Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and Dimona
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1/4 Friday, May 3, 2019 1Haaretz Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and Dimona peaceful in nature; it was about energy and de velopment. However, the Israeli leader's nar Kennedy, Nonproliferation rative also left a little wiggle room for a future and Israel reversal. His caveat amounted to a few words: "for the time being, the only purposes are for More than any other country, it was his peace .... But we will see what will happen in dealings with Israel that impressed upon the Middle East. It does not depend on us" (ital President Kennedy both the complexity and ics added). the difficulty of halting nuclear proliferation. In the fall of 1960, not long after Kennedy's The'spontaneous'second election, the outgoing Eisenhower administra visit Avner Cohen and William Burr tion first became aware of the Dimona reactor that Israel and France had begun building in The meeting with Ben-Gurion helped to secret during 1958. The CIA issued a Special clear the air for some time, but it did not re hroughout the spring and summer National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that move lingering American doubts and suspi of 1963, the leaders of the United determined that "plutonium production for cions about Israel's nuclear intentions. Start States and Israel - President John weapons is at least one major purpose of this ing in June 1962, the Americans began trying F. Kennedy and Prime Ministers effort." Furthermore, the estimate predicted to arrange a second visit to Dimona, but failed David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol that if the Arab world believed that Israel to make headway. It wasn't until September T-were engaged in a high-stakes battle of wills was acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability, 26, 1962, after frequent requests over several over Israel's nuclear program. The tensions it would cause "consternation," and blame months, that such a visit finally took place. were invisible to the publics of both countries, would be directed toward the U.S. and France Until recently, little was known from and only a few senior officials, on both sides for their presumed support of the project. American documents about that second Di of the ocean, were aware of the severity of At a White House briefing on January 19, mona visit except that U.S. Ambassador to the situation 1961, the eve of his inauguration, Kennedy Israel Walworth Barbour referred to it as In Israel, those in the know saw the situ inquired which countries were seeking the "unduly restricted to no more than 45 min ation as a real crisis, as a former high-level bomb. "Israel and India," outgoing Secretary utes." Recently declassified documents shed science adviser, Prof. Yuval Ne'eman, told one of State Christian Herter told him, adding new light on the visit. The key document is a of us (Avner Cohen) 25 years ago. Ne'eman that the then-newly discovered Dimona reac memo, written on December 27, 1962, by the recalled that Eshkol, Ben-Gurion's successor, tor would be able to produce 90 kilograms of deputy director of the Bureau of Near East and his associates saw Kennedy as present weapons-grade plutonium by 1963, enough for ern Affairs, Rodger Davies, to Assistant Sec ing Israel with a real ultimatum. There was 10 to 15 nuclear weapons. Herter urged Ken retary Philip Talbot, detailing the story of the even one senior Israeli official, Ne'eman told nedy to press hard for inspections of Dimona second visit. me, the former Israel Air Force commander before Israel introduced such weapons into Maj. Gen. (res.) Dan Tolkowsky, who seriously the Middle East. entertained the fear that Kennedy might send Although Kennedy had a variety of tough U.S. airborne troops to Dimona, the home of issues to address from the outset - ranging Ben-Gurion was not ready to Israel's nuclear complex. from the CIA's plans for an invasion of Cuba confront a determined U.S. What was at stake was the future of Is to a crisis over Laos - within days of taking rael's nuclear program. Kennedy, with an office he began urging Ben-Gurion to accept president. Nor, however, could he exceptionally strong commitment to nuclear a U.S. visit to Dimona, insisting that a visit nonproliferation, was determined to do all was a condition for good diplomatic relations. accept semi-annual visits, which he could to prevent Israel from producing In responding, Ben-Gurion dragged his feet, would've been a death blow nuclear weapons. Ben-Gurion (and later Es citing a cabinet crisis that had to be resolved. hkol) were equally determined to complete By April1961- by which time Ben-Gurion, to Dimona. In a sense, he was the Dimona project. For them, nuclear capa who had resigned as prime minister on Janu trapped by his original 'peaceful bility was an indispensable insurance policy ary 31, in