1/4 Friday, May 3, 2019 1Haaretz Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and Dimona

peaceful in nature; it was about energy and de­ velopment. However, the Israeli leader's nar­ Kennedy, Nonproliferation rative also left a little wiggle room for a future and Israel reversal. His caveat amounted to a few words: "for the time being, the only purposes are for More than any other country, it was his peace .... But we will see what will happen in dealings with Israel that impressed upon the Middle East. It does not depend on us" (ital­ President Kennedy both the complexity and ics added). the difficulty of halting nuclear proliferation. In the fall of 1960, not long after Kennedy's The'spontaneous'second election, the outgoing Eisenhower administra­ visit Avner Cohen and William Burr tion first became aware of the Dimona reactor that Israel and France had begun building in The meeting with Ben-Gurion helped to secret during 1958. The CIA issued a Special clear the air for some time, but it did not re­ hroughout the spring and summer National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that move lingering American doubts and suspi­ of 1963, the leaders of the United determined that "plutonium production for cions about Israel's nuclear intentions. Start­ States and Israel - President John weapons is at least one major purpose of this ing in June 1962, the Americans began trying F. Kennedy and Prime Ministers effort." Furthermore, the estimate predicted to arrange a second visit to Dimona, but failed David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol that if the Arab world believed that Israel to make headway. It wasn't until September T-were engaged in a high-stakes battle of wills was acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability, 26, 1962, after frequent requests over several over Israel's nuclear program. The tensions it would cause "consternation," and blame months, that such a visit finally took place. were invisible to the publics of both countries, would be directed toward the U.S. and France Until recently, little was known from and only a few senior officials, on both sides for their presumed support of the project. American documents about that second Di­ of the ocean, were aware of the severity of At a White House briefing on January 19, mona visit except that U.S. Ambassador to the situation 1961, the eve of his inauguration, Kennedy Israel Walworth Barbour referred to it as In Israel, those in the know saw the situ­ inquired which countries were seeking the "unduly restricted to no more than 45 min­ ation as a real crisis, as a former high-level bomb. "Israel and India," outgoing Secretary utes." Recently declassified documents shed science adviser, Prof. Yuval Ne'eman, told one of State Christian Herter told him, adding new light on the visit. The key document is a of us (Avner Cohen) 25 years ago. Ne'eman that the then-newly discovered Dimona reac­ memo, written on December 27, 1962, by the recalled that Eshkol, Ben-Gurion's successor, tor would be able to produce 90 kilograms of deputy director of the Bureau of Near East­ and his associates saw Kennedy as present­ weapons-grade plutonium by 1963, enough for ern Affairs, Rodger Davies, to Assistant Sec­ ing Israel with a real ultimatum. There was 10 to 15 nuclear weapons. Herter urged Ken­ retary Philip Talbot, detailing the story of the even one senior Israeli official, Ne'eman told nedy to press hard for inspections of Dimona second visit. me, the former Israel Air Force commander before Israel introduced such weapons into Maj. Gen. (res.) Dan Tolkowsky, who seriously the Middle East. entertained the fear that Kennedy might send Although Kennedy had a variety of tough U.S. airborne troops to Dimona, the home of issues to address from the outset - ranging Ben-Gurion was not ready to Israel's nuclear complex. from the CIA's plans for an invasion of Cuba confront a determined U.S. What was at stake was the future of Is­ to a crisis over Laos - within days of taking rael's nuclear program. Kennedy, with an office he began urging Ben-Gurion to accept president. Nor, however, could he exceptionally strong commitment to nuclear a U.S. visit to Dimona, insisting that a visit nonproliferation, was determined to do all was a condition for good diplomatic relations. accept semi-annual visits, which he could to prevent Israel from producing In responding, Ben-Gurion dragged his feet, would've been a death blow nuclear weapons. Ben-Gurion (and later Es­ citing a cabinet crisis that had to be resolved. hkol) were equally determined to complete By April1961- by which time Ben-Gurion, to Dimona. In a sense, he was the Dimona project. For them, nuclear capa­ who had resigned as prime minister on Janu­ trapped by his original 'peaceful bility was an indispensable insurance policy ary 31, in protest of his colleagues' conduct against existential threats to Israel. The ex­ regarding the Lavon affair, was heading a purpose' pledge that aimed at change between the American president and caretaker government - Israeli Ambassador preventing a confrontation with the two prime ministers illustrates both Ken­ to Washington Avraham Harman told the ad­ nedy's tenacity and the Israeli leaders' recal­ ministration that Israel had agreed to a tour the U.S. citrance. of Dimona by U.S. officials. On May 20, two Earlier this week, we published - on the Atomic Energy Commission scientists, U. M. website of the National Security Archive- a Staebler and J. W. Croach, Jr., visited the site. collection of nearly SO American documents Its management team explained that the tech­ After the two AEC visiting scientists - from U.S. archives that illuminate for the first nological rationale for the project was to gain Thomas Haycock and Ulysses Staebler- had time the full scope of this secret American­ experience in building and operating nuclear inspected the small, U.S.