en, refer to WHTK. chQan 24, p. 231. Refer to the calculation of Wang Tseng-yfl, Sung-ch'ao oing-chih chWan. pp. 13-21, Ke Chin-fang, "Sung-tai Jung-ping ch'eng-yin hsin-shuo", Wang YQ-chi, "Kuan-jrQ Pei-Sung yang-ping chih-fei te su- 345

The geogr^hic diversity of such an economically abundant society must be

considered. Shensi and Ordos were the areas of the potential outburst of hostilities but were

not the most economically developed regions. In addition, social response toward the

militarization movement varied from Shensi to Southeast China. Since the beginning of the

century. Tenant Archers took the form of the fii-ping militia, an auxiliary force of respected

strength in Shensi. Nevertheless, the economic perfomance of such farming soldiers was

limited and the insecurity of frontier farming diminished its profitability. Shensi Circuit

enjoyed the third higest amoimt in the measure of cultivated land provided by Pi Chung-you

(1047-1121) in 1080 but an effort to improve its poor irrigation and water conservancy

received no impressive results.^^ From 1073 to 1074, North China suffered firom severe

drought and the price of rice in particular areas of Shensi increased finm seventy five wen a

tou in 1071 to four or five hundred wen a tou in 1075.^^ K'aifenc still needed to transport

food to Shensi aimually and innovation in technology and logistics were far from

completely ovecoming natural geographic barriers.

Historians have long considered that there was an ingredient of proto-socialism in the

reforms of Wang An-shih. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1935 compared the Green Sprout Act with

farmer loans of the modem state and the Imperial Trading Post with the modem commercial

bank. Hu Shih, a leading scholar of the Republic of China, considered Wang An-shih as one of the two proto-socialist reformers of premodem China, with the other being Wang Mang, the usurper of the imperial Han. In a popular biography of Su Shih, Lin Yil-t'ang identified

Hang wen-t'i", and "Pei-Sung Jung-ping hsin-shih''. 346

the New Policy as a movement of "national capitalism"/*

Since 1949, mainland historians, led by Teng Kuang-ming, have agreed that the nature

of the New Policy was "refonn within the landlord ruling class of the feudal society" but

still debate its otitcome as either positive, negative, or realistic. Mainland historians denied

that the New Policy movement was a socialist or national capitalist movement and the

argument hinges on the definition of "socialist" and "capitalist". Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Lin

Yu-t'ang introduced a broader meaning of "socialism" and "capitalism", while mainland

historians employed a strict Maxist-Leninist terminology. For Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a policy of

socieil welfare was considered "socalist" policy and for Lin Yu-f ang state enterprise, such as

the monoploy of salt, tea, and ux)n, were indicators of "national capitalist".Recent westem

historians seem to have less interest in debating whether the New Policy was a "socialist" or

"capitalist" reform. Paul Smith in 1991 described the Sung economic policy as "economic

activism" which means "first, the propensity of the state to participate in the commercial

economy both directly, through monopolies and government enterprises, and indirectly

through commercial taxation; and second, a commitment to using state power both to

promote economic activity and to increase the government's share of the economy's total

resources. Many schoars agree that in terms of its theoretical orientation, its dependence on

the extraction of revenues from commerce, and very probably the share of total economic

activity that it commanded, the Sung state-and in particular the statist reforms of the new

WHTK. chQan 4, pp. 59-60. " SS, chQan 321, pp. 10435-36, HCP. chflan 246, p. 5990, chaan 276, p. 6755, and " Refer to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wane Ching-kung (Wang, The Duke of Chtng), in Lin Chih-chOn ed., Yin- ping-shih he-chi. (Shanghai: Chung-hua, first print in 1932, Beijing: Chung-hua, reprint in 1989), v. 7, pp. 347

policy—represents the apex of economic activism in the imperial era."*^ According to

Smith, Wang and Emperor Shen-tsung"embroiled the nation in a reform campaign built on culminative apparatus and techniques of the professional financial service by mobilizing an expanded corps of bureautic technicians to extend state control to new regions and industries and directly challenge private commercial interests for the profits of the policy of territorial expansion and national defense."^®

It would be fair to say that the New Policies committed to enhance economic productivity instead of merely increasing taxes. For example, the Irrigation Act during the

1070s focused on the expansion of arable land. Wang An-shih and his colleagues encouraged a broad investigation of land qiiality and plans for irrigation improvement.

From 1070 to 1076,10793 irrigation programs started and added 36,309,418 mou of arable land.^^ The agricultural improvements in the southwestern region of Honan and the northwest segment of Hupei were significant. During the 1020s, a considerable portion of these areas were degenerating into jimgles and despite the govenmient effort this did not improve until the late 1050s. It was only until the implementation of the New

Policies that a large recovery of arable land availability occured in these areas.

At the beginning, Wang An-shih seemed to have a socialist idea focusing on diminishing the hazard of "engrossers" and the Green Sprout Act, originated by the

74, 78-79. Smith, Paul J., Taxing Heaven's Storehouse: Horses. Bureaucrats, and the Destruction of the Sichuan Yea Industry. 1074-1224. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), p. 6. Smith, p. 9. '•' SHY. v. 121, economy1,4801-02. 348

Transportation Intendant of Shensi Li Ch'an (d. after 1067), was the model. Li made farmers estimate their surplus of grain output and loaned them cash. In autumn these farmers paid their debts with graiiL*^ The Green Sprout Act promulgated by the government later was more or less the same. Nevertheless, Wang An-shih and his colleagues claimed that the new act had social meaning acting against "engrossers."

Before the formulation of the Green Sprout Loan, peasants demanded cash during late spring when their stored grain was depleted. Land owners and local magnates grasped this opportunity providing loan with high interests. Realizing the difficulty to pay back in autumn, farmers sold or mortgaged their land to the rich. As a result, the land in possession of land owners and magnates increased, while fanners lost their land and became tenants and servants. Wang An-shih and his colleagues claimed that the new act would diminish the exploitative profiteering of such "engrossers" and palliate the social dichotomy, offering cash for fanners at only twenty percent interest.^®

The collection of Corvee Exempition Fee was another example and, as a form of tax, had long allowed exemption from military conscription. Since the Palace Army acted as the standing army, people subject to the corvee as rotated laborers, clerks, storage keepers, bridge and ford atrtendants, gate watchers, tax officers, and policemen. Some earned considerable incomes but the majority did not Farmers unfamiliar with management took their own risk in keeping public property and prepayment of tax, reparations, and other reasons caused bankruptcy. During the 1040s, Fan Chung-yen attempted to reduce the

WHTK. chQan 4, p. 59-60 349

number of counties to lessen the fiequency of rotation but the problem was never solved.

New Policy makers proposed the complete exemption of corvee and collected the Corvee

Exemption Fee to hire regularly salaried substitutes instead. Head of urban households, the adolescent, widows, single adults, and the poors, previous immune &om the corvee, were now obliqued to pay a supplementary fee. An extraordinary twenty percent of the Corvee

Exemption Fee was also collected as a reserve for natural disaster.^^

The distribution of the Green Sprout Loan and the collection of the Corvee Exemption

Fee had controversial outcomes. Critics pointed out that twenty percent interest was still high and, in practice, the interest usually reached forty percent. The suffering of the people was even more aggravated with the governmental manipulation of the legal system. Those who failed to pay were now punished according to the law. To avoid such dire consequences, they hurried for another loan from the "engrossers" to cover the debt and, eventually, the government's effort did nothing to diminish engrossing. In addition, the loan exhausted the government reserve for natural calamity and this became a problem when serious drought occured in the late 1070s. Yet, the Corvee Exemption Fee was the most successful program among the New Policies. Some Old Party members such as Su Shih and Su Ch'e agreed that the act released farmers from non-agrarian exertion.

Nevertheless, the financial means in many places diminished its social benevolence.

Previously exempted from the corvee, poor families now had to submit the Supplementary

SS,chQan330,p. 10619. SHY. V. 122, economy 4, p. 4840. " HCP, chQan 227, pp. 5521-24. 350

Fee.^^ The circulation of cash in rural areas was scarce and peasants were compelled to sell agrarian products at a low price.

K'aifeng generated a large sum of cash through the Green Sprout Loan and Corvee

Exemption Fee. The interest on the Green Sprout Loan in 1073 was slighty more than

2,920,000 kuan^ in 1080 was slightly 4,040,000 kuan, and in 1081 reached 8,710,000 kuan.

Despite the purpose of the Corvee Exemption Fee that to have the recruitment of laborers replace conscription, the government still reserved a considerable portion of such a great sum of money. The Corvee Exemption Fee in 1076 totalled 10,414,553 kuan and shih. expended 6,497,688 to hire labors, and created a surplus of3,926,865, twenty eight percent of the total. In 1084, the Sung govermnent collected a Corvee Exemption Fee of 18,729,300 kuan and shih.^^ In 1076, Chang Fang-p'ing reported that in the Southern Capital Ying-t'ien

Fu, officials collected 152,000 sbih of rice and wheat and 40,700 bolts of silk as regular tax,

113,000 kuan as miscellaneous tax paid as other materials in equivalent value, 75,000 kuan as Corvee Exemption Fee and 16,600 laim as interest of Green Sprout Money. In 1084,

K'aifeng received 18,729,300 kuan Corvee Exemptiong Fee.^*

In Ch'iian Han-sheng's description, deflation underlined the monetary policy of Wang

An-shih. By the collection of Green Sprout Money and Corvee Exemption Fee, the

Historians such as YQ Chung-hsien mdicated tbat the collection of Supplementaiy Fee was to prevent the people from dividing &nilies into single individuals. See YQ Chung-hsien, "Lun Wang An-shih mien-yi-&", in Giung-chou shu-hua-se ferf). Sune-shih lun-chi (Coilected Studies of Sung History), (Ho-nan; Chung-chou shu-hua-se, 1983), pp. 107-23. Household as the fundamental unit of trx collection must be preserved and the prevention of family division was necessary in taxation sense. Nevertheless, with this Supplementary Fee, the Corvee Exemption Act could no longer clann as a policy releasing the poor. It was, to a certain extents, beneficial to smaller landlords and farmers having their own land, but definitely to the disadvantage of the poor. refer to CPPM chQan 69, pp. 2228-29, chQan 70,2258. 351

government procmed a considerable amount of cash in^e palliating price inflation. One

thousand cash could buy approximately 10 shih of rice in the 1000s but only 0.7 to 0.9 shih

in lOSOs, and I shih in most of the 1070s. Military spending rose fiom 17 to SO kuan per annum per chin-chOn soldier and, with the inflation fiom 1000 to 1065, seemed to be constrained.^^ The promotion of the Green Sprout Loan and Corvee Exemption Fee even accelerated the role of hard currency. Although the initial plan did not prohibit people fi:om paying in rice or like commodities, on many occasions it was collected in cash and caused a

"shortfall of money" or ch'ien-fane.

The State Trade Act created a state-run merchant guild dimnishing private monopoly and large wholesalers. The treasury Plarming Commission claimed that state intervention into trading would protect smaller merchants fix)m being "engrossed" by wholesalers. The

State Trade Act heralded the establishment of the State Trade Post purchasing merchandise from small suppliers at a reasonable price. Afterward, the State Trading Post distributed the goods to the market at a slightly lower price. State intervention into the market inflation suppressed to a certain extent; however, the government acting as a wholesaler created a conflict of interest From the aspect of state market policy, the government should slightly enhance the purchase price and lower the sale price of mechandise in order to protect the interest of the suppliers and small sellers. From the viewpoint of the wholesaler, the state should lower the purchase price and enhance the sale price in order to gamer some financial

" WHTK. chQan 12, p.l33. LCC, chflan 26, pp. 23a-28b. Also, HCP. chOan 277, p. 6789. Ch'uen Han-sheng, "Pei-Sung wu-chia te pien-tung". On the effect of inflation onto the Sung military spending, refer to Wang YQ-chi, "Kuan-yO Pei-Sung yang-ping chih-fei te su-liang wen-t'i", Shan-tune ta- hsOeh hsOeh-pao. philosophy and social science edition, no. 1(1990), pp. 20-26. 352

profits. The discussions of this conflict turned into vehement debate and the managers of the

State Trading Post accelerated the generation of more surplus in order to hold onto office.

More significantly, the unwillingness of Wang An-shih in looking for "socialist ideas," to tax the daily necessities of the people is revealing. From 1056 to 1063, Wang

An-shih suggested:

"The abolition of the tea monopoly to firee the private business is not only appropriate at the present time but also reflect the ancient wisdom. Criticism of this appropriate policy is derived firom tax agents who intend to extract maximum profits fi'om common commodities...Tea, as well as rice and salt, is indispensable for the daily life of the people....In taking these away these fi'om the people and leaving them nothing to eat, we would have extreme difBculty enforcing the prohibition even though we imposed severe punishment."^®

On another occasion, he composed a poem blaming the state tea monopoly in southeast

China as the greatest evil of the region.^^ However, after Wang An-shih became prime minister, K'aifeng imposed a tea monopoly in Szechwan. In 1074, the sale of state tea created a 400,000 kuan of profit, about the annual tea tax of 1064 to 1067,498,600 loian

After 1074, the profit of the tea enterprise in Szechwan was almost 500,000 kuan a year and, firom the winter of 1077 to the autumn of 1078,the annual surplus of the tea monopoly reached 777,060 kuan. From 1078 to 1082, the state profited a total of

4,280,000 kuan. and an annual average of about 850,000 kuan. firom the tea trade in

Lin-ch'uan-chi. chaan 70, p. 743. 353

Szechwan. After 1082, this annual surplus increased to one million lcuan.^°

It was also worth to note that after 1067, the state monopoly generated tremendous income. Salt production accelerated. Output fix)m the two major salt lakes in An-i and

Chieh Couty from 373,545 shih in 996 to 1,525,429 shih in mid-eeventh century. After

1074, the output of salt in the two lakes were reserved for a paper credit, ven-ch'ao. which was to pay for the annual ration of the Shensi garrisons. Chang Fang-p'ing in 1076 indicated that monopoly income of tea, salt, and alcohol from the late tenth century tripled from approximately 15,000,000 to 5,000,000 kuan.^° In 1074, Emperor Shen-tsung imposed a state monopoly of tea in Szechwan to faciliate horse trading with the Tibetan.

The Tea House in Hsi-Ho Circuit enjoyed a surplus of767,066 kuan in 1077 to 1078 and continued at the same figure to 1082, showing a total income of4,280,000 kuan.^^ One direct contribution of the Tea House to the Shensi defense was that it generated about

400,000 kuan a year to support the Hsi-Ho Campaign and could purchase food in local markets when logistics problems occurred.®^ One controversial policy was the abolition of the dynastic monopoly of copper, which expended inestimatable amoimts of copper molded

Lin-ch'uan-chi. chQan 5, pp. 115-16. " SS, ChQan 184, pp. 4489-4503. "SS. chOan 181, pp. 4415-22. LCC. chOan 26, pp. 24b-25a. HCP. chflan 297, pp. 7234-37, chQan 334, pp. 8044-45. " HCP. chQan 254, p. 6209, chOan 259, p. 6318, LQ Tao (1029-1102), Ching-te Chi fCollected Worics of LQ Tao), SKCSCP. special series, (Taipei: Taiwan Conunerial, 1975), v. 274-77, chQan 1, 10a, chQan 3, p. 7a-b. Historians who focused on the function of Tea House in horse tradhig such as Chiang Tien-chien criticized this policy. See Chiang Tien-chien, Tei-Sung Shu-ch'a-po-ma chih yen-chiu". Indeed, the budget for horses purchase was a long-term strategic establishment and should not be affected by the fluctuating food market in Shensi. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note food supply did not seem to have lower priority than the purchase of horses. 354

as vessels.®^

The above observation of the Sung taxation, monetary policy, and state monopoly

suggested that after 1067 K'aifeng had a larger economic capaci^ to deal with a potential

war against Hsi Hsia. Certainly, the financial policies after 1067 did not necessarily avail

the Sung social stability and betterment of poor peasants as Wang An-shih claimed.

Whether or not the enlarged purse of K'aifeng became more able to support its military

power demands an investigation of the Sung military budget and preliminary studies by

historians have not yet enabled any conclusion. Nevertheless, economic deflation enabled

K'aifeng to hold a huge simi of cash as reserve for national defense and maintain standing

army of 600,000 men despite tripled inflation!

Military Development

Mainland historians, such as Wang Tseng-3^ have evaluated the military success of

the New Policy as limited. The Mutual Security Act and the Public Horse Breeding

Program did not seem any significant improvement in the military. The Arsenal Board

became involved a dispute with the Imperial Smithy and nearly ruined its reputation.

Wang An-shih did not become personally evolved in the reorganization of field armies and the Hsi-Ho campaign of Wang Shao seemed to be the only achievement of the military reform. Considering the four military-oriented acts as limited in success may

WHTK. chOan 9, pp. 95-96. 355

serve to evaluate the personal achievement of Wang An-shih. Nevertheless, to examine the New Policy as an ingredient of the Sung grand strategy after 1067, it is necessary to explore long term development starting in the 1040s and judge with the success or &ilure of particular reform acts.

The military reforms of the New Policies were difiScult to evaluate due to the following reasons. First, they were not the center of the reform. Wang An-shih was not a military specialty and some military experts contributing to the New Policies, such as

Ts'ai Ping, Wang Shao, and Shen K'uo, did not serve long in making central decisions.

Second, the tentative nature of the military reform programs prevented their being studied as a regular institution. Unlike economic reform that significantly represented the growth of state entrepreneurship, an integral approach was absent among military reform programs. Some of these programs such as the Mutual Security Act and the Public Horse

Breeding Program inspired nostalgia for a harmonious society in which families were the fundamental economic and military units. The establishment of Legions and Arsenal

Board did not exhibit such social idealism. A more stratified and functionalized society was not necessarily compatible with the family-based society of Social Security Act and

Public Horse Breeding Program. Third, unlike economic growth, military development in the premodem period was not always quantifiable. The invention of weapons, innovation in tactics, and improvement in training were seldom measurable and victory on the battlefield was the only successful measure of military reform. In this sense, the Hsi-Ho

Campaign ought not to be treated as "policy" in the same categoty with the Mutual 356

Securitjr Act and the Public Horse Breeding Program. Instead, the Hsi-Ho Campaign was a commitment from which the success or failure of a series of interrelated New Policies such as State Trade Act, Horse-Tea Trading, and Legionary Reform can be evaluated.

In military technology, horse supply, and army reorganization, the New Policies did not seem to reach impressive success. However, achievements in these three aspects were inseparable parts of long term development since the 1040s. Mid-eleventh century laid a benchmark of military technology development in China. Traditional metal arms, long- range weapons, firearms, and fortifications exhibited impressive progress. Arms manufacture received far more attention after 1045. As a consequence, the Sung became more confident to deal with attack from Hsi Hsia and even Khitan. The increase of heavy infantry equipment indicated a dramatic development in traditional arms. The innovations of Yang Chih and Kuo Chih were remarkable. Yang Chieh invented a new weapon combining shield and blade to be used by heavy infantry to defeat nomad cavalry.

Civilian critics pointed to the over-weight of this shield-blade but professionals such as

Wang Chi (d. after 1042) applauded its outstanding design after defeating Wei-ming

Ytian-hao with this weapon in Rabit Hair Valley (1041).®^ Also, the battle axe and long blade received increasing attention although spears were the standard equipment for the armed force in South China. Advocates of axe and long blade won the debate following

Ti Ch'ing's brilliant victory at Kuei-jen-p'u, despite a majority of the Sung advisors suggesting the employ of more spears. Sun Mien, a civilian commander, ordered a

Ou-yang Hsiu, chQan 4, p.32. 357

massive production of heavy axes and long blades before battling Nung Cliih-kao.

Combined with the tribal horsemen under Ti Ch'ing, the Sung army decisively crushed

the rebels who were mostly armed with spears.®* During the Sino-Vietnam War from

1076 to 1077, Sung Supreme Commander Kuo K'uei destroyed the Vietnamese formation

of elephants and infantry, by having his men slice the elephant's trunks with long

blades/^ Yang Chieh also invented some other heavy weapons and a new type of battle

wagon. With these new arms, he formulated a battle formation, called Eight Ranks

Formation of Dragon and Tiger or lune-hu pa-chen-t'u and demonstrated its drill before

the emperor.®® Kuo Chih (circa mid 11th century), once a subordinate of Yang Chieh,

also evolved new tactics with the large>scalevast employment of Speared Abattis or chu-

ma ch'iang to the approval of the Emperor Jen-tsimg. Some Hsi Hsia arms were adopted

by the Sung army such as the Double-sectioned Chain-staff or t'ieh-lian-chia-p'ene. In

addition, the Iron Whip became a powerful weapon in hand-to-hand combat. In 1041

Sung Captain Wang Kuei challenged two Hsi Hsia generals and killed them with this

weapon in a few bouts.®® The Yflan dynasty novel Water Margin reinforced the horrific

image of the Iron Whip narrating the story of Hu-yen Ch'iieh, an expert in its use.

Among long-range weapons in technological advances, the development of the

crossbow was the most remarkable. Acording to Wang Yao-ch'en in 1041, a Tangut

fusillade following a heavy cavahy charge could not be resisted by the Sung infantry.

HCP. choan 174, p. 4199. Chene-nan-lu. pp. 4b, 5b-6a. HCP, chQan 279, p. 6832. "Kuo K'uei mu-chfli", 15b. " HCP. choan 132, p.3145-46. QYHCC. chu-shih-chi. chOan 29, p. 204. Also, HCP. chOan 128, pJ027. " WCCY. choan 13, pp. 683-84 358

Tseng Kung-liang, the author of the Sung military encyclopedia Wu-ching chung-vao.

concluded that the development of the Sung crossbow was to diminish the effectiveness of barbarian superiority in archery/^ In the lOSOs, Kuo Chih combined heavy crossbow and battle-wagon into the Single Shafted Crossbow or tu-yfian^u, a crossbow wagon highly mobile in the mountainous terrain of Shensi and Ho-tung. Mass production started in 1060 when Sung Jen-tsung ordered one thousand Single Shafted Crossbow for the defense of Ho-tung.

Foreseeing that amred conflict between the Sung and Liao would eventually be renewed, Kuo Chih evolved a blueprint for an offensive operation to retake Yu-chou with his newly developed weapons and tactics An important invention was the Mighty Ann

Crossbow or shen-pi kune^^ with which fire superiority turned in favor of the Sung. Even

Hsi Hsia general Ts'a-ko (circa, late 11th century to early twelfth century), conceded that his foot archers were constantly defeated by the Simg Mighty Arm Crossbowmen.^^

During the Sino-Vietnam War fi-om 1076 to 1077, Sung Mighty Arm Crossbowmen shot down numerous Vietnamese elephants.^^ The invention of the Three-Bow and Eight-Cow

Crossbow or san-kung pa-niu lu and Three-Bow and Paired-Scroll Crossbow or san-kung he-ch'an lu marked the development of the heavy crosbow. The former reqmred 100

" HCP. chQan 128, p. 3042. " HCP. ChQan 132, ppJ137,3149. Chi-le pien. chOan 1, p. 33. WCCY. chQan 2, p. 265. SS, chQan 326, p.10530-32. HCP, chOan 191, p. 4623-24. SHY. chQan 185, mlitary 26, p. 7726, also, Ch'en Chih-ch'ao (ed.). Sung Hui-vao pu-i. (Supplimentaiy of Documents Pertaining to Matters of State in the Sung Dynasty), (Beijing: Ch'Qan-kuo fu-shu-kuan wen- hsien shua-wei fu-chih chung-hsin,1988), p. 352. WHTK. chQan 161, mlitary 13, p.l403. SS, chQan 197, p. 4913. Hsi Hsia shu-shih. chOan 31. p. 361, SS, chQan 190, p. 4720-21. HCP. ChQan 271, p. 6640. 359

crossbowmen to operate and the latter was a modified type in the early twelfth century,

having an effective range of two li.^* In 1081, Wei-chou rebuilt its defense towers and

equipped them with Three Bows and Eight Cow Crossbows. The Arsenal Board authorized the prefecture to produce it locally because of its extraordinary weight and the ensuing transportation cost7®

Catapult was produced in a broad variety of sizes, range, and capacity. Single Lever

Catapults, requiring 40 men to operate, could send a stone of two chin out at a range of 50 pu. The Double Lever Catapult demanded manning by one hundred men and was able to attack a target at sixty gu with a twenty-five chin stone. A Five Lever Catapult allowed the projection of a stone of seventy to eighty chin to a range of fifty pu. Stones of ninety to one hundred chin were used in a Seven Lever Catapult manned by two hundred and fifty soldiers.^®

The emplojTnent of gunpowder enhanced the effectiveness of long-range weapons.^^

In the early Sung there was the innovation of the combination of the Whip-Arrow with

Gunpowder or huo-vao oien-chien.^^ During the time the use of gunpowder remained in its rudimentary stage as an incendiary. However, in the mid-Northern Sung, the use of the

WCCY. chaan 13, p. 688, also. Hsi-ch'i tsune-vO. appendix I, p. 146. HCP. chOan 314. p. 7608. WCCY. chQan 12, pp. 593-606. About fireaims during the Northern Sung, refer to Feng Chia-sheng, Huo-yao te fa-ming chi-ch'i ch'uan- pu, Shih-hsOeh chi-k'an. no. 5, (1947), pp. 29-84. Chao Tieh-han, Huo-vao te fa-ming (The Invention of Gunpowder), (Taipei: National Histori^ Museum, I960). Jung Tung-wen, "Chen-yOan miao-tao yao-leuh te ch'eng-shu nien-tai chi hsiang-kuan te huo-)^-shih wen-t'i", SSYCC. chOan 7, (1974), pp. 271-90. Needam, Joseph, Science and Civilization in China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), v. S, part 7, pp. 1-117. Yeh Hung-sa, "Shih-fan Pei-Sung huo-yao wu-ch'i te yen-chih ytl ying-yung", Tan- chiane shih-hsOeh. noJ, (1991) 6, pp. 35-48. WCCY. chQan 12, pp. 626-27. Needham, 147-50. 360

Fire Ball or huo-ch'iu and Fire Catapults or huo-p'ao. two explosive weapons, provided far more powerful long-range weapons in siege warfaie.^^ The massive employment of gunpowder also contributed to the defense of towns in which burning oil was crucial. In

1084, K'aifeng transported 100,000 Arrows with Gunpowder for the Mighty Armed

Crossbow or shen-oi-kung huo-vao huo-chien. 20,000 Arrows with Gunpowder or huo- vao-lamg-chien. 2,000 Balls with Gunpowder for the Catapult or huo-vao huo-p'ao. and two thousand Ball with Gunpowder or huo-tan.^°

Advances in science and technology also affected town fortification and Shen K'uo was one of the first to acknowledge the importance of crossfire. He studied the design of walled towns and indicated that a rectangular-shaped walled town was not favorable for defense even though it was solid and thickly walled. Although it was impossible that

Sung China could rebuilt all cities in the star shape of European fortresses in the seventeen and eighteen century, nevertheless, Shen K'uo reintroduced a fifth century design of a walled city having many trapezium, which he called the Horse Face or ma- mien, outer in the wall providing cross-fire. The most effective defense, the scientist indicated, was not to allow a large number of the enemy coming close to the wall.

Therefore, it was extremely difScult for a force to assault a walled town with a high density of Horse Face.^^ Defense towers was expanded with double floors, each

"^WCCY. chQan 12, pp. 635,642-44,650-52. Needham, 147-190. " HCP. chOan 343, pp. 8248-49. " MCPT. chOan 11, p.l21. The scientist also regulated the proper design of a waled town with Horse Face in a menu Hsiu-ch'eng fa-shih t'iao-vOeh (Design and Regulation for Walled Town Construction), see Wen- hsien t'ung-k'ao ching-chi-k'ao. chQan 48, p.l 120. 361

providing space for twelve crossbowmen.®^ In addition, there were numerous other newly

invented weapons for walled town defense, e.g. the Bladed Wagon for Gate-blokade or sai-men-tao-ch'e and the Hand-cutting Axe or ch'uo-shou-fii. Hand-cutting Axe had an especial blade angle facilitating the cutting off of enemies' hands climbing onto the wall.®^

After 1067, arms manufacture received far more attention. In 1070, Emperor Shen- tsung offered new annexes for the South and North Arsenals and renamed them East and

West Arseneils. The size of the working teams in the two arsenals reduced sightly, only numbering five thousand. However, the court established other specialized armories. In the 1080s, a newly established Wan-ch'uan Armory or wan-ch'uan chuo-fane consisted of

3,700 smiths.®^ Remarkably, the fact that the Wan-ch'uan Armory was a battalion-level military unit suggested the arms manufacture had come directly imder the military. Also, there were some independant armories such as the Saddle Works or An-tzu-suo. Horse- saber Blade Works or chan-ma-tao-suo. and the Imperial Smithy or vfl-ch'ien-shene-huo- suo.®^ The administration of arms manufacture improved remarkably. At the early Svmg all these arsenals were under the Armor Sub-division or chou-an. a subdivision of the

Three Treasures. Emperor Shen-tsung later enhanced their status by establishing an

Arsenal Board or chOn-ch'i-chien.®^

WCCY. chOan 12, pp. 523-33. " WCCY. chflan 12. pp. 557,561, 586-87,652. Li Hsin-ch'uan (116^1243), Chien-ven i-lai ch'ao-veh tsa-chi. (Note-book on the Palace and the Provinces from the Chien-yen Period, 1127-1130), (Taipei, Wen-hai, 1967), book one, chOan 18, p. 610. " HCP. chQan 233, p. 5645, chQan 262, p. 6411, and chOan 264, p. 6474. Also, SS, chQan 197, p. 4913. HCP. ChQan 262, p. 6373, chflan 264, pp. 6471-74, SS, chflan 165, pp. 3920-21, chflan 189, p. 4666, 362

From 1067 on, two nascent trends in the organization of the armed forces could be observed, namely, the separation of field armies from garrisons and the localization of the central army. The separation of field army fixim local garrisons became common and necessary not only in China but in the Roman and Byzantine empires as well. The Roman

Empire in the fourth century divided its army into Commitates and Limitates. The former was comprised of legions and cavahry squadrons, while the latter was formed by a number of second class units and militia. A further separation of the tagmatic army from the thematic army of the Byzantine Empire during the eighth century represented the same trend. The situation in the mid-Northem Simg was comparable.

That field armies ought to be separated from ordinary garrisons was not a new idea after 1067 and all the Sung palace army units were presumably field armies except the

Solar Supporter and Celestial Military. Nevertheless, during the war against Hsi Hsia in the 1040s, theater commanders and civilian strategists vehemently criticized the implement of rotational service, a system deploying the palace army as a field army.

SHY. v. 187 geography 3, pp. 7354-55. Evolution of military institution from the fourth to the eleventh century illustrated a consistence tendency of diversification and localization. The Limitates became inactive after the fifth century and Justinian I stopped to pay them. As a result, the field armies completely took over regional defense. The prodigious growth of the Arabic power necessitated a further diversification of the Roman force. The three remaining Held armies in Asia Minor, Armenia, and Thrace were re-organized into Anatolic, Armaniac, and Thracian themes. Each theme was administrated by a military governor called strategi with combined administrative, financial, and military leadenhip in one. Decentralization of military leadership fostered political intricacy and military coup continued through the seventh and eighth centuries. In the 740s, Emperor Constantine V rebuilt the central army by establishing several palace corps called the tagmata. With such powerful strategic reserve, the eastern emperors during the tenth and eleventh centuries re­ conquered Balkan, Armenia, Crete, Cyprus, and Antiorch, knocking the gate of Damascus. The vicissitude of the Roman and Byzantine army suggested division of elite force from ordinary troops an important policy to retain the capability of the armed force. Localization of incompetent units became a consequential result. Refer to Treagold, Warren, BvTantium and Its Armv. 284-1081. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 8-42. 363

Soldiers unfamiliar with the Shensi highland and Ordos Desert were constantly defeated

by the Tanguts, while those who became experienced after three years service were

redeployed. Commanders had few opportunities to assess the strength of the newly joined units. The situation deteriorated r^idly dealing with the continual offense of Wei-ming

Yuan-hao. Lack of training caused defeat and it became necessary to select those still capable soldiers from their original units and assigned them imder particular commanders responsible for their entire training and active service. By 1041 or 1042, Fan Chimg-yen made an ammendment of the system, reorganizing his troops in Fu-Yen Circuit into six units each consisting of three thousand soldiers imder an speicially assigned ofiicer.

During the Sung offensive in 1069, Supreme Theater Commander Han Chiang reorganized the garrisons in Ching-YCian Circuit into seven units. Such a temporary mutation was abolished shortly due to the revolt of the Ch'ing-chou garrisons and the

Sung failure in the Lo-wu Campaign. In 1070, Ts'ai Ting (1014-1079), theater commader of Ching-Yuan Circuit, promoted the universalization of Fan Chxmg-yen's precedent. He reorganized the troops in Ching-YOan Circuit into seven units, each comprising 2,500 soldiers.^^ According to his suggestion, the Sung Shensi command reorganized the Fu-

Yen garrisons into nine imits, Ching-YOan garrisons into eleven units, Huan-Ching garrisons into eight units, Chin-Feng garrison into five units, and the garrisons of the newly foimded Hsi-Ho Circuit into nine units, totally forty-two units. The number of

For the contribution of Ts'ai Ting, refer to Tung-tu shih-lOeh. chflan 82, p.I2S3, SS, chQan 328, p. 10576. For Han Chiang re-organization of the Ch'ing-YQan army, see SS, chQan 315, p. 10303. 364

these units gradually increased after 1080.°^ Such newly established units were the

various Legions or chiang because they were supposely under specially assigned commanders. Remarkably, the size of a legion after 1075 doubled the original establishment of Ts'ai Ting, which usually numbered 4,000 soldiers in each. In exceptional cases, a chiane could reach a strength of ten thousand soldiers.^°

The founding of chiane represented the Sung intention to separate field armies from ordinary garrison. At the beginning, all central army units were combat units. Organizing into chiane effected the concentration of capable forces and created a new and indispensable administrative and command hierarchy. The emerging of squards or ^ and regiments or pu as fundamental units of a legion were part of this reorganization.

Emperor Shen-tsung, who engaged in strenuous study of battle formations, claimed that the establishment of tui was in emulation of Li Ching (571-649), a great captain of the early Pang. The system of organizationwas to group three soldiers into a smaller tui, three smaller tui into a medium tui, and five medium tui plus five ofBcers into a tui, totalling fifty men.®^ The organization of gu seemed irregular but according to the precedent of Ching-Yuan Circuit in 1079, twenty five tm formed a gu and four pu constructed a chiane.®^ From this time on, a unit constructed with tui-pu-chiang was catagorized as Legionary Palace Army or hsi-chianc chin-ping, differentiating it from the

Palace Army in the Capital or teai-chinp chin-pine and Non-Legionary Palace Army or

" HCP. chOan 258, chOan 288, p. 7046, chflan 289, p. 7077, chOan 297, pp. 7220-22, chQan 299, pp. 7278- 79, chOan 315, p. 7618. Wang Tseng-yfl, Sune-chao ping-chfli ch'u-t'an. p.99. HCP, ChQan 257, pp. 628-84. 365

pu-hsi-chiang chin-ning. Among the three categories only the Palace Anny in the Capital retained its nature as imperial guard, >^e the other two became field army and prefectural garrison. While the Legionary Palace Army was a field army under theater or regional commands, the Non-Legionary Palace Army degenerated into local garrisons.^^

In 1079, Emperor Shen-tsung acknowledged the reality that training had largely been abolished in Non-Legionary Palace Annies.®^

The emergence of chiane provided a higher level unit for strategic deployment.

Previously, the battalion or chih-hui. approximately five hundred soldiers, was the largest unit in strategic deplojroent. To deal with emergencies, K'aifeng needed to dispatch hundreds of battalions from different armies to a theater.®^ However, the founding of chiane provided sufficiently large units that improved efficiency in deployment.

Officially, K'aifeng did not mobilized any larger military unit other than the legion.

Nevertheless, the army corps or chun occasionally emerged as the organizations constituting an expeditionary force. Despite not being regularly constituted, army corps exhibited an active role as described in rare battle reference. This newly emerging army corps would be easily confused with the long prevailing army corps in the Sung Palace

Army. In miltary nomenclature both were called chfln without translatable distinction.

" HCP. chQan 297, pp. 7220-21. Wang Tseng-yti, Sune-chao pine-chih chWan. p.l 10. " For general survey of these three kinds of Palace Army, refer to Wang Tseng-yO, Sung-chao pine-chih ch'u-t'an. pp. 95-106. HCP. chaan 288, p. 7042. In the Northern Sung, Army was an administrative units seldomly deployed on battlefield as a whole. In actual practice, battalions of an army were to be individually deployed to various front or stationed in the capital. A ruler and his assistants must be familiar with how many battalions under what army were placed in what theater. Prime Minister Li Ti was well-known in such knowledge, see HCP. chQan 88, pp. 2012-13. Pao Ch'eng in 1049 undertook a research on the battalions encamped in Ho-pei, see Pao Ch'ene chi pien- 366

The former were formed of a number of legions, while the latter was an administrative unit consisting of battalions which, in practice, were the units for strategic deplo3anent.

The standard practice was that K'aifeng would assigne a la^e number of battalions from different armies to a theater rather than dispatch an entire army and this followed principle of compartmentation for coup prevention. In sharp constrast, corps composed of legions were task forces with code names not of splendid allusion but their positions in deployment such as front, rear, left, right, and central. During the Vietnam campaign in

1076, a number of legions were grouped under nine army corps.^^ In the campaign against Hsi Hsia in 1081, commander of Fu-Yen Circuit regrouped the forces of sixteen legions into seven army corps.®^ The ranks of t'ung-chih and tu-t'une-chih. commander of one and more than one army corps, consistently appeared in the late Northern Sung records.^^ This suggested the existence of a high strategic command conducting a large- scale campaign.

The reorganization of the Sung army created a new structure within the original military hierarchy and molbilized the war machine for active service. Certainly, the establishment of legions was not the only factor with an overall enhancement of military capability. Nevertheless, it accelerated the degeneration of the Non-Legionary Palace

Army. Such efforts clarified different roles of the armed forces and enabled the various

nien chiao-Du. chQan 2, pp. 116-20. HCP. ChQan 272, pp. 6659,6661-62, chQan 282, p. 6904, chQan 297, pp. 7220-21. Also, see Wang Tseng-yQ, Sune-chao Ding-chfli ch'u-fan. pp.110-111. " HCP.. chQan 316, p. 7651. HCP. chQan 458, p. 10960, chQan 498, p. 11858, chQan 504, p. 12000, and 12014, chQan 514, pp. 12218-19. Also, Refer to Wang Tseng-yQ, Sung-chao Dine-chfli ch'u-fan. p.l 11-13. 367

classes of anned force units to acomplish their missions in more effective fashion.

Horses were indispensable to medieval warfare but interior China was not a base of

Horse Breeding. At the early Sung, the government designated a number of grazing areas, especially in Hopei and Ho-tung, for tending horses. During the reign of Emperor Chen- tsung, ofScial horse tending reached its peak with a total of200,000 horses and an annual production of8,000 goals as mounts for the imperial cavalry.®® However, after maladministration for several decades, the Imperial Stable or mu-chian degenerated into an unneeded appendage. The inauguration of the Public Horses Breeding Program marked the end of bureaucratic directed horse tending. In 1072 K'aifeng dismissed the mu-chian and distributed the horses to volunteer households in Shensi, Ho-tung, and the

Metropolis. A family enrolled in the horse breeding program tended a government horse with an exemption of annual miscellaneous tax of approximately fourteen kuan. Ususally, this horse served the household in ordinary domestic tasks but remaining as official property ready for military mobilization. OfScials supervised and conducted standard year checks. Reportedly, the horses were cared by the households much better than by bureaucrats.

In 1080, however, K'aifeng revised the Horse Breeding Program making it a compulsory obligation for "rich households" possessing 3,000 kuan. In 1084, the Horse

Breeding Program became a part of the Mutual Security System, in which a tu-oao of 250 households was responsible for fifty horses. The both later version of the Horse Breeding

chQan 198, pp. 4929. For the development of the eaby Sung Imperial Stable, see Sung Ch'ang-Iian, 368

Program were coercive and the government no longer provided horses. Families complying to the program had to both buy and tend horses for the government

Eventually, the increase in official horses resulted in increasing the financial burden on the people. Further, horses raised in a domestic environment might not necessarily be as cavalry mounts. In spite of this, K'aifeng managed to mobilize 6,000 Mutual Security

Horses in 1084 against Hsi Hsia in Hotung Theater.^°°

A more effective way to procure horses was the tea horse trading in Shensi.^°^ The exchange of tea for horses was devised at the beginning of the Sung when the predominant trading partners were the Uighurs in Kanchou. However, as an aftermath of the fail of Ling-chou, Sung horse trading suffered from the loss of such a gateway. Ch'in- chou became the only access through which the Sung could purchased a great number of horses from the Kokonor Tibetans. Bilateral trading was initiated as a form of tribute and reciprocal exchange. After Tibetan leaders had submited a certain nimiber of horses, the

Sung emperor rewarded them commensurated with the price of the horses. In1067, Lu

Hsi-tao (1025-1091), a Sung official, promoted the massive purchase of tea in Szechwan as local tax revenue and then sold the tea to Tibetans in exchange for horses. In 1074,

Wang Shao also pointed out the desperate need for tea by the Tibetans. As a result.

Emperor Shen-tsung delegated P'u Chung-wen (circa later 11th century) and Li Chi (d.

"Pei-Sung te ma-cheng, Ta-Iu tsa-chfli", v. 25, no. 10 (1962), pp. 19-22, no. 11(1962), pp. 19-22, and no. 12(1962), pp. 24-30. Ch'en Chen, "Lun Pao-ma fa", in Teng Kuang-ming and Ch'eng Ytng-Hu ed. Sune-shih ven-chiu lun- wen-chi. (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, 1982), pp. 321-334. Chiang Tien-chien, "Pei-Sung Shu-ch'a-po-ma chih yen-chiu", in SSYCC. chQan 23, (1995), pp.439- 78. 369

1082) to establish the Tea House and the Horse House in Ch'eng-tu and Ch'in-chou and promulgated the ofBcial monopoly of tea commerce in Szechwan. For such business,

K'aifeng invested 100,000 taels of silver, 25,000 bolts of silk, and 500 licenses for monks. All producers of tea were allowed to trade their products to the Tea House only, which then sold in bulk to transport merchants immediately after raising the price for thirty percent. As merchants conveyed tea to Ch'in-chou and the various ofBcial tea trading posts in Shensi, the ofBcials collected the tea and conducted broke-sale with the

Tibetans. To meet their daily need of tea, the Tibetans sold horses to the Horse House for cash and bought tea from the Tea House. In 1075, K'aifeng directed the Horse House to buy 15,000 horses a year and from 1081. As Sung-Hsia conflict escalated, K'aifeng increased the demand for horses to 20,000 annually but the quota was not always filled.

For example, in 1075, the actual purchase of horses reached 14,600 but from 1081 to

1082 the Horse House did not fulfilled the increasing demand. It could only purchased

14,700 horses.^°2

The tea monopoly of Szechwan assured the Sung invesment in horse trading and the establishment of Horse House provided a stable import source. To the Sung, a country lacking in cavalry, this was an indispensable access to maintain military might.

The Sung effort to provide a social foundation for the increasing military strength was centered in the Mutual Security System or oao-chia-fa. According to Wang An-shih, the establishment of the Mutual Security System had three meanings: the apprehenion of

SHY. v. 84, institution 43, pp. 3283-91. 370

crimes, the partial reintroduction of military conscription, and the reduction of budget for the upkeep of the standing army. In 1070, K'aifeng regulated its population grouping: five households into a pao. five pao into a larger pao. and ten larger ^ag to a supreme pao.

Each household having two male adults provided one militia soldier, who was to practice archery but not allowed to own weapons such as a blade or spear. Chiefs of each Larger

Pao and Supreme Pao were selected from rich and well-to-do hoiiseholds of the

Iocality.^°^

Mutual Security System was a police-militia program. In 1072, K'aifeng regulated the rotation of the Mutual Security force to local Patrol Offices or hsQn-chien-shih and later to County Sheriffs or hsien-wei also. As a result, a large portion of soldiers and bowmen originally under Patrolling Inspectors and Sheriffs were disbanded. From

1071, the Court formulated the rule for military training in winter of the Mutual Security force in K'aifeng, Hopei, Ho-tung, and Shensi. After 1078, the Sung combined The

Righteous and Brave Militia with the Mutual Security force and carried out Intensive

Training or chi-chiao and Regimental Training or t'uan-chiao. Intensive Training was a martial arts training regiment for chiefs of Larger Pao. After completion those chiefs were to conduct Regimental Training in nearby areas of their home village. According to the official account of 1081, there were 690,000 personnel participating in such atmtial training. For the increasing need for efficient administration, K'aifeng established the

HCP. chQan 221, pp. 5375,5380, SS, chQan 192, pp. 4767-72.. Wang Tseng-yQ, Sung-chao pine-chih ch'u-t'an. pp.l22-l26. HCP. ChQan 235, pp. 5697-99,5701, 5710-11,5715-17, chOan 237, pp. 5759,5769-70. SS, chQan 192, pp. 4773-78. 371

office of Mutual Security Intendant or t'i-chu pao-chia in various circuits.^®^

Militaiy training for the Mutual Securi^ force resulted in only limited success.

Regimental Training was an additional burden unwelcomed by the farmers, who already

paid a regular tax for defense. A few militia soldiers fit)m local elite families developed exemplary skills in martial arts but the majori^ suffered from the disrupted training due to the demand of farming. Landlords abuse of those disaffected was another common problem. A number of Mutual Security militia used their authority illegally and even engaged in organized crimes.^"® Despite its intention to replace the standing army, the

Mutual Security force never reached the required strength. In the campaign against Hsi

Hsia in 1081, Emperor Shen-tsimg, who initially intended to mobilize ten thousand

Mutual Security soldiers to assist the standing army, abolished the idea after advice by theater commanders. The Mutual Security force as a relic of the Confucian ideal of the farmer-soldier did not gain as much credit as hoped. It merely signified the ambition of

Emperor Shen-tsung to found a militarized society.

Uncertainty in Foreign Relations

Despite the significance of the growth of the military, ambitious efforts in social militarization, improvements in finance and the domestic reform, it was the altering systemic international environment that was the main reason for the radical change in Sung grand strategy. The general atmosphere among Sung, Liao, and Hsi Hsia was intense and

ss, chflan 192, pp. 4770-71, SHY, v.172 military 2, p. 6767, HCP. chQan 337, pp. 8121-24. For its limited success, see SS, chilan 192, pp. 4771-72 For opposit point of view, refer to the memorial of Ssu-ma Kuang, in Wen-kuo wen-chene Ss-ma kune chL chQan 46, pp JS8'S9, chQan 48, pp J67-68. 372

paradoxical.

After the peace of 1045 Sung foreign relations ostensibly stablized. The resolution

of the Kuan-nan Crisis provedthe Khitan preference for profit fit)m peace rather than risk

the uncertainty of war. Hsi Hsia had become an axis of the strategic triangle though still

the weakest. Intermittent conflicts could have been deescalated through economic sanction

and the suspension of aimual reward if K'aifeng desired peace. But the reali^ was that the

military might of Khitan and Tangut soldiers had atrophied in sedentary living for decades

and Liao and Hsi Hsia no longer posed a threat to Simg China. The movement of Khitan

forces in the mid-eleventh century were bound as much by logistics as was the Sung. In

1054, Sung emissary Wang Kung-ch'en recorded his private dialogue vvith Liao Hsing- tsung, who revealed that the Khitan defeat in the River Bank Campaign in 1049 by Hsi Hsia

was due to the loss of food supply.In 1062, Hsi Hsia mobilized more than 10,000 troops to attack Tung-chan (1032-1083), son of Chueh-ssu-lo, and suffered an unexpected defeat.^In the defeat by the Sung at Fort Great Obedience, Liang-tsuo suffered a mortal wound and died in 1067, leaving the throne to his infant son Ping-ch'ang (1060-1086). The transition fi'om Liang-tsuo to Ping-ch'ang mariced the absence of a dominant Tangut leadership and the persistence of court intrique. In the view of K'aifeng, the infancy of Ping- ch'ang and the regency of his mother Liang signified the decline of the Tangut kingdom.^^°

HCP. ChQan 313, p. 7594, chOan 314, p. 7611. Wang Kung-ch'en, Wane Kung-ch'en oieh-lu. quoted from Li Tao's commentary in HCP. chQan 177, p. 4282. HCP. chQan 197, p. 4774 HCP, chQan 229, p. 5574, chQan 231, pp. 5613-14, chQan 232, p. 5632, chQan 236, p. 5752, chQan 244, p. 5943. 373

Wang An-shih pointed out that during the conflict at Ch'ing-chou in 1070, the Hsi Hsia army was undisciplined and comprised of numerous aged and weak soldiers.^^^ From these facts, Wang An-shih concluded that the "four barbarians" all had become "weak".^^^

To the Sung, security and survival no longer seemed urgent problems; the meaning of the the peace of 1045 depended,on the fiiture, however. In the sense of stability, it enacted long-term economic interests with a foundation of peace and suggested that a diplomatic resolution was reliable.^^^ Nevertheless, concerning its ultimate value, the peace of 1042 and 1045 provided no betterment for Sung China and doubled the annual payments of K'aifeng to its two neighbors. The creditability of Hsi Hsia was veiy questionable in K'aifeng and Hsi Hsia extortion became discernible in the Kuan-nan negotiation. This pathetic reality underlined the Sung-Liao relations with a "negative peace" that only meant the absence of war from 1045 to 1067. Distrust and wariness occasionally surfaces in Sung behavior. In 1054 the Liao proposed an exchange of emperor's portraits. But, in carefully chosen diction, the Sung rejected to prevent the execise of black magic upon the emperor's likeness.^^^ If the Sung only sought survival, there was no question that the peace of 1042 with Khitan and 1045 with Tangut served the goal. However, even armual payments did not guarentee any tranquil order.