protest of his colleagues' conduct against existential threats to Israel. The ex regarding the Lavon affair, was heading a purpose' pledge that aimed at change between the American president and caretaker government - Israeli Ambassador preventing a confrontation with the two prime ministers illustrates both Ken to Washington Avraham Harman told the ad nedy's tenacity and the Israeli leaders' recal ministration that Israel had agreed to a tour the U.S. citrance. of Dimona by U.S. officials. On May 20, two Earlier this week, we published - on the Atomic Energy Commission scientists, U. M. website of the National Security Archive- a Staebler and J. W. Croach, Jr., visited the site. collection of nearly SO American documents Its management team explained that the tech After the two AEC visiting scientists - from U.S. archives that illuminate for the first nological rationale for the project was to gain Thomas Haycock and Ulysses Staebler- had time the full scope of this secret American experience in building and operating nuclear inspected the small, U.S.-supplied reactor at Israeli confrontation. The collection includes reactors that could be used in the future for Nahal Sorek, they were unexpectedly offered not only the entire exchange of messages peaceful power generation. a sightseeing tour at the Dead Sea. Later, as between the leaders - Kennedy, Ben-Gurion From U.S. documents, we know that the they were being driven back to their hotel, and Eshkol- but also many related American AEC team was "satisfied that nothing was their host told them that they were near the documents, some of which were declassified concealed from them and that the reactor is Dimona reactor and that a meeting with the and became available only in recent months. of the scope and peaceful character previous director could be arranged. The director These include a full report of the U.S. in ly described." This visit laid the foundations was not there, but they met and were briefed spectors who visited Dimona in 1964; memos for a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Ken by the principal engineer, who gave them a in which senior White House officials deliber nedy in New York, on May 31, 1961. 40-minute tour of the facility. The report's fi ated how to deal with the prime minister; and The rationale Ben-Gurion presented to nal sentence states that "the inspectors were intelligence assessments that had analyzed Kennedy during that meeting, held at the Wal not certain whether they were guests of their whether Israel's nuclear reactor was, as the dorf Astoria Hotel, was consistent with what scientist-hosts or on an inspection. Although Israelis insisted, really meant for peaceful the Dimona management team had told the they have not had time to see the entire instal use. American scientists: The nuclear project was lation, and although there were some build- 2/4 Friday, May 3, 2019 1Haaretz ings they did not enter, they were able to con biannual visits. The reason for the proposed a determined U.S. president. Nor, however, firm the research nature of the installation." frequency was purely technical: To trace ex could he accept semi-annual visits, which The highly unconventional nature of the traction of weapons-grade plutonium, there would have been a death blow to Dimona. In a visit stirred suspicion in Washington, espe must be two visits annually, because pro sense, Ben-Gurion found himself trapped by cially in the intelligence community. Dur duction reactors operate on a much shorter his original "peaceful purpose" pledge that ing one interagency meeting, a senior intel schedule than research reactors. aimed at preventing a confrontation with the ligence expert, probably Deputy Director of Weeks later, in early March, Kent Sher United States. Intelligence Ray Cline, was quoted as saying man, director of the Office of National Esti Ben-Gurion decided to try to avoid con that "the immediate objectives of the visit mates, which prepared the NIEs, signed an frontation and evade the nuclear issue by at may have been satisfied, [but] certain basic intelligence estimate detailing the grave con tempting to persuade Kennedy to think about intelligence requirements were not." It was sequences of Israeli nuclearization. "Israel's Israel's overall security predicament. The also observed that "there were certain in policy toward its neighbors would become prime minister needed to change the subject consistencies between the first and second more rather than less tough ... it would ... seek of the conversation from Kennedy's specific inspection reports." to exploit the psychological advantages of its demand for American twice-a-year visits to Whatever the doubts about the ultimate nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs and Dimona into a broader and urgent discussion intelligence value gleaned from the second to prevent them from making trouble on the about Israel's overall strategic situation.