HCP. chOan 241, 5883-84. HCP. chOan 232, p. 5628, chOan 235,5700-03. For explanation from this point of view, see Liao Lung-shen, Ts'ung Shan-yQan chih-meng tui Pei- Sung hou-ch'i chQn-cheng te ying-hsiang k'an Ching-k'ang chih-nan &-sheng te yQan-yin", in Shih-huo v. IS, 1-2 (198S) 6, pp. 15-31. Hatachi Masanori, "Pei-Sung yU Liao te mou-i chi ch'i shui-tseng", Cheng Liang-seng (trans.). Shih-huo. v.4, no.9, (1974)12, pJ2-47. HCP. ChOan 177, p.4281. 374

The stability of international order during the 1060s in East Asia was dependent upon three variables: the ability of Sung, Liao, and Hsi Hsiato settle the intensifying border conflict, the ability of the Tanguts to define their foreign policy versus domestic needs, and the ability of the Kokonor Tibetans to prevent their country finm disintegration. Border disputes arose in direct relation to population growth and enlarging demand for land.

According to Li Pao's account, there was a neutral zone along the Hotung border since the

Sung-Liao War. However, after the 1040s, there were violations of the neutral zone and border security deteriorated especially in Tai-chou. In 1042, both sides agreed to a demarkation along the northern foothills of Huang-wei Mountain. Nevertheless, the appearance of the (Chitans on the mountain during the 1050s alarmed K'aifeng. After a series of protests and negotiations by Military Governor Han Ch'i, the Liao returned Cool- springs Village or Leng-ch'uen-ch'uen on the mountain.^^^ In 1057 a Sung report indicated that Khitan cultivation north of Tai-chou violated the Sung border in Ho-tung. At the same time, several BChitan records accused the Sung with the similar offense. This issue was temporarily resolved by a demarkation with a stone benchmaric.^^® Reportedly in 1065,

Khitan infiltration activities renewed with three Sung soldiers and two militia killed. As a countermeasure, the Sxmg built a few depots on Khitan lands by the end of the year.^^^ On

HCP. chOan 174, p. 4194. Also, Tao Jing-shen, "Sung-Liao pien-chieh cbiao-se te wen-t*!" in Liu Feng- chu, Hua Chu-ken, and Lu Hsun. Chung-kuo min-chu-shih ven-chiu fBeiiine: Kai-ke, 1992), chdan 4, pp. 40-48. SHY. chOan 196, barabrian 2, p. 7687. About the dispute and its ensuing negotiation and demarkation, see SHY. chQan 196, barbarian 2, p. 7688. According to the Liao account, the demarkation in 10S7 was to the &vor of the Sung. When Wang An-shih discussed this event in 1075, he revealed that the Sung had built depots by force. See HCP. chOan 262, p. 6385. Examining the relevant documents, Tao Jing-shen suggested that Sung violation on Liao border was not inconceivable. See Tao, "Sung-Liao pien-chieh chiao-se te wen-t*!". 375

the border along Hsiung-chou, Khitans fished for the first time in the border river and were expelled by a Sung force.^^^ In 1072, several hundred Khitan horsemen crossed the border and caiised a half-year-long border disturbance. Wen Yen-po and Ts'ai Ting indicated the plausibility of armed conflict in near future, but Wang An-shih insisted that de-escalation was necessary for undertaking any domestic reform.^^^ In 1074, a Liao delegation led by

Hsiao Hsi (circa late 1Ith century) arrived in K'aifeng demanding a further demarkation in

Ho-tung along the border of Wei, Ying, and Shuo prefectures, >^ch was not clearly verified in the Peace of 1005. With the dispute unsettled for months, the presence of a Liao emissary in K'aifeng created an imeasy and tension. In the next year, the Simg sent emissary

Shen K'uo six times to negotiate at the Liao court Shen K'uo soberly studied documents and map in the State Letters B\ireau and gathered ample evidence favoring the Sung claim.

Accordingly, Shen K'uo rebuked the Khitans but the next year another Sung emissary yielded relinqviishing six hundred square li.^^°

Border dispute also occurred between the Sung and Hsi Hsia along the buffer zone of the Ch'ii-yeh River in nearby Lin-chou. According to Patrolling Inspector Wang Chi, the

Sung had the rightfiil claim to the area one himdred U to the west and seventy U to the southwest of the river. Nevertheless, in order not to provoke any Tangut antagonism, the

Sung local administration voluntarily abolished further cultivation in the vicinity after 1023

HCP. chOan 205, p. 4969. HCP. chQan 232, pp. 5631,5638, chOan 233, pp. 5646,5654, chtlan 234, p.5681,5692, chQan 235, p. 5700-03, 5711-12, chQan 236, pp. 5725-26,5733-36, 5739-40,5745, 5751-52, chQan 237, pp. 5757-63, 5772-73, ChQan 238, pp. 5787-92. HCP, chflan 251, p. 6121-23, chOan 253, p. 6201-02, chQan 261, pp. 6362-64,6367-69, chQan 262, pp. 6372-86. Tao Jing-shen, Sung Liao kuan-hsi shfli. pp. 131-68, Two Sons of Heaven, pp. 68-78. 376

in order to create a buffer zone. Almost all fanning activities in the zone ended shortly thereafter. However, during the 1040s, Hsi Hsia started to cultivated the land west of the

Ch'vi-ye. After the mission of Wang Chi, Sung border officers never patrolled in the buffer zone after 1057. As a result, Hsi Hsia pressed its claim on the western bank of the Ch'a-yeh and even infiltrated the eastern bank as &r as Lin-chou pre&cture.^^^ In I0S7, the Sung commissioner eunuch Huang Tao-yQan (d. 1057) and regional commander Kuo En (d.

1057) patrolled the westem bank with 1,400 soldiers and encountered the Tanguts. Huang and Kuo were captured and five ofBcers and 387 soldiers were killed. However, the bloodshed did not escalate tension and K'aifeng simply threatened to close all trading posts along the Sung-Tangut border.^^^

K'aifeng carefully prevented escalation partially because of knowledge of the ditchotomized Hsi Hsia court politics and the complexity of border conflict The foreign policy of Hsi Hsia during the two decades after 1045 fluctuated and the key was its internal power struggle. King Wei-ming Liang-tsuo (1047-1068), son of Yflan-hao, experienced unusual vicissitudes throughout his youth witnessing the power struggle among the Tangut nobility.^^^ His inability to restrain aggressive Tangut nobles during his early reign caused

HCP, chflan 185, pp. 4469-71. HCP. chOan 185, pp. 4476-78. SS, chOan 485, p. 14001. YQan-hao matried seven women including a Khhan Princess and younger sister of Yeh-li Wang-yung (d. 1046), an assertive noble of the Nan-shan Tangut These marriages actualizmg political alliance did not necessarily reflected the real appreciation of the Hsi Hsia ruler. As peace with the Sung was establsihed in 1045, court politic strives among the Tangut nobility intensified. Realizing the plot of Yeh-Ii brothers to overthrow him, YOan-hao ordered a complete wip-out of the Yeh-li family but involved affairs with the wife of Yeh-li YQ-ch'ia (d. 1046), Mo-tsang, another powerful &mily. WiA die afi^ unfolded, Mo-tsang was forced to live in a nuneiy. In 1048, YOan-hao was moitally wounded in an insurrection by his elder son, who was bom by Yeh-li. As a consequence, Mo-tsang, who had been pragnant became the only women who could bom a royal heir. Various Tangut nobles released her from the nunery and put on the throne the new-birth 377

unnecessaiy anned conflict with the Sung, but the tenuousness of his rule detened over

reaction. After 1064, the policy of Liang-tsuo shifted radically to the offense. In the Sung

description, Liang-tsuo was overwhelmed by his Other's legend as a conqueror.

Nevertheless, for a ruler of a semi-sedentary kingdom, it would not be irrational to pursue

military achievements to consolidate his own power.

When Liang-tsuo was still a child, his uncle Mo-tsang 0-p'ang (d. 1061) dominated

the court and caused conflict along the Chu-yeh River. His rival Pu-na Chia-yi (7-1056), a secret lover of the Royal Dowager Mo-tsang and once Hsi Hsia envoy to K'aifeng, was probably a peace advocate. He realized that the western bank of the Ch'il-yeh River was

Sung territory. His death in an aborted coup d' etat against Mo-tsang in 1056 silenced a

voice of peace and bloodshed along the Ch'u-yeh River occurred in the next year.^^^

Internal strife in the 1060s eventually motivated Liang-tsuo to eliminate the influence of the Mo-tsang family and introduce more Chinese ritual into his court. Highlighting the mandate of a ruler, Chinese rituals enforced the legitimation of the rule of Liang-tsuo. In

1061, Liang-tsuo asked for Sung approval to adopt Chinese rituals in the reception ceremony of the envoy from K'aifeng. When this was proved, the Hsi Hsia ruler moved baby, Liang-tsuo. HCP. chOan 162, pp. 3901-02, SS, chQan 485, pp. 14000-01, SSCW. chOan 11, pp. 208- 09. After the war, Ch'ung Ku, the son of Ch'ung ShOi-heng, brought a petition of bis dead father's merit in intelligent activites. He claimed, first, the execution of Yeh-li brother by YQan-hao an outcome of deceptive intelligence offered by an agent worked for his father. Second Ch'ung Ku claimed the wipping out of such a powerful family as an indispensable merit to draw YQan-hao to the negotiation table in 1045. His second claim was chronologically disagreed with historical event The execution of the Yeh-Ii brother occurred after 104S and had no place to affect the peace establishment. See Nakajima Satoshi, Genko to Nori kyodai" in Nakajima Satoshi, Tovo Shieaku ronso: Sodai shi kenlcvu to sono shuhen. (Studies in Oriental History; Historical Research on the Sung Dynasty and Related Field), (Tokyo: Kyuko Shoin, 1988), pp. 433-445. Hsi Hsia shih-kao. pp. 78-79. SS, chQan 485, p. 14001, SSCW. chQan 11, p. 209. In HCP. chQan 184, p. 4462, Pu-na Chia-yi was 378

even further to rename his military commanderies according to the Chinese nomenclature, such as Tranquil Frontier Commandery or Ching-sai chun; Secured Pacification

Commandery or Pao-fai chim; and Transcendent Bravery Commandery or Shen-yung chOn.

Nevertheless, the excessive emulation of Chinese rituals eventually deluded the Tangut king to view himself as emperor. Alerted by Liang-tsuo's posturing, K'aifeng rejected the request of Liang-tsuo for a duplication of Ch'e-fu vfian-lniei and Sung Court Rituals. In addition, the proposal by the Hsi Hsia ruler for a marri^e with a Sung princess in 1062 was rejected.

In 1064, a Tangut envoy complained of the Sung reception ofiBcer who threatened to use unreasonable force against Jfei Hsia. Before the issue had been factually verified and resolved, the Tangut raided the border along Ching-YQan and Ch'in-Feng. The number of forays heightened to a climax 1065 with the appearance of "myriad" Hsi Hsia soldiers under Liang-tsuo's personal command before the rampart of Fort Great Obedience of Huan-Ch'ing Circmt Sung theater conmiander Ts'ai Ting, the founder of the Sung legionary army, was well prepared for the raid. He inflicted a heavy defeat over the Hsi

Hsia in a three-day-siege. King Liang-tsuo was severely wounded by Sung crossbowmen.^^®

As animosity between Sung and Hsia empted, an even more grave situation threatened the Sung. A staimce ally of K'aifeng ChQeh-ssu-lo died in 1065. His absence marked the irreversible disintegration of the Ch'ing-t'ang Tibetan Kingdom. Tung-chan, the heir of

ChUeh-ssu-lo, remained loyal to K'aifeng and ruled an area around Ch'ing-t'ang City. At the recorded with his Chinese name Li Shou-kuei, also, HCP. chQan 18S, p. 4471. 379

same time, the eldest grandson of Chfieh-ssu-Io, Mu-cheng, established his rule in Ho^hou, sharing a common border with the Sung. Sporadic confiontation occurred on the border of

Ch'in-choiL^^^ Sung strategist Wang Shao discussed the gravity of the situation and said:

"Of the descendants of the Chfleh clan, only Tung-Chan can take independent action at

present, and with di£5culty. Hsia-cheng and Ch'i-pa-wen exercise very limited

authority, their Government orders extending only one or two himdred U. So that in

any case they would be unable of themselves to oppose an advance of the Tanguts."

The strategist analysed how the dilemma of Sung defense would be fiirther exacebated if the Tanguts overran the domain of Chueh-ssu-lo. Wang Shao wrote:

"Each year they attack Ch'ing-t'ang, but so far have not succeeded in their efforts to

conquer the area. Should they succeed, the way will be open for them to unite their

forces and make a southern drive. They will be able to ravage the country between

Ch'in and Wei, pasture their horses in Lan Hui, fortify Wu-sheng (the present day Ti-

tao Coimty) on the west, sending expeditions occasionally to ravage the Tao Ho area,

and, by threatening Western Kansu and Szechwan will disturb the whole region."

The anxiety of Wang Shao in the 1060s was not gratuitous. In 1071 Wang An-shih anticipated that a possible Tangut ovemming of Ch'ing-t'ang would block the Sung

HCP, chOan 202, p. 4905-06. SS chOan 485, p. 14002. HCP. chQan 208, p.5062. SS, chQan 328, pp. 10575-76, chQan 464, p. 13575. MCPT (1975), chQan 25, pp. 259-60 Translation of Wang Shao, "Proposal for Subduing Barbarian" or p'ing-iune-ch'e. Williamson, pp. 305- 06.1 remaric the present day location of relevant place and edit several names of person such as Tung-chan instead of Tung Chan in thepurpose to maintain consistency in this dissertation. 380

import of horses firom the Tibetans.^^^ After the unsuccessful attack on Tung-chan, Liang- tsuo built a fort on the border near Fort Ku-wei, the outpost on the Ch'in-Feng Circuit of the

Sung.^^° To the Simg, the presence of the Tanguts in this area was a bitter reminder of Hsi

Hsia threat. Sharing no common border with Hsi Hsia during the 1040s, Qi'in-Feng Circuit

^vas compelled to deal with the intensifying Tangut activities along its extreme western flank. The increase of such activities cast a shadow over the security of the Sung.

Formulating an Offensive Grand Strategy

By the 1060s, K'aifeng came to a strategic corssroads when Liao and Hsi Hsia could no longer pose an imminent threat to the Sung as in 1042. The Sung could maintain its peace with Khitan and Tangut with considerable annual payment; the temporary lull enabled military reform. When Wei-ming Liang-tsuo renewed conflict against K'aifeng in

1065, a broad range of strategic options were discussed. Despite their political rivary, influential political figures in the 1060s such as Han Ch'i, Ou-yang Hsiu, Szu-ma Kuang,

Wen Yen-po, and Wang An-shih agreed to the same basic strategic perceptions. They acknowledged that Khitan and Tangut had no vital interests in overthrowing China nor were their degenerating military a threat to the Sung. Most evaluated the annual payments as effective in short term but none considered buying peace from "barbarians" a long- term desirable goal. Regarding conflict as inevitable, these statesmen distrusted both

Khtian and Tangut and urged domestic and military improvement as indispensable in the long term to increase the Sung diplomatic leverage. Diversity between reformers and

HCP, chQan 214, p. 5205. 381

counter-reformers in grand strategy hinged not on the different foreign perceptions but on the necessity, nature, and scale of domestic reform.

One possible grand strategy alternative in the short-term was the permanent reliance on the annual payment to avoid conflict Modem scholars such as Liao Lung-sheng admired the relative success of the Sung in pacifying Liao and Hsi Hsia economically^^^ and the efficacy was testified by the resolution of the conflict in 1066. As an aftermath of

Wei-ming Liang-tsuo's attack on Fort Great Obedience, the Sung suspended the annnal reward of the year. As peace was interrupted in 1070, the Sung removed the annual reward to Hsi Hsia and utilized it as a part of military budget. Hsi Hsia immedately proposed a peace to obtain the reward.^^^ Not only annual payment but trading was also of vital concern to Khitan and Tangut. The most inactive among K'aifeng administrators in the 1060s, Fu Pi advsed Emperor Shen-tsimg not to discuss the military agenda for two decades.^^^ He reminded the Emperor that escalation would be reciprocated and insisted as fact that Khitan had already abrogated any trust with K'aifeng.^^^ Nevertheless, Fu Pi did not define any long-term strategic goal for K'aifeng other than a standstill, nor could he convince the Sung emperor that the management of a temporary coexistence would eventually lead to a permanent cessation of Khitan threat and exploitation.

When survival was no longer the pre-eminent issue, the sense of humiliation heightened and then remorse. It was an uneasy cultural sensitivity that drew to the basic

HCP, chOan, 197, p. 4774. Liao Lung-sheng (1985). HCP, chOan 208, p. 5068. '"SS,chUan313, p. 10255. 382

Sung vulnerability to Khitan manipulation. Wang An-shih asserted: "Mandated by Heaven

as Ruler of Spirit Human kinds within the Four Seas, Your Majesty should have pacified

the Four Barbarians. Now Your Majesty addresses a Khitan as Uncle and his mother as

Grandaimt, bestowing upon them several himdred thousands string money and silk bolts

armually. This humiliates your servants. And, even more, after serious reflection, you

humble yourself. Your Majesty."^^^ This statement reasserted the traditional sinocentric

role of Emperor. In an argimient with Wang in 1072 his rival Wen Yen-po quoted a

saying from the Confucian classics: "Fortresses outside the captital signifies the

humiliation of ministers."^^® The ascendancy of the twenty-year-old Emperor Shen-tsung

compounded the humiliation with a desire for vengeance. A private anecdote recorded

that shortly after his ascendency an old palace women revealed the young Emperor that

Sung Tai-tsung had been gravely wounded by an arrow at the Battle of the Sorghum

River in 979causing his death. Hearing this, the young emperor shed a tear and turned to

vengeance.^^^ Animosity against Khitan affected court discussion. With Prime Minister

Wang An-shih and Military Councilor Wen Yen-po dealing with the border conflict in

1072, Sung Shen-tsung reviewed the Sung posture toward the Liao for six decades as one of "fear" and the Khitan policy toward the Simg as one of aggression and exploitation.

The Emperor asked: "How can we deny our panic since I address a Khitan as my Uncle?"

HCP, chQan 218, p. 5315-16. HCP. chOan 237, p. 5762. HCP. chOan 238, pp. 5790-92. Mo-chi. chQan 2, p. 20. 383

The Emperor concluded that the Sung had feared Khitan for "sixty or seventy years.''^^^

As the feeling of hximiliation spread, defending an attitude of yielding in foreign

intercourse became sensitive and questionable regardless of one's poltical identity.

Despite consistent remonstrations of radical domestic and foreign policy. Wen Yen>po

and Ssu-ma Kuang illustrated that conservative politicians did not necessarily hold

"weak" stances in territorial dispute. When Khitan lighthorse infiltration increased in the

vicinity of Hsiung-chou in 1072, Wen Yen-po protested the worst case resolution

suggested by Wang An-shih~relinquishing Hsiung-chou prefecture. Wen Yen-po insisted

that war was the undeniable option.^^® During the border conflict with Hsi Hsia along the

Ch'u-yeh River, Ssu-ma Kuang supported two frontal ofBcers in their building two forts

in the disputed area troubling the Tanguts. According to Li Pao, Ssu-ma Kuang was

liable for the ensuing bloodshed and he received no punishment only because of the support of Military Councilor P'ang Chi.^*° Thus, it is imwarranted to label Old Party

politicians as "The Pigeons" or "Gang of Surrender". To the minimal extent, such broadly

recognized leaders of the Old Party still regarded territory as crucial to the strategic interests of the Sung state.

Evidence suggests that Ssu-ma Kuang was a pacifist in the broad sense but he was not a total abolitionist negating all strategic agenda. As the author of the Comrehensive

Mirror. Ssu-ma Kuang provided posterity with a comprehensive historical chronicle with an emphasis on war. He inexorably opposed the ruler's ambition for conquest and the

HCP. chQan 238, pp. 5790-92. 384

general's prosperity to escalate-but was not against all violence. In Ssu-ma Kuang's

conception, outward expedition suffocated the masses and the propriety of fighting a

"defensive" war was not alAvays unquestioned. He acknowledged that the institutional

causes of war, the interests of the ofiBcer corps and the desires of aggressive rulers, would

compel a nation to violence. To Ssu-ma Kuang, frequent bloodshed and violations along

the border were usually the consequence of bilateral escalation. The massive repulse of

minor trivial thrusting provided officers opportunities for promotion and reward and this

explained why frontier officers prefered overreaction against any provocation. With such

an instiutional causes of violence, Ssu-ma Kuang considered that frontier officers were

liable for most of the outbreak of hostility due to mutual misperceptions. Accordingly, the

Border River Dispute in 1072 with Khitan was largely due to an overreaction by

Governor of Hsiung-chou Chao Chih. Given no punishment but appointment as a high

ranking palace army commander induced further similar behavior.^^^ Therefore, in the interest of the state and not of officers, Ssu-ma Kuang insisted that an enlightened ruler should refrain from any provocation.

Ssu-ma Kuang's renunciation of war was reflected in his higher priority given to domestic affairs. Ssu-ma Kuang omitted not only war jeopardizing the intemal order but also the frequent mobilization of the Strategic Reserve Force or hsia-fan-pine in peace time. In 1062, Ssu-ma Kuang criticized the impetuous mobilization of the Strategic

Reserve Force by Theater Commnder Chang Fang-p'ing to deal with a potential Tangut

'HCP.chOan 238, pp. 5790-92. 385

hostility. The Tangut host emerged near Fort Ku^wei and attacked Ch'ing-t'ang instead of

the Sung, as later proved. Prime Minister Tseng Kung-liang was concerned that such

harsh criticism might lead to timidity in taking the necessary foremost precautions in war.

Nevertheless, Ssu-ma Kuang clarified that he had no intention to obstruct any necessary

military preparedness. On the contrary, he meant to criticize the impetuous mobilization

of strategic reserve imits. Ssu-ma Kuang traced the establishment of the Strategic Reserve

Force in the hinterland of Shensi with the intent of preventing massive deployment on the

border, lessen the burden of logistic transport, and emancipate the people from the

harassment of frequent conscription. Frequent mobilization of the Strategic Reserve

Force would contradict to the original idea of its establishment. In addition, according to

Ssu-ma Kuang, only an incompetent theater commander with insufficient preparation,

inaccurate intelligent, and ill-disciplined soldiers would mobilize a massive strategic

reinforcement before actual hostilities were confinned.^^^ Thus, Ssu-ma Kuang did not

omit violence as an option and war preparedness was critical. His predominant

preferrence in the grand strategy was domestic stabilty and this led to a concern of peace.

Nevertheless, he did not systematically expound how a stable domestic environment

would eventually accomodate the security of Sung China.

In short, from 1067 to 1085 there was no fimdamental disagreement on the imderstanding of strategic security as the pre-eminent Sung national interest. The general focus was how to de-escalate border conflict in the short term and develop military power

"°HCP,chQan 185, p. 4477. 386

in the long term. Refonners in the Ch'ing-Ii era, such as Han Ch'i, suggested that a realistically moderate scheme combining negotiations with accelerated military preparations. To Han Ch'i, annual payment was useful in times of peace and normally provided that peace was assured with grea military might. Han Ch'i made serious study on the necessary military capacity backing disuasion but never seemed to have developed an expressed theory. In early 1060s, Han Ch'i established the Righteousand Brave militia in Shensi to dissuade the transgression of Wei-ming Liang-tsuo. When bloodshed at Fort

Great Obedience occurred in 1066, Prime Minister Han Ch'i proposed a moratorium of giving the annual reward to Hsi Hsia and requesting a diplomatic explanation. In argument. Military Councilor Wen Yen-po suggested that a suspension of the annual reward would likely provoke further invasions such as had occiured in 1039 and Han Ch'i expounded the relations between them in the economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. He clarified that stoppage of payment was only a preliminary in his dissuaion policy; the crux was increased war preparations in Shensi.^^^

Considering the shrinking military power of Liao and Hsi Hsia, the option of using force to resolve territorial dispute was tempting. As an intimate colleague of Han Ch'i for years, Ou-yang Hsiu took a slightly active stance. In 1066, he compiled a "grand strategy" proposal or ta-chi. asserting that the returning Tangut military ambition was not

HCP. chflan 195, p. 4721, SMKCI. chflan 9, p. 102, chOan 11, pp. 123-24. SMKCI, chflan 5, pp. 55-56. HCP. chflan 208, p. 5068. Han Ch'i did not encourage Sung Shen-tsung to retake the Yen YOn region. According to Fang Ch'Qeh, Han Ch'i discovered a poem of Sung Tai-tsung scripted on a wall of the ofHce in Ta-ming Magistrate, revealing the emperor's intend to retake the territory. When a official advised Han Ch'i to report such a discovery to the court, Han Ch'i kept silent and considered encouraging the amibtion 387

only a threat but also an opportunity for China. Assessing the military defficiencies of the

Tangut army, Ou-yang Hsiu focused on the offense rather than defense as the key to dealing with the imminent outbreak.^^^

Emperor Shen-tsimg expressed even more animosity toward the "two enemies" and spelled out strengthening the armed force as the ultimate solution to foreign issues.^^^ He said, "During the Ch'ing-li period, All-Under-Heaven lost one hundred thousand lives but perceived no impairment." The Emperor considered that the real obstacle to reprisal was not how many lives it would cost but the question of logistics.^*® In another discussion.

Sung Shen-tsxmg argued the use of violence as "normal". Giving the historical evidence, the Emperor pointed out that the Tang invariably waged war every year even during the

K'ai-yiian period, a period conventionally marked with extraordinary tranquility.^''^ At this point, the Emperor did not make any statement on the consequential devastating civil war of these foreign adventures from the eighth to tenth centuries. As a consistent advocate of military reform and the foimder of the Sung Legionary Army, Military

Councilor Ts'ai Ping perceived war as an acceptable option as comparable to relinquishing territory.^^^ This unbending attitude against Hsi Hsia provocation became even more discernible in political symbolism. When Hsi Hsia delivered a state letter without a passage of oath. Wen Yen-po rebuked the suggestion of Wang An-shih on

of the emperor as inappropriate. Fo-chai nien. chQan 9, p. S3. HCP. ChQan 204, p. 4939. HCP. ChQan 236, p. 5744. HCP. ChQan 214. p. 5196. HCP. chQan 230, p. 5596. HCP, ChQan 238, p. 5786. 388

downplaying the event. On the contrary, he proposed a rejection.^^'

In the long-tenn, the elimination of Liao and Hsi Hsia would unquestionably increase imperial dignity and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, in the short-term, war would harm the economy and probably not improve the betterments of the people. This dilemma compelled the decision makers of K'aifeng to engage in serious strategic consideration. Among the Sung political leaders in the 1060s, Wang An-shih provided the most deliberate grand strategy and shared a common consensus with his contemporaries. Wang An-shih shared the perception with Fu Pi and regarded that the

Khitan Emperor "does not exclude themselves from the matter of rites and propriety."

Further, Wang An-shih believed neither Liao nor Hsi Hsia could confront China in the long-term because both were either troubled by intenuil strife or its military power had declined. Since it was unlikely that either could guarantee booty comparable to the annual payment, the use of force against the Sung was not to the interest of Khitan and Tangut.

"The northern people (IChitans) would prefer inaction rwii-shih^ and dare not to stand rigid." In this sense, Wang An-shih considered that the Sung annual payment to IChitan and Tangut were crucial in pacifying the two enemies. As well as Fu Pi, Wang An-shih acknowledged Khitan anxiety of China's irredentism. Agreeing with Ssu-ma Kuang,

Wang An-shih regarded armed conflict on the border as largely due to misperception. As these conflict, frontier ofRcers were almost obliged to initiate a cycle of escalation for the sake of their own promotion. As Han Ch'i and Fu Pi had discussed, Wang An-shih also

HCP. chOan 237. p. 5760. 389

suggested a moderate posture toward Khitan and the diplomatic resolution of any border conflict.^^° In the long term, Wang An-shih expressed the same anxieties as Ou-yang

Hsiu, doubting the trustworthiness of Khitan and Tangut In response to the Tangut State

Letter without an oath in 1072, Wang An-shih doubted any reliability of Tangut oath or not.^51

Nevertheless, Wang An-shih did not define negotiation as normative behavior to settle international conflict nor was the preservation of peace his ultimate goal. Ample evidence suggested Wang An-shih's predilection for power politics. He regarded the lack of power rather than any compliance of treaty as the major reason for not using force against Khitan. "If we are not so impotent, even retaking Yu-yen (Yu-chou) would not be unreasonable. In addition, he asserted the scope of his "grand strategy" or ta-chi and ta-lueh. Compared with Ou-yang Hsiu's, the usage of Wang An-shih to the term "grand strategy" was close to the modem definition^ addressing political, economic, and diplomatic dimensions. A further unique aspect of Wang An-shih's "grand strategy" was its dialectical relation among different strategic dimensions. For example, during the border dispute with Khitan in 1072, Wang An-shih analysed that a "firm" grand strategy need to be covered by a "soft" diplomatic stance. When Emperor Shen-tsung eagerly examined every detail of the border conflict and the ensuing demarcation negotiations in

HCP. chQan 235, pp. 5700-03, chQan 236, pp. 5733-36,5745, chOan 237, p. 5760, and chOan 241, p. 5877. Ou-yang Hsiu's memorial, HCP. chQan 204, p. 4939. Wang An-shih's opinion on the Tangut State Letter, HCP. chQan 237, p. 5760. HCP. chOan 238,5790-92. More detailed explanation on the ostentatious "soft" posture of Wang An- shih, refer to Tao Jing-shen, Two Sons of Heaven, p. 67-78 390

1075, Wang An-shih repeatly asserted that a wise emperor should fociis on aspects with

"grand strategic" significance. The gain and loss of trivial post stations along the border were a matter of diplomatic agents.^^^ Temporary de-escalation was indispensable to an economic and military reform which would enable an eventual suppression of Khitan and

Tangut in sequence.^^^

Wang An-shih's grand strategy was composed by five policies; a radical financial reform, a pragmatic personnel management, a moderate foreign policy toward Khitan, a hostile but still defensive strategy again Hsi Hsia, and a rapid annexation of the Kokonor

Tibetan regime and these five policies were correlated. Finance was a fimdamental factor in Wang An-shih's reform and he considered, "InsufBcient budget is the result of an ignorance of financial management." A broad financial base allowed territorial expansion and, thus, the establishment of the Imperial trading post was to the crucial interest of the state.^^® Nevertheless, finance was only one facet. On more than one occasion, Wang An- shih rebuked the point of view arguing that no foreign adventure ought to be initiated before achieving success in the domestic reform. He said: "If one postponed (military) action until the state became rich and the population became enlarged, the great achievements of the ancient kings would have never occurred."^^^

Collins, pp. 1-5. HCP. ChQan 232, p. 5628, chOan 236, p. 5726, chQan 237, p. 5773. HCP. ChQan 220, p. 5343, chQan 237, pp. 5769,5773, chflan 238, pp. 5790-92, chflan 239, p. 5582, chflan 241, pp. 5883-84. HCP. chflan 224, pp. 5460-61. HCP. chflan 232, p.5628, chflan 236, p.5752. 391

The selection of capable agents was centrally important in his grand strategy.^^^ On

more than three times, he expounded his higher priority to personnel rather than financial

management. Especially in 1070, he rationalized his personnel policy as a strategic aspect

derived from the first chapter of Sun Tzu's The Art of War.^^^ In addition, he advised the

Emperor to follow the method of Ch'ung Shih-heng who put silver taels as targets of archery training and rewarded them to outstanding bowmen. Contrary to the proposals of

Ssu-ma Kuang about military budget reduction, Wang An-shih considered the welfare of soldiers as indispesable to maintain morale. Appropriate reward was, thus, an effective way to recruit capable personnel.^®" When 3,500 soldiers took Ho-chou in 1073, Wang

An-shih suggested an extraordinary reward—five bolts of silk for every enemy's head.^®^

To Wang An-shih, encouraging capable officers and soldiers had a higher priority than saving money.

Wang An-shih held a pragmatic point of view in which success or failure was the only important criteria. To observe and analyse the agent's capability, a ruler had to maintain an active role. Wang An-shih indicated: "Operations provide opportunities to those capable and suffer those incapable." For their own interests, those incapable

It must be stated that the "grand strategy" of Wang An-shih had a broader meaning than the cunent usage. In modem conception, administration and persoimel management was identified as routine and not included in the realm of strategy. Arkin, William M., Encvclcnedia of the U.S. Military. (New York, Harper and Row, 1990), p. 647. Nevertheless, the supposition of Wang An-shih was different As a reformist, he did not see personnel recruitment and promotion as routine and regular. His personnel selection theory was comprised by extraordinary reward and punishment which was used as instrument of policy implementation. HCP, chQan 221, pp. 5377-78, chOan 232, p. 5628, chQan 236, p. 5752. HCP, chQan 222, p. 5403, chOan 238, pp. 5803-04 HCP, ChQan 244, p. 5937. HCP, ChQan 244, p. 5937. 392

servants would produce rumors to discourage the capable and to prevent the initiation of operations. At this moment, a wise ruler should see through the delusion of rumors and protect his capable agents from being harmed. He repeatly exemplified his opinion with

Ch'en P'ing, a talented strategist in Han Dynasty. When Ch'en P'ing was accused with receving bribe, Emepror Kao-tzu of the Han appointed Ch'en P'ing as supreme supervisor to all generals. As a result, all rumors immediately ceased. Wang An-shih concluded that

Emperor Kao-tzu of the Han was a talent who knew how to protect his capable agents.

A capable agent needed authorization to undertake his tasks and Wang An-shih suggested giving full authority to qualified agents in a theater. At the initiation of the Hsi-

Ho Campaign, he separated the authority of Acting Tribal Pacification Intendant along the Border of Ch'in-Feng Circuit, Wang Shao from the Chin-Feng Circuit and founded

T'ao-ho Pacification Circuit shortly afterward. These establishments originated the Hsi-

Ho Circuit. With the high hope of proving the merit of his officiers and soldiers on the

Hsi-Ho front, Wang An-shih disregarded the objection that such an offense was an excessive aggression. To him, it was a necessary preparation for the eventual elimination of the Liao and Hsi Hsia.

Being a civilian without experience in theater command, Wang An-shih constructed his military strategy based mostly on the scheme of Wang Shao. Wang Shao, an ordinary chin-shih degree holder, composed a memorial in approximately 1067, "Proposal for

Subduing the Barbarians" after sober research on the Shensi frontier. At the beginning of

HCP. ChQan 214, pp. 5205-07, chOan 230, p. 5594, chOan 236, pp. 5738-39, chQan 237, pp. 5767,5775- 393

the proposal, Wang Shao heralded:

"If the Court wishes to subjugate the Tanguts, we must first recover the territory of

Ho-huang. If that can be done, the Tanguts will have to guard against frontal and

rear attacks...If we can get six or seven of the more important chiefs on our side, the

rest will be forced to submit When all the rest have been won over, the Chfieh clan

will be compelled to yield. Then the Li clan of Ho-hsi (the Tanguts) will be in our

hands...The immediate aim will be to gain the Tibetan's alliance, but the ultimate

and greater success will be achieved in our new relations with the Tanguts."

By this analysis Wang Shao impressed Emperor Shen-tsimg and Wang An-shih who started to adopt Wang shao's idea as an integrated part of his own grand strategy.

"Proposal for Subduing Barbarians" defined the strategic course of K'aifeng after

1067 in four aspects. First, it installed the eventual suppression of the two enemies as the

Sung strategic goal. After elaborated by Wang Shao, a final Sung victory became not only conceivable but feasible as well. Second, Wang Shao revitalized the Simg strategy of indirection. He suggested not to confront Khitan and Tangut with devastating and prolonged war. Instead, the Sung should outflank the two enemies by annexing the

Kokonor Tibetan kingdom. An annexation of Ch'ing-t'ang would enable the Sung to have siifficient military power composed of combined by Han and Tibetan forces. The regaining of Wu-sheng, Tao-chou, and Lan-chou provided opportunities to attack Hsi-hia from the upper Yellow River and inevitably threaten the Tangut rule along the Ho-hsi

76. 394

corridor. At this point, the strategy of Wang Shao did not very differ from Wang P'u and

Sung Tai-tzu. All prefering an attack against the weakest adversary and confionting the more formidable enemy only at the final stage. Third, this proposal merged neatly into the grand strategy of Wang An-shih, who considered an active Sung conversion of

Tibetans needed to be covered by a moderate gesture toward Tangut and Khitan. In addition, it provided an arena for K'aifeng to reactivate its war machine. Fourth, Wang

Shao carefully pre-empted the challenge against the convention viewing war as expensive and devastating. Rather, in the original version of "Proposal for Subduing the

Barbarians", Wang Shao agreed with such an assumption but skillfiilly argued his proposal as one preventing excessing expense and devastation. According to Wang An- shih, Wang Shao claimed only several thousand kuan as the initial cost.^®^ In Wang

Shao's conception, the key to pacifying the Tibetans was cultural conversion rather than military conquest. The Sung should provide political order, law enforcement, and trading to gain tribal allegiance. The upkeep of merely an adminstration in Hsi-Ho would be minimized since K'aifeng had no need to deploy a strategic force there.^®® He also proposed to allow the subjugated Tibetans to retain their own land.^^^ To conclude his proposal, Wang Shao asserted that the subjugation of Tibetans as the initial phase for a long-term preparation to subjugate Tangut and Khitan were strategically feasible, politically necessary, and economically acceptable.

Williamson, pp. 305-06. HCP. chaan 214, pp. 5205-06. HCP. chQan 299, p. 5571, chOan 230, p. 5600. ' HCP. ChQan 212, pp. 5146, 5160-62. 395

There were some undeniable doubts in the diplomatic and political risks. The internal disorder of Ch'ing-t'ang laid irrepazable harm to its stability and K'aifeng had the strategic necessity to assume the defense for the Tibetans. Nevertheless, diplomatically and politically the rationale was not so pat Although the territory belonged to the Han and Tang domain, it had been under Tibetan rule for more than three hundred years.

Ch'ing-t'ang as a constant ally had never betrayed K'aifeng. In addition, it was not in immediate jeopardy, nor did it require any military intervention. Therefore, the political reason for Hsi-Ho campaign depended on whether or not realpolitik could be justified.^®®

This chapter has examined the complexity of strategic analysis and Sung political change, economic reform, military development in mid-eleventh century, and the environment of the Sung foreign relations from 1045 to 1067. Did all these variables suggested an alteration of strategic preference from peace to war? This question can be answered in two perspectives, namely, military strategy and grand strategy. From the military strategic perspective, the development of technology and the reform of the legionary army unquestionably diminished the gap of strategic capacity among Sung, Liao, and Hsi Hsia. In addition, the continual failures of the Khitans and Tanguts in operations seemed to suggest a return to the military equilibriimi that had been challenged by Wei- ming Yiian-hao in the 1040s. The Sung advance in military technology produced new weapons and tactics and the legionary reform enhanced coordination among units in

• For criticism on Wang Shao's strategy, see Shao-shih wen-chien-ch'ien-lu. chQan 13, pp. 144-45. 396

operations. More reliable horse import made Sung cavalry penetration into barbarian lands

more likely feasible. However, such ^veaponry, tactical, and operational innovatioa only

resulted in a gradual improvement and there was no decisive breakthrough in logistics. The

Sung legionary army, regardless of being much better-armed and better-trained, was still hobbled to slow moving transports. Sung military progress gave K'ai&ng more confidence to the efiBcacy of violence wiienever it needed; it did not enable its army to simply overcome the Khitans and Tanguts in offensive operations.

In terms of grand strategy, this chapter only observed the elements affecting two dimensions: grand strategic environment and grand strategic preference, leaving grand strategic decision making as a matter for discussion of the next chapter. Grand strategic environment consisted of domestic and external factors. Domestically, the Sung economic prosperity was nurtured by a peace but, at the same time, it provided a financial base for external venture. It was noteworthy that the surplus of the Sung economic growth during the mid-eleventh century was, in part, consumed by a huge population and pressing inflation. Reform programs such as militia conscription and mutual security system had an uncertain efiScacy on either enhancing societal stipport on military expansion or improving social stability. A highly developed bureaucracy narrowed the path of success creating tension in thwarted ambitions and frustrated goals. Radical reform further induced political polarization. Externally, there was no imminent threat jeopardizing Sung survival. Simg economic prosperity allowed the management of peace by regular payment to its two semi- sedentary neighbors. Nevertheless, such a policy could not overcome the instability of 397

intercourses among Sung and its neighbors. Dormant borders would flare-up in minor incursions, became enflamed, and spread in violence. Unable to effect the internal upheaval of the Tangut state and direct Tangut political culture to one of peace, the Sung worried about the potential emergence of a dominant Tangut leader >^o would renew animosi^.

Furthermore, the disintegration of the Kokonor Tibetan kingdom increased the insecurity of

Shensi. The Sung grand strategic environment was one of the unrest though not necessarily violence oriented. It was an optional violence but not unconditional war.

Historical and empirical aspects defined the preference of the grand strategy of

K'aifeng to the scope of realism. The Sung experience firom 1005 to 1045 indicated that the constitution of peace did not secure long lasting tranquility. The trauma of the Sung during the Kuanan Crisis directed its foreign attitude to a general suscpison and, to some politicians, potential animosity against the "Two Enemies in the North and West" or hsi- pei-erh-ti despite their alliance already lapsed. To prevent the state from being invaded started to have higher priority than to build a normative international order. 398

Chapter 10 The Sung Army Strikes Back

As the Khitan-Tangut alliance lapsed and boundary conflict subsides, the time for

Sung restoration seemed to come. Prestige of the realm became the core concern of

Emperor Shen-tsung's reign and the conversion of Tibetan and Tangut tribes was hastened. Although Wang An-shih insisted onmore domestic improvement before any overt armed conflict with Khitan and Tangut, the intensifying international conflict demanded a sharp realigrmient of grand strategy. K'aifeng was to take a more active role in the strategic triangle but such a transition was not smooth due to the complexity of internal power struggles and international issue. The process which led to the revision of the Sung ambition was not rapid, but neither was it irreversible. Many factors masked, slowed down, or interrupted its course; fortunes frequently ebbed back and forth.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the very perigee in military success, the Simg came to a crossroads of war and peace. The option was opened for the Sung to refrain from threatening its neighbors after several victories. Or, the Sung could elect to dominate and re- emerge as the center of East Asian power politics. From 1067 to 1100 the Sung annexed

Kokonor Tibetan regime, defeated the Vietnamese, and took a number of strategic Hsi

Hsia strongholds. This chapter surveys Sung theater strategy from 1067 to 1100 and its corollary operations.

Theater Strategy and Operation: The Scheme to Outflank the East Wing

The second Sung-Hsia war was renewed after a series of bilateral escalations. The 399

historical occurrences from 1067 to 1082 did not fit the anticipation of Wang An-shih,

nor did they necessarily reflect the initial desire of K'aifeng. Before Wang Shao's

proposal received attention, a series of issues with Hsi Hsia occurred during the 1060s inciting the Sung theater command to employ a scheme to the east wing of the Tanguts.

The strategic Horizon Mountains extended firom the eastem border of the Fu-Yen circuit to Huan-Ch'ing, separating the Ordos Desert and Shensi region and was a low and fertile range "suitable to all grains".^ Iron ore, salt, tea, and bamboo were natural resources of this area. Along the moimtain there were Sui-chou (the present day Sui-te County), Fort

Rice Lard or Mi-chih (the present day Mi-chih, County), Yin-chou, Shih-chou and Hsia- chou as potential defensive stronghold. The Sung offense from 1067 to 1071 was first directed northeast of Fu-Yen Circuit at Sui-chou, three hundred li from Yen-chou and about one hundred li from Fort Pure Spring.^ Guarding the junction of the Wu-ting, Ta-li, and Huai-ning Rivers from the top of the Horizon Mountains, Sui-chou was known by a

Tangut name Li-wang-hsin-ku, referring to "Upper Capital" in Chinese.^ To the east, there was Fort I-he, a Tangut stronghold and Fort Wu (present day Wu-pao County) on the west bank of the Yellow River. On the north there was the former Pang territory of

Yin-chou prefecture, with several high points excellent for military construction, such as

Lo-wu and Yung-Io (between the present day Yil-lin and Mi-chih County).^ Farther northward about three hundred U, the Tangut cultivated land along the Ch'Q-yeh River

^ CPPM. chOan 83, pp. 2634,2638-39. ' WCCY. chQan 18, pp. 877-80. ^ CPPM. chOan 83, p. 2634. ^ The location of Fort Yung-Io, see 400

adjacent to the Simg Lin-Fu salient.^ In general, the ofifense of Fu-Yen Command was directed northeast to occupy such fertile and strategic possessions, instead of launching a direct attack on the Hsi Hsia heartland in the northwest

Conflict from the 1040s and lOSOs had long defined Horizon Mountains and the

C'hv-yeh River Valley as the strategic arena. At the high point of the Sung-Hsia border dispute along the Ch'u -yeh River in 1057 with the death of Sung commander Kuo En, the security problem of the Lin-fu salient of Ho-tung became pronounced. According to

Wang An-shih, the garrison of Lin-Fu doubled from 10,000 to 20,000 troops from the

1040s to 1072.® Foreshadowing the renewal of animosity, Wei-ming Liang-chuo launched an all-out attack against Huang-Ch'ing Circuit in 1066 which had influenced on

K'aifeng's foreign policy. Ou-yang Hsiu envisaged the bloodshed and suggested massive countermeasures. Han Ch'i proposed an occupation of the Horizon Mountainss, preparing a copy of his previous memorial with Fan Chung-yan for Emperor Jen-tsimg in 1041 In the same year. Commander of Fu-Yen Circuit Ch'eng K'an (997-1066) confirmed to the

Court the willingness to surrender of a mmiber of tribes living on the Horizon Mountains.

K'aifeng did not immediately respond due to the aggravating illness of Emperor Ying- tsung.®

Among these proposals, the one offered by Transportation Intendant of Shensi Se

Hsiang became the most influential. From 1063 to 1067, Se Hsiang consistently proposed

^ WCCY. chQan 17, p. 871. HCP. 193, pp. 4679-80, Tune-hsien pi'-lu. chOan 5, p. 54. ® HCP. chOan 241, pp. 5877-78. •' HCP. chOan 204, p. 4939. ® HCP. chQan 207, p.5021. 401

economic boycott to forestall an offense pre-empting an outbreak of hostility, greatly impressing Emperor Ying-tsung. As the Emperor habitually carried the memorial all the time, his son and later Emperor Shen-tsung read it on occasion. On Shen-tsung's ascending the throne in 1067, he gave priority to this strategic scheme. In August of

1067, Se Hsiang and the third son of ChHrng Shih-heng, Governor of Fort Pxire Springs

Ch'ung O (d. 1083) urgently reported that the Hsi Hsia commander of Sui-chou intended to defect and required political asylum. Emperor Shen-tsung immediately approved the plan, committing to a three year struggle outflanking the east wing of the Tanguts.

As a son of Ch'ung Shih-heng, Ch'ung O experienced the war from 1039 to 1045. A civilian family background did not train him to be a warrior; instead, he became deeply involved in staff work. He had a much ambitious objective than Fan Chung-yen and Han

Ch'i to not only the occupation of the Horizon Mountains but also to rejoin it with the

Lin-Fu salient as well. Many Sung officials in the late 1060s questioned the strategic necessity of such an immense operation but it was not unreasonable. Since the bloodshed along the Ch'ii-yeh River in 1057, the Lin-fix salient became a hotspot and the increasing garrison demanded a more secure communication line. In addition, corrected perimeter would integrate the Lin-Fu to the salient into the Simg defense. During the 1060s and with difficulty,the Sung compelled surrendered tribes with arable land to settle in the area. A simultaneous pincer penetration from Fu-Yen and Lin-Fu could seize iron mines, tea plant farms, and broad, fertile land from the Tanguts.^ This plan probably reflected

' HCP. chflan 220, pp. 5344-45,5363. 402

the strategic security and economic interests of the Tse Family of Fu-chou since it was evolved by a Tse family member, Tse Chi-shih (d. 1072), serving Ch'ung O os his stafF.^°

Despite such rationale for a right wing flanking operation and the rejoining of Lin-Fu salient, one undeniable disadvant^e was the scarce Han population in this area for logistic transport and military construction. The ignorance of this factor eventually prevented Ch'ung O from ultimate success.

The approval of the surrender of the Hsi Hsia commander of Sui-chou provided a surprising prologue to the Sung operation. Hsi Hsia Commander Wei-ming Shan was raised in a household which had converted to the Sung, captured by Hsi Hsia during the war from 1039-1045, and appointed as a commander.^^ Responding to his petition of siirrender. Emperor Shen-tsung approved with the condition that Wei-ming Shan should stay in Sui-chou with his tribe and withstand the Tanguts for the Sung. Meeting with Se

Hsiang, Theater Commander Lu Hsien and Ch'ung O drafted a scheme dealing with three scenarios dependent upon the strength of the Tanguts defecting with Wei-ming Shan to which no one could guarantee. In the best case that Wei-ming Shan could offer with sufficient manpower, the Sung should initiate an attack to take all of Horizon Mountains.

In the conservative case in which Wei-ming Shan had a medium force, the Sung should hold Sui-chou as a outpost for the ongoing Horizon Mountains campaign. Even in the worst case, Ch'ung O estimated that the Sung would still be able to settle the defecting

HCP, chOan 220, pp. 5344,5356. SS, chflan 253, p. 8865. " CPPM. chQan 83, p. 2633. The account of Ssu-ma Kuang differed slightly, saying that the brother of Wei-ming Shan instead of himself was a Sung Intimate Household. See SSCW. chQan 11, p. 209-210. 403

tribemen within the buffer zone.^^ This discreet and comprehensive estimation impressed

Emperor Shen-tsung who authorized the action by personal decree. Shortly, questioning

arose as the Emperor had handled the action in clandestine collusion excluding open

discussion at the Court. Sharing a common understanding with the Emperor, Ch'ung O

immediately prepared to welcome the surrender without informing his superior, Lu

Hsien, Pacification Intendant and Director of Operations of Fu-Yen Circuit. As a result, the State Affairs Chamber, Bureau of Military Affairs, and Fu-Yen Theater Command

Headquarter were all shocked. When they realized that full scale war with Hsi Hsia would break out momentarily, Ch'img O had already marched into Sui-chou.^^

Ironically enough, the sudden emergence of the Sung army outside the ramparts of

Sui-chou also astonished Wei-ming Shan who, in actuality, had never submited any proposal for defection. The persons plotting the defection were a group of his subordinates who owed the Tangut government a great sum of money and failed to redeem their debt. Seeing the sudden appearence of the Sung force, Wei-ming Shan felt that he had no alternative other than surrender according to the original plot. Ch'ung O accepted the surrender of a total with 300 chiefs, 10,000 well-trained soldiers, 15,0000 individuals, and more than 100,000 domestic animals.^^ Realizing that a Tangut reprisal

CPPM. chOan 83, pp. 2632, SS, chOan 332, p. 10681. " SSCW. chOan 11, p. 210, CPPM. chOan 83, p. 2632. CPPM. chQan 82, p. 2632-33. Ssu-ma Kuang gave a much smaller number of those surrendered, ten thousand at the begiiming and only four thousand remamed after they moved into die border. SSCW. chQan 11, p. 209-210. According to the original plan of Ch'ung O, these tribal households were to stay in Sui-chou instead of migrating to the interior. Ssu-ma Kuang's account was based on an interview of Kuo K'uei, the Fu-Yen Commander right after the incident. Therfore, rather than laying doubt to the reliability of either source, a more likely situation is that SSCW and CPPM were describing th number of different times. The larger number in CPPM was likely the original size of the host of Wei-ming Shan. What Ssu-ma 404

be imminent, Ch'img O hastened to fortify the town and defeated a Tangut force at nearby

Fort Huai-ning on the border.

The incident loomed over the Sung court Hsi Hsia strongly protested such belligerence and demanded that the Sui^ transfer Wel-ming Shan and punish Tse Chi- shih. At the same time. Sung imperial censors and advisors accused Ch'ung O of unauthorized action. Cheng Chieh (1022-72) criticized the Emperor as a Warring States tyrant entrusting in wicked strategists and damned Ch'ung 0 to the death penalty. Under domestic and foreign pressure. Sung Shen-tsung decided that Ch'ung O should be the scapegoat and had him demoted four ranking and imprisoned in Yung-ch'ing

Coramandery.^® In addition, the embattled Emperor was persuaded to settle the dispute by returning Sui-chou to Hsi Hsia. According to this order, Fu-Yen Conmiand started to disperse some of the surrendered Tanguts.^^

Compared with factors such as the strategic location of Horizon Mountains and the political change in K'aifeng, the Tangut response to the Sui-chou Incident was an indispensable variable in driving the enitre Sung decision-making leadership to adopting a hard line. An even more dramatic incident occurred shortly thereafter. Hsi Hsia murdered three Sung ofQcers at the negotiation inside the border trading post of Pao-an

Kuang described was likely based on a later occurrence. Durnig the later negotiation, the Sung once dissolved the tribe and decide to return the refecture to Hsi Hsia. After that the size of Wei-ming Shan's host drastically shrank. CPPM. chOan 83, pp. 2633-34. SS, chttan 335, pp. 10745-46. CPPM. chflan 83, pp. 2635-36.2639. SS. chflan 321, p. 10418. For opinion of Chao Hsieh, refer to SS. chOan 332, pp. 10683-84. Opinion of Ssu-ma Kuang, see SS, chQan 336, p. 10763, also, SMKCI. chQan 23, pp. 253-56. Remonstrtion by Kuo Shen-hsi ( d. after 1071), see SS, chQan 330, p. 10621. CPPM. chQan 83, 2640. 405

Commandery.^^ Initially suggesting moderation. Prime Minister and Acting Supreme

Theater Comander of Shensi Han Ch'i now saw the necessity of holding Sui-chou as further negotiation leverage.^® At the same time, Ex-Commissioner of Bureau of Military

Affairs and newly appointed Theater Commander of Fu-Yen Curcuit Kuo K'uei concealed an Imperial Edict ordering him to demolish the wall of Sui-chou. In constrast,

Kuo K'uei swore publicly to defend Sui-chou to death. Asking Han Ch'i for extraordinary provisions to supply the surrendering Tanguts, Kuo K'uei then organized them into regular army and militia.^°

Negotiations renewed and expired. At the beginning, both sides agreed to an exchange of Sui-chou with Fort Frontier Gate and Fort Pacified Famess taken by Hsi

Hsia during the war firom 1039 to 1045. However, when actual demarkation was undertaken, Chao Hsieh (d. after 1086), one of Kuo K'uei's staff, discovered that Hsi Hsia only intended to return the two isolated forts without even an acre of the peripheral lands.^^ Such deception astonished all decision makers in K'aifeng including the conservative Wen Yen-po. K'aifeng instantaneously promoted Tse Chi-shih and Wei- ming Shan in rank and delegated them to defend Sui-chou.^^ The dispute prolonged to

1069 and neither could the Tanguts retake Sui-chou by force nor through negotiation as

SS, chOan 485, p. 14002, chOan 486, p. 14007, CPPM. chflan 2636-37. CPPM. chQan 83, pp. 2635-36,2638-9, HWKC. chflan 16, pp. 231-33. SSCW. chOan 11, p. 210-11, CPPM. chOan 83, pp. 2640,2645-46. Also, "Kuo K'uei mu-chih", 9a-10a. SS, chflan 486, p. 14008, CPPM. chflan 83, pp. 2645-46. CPPM. chflan 83, pp. 2638,2647. In "Kuo K'uei mu-chfli''. Yen Ta was the officer assigned for the defense of Sui-chou, accompanied by Liu Fu in Fort Sui-p'ing and Wang Ya in Fort Huai-ning. This was propbably that before the imperial edict arrived Yen-chou, the desire of K'aifeng to keep Sui-chou was unclear. In order to prevent die prefecture remaining vulnerable, Kuo K'uei delegated Yen Ta the fortification of Sui-chou. After the Court had made the decision to hold Sui-chou, Tse Chi-shih and Wei- 406

the Sung were no longer interested in regaining Fort Frotier Gate and Pacified Famess.

Peace was barely reinstated with the death of Wei-ming Liang-chuo and the succession of his son Ping-ch'ang.^^

The border conflict continued to escalate. In the early summer of 1070, Hsi Hsia mobilized twen^ thousand troops to build eight forts to contain Sui-chou, now Fort Sui­ te, and its nearest outpost was only four U from Sui-te. Commander Kuo K'uei avoided battle, but destroyed all forts after the withdrawal of the Tangut hosts. Simultaneously, the Tanguts fortified the border adjacent to Huan-Ch'ing Circuit, building Fort Nao-o and some other forts within their territory. Sung Theater Commander of Huan-Ch'ing Circuit

Li Fu-kuei dispatched a force to disrupt the Tangut construction and was defeated. Over­ reacting to this setback, Li Fu-kuei conducted a massive attack in reciprocation, ravaging more than five large Tangut forts outside the border. This ensued in a full-scale Tangut countermeasure, numbering two to three himdred thousand men. Within nine days, Huan-

Ch'ing Circuit suffered vigorous Tangut attack and pillage—four officers were killed and seven forts were besieged simultaneously. Sung officers Lin Kuang, Yao Chiu, and many others organized determined resistance until the eventual withdrawal of the Tanguts.^^

As hostility were confirmed. Emperor Shen-tsung delegated Pirme Minister and confidant of Wang An-shih Han Chiang (1012-88) to act as Supreme Theater Command of Shensi. Han Chiang interviewed Ch'ung O and immediately restored him to the commander of Fu-Yen Circuit and govemer of Fort Pure Springs. With Tse Chi-shih as ming Shan became in charged. 407

associate, Ch'ung O submited his plan for the takeover of the Horizon Mountains and the incorporation of the Lin-fii salient by outflanking the Tangut east wing. Emperor Shen- tsung admired this operation plan and ordered a general mobilization in Shensi theater.^^

Han Chiang reorganized the army of the ^^ole theater under seven commanders and had them all subordinate to Ch'ung O. To fully equip the Tribal Auxiliary, which had become the main strength of Sung, Han Chiang even forced regular Cavalry units to transfer their horses to the tribal auxiliary units. Huan-Ch'ing Circuit was established as a base for blocking any Tangut relief force to the Horizon Moxmtains Range, with a battlegroup mostly composed of troops under Lin Kuang and tribal ofBcers such as Wang

Wen-Iiang and Chao Yu-ch'ing.^® On the right wing there was another battlegroup under

Ch'ung O, Tse Chi-shih, Yen Ta, and Kao Yimg-neng (d.l082) to overrun Horizon

Mountains Range and build forts on several crucial highpoints. Ch'ung O was to construct a stronghold at Lo-wu, the farthest point of his campaign, and four forts at Fu-ning, Pin- ch'ao, I-he, and Ridge P'ei to safeguard his supply link from Sui-te.^^ Simultaneously, a third battlegroup from the Lin-fli salient would penetrate into the Ordos and join Ch'ung

O at Lo-wu. This battlegroup from Lin-Fu was to guard the construction of additional four forts, Huang-tui-san-ch'iian, Tu-hun Valley, K'ai-kuang Ridge, and Chia-lu ( present day Chia Coimty), to complete the Sung perimeter on the western bank of the Yellow

" SS, chOan 486, p. 14007. CPPM. chOan 83, p. 2647. HCP, chflan 214, pp. 5193,5203-05, 5220, chOan 216, 5254-55,5258-59. SS, chflan 291, p. 9743. " HCP. chflan 220, p. 5356. " HCP. chflan 220, p. 5360, chflan 221, pp. 5390-91, ^ chflan 315, p. 10303. =•' HCP, chflan 220, p. 5356, chQan 221, p. 5368. 408

River.^®

In January of 1071, Ch'ung O infoimed the Ho-tung command about the initiation of

this carefully prepared campaign and led 2,000 soldiers out of Sui-te. Doubting the

feasibility of a joint operation in the Ordos, Chao Hsieh strongly advising reconsideration

by Han Chiang. In K'aifeng, Ssu-ma Kuang sternly remonstrated against the offense

insisting on domestic priority, while Fu Pi caxitioned the potential danger of a reinstituted

Khitan-Tangut collusion.^® Two days after the Chinese New Year, Ch'ung O approached

Lo-wu and vanquished a Hsi Hsia force, killing 1,200 men and capturing 1,400 Tangut

soldeirs. The entire campaign took 35 days of which 29 were spent in the construction of

Fort Lo-wu. Rapidly overruning the eastern part of the Horizon Mountain Range, Ch'ung

O captured all the Tangut ration storages and consimied them without expending any of

his own provisions except two tou and two sheng. At the same time. Yen Ta built Fort

Fu-ning in the snow.^°

In contrast to the rapid action of Ch'ung O, the battlegroup from Lin Fu encountered severe obstacles. The 170 li from the outpost of Lin-chou to Lo-wu was all hostile sector.

Laborers suffered from the harsh mobilization in winter and reinforcements from Fort

Divine Chamber were ambushed by the Tanguts.^^ Meanwhile the rivalry between Ssu- ma Kuang and Wang An-shih became open at Court and several companions of Wang such as Ch'eng Hao and Fan Ch'un-jen (1027-1101) split The Emperor delegated Fan Yu

" HCP. chQan219. p. 5330. HCP. chOan 218, pp. 5305-06,5312-16. Ssu-ma Kuang chou-i. chOan 28, pp. 308-10. HCP, chUan 219, pp. 5320, 5323. HCP. chOan 218, pp. 5305-06, chQan 220, pp. 5337-38 409

(d. after 1085) to observe the operation in Ho-tung and he reported that Lo-wu could be held only when all eight forts were built However, the energy of the manpower of Ho- tung theater had been exhausted after finishing the construction at Huang-tui-san-ch'uan and it was unlikely that the remaining forts could be accomplished.^^

Similarly, the force from Huan-Ch'ing Circuit remained blocked and its leadership incompetence in procrastination. Han Chiang conducted two incursions from Huan-

Ch'ing Circuit and was repulsed. Due to the recent disruption of the original command system, discipline collapsed and ethnic conflict erupted between Tribal Auxiliary and

Chinese soldiers. Wang Wen-liang, a tribal officer defected from Tangut, instigated a revolt. Although Lin Kuang and Yao Chiu fought callously to eventually suppress the marauding soldiers, the blocked force was immovable and began to dissipate.^^

Just prior to this, Hsi Hsia launched a counterattack upon the recently built Fort Fu- ning, slaugthering more than 1,000 Sung garrison soldiers. Although Lo-wu was built on mountanous terrain, neighboring Fort Fu-ning did not have such an advantage. The situation became grave afrer the Tanguts retook Fu-ning and threatened the supply link of

Lo-wu. Tse Chi-shih and Kao Yung-neng with more than six thousand soldiers encamped at Junior Pagoda or Hsi-fou-t'u near Lo-wu, preventing the situation from any further impairment. Frustrated by the fall of Fu-ning, Commander Ch'ung O was compelled to decide between two options: first, ivging Tse Chi-shih and Kao Yung-neng to retake Fu-

" HCP. chOan 220, pp. 5338,5344-45. HCP. chOan 220, pp. 5361-62. Fan Ch'un-jen (1027-1101), "Ssu-hung K'ang-kuo Han-kung mu-chih- ming", in Fan Ch'un-jen, Fan Chune-hsflen chi, SKCSCP. ser. 8, (1978), v. 151-54, chQan 15, p. 8 indicated that Han Chiang only coducted two incursions, although he was blamed with "exhausting the 410

ning and, second, aborting the entire mission. After a tormenting and tearful discussion with his transportation intendant, Ch'ung O finally aborted the operation and ordered Yen

Ta to the relief of Lo-wu and the return of the last men.^* Yen Ta conducted a valiant march, broke through to the encircled fort, withdrew the troops and rations, and returned with a considerable portion of soldiers alive.^^ The battlegroup from Ho-tung demolished

Fort Huang-tui san-ch*tian and returned.^®

The Sung failure was deep-rooted in an incomplete grand strategy assessment. The operation planners concerned with the economic aspect stressed an overruning of the

Tangut iron mines, tea plantfarms and fertile lands. Nevertheless, such a vigorous challenge of the Tangut ability to protect its economic resources inevitably compelled strong resistance of the Hsi Hsia Left Front Army or chuo-hsiang ping which guarded the northern ridge of the Horizon Mountains. In addition, the decision to war intensified the conflict disturbing Sung domestic reform. It did not serve the policy of Wang An-shih nor that of Ssu-ma Kuang. In the military sense. Sung Shen-tsung had delegated theater commander Han Chiang and commander of operation Ch'ung O with fiill authority, but none of the two managed to communicate with Ho-tung Theater. Han Chiang did not allow his reorganized army to have sufBcient time to adapt to the new command system.

This resulted in general confusion among his troops and provided an opportunity for the military revolt at Ch'ing-chou eventually disabling his blocking force. Ch'ung O had force and causing unrest" HCP. chQan 221, pp. 5368-69. Kuo K'uei analysed the Hsi Hsia tactics capturing Fu-ning as a prologue of taking Lo-wu, refer to "Kuo K'uei mu-chih", 12b-I3a. HOP, ChQan 223, p. 5417, chQan 240, p. 5825. 411

collected sufficient intelligence and accurately calculated his own provisions.

Nevertheless, his precipitate order of initiation inflicted intractable logistic and engineering problem on Ho-tung headqtiarters. He allowed only five days for the batdegroup from Lin-fo salient to advance up to Yin-chou, but in actuality such a distance usually took fifteen days.^^ Despite being a capable tactician, Ch'ung O failed to envisage the potential threat of Fort Fu-ning foreseen by Kuo K'uei. Also, the difficulties in well-building was another reason for failure.^® Nevertheless, he made the right decision to abort the campaign that minimized his loss. Officers such as Yen Ta, Tse Chi- shih, and Kao Yung-neng demonstrated outstanding service. In his final report, Han

Chiang evaluated the Lo-wu Campaign as a stalemate rather than a defeat by a quantiative comparison of gain and loss. However, xmdeniably, the Sung strategic goal was not achieved and both Han Chiang and Ch'img O were demoted.^®

Theater Strategy and Operation: The West Wing

In 1070, Wang Shao was appointed as Chief of Staff of Ch'in-Feng Theater

Command or Chu-kuan Ch'i-Feng lu chi'np-lueh-shih chi-i wen-chih. in charge of the preparation of a left wing offense. The idea of annexing Ch'ing-t'ang was derived from the many precursors of Wang Shao. After the death of ChQeh-ssu-lo, more than five civilian strategists in Shensi proposed such a scheme, including a Neo-Confucian forerunner Chang Tsai (1020-77). In P'eng Po-ch'uan's account, Wang Shao obtained

HCP.ch0an221.D. 5372. HCP, chQan 218, pp. 5305-06. HCP. chQan 220, p. 5356. SS^ chOan 330, pp. 10622-23. 412

such a proposal by a ofBcer Hsiang Pao from Ching-Yiian Conunander Ts'ai Ting, which embodied his "Proposal for Subduing the Barbarian". Another private anecdote attributed the origin of the Hsi-Ho campaign to Hsia Sung, on whose tomb tablet inscription Wang

Shao was inspired/" Wang Fang (1044-76), son of Wang An-shih, interviewed a senior soldier from Ch'in-chou and evolved the same plan/^ As these private records were likely provided by political rivals of Wang An-shih, they are not necessarily reliable.

Nevertheless, from ofGcial sources, it was still discernible that after the 1040s, the

Sung gradually extended its salient along the Wei River upstream. The culminative effort was the founding of Fort Ku-wei, the present day Lung-hsi County in 1055, spending one million kuan as construction cost and 100,000 kuan annually as garrison cost."*^ Fort Ku- wei was located at 310 li northwest of Ch'in-chou,^ ^ and originally dominated by the

Chang Hsiao-ch'i Tribe. As animosity sporadically intensified among Tibetan tribes and

Chang territory was gradually ravaged, the Chief surrendered the land to the Sung. Ch'in-

Feng Pacification Intendant Fan Hsiang ( mid 11th c.) accepted the surrender and appointed the Changs as patrolling inspectors by inheritance. Accompanying with Wang

Shao's later success, K'aifeng appointed a son of Fan Hsiang as a starting grade ofScial in

1072 in compensation of his father's establishment of Fort Ku-wei, the first walled

" HCP. Chaan 221, p. 5386-91, chOan 222, p. 5406. Tung-hsien pi-lu. chOan 5, p. 56, Shao-shih wen-chien-ch'ien-lu chQan 13, p.l44. Hung Mai (1123- 1202'>. Jung-tsai hsO-pi (Contiuation of Pen Notes by Hung Mai), (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition with Jung-tsai sui-oi and Jung-tsai san pi. 1978), chOan 15, p. 397. ' - HCP. ChQan 226,5507, TPCCTL. chOan 16, p. 1211. HCP, ChQan 177, p. 4291. ' ^ WCCY. chQan 18, p. 933, chQan 19, p. 972. 413

construction on the later ^^si-Ho Circuit/^

The newly founded Fort Ku-Wei was in extreme peril. There was ninety li along a single route from Ku-wei to Wen-ying Pass, the stronghold of Ch'in-chou, and beside the route there was the border moat. Tribes against Chang Hsiao-ch'i occasionally transfered their hostility against the Sung, once even building a fort to interdict the only viable route from Ku-wei to Wen-ying. Ch'in-Feng Circuit delegated Commander Kuo En and Liu

Huan to crush the tribes and the two generals destroyed the hostile fort after violent assault.''^ In 1068, Han Ch'i submitted a memorial, criticizing the strategic errors of the early Sung policy of inactivity especially the abandonment of Ling-chou. He was concerned that the Tangut construction of Fort Western Market or Hsi-shih-ch'eng as

Pao-t'ai Commandery near Lan-chou, was "only 120 li from Fort Ku-wei, a dangerous proximit>' in striking distance of the Han border". Also, he spelled out that Mu-cheng, the grandson of Chiieh-ssu-lo, had started to reinstate a previous collusion with a nxomber of

Tibetan tribes in Ch'in-chou and allied with the Tangut headquarters in Western Market

City. He concluded that the situation of Ch'in-chou had become "entirely different from that in 26-27 years before." Concerning a more initiative strategy, Han Ch'i proposed the enlargement of the western salient of Ch'in-Feng Circuit to protect the converted tribes and safeguard the route from Ku-wei to the interior and delegating Commander Yang

" HCP. chQan 241, p. 5887. Su Ch'e (1039-1112), Lung-ch'uan pieh-chih. (Supplimentary Records by A Man from Lung-ch'uan), (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition with Su Cb'e, Lung-ch'uan iQeh-chih. 1982), chQan 3, pp. 94-95. Lung-ch'an pieh-chih chOan 3, pp. 94-95. HCP. chOan 175, pp. 4224-26. Also, "Kuo K'uei mu-chih", 3b. 414

Wen-kuang to build Fort Kaa-ku.^^ Chih-yiian (d.l074), a Buddhist monk active among

tribal leaders of the region, evolved the same scheme with Wang Shao, suggesting that

the Sung take Hsi-Ho/^ Therefore, an active strategic position on the left wing of Shensi

theater had been nascent even in the days of Wang Shao.

However, when Wang Shao proposed to establish a Trade and Exchange Bureau in

Ku-wei and build two more forts in its west at Wei-yuan (the present day Wei-yuan

County) in 1070, dissensiion and disagreement so as to strategic means arose in the

Ch'in-Feng headquarters. Seeing that Wang Shao had gained favor from the Emperor and

Prime Minister, more than three colleagues and previous supporters of the expansion

turned to omit the plan in two different ways. Pacification Intendant of Ch'in-Feng Circuit

Li Shih-chung suggested the subjugation of tribes by purely diplomatic maneuvering, lest

the show of military construction and armed force would incite the tribes.''® On the

contrary-, Hsiang Pao, the original planner of the Hsi-Ho Campaign, now proposed the

hardline suppression of every ungovernable tribe. He argued that the tribes could not be

gained "merely with alcoholic drink, food, and sweet talk".^® Monk Chih-yiian, once

Wang Shao's colleague, was incited by Ex-Commissioner of Bureau of Military Affairs

Kuo K'uei who insisted on a defensive strategy, to become Wang Shao's rival.^° More

disturbing events occurred in the survey of virgin land along the Wei River. Of this vigin

land, Wang Shao claimed that there were more than one million mou sufficient to support

CPPM. ChQan 83, p. 2655-56, SHY, v. 186, mUitary 28, p. 7271. HWKC. chQan 16, pp. 234-36. ' • HCP. chQan 226, p. 5501, chQan 229, p. 5571. Tung-tu shih-tOeh. chQan 91, pp. 139^97. ^ chQan 332, p. 10679. HCP. chQan 210, p. 5101-02, chQan 212, pp. 5144-46, chQan 213, pp. 5176-77. 415

a large Tenant Archer force. Remonstrators accused Wang with of fabricated information

and the investigation prolonged up to 1071. The final report by Han Chen (1017-98)

confirmed that there were at least 400,000 mou. Despite exaggeration in Wang Shao's

original report, it was definitely not fabrication.^^ As a result, K'aifeng elevated Fort Ku-

wei as Tung-yuan Commandery and completely separated its conunand from Ch'in-Feng

Circuit. Wang Shao was given back all official titles and delegated as Pacification

Intendant of the newly established Tao-Ho circuit. Also, Emperor Shen-tsung delegated

Kao Chim-yii (d. after 1081), a grandson of a well-known captain of the early Sung Kao

Chiung, as deputy to Wang Shao.^^

From 1070 to 1071, Wang Shao and Monk Chih-yuan developed an intimate relation

with Chieh-wu ch'i-la, a Buddhist high priest, and Yu Lung-k'e (hereafter Pao Shun), the

chief of a powerfial Tibetan tribe. Their surrender with their whole tribes sped the

expansion of Tao-Ho Circuit." As Yu Lung-k'e brought with him a populace of

120,000, the demographic total of Pao-Ho Circuit was 200,000 men and women and

2,000 square li.^^

The Hsi-Ho Campaign from 1072 deviated from Wang Shao's original plan in two

places. Wang Shao did not intend to establish a separate circuit and direct administration

chflan 226, p. 5501, chflan 229, p. 5571, chQan 230, p. 5596. -- SHY. v. 121, economy 2, pp. 4826-27, v. 98, institution 65, p. 3863. HCP. chQan 213, p. 5176, chQan 216, p. 5262, chQan 224, p. 5460-61, SS, chQan 328, p. 10580. -- HCP. chQan 212, pp. 5144-45, chQan 226,5501-02, chQan 229, p. 5571, chQan 230, pp. 5600,5605, chQan 233, pp. 5645-46. Tung-tu shih-lOeh. chQan 82, p. 1255, HCP. chQan 214, p.5205, chQan 226, pp. 5501,5504, chQan 228, p. 5556, ChQan 230. pp. 5596-97, chQan 233, p. 5653 Tung-tu shih-lQeh, chQan 82, p. 1255. 416

in Pao-chou and Min-chou. With a governmental establishment and prefectural garrison, the Sung supply link extended and a cheap victory became impossible. An ominous sign was seen in 1072 when Wang Shao spent 600 bushels and 400 kuan a day in the constuction of Ch'ia-shen-p'ing in the northwest of Wei-yiian, as a stepping stone to seize

Wu-sheng. Wang An-shih approved this extraordinary spending but denied its questionable nature regarding improving soldier morale as a more imperative agenda.

When Wang Shao worried that there was insufScient time for mobililizing laborers from the interior to construct the walled town of Wu-sheng before the coming of snow, Wang

An-shih prefered to spend more than 100,000 kuan to hire laborers in the immediate vicinity.^^ By the late autumn of 1072, K'aifeng was compelled to establish a regular

Grain Exchange Bureau in the new territory to purchase regular rations.^®

In addition, both Wang An-shih and Wang Shao underestimated the Tibetan loyalty to the family of Chueh-ssu-lo. The name of Chueh-ssu-Io's eldest grandson Mu-cheng meant "Dragon Head", signifying the prevailing influence of the "Son of Buddha" in the

T'ao-Ho area. Wang Shao initially thought that the Tibetan tribes could be subjugated with a combination of deterrence and accomodation. Fort building and the standing army, especially with the stem performance of the Sixth Legion from Ching-Yuan,^^ demonstrated Sung military might, while tranquil order, lucrative trade, massive import

" HCP, chQan 237, pp. 5774-75, chQan 239, p. 5808. HCP, ChQan 238, p. 5786. In 1072 and 1073 the Sung reinforced Wang Shao with the Sixth Legion of Ching-YOan from Virtual Obedience Commandery associated by five thousand horsearchers, totally numbering nine thousand soldiers. This force embodied the fimdamental military power of the Tao-Ho Circuit TPCCTL. chQan 16, p. 1216. HCP. chOan 238, p. 5818, and chQan 240, p. 5826. 417

of tea and alcohol drink, appeased and pacified them under Sung rule. Nevertheless, when a Sung force penetrated into the Tibetan heartland of the Tao Valley, Wang Shao had to confront marauding tribes on one side, and loyalists of Mu-cheng on the other. Military means thus became indispensable. In the summer of 1072, Wang Shao suppressed

Chieftan Meng-lo-chiao (circa late 11th c.), who condoned pillage and banditry. Shortly thereafter, Wang Shao gained a series of victories over the Tibetan loyalists of Mu-cheng and overran Wu-sheng by surprise. At this very moment, despite being a consistent supporter of military reform, Ts'ai Ting reminded Sung Shen-tsxmg that massive slaughter was not to the advantage of pacification. The Emperor replied that it was impossible to subdue incorrigibles without a battle.^®

Wu-sheng was a crucial town upstream on the Tao River. A sizable Sung armed force stationed here could menace Lan-chovi, a large city of Hsi Hsia in the southwest.

Shortly after the conquest of Wu-sheng, the Sung established Chen-Tao Commandery and moved headquarters of Tao-Ho Circuit from Ku-wei to Wu-sheng. Wang An-shih expressed his regret at the slaughter but, at the same time, stated that the recovery of order would better Tibetan life.^® According to eunuch Wang Chung-cheng (d. after

1081), the Sung administration was warmly welcomed by the Tibetan populace at Wu- sheng. Girls gathered around Han Chinese officials "celebrating the extinction of private revenge and the beginning of a joyful living with trade."

" HCP, 235, p. 5702, chOan 237, p. 5764,5766, SS, chQan 328, p. 10580. " HCP. ChQan 237, p. 5767. HCP.chaan24I.D. 5886. 418

Wang An-shih was eager to overrun the western bank of the Pao River, where the power base of Mu-cheng, Ho-chou, became the hotspot K'aifeng upgraded Chen-Pao

Commandery as Hsi-chou prefecture and renamed the new territory Hsi-Ho Circuit.

Wang Shao seemed reluctant to agree to the incorporation of Ho-chou in the circuit as it would induce panic and opposition. However, Wang An-shih preferred an overt and firm stance of gaining Ho-chou to undermine Mu-cheng's resistance psychologically.®^

Associated by Ching Shih-li (d. 1074) and his Sixth Legion from Ching-YOan, Wang

Shao penetrated into the western bank of Ho-chou, occupied Hsiang-t2u-ch'eng or Fort

Fragrance, the present day Ho-cheng County, and Ho-chou. Mu-cheng escaped and struck back, launching a simultaneous attack against Wang Shao from multiple directions. Fort

Frgrance was under siege and the Sung relief force from Hsi-chou was destroyed. Wang

Shao and his ofScers Ching Shih-li, Miao Shou (1029-95) and Wang ChOn-wan fought ferociously to relieve Fort Fragrance from Ho-chou and routed the Tibetans. The force under Miao Shou killed five thousand Tibetans. But when Wang Shao was absent, Mu- cheng retook Ho-chou.®^

After this fruitless campaign, Wang Shao re-adjusted his strategy to target the

Tibetan inhabited area in the south, gaining a series of victories. With extraordinary prizes awarded, Wang Shao and Ching Shih-li launched a two-pronged final attack in the summer of 1073. On his second attempt, Wang Shao penetrated into the mountanous southern area of Hsi-ho Circuit, ravaging the living environs of hostile tribes, while

" HCP. chOan 238. p. 5818. 419

Ching Shih-li launched a sudden assault upon Ho-chou. His attention deceived by the southern campaign of Wang Shao, Mu-cheng again abandoned the vuhierabie town which was far firom ready to withstand the Sung.^^ In a one and half year campaign, Wang Shao took five prefectures, expanded territory for 2,000 U, killed 19,000 opposition soldiers and civilians, and subjugated 300,000 minority residents.^^

However, the success of Wang Shao was incomplete. In a military sense, this was a great victory unprecendented since 1005. Neither Ti Ch'ing nor any other Sung general ever achieved comparable success and Wang Shao was promoted from an ordinary degree holder to be Vice Military Counselor within the seven years from 1067 to 1074.®^ The

Sung domination of the upper range of Yellow Bliver and Pao River and the subjugation of the Tibetan population in the area provided a broad base of manpower for the constitution of an auxiliary force. Nevertheless, the extinction of the rule of Mu-cheng imposed political uncertainty on the nearby Tibetan dissident groups and jeopardized

Sung relations with Ch'ing-t'ang. In 1072, Tung-chan established a matrimonial alliance with Tangut, delegating General Ch'ing-i-chieh Kuei-chang (before 1017-91) to recover

Tibetan sovereignty south of the Yellow River. Armed conflict continued and the Sung created a new enemy by its own effort.®®

Kuei-chang rapidly mobilized a host nimibering 20,000 soldiers to confront Wang

Shao favorite and Ho-chou Govemor Ching Shih-li. Despite being a capable tactician and

" HCP. chOan 243, pp. 2912-14, 5919,5924-25. " HCP. chflan 246, pp. 5981,5983-86,5989, 5996-98. Lin-ch'uan hsien-sene wen-chi. chOan 56, p. 604. Tung-tu shih-lOeh. chflan 82, p. 1258, SS, chflan 328, p. 10581-82. Shfli-lin ven-vfl. chflan 9, p. 137. 420

distinguished through his career in the Sixth Legion, Ching Shih-li precipitately accepted battle at Fort Reconnoiter or Ta-pai ch'eng. With slightly more than 6,000 troops, the

Sung force was ambushed and Ching Shih-li was slain in a day-long bloody battle/^

Wang Shao immediately initiated his third adventure in the southern sector of the Hsi-Ho

Circuit, reconquering all the lost territory through quick and determined attack. However, he never completely exterminated loyalists of Ch\ieh-ssu-lo and a regular force had to be maintained in Hsi-Ho Circuit.®® From 1074 to 1076, the amiual military spending of the

Hsi-Ho Circuit to include food was 320 thousand shih of which the Court needed to purchase 220 thousand shih from the populace.®® This exemplified the cost of victory.

Despite bcoming a memeber of the Sung decision-making coterie, Wang Shao expressed his disagreement with the policies establishing direct administration on the new territory. He denied any responsibility for the increasing military budget and Wang An- shih felt offended. When the Sung-Vietnamese conflict escalated and the Vietnamese took Jung-chou in 1076, Wang Shao criticized Wang An-shih's policy in South China and was demoted.^" In his late life, Wang Shao established a Taoist sect synthesizing some early Neo-Confiician ideas such as "discovering Internal Nature" Cfa-mine chih-hsing).^^

Wang Shao revitalized the Sung military might and bestowed the emperor with glory.

" HCP. chQan 233, pp. 5651-52, chflan 241, p. 5879. Tai-ping chfli-chi t'line-lei. chQan 16, pp. 1221-22. Tai-ping chih-chi fung-lei. chOan 16, p. 1223, Tung-tu sbih-lQeh, chQan 82, p. 1258, SS, chQan 328, p. 10581, HCP. chOan 250,6098, chQan 252, p. 6178. HCP. chQan 254, p. 6209, chQan 272, p. 6670. SHY. V. 106, instinition 78, p. 4187, SSCW. chQan 16, p. 320, SS, chOan 328, p. 10582, HCP. chflan 273, p. 6684. SSCW. chflan 16, p. 319. Different record saw in Wei Tai's account, which described that Wang Shao converted to Buddhism, see Tune-hsien pi-lu. chQan 15, p. 172. 421

However, the Sung failed in gaining the cheap victory guaranteed by Wang Shao.

Conversion of the Southern '*Barbarians"and the Sino-Vietnamese War

Similar with Wang Shao's effort, a curriculum for massive ethnicconversion, territorial expansion, and land cultivation brought equivocal result in South China. In accounts provided by the Old Party, Chang Tun, Hsiung Pen, Hsiao Chu (1013-73), and

Shen Ch'i (d. 1088) were aggressive govemors but the Sung border erupted in excessive conflicts which effectively abolished the traditional "loose control" policy. Conflicts along an extensive border from Szechwan, Hunan to Kuangsi with a variety of ethnic and minority groups were difBcult to generalize; emotional vilification and factional bias prevalent in primary sources complicated historical judgment.^^ Nevertheless, policy changes by K'aifeng with economic, social, and military dimensions were still discernible.

In the first half of the eleventh century, territories from the southwest to the east of

Szechwan and a portion of the present day Kuei-chou Province, were settlements of the

"Southwest Barbarians". Among them, the "White Barbarians" or Pai-man founded the united Ta-li Kingdom, maintaining a stable relation with the Sung. Unlike the "White

Barbarians", another minority of the southeast, the "Black Barbarians" or Wu-man.

Lin Tien-wei, "Sung-tai Yao-luan pien-nien chi-shih'', in SSYCC. v. 6, (1971), pp. 457-86.Li Yung- Ts'un, "Sung-YQan i-lai Hunan oing-nan te Yao-luan", in SSYCC. v. 8, (1976), pp. 575-631. Li Yung- Ts'un, "Sung-tai Hupei-Iu liang-chiang ti-ch'Q te Man-luan", in SSYCC. v. 15, (1984), pp. 351-410. Ma Li, "Shih-lun Wang An-shih k'ai-fo Ching-bu Man-ti", in Teng Kuang-ming, Wang YOn-hai (ed), Sune-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (1993), pp. 371-92. Li Yung-ch'uen (1978)concIuded the various "barbarian" riots as a resuh of the Sung aggressive policy, without considering social and economic courses of these conficts, pp. 359-62. 422

believably the ancestors of today's I-chu, swere sparsely and separately settled in

Szechwan and Yunan."^^ Similar political disuniQr saw in the Yao tribes, especially the

"Liang-chiang-man", and variotis "barbarians" in Kuangsi/^ Some minorities such as the

"Liang-chiang-man" built tribal federation each ruled by shamans called "Oath Masters" or shih-chu. and "Supreme Oath Masters" or tu-shih-chii7^ In central Kuangsi, shamans holding copper trumpets assumed local leadership.^^ Most of these minorities remained in a slave or primitive society with rudimentary agrarian skills. Oxen were valuable possessions occasionally inciting property disputes and even armed conflict.^^ Because there was low profit in agrarian exertion demanding additional manpower, the kitnapping of Han people and slavery trade became active.'® Human sacrifice and cannibalism occured in some particular tribes.'^ Salt was desperately needed in these regions except for the coastal area of Kuangsi. Minorities living in interior Kuangsi acquired the smuggling trade from the Vietnamese.®"

Since the foimding of the Sung, K'aifeng employed a "loose control" policy and recognized local chieftains along the Szechwan, Himan, and Kuangsi borders as governors of "loose controlled prefectures". This policy claimed to "respect local custom" and minimized government involvement in the endless conflicts among tribes. However,

'^SS,chQan496.p. 14244. SS, chQan 493, pp. 14171-80. SS, chOan 493, pp. 14177-78 SS, chOan 495, p. 14209. For an illustrative example, refer to a case recorded in SS, chQan 494, p. 14199. SS, ChQan 493, pp. 14175-76, SS, chQan 493, p. 14174, chQan 495, p. 14217, SHY, v. 198, barbarian 5, p. 7789. SS, chQan 493, p. 14183, chOan 495, p. 14123. SHY, v. 198, barbarian 5. p. 7790. 423

this policy built a social and economic barrier between the "loose controlled prefectures"

and interior China. Private revenge and tribal ^war were forms of conflict resolution. Land

cultivation in the vicinity of "loose controlled prefectures" was prohibited, while crossing

border trade was subject to severe pimishment.^^ As the economic gap between Han and

non-Han widened, relations deteriorated with increasing smuggling, more slave trading,

and rioting. In 996, local Sung officials reported Vietnamese involvement in tribal riot in

which the town Ju-hsi in Kuangsi was pillaged. In 1072,1-chou, present day northern

Kuangsi, there was large scale revolt due to starvation.®^

Inspired by Wang Shao's success in Hsi-Ho, another New Party cadre Chang Tun

excercised direct control over the Plum Mountain region of Hu-Kuang Circuit, present-

day An-hua, Shao-yang City, and Leng-shui-chiang City of Hunan. As a result, minorities

enthusiastically converted and road building spread.®^ After this achievement, Chang Tun

gained the favor of Wang An-shih. He then shifted his effort to Liang-chiang-man located

in North Ching-hu Circuit and the westem segment of the present Hunan Province,

establishing Yiian-chou and Shen-chou.®^ As a result, massive cultivation was undertken

and local autonomy system was never reinstated in these districts even up to the Ming

and Ch'ing. In Kuei-chou, Hsiung Pen interfered in the tribal war between the Lo and Fu-

wang families. In 1080, Chieftan Ch'ia-ti (d.l082) of the Fu-wang Family attacked the Lo

tribes, which composed the militia force under Hsiung Pen, and eliminated a Sung

" SSj chQan 494, p. 14196, SHY. 198, barbarian 5, p. 7790. Also, for comprehensive disscussion of these prohibition, see Ma-li, "Shih-lun Wang An-shih k'ai-t'o Ching-hu Man-ti", pp. 374-79. SS, ChQan 488, p. 14063, chQan 495, p. 14208. " SS, ChQan 494, pp. 14196-97. 424

garrison. K'aifeng assigned Han Ch'uen-pao (d. 1081), the previous deputy commander of the Sixth Legion of Ching-YOan under Ching Shih-ii, to crush Ch'ia-ti with three legions.

Without obvious success, Han was sentenced to the death penalty in 1081 and replaced by Lin Kuang.°^ Lin Kuang, an officer who once withstood an all-out Tangut attack against the Huan-ch'ing circuit in 1070 and suppressed the Ch'ing-chou revolt in 1071, occupied the domain of Chia-ti in a forty-day winter campaign. However, he failed to eliminate the enemy due to unfamiliar geography.®® Only after the sudden death of Ch'ia- ti did the Sung barely manage to reorganize the tribes into militia units and pacify the region.

Kuangsi became a hotspot as the conflict with Vietnam escalated in the 1070s.

Conflict originated with the active Vietnamese intervention into tribal war complicating

Sino-Vietnamese relations. Known as An-nan and Chiao-chih in Chinese, Vietnam was independent from China during the Five Dynasties. The Pang established An-nan

Colonial Headquarters to administer the affairs of the "Southem Barbarians". In 907, with the fall of Tang, military governor Ch'ii Hao and, later, his son Ch'G Ch'eng-mei (d. after

930) dominated the territory. The Ch'ii family was defeated by the Southem Han regime in Kuang-chou but the militocracy survived and created instability during the following period of Wu domination (938-965). After the Wu rule had been sliced into pieces by twelve local warlords in 965, father Ting Pu-ling and son Ting Lien reunified An-nan and

SS, chaan 493, p. 14180, Ma-li, "Shfli-Iim Wang An-shOi k'ai-fo Chtng-hu Man-ti", pp. 379-81. SS, chOan 331, p. 10666, chOan 496, pp. 14246-47. SSCW. chOan 13, p. 271. SS, chaan 334, pp. 10738-39, chOan 496, p. 14247. HCP. chOan, 320, p. 7733, chOan 321, p. 7747, chaan 323, pp. 7778-7780. SSCW. chOan 3, pp. 271-72. 425

sent tribute to K'ai&ng in 973. Sung Tai-tzu recognized his autonomy but still claimed

Chinese overlordship. Ting Pu-ling was titled Prince of Chiao-chih, Colonial Intendant of

An-nan; in actuali^. Ting Pu-ling had proclaimed himself emperor in 968. Ting Lien was murdered in late 979 and a local ofBcer Li Huan usurped the power.^^ Infuriated by this usurpation. Sung Ta'i-tsung dispatched a force to An-nan in 980, defeated the Vietnamese in an open battle, but achieved no final success in the following jungle war. From 982, Li

Huan employed a political strategy similar with Li Chi-ch'ien's, maintaining ostensible allegiance but, at the same time, speeding up independence.®® After 986, K'aifeng engaged in a huge effort to deal with the Liao and had no &ee hand to interfere into the

Vietoamese succession conflict. The "loose-control" policy was maintained in which tribute and political autonomy were themes of Sxmg policy. As a consequence, Chiao- chih Palace Corps Commander Li Kung-wen seized power from the sons of Li Huan gained the Sung recognition as king.®®

From 1023 to 1031, border conflicts and sporadic incursion persisted and Sung

Kuangsi Regional Command started to fortify the border in 1047. Kuang-yOan Prefecture and Chia-t'ung were among the most aggressive Vietnamese regional powers, pillaging

Kuangsi border and enslaving numerous Sung households. The Sino-Vietnam relation from the 1050s to 1070s was complicated by the fluctuating posture of Kuang-yOan

SS, chflan 488, pp. 14057-62, SHY, v. 197, barbarian 4, pp. 7709-12. MCPT. chOan 5, p. 259. For a general survey, see HsQ YQ-hu, "Sung-ch'ao yO An-nan chih kuan-hsi", in Chune-hua wen-hua fii-ch'ine vfleh-k'an. v. 4, no. 9, (1971)7, pp. 54-57. More comprehensive data, referto LQ Shih-p'eng, "Sung-tai Chung-YQeh kuan-hsi nien-piao", in Tunghai Journal, v. 2, no. 1, (1960) 6, pp. 171- SHY. v. 175, military 8, p. 6891, HCP, chQan 21, pp. 476,484, chOan 22, p. 491, SS chQan 488, pp. 14058-63. 426

Prefecture. Kuang-ytian was originally a Sung "loose-control" prefecture but for most of

the eleventh century subjugated to Hanoi.^° In 1052, Kuang-yiian Prefect Nung Chih-kao

rose up against Chiao-chih and sought Sung support Rejected by K'aifeng, Nung Chih-

kao proclaimed himself Emperor, shifted his hostility against the Sung, and overran

Kuangtung and Kuangsi. Sung Jen-tstmg initially approved a Vietnamese proposal for a

joint force but finally rejected it on the advice of Ti Ch'ing.'^ A successful military operation, Ti Ch'ing's suppression of Nung Chih-kao did not sufBciently diminish the poltical tension among Sung, Kuang-yQan, and Chiao-chih. Chiao-chih pillaged nineteen villages and enslaved numerous inhabitants in 1059. In 1060, Chiao-chih and Chia-t'ung raided the Kuangsi border and killed Sung Patrolling Inspector Sung Shih-yao (d.l060)-®^

Nevertheless, it seemed that after the Nung Chih-kao rebellion the Sxmg employed an even more flexible policy than "loose control". Supervisor of Kuangsi Hsiao Chu enthusiastically collected information and built connections with chieftains in Kuangsi.

When the situation along the Kuangsi border deteriorated in 1059, Hsiao Chu submitted a memorial suggesting force. He foresaw that Hanoi had no intention of maintaining a long-term peace relation with K'aifeng and would threaten the Sung defenses in South

China. Perhaps influenced by biased sources provided by Old Party ofiBcials, historians have regarded the strategic advice of Hsiao Chu as the first document describing Sung

SS, chQan 488, pp. 14064-66, SHY, v. 197, barbarian 4, pp. 7712-14. About Kuang-ydan Prefecture, refer to HCP. chOan 167, pp. 4014-15. SHY, v. 198, barbarian 5, p. 7783. About Chia-t'ung, refer to MCPT. chflan 25, p. 258. SSCW. chOan 13, p. 270. MCPT. ChQan25, p. 258, SSCW. chflan 13, p. 270. HCP. chflan 172, pp. 4142-48, chOan 173, pp. 4162- 64,4166-69,4171-76,4179,4182-83, chflan 174, p. 4190. SHY, v. 198, barbarian 5, pp. 7783-84. HCP. chflan 189, pp. 4550-51, chflan 191, p. 4628, chflan 192, pp. 4634-36. SS, chflan 488, p. 14069. 427

aggression in Southeast Asia. To Hsiao Chu, this strategic discord with K'aifeng resulted

in demotion. However, historical investigation does not concluded that Hsiao Chu's

strategy was aggressive. It needs further research to confirm \^ether Hsiao Chu was a

forerunner of Sung foreign aggression or merely an active defense strategist. When Sung

Shen-tsung attempted to laimch an offense against Vietnam in 1073, he expected a support from Hsiao Chu; the latter advised the emperor to reconsider. He pointed out that the Viemamese had accelerated war preparations for years and was more ready for war than China.®^ As a related aspect of Hsiao Chu's ambiguous role, there were several

Kuangsi governors who after 1067 fostered war preparation, although not all of them were advocates of strategic offense. Lu Hsien, a serious remonstrator of Ch'ung O's sneak attack against Hsi Hsia, established a militia force among Kuangsi minorities during his incumbency as Kuangsi governor.®^

The successors of Lu Hsien accelerated war preparations to meet the outbreak. Shen

Ch'i and Liu I hastened militia trainning, built battle vessels, and even suspended bilateral trading.®^ Overreacting to this, the Vietnamese attacked Kuangsi at early 1076 and took

Sung regional headquarters at Yung-chou, the present provincial capital Nan-ning City, slaughtering 50,000 commoners.®® Prior to the fall of Yxmg-chou, Sung Shen-tsung had

" HCP, chOan 190, p. 4593, chOan 240, p. 5865, cfaQan 242, p. 5904,. SS, chOan 334, pp. 10728,10733- 34, SHY, V. 197, barbarian 4, p. 7716. HCP, chQan 203, pp. 4922-23. " SS, chOan 334, pp. 10728-29, HCP, chOan 242, p. 5904, chOan 244,5933, chQan 271, p. 6639. HCP, chQan 271, p. 6640, chOan 272, pp. 6656-58,6664-65, SHY, v. 197, barbarian 4, p. 7717, SSCW. chOan 13, pp. 248-249, in p. 249 Ssu-ma Kuang recorded that there was a Han scholar who mailed a letter to the King of Chiao-chih encouraging an invasion. After the Vietnamese defeat in 1077, Kuangsi regional command posted a bounty for this scholar, who committed suicide shortly. 428

decided a countenneasure; and, acknowledging the contingency, the Emperor immediately assigned Kuo K'uei, Chao Hsieh, and Yen Ta to conduct the campaign.^^

The expeditionary force, mostly organized ofr soldiers &om Shensi and Ho-tung, arrived in Kuangsi during the summer and launched a counter-attack in winter. Kuo K'uei astutely realized that Kuang-ytian Prefecture was the crux of the conflict and the conflict could not be one that was prolonged without the subjugation of all the local leaders. He delegated Yen Ta with three thousand Shensi cavalry to take Kuang-yiian Prefecture and subue the prefect and all chieftans. After this. Yen Ta conducted a feint fix)m Kuang-yuan but actually returned and advanced with Kuo K'uei toward the Vietoamese capital Sheng- lung, the present day Hanoi. With a concentrated force, Kuo K'uei heavily defeated the

Vietnamese elephant soldiers once and again at the northern bank of Fu-liang River, with the Vietnamese imperial heir killed. Skillfully employing the Shensi cavalry in the latter encoimter, Kuo K'uei and Yen Ta almost eliminated the entire Vietnamese imperial guard. Acknowledging the difGculty of corssing the river and the sufTering of soldiers from infection, Kuo K'uei approved a conditional smrender of Hanoi in early 1077.®®

In some accounts in pennotes provided by Old Party scholars, the Sino-Vietnamese

War from 1076 to 1077 was the climax of a series of political and military failures. Hsiao

Chu was blamed as introducing an "aggressive strategy" against Vietnam, while the war

HCP. chQan 271, pp. 6649-51, cbOan 272, pp. 6659-61, chOan 273, p. 6674, "Kuo K'uei mu-chOi", 14b- 15a, ^ chQan 290, p. 9725, chOan 332, p. 10685, chQan 349, p. 11056. SSj chQan 290, p. 9725, chQan 349, pp. 11056-57, chQan 350, p. 11083, "Kuo K'uei mu-chih", 15a-16b, HCP. chflan 276, pp. 6739-40,6748,6762, chQan 279, pp. 6830-34,6843-44, SHY, v. 175, miilitary 8, p. 6891. 429

preparations by Shen Ch'i and Liu I were considered provocative.'® Without taking the

Vietnamese capital and capturing their king, the victorious general Kuo K'uei received an emotional vilification. To some Old Party scholars, this campaign was a military failure.

As Ch'eng I claimed, Kuo K'uei mobilized more than 100,000 soldiers and 200,000 laborers. Most of them were lost due to infections in summer and only 20,000 soldiers retumed.^°° Nevertheless, these accounts need more study to confirm their reliability.

According to ofBcial records, Kuo K'uei moimted his campaign with only 49,000 soldiers instead of more than 100,000 soldiers.^°^ For the polittcal rationale of war, these pennote writers did not observe Sino-Vietnamese relations from an interactive angle and merely criticized them from a domestic point of view. The Sino-Vietnamese War from 1076 to

1077 was the culmination of bilateral escalation for years and not necessarily the fault of any one individual. Some particular policies such as Liu I's suspension of bilateral trade might have provoked invasion, but, similarly, it was difficult to regard sporadic

Viernamese transgressions as tolerable. The political consequence of the Sino-

Vietnamese War served a stable bilateral relation. There was no severe conflict between the two countries after Kuo K'uei's expedition. The Vietnamese relinguished all territories occupied by Kuo K'uei to K'aifeng. Nevertheless, the Sung only established prefectural rule in Kuang-ytian that was previously a "loose control prefecture" during the early

Sung. Even this prefecture was returned to Chiao-chih under the terms of releasing

" SS, chQan 334, pp. 10728-29, HCP. chOan 271, p. 6639. •°° HCP, chQan 280, p. 6868. HCP, ChQan 280, p. 6868-69. 430

captives and enslaved conimoners.^°^ No Sung territorial ambition toward Vietnam was

evident.

The question is then raised not on the military accomplishment, nor on its political

outcome, but how on its e£fect on the priorities in Sung grand strategy. Disregarding Old

Party criticism with its bias and vilification, was it worth while for K'aifeng to engage in

such strenuous effort in South China? Did it serve the grand strategic priority of Wang

An-shih: Hsi-Ho the first, Hsi Hsia the second, and Liao the last? It was unquestionably

the conversion of the various minorities that improved economic prospects and enhanced

social stability in South China; and Sung military measures against the Vietnamese was an undesirable response after the fall of Yung-chou. Nevertheless, unlike the colonization of Hsi-Ho, the conversion of the "Southwest Barbarians" and the defeat of Vietnam could not generate any military resources for the Sung against Hsi Hsia, nor could the southern frontier rely on its own regional forces. Despite the absence of prolonged war against a specific enemy, the Sung inevitably deployed a considerable proportion of its elite

Legionary Army. The Vietnam Campaign was undertaken during the second half of the

1070s, a relatively tranquil period in foreign affairs. Despite a military victory, at least half of soldiers were lost in this campaign, even according to the ofScial figure. A more irksome situation dealing with the "Southem Barbarian" happened in 1081 when the

Sung had nearly 500,000 soldiers launch an all-out attack against the Tangut enemies.

Some capable Sung commander such as Lin Kuang, Yen Ta, and Yao Chiu were absent

SS, chQan 334, p. 10736, HCP. chOan 300, pp. 710-11, chQan 349, pp. 8372-74. 431

on the battle list of the most vigorous offense against Hsi Hsia since 898. Shortly prior to

this campaign, the newly appointed Huan-Ch'ing commander Kao Chun-ya arrived at his

headquarters and discovered a pitiable reality. All well trained infantry and cavalry had been dispatched to Szechwan under Lin Kuang against Ch'ia-ti and the rest were untrained in the use of the newly employed heavy crossbows, shields, and other equipment.^°^ The Sung created a two-front war in 1081 when 100,000 soldiers deployed in Szechwan with capable commanders Lin Kuang and Yao Chiu against the "Soutwest

Barbarians".

The Ling-chou Campaign, 1081

In the sxmuner of 1081, Vice Supreme Director of Operation of Fu-Yen Circuit

Ch'ung O submitted a confidential memorial to the Emperor indicating that King P'ing- ch'ang had been overthrown and Tangut anarchy was imminent. Ch'ung O urged a quick response to such an opportunity. If the Court had difficulty mobilizing troops for a large expedition, he said, "just authorize me to lead the nine legions of Fu-Yen Circuit and overrun them."^°* At the same time, rumor spread along the frontier about the assassination of Ping-ch'ang whom, in actuality, was imprisoned by Empress Dowager

About the complaint of Kao Chun-yQ, see HCP. chflan 322, p. 7763; about the size of Lin Kuang's expeditionary force, see chQan 323, p. 7779. Fan Ch'un-jen, "Shih-wei ch'in-chiln ma-chOn tu-ya-bou Lin-hou mu-chih-ming'*, hereafter as "Lin Kuang mu-chih", in Fan-chune-hsflen-chi. chflan 13, p. 17a recorded: "[After the execution of Han Ch'uen-pao, the Emperor] ordered the Marquis (Lin Kuang) to take over the command. As the Marquis arrival, he demanded 30,000 soldiers and a total of twenty legions divided into Vanguard and Rear Guard." It is likely that the 30,000 soldiers were reinforcement instead of the total strength because a large force had been under Han Ch'uan-pao since the last year. Also, the culminated figure of twenty legions, each having five thousand solcUers, was 100,000 soldiers. HCP, chOan 312, pp. 7568-69. 432

Liang and her favorite. The younger brother of the Empress Dowager, Liang I-mai,was empowered. Sung Shen-tsung rejected the impetuous proposal of Ch'ung O but enthusiastically engaged in a large effort for preparing an offense. By the end of the year, the Shensi command finalized campaign readiness and organized the Sung legions into five battlegroups.

The objective of the Sung expedition was, in the first place, the reconquest of Ling- chou and, further, a complete eradication of Hi-hsia. Emperor Shen-tsimg assigned Li

Hsien, an eunuch general previously supervising Wang Shao and the current theater commander of Hsi-Ho Circuit, to lead the first batdegroup. His attack was designed with great flexibility, advancing northward either by boat or foot and turning northeastward to

Ling-chou. Or, the imperial edict said, he could take Liang-chou and cut off the Ho-hsi

Corridor, if the situation allowed. Whatever his route, the Tangut Pao-t'ai Commandery would be formidable adversaries. The strength of this battlegroup supposely numbered more than 100,000 soldiers but was actually approximately 50,000 soldiers.^®®

Composed by 50,000 well-trained Ching-Yiian warriors, the second battlegroup was under Commander Liu Ch'ang-chuo. Liu Ch'ang-chuo was bom of a veteran family whose father Liu Ho (d.l042) was killed by the Tanguts at the Battle of Ting-ch'uen

(1042). Liu Ch'ang-chuo grew up as an expert archer and tactician, known for his special

HCP. chQan 313, pp. 7593-94. Another similar report by Hsi-chou 2 Governor Miao Shou, refer to HCP. chQan 312, p. 7578. Also, memorial by Ytt Ch'ung (d. 1081), HCP. chQan 312, pp. 7584-85. HCP. ChQan 313, pp. 7603-04,7608, chflan 315, pp. 7621,7624, 7633-34. On the size of his battlegroup, see Ch'en Shou-chung, Ti Hsien ch'Q Lan-Hui chi-ch'i shuo-ching ch'eng-tsai k'ao", Hsi-pei shih-ti. 1(1986)3, pp. 86-90, also, in Ho-Lune shih-ti k'ao-shu. pp. 128-35. 433

inclination for new tactics and weapons.^°^ Blis task during the 1081 campaign was to

open the path in central fix>nt directly toward Ling-chou fix)m the south to the north

through the Gourd River. Because this was a historical and predictable route, the

battlegroup confronted a stubborn Tangut resistance by the Tien-tu chian-chOn-shih or

Celestial Capital Commandery.^°®

The third battlegroup from Huan-Ch'ing under Kao Chun-yQ would cover the right

flank of Liu Ch'ang-chuo. Kao Chun-yii was an uncle of Sxmg Shen-tsung and the Ex-

Vice Pacification Intendant and Vice Supreme Director of Operation of Hsi-Ho Circuit

under Wang Shao. His grandfather Kao Ch'iung was a respected veteran covering Sung

Tai-tsung's withdrawal from the Sorghum River in 979 and assisting Sung Chen-tsxmg during the Shan-yuan Campaign in 1004.^°® BCao Chun-5ai was known for his caution but was probably over wary in the view of Wang Ah-shih.^^° Now he was to attack from

Huan-chou border through another historical route toward Ling-chou through the P'u-lo

River where a Sung force carrying a 400,000 shih food supply was ambushed in 996. Kao

Chun-yu would confront the Tangut Wei-chou in the Ching-sai chun-shih or Tranquil

Frontier Commandery and lay siege to Ling-chou assisted by Liu Ch'ang-chuo.^^^ As stated before, his best troops were under Lin Kuang deployed along the southern border

SS, chOan 349, p. 1053. Forage, Paul C., "The Sino-Tangut War of 1081-1085", Journal of Asian History. (1991) pp. 1-28, identified Liu Ch'ang-chuo as an eunuch in p. 8. This identification contradicted to the biography of SS. About his enthusiasm on weaponry innovation, see SHY, v. 185, military 26, p. 7229. ^°^HCP. chOan317. p. 7677 SS, chQan 464, p. 13574. About Kao Ch'iung, see, SS, chOan 289, pp. 9691-94. HCP, chQan 243, pp. 5914-15. HCP, chOan 317, p.7677. 434

of Szechwan and not available for this campaign.

At the same time, the fourth and fifth battlegroups under Ch'img O and Wang

Chung-chen were nearly to repeat the Lo-wu campaign a decade before. Ch'ung O was assigned to depart ftom Sui-te Commandery and attack the Tangut Left Front Army along

Wu-ting River with 54,000 Fu-Yen warriors and 39,000 troops firom the Metropolitan, overruning the Horizon Mountains. Wang Chung-cheng's battlegroup fi-om the Lin-fli salient would break through into the Ordos Desert, with 60,000 soldiers and a similar size of laborers. The pincer attack would join at Hsia-chou first and advance toward Ling- chou later.^^^

Four days after the initiation in late 1081, Ch'ung O crushed the Tangut Left Front

Army numbering 80,000 soldiers along the Wu-ting river. He immediately laid siege of

Fort Rice Lard, a Tangut supply center in by the most fertile land around Horizon

Mountains.^^^ Wang Chvmg-cheng remained inactive for nine days after entering hostile sector.^^^ To clinch the final stroke of the Hsi-Ho Campaign and at the same time provide a prologue to the Ling-chou expedition, Li Hsien entered Ma-han Mountains, its peak height 3670 meters; passed through Nu-che Valley, and defeated 20,000 Tangut cavalry.

With this initial victory, he took Fort Kan-ku (the present day Hsiao-k'ang Ying) with a

Tangut royal farm, capturing nimierous arrows and iron stafts. Vigorously storming Lan- chou, Li Hsien completely destroyed Hsi Hsia Pao-t'ai Commandery and gained a foothold on the upper reaches of the Yellow River. After assigning his deputy to

HCP. chQan 316, pp. 7650-51. 435

consolidate the defense perimeter, Li Hsien personally formed his attack toward the

Celestial Capital Mountain.^^^

Simultaneously at Mo-chi Pass, Liu Ch'ang-chuo clashed with a formidable Tangut

host under Prime Minister Liang I-mai, numbering 30,000 soldiers. As the Tangut army

occupied a ridge controlling the pass, the lay of the terrain was to the extreme

disadvantage of the Sung. Nevertheless, Liu Ch'ang-chuo conducted a stalwart frontal

attack, forming his battlegroup in four lines. First, he covered his "Mighty Arm"

Crossbowmen with shieldmen. After the "Mighty Arm" Crossbowmen were Ordinary

Crossbowmen and Archers. Vanguard Cavalry stood in the last line. Commander Liu

personally led the assault, carrying two shields as an ordinary soldier on the first line.

After several hours struggle, the Sung Ching-YOan battlegroup overcame the enemy and

broke through the pass. As a result, the Tangut army was demoralized through this

encounter, Liu Ch'ang-chuo faced no ftirther strong resistance all the way to Ling- chou."®

Grasping that the defeat of the Hsi Hsia Left Front Army by Ch'img O was an excellent opportunity to take the Horizon Mountains, Pacification Intendant and Sureme

Director of Operation of Fu-Yen Circuit Shen K'uo pressed the attack. On one side, he delegated Commander Ch'Q Chen to take P'u-t'ao-shan or Peach Mountain. On the other,

Shen K'uo, himself, overran the Tangut forts at Junior Pagoda, Chia-lu, I-he, and Fort

^ ChOan 335, pp. 10746-47. HCP. chOan 316, p. 7653. HCP, chQan 316, pp. 7650-51, chOan 317, p. 7657, chOan 318, p. 7680. SSCW. chOan 14, p. 277. HCP. chOan 315, pp. 7632-34, chOan 316, pp. 7638-42. Ch'en Shou-chung, "Li Hsien ch'O Lan-Hui chi- ch'i shuo-ching ch'eng-tsal k'ao". 436

When Fort Rice Lard fell into the hands of Ch'ung O, he captured 19,500 shih of grain and 4,000 arrows and other weapons. However, these victories cost him nine days from exploiting the penetration. Prior to his occupation of Hsia-chou, the food supply of the Fu-Yen battiegroup had rapidly depleted. Wang Chung-cheng, hestitating to penetrate any farther and spent nine days near the border and faced a similar intractable shortage of food. His only hope was to capture the Tangut storage at Hsia-chou, but at his arrival he discovered that the whole prefecture had been pillaged and abandoned by Ch'ung O one day before. From this time on, the two battlegroups, Fu-Yen on the front and Lin-Fu at the rear, started on an imdemourished plunder toward Ling-chou.^^®

Kao Chun-yu did not clash with any formidable adversary as Liu Ch'ang-chuo had encountered, but his advance was slowed by a series of skirmishes along the P'u-lo River.

His subordinate Chang Shou-yueh (circa mid 11th c.) proposed a rapid penetration with cavalry toward Ling-chou but this was rejected by Kao.^^® As Liu Ch'ang-chuo and Kao

Chun-yu approached Ling-chou, a senior Tangut general suggested a fabian strategy against the Sung: avoiding open battle and exhausting the Simg force in a prolonged siege. On the eighteenth day of the campaign, the Ching-YOan battiegroup approached the walled city of Ling-chou. Liu Ch'ang-chuo almost gained entry by breaking into the gate. However, this vigorous effort was nullified by rapidly depleting rations. As Kao

Chun-yii arrived, dispute in strategy and logistics immeditately arose between the two

HCP. chflan 317, pp. 7677-78. HCP. chUan 318, pp. 7693,7696-97, chQan 319, pp.7703-04, chQan 319, p. 7717. HCP, chOan 318, pp. 7680-82, 7686, 7692, 7694, 7696-97, chQan 319, p. 7702-03,7705. HCP. chflan 318, pp. 7681, 7683-84,7686,7693. 437

generals. Kao and Liu soon discovered that the Tanguts had destroyed a Ham on the upper

Yellow River. Thanks to ingenious construction, Ling-chou city was built on a sandy island that survived the frequently flouding Yellow River and a flood was only disastrous to the Sung army encamping in open terrain. Liu Ch'ang-chuo and Kao Chun-yti siiffered from the flood and the pursuit of Tangut army. The two battlegroups from Fu-Yen and

Lin-Fu were in a state of serious starvation after approaching Yu-chou so that the

Emperor authorized them to abort the mission under aggravating conditions. Wang

Chung-cheng lost nearly 20,000 soldiers and 3,000 laborers before returning to the border.^^^ Li Hsien proceeded toward the Celestial Capital Mountain, defeating a famous

Tangut general Jen-tuo Ling-ting (or Hsing-tuo li-ting). He marched victoriously into the

Hsi Hsia seasonal palace at Celestial Capital Mountain and burned it. Acknowledging the withdrawal of Liu Ch'ang-chuo and Kao Chun-yii, Li Hsien rapidly returned to Lan-chou in full strength.

The unsuccessful Ling-chou campaign testified that an expedition longer than a month could not be sustained by Sung logistics. As assessed by Shen K'uo, the maximum length of a campaign by 100,000 soldiers was thirty-one days.^^^ Probably flushed by his early victories, even Ch'ung O at this time failed to calculate his provisions needs accurately. The Sung conducted the campaign in late winter and low temperatures, as

HCP. chQan 318, p.7697, chQan 319, p. 7700,7704,7707, Maeda, pp. 402-03, chOan 320, p. 7720, 7731. HCP. chOan 319, p. 7715-16, chQan 320, p. 7721,7727. SSCW. chQan 14, pp. 278-81. HCP. chQan 317, pp. 7666-67, chQan 319, p. 7709, chQan 320, p. 7725. MCPT. chQan 11,pp. 126-27. Also, on the difficulties of the Sung logistics, see HCP. chQan 317. p. 7677, ChQan 319, pp. 7703, 7712. 438

well as starvation, hazarded the soldier's performance. But, providing that the operation was conducted in preferable weather, its plan had still even another questionable ingredient. It required exact coordination of the five battiegroups to concentrate at Ling- chou and assigned routes for Wang Chung-cheng and Ch'ung O that were too long to accomplish. Nevertheless, the siege of Ling-chou marked the first time since1039 that Hsi

Hsia started to avoid open battle e^ainst the Sung.

Right Wing Outflanking 11: The Fiasco at Fort Eternal Happiness

After the unsuccessful Ling-wu campaign, there remained two options for strategic offense. The first, composed by Li Hsien, suggested a second strike by a concentrated force from Ching-Yuan Circuit to occupy the Celestial Capital Mountain. Li Hsien suggested that a Sung fortress in the environ of Ling-chou would harrass Tangut farming and facilitate a foothold for further attack. However, after investigation by another euinuch Li Shun-chu (d. 1082), the Court realized that Ching-Yiian Circuit could not provide sufficient laborers for logistic transport.

The second plan proposed by Shen K'uo and Ch'img O renewed the Sung offense for taking the Horizon Mountains. Their scheme did not differ fix>m that of Liu P'ing, Fan

Chung-yen, and Han Ch'i's very much but provided a far more systematic and orderly analysis of theater geostrategy especially the economic aspects, the strategic transition fi-om defense to offense, and a variety of operational and tactical options,. At the beginning of the memorial, they forecasted: "Now when Ching-Yiian was preparing an 439

offense, the enemy will not dare to leave their base and fortify the mountainuous border.

This is the time for conducting an operation by our circuit." As a scientist and

geographer, Shen K'uo presented a professional evaluation. "Advantages and

disadvantages hinge on the desert If they (the Tanguts) cross the desert to attack, they

would be the first exhausted; and if we crossed the desert to attack, then we would be the

first exhausted. However, in actuality, the western barbarians manage to raid the border

frequently. Why? This is because in the south of the desert there are food to eat, people to conscript, water to drink, grass to feed their horses, and favorable terrain to defend along the mountainous border...This is the geographic reason for why the commoners of Ch'ing- ch'ing (the Tangut capital) can be emancipated to sleep in repose, while our forts along the frontier have never ceased from alert."

If the Sung occupy the Horizon Moimtains, the Tanguts would be compelled to suffer several tactical disadvantages as discussed by Shen K'uo and Ch'ung O:

"With their provisions exhausted and their army fatigued after crossing the desert,

they would be compelled to station their troops around dimes and attack our fortified

strongholds on the mountain. Then we can gain numerous options. We can open the

gates and offer battle as we wish; we can rest our troops until the enemy are

exhausted in prolonged siege. We may pursue the enemy in retreat or only exert

abstemious effort to withstand their attack. We can even give more priority to

domestic affairs and make the enemy fight on an disadvantageous open terrain

SHY. v. 186, military 28, pp. 7282-83. SSCW. chflan 14, p. 282. 440

against our fortresses on the mountain."

On economic aspects, Shen K'uo and Ch'ung O mentioned that the local output could sustain a long war and the Court had no need to worry about the corresponding expense for such an extended perimeter. They said:

"Local farming can support several ten thousand soldiers. The grassland is good for

husbanding battle horses, while salt lakes would accelerate trading to the four

directions. Output &om the iron mines facilitates arm manufacture and coin

molding, reducing the logistics transport from south of mountain."

With this economic base, the Sung could "expel their populace south of the River to the north and have them become refugees. Terminating bilateral trade, suspending annual reward, appeasing Khitan, and allying with Tung-chan are all the methods to devitalize the enemy." Long-term blockade would eventually provide opportunity for quick decision. "After the fortification of the Mountain, they (the Tanguts) were only distant for several-days forced-march...When their preparation weakened, we can dispatch battle vessels firom the Pao-River into the Yellow River and laimch a surprise attack by the troops on Horizon Mountains. This single strike would be su£Scient to carry out a decisive annihilation."

As Emperor Shen-tsung approved this proposal for further research, Shen-tsung and

Ch'img O conducted a survey and proposed the first construction at the site of the ruins of a castle, Wu-yen. According to their description, Wu-yen was located eigthy li to the west

SHY. V. 194, geography 19, p. 7649, HCP, chOan 326, pp. 7856-58. SS, chOan 335, p. 10747. 441

of Hsia-chou and forty li east of Yu-chou.^^® Sung Shen-chung delegated civil ofiBcial

Hsu Hsi (d.l082) and eunuch Li Shun-chu to supervise the operation.^^^ Ch'ung O elaborated the plan in a total of eleven memorials and made modifications in court interview. However, when Ch'ung O expounded his scheme in detail at K'aifeng, Hsu Hsi overruled Shen K'uo in the field survey and shifted the first site to a mountain in Eternal

Happiness Valley or Yung-lo ch'uen.^^® After finishing Fort Eternal Hapiness, the Sung would construct Fort Wu-yen and the others, a total of twelve forts along the Horizon

Mountains Range.^^® At the same time, Ch'ung O was criticized for his performance during the Ling-chou Campaign and was demoted a rank.^^° After returning to Yen-chou,

Ch'ung O realized that some vital alterations had been made on his original plan. He strongly advised Hsu Hsi not to start the construction at Yung-lo; otherwise "it would result in defeat." As a result of discord, Hsu Hsi and Shen K'uo excluded Ch'ung O away fi-om the operation and assigned him to command the garrison of Yen-chou. Hsu Hsi, Li

Shun-chu, and Shen K'uo mobilized the legionary and tribal army of Fu-yen Circuit, numbering 40,000 soldeirs, and marched toward the Horizon Mountains with a double size of laborers. Military officers Ch'u Chen, Kao Yung-neng, and Ching Shih-i (d.l082).

SHY. V.194, geography 19, p. 7649-7650. HCP. chQan 326, p. 7859. Tune-tu shih-lOeh. chOan 86, p. 1312. Wei Tai, Tune-hsien oi-lu has an erroneous account on the terrain of Fort Eternal Happiness, regarding that the fort was built on a plain land and ensued the fiasco. This incorrect description was probably aimed to exaggerate the military incompetence of HsQ Hsi and blamed the New Party with the entire failure of foreign policy. HsQ Kuei, "Tung-hsien pi-lu chi-shih ting-wu", in Teng Kuang-ming and Wang YQn-hai (ed.), Sung-shih ven-chiu lun-wen-chi. (K'aifeng; Honan Ta-hsQeh, 1993), pp. 434-49 pointed out the error of Wei Tai's account. HsQ Kuei quoted a passage from SSCW suggesting that Fort Eternal Happiness was built not on plain terrrain but on a mountain, p. 447. Also, SSCW. chQan 14, p. 283. HCP, chOan 328, pp. 7893-96. HCP, chOan 328, p. 7893-94, chOan 329, pp. 7921-23. 442

younger brother of the Commander of the Sixth Legion Ching Shih-li, each commanded a force. Transportation Intendant Li Chi (d.1082) was in charge of logistics.^^^

According to a common explanation, the failure of well building determined the tragedy of Fort Eternal Happiness. Li Tao recorded, "(Fort) Yimg-Io was built on a mountain without a reservoir. Along Wu-ting River there were fourteen wells surrounded by a wall. As a result of a sudden strike by the enemy,...all these 'water forts' (shui-tsai") were lost." Hsu Hsi ordered a strenuous effort to build three wells within the fort but it was only sufScient for the daily need of officers. Ordinary soldiers rioted and all afterward vilification focused on Hsu Hsi.^^^ Nevertheless, historical accounts do not seem to suggest that geography and engineering allowed every walled construction on the

Sung-Tangut border to include springs, wells, and other water resources sufBcient for the daily demand of every being within the walled area. Geography forced engineering into the harsh dilemma of building a fort on a mountain or on a riverside. It was not uncommon to build supplementary"water forts" outside the main fort built on a moimtain ridge. Fort Great Obedience, known as a formidable stronghold, had a 'water fort' outside

HCP. Chaan 329, pp. 7921-23, SSCWchOan 14, pp. 283-284. HCP chflan 329, p. 7921 recorded the number of soldiers as 80,000, doubling the size provided by Ssu-ma Kuang. I regard Ssu-ma Kuang's count as more reliable for the following reasons. First, Ssu-ma Kuang was a contemporary of the event and had easier access to information from the front Second, as an anti-reformist, Ssu-ma Kuang might have the motivation to enlarge the size of army and show the follacy of aggression. However, on the contrary, the number he gave was much smaller than Li Tao's. This suggests that his estimate was likely unbiased. Third, Li Tao in some other passages seemed to agree with Ssu-ma Kuang. In HCP. chOan 329, p. 793S, Li Tao recorded a dialogue between Shen Kua and HsQ Hsi, in which Shen Kua said; "Our force is only numbering thirty thousand." Also, in p. 7932-33, Li Pao indicated that Shen Kua returned to Fort Rice Lard with 10,000 soldiers. Therefore, we can deduce that there were 30,000 soldiers in Fort Eternal Hapiness and 10,000 soldeirs in Fort Rice Lard shortly prior to the siege, agreeing with Ssu-ma Kuang. Fourth, the Sung lost half of troops at the first encounter outside Fort Eternal Happiness, on which Ssu-ma Kuang wrote: "Ch'Q Chen and more than 10,000 soldiers returned to the fort" This also agrees with his 443

the gate. It was not until 1071 that Lin-chou, the heart of the Lin-Fu salient, could extend its town wall to include exterior springs and wells. None of these strongholds fell during the vigorous Tanguts offense in 1041 and 1070.^^^

The Sung misfortune at Fort Eternal Happiness had more fundamental reasons. Both

Shen K'uo and Ch'ung O had an over-optimistic evaluation of blocking effect of Li Hsien in Ching-YOan. In actuality, this attack was never undertaken. At the same time. Shea and

Ch'vmg under-estimated the Tangut capacity to react. The entire operation plan assumed that the Tangut mainbody would not leave the central position to riposte the ofiense of

Fu-Yen. On the contrary, Tangut mobilized ninety percent of male adults to organize a gigantic host consisting of200,000 men, carrying rations for a hundred days. Hsu Hsi was responsible for not taking any action when more than ten reports about unusual Hsi

Hsia mobilization reached his headquarters.

Hsu Hsi committed several flaws in tactical command that dramatized the Simg defeat and provided components for emotional castigation by Old Party ofScials. Battling the Tangut host, Hsu Hsi inappropriately employed the ch'i-pine or Striking Force, a type well-trained in martial arts and usually reserved for counterstrike, as the vanguard of the entire formation. Ch'a Chen immediately pointed out the error and reminded Hsu Hsi that he would likely lose his best troops at the earliest stage of the battle. Not only did Hsu

Hsi reject changing the battle formation, but he made another problematic decision.

previous record of 30,000 soldiers in Fort Eternal Happiness. SSCW. chOan 14, pp. 283-84. HCP. chQan 239, pp. 7936 SSCW. chOan 14, p. 284. Chi-nan hsien-shene shih-vou fan-chi. p. 14b. HCP. cuhan 214, p. 5220, chQan 226, p. 5506, SSCW. chOan 12, p. 243. SSCW. ChQan 14, p. 283. 444

Confinning that the Tangut vanguard were the "Iron Hawks", Kao Yung-neng urged Hsu

Hsi to take the initiative and attack the Tangut cavahy beside the Wu-ting River. Fighting

on the muddy land of the riverside would have reduced the capability of the Tangut heavy

cavalry. With this suggestion also rejected, 30,000 Sung warriors confronted the Tanguts

in overhelming number on the open plain. Seeing that the battle would soon be hopeless,

Ch'u Chen proposed an flanking attack upon the rearguard of the Tanguts but was

rejected again. The Sung lost more than 10,000 men at the first day and Fort Eternal

Happiness fell after a desperate resistance for only a few days.

This was a disastrous fiasco in which a number of experienced officers died.

Unwilling of being captured and disgracing the country, Kao Yung-neng wore a soldier's

uniform at the last moment and fought to the death. Ch'ti Chen struggled away with less than twenty percent of his troops. Ching Shih-i was imprisoned by the Tanguts; his final proposal for a conditional surrender was rejected.^^® Hsu Hsi, Li Chi, and Li Shun-chu were likely slain not by the Tanguts but rioting soldiers. Shen K'uo, with 10,000 soldiers stationed at Fort Rice Lard, and Ch'ung 0, with only 4,000 troops in Yen-chou, were outnumbered and unable to take any action under the extenuating the circumstances.

The debacle had great psychological impact on the Sung military leadership.

Sheding tears in open court. Emperor Shen-tsung delcared the abolition of war and the enjoyment of peace as his policy for the following years. Nevertheless, the solitary

Emperor did not seem to enjoy peace very much and passed away in 1085. Demoted and

SSCW. chOan 14, pp. 284-85. HCP. chQan 329, pp. 7936-37. 445

imprisoned for a period, Shen K'uo turned to focus his effort on drafting the Meng-chi oi-

t'an. Taking over the command position of Shen K'uo, Ch'ung O suffered &om an

undetermined mental disease and died in 1083.^^^

The fall of Fort Eternal Happiness marked a close Sung Shen-tsung's offense. From

1067 to 1085, Sung success in self>strengthening was significant The grand strategy of

Wang An-shih gave higher priority to domestic reform than aggression against Khitan

and Tangut. Initiating the Hsi-Ho Campaign was the first step in strengthening the army

and establishing a cornerstone for outflanking Tangut. Sung China became more confident in conducting large campaigns and its theater strategy started to excel in a comprehensive analysis of geographic, economy, political and military factors. During the three campaigns against Hsi Hsia, the battlefield performance of the Sung army improved notably, defeating the Tanguts many times. The Tanguts, failing to withstand the attack by Ch'img O and Liu Ch'ang-chuo during the Ling-chou Campaign, turned to defense and a fabian strategy.

Despite having an ambitious emperor and a prime minister with broad vision, the

Sung military success was limitted by its deviation firom Wang An-shih's grand strategy.

In Wang An-shih's initial conception, the military campaign should follow instead of parallel domestic reform. Continuous engagement in Sui-chou, Lo-wu, Hsi-Ho, Vietnam,

Ling-chou, and finally Fort Eternal Happiness diverted the Sung attention away from domestic reform. One important reason for such deviation was political dichotomy. When

HCP. chQan 329, pp. 7932-33. domestic policies were in dispute and achievement of refonn could not be evaluated consensually, it compelled reformers to reafBrm their confidence through diplomatic and military success. This tendency was nascent in the rule of Shen-tsimg and became more discernible during the period of Che-tsung and Hui-tsung. In addition, there was the dilemma of Wang An-shih's philosophy of talents that drove the Sung too early into frequent military action as ordeals for strategic talents such as Wang Shao, Ch'img O, Li

Hsien and Shen K'uo. They were ironically sober strategists and astute tacticians but usually lacked a broad view in grand strategy as well as political wisdom.

Mo-chi. chOan 2, p. 20. HCP. chQan 334, pp. 8033-34,8047 Timg-tu Shih-lOeh. chQan 86, p. 1312-13. 447

Chapter 11 Winning Battles and Losing the Peace

War renewed after the death of Emperor Shen-tsung. During the regency of Empress

Dowager Kao, the Old Party soiight reconciliation and returned a part of occupied Hsi

Hsia territory to the Tanguts. However, mutual distrust could not cease and violence renewed sporadically. In 1099 the Sung gained a decisive victory, occupying the Horizon and Celestial Capital Mountains at high cost After the death of Sung Che-tsung, Sung Hui- tsung continued the attempt to retake Ling-chou and to cutofifthe Ho-hsi corridor. For their own survival the Tanguts strenuously resisted the Sung and war intensified. Both sides suffered from the devastating war and, for the Sung, the Pyrrhic victory resulted in financial exhaustion and political decay. The first section examines the foreign policy of the Yuan-yu era (1086-94) and pay special attention to the pacification policy of Ssu-ma Kuang. The second section describes the renewal of hostility under Sung Che-tsung's personal rule and focuses on the Sung strategy and operational art from 1085 to 1104. The third section delineates the triumphant Sung Celestial Capital Mountain campaign which marked the end of the Tangut military domination in the Ordos. Such a decisive Sung victory has rarely been discussed by previous historians. The fourth section narrates the conclusion of Hsi-Ho

Campaign.

Pacifism after 1067 and the Defense of the Yfian-yu Era

In conventional history, the Ytian-yu era was known as a short respite between two periods of bloodshed. It saw the revision of political conservatism and reinstatement of 448

defensive strategy. Reform in the 1070s highlighted political despotism and received

broad remonstration from ofScials and scholars. Divisive factionalism underlined the late

Northem Sung politics with fluctuations of policy. When Emperor Shen-tsung died in

1085, his mother Grand Empress Dowager Kao (1031-1093) assumed regency reinstating

Ssu-ma Kuang and other Old Party politicians. Ssu-ma Kuang intended to abolish all New

Policies but met unexpected executive difGculties and opposition. Lu Kung-chu

recommended retaining the Public Service Act but Su Shih criticized his rigid stance against all New Policies. When Ssu-ma Kuang died in 1086, the Old Party consequently split into three groups, the Szechwan Clique or Shu-tang led by Su Shih (1036-1101) and

Su Ch'e promoted flexible policy and executive skills, the Loyang Clique or Lo-tang led by

Ch'eng I and Ch'eng Hao crying for reinstatement of Confucian Rituals, and the Hopei

Clique or Shun-tang led by Liu Chih insisting on a conservative line. Members of the New

Cliques suffered from exile in South China and Ts'ai Ch'iieh died on his way. His death inaugurated a cycle of reprisal.^

The social and economic burden of war became harsher during the Yuan-yu reign. The abolition of New Policy toppled the economic axis of war. Before 1085, the military spending of Hsi-chou, Lan-chou, Fort Rice Lard, and Fort Secured Border reached approximately three million and six (or seven) hundred thousand kuan. Among these territories, the defense of Lan-chou alone cost one million kuan annually.^ Su Ch'e indicated that a majority of this fund came from the interest of Green Sprout Loan and the

^ Liu, James T.C., "Wang An-sbih, Tseng Pu yQ Pei-Sung wan-ch'i kuan-liao te lei-hsing". 449

surplus of Extraordinary Exemption Fee of Covee. As the two acts were expired, the Sung was compelled to make use bridge, ford, and industrial taxes as maintenance cost of the new territory, of which Su Ch'e intended to hire Ya-ch'ien covee servers.^ The crux of the financial problem with the new border was that Hsi-Ho and the several new forts had no regular tax income due to insu£Bcient populace despite fertile land.^ In Ho-tung, people living in the hinterland had to transfer their tax payment to Fort Chia-lu and Wu-pao.

According to Wang Yen-shou (1043-1093), Ho-tung circuit administration assigned upper households of Chin-chou to pay tax at Chia-lu and the upper households of Chiang-chou to pay at Wu-pao. It was three hundred U from Chin-chou to Fen-chou, suitable for ox-wagon, and then three hundred and sixty U from Fen-chou to Wu-pao. It was three hundred and ninety li from Fen-chou to Chia-lu, not suitable for ox-wagon. Therefore, the total transport back and forth became nearly one thousand and four hundred in every year. With the transportation cost, the price of a tou of rice was raised ten times from the original fifty wen to five hundred wen.^

Political conservatism and socio-economic objection of external adventure revitalized pacifism. Polarization in political and economic policies necessitated that the Old Party scholars seek conventional wisdom fix)m pacifism as a mean to remonstrate against foreign aggression. Pacifism after 1067 was a continuation of early Sung pacifism. First, it

- HCP, chQan 375, p. 9093, chOan 381, p. 9284. ^ HCP. chQan 375, pp. 9093-94; also, Su Ch'e (1039-1112). Luan-ch'ene Chi. (The Collected Works of Su Ch'e), (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937), chQan 37, pp. 515-6. ' HCP, chQan 397, pp. 9672-74. - HCP, chQan 393, p. 9559-60. 450

reasserted domestic prioiiQr, highlighting the socio-economic devastation of war. In 1077,

Chang Fang-p'ing compared military ambition with sexual license. He spelled out; "Among myriad insalubrious behavior, lechery is the most deadly. Among the myriad policies suffering the people, military ambition is the most pernicious... (War) empties imperial revenue as well as the coffers of people. Suffered fiom frostbite and starvation, banditry arises accompanied by drought and flood...To the upper class, there are unbridled generals controlled nimierous troops; and to the lower class, there are exhausted masses with increasing rebel sentiment All these himdred of uncertain events are caused by the decision of using force." Also, Fu Pi advised Sung Shen-tsung to reconsider the Vietnam campaign with the human suffering. Second, it undermined the value of military victory. Su Shih clarified this in a memorial in 1087, indicating that military victory over the barbarians without pacification in mentality could only deepen the hatred; and hatred caused the next war. Chang Fang-p'ing criticized four emperors in Chinese history, Ch'in Sh'ih-wang, Han

Wu-ti, Sui Wen-ti, and Pang Pai-tsimg. All these emperors indulging in war and territorial expansion planted the seeds of disorder. He concluded, "Therefore the sages were concerned not if the result were victorious or failing but whether the effort diminished the devastation of war." Third, pacifism after 1067 denied taking territory firam the "barbarians" as serving the Sung strategic interest Su Shih sarcastically criticized the New Party. He said: "Now people intend to take Fort Chiang-chu (or Fort Chia-mu-chuo, between the present day Ning-ho and Hsia-ho County) for the reason of its indispensable strategic importance. Let us think about during the heyday of the Pang, An-hsi Colonial 451

Headquarters was established ten thousand li away fix)m Ch'ang-an. According solely on

strategic value, all places fix)m here to the far west can be regarded as important"^ Even

Tseng Pu as a New Party leader considered that Sung China did not demand excessive

territory from the "barbarians."'

Contrasted to Wang An-shih and Wang Shao enthusiastically converting minorities

into Chinese, Yfian-yu politicians stressed ethnic diversity. Fan Ch'un-jen (1027-1101)

compared war between Chinese and the barbarians as a worthless competition between

"large wagon and wheelbarrow, phoenix and owl, and city and slum." Also, Ssu-ma

Kuang argued the contrast between Chinese and nomads with different cultures and

customs, especially in martial culture. He concluded that even though they were under

regular training in farming season, the "Righteous and Brave" militia and Mutual Security

Militia were unlikely to adopt military skills and become competent forces on the

battlefields. Forming a vulnerable part of the formation, these militia units would be

defeated at the very first and lead to fiasco. Therefore, Ssu-ma Kuang opposed social

militarization as a policy with potential Khitan and Tangut invasion.^

Seemingly an influence of Buddhist, pacifism after 1067 increasingly condemned

° For the memorial of Chang Fang-p'ing, see HCP. chQan 286, p. 7005. For the memorial of Fu Pi, refer to HCP chQan 276, p. 6753-54. For the memorial of Su Shih, see Chou-i-chi (Collected Memorials), in Su Tung-po ch'Oan-chi (Collected Works of Su Shih), (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chu, 1969), hereafter as STPCIC. chQan 4, p. 442. For the memorial of Teng Shun-wu and the memorial of Chao Pu provided by him, see Hsti Meng-hsin (1126-1207), San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-oien. (Compilation of Documents on the Treaties with the North during Three Reigns), hereafter as SCPMHP. (Taipei: Wen-hai, 1962), chQan 1, p. 7a-14b. ' HCP. ChQan 500, pp. 11911-12. ® HCP, ChQan 203, p. 4916-22, WHTK. chQan 153, p. 1336, SMKCI. chQan 16, pp. 176-181, chQan 17, pp. 182-187, ChQan 33, pp. 357-58. 452

killing as evil behavior. In a private anecdote^ durii^ his late aige Wang Shao repented to a

monk his slaughtering of Tibetans and yet, was unable to get absolution. Fu Pi revealed that

the actual number of victims slaughtered by Wang Shao was much more than the number in

official record. The sudden death of his son Wang Hou (d. after 1115) was also interpreted

by recorders as recompense for his massive killing in Hsi-Ho.^

However, the nascent complexity of strategic interaction between Sung and Hsi Hsia prevented the Sung from defining its grand strategy simply because of domestic interests.

Pacifists and politicians during the Yuan-yu era were not able to extricated themselves from this. Despite the utter fiasco of Fort Eternal Happiness and the apparently shrinking military ambition of Emperor Shen-tsung, military failures in 1081 and 1082 did not end the hostilities between Sung and Hsia. Despite failing, the two Sung operations gained territories and Hsi Hsia succeeded in the sense of mere survival but by no means won the war. Lan-chou and the various fortresses in its environs formidably controlled the upper reaches of the Yellow River menacing Ling-chou and the Tangut capital Hsing-ch'ing.

Fort Rice Lard, Chia-lu, I-he, Pagoda, Wu-pao, and Secured Border or Fort An-chiang dominated crucial highpoints and the fertile land of the Horizon Mountains. In 1083, the

Tanguts launched a fiiU-scale offense against Lan-chou, momentarily retaking the

Western Fortress in a fierce assault The loss of Westem Fortress caused a short-lasting panic in Lan-chou, but the higly charged Tanguts were finally exhausted before the

- About Wang Shao and the monk, see Tune-hsien pi-lu. chflan 15, p. 172. For the death of Wang Hou, Hung Mai, I-chien tine-chih. in I-chien-chih (Beijing: Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1981), chOan 7, p. 592. 453

formidable city. Sung Commander Wang Wen-yti initiated a counterattack with seven hundred picked men and the Tanguts abandoned the siege shortly thereafter.^" In 1084,

Sung Ching-Yuan legion commander P'eng Sun heavily defeated a Hsi Hsia invasion force and killed the Tangut Regional Commander Jen-tuo Ling-ting.^^ Until 1090,

K'aifeng did not seem to lose the war. Instead, an attrition emerged.

Diplomatic resolution thus became a serious consideration. Inexorably opposing both conquest and escalation, Ssu-ma Kuang composed a de-escalation proposal to pacify the Tanguts and restore bilateral relations. Despite avoiding overt criticism against Sung

Shen-tsung, Ssu-ma Kuang described the Hsi Hsia policy of the preceding emperor as aggression. By the ascendancy of Sung Che-tsung, Ssu-ma Kuang submitted a memorial which spelled out: "The Ling-Hsia campaign was our bellicose act and the newly established forts were all their farms." His first alternative claimed that the "superior strategy" was to first return the above mentioned territories to Hsi Hsia. Ssu-ma Kuang insisted K'aifeng to take the initiative to exhibit the benevolence and good will of the new emperor, anticipating a restoration of cordial relations. If the return of lands became a consequence of any Tangut military threat, it would lead to no benevolence but only excessive humiliation. His second and "inferior strategy" was economic blockade. To conduct a complete and effective sanction, Ssu-ma Kuang conceived a strict prohibition of smuggling along the border imposing "heavy law" and death penalty. Nevertheless, he

--^chaan486, p. 14013. " SS, chQan 331, p. 10671, chQan 486, p. 14014, HCP. chQan 349, pp. 8377-78, chQan 350, pp. 8381-82. The name of Jen-tuo Ling-dng was written as Jen-tuo Wei-ting in SS, chQan 331, p. 10671. 454

was afiaid of the resulting social unrest due to enforcement that would likely happen.^^

Wen Yen-po emphasized the devastation of war and reminded the Emperor of Tang failure. Agreeii^ with Ssu-ma Kuang, Wen Yen-po traced the origin of violent escalation to the ambition of firontier administrators and officers. He spelled out that Sung Shen- tsung had repented his aggressive policy and quoted the words of eunuch Li Shim-chu.

Therefore, he proposed not only the return of territory to Hsi Hsia but an entire withdrawal from Hsi-Ho.^^

Despite all protesting foreign aggression, Yuan-yu politicians did not agree in diplomatic retreat. In the words of Su Ch'e, FC'aifeng faced a dilemma in which the defense of the new territory became costly, but returning them without harsh negotiation seemed to be a weak diplomatic stance.^* To Ssu-ma Kuang's surprise, the court preferred his "inferior strategy" instead of his "superior strategy" because no consensus could be reached on territorial return among prime ministers and military councilors. Su Ch'e suspected that Hsi Hsia was waiting for the Sung to take the initiative and return these territories unilaterally to increase Hsi Hsia diplomatic leverage. Therefore, Su Ch'e considered the proposal of Ssu-ma Kuang an ambiguous one because it could be interpreted differently. It could be the benevolence of a Chinese emperor to a petty

"barbarian" from the Sinocentric view of world. Nevertheless, it could also be a

" SMKCI. chaan 35, pp. 380-84, chOan 37, pp. 405-6, chQan 38, pp. 417-18, SS, chOan 486, p. 14015, HCP. ChQan 365, pp. 8752-54, chOan 366, 8787. HCP. chQan 367, pp. 8842-43, chQan 382, p. 9312. HCP. chQan 368, pp. 8867. 455

diplomatic retreat of K'aifeng in bilateral relations.

Remonstrators of relinquishing territory such as An Tao (late 1 Ith-early 12tfa century), Mu Hsien (d. after 1097), Sun Lu Gate 11th century), and You Shih-hsiung

(1038-1097) stood their strategic ground. The fundamental reason for their protest was the lack of equity between relinquishing territory and assuring peace. Giving up such prefectures and forts did not necessarily guarantee a long-lasting peace and without Lan- chou the next war against Hsi Hsia would place Hsi-Ho Circuit in a difficult situation. In this agenda. Old Party politicians exhibited their limited knowledge of the new border and insisted giving up territories based on out-of-date intelligence. Unable to locate Hui-chou in his memorial. Wen Yen-po imderestimated the strategic value of Lan-chou because, he said, no residential and military construction had ever been built there by the Tanguts.^® This was probably true during his incumbency as Govemor of Ch'in-chou two decades before but definitely was not the situation in 1086. After the effort of Li Hsien in 1081 opening routes for massive military maneuver, Lan-chou had become an indispensable part of Hsi-Ho and was protected by a group of fortresses in its vicinity. This is why not all of these remonstrators cared about the destiny of Fort Rice Lard and the other forts, but most strongly opposed a withdrawal from Lan-chou. Given the taking of Lan-chou by diplomatic effort only, Hsi Hsia would utilize such a valuable base in the next war against the Sung.

HCP. chOan 382, p. 9304. Also, Tu Chien-lu, Hsi Hsia vO chou-m'en min-chu kuan-hsi-shih. (History of Hsi Hsia Relations with Its Neighboring Ethnic), (Lan-chu: Kansu Wen-hua, 1995), p. 90. - = HCP. chaan 381, pp. 9282-84. For the opinion of An Tao, see SS, chOan 328, p. 10S66, HCP. chQan 38, p. 9312. For the opinion of Mu Hsien, see HCP. chQan 382, p. 9312, SS, chQan 332, p. 10691; the opinion of Sun Lu, see SS, chQan 332, 456

Sun Lu foresaw the dangerous situation of Hsi-Ho Circuit without Lan-chou. "To the left

(the Tangut) could interdict the route fiom Hsi-chou to Tung-yOan, ^^e to the right they

could cutofif the communication (between Hsi-chou) and Ho-chou. As a result, Hsi-chou

would be isolated in a single valley."^® This analysis shocked Ssu-ma Kuang who had been

writing the Comprehensive Mirror for ten years in Loyang with no service in Hsi-Ho

Circuit.^®

To conclude the debate, rationality, moderation, and compromise defined the norms.

Su Ch'e summarized the opinions of the Old and New Parties and attempted to give an objective point with a scenario analysis. He criticized both sides only based solely on an optimistic estimation and never acceded the worst case. The worst case of Ssu-ma Kuang's proposal was a Tangut violation of peace after receiving territories from the Sung. The worst case of keeping all these territories was a Sung military defeat as a result of a xigorous Tangut offense. Comparing the two worst cases, Su Ch'e preferred the former scenario because the Sung was politically more righteous and would be less economically harmed.^° Fan Ch'im-jen also discussed three scenarios: first, returning all territories to Hsi

Hsia; second, returning all but Lan-chou; and third, only returning Fort Chia-lu, Rice Lard,

Pagoda, and Secured Border and keeping Lan-chou, I-he, Wu-pao, and Fortress Gate. The

pp. 10687-88. For the opinion of You Shih-hsiung, see Chang Shun-min (ca. 1034-ca. 1110), "You-kung mu-chih-ming", Hua-man-chi pu-i in Hua-man-chi. (Collected Works of Chang Shun-min), (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935, pp. 73-80), also, SS, chOan 332, p. 10689, HCP. chQan 382, p. 9314. In addition, other strategic reasons quoted by Su Ch'e, see HCP. chQan 381, p. 9278. HCP. chQan 382, p. 9312, others remonstrating the relinquishing of Lan-chou, see HCP. chQan 382, pp. 9319-20, SS, ChQan 332, pp. 10687-91. -- SS, chQan 332, pp. 10687-88. Luan-ch'eng Chi chQan 37, pp. 524-29; also, HCP. chQan 381, pp. 9282-83. 457

last scenario was selected by the court though it was not a favorable option in the

consideration of Fan Ch'un-jen. This reflected the compromising nature of K'aifeng

decision-making. Fan Qi'un-jen also suggested an additional stipulation for Hsi Hsia to

exchange the four forts and release of all Fort Sung hostages taken at Fort Eternal

Happiness with a ransom of ten bolts of silk for each person.^^ As a result, the Sung

returned the four forts and Hsi Hsia liberated approximately one hundred and fifty Sung

hostages. The demarcation process dn^ged on for years centered on K'aifeng's

unwillingness of returning Lan-chou. Another problem of demarcation developed due to the

cultivation of land preventing a clear-cut border line among forts belonging to different

countries. As a consequence of unresolved territorial dispute, peace was reinstated only

ostensibly and hostility never ceased.

In addition to the insolvable demarcation issue, the reasons for Hsi Hsia agression

were also deep-rooted in its matriarchal politics. Throughout the entire second half of the

eleventh century, Hsi Hsia rule was dominated by the surrogacy of matriarchal families and

the attendant political machinations consistently formented military aggression. The three

Tangut rulers during this period, Liang-tsuo, Ping-ch'ang, and Ch'ien-shun, were placed on

the throne at the respective ages of only one, eight, and three. Regents extended their rules eleven years within the nineteen-year reign of Liang-tsuo, ten years within the eighteen-year

reign of Ping-ch'ang (1068-86), and thirteen years within the fifly-five-year reign of Ch'ien-

-• HCP. chQan 382, p. 9310. Fan Ch'un-jen (1027-1101), Fan Chune-hstlan Chi (Collected Works of Fan Ch'un-jen), SKCSCP. set. 8, (1978), v. 154, appendix, "Fan Chung-hsQan i-wen," pp. 24b-30b, and "Fan Chung-hsQan chou-I," chQan 2, pp. 7b-13b. 458

shun (1186-1239). According to Pai Pin, the three Tangut kings exhibited a relative concern for domestic affairs, ^^diile the regents fiom the matriarchal &milies centered their attention on internal power struggle and external aggression.^^ During the early years of Liang-tsuo, the Tangut kingdom was dominated by the Mo-tsang £imily as examined in Chapter Nine and the death of Liang-tsuo in 1067 ended the first cycle of surrogacy over an immature monarch. The regents of the reigns of Ping-ch'ang and Ch'ien-shim were from the same

Liang family originating &om local Tangut tribes near Ling-chou. As the wife of Liang- tsuo, Royal Dowager Liang assumed the regency in 1068 and appointed her younger brother Liang I-mai as prime minister. Liang I-mai promoted massively the Liang &mily members and ousted Yuan-hao's younger brother General Wei-ming Lang-ytt.^^ Despite resuming personal rule in 1076, Ping-ch'ang was controlled by his mother and uncle and reluctantly waged war against the Sung. In 1081, Tangut General Li Ch'ing proposed that the Tangut King surrender to the Sung with the territory south of the Yellow River. In response, Liang I-mai and his sister dethroned the King renewing a regency that incited full- scale Sung offense. In 1083, the Liangs reinstated Ping-ch'ang on the throne to show the legitimacy of the Tangut state and sought reconciliation with the Sung.^^ Before his death in 1085, Liang I-mai installed his son I-pu as prime minister. Liang I-pu divided the theater command of the Left and Right Front Army with General Jen-tuo Pao-chung but conflict between the two armies only heightened. In the same year, Ping-ch'ang married the

Pai Pin "Lun Hsi Hsia shih-ch'i te hou-tzu cheng-chih", in Chune-kuo min-tzu shih ven-chiu. v. 3, (Beijing: Chung-yang min-tzu hsQeh-yQan, 1993), pp. 124-37. " MCPT. chOan 25, p. 248. HHSS. chflan 23, p. 270. 459

daughter of Liang I-mai to extend Liang domination into the next generation. Ping-ch'ang

died in the next year and his infant son Ch'ien-shun was placed on the throne.^^ The junior

Liang brother and sister inaugurated the third cycle of regency, seizing military power fix}m

the Tangut nobility. From 1085 to 1099, the junior Liang brother and sister raided the Sung

border more than fifty times. Royal Dowager Liang the Jimior personally led the command

for more than twenty campaigns.^^ According to Simg intelligence, Liang I-pu once claimed his superior military achievement over the Wei-ming family and all Sung postures for reconciliation were interpreted as cowardice and fear.^^ As a result, Liang I-pu moved further to established a matrimonial alliance with Ch'ing-t'ang against K'aifeng.

The Sung colonization process of the Hsi-Ho region fixjm 1067 to 1175 can be divided into two phases. Wang Shao initiated the first phase with political, economic, and legal effort, pacifying the upper reachs of the Wei River. His political success was crystallized in the construction of Fort Ku-wei and the surrender of Yu Lung-k'o. However, the second phase started when Wang Shao marched toward Wu-sheng confronting Mu-cheng and his

Hsi Hsia alliance. Taking Wu-sheng and Ho-chou by force, Wang Shao gained several brilliant military victories that also marked the beginning of a long struggle. The Sung established headquarters in Hsi-chou but never controlled upstream of the Tao River where

Tibetan tribes gathered aroimd General Gi'ing-i-chieh Kuei-chang at Pao-chou imtil 1088.

The growth of Kuei-chang's power threatened the security of the Sung outpost at Ho-chou.

SS, chOan 486, 14010-11,14014, HHSS. chQan 25, p. 282-83, chQan 26, p. 302. SS, chOan 486, p. I40I5, MCPI(1957), chOan 25, p. 248. HHSS. chOan 27, pp. 309-12. HCP. chQan 409, pp. 9976-77. Pai Pin, "Lun Hsi Hsia shih-ch'i te hou-tzu cheng-chih", pp. 132-33. 4 60

Also, the supply link of Hsi-Ho was menaced by the Hsi Hsia in Lan-chou, Western

Market, and Nu*che Valley from the north and Ch'ing-i-chieh Kuei-chang fix>m the west

Tung-yuan Conunandety and Min-chou were still vulnerable before vigorous attack.

From 1074 to 1085 the Sung engaged in strenuous effort to secure the two flanks.

K'aifeng appointed Ch'ung O as Governor of Min-chou, inflicting a defeat over Kuei-chang

at Fort Iron, northeast of Min-chou, and posted a bounty for Kuei-chang in 1077.^® This

failure compelled Tung-chan to reconsider his policy toward K'aifeng. By the end of this

year, he sent an emissary to K'aifeng asking reconciliation. Sung Shen-tsimg gladly

renewed Timg-chan's appointment as military governor and local administrator with his

generals Kuei-chang and A-li-ku as prefects.^® In early 1078, a Tibetan tribiite delegation

arrived in K'aifeng and received abundant rewards. A larger delegation led by a high-

ranking Tibetan ofiicial visited K'aifeng for three months the next year. Sung Shen-tsimg

personally promised fi%e trade and mutual non-aggressioiL From 1077 to 1083, Tung-chan

remained allegiance to K'aifeng, rejecting strategic alliance with Liao and Hsi Hsia twice in

1082 and 1083. Economic consideration was central since Hsi Hsia and Ch'ing-fang were

both semi-sedentary kingdoms and not able to conduct lucrative bilateral trade. Only allying

with the Sung could the Tibetan obtain tea by selling horses and hostilities between Sung

and Hsia would even benifit the horse maricet^° Military cooperation between Sung and

Ch'ing-t'ang was carried out during the Ling-chou campaign in 1081. When Li Hsien

" HCP. chQan 467, pp. 11146-47,11153, HHSS. chQan 29, pp. 337-38. 2' HCP. chOan 279, pp. 6827,6846, chOan 280, p. 6861. " SHY. v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7811. 461

initiated his campaign from Hsi-chou, Tung-chan mounted a simultaneous attack against several crucial Hsi Hsia forts with thirQ^ thousand troops.^^ The enraged Tanguts ensieged

Mo-ch'uan but was evacuated by A-li-ku (or E-te Ling-ku, 1040-96), the general and adopted son of Tung-chan.^^

However, the enigmatic death of Tung-chan ended such careful amity. A report in

1084 revealed his death and the succession of A-li-ku who gathered influential Tibetan leaders to bum incense toward the Western Heaven. Nevertheless, the Ch'ing-t'ang tribute delegation still claimed that they represented Tung-chan up to 1086 and Sung historian

P'eng po-ch'uan suspected that A-li-ku had murdered his father.^^ In fact, A-li-ku was a native son of a Yu-tien resident, having no blood relations with the family of ChQeh-ssu-Io.

Because of courtly affairs with the native mother of A-Ii-ku, Tung-chan adopted A-Ii-ku as his son and installed him as the royal heir on his death bed in 1083. Despite being a capable field commander, A-li-ku could not assert fiiU political control on his domain due to dissident Tibetan groups swearing loyalty only to the blood descendants of ChQeh-ssu-lo.

Feeling insecure, A-li-ku concealed the news about the death of Tung-chan and sought reconciliation with the Tanguts. As a result, the Sung emissary to Uighurs and Tartar proposing an anti-Tangut alliance was slandered by Ch'ing-t'ai^. In 1086, A-li-ku reported his succession to K'aifeng and demanded political recognition. After being installed in his

HCP. chOan 298, pp. 256-57. Also, Chu Ch'i-yOan, pp. 116-22. SHY. V. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7812. " HCP. chQan 341, pp. 8205-08. " TPCCTL. chOan 21, pp. 1495. 462

adopted father's position, A-li-ku shifted to the Tangut camp.^*

In 1087, the Tangut-Tibetan alliance launched an all-out attack against Hsi-Ho. They agreed that the Tanguts would take Lan-chou and the Tibetans would take Hsi-chou, Ho- chou and Min-chou. As a prologue to the offense. General Ch'ing-i-chieh Kuei-chang took

Tao-chou from the Sung as a power base and rebuilt connections with Tibetan tribes in

Sung territory. Nevertheless, the initial date of the grand operation was discovered by

Ch'ung O's younger brother and Governor of Min-chou Qi'ung I. K'aifeng mobilized its

Strategic Reserve Force for 150 battalions, approximately 70,000 troops and moved them to

Hsi Ho. Strongly supported by Chief-of-Staff of Hsi-Ho Theater You Shih-hsiung, Ch'img I and Yao Chiu divided the force and initiated a two-pronged operation. Yao Chiu marched to the Fort Chiang-chu, burned the bridge over the Ta-hsia River,^^ and interdicted Ch'ing- t'ang host. At the same time, Ch'img I conducted a secret march at night toward Pao-chou, approaching the wall at dawn. With the brave tribal ofiBcer Pao Shun, the Sung re-captured the prefecture taking Ch'ing-i-chieh Kuei-chang alive.^® This decisive victory caused a number of states in Central Asia such as YQ-t'ien and Ta-ch'i to submit tribute to the Sung

SS, chOan 492, pp. 14165-66; HCP. chQan 340, pp. 8192, SHY, v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7819, Luan- ch'ene Chi. chQan 39, pp. 543-47; Chang Shun-min, "You-kung mu-chih-ming", p. 76; STPCIC. chQan 4, pp. 439-40; Wang Kung, Chia-sen tsa-chi (Miscellaneous Note during the Year of Chia-sen), in Ch'ing-hsQ tsa-chu (Miscellaneous Studies with I>urity and Emptiness), with Sui-shou tsa-lu fMiscellaneous Pen- Notes) and Wen-chien chin-lu (Records of Recent Witness and Hearing), in Chih-pu-chu tsai ts'une-shu. Pai-pu-ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng. ser. 29, case 245, v.2408, p. la-b. On the question whether this bridge was built on the Yellow River or the Ta-hsia River, I agree with Chu Ch'i-yQan who wrote a detail note examining its location. See Chu Ch'i-yQan, p. 141, foomote 11. Chang Shun-min, "^ou-kung mu-chih-mmg", p. 75, SS, chQan 332, p. 10689, chQan 335, p. 10748, chQan 349, p. 11058, chQan 350, p. 11090. HCP. chQan 402, p.9789. chOan 404, pp. 9840-43,9851-58, chQan 405, pp. 9862-66,9872-75, chQan 406, pp. 9881,9886,9890-93, chQan 407, pp. 9905-06, chQan 408, p. 9923. TPCCTL. chQan 21, pp. 1473-88. Also, Li Fu (1052-1128), Chu-shui chi (Collected Works 4 63

and K'ai&ng regulated at a biannual fiequency.^^ bi addition, the Sung asserted control over

the Pao River Valley and Hsi-Ho was no longer a vulnerable salient More meaningfully,

this victory incapacitated the Tangut-Hbetan alliance and A-li-ku turned to follow the

precedent of Tung-chan, asking reconciliation with K'aifeng. Violence ceased in 1088 and

the Sung and Ch'ing-t'ang further ^reed to permanent peace relations and mutual

recognition on the current border.^®

Hsi Hsia remained in the arena and violence escalated at the end of 1092, when Hsi

Hsia Royal Dowager Liang personally led an offense against Huan-Ch'ing Circuit Prior to

the initiation. Governor of Huan-chou Chang Che (1027-1102) perceived her attempt from

loyal Tangut agents. He poisoned the only fountain along the border and dispatched three

legions to outflank and interdict the rear of the Tangut host Laying siege on Huan-chou for

four days without any outcome, the Tangut force suffered from poison on return and was

ambushed by the Sung near Fort Hung-te. Sung Commander of the Seventh Legion Tse

K'o-shih (1049-1110) recognized the banner of Royal Dowager Liang and fell upon the

Tangut headquarters with eight thousand soldiers. The Tangut Central Guard or chung-tsai firmly resisted and assaulted Fort Hung-te vehemently for hours when its heavy cavalry the

"Iron Hawks" anived. Tse K'o-shih inflicted several hundred Hsi Hsia causalities with

Mighty Arm Crossbows and Sit Tiger Catapults or hu-chun-oao. At evening, Tse K'o-shih launched a vigorous counterattack and pressed the Tanguts toward a soaring mountain.

of Li Fu), in SKCSCP. ser. 2 (1971), v. 249-50, chflan 3,3b-5b. SS, chQan 332, p. 10690. Chu Ch'i-yQan, pp. 144-49. 464

More than a thousand Tanguts were slain and countless fell down the clifis. Liang

abandoned her precious tent and barely esc^)ed through a remote mountainous route.^^

Simultaneously, Vice Director of Operation of Huan-Ch'ing Circuit Li Hao pressed the

Tangut rear guard with twenty thousand soldiers, gaining no impressive outcome due to the

excellent performance of the Hsi Hsia heavy cavalry/^ Accompanying with the battle of

Tao-chou, this victory marked the success of Simg defensive strategy during the Yiian-yu

period.

Sung Strategy in the 1090s

Political inconsistency created uncertainty in foreign relations. As Emperor Che-

tsung exercised his individual rule in 1094, he employed a more involved policy supported

by New Party Prime Minister Chang Tun. When Chang Tun became prime minister, he condemned Ssu-ma Kuang, Wen Yen-po, and another nine ofiBcials involved in the giving

up of territorry.^^ Shortly thereafter, another New Party politician Tseng Pu was appointed as Military Coimselor. In 1094, the appointment of Theater Commander of Huan-Ching

Circuit Sun Lu, who consistently remonstrated the relinquishing of Lan-chou, indicated the change of foreign policy. In addition, an imperial advisor suggested that the Emperor

HCP (1962), chQan 478:2a-b. Li ChOi-I (d. after 1108), Huai-k'ang-chOn chieh-tu Ts'ai-chou kuan-nei kuan-ch'a ch'u-chih teng shih ch'ih-chieh Ts'ai-chou chu-chOn-shih Ts'ai-chou ch'i-shih Ching-Yua-Iu Ching-lQeh An-fu-shih chieti Ma-pu-chOn tu-chung-kuan chien chih Wei-chou chQn- chou-shih chien kuan-nei ch'uen-nung-shih Hsi-ho chOn kuo-hou shih-i i-ch'ien shih-pai hu, shih-shih-feng shih-pai hu Shang-ch'u-kuo Tse-kung mu-ctuh-ming", hereafter as Tse K'o-shih mu-chih", in Li Chih-i, Ku-ch'i chu- shih hou-chi (Collected Worics of Li Chih-O, fSKCSCP. ser. 10, v. 225-230, chQan 20:1-15), 4b-5a. Also, a detailed report by Chang Che, in commendary of HCP (1962), chQan 479:7a-8b. " HCP(1962), chQan 479:4a-6b. SHY. V. 194, geography 19, p. 7617. 465

disregard the demarcatioa negotiatioiL When Hsi Ifeia became embroiled in demarcation

meetings and murdered a Sung negotiation representative the next year. Sung Che-tsung

terminateed with the entire abolition of demarcation negotiation. He recalled the delegation

and renewed the o£fense.

Accomplishing the will of one's father, or in Sung terminology shao-shu. became a

theme of Sung Che-tsimg foreign policy after 1094. Related to this goal, the reign name was altered into shao-sheng. referring to "following the way of the sage ancestors". In a private anecdote. Sung Shen-tsung's death at middle age resulted in the psychological fiasco of

Eternal Happiness and Sung Che-tsung cried on hearing the cause of his father's death from

Chang Shun-min (ca. 1034-ca. 1110).''^ From the point of view of the Old Party, shao-shu was a political spectacle praising filiation on the surface but in actuality encouraging external adventure. As a diplomat maintaining neutrality in factional politics but consistently rebuking the Old Party's proposal for an entire withdrawal firam Hsi-Ho, An

Pao criticized the New Party (c. 1101). He said: "Since the reigns Shao-sheng and Yiian-fii

(1098-1100), powerfiil ministers gulled His Majesty under the name of shao-shu.. Those at the top ranking aimed to consolidate their own position fi«e from vendetta, while those at the bottom looked for rapid promotion and the founding of connections. They committed the most to their private interest and the least to the concern of the state."^^ Therefore, filial emotion of Emperor Che-tsung, factional interest of the New Party, and selfish concern of

Mo-chi. chOan 2, p. 10, Tao-shan hsien-sheng (circa, early 12th c.) Tao-shan-hsien-ch'ing-hua (Purified Sayings of a man from the Way Mountain), in Pai-ch'uan hsOeh-hai. case 10, v. 109, p. 22b. SS, chtlan 328, p. 10568. 466

particular politicians, such as Chang Tun, engendered the Sung renewal of offensive strategy in 1094.

Ample evidence also suggested the rational &cet of the Sung offensive strategy after

1094. Not all strategy planners of this period were New Party politicians. On the contrary, a considerable portion of them were politically tarnished, such as An Tao, Mu Hsien, LQ Ta- chiing (d. after 1096), Chang Che,** and his staff Li Chung-chieh. Even the notorious New

Party foreman Tseng Pu, who sponsered the Celestial Capital Mountain campaign, employed an offensive-defense strategy and denied territorial expansion as a general policy.

Offense came to the favor of the court fundamentally because the policy of the Yiian- yu period had never diminished Hsi Hsia aggression and created a peace order. Territorial retum increased arrogance of the Tangut ruling class, while economic blockade did not deter invasion. As an Old Party politician, Su Shih criticized the court as "without sober consideration." He said:

"Merely because the Middle Kingdom had been overtaken from war, the court received the

[Hsi Hsia] emissary. Each emissary brought at least fifty thousand bolts of silk as accomodating for reward and trade allowance. Each bolt can be sold for the price of five to

Imperial censors revealed that Chang Che was brother of Chang Tun, Sune-Shfli-i. chOan 5:5a-b. But the biography of Chang Che in SS, chOan 328, p. I0S89 only said their relations "was suspected by the world" and did not clearly indicate what kind of kinship relation they had. The families of Chang Che and Chang Tun were famous and distinguished in Su-chou, called the "southern and northem Chang". The family of Chang Che was falsely accused by Ts'ai Ching and was extinct, see Chune-wu chi-wen. chOan 6, pp. 136, 143; also, ^o-chai oien. chQan 2, p. 12. During the early age of Chang Che, he maintained acquaintance with Su Shih and exchanged poems, see Huang Chin-chOn, "Chang Che nien-p'u", in Szechwan Ta-hsfleh ku-chi cheng-Ii chung-hsin and Szechwan Ta-hsfleh Sung-tai wen-hua yen-chiu chih- liao chung-hsin (ed.), Sung-tai wen-hua ven-chiu. (Ch'eng-tu: University of Szechwan, 1994), pp. 189-210. SS, ChQan 328, p. 10589, 467

six strings. Therefore, each emissary increased two hundred thousand strings in their

revenue. After five or six emissary exchanges, all their loss in the suspension of annual

reward is recovered. Able to utilize our goods to please their people, revitalize their

economy, and surmise our preference of peace, the Tanguts would come to consider that

they can determine war or peace as they wish. As a result, they recklessly violated the

border without deliberate estimatioru To them, victory encourages further ofifense, v^e a setback does not close the door of negotiation."^ ®

The successful Sxmg defense of Lan-chou in 1083, Hsi-Ho in 1087, and Huan-chou in 1092

proved the undoing the pacification policy and, eventually, the military capability of the

Sung force. In the autumn of 1091, Hsi Pisia mounted a large-scale incursion against Lin- chou and Fu-choul, enraging Theater Commander of Fu-Yen Circuit Fan Ch'un-ts'ui (1046-

II17), a follower of the elastic defense strategy of his father Fan Chimg-yen. Fan Ch'im- ts'ui added a note in his memorial and said; "The Court has treated the Hsia kindly with the maximum of patience in order to win their hearts but their rebel sentiment has increased...In my opinion, they have mobilized three times within this year and antagonism has climaxed." According to Fan Ch'un-ts'ui, every time Hsi Hsia agreed to investigate these outbreaks of violence they would reply to the Sung petition but their attitude never improved. "While maintaining an ostentatious tribute relation to faciliate trade, in actuality, they have no intention of ending their inctirsions and pillage." Therefore, Fan Ch'un-ts'ui

Su-tune-DO-chi. chou-i-chi. chOan 4, p. 439. 468

considered any further peace o£fer insufficient to cease the violence/^

Along with this unintennqited Tangut treachery, it became obvious that Hsi Hsia was becoming strategically weaker after 1067. The inferior size and population of Hsi Hsia made it less able to sustain a prolonged war and this became a crucial factor in the Sung strategic consideration. Theater Commander of Ch'in-Feng Circuit La Ta-chimg indicated that fertile Tangut land south of the Yellow River was rare except for the areas along the

Horizon, Celestial Capital, and the Ma-han Mountains. Most other areas were not arable.''^

Further, taking territory from Hsi Hsia would not necessarily profit the Sung; it laid unquestionable harm on the Tanguts. As an important argument against the Old Party dogma "not to take useless territory", Chang Che spelled out that taking the Tangut territory ought to be viewed as a rational counter measure to its belligerence and it was no correlative need to question the Chinese gain: "The Hsia indulged in profit and were afraid of force.

With no deterrence of punishment, suffering along the frontier was by no means relieved.

As practiced by the ancient kings, it was the time to pare their territory slightly and improve our defense."^® As Fan Pai-lu (1030-1094) pointed out, the fort construction strategy of the

1090s differed from that of the previous in strategic locations. During the 1040s, Fan

Chung-yen preferred mountainous terrain favorable to defense, while such theater commanders of the 1090s as Fan Ytt were eager to seize fertile land from the Tanguts. This description was not completely accurate as a number of forts built in the 1090s were on

HCP. chOan 466, p. 11126-27. '^HCP.chQan466. p. 11129. ''SS,chQan 328, p. 10589. 469

inhospitable terrain, such as Fort Ling-p'ing and Rocl^ Fortress. Nevertheless, the description of Fan Pai-lu reflected a different strategic goal after 1094. Through a series of forts built in Tangut territory, the Sung aimed to seize arable land fix>ni Hsi Hsia to diminish its economic base for war.

The limited population of Hsi Hsia also became conspicuous as a strategic shortcoming. Contrasted to the civilian strategists of the 1040s, LQ Ta-chung did not consider Tangut military conscription as a strategic advantage. He wrote: "In every campaign, Hsi Hsia mobilizes the masses for months and urges them to be self-sufficient. In contrarst, our forces in the various circuits are supported by official sources." At the same time, Chang Che indicated: "Judging from the various invasions since the Ch'ing-li period, it is clear that the Tanguts cannot break through the border without fully mobilizing their masses. Their current concentration of forces on the border of Huan-ch'ing shows that such a general mobilization takes forty to fifty days... It is exhausting and punishing for a state to mount such a campaign from summer to autumn with limited territory and people."^®

Therefore, diminishing the arable land and exhausting the people of Hsi Hsia became a predominant grand strategic goal in the 1090s.

Under the new strategy, the traditional wisdom of chien-pi-ch'ine-veh became insufficient to serve such a new objective. Chang Che pointed out the shortcoming of

Fabian strategy was merely to minimize Sung loss and could not harm the strategic c^acity of Hsi Hsia. He described the previous strategy as "merely preparing for the invasion of the 470

enemy with no strategic gain" and sxispected: "How can we demoralize and exhaust them

only by this means? V^thout demoralization and exhaustion, stalemate would occur and

violence would be prolonged." Chang Che spelled out that moving people into fortresses

cannot become an usual practice. Regardless of whether Han or non-Han peoples they had

homes, cattle, and other properties. Abandoning these properties "three times in a year

would first exhaust our own people." Chang Che discussed the defense of Ching-YQan in

1087 as an example, in which all eleven legions were assigned to defend walled towns,

yielding all the open fields to the Tangut As a result, the Tanguts pillaged an area of three

hundred H. Therefore, Chang Che concluded that chien-pi-ch'ine-veh was not sxifiBcient to

defeat Hsi Hsia. "Only having a powerful field army outside the town can the fortification

be consolidated."^^

In effecting the new strategic object in Shensi theater, the absolute eradication of any

Tangut agrarian activity within 200 U or three hundred U fi'om the Sung border became

indispensable.^^ The means to eradicate Tangut farming was called "shallow incursion" or

ch'ien-kung. One century before the 1090s and at the climax of Sung-Liao war. Imperial

Advisor Liang Hao proposed a reorganization of the cavalry on the frontier. He suggested

selecting ten capable captains regardless of rank and alloting each of them five thousand

horsemen. These ten captains were not to camp in any town but on grasslands, attacking the enemy any time they wished. The imperial advisor claimed this idea was inspired from the

HCP. chOan 466, pp. 11130-31. HCP. chOan 466. pp. Ill3l-32,chQan469, p. 11208-09. HCP (1962), chQan 470:3-6. " HCP. chQan 466, p. 11132. 471

Han experience against the Hsitmg-nu, especially from the outstanding senice of General

Li Kuang (d. 115 BQ.^^ This proposal was partially carried out from 998 to 1004 by the

so-called "Vanguard Cavalry" under Pien Min, Wei Neng, Chang Ning, and Yang Yen-

chao.^'' During the war in the 1040s, a similar strategy was adopted under the name "tribe

thrashing" or ta-chu. As a counter measure of the Tangut pillage of frontier villages, the

Sung conducted "tribe thrashing" against the Tangut tribes near border. In these efforts, the

elimination of Hsi Hsia Fort White Panther by Jen Fu was well-known during the 1040s. In

1070, Li Fu-kuei retaliated for Tangut plimdering by ravaging the Hsi Hsia border adjacent

to the Huan-ch'ing circuit with in more than twenty incursions. Despite routine practice, the

value of this strategy was still controversial among civilian strategists. As Pien K'uang criticized, "tribe thrasting" treated the unarmed, aged, and juvenile Tangut tribemen as enemies and caused an endless cycle of retaliation.^^ Indeed, killing unarmed civilians was contradictory to pacifist ideology and retaliatory pillaging did not seem to be an appropriate strategic means when the Sung still intended to achieve peace with limited violence.

"Shallow incursion" was significant in the late Northem Sung strategy. By its nature,

this "shallow incursion" was inspired from the pillaging incursions of the nomads.

Nevertheless, the nomad incursion reflected the economic need to procure consumer goods

from the sedentary indigenous border populace when trade was not available. However, the

Sung "shallow incursion" had no such economic concern but was an outcome of strategic

" SS, chQan 296, p. 9865. HCP. chQan 58, p. 1277, chOan 73, p. 1662, chQan 151, p. 3676, SS, chQan 296, pp. 9864-65. -- HCP. chQan 132, pp. 3129-30, chflan 214, pp. 5203-04,5220, chQan 216, p. 5258. 472

interaction.When the elimination of Hsi Hsia became a strategic objective, the advantages of "shallow incursion" became ^)preciable. It did not involve a sizable force and thus casualties in each action would not likely be large. In 1091, Fan Ytl suggested mobilizing three to five thousand soldiers in each action. In 1098, Chang Che regulated its size as five to 7,000 cavalry.^^ Since the participants in each action were all cavalry, it did not require laborious logistic transport >^ch had become an intractable problem of Sung operations planning. Sporadic and spontaneous fiiequency increased the unpredictability of the incursions, while limited penetration depth and duration reduced combat risk. In 1092,

Chang Che conceived that each action should be restricted to within five to seven days and never more than ten days.^^ Furthermore, this strategy was also compatible for Sung frontier garrisons after 1040 as they were constructed and manned by a considerable number of tribal auxiliaries, to whom cross border pillaging and warfare was lucrative and ethically acceptable. In 1091, Chang Che suggested a fair distribution of booty among participants to enhance their morale. Finally, since the disturbance of Hsi Hsia agriculture was the premier goal, the number of c^tives and booty defined the success of Simg incursion. In 1092, Theater Commander of Huan-Ch'ing Chang Che ordered legion commander Tse K'o-shih to conduct a "shallow incursion" Tse K'o-shih captured two chieftains, thir^ camels, and more than thirty heads of cattle and sheep, burning more than

1,000 tents to a distance of two hundred li fi»m the border.^® In fact, prior to the New Party

" HCP. chQan 467, pp. 11164-65, chQan 499, pp. 11892-93. " HCP. ChQan 469, p. 11211. HCP(1962) chOan 471:7a-b. 473

atavism in 1094, an imperial edict in 1091 authorized theater commanders of the various

circuits to conduct "shallow incursion". As a culminative result, Hsi Hsia suffered from

immeasurable loss in harvests and lives.^'

Moral acceptance of the "shallow incursion" strategy became a concem of civilian strategists and policy makers. Despite being consistently blamed as a typical belligerent politician by the Old Party, Lfl Hui-ch'ing reminded that the success or failure hinged on the

reward for soldiers taking captives alive. To undemiine the resistance of a tribe, the

question was continually raised whether the Sung should kill all the tribesmen or force them to surrender. A legion commander or any equivalent military officer became the person to decide since there was no higher civilian commander involved in such a cavalry operation.

If the reward for an enemy's head were higher than taking him alive. Sung officers would tend to slaughter all Tanguts regardless male, female, junior, or seiuor. If the reward for taking captives were comparable, it would prevent excessive killing.®®

After 1084, coordination among circuits improved. The founding of Hsi-Ho Circuit increased the security of Ch'in-Feng Circuit and the Lung-kan salient of Ching-Yiian Circuit and their garrison could be used as strategic reserve. The active performance of the Sixth

Legion of Ching-Yilan in the founding of Hsi-Ho testified this. In 1092, K'aifeng assigned the Fourth Legion of Ch'in-Feng Circuit as reserve unit for any Hsi Hsia invasion against

Ching-Yuan. In addition, Ch'in-Feng Circuit was responsible for sending one or two legions

For the date of he imperial edict, refer to the commendary by Li Tao in HCP. chQan 467, p. 11165. For examples of the Sung incursion, see HCP(1962), chQan 486:5, HCP. chQan 499, pp. 11892-93, SHY. military 8. p. 6904. 474

to Hsi-Ho to deal with any possible crisis.^^ In 1086, Fan Ch'un-ts'ui originated the

establishment of two reserve legions in each circuit, ready at all times as quick response to

any crisis in other circuits. In addition, the Military Bureau in 1098 compiled the StanHarH

Rattle Instructions or hua-i chih-hiii with nine headings, regulating a typical elastic defense strategy.®^ Furthermore, when "shallow incursion" became the predominant strategy in

1092, Fan Ch'un-ts'ui stressed the simultaneous initiation in all circuits to confuse the

Tanguts and cover the real Sung objective.®^ During his incumbency as theater commander of Ching-Yuan and Huan-Ch'ing, Chang Che consistently organized two or three units under a senior commander and conceived to form a larger unit consisting of seventy thousand soldiers.®^

The offensive strategy of K'aifeng in the 1090s was a result of diplomatic negotiation in vain. After different fruitless diplomatic effort, the Sung strategists aimed to undermine the strategic resources—territory and population—of the Tanguts. Despite the emperor's decision of war, the general atmosphere in K'aifeng in 1094 was still preplex. In Tseng Pu's description, "everyone laughed at this decision at the begiiming of the operation."®®

Nevertheless, this aggressive grand strategic goal was associated with cautious operation planning. Operational art in the 1090s was not very irmovative but more deliberate and

HCP. chOan 503, p. 11973. " HCP (1962), chQan 477:la-b. " HCP. ChQan 374, pp. 9061-62. " HCP. ChQan 500,p. pp. 11901-05. " HCP. ChQan 468, pp. 11188-89. HCP. ChQan 469. p. 11211. HCP. ChQan 510, p. 12144. 475

elaborate in memorials. Theater commanders such as Fan Ch'un-ts'ui and Chang Che were more circumspect in character and, in their consideration, optimism and opportunism were diminished.

Triumph on Celestial Capital Mountain

From 1093 to 1095 the Sung redeployed its forces along the Shensi perimeter and reappointed all frontier commanders. Lu Hui-ch'ing, a New Party hard-liner, assumed

Theater Commander of Fu-Yen circuit, while Sun Lan (1043-1101) succeeded Theater

Commander of Ho-tung Wang An-li (1034-1095). Despite being a younger brother of

Wang An-shih's, Wang An-li opposed the aggressive policy. A military professional Wang

Wen-yu replaced Fan Ch'un-ts'ui as Theater Commander of Hsi-Ho Circuit and Chang Che asssumed command of Ching-Yflan theater commandership. In K'aifeng, Prime Minister

Han Chung-yen and other Old Party supporters were ousted.®^ Wartime administration and theater command were established.

Within fifty days from his arrival in 1096, Fu-Yen Theater Commander Lu Hui-ch'ing conducted fourteen small-scale incursions against Hsi Hsia, provoking the Tanguts to a full- strength counteroffensive. The Tangut Yen-an Campaign in late 1096 was significant in the massive mobilization on both sizes. Hsi Hsia gathered 500,000 troops aimed to overwhelm the Sung strategic capacity of Fu-Yen circuit Receiving reinforcements from K'aifeng, Lu

Hui-ch'ing reorganized his troops into twenty-two army corps. He reserved half of these

'' SS, choan 322, pp. 10687-91. 476

troops within the walled city of Yen-chou, then renamed as Yen-an Prefecture, and stationed the rest in its environs. The Tangut host broke through the Horizon Mountains at

Wu-yen Pass and divided into three bodies. On the east, the Tanguts menaced Fort Pure

Springs, while in the center they encircled Fort Fortress Gate, Fort Dragon Security, and

Fort Platinum. The Tangut west wing conducted a deep and r^id penetration fiom Fort

Shun-ning on the border through Fort Proclaimed Amnesty to within five li of Yen-an in a single day. Seeing the dense deployment of the Sung, the Tangut host established eleven forts against the eleven Sung army corps. Theater Commander Lu Hui-ch'ing took personal command of deployment maintaining coordination among the various corps. The Tanguts were unable to take Yen-an merely by a siege in a few days, nor could they pillage southward any farther considering the potential danger of being cut off by Lu Hui-ch'ing.

Therefore, the Tangut host shifted toward Fort Platinum. It took the fort in a two-day siege eliminating the entire Sung garrison of2,800 soldiers except for five survivors. As the Hsi

Hsia force withdrew, Lu Hui-ch'ing dispatched a force to pursue but it was repulsed by

Tangut cavahy near Fort Dragon Security. The campaign concluded seemingly with a

Tangut tactical victory. Nevertheless, mobilizing 500,000 men and killing less than 3,000

Sung soldiers was an insignificant result

Simultaneously, Sung Hsi-Ho Headquarters undertook the fortification of Nu-che

Valley to secure the only viable route fixim Tung-yOan Commandery to Lan-chou. It was in

SHY. v. 175, military 8, p. 6889, v. 186, miUtary 28, pp. 7274-76, SS, chOan 471, p. 13708, chQan 486, p. 14016. Also, Ma Li, "Sung Che-tsung ch'in-cheng shBi tui Hsi Hsia te k'ai-pien he Yflan-fii hsin chiang- chieh te ch'fleh-li", in Teng Kuang-ming, Ch'i Hsia (ed.), Sune-shih ven-chiu lun-wen chi. (Shih-chia- 477

109S that Emperor Che-tsung ordered a fort to be built at this same former Hsi Hsia army station.^^ When Hsi Hsia concentrated its force on Fu-Yen, Hsi-Ho command immediately occupied the valley and built the fort, extending the right flank of the Hsi-Ho perimeter. In addition, a Ching-YQan force raided the Tangut fort at Splash Smoke Pass or Mo-yen hsia leading to Celestial Capital Mountain.

After the fruitless Tangut campaign against Fu-Yen circuit, the Sung Ching-Yflan theater command accelerated its offense along the Gourd River, or Hu-lu-he, approaching the Celestial Capital Mountain. Gourd River was a branch of the Yellow River; its valley was an important path of the traditional Silk Route from the Tang Metropolis to Ho-hsi

Corridor. Rocky Gate Pass was located forty li from the Sung border and it was a strategic gateway leading to the Celestial Capital Mountain, which the Hsi Hsia called the "land of

Songs and Happiness" On the Celestial Capital Mountain there was a Hsi Hsia palace at

Nan-mou-hui with a military base and salt lake.^^ From 1097 to 1098, both sides wrestied for the control of this area.

In early 1097, Ching-Yuan Theater Cormnander Chang Che prepared construction tools and materials and required other circuits to make feints to draw Hsi Hsia attention. In response, Lu Hui-ch'ing ordered a general to demolish the Tangut Hung-chou Prefecture on the Horizon Moimtain, v^e Sun Lu dispatched a force to breifly occupy Yen-chou. At the

chQan g: Ho-pei chiao-yQ, 1989), pp. 126-155. "HCP, ChQan 510, p. 12144. HCP (1962), chQan 485:5a-6b, chQan 486:6a-8a, chOan 488: 8b-9b, SS, chOan 328, 10589-90. Ma Li, "Sung Che-tsung ch'in-cbeng shih tui Hsi Hsia te k'ai-pien he YOan-fii hsin chiang-chieh te ch'Qeh-Ii", p. 131. 478

same time, Hsi-Ho Theater Commander Chung Ch'uan (d. ca. 1105) «ctended Lan-chou perimeter and built Golden Ci^ Stronghold on the north bank of the Yellow River, threatening the Hsi Hsia Right Front Amiy7^ Despite these efforts, Hsi Hsia still mobilized troops &om six of its twelve commanderies, namely, Kan-chou, Right Front, Chuo-lo, Wei- chou. Central Guard, and Celestial Cf^ital Mountain, under famed general Mei-le Tu-pu (d. after 1099), against the Simg Ching-Yuan battle-group.^^ The two hosts clashed near the

Rocky Gate. Prior to the offensive, Chang Che obtained reinforcements from Hsi-Ho,

Huang-Ch'ing, and Ch'in-Feng circuits. Sung Hsi-Ho Captain Yao Hsiimg defeated a

Tangut body beheading 3,000 and taking more than 30,000 hostj^es.^'' Unfortunately, Tse

K'o-shih lost 2,000 troops from Hsi-Ho on his way pursuing the Tangut hosts through the

Splash Smoke Pass.^^ Unlike the tragedy of Fort Eternal Happiness, the Sung forces controlled more favorable terrain in the vicinity during the twenty-two day construction of

Rocky Gate and Good Water Valley, giving them the names Fort P'ing Hsia and Fort Ling- p'ing.^® _The two forts brought with the names the connotation of the elimination of the

Tangut kingdom.

The completion of Fort P'ing Hsia inaugurated a series of Sung offenses. With the

Tangut weakness proven, the five Sung circuits retook all forts retumed after 1085 and

P'o-chai pien. chQan 3, p. 15. HCP (1962), chOan 485:5a-6b, chOan 486:6a-8a SHY. V. 175, military 8, p. 6889. SS, chQan 349, pp. 11059-60. "Tse K'o-shih mu-chih", pp. 5b-6a. SS, chQan 253, p. 8867 recorded the loss as only one thousand soldiers HCP (1062), chQan 486:5a.6b, "Tse K'o-shih mu-chih", 5a-b, SS, chQan 253, p. 8867, chQan 328, p. 10589-90. SHY, v. 194, geography 19, p. 7614 erroneously dated this event in 1081. 479

undertook a series of construction in Hsi Hsia tenitory. Ho-tung reoccupied Fort Chia-Iu in early 1096 and built Fort Transcendent Fountain or Shen-ch'uan-tsai twenty U northwest of

Chia-lu in 1098. The completion of Fort Tri-Crossroad or San-chiao-pao created a defense triangle in the vicinity.'^

Fu-Yen Circuit fortified the valley of Wu-ting and Ta-li rivers, occupying all strategic terrain along the eastern Horizon Mountain. In early 1097, Ltl Hui-ch'ing fortified Wu-yen

Pass, the original site of Shen K'uo and Ch'ung O in 1082 and the gateway of Tangut invasion two years prior. Grasping the strategic opportunity as the Tangut mainbody confronted Ching-Yuan forces in Rocky Gate, Lil Hui-ch'ing hastened the construction of

Fort Pagoda. The completion of Fort Pagoda and the two other forts along the Ta-Ii iver would then control the watershed between the Wu-ting and Ta-li Rivers. In the autumn, Lu

Hui-ch'ing built an additional fort outside the Wu-yen Pass to disrupt the Tangut farming. In the next year, Lu Hui-ch'ing launched a larger scale offense, ordering Wang Min to conduct a cross-border attack. As Tangut resistance was completely undermined. Sung morale peaked to its zenith. Lu Hui-ch'ing assigned the Sixth Legion to build Fort Rice Lard and delegated the Second and Fourth Legions to construct Fort K'ai-kuang. In addition, three other legions, the Third, the Fifth, and the Seventh, protected engineering at Na-niang.

Promised extraordinary payment, provisions, and reward for supplementary units, mutual security militia, and laborers, the Sung rapidly completed each construction in five or six

Pi Chung-you (1045-1119), "Ch'ao-ch'ing ta-fii Sun-kung mu-chih-ming", in Hsi-tai chi. (Collected Works of Pi Chung-you), in SKCSCP. special series, (1975), v. 288-91, chQan 13, pp. 9a-10b. HCP. chQan 495, p. 11770, ChQan 497, pp. 11820, 11832, chQan 502, p. 11959, SHY. v. 175, military 8, p. 6889-90, 480

days.^° Altogether, Fu-Yen Circuit accomplished nine forts and straightened the border connected with the Lin-Fu salient Some of these constructions, such as Wu-yen Pass, K'ai-

kuang Ridge, and Fort Pagoda, were according to the former plan of Ch'ung O in 1070. In other words, the mission of Ch'ung O in his Lo-wu Campaign (1070-71) was accomplished by Lii Hui-ch'ing a quarter century later.

Huan-Ch'ing Circuit gained a foothold along the White Horse Valley leading to Ling- chou and established Fort Rising Pacification or Ch'ing-p'ing-ch'eng as a stepping stone to attack the Tangiit Wei-chou Commandery. At the same time, Sun Lu ordered the building of Fort Horizon Mountain on the uplands of the mountain range. After this establishment, the Tangut tribes surrendered gradually. \\^th such achievements. Sun Lu only mobilized

Supplementary Units and Mutual Security Militia and never conscripted nor hired laborers fi-om the masses.^®

Ching-Yuan Circuit also achieved the construction of four forts in the environs of Fort

P'ing-Hsia, completely dominating Rocky Gate and the west bank of the Gourd River. As this was accomplished, Chang Che stationed the Eleventh Legion to guard this salient and recommended his most capable captain Kuo Ch'eng (1046-1102) as its commander.^"

Furthermore, Chang Che ordered an advance of sixty U, building two forts at the entrance

HCP. chflan 491, p. 11659, chOan 492, pp. 11680-83, chQan 494, pp. 11730-31, chQan 497, pp. 11816, II818-I9, HCP. chQan 489, p. 11603, chQan 495, pp. 11771-73, also, Tsene-kung i-lu. in HCP. chQan 497, p. 11817. Wang Chih-wang, "Ku K'e-sheng-shih Hsiung-chou fang-yO-shih Ching-YQan-lu ping-ma ch'ien-hsia chien ti-shih-i chiang Kuo-kung hsing-chuang", hereafter as 'ICuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", in Wang Chih- wang, Han-pin chi (Collected Woiks of Wang Chih-wang), in SKCSCP. (special series, 1975, v. 326, chQan 15, pp. 16-23), p. 17a. SS, chOan 350, p. 11085, HCP. chQan 499, p. 11894. 481

and egress of Splash Smoke Pass to block the Hsi Hsia invasion route &om the Celestial

Capital Mountain. According to Tseng Pu, there were numerous routes outside the pass over open terrain through which Tangut cavalry raided To deal with this, Chang Che organized the Twelfth Legion and selected his fiivorite Tse K'o-shih as its commander.^ ^

Avoiding open battle with the Sung, the Tanguts moved their forces and tribes to the hinterland without disturbing Sung construction.

On the Hsi-Ho fix)ntier, Chung Ch'uan maintained an active posture in fortifying the environs of Lan-chou and approached the Celestial Mountain fix)m the southwest In the summer of 1097, Chung Ch'uan established Fort P'ing-hsi at Green Rocky Pass or Ch'ing- shih-hsia, a crucial pass covering the supply line of the circuit and leading to Hsi Hsia Ch'o- tzu Mountain Commandery. In early 1098, Chung Ch'uan further accomplished the construction of Hui-ning Pass along which the Sung perimeter could extend eastward through Celestial Mountain and connect with Fort P'ing Hsia.^^

In summer 1098, Sung Bureau of Military Affairs received a report from Huan-Ch'ing

Circuit indicating a massive Tangut mobilization. In an over-night disctission, Tseng Pu barely persuaded Chang Tun to alert the frontline.^^ This report supported an earlier accoimt from a surrendered Tangut ofBcer claiming that the Hsi Hsia would not concentrate in shih-kuen to-chung to-ou-te. referring to siege and attack upon walled towns. Instead, this

" HCP. chOan 497, p. 1I8I7, chOan 499, p. 11894, chflan 501, p. 11938, SS, chQan 253, p. 8867, "Tse K'o- shih tnu-chih", pp. 6a-b recorded as Commander of the Thirteen Legion. This is probably an error in hand write duplication of SKCS because there were only twelve legions under Ching-YQan command by 1098. HCP. chQan 489, pp. 11604,11607. Also, Ma Li, "Sung Che-tsung ch'In-cheng shih tui Hsi Hsia te k'ai- pien he YQan-fli hsin chiang-chieh te ch'Qeh-Ii", p. 137. 482

Tangut ofScer revealed that Hsi Hsia would penetrate and pillage the countryside.^^

Correspondingly, the Bureau of Nfilitary Af&irs issued a seven-fold Standard Operational

Instructions orhua-i chih-hui. stressing elastic defense and coordination among various

circuits. This document was accompanied by nine general instructions for training,

discipline, planning, logistics, and engineering.^^ ^\^th military tension escalating, Hsi Hsia

ostensibly begged for peace through a Khitan emissary. Considering that the real Tangut

intent was unclear, the Sung downplayed diplomacy and hastened defense preparation.®® In

the early winter, the Bureau of Military Affairs received another report from Ching-Yuan

based on an escaped Simg hostage indicating that a prodigiously gigantic Tangut force,

numbering 1,500,000 men, was encamped north of the Celestial Capital Moimtain and only

fifty li from the Sung fort in the Splash Smoke Pass. Later, this force was reported moving along the border of Ching-Yuan for more than ten days with no clear objective. The bureau evaluated the possibility that the Tanguts might suddenly shift its attack on other circuits.®^

However, at the same time, the Tangut launched an unprecedented vigorous assault upon

Fort P'ing-Hsia.

The Tanguts P'ing-Hsia campaign appeared to be well-organized and they had ahready demonstrated astuteness and intelligence in warfare prior to this campaign. Carrying the

" HCP. chflan 500, p. 11915. HCP. chOan 500, p. 11899. In Chung-hua punctuated edition, the sentence was punctuated as "Jeng-yOn keng-pu ya shih, kun tu-chune to-pu-te yen pu kung-ch'eng ye". In this punctuated sentence, whether kuntu- chung to-pu-te meant "not to attack city" or this was a person is not clear. Ma Li, "Sung Che-tsung ch'in- cheng shih tui Hsi Hsia te k'ai-pien he YQan-fii hsin chiang-chieh te ch'Qeh-Ii", p. 139 punctuated as shih- kuen tu-chung to-pu-te. " HCP, chtlan 500, pp. 11091-93. " HCP, chflan 500, p. 11925. 483

infant King Ch'ien-shun, Royal Dowager Liang personally led the campaign and claimed to

have mobilized more than 1,000,000 soldiers, actually slightly more than 300,000 soldiers,

marching into the Splash Smoke Pass.°° With such a large body, the Tanguts still managed

tactical concealment until the last moment and had a carefully selected objective. Prior to

the campaign. Royal Dowager Liang had plotted with her generals that Fort P'ing-Hsia was

the largest among the various newly constructed Sung forts and Kuo Ch'eng was one of the

most capable Sung officers. With Fort P'ing-Hsia occupied and Captain Kuo captured, the

rest of the Sung forts would fall accordingly.®® To undertake this task. Supreme

Commander of the Six Commanderies Wei-ming A-mai (d. after 1099) took charge of

besieging Fort P'ing-Hsia, while Supervisor of Hsi-shou Commandery Mei-Ie Tu-pu

commanded an interdiction force dealing with the Sung relief. According to a Sung tribal officer Li A-ya-pu, the two Hsi Hsia commanders were very brave, capable, and intelligent. The Tangut host simultaneously encircled the six recently built Sung forts, four in the vicinity of Fort P'ing-Hsia and two in the Splash Smoke Pass, and attacked P'ing-

Hsia day and night with determination. The Tanguts employed various tactics in the thirteen-days siege, including the use if tunnels, large battle-wagons, and siege towers.®^

However, all these Tangut efforts were nullified by the Sung elastic defense strategy.

The left and right flanks of the Sung defenses immediately reacted to the Tangut offense.

" Tseng Pu iih-lu. in HCP. chOan 503, p. 11976, HCP. chOan 503, pp. 11975-76. Tseng Pu iih-lu. in HCP. chOan 503, pp. 11983-84, HCP. chOan 503, pp. 11975-76, SS, chflan 328, p. 10590. " "Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 17a-b, HCP. chQan 503, pp. 11983-84, SS, chQan 350, p. 11085. HCP. chOan 504, p. 12017. Also. SS, chQan 253, p. 8867, chQan 328, p. 10590. 484

Ho-tung Circuit conducted a counterstrike deep into Hsi Hsia, \«Me Vice Theater

Commander of Hsi-Ho Wang Min attacked the Tangut Chuo-lo and Right Front

Commanderies, killing 1^00 of the enemy and capturing 25,000 cattle. He also burned

cottages and shorages in an area around 700 Before acknowledging the siege of P'ing-

Hsia, the Bureau of Military Affairs had ordered Huan-Ch'ing Circtiit to dispatch a total of

10,000 troops with 3,000 cavalry to Ching-Ytian as strategic reserve. As a result. Legion

Commander Ch'ung P'u, son of Ch'ung O, led the force and, at the same time, Ch'in Feng

Circuit sent a force of the approximate same size.®^ Identifying P'ing-Hsia as the objective

of the Tanguts, K'aifeng urged Huan-Ch'ing and Ch'in-Feng to send more reinforcements. A

large combined reserve force emerged in Ching-YQan under Vice Supreme Director of

Operation Wang En and advanced toward Fort P'ing-Hsia. Since both sizes had maximized

their mobilization, a decisive battle became inevitable.

With only twenty thousand soldiers, the Eleventh and Twelfth Legions under Kuo

Ch'eng and Tse K'o-shih resisted stoutheartedly, weakening the Tanguts with crossbows

from the ramparts and harassed them in night engagements.^^ According to Wang Chih-

wang, when Fort P'ing-Hsia was in extreme jeopardy, Kuo Chu-te, an officer of Ching-

Yiian force and oath brother of Kuo Ch'eng, proposed a desperate thrust toward P'ing-Hsia

to break the Tangut siege. When Vice Supreme Director of Operation Wang En and Legion

Commanders Yao Hsiung and Yao Ku (d. after 1126) tended to agree, Ch'ung P'o suggested

"Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 17b, SS, chflan 328, p. 10590. " HCP. chQan 503, pp. 11984, 11987. " "Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 18a, HCP, chOan 503, p. 11984, chQan 504, p. 12000. 485

a delay of the counterattack. Asking Kuo Chu-te to reconnoiter the strength of the enemy,

Ch'ung P'u expounded to all and said:

"Defending a fort under siege by a strong enemy, the hope for the coming of the relief force is the only key to maintain the soldier's morale. Outnumbered by the enemy, a victory of ours may not necessarily break the siege. If we encountered any misfortune and led the enemy to exhibit their captives before the wall, our garrisons would collapse. Under such desperate condition, who would stay in their position? I consider that Master Kuo has excelled in the defense of the fort Of what should we be concerned?"®^

As Ch'ung P'u envisaged, Kuo Ch'eng and his Eleventh Legion, with 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers in the forts, inflicted numerous casualties on the Tanguts. As the weather deteriorated by the end of the year, the Tangut siege tower was damaged in a night by strong wind. The rations of Hsi Hsia force were seriously depleted. Seeing her host thrown in panic and disorder. Royal Dowager Liang cried and withdrew the force at mid-night. As the Tanguts morale was worsening. Sung Legion Commanders Yao Hsiimg and Yao Ku engaged and a Sung ambuscade force severely defeated the enemy.^^ Asked about the method of such successful defense, Kuo Cheng expressed that his only anxiety was that the relief force might arrive too early.®^ The statements of Ch'ung P'u and Kuo Ch'eng interpreted the defense principle of Chang Che, "It is only with a powerfiil field army

"Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 17b-18a, HCP. chQan 503, p. 11984, chOan 504,12011. "Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 18a-I9a. HCP. chflan 504, p. 12000 and SS chQan 350, p. 11088 attributed the similar idea to Wang En, probably because Wang En was the commander of the entire force. HCP. ChQan 503, pp. 11983-84, HCP. chflan 503, p. 11983, chflan 504,12011, SS, chQan 349, pp. 11059-60, chQan 350, p. 11088. 486

outside the walled town can the fortification be consolidated."^^

Shortly after the Tangut withdrawal. Theater Commander Chang Che ordered the

Eleventh and Twelfth Legions to launch a n^id counterstroke by cavalry and reinforced

Kuo Ch'eng and Tse K'o-shih with 10,000 cavalrymen. Kuo and Tse divided the force into six bodies penetrating to the Celestial Capital Mountain. Deceived by Chang Che's four previous feints across the borders, Tangut Supreme Commander of the Six Commanderies

Wei-ming A-mai and Supervisor of Hsi-shou Commandery Mei-le Tu-t'ung did not anticipate the impending deep penetration of the Sung cavahy force. Surprising the Tangut headquarters in a banquet after hunting, Kuo and Tse captured the two Tangut commanders.®® Simultaneously, Tribal officer Li Chimg-chieh conducted a cavalry penetration to Chuo-chih Mountain attacking the Hsi Hsia headquarters of Chuo-Io

Commandery; its Supervisor Jen-tuo Pao-chung (d. after 1104) barely escaped.

Appeased by such a brilliant victory. Emperor Che-tsung received the congratulations of hundreds of officials and bestowed special awards on Prime Minister Chang Tun, Theater

Commander Chang Che, and the two legion commanders. Kuo Ch'eng was given an exceptional promotion as Defense Commissioner of Hsiung-chou, \^e Tse K'o-shih was promoted as Defense Commissioner of Ming-chou.^°^ In addition. Emperor Che-tsung

"Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 19a. HCP. chflan 466, pp. 11131-32, chOan 469, p. 11208-09. HCP (1962), chOan 470:3a-6b. "Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", 19a-b, Tse K'o-shih mu-chih", 6b, Tseng Pu ifli-lu. in HCP. chOan 504, pp. 12017-18, SS, chflan 253,p. 8867, chflan 328, p. 10590, chflan 350, p. 11085, chflan 486, p. 14018. HCP. chflan 503, p. 11976, chflan 504, p. 12017,, chflan 505, pp. 12032-33, chflan 505, p. 12038. Tseng Pu iih-lu. quoted from HCP. chflan 504, p. 12018. About Jen-tuo Pao

ordered Chang Che to have the two Hsi Hsia generals sent to K'aifeng in cages and cangues.

Because of their intelligence value, Chang Che asked special amnesty for the two Hsi Hsia generals and appointed them on his own staff.^°^

The Sung victory reverberated into interstate relations. Shortly thereafter, Hsi Hsia cried for a Khitan military intervention three times^°^ and the Liao emissary arrived in

K'aifeng urging an immediate armistice. The Khitan motive for interfering into the Sung-

Hsia war was clearly that the elimination of Tangut by the Sung was not to the strategic interest of the Khitans. hi a preliminary conduct before formal negotiation, the Liao revealed that the imustial intercession was due to the desperate Hsi Hsia situation and demanded Sung reconciliation. The Khitan policy to urge a quick restoration of peace was not clearly recorded but in the scarce reference, it seemed to be a three-fold policy. First, the

Liao initiated a plot against the Hsi Hsia hardliner. Not only did Liao Tao-tsung (1032-

1101) reject the Hsi Hsia demand for a military intervention, but he sent an envoy to poison

Hsi Hsia Royal Dowager Liang who was identified as an invetarable war maker.^"" As a resxilt. King Ch'ien-shun assimied personal rule and directed peace negotiation with the

Sung. Second, the Liao urged the Sung to withdraw and return all occupied territories, forts, and prefectures to Hsi Hsia.^°^ Such a Sung-Hsia reconciliation would highlight the Khitan superiority over the two states. Third, the Khitan emperor seemed to employ a policy of

"Kuo Ch'eng hsing-chuang", I9b, Tsc K'o-shih mu-chih", 7a. HCP. ChQan 505, p. 12026, chttan 506, p. 12061. ^"LS, ChQan 115, p. 1528. HCP. ChQan 508, pp. 12102-03. HHSS. chOan 31, p. 351, Ma Li, p. 141. Tu Chien-Iu, p. 132. Wang Tien-shun, p. 223. 488

armed dissuasion and personally conducted a hunting foray just outside the Sung border

near Tai-chou. A Sung report revealed that the Liao camp was only five to seven U north of

the Yen-men Pass.^°®

There were two confinnting opinions in K'aifeng. Prime Minister Chang Tun

suggested that ignoring Khitan mediation, regardless of war or peace, should be the Sung

decision. Military Counselor Tseng Pu and Fu-Yen Theater Commander Ltt Hui-ch'ing considered the Simg should focus on its actual gains fix)m Hsi Hsia instead of becoming

further imbroiled with the Liao.^°^ Chang Tun's suggestion seemed to be influential at the

beginning. During the preliminary negotiation, the Sung reception official replied to the

Liao emissary that the Sung would likely reconcile according to "Principle" (or U) rather

than "Compassion" (or ch|ing).^°® The meaning of the Simg "principle" was later revealed in the Sung supplementary state letter. In a note, the Sung Emperor agreed to reconcile with the Tanguts without mentioning the Khitan role in the negotiation. The tone of this state letter reflected exactly Chang Tun's suggestion and incited a serious Liao protest. After an extensive discussion among Emperor Che-tsung, Chang Tim, Tseng Pu and other high ranking ofScials, the Simg court adjusted its stance and K'aifeng conceded adding a paragraph in favor of the Liao: "The unforgivable crime of the Hsia state ought not to be muted merely by a state letter of confession. As a result of the mediation of the Northern

Dynasty, now [the Emperor] ordered a negotiation conducted by fix}ntier ofBcers. If they

HCP. chflan 509, pp. 12116-17. Wu rien-ch'ih, p. 98, Tu Chien-Iu, pp. 132-33. HCP. chaan 509, p. 12119, chttan 515, p. 12245. HCP. chaan 509, pp. 12116-18. 489

[the Tanguts] are proved to be honorable and humble in a con&ssion, then [the Emperor] would consider offering an amnesty."^°^ Nevertheless, K'aifeng clarified the different nature between Liao-Hsia and Sung-Hsia relations and asserted Sung overlordship over Hsi

Hsia. As the state letter claimed, while the Liao and Hsia were father and son-in-law. Sung and Hsia were ruler and subject Sung punishment of its own subject did not suggest any antagonism against the Liao. In addition, the state letter declared that all Tangut territories were Chinese domain given to Li Chi-ch'ien by Sung Tai-tsung and Sung Chen-tsung.

Therefore, China reserved the final right to resume the rule if Hsi Hsia had no intend to subjugate. The state letter pointed out the Tangut attitude as "on one hand submitting tribute, on the other hand preparing further invasion." More important, the state letter stated that parabellum as a strategic preference was not inaugurated by the Sung. On the contrary, it was exactly what Liao Ch'ing-tsung employed to deal with the Tangut aggression and the

Sung merely followed precedent. Finally, the state letter promised to offer negotiation.

After staying at K'aifeng for thrity-five days, the Liao emissary accepted the Sung state letter and returned. At the same time. Sung urged Hsi Hsia to submit a "letter of confession" and transfer two war criminals, Wei Pao-mo and Ling-chi 0-yii, as necessary conditions for peace.^^^ Before Hsi Hsia fulfilled these requests, the Sung accelerated the fortification of the Horizon and Celestial Capital Mountains.

HCP. chflan 505, p. 12034. HCP. chOan 509. pp. 12116-17. HCP. chQan 509, pp. 12113-18. HHSS. chQan 31, pp. 352-53. Wu rien-ch'ih, p. 98, Tu Chien-Iu, pp. 132-33. HCP. chOan 508, pp. 12102-05. HHSS. chQan 31, pp. 353-54. 490

The Tangut fiasco of the P'ing-Hsia Campaign led to complete occupation of the

Horizon and Celestial Capital Moimtains by the Sung. On the eastern front, Fu-Yen Circuit

built Fort Warm Fountain forty-five U northeast of Fort Rice Lard. At the same time, Ho-

tung Circuit built four forts on the western bank of the Yellow River supporting control of

Horizon Mountain. In the summer of 1099, the Sung mobilized more than 100,000 troops

building eight additional forts within ten days. As a result, Fu-Yen, Ho-tung, and Lin-Fu

were connected in a new perimeter for more than 300 U along the Horizon Moimtains and

the Tanguts were expelled into the desert To assert the control of this new territory, the

Sung established Chin-ning Commandery at Fort Chia-Iu.^^^ On the central front, Huan-

Ch'ing Command constructed three crucial forts in the Horizon Mountains and one fort on

the edge of the desert only ten U from the previous Hsi Hsia Wei-chou Commandery.^^^

More remarkable, the Sung occupied the Tangut salient controlled by Forts White Panther and Fused Gold, embedded in the Sung perimeter between Fu-Yen and Huan-Ch'ing since

1038. After the accomplishment of these fortifications, K'aifeng decided not to rename the two forts as remembrance. Fan Chimg-yen's initial concept in 1041 to regain these two forts was the first explication of the Sung strategy to take the Horizon Mountains.

At the same time, Ching-YOan Circuit expanded its territory northward from P'ing-

Hsia to the previous site of the Hsi Hsia summer palace Nan-mou-hui where Hsi-an-chou

"Ch'ao-ch'ing ta-fii Sun-kung mu-chih-ming", 13b-l4a, HCP. chQan 506, pp. 12058, 12062, chQan 507, p. 12075, chQan 508, pp. 12106-07, chOan 509, p. 12124-25, chOan 511, pp. 12160, 12168-69 chOan 514, p. 12216, 12224-28. HCP. chQan 506, p. 12060, chQan 510, pp. 12125-26, chQan 511, p. 12168, chQan 508, p. 12105, chQan 509. p. 12123, ChQan 513, p. 12199, chQan 513, p. 12201, chQan 514, p. 12216. 491

was established the headquarters of Sung territory along Celestial Capital Mountain. Hsi-

an-cbou was only fiffy U to Fort Tung-hui of Hsi-Ho Circuit and the Hsi Hsia Celestial

Capital Mountain Commandery no longer existed. According to Fang Ch'ueh and Han Piao

(1159-1224), after c^turing the nearby salt lake, the Sung monthly produced salt worth

140,000 cash, su£5cient for the consumption of most of Hsi-Ho circuit.^^^ In the autumn of

1099, Ching-Yiian and Hsi-Ho Circuits finalized the construction of Hui-chou with three

additional forts, rectifying the border from Lan-chou through the Yellow River to Hui-chou

and then along the northern ridge of Celestial Capital Mountain through Splash Smoke Pass

to Fort P'ing-Hsia. After this, Ch'in-Feng became an interior circuit sharing no common

border with Hsi Hsia.^^® In the late autumn of 1099, Hsi Hsia submited a "letter of

confession"and Emperor Che-tsung expressed his appreciation for its humble language.

By the end of 1099, peace was restored rectifying the new Sung border.^^® In the Sung

Standard History, the author commented: "Since the fiasco at P'ing-Hsia, the Hsia could no

longer conduct any campaign... [Chang] Che's achievement in the westem fi-ontier was the

HCP. chOan 508. p. 12110, chOan 511, pp. 12155, p. 12170, chQan 512, p.l2186 P'o-chai pien. chQan 3, p. 15. Han Paio (1159-1224). Chien-ch'Oan iih-chi fPav After Day Notes), with Ch'en Ko (late 12th c.), Hsi-fane chi shih-chiu hsO-wen. (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi, punctuated edition, 1993), chQan 6, pp. 46-47. About the plan, see HCP. chQan 504, pp. 12006-12015, chQan 505, pp. 12034-36, chQan 506, pp. 12061-62, chQan 508, pp. 12095-12100. About the actions, refer to chQan 508, pp. 12108-10, chQan 509, p. 12123, chQan 510, pp. 12126-27, chQan 511, pp. 12160,12163-64,12167-68, chQan 512, p. 12187, chQan 513, pp. 12203-04, chQan 514, pp. 12208, 12216,12220,. Also, Ma Li, "Sung Che-tsung ch'in-cheng shih tui Hsi Hsia te k'ai-pien he YQan-fii hsin chiang-chieh te ch'Qeh-li", pp. 145-46. HCP. ChQan 515, pp. 12234, 12240. ^ ChQan 486, p. 14018, HCP. chQan 519, pp. 12343-44, HHSS. chQan 31, pp. 355-56. Wang Tien- shun, pp. 222-223. Ma Li, pp. 141-49. LQ Chuo-min, "Sung Hsia Shen-pei cheng-chan yQ Pei-Sung te chu- ch'eng", in Hsi-pei li-shih ven-chiu. (1989), pp. 161-84. 492

most splendid and meritorious."^^®

The Second and Third Hsi-Ho Campaigns

During the period firam 1099 to 1104, the Sung expanded north beyond the Yellow

River, conquered Ch'ing-t'ang, and threatened Ho-hsi Corridor. Three campaigns were

notable in this period, namely, the second Hsi-Ho Campaign in 1099, the third Hsi-Ho

Campaign in 1104, and the Chuo-lo Campaign. Chuo-lo was a Tangut commandery

guarding the route toward Ho-hsi Corridor. War was extremely intensified as the strategic

focus shifting from the Tao Valley and the Yellow River to the Huang River Valley and the

Ta-t'ung River Valley.

Geographically, Mo-ch'uan guarded the mouth of the Ta-t'ung River to a branch of the

Yellow River, or the Huang River. Ch'ing-t'ang City was located on the upper reachs of the

Huang River, approximately one hundred U in the west of Mo-ch'tian and the Hsi Hsia

Chuo-lo Commandery was on the upper Ta-t'img River, approximately 100 U north of Fort

Nan-chung of Mo-ch'uan^^° and Mo-ch'uan became the hinge to the strategic gateway from

the Huang Valley to the Ho-hsi Corridor. The aimexation of Mo-ch'uan by Hsi Hsia would

imperil Lan-chou and Ho-chou, A^Me a Sung occupation of Mo-ch'uan would threaten

Tangut control over the Ho-hsi corridor. A friendly, or at least neutral, and autonomous Mo- ch'uan provided the Sung a buffer zone separating Hsi Hsia and Ch'ing-t'ang. Nevertheless,

when the Kokonor Tibetan political strife jeopardized Mo-ch'uan autonomy, a Sung Hsi

^^-^chOan 328, p. 10590. HCP. chQan 514, p. 12212-13, chQan 516, p. 12272. Ch'ing-t'ang lu. dp. 9-10. The location of Chuo-lo 493

Hsia struggle for control of the Huang Valley erupted.

The political situation of Ch'ing-t'ang from 1088 to 1099 was extremely delicate. Not a blood descendant of ChOeh-ssu-lo and defeated by the Sung in 1088, Prince A-li-ku fk:ed a precarious rule confix)nting another powerfiil Tibetan lord Wen Ch'i-hsin (d. ca. 1092).

Before the death of Tung-chan, Wen Ch'i-hsin assumed the administration of Mo-ch'uan, a power base of the Tibetan regime and once the coital of Chueh-ssu-lo during his early reign. Wen refused to cooperate with A-li-ku against the Sung in 1088. He even provided the intelligence to Hsi-Ho headquarters resulting in the defeat of the Tangut-Tibetan alliance. Because of this, Hsi Hsia encouraged A-li-ku to eliminate the autonomy of Mo- ch'uan after 1088 and A-li-ku even agreed to relinquish Mo-ch'uan to the Tanguts should they join force with the Tibetans to take the city. Although the lapse of the Tangut-Tibetan alliance did not facilitate this operation, K'aifeng expressed crucial concern as to the destiny of Mo-ch'uan.^^^

After the cessation of hostility in 1088, K'aifeng spelled out the stable rule of A-li-ku and his toleration toward Wen Ch'i-hsin as indispensable to the Sung-Kokonor Tibetan relations. In the imperial edict approving the reconciliation of 1088, K'aifeng advised A-li- ku to improve domestic stability with benevolent rule.^^^ However, understanding the grave situation differently, A-li-ku imposed cruel punishment against dissidents and collected a

Commandery, CPPM. chOan 139, p. 4198. For a detailed examination, refer to Maeda, p. 532-43. SHY. v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7815-17, SS, chOan 492, pp. 14165-66. Sung Min-ch'iu, Sung Ta-chao-line chi. (Taipei: Cbeng-chung shu-chu, 1966), chQan 239, pp. 1565-66. 494

heavy tax to biiild a colossal Buddha statue.According to Sung ofBcer Li YOan, the erection of this colossus marked a drastic shrinking loyalty of the Ch'ing-t'ang people.^^^

Massive Tibetan refugee flight to Sung and Hsi Hsia resulted. The grandson of Chueh-ssu- lo and nephew of Tung-chan Ch'i Pa-wen (d. after 1100) rebelled and the Tibetan

Administrator of K'uo-chou secretly negotiated a surrender with Hsi-Ho headquarters.

Preventing a lapse of the peace relations with Ch'ing-t'ang, the Sung rejected the surrender of K'uo-chou but could not prevent the continued request for asylum.^^^ After 1093, Tangut

Chuo-Io Commandery expanded their control to the vicinity of Mo-ch'uan and intended to coerce Wen-ch'i-hsin to join an anti-Simg alliance.^^®

Tension culminated in 1096 with the sudden death of A-li-ku. Ch'ing-t'ang lost a political leader with bold character before any policy was made to reinforce the perilous status of Mo-ch'uan. The rule of Hsia-cheng (d. 1102), son and successor of A-li-ku, proved unable to pacify internal strife, nor could he deal with Sung and Tangut aggression. Hsia- cheng imposed even harsher rule resulting in the complete disintegration of his monarchy.

Conflict between surrogate Hsin-mou Ch'in-chan and the younger brother of A-li-ku Su-nan

Tang-cheng escalated to the false accusation and mass execution of all family members of

Su-nan Tang-cheng with only his son Ch'ien-lo-chieh escaping. Sponsored by Ch'i-pa-wen,

Ch'ien-lo-chieh revolted with the Tibetan tribes on the southern bank of the Yellow River.

SS, chOan 49, p. 14165, Chu-shui chi. chQan 3, p. 4a-b. •'* Ch'ing-t'ang lu. p. 10. --- WCP (1962), chQan 474: 1 lb-12a, HCP. chOan 513, p. 12193, SS, chOan 492, p. 14165, SHY, v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7816. SHY. v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7817-18. 495

Shortly thereafter, Ch'i Pa-wen expelled Ch'ien-lo-chieh, proclaimed himself prince, and

marched into Ch*i-ke, present day Kuei-te County of Ch'ing-hai. Ch'ien-lo-chieh defected to

Ho-chou where the Sung established the headquarters of Pacification Intendant of Western

Bank of Tao, or Tao-hsi An-fii-shih, under Wang Chan (d. ca. 1101). Wang promised

Ch'ien-Io-chieh a military intervention in the Ch'ing-f ang succession crisis.^^^

Initially, K'aifeng recognized Hsia-cheng as the legal successor to A-li-ku.

Nevertheless, the massive nimiber of the Tibetan refugees fix)m not only Ch'ing-tang City but also other areas increased Sung suspicions as to the legitimacy of his succession. Since

A-Ii-ku was merely an adopted son of Chueh-ssu-lo, Hsia-cheng had no blood relations with the Son of Buddha. In 1099, Pien-shih-po-chieh, grandson of Ch'ing-i-chieh Kuei-chang, surrendered to the Sung with four crucial forts Chuo-cho, Chiang-chu, I-kung, and Tang- piao, in the vicinity of the present day Ch'im-hua Sa-la Autonomic County.^^® At the same time, Ch'ing-t'ang surrogate Hsin-mou Ch'in-chan secretly swore loyalty to Ch'i-pa-wen.

The Sung seized such a crucial moment and asserted its support of Ch'i-pa-wen as the legal ruler of Ch'ing-t'ang. Prime Minister Chang Tun assigned Director of Operations of Hsi-Ho

Circuit Wang Min as Supreme Commander and Wang Chan as Vice Commander of the expeditionary force setting out for Mo-ch'uan.^^®

Contrary to the first Hsi-Ho Campaign which revitalized the Sung military machine

" • ss, ChQan 492, p. 14166, HCP, chOan 507, p. 12091-92. HCP. ChQan 507, p. 12092, chQan 512, p. 12188, chQan 511, pp. 12171-72, chQan 513, pp. 12193-4, 12202-03, ChQan 516, 11263-64, chQan 517, pp. 12304,12306. Kao Yung-nien, Lung-vou lu. (Record of the Lung-you Campaign), extinct book, quoted from commendary of HCP. chQan 511, p. 12173. Also, HCP. chQan 513, p. 12203. SS, chQan 350, pp. 11070-72. 496

and complicated international politics, the second Hsi-Ho Campaign did not seem to have an ambiguous grand strategic goal. However, it was almost infeasible in the operational sense. The geogr^hy of the Huang River Valley was not &vorable for a rapid overrunning by the Sung. According to Wang Min and his lieutenant Li YOan, it was indispensable to build a series of fortifications around Mo-ch'uan before taking Ch'ing-t'ang. Wang and Li analyzed the risk of the operation in a professional manner. It was 400 U from the Sung bridgehead on the Yellow River at Ping-ling Temple, present day Ping-ling-ssu Dam, to

Ch'ing-t'ang City. Such an extraordinary operational depth made impossible any reinforcement of the expeditionary force. If the Tibetans sabotaged the floating bridge at

Ping-ling Temple and interdicted the path along Hsing-chang Canyon, the present day Lao- ya-hsia or Raven Canyon, between Mo-ch'uan and Chung-ko City, "we would no longer be able to relieve the expeditionary army even with a powerful reinforcement numbering a million soldiers." In fact, the barely viable route along the Hsing-chang Canyon was constructed by hanging planks along the cliff, allowing one single horseman to pass and thus was very vulnerable to sabotage.^^° Without powerful reinforcement, the situation of a expeditionary force surrounded by Tibetan tribes would become extremely perilous. Food storages in Mo-ch'uan, Chung-ko, and Ch'ing-t'ang might be available for the Sung expeditionary force, but their reliability was difficult to foresee. Wang and Li said that, even under an optimistic estimation, it would be unlikely that they could support the

Ch'ing-t'ang lu. p. 9. HCP. chOan 518, p. 12319. 497

expeditionary force for more than a month.^^^

The early stage of the expedition was unexpectedly successful. Crossing the Yellow

River in summer 1099, the Sung expeditionary force marched into Mo-ch'uan almost unopposed. The Sung cavalry under Wang Hou, son of Wang Shao and Cheif-of-Staff of the Hsi-Ho Circuit, and Kao Yung-nien (d. 1105), Tribal Auxiliary Commander, rapidly overran Chung-ko City shortly thereafter. Realizing that his personal rule would soon come to an end, Hsia-cheng sent an emissary to negotiate for surrender and request a prestigious official appointment from K'aifeng. Before receiving any reply but only the news about the

Sung army approaching, the panicked Ch'ing-t'ang ruler abandoned his palace. He and his wife shaved their heads and sought refuge in a Buddhist temple as a monk and mm.

According to Tibetan custom, monks and mm were immune from the death penalty.^^^

With an empty throne in Ch'ing-t'ang palace, the royal nobility led by Hsin-mou Ch'in-chan, the Khitan Princess and widow of Tung-chan and the Tangut Princess and widow of A-li-ku sent two hundred horsemen to welcome Ch'i-pa-wen and his son Lung-chan. As a result,

Lung-chan was promptly crowned as the ruler of Ch'ing-t'ang. To install a descendant of

Chueh-ssu-lo would have prevented the extinction of the Kokonor Tibetan kingdom.

Nevertheless, the situation changed dramatically as the Sung expeditionary force rapidly overran Chimg-ko City. Hsin-mou Ch'in-chan and the two princesses delegated six

HCP. chQan 516, p. 12286, chQan 520, p. 12383. Ch'ing-t'ang lu. p. 10, HCP. chQan 514, p. 12222, chQan 515, p. 12261. ^ chQan 492, p. 14166 erroneously described Lung-chan as the son of Mu-cheng. According to the study of Chu Ch'i-yQan, Lung-chan was the son of Ch'i-pa-wen instead of Mu-cheng. See Chu Ch'i-yQan, pp. 161-62. 498

chieftains to go to Chung-ko and negotiated an honorable sinrender. Sung Supreme

Commander Wang Min £q)proved the surrender at the gate of Chung-ko and sent a large force to occupy Ch'ing-fang City. All members of the Ch'ing-fang royal family ^were sent to

K'aifeng. Succeeding the throne after the death of Sung Che-tsung in 1100, Sung Hui-tsung

(b. 1082, r.l 101-25, d. 1135) organized a brilliant ceremony receiving these hostages including Hsia-cheng, Lung-chan, and Khitan, Tangut, and Uighur Princesses ^o was another wife of A-li-ku, all of whom received official titles commensurate with their original position in Ch'ing-fang. According to Tseng Pu, the conversation between Lung- chan and the Sung Emperor was polite and enthusiastic. Contrary to this, Tseng Pu described Hsia-cheng as a person with difficulty communicating with others. After the banquet, Tseng Pu met the Khitan Princess who appreciated the grand amnesty and kind treatment of the Sung Emperor.^^^

Nevertheless, long before the hostages arrived K'aifeng, disagreement between Chang

Tun and Tseng Pu heightened in determinating the destiny of Ch'ing-fang. Chang Tim initially intended to establish Colonial Headquarters supervising tribal autonomy.

According to this idea. Theater Commander of Hsi-Ho Sun Lu promised the Tibetan tribes that the Sung did not want a single piece of land finm them along the way toward Ch'ing- fang. However, flushed by the victory, Chang Tun and Sim Lu hastened to establish prefectural rule in Mo-ch'uan and Ch'ing-fang. Military Counselor Tseng Pu strongly

HCP. ChQan 514, pp. 12212-13,12223-24,12226-12228,12231-32, chOan 515, p. pp. 12241-45, 12247-48, 12261, chQan 516, pp. 11265-68 12284-85, chQan 517, p. 12296, chQan 518, p. 12333, chQan 519, p. 12348. SHY, v. 199, barbarian 6, p. 7821-24. 499

opposed this with political, economic, and logistic reasons. Tseng Pu regarded the Sung

victory as a result of the brutality of Hsia-cheng and Tibetan loyalty to the Chtieh-ssu-lo

Family should not be overlooked. Any direct administration by the Sung would signal the

extinction of the Chtteh-ssu-lo regime and incite Tibetan revolt In addition, military occupation over the Huang Valley was not only economically not profitable but logistically infeasible as well. Instead, Tseng Pu suggested founding a puppet regime ruled by a loyal

Chueh-ssu-lo descendant to fulfill the political demand of the Tibetans. Unfortunately, having better connections with the commanders on the fiont, Chang Tun manipulated the decision-making and established Huang-chou in Mo-ch'uan and San-chou in Ch'ing- fang."^

Miscalculating the nature of the Tibetan chaos, Chang Tun unreasonably translated the decay of the Chueh-ssu-lo regime and the surrender of a number of tribal leaders to Tibetan willingness to be under the Han Chinese rule. Acknowledging the news about the Sung annexation of the Chueh-ssu-lo territory, the Tibetan rebelled predominantly along the

Huang Valley and the southern bank of the Yellow River. Divided into three separate groups in Huang-chou, San-chou, and Chung-ko City, the Sung expeditionary force now faced a grave situation. When Vice Commander Wang Chan arrived in Ch'ing-tang City eighteen days after it had been abandoned by Hsia-cheng, he found the granary bad been marauded by the rebels. The original capacity of food in the Ch'ing-tang granary would have been insufGcient to deed 10,000 soldiers for a year and now only about fourteen-day

HCP, chOan 514, 12212-14, chQan 516, pp. 12267, 12274, chOan 517, p. 12301, chOan 518, p. 12325. 500

provisions remained. Wang Chan executed nine Tibetan leaders but could not prevent

communication with the locals.^^® The Tibetans rose up and besieged Ch'ing-f ang. At the

same time, Hsi Hsia dispatched Supervisor of Chuo-lo Commandery Jen-tuo Pao-chung and

two other commanders with an intervention force numbering more than one hundred thousand men. As a result, Wang Min with two thousand and four hundred soldiers was

under siege in Huang-chou for sixteen days. Wang Chan and Wang Min resisted ferociously in separate cities until the arrival of a relief force led by Miao Li (before ca. 1060-after

1100), Yao Hsiung, and Kao Yung-nien.^^^

Before the Sung situation in Huang River valley improved, they were defeated by the

Tibetan tribes on the southern bank of the YeUow River. To mherit the throne of Chfleh- ssu-lo, supporters of Ch'i-pa-wen proliferated into the areas of Chuo-cho, Chiang-chu, I- kung and Tang-piao, the four forts surrendering to the Sung earlier. Distinguishing himself in the relief of Fort P'ing-Hsia, Ch'ung P'o assumed the Sung command of the southem bank to deal with the crisis. Theater Commander of Hsi-Ho Circuit Hu Chung-hui (d. ca

1109) urged Ch'xmg P*u to relieve Fort I-kung only two days after the appointment of

Ch'ung as Govemor of Ho-chou. Despite being an intelligent and wise c^tain, Ch'ung P'u was betrayed by two Buddhist monks who led his force into a Tibetan trap. The Sung force was ambushed by Ch'i-pa-wen's general Lang A-chang, or A-k'e-chang in some sources. At

Chao Ting-chfli, Ch'ung-ning oien-lOeh. (Defense Strategy during the Ch'ung-ning Reign), extinct book, quotation in conunendary ofHCP. chOan SIS, pp. 12248, 12260. Also, HCP. chQan S16, p. 12286- 87, ChQan 517, p. 12297. SS, chOan 350, pp. 11071-72. HCP, ChQan 516, pp. 12286-89, chQan 517, pp. 12295,12298, 12313, SS, chQan 350, p. 11069. 501

the pass of Ku-t'ing Mountain, present day Ta-Ii-chia Mountain,^^® Tibetan horsemen

suddenly fell on the Sung column and killed Ch'ung P'u. Expert archer and Acting Legion

Commander Wang Shun-ch'en took command and held the pass, personally shooting down

nearly a thousand Tibetans in an entire afternoon. He returned to Ho-chou with a third of his

soldiers.^^^ Such a defeat immediately demoralized the Hsi-Ho front and shocked the

K'aifeng leadership. Prime Minister Chang Tun changed his mind and agreed in recognizing

Ch'i-pa-wen and recalled the entire expeditionary force from Huang-chou and San-chou.^^°

Becoming a Buddhist monk and not available for the secular throne, Ch'i-pa-wen installed

his third son Lung-chan the Jimior, or Ch'i She-Io-sa, as the ruler of Ch'ing-t'ang.^^^ As a counter balance to this, K'aifeng appointed Lung-chan as Military Governor of Ho Hsi and

Hereditary Governor of San-chou following the precedent of the Tse Family of Fu-chouL

Soon expelled by his younger brother, Lung-chan stayed at Mo-ch'uan.^^^

In short, the second Hsi-Ho Campaign was necessitated by the intensifying struggle between Sung and Hsi Hsia for control of the Huang Valley. The crisis of Wen Ch'i-hsin's

Mo-ch'uan autonomy and the downfall of the A-ii-ku family marked the collapse of the only buffer zone between Sung and Hsi Hsia. Not only did the difficult terrain minimize the opportunity for Sung success, but some chance mistakes during the operation lost the

The present day location of the place where Ch'ung Fo encountered misfortune, see Li chih-hsin, pp. 170-72. HCP, chOan 517, pp. 12295,12303-05, 12313-14, SS, choan 335, p. 10749, chOan 350, p. 11072. HCP. chOan 517, p. 12295, chQan 518, p. 12324. HCP, ChOan 517, p. 12304-05. SHY. v. 199, barbarian 6, pp. 7823-24, HCP. chOan 518, p. 12324, chQan 519, pp. 12348-50, chQan 520, p. 12377. 502

victoiy as well. Contrary to his preceding rapid penetration, Wang Chan remained

hesitation for eighteen days at Chung-ko and his occi^)ation of Ch'ing-fang City came too

late to seize the granary. Hu Chtmg-hui allowed Ch'ung P'o, a commander transferring &om another circuit, only two days to prepare for the relief of Fort I-kung. This abrupt decision forbade any verification of information ensuing in defeat at Ku-ting Mountain Pass.

Furthermore, troubled by the sudden death of Sung Che-tsung, K'aifeng delayed the appointment of Lung-chan for more than two months and provided an opportunity for

Lung-chan the Junior to consolidate his rule in Ch'ing-t'ang. A more fundamental problem, as Tseng Pu indicated, was the moral wrong of armexing the domain of the Chiieh-ssu-lo family and establishing direct control over the Tibetans. To do so, the Sung contradicted its original claim and incited revolts. Without cooperation firom the majority of the population, the Sung attempt to occupy Ch'ing-t'ang failed. Wang Chan, the general vilified as responsible for the defeat, committed suicide on his way to exile.^^^

Studying the lesson of the lost victory, the Sung army struck back two years later with a more vigorous military commitment From 1100 to 1101, Sung foreign policy remained equivocating due to the succession of Sung Hui-tsung. As the regency of Empress Dowager

Hsiang ended in 1102, Sung Hui-tsung continued the effort of military expansion.

Supported by eunuch Tung Kuan, Prime Minister Ts'ai Ching ousted Chang Tun and Tseng

Pu and renewed violence. Wang Hou, son of Wang Shao, assumed the position of Theater

Commander of Hsi-ho Circuit After a sober study of the geography of the Huang Valley,

SS, chttan 350, p. 11072. 503

he composed a much more feasible operation plan with his assistant Kao Yung-nien. Wang and Kao insisted on reconciliation with Tibetan tribes under a principle of "amnesty and honor" and only one or two treacherous tribes were to be eliminated. Considering the failure of 1099 in which the Sung force penetrated through a single and vulnerable route, Wang

Hou conducted a pincer campaign in the summer of 1103. Wang Hou and his supervisor

Tung Kuan followed the previous path fix)m An-hsiang-kuan of Ho-chou and crossed the

Yellow River at Ping-ling Temple. Simultaneously, through a new route along the northem bank of the Huang River, Kao Yung-nien led a force toward Mo-ch'uan fix)m Ching-yu- kuan of Lan-chou.^*^ On Pa-chin Mountain, Wang Hou defeated Tibetan general Tuo-lo-pa and rapidly overran Fort Lung-chu-hei guarding the gateway toward Mo-ch'uan. At the same time, Kao Yung-nien defeated a tribe and occupied Castle Pa-chan-chung and Chie- tang.^^^ On the fifth day of the campaign, the two forces gathered together outside Mo- ch'uan. The Sung expeditionary force took the city after a three-day siege.^*®

Wang Hou hastened to pacify the city's environs during the following six months after taking Mo-ch'uan, renamed Huang-chou. Subjugating twenty one tribes with a total of more than 100,000 people, he occupied ten forts ahnost unopposed. Among these forts, Wang

Hou concentrated his force on three crucial sectors. The first sector was the area of Fort

Chie-tang now renamed Fort Welcoming Foreigners or Lai-pin-cheng, controlling the

CPPM. chOan 139:6a-8b. The ruin castle of Chie-tang was discovered in 1982 by the Ch'inghai Archaeology Research Center. The castle was located at Chung-ch'un Village of Min-he County, four kilometer north of the Yellow River. See Li Chih-hsin, p. 47. CPPM. chflan 139:9a-10a. 504

southward path of Huang-chou. The second important area was Hsing-chang Canyon guarding the only viable route to Ch'ing-t'ang. Fort Nan-chung became a third focal point of

Wang Hou and was only one hundred U of Hsi Hsia Chuo-lo Commandery. In addition,

Wang Hou assigned several c^)able ofBcers to guard Ching-yQ-kuan and An-hsiang-kuan securing his supply lines. In the autumn, Wang Hou shifted his attack to the southem bank of the Yellow River and surprised and overran Tang-piao and I-kung. The Tibetans launched a counterattack taking Fort Welcomii^ Foreigners for a short time but the Sung force eventually controlled this area by the end of the year.

In the spring of 1104, Wang Hou renewed his campaign against Ch'ing-t'ang, dividing his force into three bodies. The vanguard under Kao Yung-nien moved through Victorious

Bell Pass or Sheng-to-ku, in the northem Hsing-chang Canyon; the center guard under

Wang Hou moved through Thirst Donkey Mountain, or K'o-lu-ling, in the central Hsing- chang Canyon; and the rear guard under Chang Chieh moved along the southem bank of the

Huang River toward Chimg-ko City. Having rebuilt relations with the local Tibetan tribes, the three forces successfully passed through the natural obstacles unopposed and confronted the Tibetan main force at Ko-po-t'ang twenty li to the east of Chimg-ko. Lung-chan the

Junior and Tuo-lo-pa established headquarters on a ridge with several thousand bodyguards, deploying his force of s^proximately 50,000 to 60,000 men along the foothills. Wang Hou surmised that the Tibetans intended to exhaust the Sung force by forcing them to attack up the ridge under the hot noon day sun. He changed tactics forming his force into an oblique order, and had his center guard pass through the vanguard and rush a hill on the north. This 505

movement to the oblique transformed his center guard into an overwhelming right wing,

Wang Hou occupied the hill and defeated a Tibetan body on the flank. Simultaneously,

Chang Chieh urged on the rear guard crossing the Huang River from the southem to the northern bank and filling the void left open by the central guard. Outflanking the enemy with 1,000 light horsemen, Wang Hou ordered a vigorous final attack on the Tibetan central body. Kao Yung-nien's select elite detachments broke into the enemy formation and were followed by a cavalry attack conducted by Chang Chieh. Chang Chieh charged and took the

Tibetan headquarters on the ridge. The routed Tibetans lost only 4,000 lives, but their morale was drastically destroyed in this battle. Discovering that the garrison of Chung-ko

City had shifted their loyalty to the Sung, Lung-chan the Junior struggled toward Ch'ing- t'ang and barely escaped from the Sung light horse. On his arrival, Lung-chan the Junior realized the unwillingness of the tribal leaders to conmiit to any longer resistance. He abandoned the capital and rushed for Lake Kokonor. Wang Hou marched into Ch'ing-t'ang

City and K'uo-chou, asserting the conclusion of the Hsi-Ho Campaign with completed Sung domination of the entire Huang River Valley.^^^

Ominous Signs of a Catastrophic Collapse

The annexation of the ChQeh-ssu-lo Kingdom in 1104 marieed the zenith of Sung military success. Nevertheless, the fact that K'aifeng fell in 1127 has always induced historians to overlook the victories just three decades prior. From 1094 to 1104, the Sung

CPPM. chOan 140: Ia-8b. 506

anny nearly expurgated the Tangut presence south of the Yellow River and completely

destroyed the Kokonor Tibetan Regime. Why did such a capable army suddenly collapse

in 1126? One common explanation was overwhelming Jurchen military might Regarding

the surprising doAvnfall of the Liao from 1114 to 1124, it was possible to view the early twelfth century as a period of collateral catastrophe. Nevertheless, traditional historians focused their examination on the Sung political decay of the last two decades.

In the Sung politics of this period, the surrogacy of Ts'ai Ching received particular attention. Unlike Wang An-shih, Chang Tun, and Tseng Pu, the power of Ts'ai Ching was emboldened by his alliance with eunuch. Supreme Theater Commander of Shensi and later

Military Counselor Tung Kuan. This alliance started by the ascendancy of Emperor Hui- tsung. The death of Emperor Che-tsung in 1101 engendered an opportunity for Tseng Pu's expelling Chang Tun and reconciling the Old Party. Empress Dowager Hsiang (1046-1101) delegated state affairs to Tseng Pu and Han Chung-yen (1038-1109), the son of Han Ch'i, directing a moderate administration. Nevertheless, the personal rule of Emperor Hui-tsung altered the climate of court politics to the favor of Ts'ai Ching, a calligrapher and art collector. As a consistent and enthusiastic art patron. Emperor Hui-tsimg admired Ts'ai

Ching introduced by eimuch Timg Kuan. With the support of Tung Kuan, Ts'ai Ching bent on personal aggrandizement, gained imperial grace, and finally replaced Tseng The rule of New Party grew to the point where 203 ofBcials personally disagreeable to Ts'ai

Ching were demoted, exiled, or punished in different degrees. Deeply indulged in art and 507

Taoist belief Emperor Hui-tsung was indifferent toward such a disruptive policy. One of

his Taoist favorites, Lin Ling-shu, claimed that not only was the Emperor an inramatinn of

a transcendent being but that Ts'ai Ching, a number of imperial servants, and even Lin,

himself, were all living Taoist divinities.^^^ Descendants and disciples of Su Shih were

condemned as the followers of "Bias Study."^^° Ts'ai Ching cultivated a close relation with

Empress Dowager Hsiang and eunuchs as a way to maintain imperial favor.^^^ Some Sung

scholars even suspected Ts'ai Ching of having a certain connection and friendship with the

Liao surrogate ruler Li Yen since they were of the same ilk.^®^ The domination of Ts'ai

Ching extended to 1126 until the end of the Northem Sung but the successes of various

reform programs were not conclusive.

Tung Kuan was blamed by numerous Southern Sung scholars for the military disaster of 1126. Together with eunuchs Chu Mian (1075-26), Timg Kuan was identified as vain and perverse;^^^ however, some criticism of Pxmg Kuan was personal vilification and contradictory. For example, Ts'ai Pien (1058-1117) compared Tung Kuan to his predecessor Li Hsien in that "Li Hsien deeply devoted himself to the art of war, but (Tung)

Kuan did not." Contrary to his description, the StanHarH Risfnrv did not describe Tung

Kuan in the typical eunuch stereotype. He wore a stem looking beard much as a general

Liu, James T.C., "Wang An-shih, Tseng Pu yfl Pei-Sung wan-ch'i icuan-liao te lei-bsing". Chia-shih chiu-wen. chOaa 2, pp. 217-19. Chia-shfli chiu-wen. chOan 2, pp. 212-13. Chia-shih chiu-wen. chOan 2, pp. 205-06,215-16. Tune-ni shih-lOeh. chQan 121, p. 1863-73. Chia-shih chiu-wen. chflan 2, pp. 191-92. Tung-tu shih-lQeh, chflan 106, p. 1625-31. 508

rather than an eunuch. His neck "as hard as iron"^^* and whether this indicates his background in martial arts and ch'i-kune was not clear. It was possibly that Tung Kuan was individually a competent generals as was his colleague Li Ch'ang.^^^ Nevertheless, institutionally, Tung Kuan opened a path for the massive promotion of eunuchs causing the

Sung decline. According to the Sung precedent, eunuchs could not be appointed as military governors. Ts'ai Ching exempted those with military merits to promote Pung Kuan. Ts'ai

Ching further perverted the rule by equating ritual service with military merit and this enabled a large number of eunuchs to be promoted as military govemors.^^® This policy unquestionably demoralized the officer corps.

Tung Kuan's appointment as Supreme Theater Commander of Shensi was significantly unprecedented. Early Sung rulers such as Sung Tai-tzu, Tai-tsung and Chen- tsung appointed a number of eunuch generals but had never appointed them as theater commander. Among them Wang Chi-en, Wei Chao-ch'in, and Han Shou-ying demonstrated their competence in the suppression of Li ShuiL^®^ Ch'in Han, Chou Huai-cheng, Chang

Chi-neng, Tou Shen-pao, Tou Shen-you served as Army Supervisor and Commander during the Sung-Liao War.^^^ Chang Ch'ung-kuei handled negotiations with Hsi Hsia.^^^

Some of them were martial arts experts and Yang Shou-chen's archery skill was

^ chQan 468, pp. 13661-62. SS, chQan 468, p. 13649. Tung-tu shih-lOeh. chQan 121, p. 1863-73. Chia-shOi chiu-wen. chQan 2, p. 206. SS, chOan 277, p. 9416, chOan 466, pp. 13603-04,13624, chQan 467, p. 13632. SS, chOan 466, pp. 13600-01, 13606, 13610-23 S^ chQan 466, p. 13617-18. 509

illustrious.^^" More important, eunuchs maintained a more intimate relation with the emperor than any generals. Li Shen-fu had served Sung Pai-tsung for years A^iien the emperor was still the Prince of Chin.^^^ Nevertheless, the iqjpointment of eunuchs as theater commander was the topic constant and consistent remonstration by civil officials. When

Emperor Ying-tsung intended to appoint four eunuchs as commanders or supervisor of the four circuits of Shensi, Chao Chan (1019-90) opposed citing the fatal Tang experience in which eimuchs controlled the Tang palace army and eventually dominated the imperial succession. Despite being a capable commander, Li Hsien was vehement attacked by such civil ofiBcials as Teng Yun-p'u (1027-94), Ts'ai Qi'eng-hsi (1035-84), and P'eng Yu-li

(1041-94).^®^ Even Wang An-shih was so alanned by the empowerment of Li Hsien that he preferred a quick conclusion of Kuo K'uei's incomplete Vietnamese campaign to prevent reinforcement by Li Hsien. On another occasion, Wang An-shih discovered that one ofi5cial was close to Li Hsien and dismissed this ofiQcial immediately.^®^

Criticisms of Tung Kuan were not completely ungrounded. Before the fall of K'aifeng, university students criticized Tung Kuan for having lost numerous proven veterans in the twenty years he was supreme theater commander of Shensi.^®^ An Yao-ch'en described how the growth of eimuch power was not only an internal political issue but also marked the escalation of violence with foreign countries. The central argument of these criticisms

""55,467, p. 13631. 55, chOan 466, pp. 13609-10. "2SS,ch0an 341, p. 10878. 55, chaan 343, p. 10911. 5un 5heng, Sun-kune fan-Du. chQan 3, pp. 16b-17a. 510

was that it was unlikely that such eunuch generals would be concerned with foreign policy of the state. Instead, they only focused on their own aggrandizement and inevitably committed themselves to excessive killing in battle. This killing would in turn complicate foreign relations.

Whether or not such a syllogism was sufficiently convincing, historical evidence suggests that not only did eunuch generals mark the war-making policy of the late Northern

Sung, but civilian commanders became less significant as mediators between grand strategic decision makers and directors of operation. Sung emperors after 1005 were rarely involved in military action and civilian theater commanders such as Han Ch'i and Fan

Chung-yen initiated operational planning. Having experience in civil service, these civil commanders managed to balance grand strategic options and operational needs. The two debates between Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen on strategic offense or defense in 1041 and on the construction or destruction of Fort Shui-lo illustrate their broad perspective and cautious appreciations from various strategic angles. The reform of Wang An-shih started to provide opportunities for tacticians such as Ch'ung O and Wang Shao as theater commanders and were justified as meeting the need of selecting military talent But their lack of civil experience impelled these commanders to focus on exclusively operational aspects. During the 1090s, aware of the danger of relying an entire campaign solely on the tactical angle, Chang Che strenuously reinstated the previous role of the civilian theater commander as mediator between high decision makers and operation commanders. His

' San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-pien, chQan 35, p. 9. 511

retirement in the early 1100s marked the end of such mediation. BCs colleagues Chimg

Ch'uan, Hu Chung-hui, and Sun Lu were either followers of surrogate rulers or aggressive civilian strategists. As a consistent advocate of aggressive strategy, Chung Ch'uan was the only Simg theater command younger than forty with the exception of Yiieh Fei (1103-41).

Chung Ch'uan's career was mariced with the vicissitude of meteoric promotion and equally dramatic demotion. Starting on Li Hsien's staff, Chung Ch'iian set a precedent when he was appointed as Theater Commander of Hsi Ho only two years after receiving the beginning official grade.^®®

Private communication largely replaced open discussion in the process of decision making. During the 1070s, Wang An-shih utilized such extraordinary communications with theater commanders Wang Shao and Chang Tun to prevent attack from remonstrators. The surrogacy of Chang Tun impelled the function of private mails to the extreme. Military

Counselor Tseng Pu was shocked that the Prime Minister wrote not only to civilian theater commanders but also to military ofBcers such as Tse K'o-shih and Wang Chan. In the summer of 1099, Tibetan Prince Ch'i-pa-wen uprose resulting in the defeat the Sung expeditionary force at Fort I-kung and the death of Ch'ung P'o. Prior to this incident, Hsi Ho

Theater Commander Sun Lu had submitted daily memorials without one word mentioning

Ch'i-pa-wen. Military Counselor Tseng Pu soon discovered that the memorials from Sun Lu merely fulfilled the formality and the actual strategic decision process was conducted in private correspondence between Chang Tun and Sun Lu. As Tseng Pu criticized, Chang

^ chOan 348. pp. 11037-38. 512

Tun plotted his strategy with intimate theater commanders and never revealed his plan in court discussion. Lacking intelligence, his colleagues in the Military Bureau and Imperial

Advisory Office found it difficult to give an opinion.^®^ Even though Tseng Pu's criticized private communication, he was compelled to quote a letter fiom Commander Yao Hsiung to his father Yao Lin that revealed the precarious situation of the Hsi Ho fix)nt after the failing attempt to take Ch'ing-t'ang City in 1099. This illustrated how private mails supplanted the memorial system.

A number of theater commanders after 1104 were military. According to Wu Ting- hsieh, there were three military professionals, Tse K'o-shih, Ch'ung Shih-tao, and Liu

Chung-wu, who were appointed as Theater Commander of Ching Yuan Circuit. Their incumbency extended twelve years from 1105 to 1125, sixty percent of the period. During the same period, there were ten years that two high ranking military officers Yao Ku and

Ch'ung Shih-chimg commanded Huan Ch'ing Circuit. After 1099, Ch'in Feng Circuit had become an interior circuit and was only six years under the command of a professional.

Marking a sharp contrast, the theater commanders of Hsi Ho Circuit were almost exclusively military. The incumbency of the four military commanders extended seventeen years from 1105 to 1125. As a military region on the frontier, Fu Yen Circuit was the only exception and only two years under the command of professional military.^®^ Imperial

Advisor Jen Po-ytt (d. after 1119) seriously criticized court reliance on the military to

HCP, chOan 513, pp. 12193-95,12205-06. 166 Ting-hsieh, Pei-Sune chine-fu nien-oiao. (Beijing; Chung-hua, punctuated edition, 1984), chOan 3, pp. 208-52. 513

command theater, reminding the emperor with the An Lu-shan rebellion.^^^ His criticism was equivocal because the problem was not rooted just in the disloyal and unbridled behavior of the generals. On the contrary, it was the authoritarianism deep-rooted in their professional training. According to the Standard History, Ch'img Shih-tao, nephew of

Ch'ung O, was the only Shensi general who never bent the knee before Tung Kuan and more than once challenged the latter's aggressive strategy.^^° The failure of Wang Hou in

1104 and the tragedy of Liu Fa at the battle of Fort Tung-an was illustrative.

Shortly after the annexation of Ch'ing-t'ang, Prime Minister Ts'ai Ch'ing assigned

Wang Hou to urge the surrender of Hsi Hsia Commandery Supervisor Jen-tuo Pao-chung in

1104 and open the path for Sung influence in Ho-hsi. Wang Hou reported that despite the unquestioned willingness of Jen-tuo Pao-chung to serve the Han, he was not supported by his subordinates. Repeatedly urged to negotiate by Ts'ai Ching, Wang Hou delegated his younger brother to contact Jen-tuo pao-tsung. After reaching agreement, Wang Hou's younger brother was captured by a Tangut patrol. As a restilt of the capture, the Hsi Hsia court recalled Jen-tuo Pao-chimg, mobilized its forces, and renewed the matrimonial alliance with the Liao.^^^ In 1105, Pacification Intendant of Fu-Yen Circuit Pao Chieh-fix

(late 1 Ith-early 12th c.) built four forts on the Horizontal Mountains and seized numerous food storage sites from the Tanguts. The Tanguts cried; "The Han have taken our Golden coffer!" On the Hsi-Ho front. Sung oflBcer Chao Lung (circa 1050-1120) defeated a Hsi

SS, chQan 345, p. 10965. '''° SS, chOan 335, p. 10750. SS, chQan 486, p. 14019, 514

Hsia force on Iron Mountain or Tieh-san. In return, Hsi Hsia raided Chun-jm^

Commandery taking several ten thousand captives. At the climax of the Tangut offense.

Pacification Intendant of Ching-YOan Chung ChHian, leading a reconnoiter force along the

frontier, was cut-off from his headquarters Wei-chou for several days.^^^ At the same time, the Tangut-Tibetan alliance launched a preemptive campaign against Fort Buffalo of Hsi-

Ho. Betrayed by his Tibetan bodyguards. Sung Colonial Governor of Limg-yu Kao Yung- nien was captured and sliced to death. K'aifeng assigned Liu Chung-wu (circa 1050-1120), the father of the famous general of the Southem Sung, Liu Ch'i (1078-1162), as the successor of Kao Yimg-nien.^'^ After this setback on the western wing, Pao Chieh-fu and

Chung Ch'uan plotted another offense against Ling-choiL Leading a cavalry force. Legion

Commander Tse K'o-shih raided the vicinity of this Hsi Hsia city on the Yellow River.

Following his effort, the Sung constructed Hsiao-kuan on the gateway toward Ling- chou.^^^ When Hsi Hsia struggled to dismpt the construction, Tao Chieh-fu took Yin-chou and rapidly fortified it^^^ In 1107, Hsi Hsia demanded a peace and sent tribute to

K'aifeng."®

SS, chflan 317, p. 10351, chOan 348, pp. 11038-39, chOan 350, p. 11090, chflan 486, p. 14019. Also, "Tse K'o-shih mu-chih," p. 7b-8a. ^ chOan 350, p. 11082, chflan 453, p. 13316, chflan 486, p. 14019. It was unclear whether Hsiao-kuan was built before or after the incursion of Ling-chou by Tse K'o-shih. SS. chflan 348, p. 11038 recorded: "(Chung) Ch'uan dispatched Brigadier Tse K'o-shih with fierce cavalry from Hsiao-kuan to Ling-chou valley." However, Tse K'o-shih mu-chih" p. 8a-9b revealed that after Tse K'o-shih had returned without great success, the Sung construction Hsiao-^an to control the valley of the Gourd River. ^ chflan 87, p. 2160 indicated that Hsiao-kuan was built in 1005 instead of 1004. It fits the record of "Tse K'o-shih mu-chih". SS, chflan 348, pp. 11038-39, CPPM. chflan 140, pp. 4237-39. SS, chflan 486, p. 14019. 515

The defection of Fort Ting-yiian tribal ofBcer Li O-yi (circa, early 12th c.) fix)m Sung to Hsi Hsia in 1114 renewed violence. Following Li Oyi's plot, Hsi Hsia intended to seize the food storage near Ting-pien Commandery (in the northwest of the present day Wu-ch'i

County) of Huan-Ch'ing but did not succeed As the conflict escalated, Hsi Hsia opened

Buddha Pass near the Huan-ch'ing border and constructed Fort Tsang-ti River near the

Ching-YOan border. Fort Tsang-ti River, built on a cliff, was later elevated to Ch'eng-te

Commandery. As a result, Sung Hui-tsung ^)pointed Tung Kuan as Supreme Theater

Commander of Shensi and Ch'ung Shih-tao, nephew of Ch'ung O, as Pacification Intendant of Ching-Yuan Circuit Before the construction at Hsi-wei-p'ing beside the Gourd River,

Ch'ung Shih-tao confionted a Hsi Hsia host At the beginning of the battle, Ch'ung Shih-tao sent a force to cut-off the rear of the enemy. When the Tangut force hesitated, Ch'ung Shih- tao ordered his captain Yang K'o-shih to mount a flanking attack. Simultaneously, C^tain

Yao P'ing-chung (d. after 1126) vigorously charged with his elite cavalry against the Hsi

Hsia center guard. As a combined effort of these attacks, the Tangut host collapsed losing five ±ousand soldiers and its Commander A-san Pi-ching barely escaped.^^^

Consequentiy, the Sung offense accelerated in 1115. Commander of Hsi-Ho Liu Fa (d.

1119) with 150,000 men from Huang-chou and Liu Chung-wu with 50,000 men from Hui- chou conducted a pincer attack. Liu Chung-wu built a fort on Pure Water River and returned. Liu Fa defeated the Hsi Hsia Right Front Anny commanded by Prince Cha-ko, and took Fort Ku-ku-lung. In the autumn, Wang Hou and Liu Chimg-wu mobilized a force

SS, chQan 335, pp. 10750-51, chaan 486, p. 14019-20. Tse Ycn-chih, "Ch'ung Shih-tao hsing-chuang". 516

from four circuits and laid siege to Fort Tsang-ti River. This effort ended in fiasco with

forty to fifty percent of forces lost and the entire Third Legion of Ch'in-Feng consisting of

10,000 soldiers was utterly destroyed. To hide the defeat, Wang Hou bribed Tung Kuan and during the wiinter, ten thousand Hsi Hsia horsemen raided Hsiao Kuan.^^°

In 1116, Liu Fa and Liu Giung-wu mobilized 100,000 troops finm Hsi-Ho and Ch'in- feng, laid siege to Fort Jen-tuo Springs for three days, and butchered its inhabitants after accepting capitulation. On the Qiing-YOan front, Ch'ung Shih-tao conducted a second siege against Fort Tsang-ti River with 100,000 men fi»m seven circuits of Shensi and Ho-tung.

Despite the consolidated defense, the Sung force took the fort in an eight-day-siege^^® and in reprisal, Hsi Hsia attacked Fort Ching-hsia in winter. Tangut cavalry rode around the fort raising dust, preventing the garrisons fix)m seeing the Tanguts build an underground tuimel; more than ninety percent Sung garrison was massacred when the fort fell.^°°

Violence reached the climax in 1119 when Timg Kuan urged Liu Fa to mount a new offense with 20,000 soldiers.^®^ Near Fort Tung-an, Prince Ch'a-ko of Hsi Hsia arrayed his troops in three battle formations and Liu Fa divided the force into five corps. After ferocious battling for hours, the Sung Vanguard under Yang Wei-chung (1067-1132) set

in SCPMHP. chOan 60, pp. 6b-7a. SS, chQan 350, p. 11091, chOan 486, p. 14020. chQan 335, p. 10751, chQan 446, p. 13166, chOan 486, p. 14020. "Ch'ung Shih-tao hsing-chuang," p. 7b. SS, ChQan 486, p. 14020. ^ chQan 486, p.14020 indicated that Tung-kuan assigned Liu Fa to take Shuo-fang. The Tang E)ynasty established Shuo-fang Comamndery at Ling-chou but Ling-chou was not likely the objective of Liu Fa in this campaign. When Liu Fa escaped from the battlefield of Tung-an, he was killed at Kai-chu Pass near Fort Nan-chung of Huang-chou. Therefore, the battlefield was still within the area of Hsi Hsia Chuo-Io Commandery and far away to Ling-chou. Tung-tu shih-lQeh, chQan 127, p. 1963 recorded the 517

back commingling with the Left Guard, wbile the Rear Guard under Chao An-chieh retreated into the formation of the Central Guard. Q^itain Chu Ting-kuo fought ferociously and the Sung force withstood until the late night Liu Fa esc^)ed from the battlefield but was killed by a patrolling Tangut soldier. As a result of this encounter, Hsi Hsia laid siege on Chen-wu Commandery, built on the original site of the Tangut Fort Ku-ku-lung, for more than three days and then retreated.^®^ In 1120, Tung Kuan recommended Ch'img

Shih-tao as Commander and Liu Chung-wu and Liu Yen-ch'ing (d. 1127) as Vice

Commanders of the expeditionary force to attack Yimg-ho, Ta-ke, and Ming-sha, three forts guarding the route upstream on the Gourd River to Ling-chou. Hsi Hsia abandoned all these crucial forts.^®^ Emperor Hui-tsung soon approved the Tangut demand of peace and restriained further offense.

The Sung-Hsia War ended withoxit significance. It did not result in a long peace, nor did it marked a termination of Sung aggressive foreign policy. It was only the rise of the

Jurchens and the collapse of the Khitan Empire that attracted the Sung attentions and made

objective as Fort Ko-niu without indicating its geographic location. chQan 486, pp. 14020. After the Tangut retreat, Fung-kuan reported a victory and K'aifeng promoted and rewarded several hundred officers. §§, chOan 486 p. 14021 indicated, "Liu Chung-wu and Ho Kuan (d. 1127) led a relief force and (the Tangut) retreated." SS, chflan 446, p. 13162 exemplifies such a fabricated merit, recording an officer in Fu-Yen C^it was even attributed to Ae relief of Fort Chen-wu. Nevertheless, ^ chOan 496, p. 14021 also recorded the words of Prmce Cha-ko of Hsi Hsia: "Do not take this fort Led it be a tumor of the Southern Dynasty (the Sung)." This sarcastic description fit the point of view of the Old Party that considered fort construction on the extreme frontier as serious hazard of national resource. In my opinion, if Ch'a-ko had no intend to take the fort, he would not have attacked it after defeating Liu Fa. It seems that only because the Tanguts could not take it in three days and were compelled to withdraw, he heralded there words to maintain the morale. According to SS, chQan 3S7, p. 11226, the relief force led by Liu Chung-wu and Ho Kuan was not sizable enough to defeat Ch'a-ko, therefore Ho Kuan employed a series of deceptive actions as if a large Sung force was in advance. This was probably the direct cause of Cha-ko's withdrawal. "Ch'ung Shih-tao hsing-chuang", p. 7b. 518

Hsi Hsia no longer a strategic focus of K'aifeng. Nevertheless, ominous indicators suggesting a possible military coil^se were discernible &om 1099 to 1120. First, war instead of peace had become the grand strategic choice of K'aifeng against the "four

barbarians" and this compelled the Sung to engage strenuous effort in state violence.

Second, decision making was firmly controlled by surrogates, eimuchs, and a small group of their favorites. As a result, the deicision making process became much less transparent in vertical dimension and errors of individual leaders could bring collective damages. Third, in horizontal dimension, civilian command in Shensi theaters after 1099 rarely played a mediating role between central decision makers and operational commanders and the pernicious outcomes were revealing. Either the court became over relied on the optimistic estimation of spies, intelligence ofiBcers, and field commanders, or the military commanders, a number of them being promoted as theater commander, bent to obey the central authority in every strategic agenda. A culmination of these effects prevented a rational and flexible decision making. Fourth, the last twenty years of the Sung-Hsia War was devastating. The Sung was compelled to deploy a strategic force more than five hundred thousand persoimel in Shensi and it explained the extremely insufficient manpower in the defense of K'aifeng in 1126. In sum, historical evidence did not seem to be sufficient to prove the last two decades of the Northern Sung as a period of general decay, nor was it objective to vilify any individual leader. Nonetheless, indicators of a military collapse as a consequence of overuse of violence had been revealing and the risk to make high military commitment against the Liao was thus perceptible. 519

In 1114, Juichen tribes led by Wan-yen A-ku-ta (1068-1123) uprose and routed the

Liao army in more than three encounters. In 1115, A-lcu-ta foimed a Jurchen federation named the Great Chin. Sung Hui-tsimg and Tung Kuan approved a proposal by a spy Ma

Chih (d. 1126) to join an anti-Khitan alliance with the Jurchens. Ma Chih was renamed as Chao Liang-ssu with an imperial surname. The alliance was confirmed in 1118 under the terms that the Sung should retake the Yen Yun region that had been ceded to the Liao during the Five Dynasties. Two offenses against Yen-ching (the present state capital

Beijing) led by Ch'img Shih-tao and Liu Yen-ch'ing were defeated by the Liao Imperial

Guard. After the complete destruction of the Liao Empire by the Jurchens, the Sung regained the territory through diplomatic means in 1123. However, K'aifeng soon violated the agreement with the Chin and provided political asylum to a Liao general. The

Jurchens launched two offenses in late 1125 and 1126 that resulted in the fall of K'aifeng.

In realpolitik sense, this decision itself did not seem to be a problematic decision since it attempted to maximize the Sung interest. Although the betrayal of a neighboring state in peace for more than a century was questionable in political decency, it was far less questionable than the three Hsi Ho Campaigns that overthrew a consistent political supporter and military ally, the Chueh-ssu-lo regime. A government could justify the strategic end of the three Hsi Ho Campaigns would not likely have difSculty to give political euphemism to join the alliance against the Liao. Nevertheless, historians criticized that the Sung military means were not sufBcient to achieve the diplomatic end; the failing adventure ensued the catastrophic collapse of the Northem Simg in 1127. 520

CONCLUSION OF PART IH

From 1067 to 1104, the Sung launched eight offensive campaigns against three

neighboring states. Among them, the four campaigns against Hsi Hsia, namely, the Lo-

wu campaign from 1070 to 1071, the siege of Ling-chou in 1081, the Fort Eternal

Happiness campaign in 1082, and the Celestial Capital Mountain campaign recorded a transition from failure to success. As a response to the Vietnamese aggression, the Chaio- chih campaign ought to be classified as an offensive defense and rather than a Chinese initiation of war. The three Hsi-Ho campaigns demonstrated the retum of the Sung realpolitik in their dealing with the Kokonor Tibetans. Up to 1100, the Sung had taken

Lan-chou, Hui-chou, the Celestial Capital Moimtain Commandery, and nearly the entire

Horizon Mountain region from the Tanguts. In addition, the Sung annexed the whole

Chueh-ssu-lo kingdom and established prefectural rule over the new territory.

The changeover from the search for domestic stability to the pursuit of a military agenda was the consequence of a series of historical causes. For the long term, the Tangut offenses during the early 1040s forced the abandonment of the Simg pacifist perception of war with one that was realistic. Defeats incited sober studies in the arts of war and produced a number of strategic talents such as Wang Shao, Ch'img O, and Chang Che to define the Sung military goals. Not only did foreign gains foster the political power of

New Party statesmen during the late eleventh century, escalation also constituted the general attitude of the officers on the frontier of China as well. Despite giving higher 521

priority to domestic refoim, Wang An-shih could not reject the imetus that foreign war gave to his embattled policies. He rationaled that moderate violence was indispensable training for nurturing military talent The financial reform &om 1070 to 1085 facilitated the Hsi-Ho campaign and provided the necessary funds for the occupation of several

Tangut prefectures and forts including Lan-chou.

The uncooperating Tangut attitude continued and this encouraged the Sung offense. From 1067 to 1104, there were a number of Simg statesmen suggesting reconciliation with the Tanguts but Hsi Hsia was not eager to improve relations. The murders of Sung emissaries and ofScers, cheating in demarcation process, and sporadic transgressions provided the justification for the Sung New Party hard-liners. In addition, the succession problem of Hsi Hsia and the power struggle between Tangut nobility continuously planted the seeks of conflict. As a result, peace after 1067 became insignificant respites among massive violence.

Both Sung and Hsi Hsia considered the Kokonor Tibetan kingdom as strategically important; and whoever controlled the Pao and Huang Valley would threaten the strategic flank of the other. After the death of Chfieh-ssu-Io, the disintegration of his domain became a reality. None of the Simg and Tangut was able to woo Ch'ing-t'ang into a long-term strategic alliance, nor could they expect the continued existence of even a buffer zone. Therefore, realpolitik defined the norms of interactions and Ch'ing-t'ang finally became a victim of interstate power struggle. 522

In the military sense, the Sung from 1067 to 1104 won tremendous victories. The

Sung army occupied three strategic regions, from east to west, the Horizon Moimtain, the

Celestial Capital Mountain, and the Hsi-Ho Circuit, strengthening the defense and

opening the path for o£fense. Theater command and the operational arts developed

gradually. On one hand, various theater commanders after 1067 inherited the strategic

conventions established by Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen, excelling in fort-building, tribal

subjugation, and intelligence collection. On the other hand, theater commanders as Chang

Che and Wang Hou engaged in strenuous effort in studying previous failures and how to

nullify disadvantages. This is why the Celestial Capital Mountain Campaign was not a

repetition of the tragedy of Fort Eternal Happiness and the third Hsi-Ho campaign

achieved victory on the exactly the same difficult terrain. Coordination among various

circuit largely improved and now Shensi headquarters was able to form an offensive

army-group composed of soldiers from the various circuits. Tacticians emerged in the

Sung army after 1067 and Ch'ung O, Kuo K'uei, Liu Chang-chuo, and Tse K'o-shih achieved brilliant gains on battlefields. Tribal officers such as Pao Shun and Mu Hua assisted their legion commanders excellently. Most of these achievement reflect the success of the legionary reform of Emperor Shen-tsimg.

Sung strategy after 1067 allowed more explicit violence, deviating from that of

the early Sung. Although the perception of war as devastating but inconclusive indecisive act received few theoretical challenges. Sung strategists acknowledged that Hsi Hsia would suffer much more than the Sung. Hazards of war such as state economic burden. 523

loss of soldiers lives, and violence against civilians became more significantly rfamaging to the Tangut state having much less territory and population. Therefore, the strategic approach of the Sung was to diminish the Tangut ability to sustain a prolonged war. This meant an escalation of the use of violence. 524

CONCLUSION

This dissertation concludes without any intent to generalize the premodem Chinese foreign attitude and behavior, despite covering a relatively extended period of Chinese history. In this concluding part, I will emphasize three thematic aspects: the Sung military misfortune, the varied foreign attitude and vis-a-vis Ka'ifeng strategy, and the Sung achievement in the pursuit of peace.

Military Incompetence or Misfortune?

Military defeat is not always deep-rooted in incompetence. As Eliot Cohen and John

Gooch suggested in 1991, a distinction between incompetence and misfortune is needed in military studies.^ The causes of defeat were complex in Sung military history and sometimes there was no profound reason. It was not because of the nature of recruited soldiers for regular pay. The argimient of Yang Chieh against Hsia Sung mentioned no profound reason suggesting the competence of farming soldiers over the professional military. Despite the existence of such typical examples as Ko Huai-min and Hsti Hsi,

Sung defeats were not generally because of incapable leaders. We can find emperors or commanders who achieved brilliant victory and was vilified for defeats as in other times, such as Sung Tai-tsimg and Ch'ung O. Apparently, disadvantageous terrain laid insuperable barriers to Sung operations against the Tanguts and Tibetans, but, yet, we

• Cohen, A. Eliot and Gooch, John. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. (New York: The Free Press, 1990), pp. 1-3. 525

need not to blame the geogr^hy. In our brief discussion of battles, it was not rare to find

victory and defeat occurring on the same terrain. The Sung Horizon Mountain campaign

in 1070, 1082, and 1097, and the second and third Hsi-Ho campaigns provided examples

for the sharp contrast of success and defeat on almost the same battlefields.

The Sung armed force was a highly complex, systematized, and politically neutral

bureaucracy, in which individual failure could be ameliorated by organizational accommodation. Despite receiving a problematic battle formation firom the emperor, early

Sung generals, such as Li Chi-lung, were able to make snap decisions according to the tactical situation. There was almost no room for heroism and the heroic image of Ti

Ch'ing emerged in a very unusual atmophere hungry for victory. After a series of military successes in the late eleventh century, comparable heroes such as Liu Ch'ang-chuo, Kuo

Ch'eng, and Tse K'o-shih, did not find a similar conservatory in which to be legendized.

Compared with the semi-private armed forces of the Six Dynasties and the farmer soldiers of the Stii and early Pang, military professionalism and its political neutrality was an historic progress.

Nevertheless, the Sung military bureaucracy exhibited shortcomings in training.

When the army was not trained for civil war, personal power struggles, and immediate foreign expedition, a determined effort to maintain its capability was lacking. Only imminent external threat could incite the self-strengthening of the army for its own survival. Defeat was remarkable in the Northern Sung not because it suggests the coming of a foreign coquest dynasty nor did it foreshadow the semi-colonization of China by 526

westerners. It gave the impulse to Sung military development It is fundamentally inaccurate to describe the Sung army as "strong" or "weak". The vicissitudes of this complex organic bureaucracy marked with defeats persistently revitalized its energy.

Strategic Options, Preference, and Choice

From the eve of the ninth to the dawn of the twelth century, the tolerance for violence and strategic attitude varied over a broad range. The militocracy during the Late

T'ang and Five Dynasties allowed unlimited use of violence in both civil and foreign war.

Early Sung rulers defined efBcacious but limited violence in the unification campaign and the inconclusiveness of the Sung-Liao war compelled a diplomatic solution. After 1067,

K'aifeng legitimized a high frequency, though not constantly large scale, of the use of violence against Tangut. Varying offensive and defensive strategies emerged at every stage. Such variable employment of violence and strategy does not support a common notion in which the grand strategic preference is derived from an single paradigmatic military tradition or "strategic culture". Rather, it demonstrated the Chinese preference of a classical military doctrine, "flexibility among a myriad options."

From the memorial studies involved in this dissertation, it is possible to suggest that

Sung China had a broad range of strategic options. As a country in which such grand strategic elements as political leadership, economic performance, rule of law had been broadly discussed during the ancient Warring States, China in the Sung Dynasty did not seem to be an exception. If we must agree with David Jones that "such a 'culture' presumably affects the whole range of a nation's broad security and more narrow military 527

policies,"^ this traditioa would likely be a strategic microcorsm in which all conceivable

options were opened. Perpetual peace, temporary reconciliation, "negative peace",

economic blockade, forward defense, defense-in-depth, elastic defense, aggressive

defense, attrition, "shallowed incursion", o£fense in limited-scale or short duration, and

parabellum were employed or seriously considered by decision makers from 960 to 1104.

The model of hawk vs. dove and the "gang of surrender" vs. "gang of patriot" simply does not work in explaining the Northern Sung foreign attitude.

Nevertheless, it is not tantamount to say that a paradigm for a strategic model or, in the terminology of recent scholars, a "strategic culture" did not exist. Through the examination of the Sung experience with its neighbors revealed that its strategic preference was consistently defined as self-restrained and defensive: domestic concern over foreign ambition, minimal or limited violence, civilian command, holistic relations

between the civil and the military, and using a barbarian against another barbarian. Based on a notion of the devastating nature of war, the Simg defensive strategic preference de- legitimized foreign aggression and excessive violence. The consistency and perpetuation of this strategic notion suggests the existence of a cultural value system beyond strategic policies and committment and "strategic culture" seems to be appropriate.

Nevertheless, K'aifeng did not always give the highest priority to its preferred strategic oprion. Despite having a fundamentally defensive military machine, offensive doctrine existed and influence strategic decision. In Edward Luttwak's strategic model

- Jones, R. David, "Soviet Strategic Culture", in Carl G. Jacobsen ed. Strategic Power USA/USSR. 528

constituted by five-layers &om grand strategy to military technology, this inconsistency may illustrate the paradoxical nature of strategy and not necessary an inharmonious strategic phenomenon. To Alastair Johnston, this inconsistency represents a "disjuncture between symbolic and ideational preference and operational doctrine".^ The variation of

K'aifeng's strategic choice and the vicissitudes of the Sung empire suggest two significant variables together affected the making of deviate decisions, namely, the efBcacy of operational warfare and recent foreign experience.

Pacifists, ancient and modem, tend to describe war as an indecisive political means to resolve conflicts. On the contrary, realists, especially the Clausewitzists, considered war as an effective and indispensable means to achieve a political end. Neo-realists in the late 1980s and early 1990s have started to agree on the "relative gains" of peace^ and have not yet been able to deny the efficacy of violence. History has provided ample precedence in which the maximal violence brought decisive outcome. The Romans grasped North Africa from Carthage through three Punic Wars and the Ch'in unification conquest marked the end of the Warring States. Apparently, Northern Sung China did not escape from this dilemma. Despite a consensual view about in its devastative nature, not all Sung rulers and strategists agreed as to its indecisiveness. As ancient military thinkers.

Sung strategists tended to view victories and defeat as circumstantial. This was why the

Sung-Liao stalemate gradually engendered a normative environment but at the same time

London: 1990, pp. 35-49) p. 35. ^ Johnston, Alastair Iain, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), x, p. 5. * David A. Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary Debate. (New York: Columbia 529

K'aifeng reserved a broad choice for a possible violent solution to the Tangut issue. It was unquestioned that Sung rulers did not emphasize the maximized gain of taking territory from other countries. Nevertheless, when the efiScacy of violence enhanced, or, at least the cost of such operations was minimized, the priority of using force heightened.

Minimal cost appeared in the proposal for taking Fort Shui-lo, Horizon Mountain, and

Hsi-Ho as an indispensable legitimate reason for offense. Moreover, this consideration significantly tied the financial policies of K'aifeng, such as tea-and-horse trading and

State Trading Post to its grand strategy.

It was dubious that the enhancing efiScacy of operational warfare alone would force a strategic transition from defense to offense. It needed an insecure foreign environment to provide momentum. The Sui-chou Incident in 1067 suggested the difBculties of making strategic transition. The plot of Ch'img O was undoubtly operative. His adversary was not any Tangiit general but the politicians in K'aifeng. Only after the Hsi Hsia over- reaction precluded any opportunity for a quick reconciliation, realpolitik was inspired and exercised by Han Ch'i, Kuo K'uei, and their colleagues.

In short, military tradition or "strategic culture" may possibly define preference, but contemporary experience and the efficacy of operational warfare also afifect decision making and caused the transformation of grand strategy. When the military equilibrium and stable relations with foreign coutries were stable, it was more likely that K'aifeng preferred non-violence and minimal violence. When external threat endangered its

University Press, 1993), pp. 3-25. 530

security, K'aifeng would reserve more options for interstate violence.

The Sung Achievement in Universai Pacification

In the modem scholarly conception, peace has four interrelated meanings. Peace is a strategic preference, a symbolism and ideation constructing domestic institutions, a notion embodying norms for international behavior, and a cross-cultual, universal value.

This dissertation suggests that the Sung achieved in the first and second criteria, but it did not achieve comparable success in the third sphere, and almost failed in the fourth.

Our discussion begins with the campaigns of the Pang in Central Asia and the ensuing civil war during the Ninth and Tenth centuries, and argued the early Sung inaction in external adventure was a conscious avoidance of the excessive violence of the previous era. After the military upheaval during the Late Pang and Five Dynasties, the

Sung did not preserve a goal of the conquest of Central Asia. Early Sung memorialists criticized the devastation and inconclusiveness of war that signified Tang expansionism.

Accompanied with this, the first three Sung emperors well acknowledged the consequence of the overuse of violence. Dtiring the period firom 960 to 1005, early Sung founders were compelled to refi^ finm ther overuse of violence. On one hand, tC'aifeng employed a strategy of indirection to prevent excessive violence during its unification campaign, lest its economy be destroyed by prolonged war. On the other hand, the Sung exerted it influence in diplomatic negotiation. Its relative success saw the peaceful annexation of the Wu-YQeh Kingdom and the conclusion of the Peace of lOOS between the Sung and Liao with modest cost. Military balance and a notion of co-existence 531

underlined the cohesive relations between the Sung and Liao for almost four decades.

Seeing war not for glorifying the ruler and necessary violence as indispensable to achieve

peace and the betterment of society, strategic advisors in late tenth century highlighted

rationality in strategic decision making. Institutional change fix)m the late Tang to the

early Sung underlined the suppression of the militocracy and the institutional causes of

war, congruent with a nascent pacific foreign policy. Centralization and civilism of the

Sung largely undermined the legacy of the Late Tang militocracy and transformed the officer corps into an important organ of the bureaucratic instimtion. To the utmost, the early Sung rulers firmly controlled the military machinery and prevented war-making by internal and institutional sources.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the eleventh century the Sung still faced two unsolved problems regarding the preservation of peace. Intemally, K'aifeng attempted prevent a reversion of militocracy and civilian command became a consequential policy.

However, the Sung rulers overlooked the possibility that career civilian commanders, despite being civil servants by nature and presiunably less warlike, could still incorporate within them the institution of war and agressive strategy. Although it was still an undercurrent of the early Sung, this incipient warmongoing accelerated accompanied by internal Tangut change. Externally, the Tangut independence movement emerged as incongruent with Sung pacification. The nature of the Tangut independence movement was multi-faceted. It expressed the feeling for Tangut independence after the fall of Tang hegemony but at the same time, signified the struggle between the central authority of the 532

early Sung and the remaining power of the military governors. Also, lacking economic resources, the Tangut politico-military autarchy entered the arena of the civil war much later than the other warlords. In«q)erience with the devastation and inconclusiveness of war made the Tangut oblivious to the idea of coexistence. Conversely, the Tanguts regarded conquest and empire building as the key to survival, inheriting the warfare of the military governors dxiring the late Tang and Five Dynasties-rapidly switching alliances, false surrender, betrayal, and the spontaneous violation of peace. All these strategems made stable relations between the Simg and Hsi Hsia impossible.

The Sung-Hsi Hsia War from 1038 to 1045 drew Khitan into the arena of power diplomacy. The looming Liao-Hsi Hsia collision and the ensuing increase of the Sung annual payment to the Liao marked elevating suspicion among the three states. It also stimulated a career military service for Sung civil ofGcials and gave audiance to the voice of strategic security. This movement from 1040s to 1070s included military talent able to cleverly combine intelligence, psychological warfare and military engineering.

Associated with economic prosperity and scientific innovation, they coalesced with the

Reform of Wang An-shih, and the "hsin-tang" or New Party after the 1070s. In this dissertation, I will treat the New Party as not only a political group but one representing military interests as well. A power struggle politicized and polarized the strategic decision-making, especially the debate about renewing the animosity toward the Hsi

Hsia. The reform of Wang An-shih caused the Svmg army to be organized much more efficiently and it was better financed. In 1070, the opportunity of strategic activism 533

emerged in taking the eastern part of Ch'ing-hai from the Tibetan, which rejustified ofifensive warfare as in the long term benefit of the Simg. From 1067 to 1082, the Sung attempted to squeeze the Tanguts in a two-prong movement from the east and west.

During the second half of the eleventh century, pragmatic expansionism prevailed in the

Sung strategic decision-making. War was to gain territories, to increase political and diplomatic leverage, and to enhance imperial dignity. However, the growth of Sung military power eventually diminished the Sung ability to control war. On one hand. Sung military achievement culminated in the success of rearmament; on the other hand, it marked an end to the principle of limited violence since the early Sung. With the Sung renewal of hostility against the Liao in 1122 and the war from 1124 to 1127, the early

Sung policy of the limited and cautious use of violence was abrogated.

The vicissitudes of Tenth and Eleventh Century China are illuminating. Strategic wisdom during the days started to consider peace as a realistic strategic option, creating a domestic institution to control the war machinery of the state. Nevertheless, the existing institutioneilized peace between the Sung and Liao only created a norm of bilateral behavior but did not prevent the proliferation of violence in Ho-hsi and the Ordos. Unable to constrain Tangut expansionism, the Sung were compelled to reinstate an aggressive grand strategy and release the constrains on its war machinery. The ensuing war eventually ravaged the Sung empire, its opportunity for a great leap toward a premodem world missed. 534

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Mao Han-kuang "Tang-mo Wu-tai cheng-duh se-hui chih ycn-chiu—Wci-po erh- pai men shih-hm" in Bqfletm of the Instittite of History and Phildoyv. Academia Simca. v.50, pt 2, (1979X pp. 301-360.

Mao Han-kuang, "Wu-tai duh chaig^hih yen-hsu yu cheng-ch'uen chuan-i" m BuBetm «f tfie fartitute of Mstofv and Philotoyv. Academia Smiea. V.51, pt 2, (1980X pp. 233-80.

Meng Kuang-yao XflffW. "Ta-ts'ao4ai men" 1 •iLiti'lg. m Shc-huik'oJT«fleh hm-hafi, (1981)3

Mu Sai "Sm-te Li iu-jen mu-chih yu Sung-Hria Yen-an-chih-chan"jfS^l^^AII^ jCao-kuYuwen-wu no. 4 (1987), pp. 54-55.

!^eh Ch'ung-di'i, Sung Tai-tza shou ping-ch'flan" in Yen- ching hsfieh-pao, v.34, abo in Us Siing.Aih (Examination on The Sunglfistoiy), (Beijmfr Chnng-faua, 1979), v.l, pp. 263-282.

Ng Pak-sheung 'Chung-Tang yi Wo^ai cUh di(hi-shih diHian-t^mg yu Pei-Sung cUh t^ng-i chan-lOeh" (Hong Kong: Master Thesis of the Chinese UmveniQr of Hong Kong, 1987).

Ng Pak-sheung, l-chou sUb-hswn men-yOdi k'ao; duen hm Nan-Sung cUh Ching plen* tsuan Pei-Sung H-aWhtetfe^" 554

in Yang ^en-ting (ed), Suf^.^Ti l^-wni-chi: Lo Chlu-ch'w^ lani^Ti yung-hghi chi-nien chun-hai (Collected Papers on Sung History: Special Edition for Remonbamg The Retirenient of Mr. Lo Chlu-chln^ (Hong Kong: Ounese Historical ReseacdiSociety^ of Hong Kong, 1994X p.1-19.

PaiPin, n Yiian-tian rhiMti, (ABiogrq^ofli Yflan-haoX (Ch'ang- chHm: fTwTtn chaio-yu, 1988).

Pai Pin (ed) Hst-Ifaia-shih hm-wen-chL^jt (Collected Essj^ On The Ifistoty of Hd-Hsia), (Idn-chlian: Ning-hsia tyan-min, 1984.

Pai Pin, "Lun Hri Hda shih-ch'i te hou-tzu cheng-chih" m Chung-kuo min-tzu shih ven-chiu v. 3, (Beij^r Chung-yai^ mm-tzu hsueh-yOan, 1993X pp-124-37.

P'an Hsiao-wei "Tang ch'ien-chl chOn-shih pu-chu te yien-pien")^t^g^$^M (Alteration of aimed force deployment during die earfy Tai%), in An-ch'ing shih- chuen hs&eh-pao (se-k'o pan) (it^iiS), (1985)3, pp.37-44.

Ts'un Chung-mien Shui-Tang Shih. (HistMy of Sui and Tang) (Beijing,Chung-htia, new edition, 1982).

Shih Wei-ndn "Tang-hsiang-chu To-pa-pu te ch'ien-yi chi-ch'i yu Tang, Wu-tai chuwang-ch'aotekuan-hsi- (The Emigration of Tangufs To-pa Tribe And Bs Relation widi The Tang and Five Dynasties), in Pai Pin (ed), HM-tisia-shih lun-wen-chL pp. 80-107.

Sgabe Shizuo "Liang shui-la ch'eng-li te yu-la" Li Mmg ^3^ (trans.), in Ta-lu tsa-chih. v.21, no. 3 (1960 ), pp. 10-14.

Sun Chin-chi "Kuan-yu 'Cheng-fii wang-ch'ao'"||5if$'"tiEIS£i91l", in Tian-chtn Ch'ieh-tan Nu-chen shih ven-chiu (1982)1, pp.22-23.

Sun Chin-chi, Kan chih-geng "Lun wo4aio li-shih shang nan-pei min-chu te kuan- hsi" in Tian-chtn Ch'ieh-tan Mu-chen shih ven-chiu. (1982)1, pp.26-30.

Sung Ch'ang-fien " Pei-Su^ te Ma-cheng" T«-hi Taa-chth, 25 ( April, 1957)10-12. 555

Sung Ch'ang-lien, " Kao>liang Ho chan-i fCao-stuh" Ta-hi Tsa-chL 39.10 (1969)32.

SungHnu-fing ''Siing4aiHo-HiiangPu<^li-ch'ali-sliihtMieiirtlfanrt'ao"?^ m TMngJwrftehven-chmlg'ui^-lc'an V. 5, (Unknown; Hsi-tsang jen-min, 1993X pp. 181-203.

Tai Ying-hsin ttflfegr. Tge-shih chi»- dm sMi-^Oeh (A Short IfisUny of Ae Tse FamilyrX (Hn-an: San-Ch%i, 1989).

Tan Qi'i-shaang (ed) Chung-kuo firshih ti-t^i clu, CThe Hstorical Adas of China) (Shan^iai: Cartographic Publishing House, 1982) v.6.

Tang Chia-hung "Kuan-yu Ibi-hsia To-pa-shih te chu-su wen-ti" (Issue on The Ethnical Identification of To-pa- The Inq)erial Famity of Hsi- hsia), in Szechwan Ta-hsQeh hsQeh-pao E3i (1955)2; also, in Pai Pin (ed), Hsi- hsia-shih lun-wen-chi, pp. 26-48.

Tang Ch'eng-yeh Fan Chung-vien ven-chiu (A Stu

Tang K'ai-chien "Chieh-k'ai Huang-fou Hui-ku chi Ts'ao-fou Ta-fan chih-mi- cWen fan Sung-tai te Chlng-hai^-jlPggil^^fgSi^lga^Sfl- (Unveiling The Mydi about The Yelk>w-headed Uigurs And Grass-headed TartaisX Ch'imdiai se-hui k'e-hsOeh ^isi-nin^ (1984)4, 77-85.

Tang K'ai-chien, "Sui-Tang shih-chi Tang-hsiang pu-lo te ch'ien-yi" ^ ^^1^ (Emigration of Tangut Tribes During the Sui And Tang period^ in Hri-hsia wen- shih lun-ch'uny (Yin-ch*ucn), v.l (1992), pp.151-170.

Tang K'ai-chien, Tbu-kuan Yieh-yao-tzu' chu wen-ti te k'ao-shih" WlfiSR8i^?Wft9@69 in Shih-hriiehvOeh-k'an. (1989)1, p.3S7-68.

Tao Jing-shen Sung-Liao kuan-hsi shih ven-chiu ^esearchs on tfie Sung-liao RelationX (Taipei: Lien-cUng, 1984).

Tao Aig-shen, "Sung-Liao pien-cMdi chiao-se te wen-tl" in Liu Feng-chu Hua Chu-ken ^^{gandLu l&un JK]II^ rtiunff-kuo nm-tsu-ahih yen-chhi (Beijing; Kai-ke, 1992X v. 4, pp. 40-48. 556

Tao Mbu-ping Wii-tai yly^.]^,J>eh (A Shottlfirtoty of The Five DynastiesX (Peking, Peon's Ptes8» 1985).

-f—(WangAiMiiih: ARefooiieri^ElevmdiCentufy ChmaX (Beijmg, Jen-mm, fiirt print, 197S, levisedvenkn, 1979).

Toig Kiiaiig'411^ Sf^fflS'Tei-Siiiigteiiiii-pnigcliilHaclu-chlyutaiig-sliihcluh-p'iii, chih-iyohonung-yehseng-ch'aiitekiian-lia' in aiwh ven-clwiL 4 (1980) pp.61>77.

Cha-cM Ssu-ch'in ^L$J^^"Yur4nu-niin

Tsang Shm-hmg "Pet-Sung ChHing-^hih chiang-men chih hsing-ch'eng":|t:^#^ (Hong Kong: Master diesis for The C!hinese University^ of Hong Kong, 1984).

Tsang Shui-lung, "Sung-Liao Kao-liang Ifo Tsan-I k'ao-hm" Ta-hi tsa-chih. v.80, no.3 (1990X pp.106-117.

Tsang Shui-hjng, "Pei-Sung cfaang-ye fo-pien yOn-tung te k'ai-tuan: Chlng^ ch'ao Shui-Io Ch'eng shihsifaien fi|.wei"4b^«H^5t??§K655g5i- in Sung, mhih hm-wen-chi: Lo Clriu-ch'infr i«n-«tMh vunpAmi chi-nien chuen-kan. pp. 18-45.

Tsang Shut-hmg, "Hsiang chan-Ueh &ng-yQ te kuo-tu: Sung-liao Ch'en-chia ku chi chfin- tzu-kuan chan-iyen

Ts'ao Sung-linW^#> "Sung Jen-tsung tui Hria chanrcheng te fr^hih chiao-shua"5^Cl^^ in camng-kuo se-hui^'o^isQeh-yQan Sung-Iiao-CUn-YOan-shihyen- chiu-shihc^Sfrt#^f^^^SS^7C^fl^t;^ ed., <^iing-r hip.fSmff $Mm, (Beijing: Chung-hua, 1991X v.2, p.201-217.

Tu Chien-h) »«-»««« ya chou-pien piinwihii im^.hsj-shihgyagBf^SflllW'fS^^ (tSstory of Hd-hsia Rdalions widi Bs Ne^hboring Etfmics), ^.an

Tu Wen-yu "Sung-tai ma-chengyen-chhi' Chuny-kun-shih yen- cWu, 2 (1990X pp.22-35.

Wang Chi-Im "liao P»-tsungcliihcliimg-yaaiiclimg>yiiigyu Shih-C3imchlng- wang" (Tlie intefior Chiia campaiga of Liao Tai-tsiing andtheiiseanddeclmeofdieSluhrClimr^meX in nhuny-kuo ImMi hirfleh-hiii ghih-hsOeh chi-k'an bencefiicdi as SHCK, v.6, (1974X pp.29-90.

Wang Chung "Lim Ho-hsia te ch'mg-ch'i" i6SOC695ljS (On the Rise of Hiri-hsiaX in T i-shih ven-cMu (1962)5, p. 20-32; also, m Pai Pin (cdX Hsi-hga-ithih hin- wen-chi (Coflected Essays of The Ifistoiy of Hsi-hsia), (l^-ch'iien, Ning- hsia lyan-nun, 1984X p. 1-25.

Wang Chung-noif'f'^ Sui-Tang Wu-tai shih (Histofy of Sui and Pang), (Shanghai: Shanghai People, 1990).

Wang Hsiao-po K'ou Chun nien-p'u (Chronological Biography of K'ou Chun), (Ch'eng-tu: Pa-Shu shu-se, 1995).

Wang Hisiao-fu Tan^ Tu-po Ta-shfli chtsn^-chili Inian-hM «twti (Beijing: Beijing Univeisity Press, 1992).

Wang Hsun-huaZSWand Chin Yuog-kao "Sung-Liao ho-chan kuan-hsi chung te cM-ko wen-fi" (Issues about tfie cordial and hostfl relation between tfie Sung and LiaoX in Wen-shih, v.9, p.83-113.

Wang I-fung, £^|1I, "Ch'ien-shu chiang-yu (The Territories under Ch'ien-Su) in Hictrtrinai Atwmai^ v. 2, no. 4, (1937), 97-120.

Wang I-fung, "Wu-ctd ping-huo hsi-hi" (Nfilitaiy Devastation during die Five Dynasties^ in Higtnrinal Atwwial, v.2 no. 3 (1936) pp. 203-205.

WangM-lai £^3^, "Chu-ying hu-seng shih-chien hsin-chieh"^|^^9^f^^79fjli in. Chung-kuo-shih ven-chiu. no. 2 (1991X p.85-89.

Wang Jui-lai, Ijm Sung-tai hsiang-chHian" TJ^hih ven^hhi, 2 (1985X pp. 106-120.

Wang Min-hsin£^^, Uao-Sung Shan-yQan-chih-nieng ti-chieh te Pei-ddng" (IX (H), and(IIIX in Shu-mu chi-k'an v.9, 2 (1975X ppp.35- 49, 3 (1975X pp.45-56; and 4 (1975X pp.53.64. SS8

Wang Kfing^im "Sung^h'u te fim-dun-lim" in Teng Kiung-mmg andOil-hsia 3^ (edX Kmxhi SanffHthih venH'ao-lmihiii-wenhmen-clit (Pao-ting: Hbpei Xa^Mfieh 1992X pp.47«-«9.

WangPcxhln "Smg^tioh-tich'taan-wdwai-tilefo-shih" in Tahhitofcsbib, vJ2, no. 10 (19(S6)S, pp. 1S>22.

Wang Shou-nan, Panff4at fim-chen yu ciii«yy«^ rl^l•l^ ven-chhi (A Study On The Rdatioa between Van0lls^fi]itatyGaveIll0IS and The Pang Central GovemmaitX (Ta^: Ctua-bm sui-m wen-hua du-chm hui,|^7fc^lgi^ 1969).

WangTseng-yu Sm^g-ch'an p^-chfli chWan (A Freliniinaiy Stutfy of The Sung Kfifitaiy System) (Pek^: Chung-hua, 1983).

Wang Yu-chi "Kuan-yu Pd-Sung yaqgiang chih-fei te su-fiang wen-fi"Bfi2f^:^b5^ Shan-tung ta-haOeh hsfleh-oao. phikMophy and soda! science edition, no. 1 (1990X pp. 20-26.

Wang Yung-ch'ing£j^||, "Tang mieh kao-di'ang chi cfaih I&i-choa T1ng

Wang Yung-ch'ing, "Lun Taog ch'ien-ch'i Ho-hsi cUeh-tu-shih" in Tang-tai ch'ien-ch'i hri-pei chfln-rfiih ven-chhi, pp. 45-46.

Wei Pien-an 51^^, "Pei-Sung Kung-chian^«hou fun-tian chih-tu k'ao-shih in Ho-nan ta-hsOeh hsOeh-pao. philosophy and sodal science edfiion, 4 (1988X pp.55-60.

Wu Ching-hung "Siing-C3un knng Liao chih wai-chiao" in Tung-fang tsa-cMh. v.43, no. 18, (1947), p.45-S2; abo in Snng-ahih ven-chiu- cfe (1980), V.12, p.169-183.

WuHan Chen-tii vu Sung-T gMflg^KK^Jn Wu Han ahflt^uHeh hin-wenhsuen-chi Selected Worics of Wu Han's Historical Essays], (Beijing; People's Ptess, 1988) v.3, pp. 87-96.

WuPien-ch'h Hri-jigia shih-kao (A Ptefimmary Ifistoty of Hri-HsiaX 559

(Ch'eng-tu: Szediwan Ryenrmm, tepniit,1983).

Yang Shu-sm " LOeb-hiii liMHai chfln-dnliTcliu Ydi^ Hmi-ko: Chiai-shuo Sungliang^saikiiiig-liaocliaiMlieiigclu 3(1^5^^ m Gh'en Sim MM ed. T.WT«n An»hin^Kii. (Collected Ess^ of the Studies of Uao-ChmifistoiyX (Shan^ia: Shanghai Ko-diih chiKpaa sse, 19«8)v.l, 99-110.

Yang Wei-K Chtot-ghaKtwi-dtaAih Qfistocy of The Fonner And Later SuX (Ch'eng-tu Szechwm se^nii k'o-^isOdiyQafi chVippan se W aiiStfc, 1986).

Yao Ts*ung-wu T iafwnwn^Ti chianff-yi (Lectme notes on die histoiy of liao and CMnX in Yao Ts'ung-wu hsienrseng ch*uen-chi (Collected works of Mr. Yao Ts'ung-wuX (Taqwi: Cheng-clning, 1972).

YehHung-sa "Shih-fanPei-Sunghuo-jraowu-ch'iteyen-chihyaying-yung" Tan-chiang sMh-jisOdt ^015^55, no.3, (1991) 6, pp. 35- 48.

Yen Ch'in-heng (|Qt

Yu Chung-hsien "Lun Wang Anrshih imcn-yi-fii"Mi^5^S?£, in Chung-chou shu-hua-se (edX Sung-shih hm-chi (Collected Studies of Sung IfistotyX (Ho-nan; Chung-chou shu-hua-se, 1983X pp-107-23.

Yu Kuang-tu "Liao-Sung Kao-Kang Ho dun-i chi ch'i chan-ch'ang" in Bqpiy wen-wu vu k'ao-ku. no.l, (1983X pp.247- 57. 560

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Ifigashilchio, O Ameki shinpn nn Itenkyii^ (Tokyo: Kazama Shobo, 1970).

ISno Kaizaburo, Todat no wahan kosfau", in Tnlryn 5ai^lni Ronnhu. (Tot^o: San'ichi Sobo, 1984).

Hino Kaizaburo, "Godai, Hoku-So no saihei, saishi, no suii", m Tnyn S (1952), pp.392-503.

Ifino Kaisaburo, "Godai, Hoku-So no saihei, saishi, to zaisei", m T«wn siiipalni 6 (19S2X pp. 1-26.

Hori Toshikazu, "Godai Sosho ni okeni kmgun no hatten", in Tovo bunka kenkvuio kivo. v.4, pp. 89-96.

Kikuchi Hideo, "Godai kingun ni okeiu jiei shingunshi no seritsu", in Shikan. v.70, pp. S8-66.

M^azaki Ichisada, "Godaishijo no gunbatsu shihonka—toku ni shinyo Rishi no baai", in Asiadca. (Kyoto: Dohosha, the first edition, 1957, tfie thvd edition, 1979), pp. 105-125.

Miyazaki Ichisada, 'Sotaiso hisatsu setsu ni tsuite" in Asiatica. v.3, pp. 126-143.

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Nakajima Satoshi, "Ri Genko to Nori Igrodai", in T«yn Sh^lcii mnsn- SnHiw ahi ifiaikvu to sono shuhen. (Tolgro: Kyuko Shoin, 1988X pp- 433-445.

Nimome Chofii, "Zui no Taigi kosfau ni tsuite: Zui-To sekai teikdcu no shil^ro toshite no wahan koshu", in Todaidu kenkyu kai (ed.), Zui-To teik^tni m Afa (Tol^o: Kyuko shein, 1979).

Ogasawara Shoji, "Sodai Igiisenshu no kenl^ (zenpen)', in Yanuzaki Ifiroshi (ed), Chugoku no shato' tn diulfyo^ (Tolgro: Fumaklo Shoten, 1954X pp. 177-328.

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Saeki Tomi, "Sodai no Kqjoshi no kenl^" TohoGaknbo. 14(1938X also m Saeki, Studies in Chinese Mstotv. (Kyoto: Dohosho, 1969) pp. 1-42.

SUba Ifiroshi, "Hoku-So no hold kogyo", in TolyoUniverai^ of Education and Ajiakenlgii kai Sodai shi kenkjobu Tnyn diiylni rnnso (The Studfes in Onental IfistoiyX (Td^o: Fmnaido Shoten, 1960X v. S, pp. 1-69.

Sogabe Sfaizuo, "Sodai no basd", in Sogabe Shizuo, SnHai Maina nhi no kenkyu. (Td^o: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1974X pp. 64-144.

Tamura Atsuzo, Chukoku seifiiku ocho no kmkviL (Kyoto: Dohodia, 1985).

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Tomonaga Shoko, "To Godai saiqpan shishin ko—Socho bunhan kantyo kenl^", in committee of Sodai shi kenl^ kai (ed) SnHai nn to himkfl, (Tol^o: Kyuko Shoin, 1983), pp. 29-68.

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Yoshida Mitsukuni, "So-Gen no gunji gijutsu", in Yabuuchi I^oshi (ed.), Sn-ffen jirfai nn kagaku pifuteu, (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku jinbun kagaku kenl^jo,196'^ pp. 211-34. 562

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Glossary ^oft] dua-hi Acting intendaiit of LnpoialStaUes Qua County Chia-shaa MlU [Fort] An-chiang Chia-fting An-fii-shih (Pacification fotendant) CSus-you Penod (1056-63) An-hua Chiang ^ An-hsi Chiang ^ An-hsiang-kuan Chiang-chou An-i chiang-nan tIM An-kuo County Chiao-yefi Hyfi An-nan Chiao-chih An-nan Colonial Headquarters Chteh County B chienrfasieh An-su Conunandcfy cliien-pi ch^-ve An-tzu-shuo chih-hui battalion An-yang cMh-hui-shih Anny Siq)ervisor chih-vi ^ Arrow Works of Bow and Crossbow che fr Aimoiy Chin-fa Batde Formatioa Oiganizer Chi-men SrfPI Bitter Water River^;^^, Kansu chi-mi loosety control Bow and Crossbow House chi-michou ISSI'M Celestial Nfilitaiy Amy Chiang

[Fortl Chm-fang (JK) ChmgRiver Chung-yOns {^SM Chmg-chott Ch'en

Ch'o-tzuMountamCommandeiy Fo^ Fa County Ch-u FoH^ioal Ch'u-yc River SSFM" Ftt-clioa2 Ftt VB m (Fort] Ftt-ning ch'ung-isiiih mmm. Fu-ping Ch'ung-wu Anity Fu-Ym 1^^ chhing-yi fiMhihi (\1cc Grand Arsoial Ceremonial Commusioner) Grand Treasurer [Fort] Chuo-cho Great Wan Pass ch'uo-shott-fU hao-tsai Commando- Ha-ndCity Commissioner of tfie Western Upper Gate hafvahih Heng-shan or Horizon Mountain ^[JLf Deputy Comnmsionets Heng-shan county ^UiUS^ Dragon Defender Army Ho-cheng County East and West Broad Preparation Arsenal Ho-chm County Ho-chou Edict Couriers H6-chung Prefecture Elite Palace Guards Ho^ cUeh-tu shih (\filitaty en-vin Governor of Ho-hsi) fa-tntny chih-hMnp Ho-hsi Corridor &n # Ho<4i8i chia-cha ^IT, Tribal OfiBcer Hb-yang MRS fan-IoUg^ Hou-chlao-ch'un fan-stuh Hu m Fang-chou hu-chun-pao Fang-tang Hu4iuPo fei-hit^ ahih f{|j!|^ Hu-hHie or Gourd River ISMfM Fen River Hu-hi-tsai iSHXIl Fen-chou Hua County Feng-fasiar^ MM Hua-chou 1 Feng-Un-tsai ELu-chou 2 Ftying Fox Pass Hua County Fonner and Later Su MS, ^^(903-925, hua-j cMi'hui 0— 933-964) 570

Hua-fmgCoun^ Hm-Ning Huai-chou hri-pei-erii-ti [Fort] Huai-iimg or ri^H Hn-p%igwang Huai-miig River Hn-sUh-ch'eng or Fort Western Maiket 0 HuanCoimty^ inP Huan-chou 1 3S#[ HsifWdrpIng Huaii-chott2 Hii-yao-ch'eng or Fort littfe Waist Huang-chou Hri-ying River Huang-ch'eng shih Conaaiuioasc Hisia-dioa |C#f of biqierial Constable Hria-ch'uan-k'ott ~FiffD Huan-Ch'ing Circuit Hua^hoCounQr I&iangRiver hsia-aliih Huang-Kng County hs^ 0 Huang-fou Hui-4ai SIW@I6 (The Hmanp-fthfln ^ Yeflow-headed LJi^uis) Hsiang-tzu-ch'eng or Fort Fragrance Huang-tui san-ch'Qan m Huang-wei Mountain HMdl hsiao-chuo-& or Junior Sit MeAod Huang-yang River Hsiao-kuan HfM Hui-chou 1 f Hsiao-k'ang Hui-chou2 Hsiao Po-lfk, Hui-ningPass hsien-i kimp-chian-ahnM Hun-mo ^ ) hsien nan hou pei Hung-chou Hsicn-pci [Fort] Hung-te Hrim-p'ing (998-1003), huo-ch'iu hsien-wei huo-p'ao jAcitg Hdn County tffKg| huo-tan ^/cl? Hsin-ch'eng County huo-vao huo-p'ao Hm-lo County him-yan-kufig-chien h«n-tang frit huo-vao pien-chicn Hsin-tsai ffH Hsi-an-chou Hnng-chang Canyon hsi^hianp clmi.ping Hnng-chott Hd-chou 1 M'jf'f Haung-chou Hisi-chou2 Hshmg CountyfiiK^ IM-chouLH^ur Hnungniu Hsi-feng HsuRivw Hsi-fou-fu or Foct Junior Pagoda Hsu-chou 1 m Hsu-sui County I^-Ho Circuit 571

Hsu-te County Ku-yOan County I County Kua-chou jll#f 1-chou 1 ^'jff Kuanrchung Plain I-chou2 "Kuanan r^km" I-chou3 WW Kuang-yOan Prefecture I-chu #3^ Kuang-yungBattafion [Fort]I-he Kuet-IChOn [Fort] I-kung —or Kuei-jen^'u [Fort] Iron Kuci-te County i-yung MM kung-feng-^oian Jen-ch'iu County^ fFFfHEI Kuny-sheng chOn Ju-hsi Kuo-chou Jung-ch'eng Coun^ kuo-ch'e SH Jung-hsi (984-987) Ku-yOan County @Jl!|S^ Junior Conunissioii OfiScers /[n^^ K'ai-kuang-ling Junior Foit Wolf Mountain K'ai-yflan gSjC (713-741) Kai-chuPass K'aifeng K'ai-yuan (713-741) to ^ Kan-chou "k'uang-ju ch'ih-cliiu-giB^iX Kan-chou l^iurs KHmg-tung Mountain [Fort] Kan-ku 1 Lai-pin-cheng [Fort]Kan-ku2 Lai-yOan County Kao-ch'ang Lake Koknor (or Ch'ing-hai Kao-ping Lanrchou 191'M BCao-yangKuan Later CWn ^W(936-947) kei-kung-chu Later Chou ^M(951-960) Kingdom of Ting-an Later Han ^dK947-9Sl) Ko-po-fang Later Liang ^(907-923) K'o-lu-Ung Later rang ^^923-936) [Fort] Ko-niu Leng-shui-chiang City kuan It Leisure Stable CoRumssioners kmy-fefy kuan Leng-ch'uen-ch'uen ICu-chOn Li-waog-fasin-ku (Upper Cental, [Fort] Ku-ku-hng refer to Sui-chou) Ku-lang Liang-chou Ku-lang River Liang-chiang-nian MSS Ku-fing Mountain Liao^h'eng County 9111^ [Fort]Ku-wei -^mm Lin-chou 572

ling-chou S'j^[ Militaiy Councilor Ling-nan Xfililaiy Govemor [Fort] Ling-ping mm iMI Liu-fi-pao (Fort Glass) Mmg ^ Liu-kafim-pu (SixVallqrs \fing-cha Tribe Tibetan tribes) Nfi-tsang Liu-p'an Mountain Mo-chiPass ISIfM Lin-fao Mo-cfaou fi-pin fii-shih jSICKHS^ Vice Ceranonial Mo^huangTsai 0f#l|l Conunissioner Mo-chHianCity Lo River mo-k'an Lo-tang Mo>yenhsia [Fortl Lo-wu W\M Mo-yOn Mountain jVSUi Lu-chou mou Lu-liang Mountains mu-chian Lu-tse Na-niang WHk lun-pu Nanchao Lung-an-tsai or Fort Dragon Security f|^ ^ort] Nan-chung Nan-mou-hut [Fort] Lung-chu-hei nei-tien ch'eng-chih lung-hu oa-chen-fu Nine Sumamed Tribes [Fort] Lung-kan Ning-chou ^'if[ Lung-te County Ning-ch%i County HFt Lung-hsi chOn-wang . >Qng County Lung-hsi CounQr Ntng-yOan ta-chiang-chOn Lung-you Noble House Lungs jUS? Noitiiem Dynasties 4bM (420-589) Ma-han Mountains Nu-che Valley Ma-Kng River Director of Operation ma-mienMrgf [Fort] Pa-chan-chung Ma-pu-chfin tu-pu-chu Pa-dun Mountain Man-ch'eng Pa-chou [Fort] Mao-niu Pa County Mattress Crossbow ^ort] Pai-p'ao or Fort White Pantfier Mei-shan or Phim Mountain ^[If lie [Fort] ^fi-chih or Fort Rice Lard or Pai-man or "White Ratharian" m Palace Anny ^&-chih County Palace Corps (MM^) Mi-ch'in 573

Big Ui Fia-^iaiig County pao ^ Fo-chao mm Pao-an Comnumdeiy Fo-tzu-tsaiorFoitPbie-out pao-chia-fa m Pao-chou [FortjFiKk) Pao-shim-clifiii ddeh-tu kuan-di'a lii»>hott Ftt-k) River Fo-htChiln Pao-ta Cofmnandcfy r^iwm Pao-tmg cily Fu-fao-shan or Peach Mountain Pao-faichQn Fu-yin Pao-yi Archer Roclty Fortress Pei-t'ing Sage Siq>potter Pen-chou Sai-men-tsai Fort Frontier-gate Permanent Security Commandant sai-men-tao-ch'e pien-shih Salt Lake Operation ^ pien-shih (boundaiy afifatts) San-chiao-pao Pin County San-chou i|S#[ [Fort] Pin-ch'ao San-chou^^[ Ping-Ung Tensile 'MM# San-ch'uan-k'ou Hi r[n(Three River Pass) Ping-taiching-Hieh-shih San-faai-kuan Pass Theater Commander of Fing-tai Circuit san-kung he-ch'an lu "plotting the border afi^dis" san-lfuny pa-mu hi post units San-«an Po-chou san-pan chieh-chih Po-hai WiM San-tu-ku HffS# Po-haiBay mm Shato Prefect Secretary Provision Servants ^0^ scng-hu 4=^ pu p Sha-chou Du-hsi-chiany chin-pin£ Sha-ho p'an-kuan ^J'g' shao-sheng Fan-yQan MM «han-diii j|g^ Fei-kangorRid^ePei gfif# Shao-yangCity SPfi&rfJ Fing-an County Shen County Fing-chou Shcn-choul [Fort]FingHsia Shen-chou2 Fing-hsiaTanguts sheng Fing-jung Chfin shcng-yOan p'inp-iunff-ch'e 574

Shen-ch*aaii-tsai Suppfcnientary Army Shen-^nu County^ Si^rane PatrdKng finqwctor of the shen-pi Inw^ Westwafd of ling-chott shen-pi-lning huo-vio hmxhieii MiKW! Subduing Barbarian Commandeiy Shen-fangpao or FoctDivm Chamber Su-chou |t#f su-hu Shen-wtt mi-leuh SutPynasty R|f^ (S81-618) Shea-yung chim Sui-chou igc'M Sheng-toku (Fortisui-ping Shensi di'ien-sfan chmg-^Qch an-fu p'anr [Fort] Sui-te kuan Acting Supreme Commander of the Han and non- Secretaiy of Shensi Theater Coomiander Han Soldiers of die Heavenly Virtual Amy, and Pacfflcatioii Intendant and Prefect of Feng^hou shih 5 Shih-chu or "Oath Master" Siqireme Director of Operation shih-hao Sweet Water River slah-kuen tu-chmy to-pn-te S ta-chu m Ta-fei-ch*uan^^^j f [ shih-i-mu In^erial Trading Post Ta-hsia River Shih-ling Kuan Pass 5^115 Ta-iang-tsai Shih-pao Rocky Fortress Ta-li County Shih-wei Ta-fi Kingdom Shu-ch'eng County Ta-fi River Shu-tang Ta-pai ch'eng or Fort Recofmoiter shui-tsai ;;^||| Ta-Tars ^ ghim-chien-«hih Ta-fungCity Fort Shun-ning Ta-t^mg River Shuo-chou Tai County shuo-£uig Tai-chou Shuo-tang Tai County "Six VaDeys" Tibetan tribcs/A^#^ m a "Sixteen Prefectures of the Yen-yOn Taagat or Xs^^SBg R^on" Tan-chou ^'jff Solar Siqiporter ^5 tai-chia hsiao-cfauo-fii (Armed Junior Sit Sorghum River Method) Soutfi and North Arsenal Ta-li Shih Southern Han (917-71) Ta-li-chia Mountain ^StingLff Southern Pang (937-75) Ta-mingFu 575

Ta-shu-ch'eng tMi-flmg cha-chOn [Fort] Tang-piao ItWi^ Tsan-ch'mg Tan-te-chtiy tsan-p'u Te-ch'ing Cominaiideiy (Fort] Tsang-ti River Te-shun Comnundeiy Tse-erii Tmant-Archcfs Tse Fanii^ in Fu-chou 1 "Thitteen En^enir's Guards" Tw-pitii Ti-chin Marsh Tzfr4io-ch'a fiao-teng-hi rai-yOan tien-clrih ch'ung ghim-chien drih Pai-hang Mountain Range Palace Guard acted as PatroDiiig rang-ch%ig 011 Inspector Pang Dynasty jUm (618-907 AD) Tfled-bridgePass Pang River Tmg-chou Pao River Ting-ch'uenCFott) ^fffH tirchupao-chia Ting-nan-chiin (Disaster fieh-Kan-chia-p'eng double Su{>pression Anny) sectioned chain staff Ting-pien Commandefy Pieh-san S|[Ij tou ^ Pien-pao (742-756) Transcendent Defender Army Pien-p'ing-chOn (Celestial Pacific Transcendent Warrior Army) Tribal Auxiliaty Pien-shan mountain range m US Pien-suiCity 3^^r!3 tu-chfln-chu Pien-tu ^hian-ghfin-ahili or Celestial C^qntal tu-sUh-cfau or "Siqireme Oatfi Master" ^ Commandery Pien-tu Mountain tu-yflan-hi SIglf Ping-chou Sijlf-f Tueh-chou po-pa mm Tuen-huang County TsHmg-chengtien tw ^ Pu-hun BilP tiri-tuo-tzu Pu-hun Valley Tung-hsiang chu Autonomic Counly Pu-hi-fim County Pu-mao-chhian (Rabbit-hair Tung-shan Tanguts VallQr) Tung-ta River PUf-ytMiun tf:## Tfa-chia chih-hsueh thian-rliiaft Tsa-mu River Pun-poPass MIS# ^ H Pun-fien kimg-chiati-ahnn tsai-chingchin-pinff Pung-chou 576

Tung-li Comniaiideiy ^^(17 WiHing Commandety thmg-p'an Mf(I, Co-tpvemot Wu^4ing River Tung-yOan Commandeiy 1 31^^ Wtt-tu County (Huan-choa) Wurwd County Tung-yOan Conrniandery 2 (Fort Wtt-yen Ku-wei) Wu-yOeh ^ (907-978) Upper Four Cotps JiSSM Ya-chlen Various Commiasiofiers Yang-chou (Fort) Wa-rtng Yangs^h'eng Wan-chfian chuo-fing Yang-chHi County Wang Famity of Feng-chou Yang-kuan Wang-K Yao m wang-po Yao-teFort WangTu Yeh-chih wei S Yeh-hu ma Wei City mM "Yellow-headed Uighurs" iEMB® Wei-chou 1 Ycn-an Wei-chou 2 Yen-anCity Wei-chou 2 Ching-sai chQn-shih or Tranquil Yen-chou Frontier Conunandety at Wei-chou 2 Yen-choulj^ff Yen-chou 2 WeiliaoTzu ven-ch'ao Si# Wei River Yen-ch'ih [Fort] We-yOan Yen-men Pass wen 5t Yen-tui 91^ Wen-anCounty^ 'n-chou wen-fa Statutes and Ordinance l^-ch'uan County Wen-yingPass 1^-chou i^[ Wolf Mountain 'Vtnrch'uen City Wolf Mountain Town ^[1(131 Wu ^ (902-37) 'Y1ng-chou2 [ Wu-chung County Ying-choul Ifclff Wu-ch'i County Ying-chou3 Wu-hi-mu-ch'i City 'nng-chou4 Wu-man or "Black Barharian* MW YmgCounty WuPaoorFortWu Ying-fai JFP a Wu-sheng MM Iflng-tienFu S^W Wu-tang Mountain Yu-choul {£f^f 577

Yu-chou2 vfl-ch'ien-gheny^iiio'ghiio YQ-kuan Ya-Kn Ytt-men Yfi-menCity Yil-kuan ^919 Ya-Iin County^ Yii-fien YQait-chou 1 YQan-chou2 YOan-fo (1098-1100) YQn-chou Yung-cBi County Yung-chou Yung-ch'ing Conunandeiy Yung-ch'ing County Yung-lo ch'eng Fort Eternal Happiness yung-ping KM- Yung-p'ing-tsai ^^Kl, Fort Eternal Peace 578

Name Chang YOan A-fi-ku (orE-fcIing-to Chang Yung (946-1015) ^,1040-96) Chang Yong-te (928-1000) A-san Pi-clmig Chao An-cfaieh An Lu-shan (d. 757) ChaoChan Igli (1019-90) An Tao ^jlH (late llth-eaify 12tfi Chao Chun (ca. mid-lldi centuiy) century) ChaoChlu liH An Ts'ung-chm Chao Ch'ang-yien (945-1009) An Tzu-Io (ctcca. caify 11c.) ChaoFu Chang Che^E^ (1027-1102) Chao Hneh (d. after 1086) Chang Chi (933-996) Chao Kuang-hsiang Chang Chieh Chao Kuang-i (See Sung Tai-tsung) Chang CUen (962-1053) Chao Kuang-tzu Chang Chih (circa earfy lldi Chao KHiang-yin (b.926, r.960- centuiy) 975) Chang Ching (970-1018) Chao Lung (drca 1050-1120) Chang Ch'ao ^Hg (893-972) Chao Pao-chi see li Chi-ch'ien Chang Ch'i-hsien ( 943-1014 ) (Thao Pao-chung see Li Chi-p'eng Chang Ch'eng-feng ^^0 (d. 914) Chao PHi (922-992) Chang Ch'uen Chao Shan-ya IgUU^S (d. 1038) Chang Ch'ung-chun ( ca. mid-11 Chao Te-chao (d. 979) c.) Chao Te-ming (980-1031) Chang Fang-p'ing (1007-1091) Chao Yen-chin Chang Hai Chao YO-chlng ChangHui ^Sf (d.964) Cheng Chieh (1022-72) Chang I-ch'ao (d. 872) Cheng Chien (992-1053) Chang Kuan (ca. late lOtfa-earty llth ChengMei (ca. mid llth centuiy) century) Cheng Wcn-pao ( 953-1013 ) Chang K'uang ^§ijC (994-1056) Che-man Chia-shih ^xMMM Chang KW gg^ (988-1052) Chia Hn (circa. late 10 c.) ChangFu (d. 1004) Chia Huang-chung (940-96) Chang Shou-en Chiang Sou-chQn (

Chou Te-wei (d. 918) Enqness Dowager Haao (d. 1009) Chou Wd MM ( 923-999 ) Emperor Gh'n-tioftfae Later Chin ChuMieii a07M126) (b. 914, r. 944-46) ChuKuan (ca. imd>lldi cenfay) EnqKTor Chen-ttung (refer to Sung Chcn- ChuPai-fu tning) ChuWen (8S1-912) En^erorShib-tnng of the Later Choo ^ Chu-ke Liang (181-234) (b. 921, r.954.59) Chuang-tsung of the Later Pang En^eror'^nn-ti of tfie Later Hm (885-925) (948-50) Chfieh-ssu-k> (997-1065) En^ress Wu ^Ja (624-705) Chung Ch'uan MM (d. ca. 1105) Empress Dowager Hsiang (1046- Ch'enChih-chiing (991-1059) 1101) Fan Chen fSfX (1007-1088) Ch'en Hisi-Iiang (d. afier 1063) FanCMh MM (911-964) Ch'enHsiang itH (1017-80) Fan Chung-yen (989-1052) Ch'en Shih-ch'ing (1016-1064) FanCh-un-jen (1027-1101) Ch'en Yao-chih (d. after 1032) Fan Ch'un-shui (1046-1117) Cheng Hao (1030-85) FanCh'un-yu (1024-1063) Ch'engI (1033-1107) FanHnang (also mid llAc.) Ch'engK'an mM (997-1066) FanPai-lu (1030-1094) Ch'i Pa-wen (

(circa. cxAy ll.c) KuoChieh (dica 200-150 BC) Hsia-cheng BitiE (d. 1102X KuoCUh SPSS (area mid lltficentuiy) Hsia Shott-pin (circa, eaify^ lldi KuoChu-tc centuty) Kuo Chun (d. 1040) HdangClmi KuoCh'eng (1046-1102) Hsiang Xfin-chong (948-1019) Kuo Cfe'eng-yott IbiaiigPao fnjff Kuo ChHien 5PR Hidao Chu (1013-73) Kuo En (d. 1057) HdaoHsi IRS (c^ late lldi centuty) Kuo Ku Hidao ra-lan (before 970-1004) KuoKW (1021-88) Hsiao Ying (drcaimd lldicentuiy) KuoKfiao-shan Hsin-mou Chln-chan Kuo Shen-hsi ( d. alter 1071) HsiungPen K'angPao-jui ^'ang Chao-jui ^ HsQ Chiang (1037-1111) ^SW) HsuHisi (d. 1082) K'ouChun (962-1023) HsaHsflan (916-91) KuTzu-tuen (ca. mid-1 Ic) Hsu Huai-te (ca. mid lltfi Later Chou, Shih-tsung (r. 955- century ) 959) Hsu Wen LangA-chang or A-k'e-chang HuChung-hui (d.ca. 1109) Hu San-sheng (1230-87) Lao Tzu (circa. 6thrcentuiy BC) HuYQan (993-1059) LeiCMenrfii Hu-yen Chan (d. 1000) LeiTe-hsiang (918-992) Huang Tao-yOan HUtE (d- 1057) LeiYou-chung (947-1005) Huang Te-ho LeiYou-lin (before 947-?) JenFu (d. 1041) LengChIng (or d.1050) Jen-tuo Ling-thig (d. 1084) Li A-ya-pu Jen-tuo Pao-chung (d. after IiChao>liang (circa mid 11th 1104) century) Jen-yfl UChi (d. 1082) Kao Chi-hmg (ca. eatfy^ lltfi UChi-ch'ien (ChaoPao-cU century) W 963-1004) Kao Chuen-ya (d. after 1081) U CU-cfaOn (d. 981) Kao Chiung ( 935-1006 ) LiChi-ch'ong KaoFing (d. 887) U CM-ho ( 963-1008 ) Kao Yung-nien (d. 1105) UCht-hsOan KaoYung-neng (d.1082) U Chi-p'eng ( 962-1004X (Chao KoHuai-min (d. 1042) Pao-chung KoPa UChih mM 581

U Ouh-yOaii (b. 867, r. 926-33) UWd (979-1041) UChmg (571-649) UWen-laii (ca.iiiidlltiicentiiiy) Li Diuan-hsiao (d 894) LiYen ^ UChOn ^ (d.960) Li Yen-shin (circa, late 10 c. ) Li Chiu^-cideh UYOan Li C3i'an (d. after 1067) UYOan-hao (1003-1048) LiC^h'ang LtYyn-t» Li Ch'img-clim (-960) Liang Tai-tzu or Tai-tzu of Later UFang (925-996) Liang (r.907-912) UFu-kuei Liang I-mai ^ZJM. LiHan-chih (LiMb-yOn ^^9^) Liao Ching-tsung (948-982) UHsien (d.1092) Liao Sheng-tsung 35^^ (b.970, r. 983- LiHuan 1031) Ul-ch'ao (d.936) Liao Tat-tsung (Ye-Ki Te-kuang Ul-yin (A 967), orl-ch'ing 902-947) UJen-fo ^izm (d.933) Liao Tao-tsung (1032-1101) LiKung-wen LinLing-shu LiK'o-wen (d. 1(X)4) LmKuang Li K'o-yuan (d. 981) or Kuang- UuChih-yOan (895-948) yOan Liu Chun (or Liu Ch'eng-chun LiK'o-yung (856-908) 1%, 926-968) LiKuang (d. 115 BC) Liu Chung-wu (cnca 1050-1120) Li Kuang-hsien (circa late tenth Liu Ch'ang-chuo (circa late 11th centiuy) century) UKuang-jui (d. 978) LhiCh'i (1078-1162) Li Kuang-tsan (circa. 960) liuChHin Li Kuang-jui (d. 978) or K'o-jui Liu Fa (d. 1119) after 975 LhiFu mm LiKhiei LiuFu SIM (d-1047) U Li-chun (d. after 1032) Liu Ho 3!i5S (d.1042) LiMou-cheng LiuHuan S|f^ (1000-1080) Li O-yi (ctica. earfy 12th cent) LiulSf# Li Shihrptn (Li Shih-pin (ca. mid Liu I (circa, mid-llc.) lltfi centiuy) UuK'ai (947-1000) LiShou-cheng LiuLiu-fu (ca. mid lltfi century) Li Shou-kuei see Pu-na (I!hia-i Liu Ftng (d ca. 1040) Li Shun ^/li (d. 994) Liu Shou-kuang (d. 913) Li Shun-chu (d. 1082) LiuTsung (955-1015) Li Ti (971-1047) liu Wen-shou (908-971) 582

Liu Wen-yO (944-989) Pien-shihrpo-cfaidi Liu Yen (715-780) Prince of Cailn (d. 984) Liu Yen-ch'tng (d-1127) Pcmce of Lu (885-936) LuChiiig (dcca mid-lltfi centuiy) Pu-na cUa-i (d. 1056) LaHm-chlng gBH (1031-1126) Fan-mei (921-987) LuHsi-tao (1025-1091) Fang Chi (988-1063) L& Meng-cheng S^iE Fang-te-le La Ta-chung S:fe'£ (d. after 1096) P'engSun ^5^ LuYi-chien SH® (979-1004) FengYil-E (1041-94) LQ Yung-cldh (d. 887) P^ Qiung-wen (circa later llth Lun-khmg-iye centmy) Lung-chan Shang Fet-p'ei Lung-chan the Jumor orCh'iShe- ShenC^i'i ttj© (d. 1088) lo-sa m^mm ShenK-uo (1031-1095) Ma Chih (d. 1126 ), also Chao ShengTu (ca. eaify llth century ) Liang-ssu ShihChi (ca. mid-1 Ic.) MaCWh-tse (995-1019) Shih Ching-fang (892-942) Ma Mo (1020-1100) ShihPao-chi (954-1010) Mei-le Tu-pu (d. after 1099) SUhFu (circa eaify llth century) Meng Chih-hsiang ShihShou-hsin (928-984) Meng Hsuan-chieh Shih-to-tu ( c.a. ea^ 11 c.) Meng-lo-chiao (circalate lltfic.) SWhYen-nien (994-1041) MiHsin (927'99A) ShihYQan-sun (ca. mid llth Maio Li mWi (before ca. 1060-after 1100) century) Miao Shou (1029-95) Sfaun-huaKhan Mo-tsang O-p'ang (d. 1061) shu-m Mu Hsien (d. after 1097) Shuo Hsiang (d. 1000) Mu-yung Fu-yun (d. 635) SseChi-chao NiuNu-o (d. ca. mid-ll c.) Sse Hsiang (circa late lldi century) Mu Wan-o (ca. mid-ll c.) such'e mm (1039-1112) such'e mm Nung CMi-kao{K^i^ (d. 1053) (1039-1112) Ou-yangHsiu (1001-1072) SuLo-li milStM (cvca. early 11 c.) Pai Shou-yung (circa. 10-11 c.) Su-nanTang-cheng Pao Cu'cng (998-1061) Su Nu-erfa milZM (circa, earfy 11c.) Pao Shun see YQ Lung-k'e Su Shen m^ Pao-wu kung-chu (d. 1015) SuSUh (1036 or 37-1101) Pi Shih-an ^ f /ZT Su Shun (1009-66) PiChung-you Hftfi# (1047-1121) SuShun-ch'in m^i^ (1008-1048) Su Shou-hsin Ql^^^p^d. 1016) 583

SuYOan-lao (drcaeatfyl2A Tien ChHing-cfam BBSS (92S>-997) centiny) PienHd (940-1003) Sun Ch'ao MM (circa. lOdi c.) TwnJenrlang (628-688) SunFang-chien PicnK'uang (1005-1063) SunHsing-you TienMm SSI: SunLan (1043-1101) To-pa Ch.'eiig-di1en 15^^^ (in some SunLu MSS- Gate lltfi century) occaaons as Ch'en-hui ^^^Icvca. lOtfi c.) Sun Mien (d. after 1053) To-paCh-ih-chih Sun Phi MM (998-1057) To-pa Ssa-cUoi Sun Yu mm (d. 892) To-pa Ssu-ch^ Sung Chen-tsung (b. 968, r. 998- To-pa Shih-^isiao 1022) To-pa Ssu-kung (d- c.a. 895) Sung Ch'i 9^ (917-996) Tou^ MM (913-66) SungCh'i (998-1061) Tse Chi-shih (4 after 1072) Sung-ch'ang-shih (circa, early TseK'o-shih ^fnTM (1049-1110) 11c.) Tse-pHi Yu-hmg-po (circa. Sung Hui-tsung 9^^ (b. 1082, r.llOl- late 10th century) 25, d. 1135) Tse YQ-ch'ing ( 959-996 ) Sung Jen-tsung (b. 1010 r.1023- Tseng CUh-yao ( 947-1012 ) 63) Tseng Kung-Gang (999-1078) Sung Shen-tsung (b.l048 r. 1067- Tseng Pu (1035-1107) 1085) SungShih-yao (d.1060) Ts'a-ko (circa, late 11th century to Sung Shun (See Feng Tsung-shun) earfy twelfth century) Ts'ai Ching (1046-1126) Sung Pai-tsung (Chao Kuang-I Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsi (1035-84) b.939. r.975-997) Ts-aiCni-Oeh mB (1037-1093) Sung 'Ymg-tsung (r. 1064-67) Ts'ai Hen JI1r (1058-1117) Tang CWn (928-979) Ts'ai Ting (1014-1079) TangFei-ti (r.934-36) Ts'ao Tsung-shou TangHisQen-tsung (r. 847-59) Ts'aoHan Wit (924-992) Pang Wen-ti (d- 934) Ts'ao I-cfain (d. 940) Tao Chieh-fii Ts'ao Kuang-shih (d. 985) TengYun-p*u (1027-1094) Ts'ao PinWf^ (933-918) TengFu (or Peng Yttan-fc Ts'ao Ts'an WiSt 1020-1099) Ting Han Ts'ao Wei ( 973-1030) Ting lien "TSI Ts'ao Yen-kung (d- 980) TingPu-ling Ts'ao Yen-tu (d. 1001) TingTu TS (990-1053) Ts'ao ^^hin (d.940) Ts'ao Ying (d. 1042) 584

Ts'ao YOan-te Wtc^ (d. 942) WangLun Ts'ao Yflan-shen WtQSI (A 945) WangMin Ts'ao Yuan-chung WtSS (d. 975) WangFu Ts-uiHaii (930-992) WangFta (922-982) Ts*iii Yen-chin Wang Te-yung (987-1065) TuHsien (978-1057) WangTze ^!l (d. 1048) Tu YQ (222-284) Wang Tu (d. 928) Tung-chan gfe (1032-1083) Wang Wen-Hang Tung Shih-tian Mdrll (circa mid 11th WangWen-ytt £35315 centuiy) WangYa Tung Kuan SJt (1054-1126) WangYao-ch'en £||g (1002-1058) Tuo-Io-pa WangYen-shott £#SE (1043-1093) Wan Tsu (c.a. eaify 11 c.) WangYil-ch'eng (954-1001) Wan-yen A-ku-ta ^M§5#?T(1068-1123) WangYQan (d. 1044) Wang An-U (1034-1095) WeiNeng 5lt| Wang An-shih £^5 (1021-86) WeiPei S6S (919-999) Wang Chan (A ca. 1101) Wei-ming A-mai (d. after 1099) Wang Chi (d after 1042) Wei-ming Ch'ien-shun (1186- WangCW-chung 1239) WangChia Wei-ming Liang-tsuo (1047- WangChien (847-915) 1068) WangChi-en ( d. 999 ) Wei-ming Ping-ch'ang (1060- Wang Chun-wan 1086) Wang Chung-cheng (d. after Wei-ming Shan 1081) Wen Ch'i-hsm (d. ca. 1092) Wai^ Ch'ao (d. after 1005) WenPu-cM (d. 1032) Wang Ch'eng-hsien WenYen-po (1006-1085) Wang Ch'u-chih 5j@8ii[ (d. 922) Wu-cWeh WangCh'Qan-pin (908-976) WuHao^ WangEn Wu Tsai-ch'ing (circa, late 10 c.) Wang Fang BEW (1044-76) WuYu^W (1004-1058) Wai% Hou (d. after 1115) Ya]]gChieh#(|f WangHsi (circa. 1040s) YangCUh mm Wang hsiao-poi/jN^g^ (d. 994) YangHangHDi (852-905) WangJen-tsan (917-982) YangHuei-chih m&Z Wang Kuei (d. 1041), expert of die YangK'o-sWh use of iron whip YangWei-chung (1067-1132) Wang Kuei (1019-1085), Imperia! YangWeo-kuang Secretariat YangYenH;hao 585

YangYieh (d.986) YaoHshmg Yao Ku ^ (d. after 1126) Yao Ping-chimg (d. after 1126) Yao Tzu-tsung Ye Ch'ing-ch'en Ifl/fS (1000-1049) Ye-Ii Wang-yimg ipf rjESI (A 1046) Ye-ti Yttchia (d. 1046) Yeh-ioKo Yeh-lo-wu (d. 1016) Ye-m Ah-pao-cW (872-926) Ye-lu Chung Ye-lu Hsieh-ch'en (d-999) Ye-mHsiu-ko (d- 998) Ye-lQHstteh-ku Ye-mSan-pu Ye-IQ Te-kuang refer to liao Tai-tsung YenTa ^ Yea Tzu (A 500 BC) You Shih-hsiung (1038-1097) YQ CWng (1000-1064) Y&Chou-shuen (c.a. ndd-ll c.) YQ Ch*ung faye (d. 1081) Ya Lung-k'e (after 1071 Pao Shun '^) YQehFei (1103-41) YQn Shu (1001-1047) Yun Hsien ( 923-994 )