-supplied reactor at Israeli confrontation. The collection includes reactors that could be used in the future for Nahal Sorek, they were unexpectedly offered not only the entire exchange of messages peaceful power generation. a sightseeing tour at the Dead Sea. Later, as between the leaders - Kennedy, Ben-Gurion From U.S. documents, we know that the they were being driven back to their hotel, and Eshkol- but also many related American AEC team was "satisfied that nothing was their host told them that they were near the documents, some of which were declassified concealed from them and that the reactor is Dimona reactor and that a meeting with the and became available only in recent months. of the scope and peaceful character previous­ director could be arranged. The director These include a full report of the U.S. in­ ly described." This visit laid the foundations was not there, but they met and were briefed spectors who visited Dimona in 1964; memos for a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Ken­ by the principal engineer, who gave them a in which senior White House officials deliber­ nedy in New York, on May 31, 1961. 40-minute tour of the facility. The report's fi­ ated how to deal with the prime minister; and The rationale Ben-Gurion presented to nal sentence states that "the inspectors were intelligence assessments that had analyzed Kennedy during that meeting, held at the Wal­ not certain whether they were guests of their whether Israel's nuclear reactor was, as the dorf Astoria Hotel, was consistent with what scientist-hosts or on an inspection. Although Israelis insisted, really meant for peaceful the Dimona management team had told the they have not had time to see the entire instal­ use. American scientists: The nuclear project was lation, and although there were some build- 2/4 Friday, May 3, 2019 1Haaretz

ings they did not enter, they were able to con­ biannual visits. The reason for the proposed a determined U.S. president. Nor, however, firm the research nature of the installation." frequency was purely technical: To trace ex­ could he accept semi-annual visits, which The highly unconventional nature of the traction of weapons-grade plutonium, there would have been a death blow to Dimona. In a visit stirred suspicion in Washington, espe­ must be two visits annually, because pro­ sense, Ben-Gurion found himself trapped by cially in the intelligence community. Dur­ duction reactors operate on a much shorter his original "peaceful purpose" pledge that ing one interagency meeting, a senior intel­ schedule than research reactors. aimed at preventing a confrontation with the ligence expert, probably Deputy Director of Weeks later, in early March, Kent Sher­ United States. Intelligence Ray Cline, was quoted as saying man, director of the Office of National Esti­ Ben-Gurion decided to try to avoid con­ that "the immediate objectives of the visit mates, which prepared the NIEs, signed an frontation and evade the nuclear issue by at­ may have been satisfied, [but] certain basic intelligence estimate detailing the grave con­ tempting to persuade Kennedy to think about intelligence requirements were not." It was sequences of Israeli nuclearization. "Israel's Israel's overall security predicament. The also observed that "there were certain in­ policy toward its neighbors would become prime minister needed to change the subject consistencies between the first and second more rather than less tough ... it would ... seek of the conversation from Kennedy's specific inspection reports." to exploit the psychological advantages of its demand for American twice-a-year visits to Whatever the doubts about the ultimate nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs and Dimona into a broader and urgent discussion intelligence value gleaned from the second to prevent them from making trouble on the about Israel's overall strategic situation. But visit, the State Department passed on its frontiers." Furthermore, in dealing with the how could he do that? How could he evade conclusions to other countries. A few weeks United States, Israel "would use all means in Kennedy's demand? after the second visit, just as the Cuban Mis­ its command to persuade [it] to acquiesce in Ben-Gurion soon had an opportunity to sile Crisis of October 1962 was unfolding, the and even to support, its possession of nuclear change the subject. On April17, 1963, Egypt, State Department began to quietly inform se­ capability." Syria and Iraq signed the Arab Federation lected governments that Dimona was a peace­ On March 25, 1963, President Kennedy and Proclamation, calling for a military union ful nuclear project. CIA Director John A. McCone discussed the to bring about "the liberation of Palestine." Israeli nuclear program. According to Mc­ Such rhetoric was not new at the time and it is Cone, Kennedy raised the "question of Israel not clear whether Ben-Gurion genuinely saw Early 1963: Renewed U.S. acquiring nuclear capability," and McCone the proclamation as an existential threat to interest provided Kennedy with Kent's estimate of Israel. Nevertheless, it gave him a golden op­ In early 1963, however, concerns over Di­ the anticipated negative consequences of Is­ portunity to argue that Israel was facing just mona resurfaced. By late January, Kennedy had raeli nuclearization. According to McCone, that, and hence - by tacit implication - that received a new National Intelligence Estimate, Kennedy then instructed National Security Israel was justified in its efforts to generate entitled "The Arab-Israeli Problem," that high­ Adviser McGeorge Bundy to guide Secretary an "insurance policy." lighted the weapons potential of the Dimona of State Dean Rusk, in collaboration with the On April 26, more than three weeks after reactor. On Israel's nuclear potential, the NIE CIA director and the AEC chairman, to sub­ the original U.S. demand concerning Dimona, concluded that the facility would become opera­ mit a proposal "as to how some form of inter­ Ben-Gurion responded to Kennedy with a sev­ tional later that year and that by the following national or bilateral U.S. safeguards could be en-page letter that focused on broad issues of year, 1964, "if operated at its maximum capacity instituted to protect against the contingency Israeli security and regional stability. Claim­ for the production of weapon-grade plutonium, mentioned." That also meant that the "next in­ ing that Israel faced an unprecedented threat, the reactor could produce sufficient plutonium formal inspection of the Israeli reactor com­ Ben-Gurion invoked the specter of "another for one or two weapons a year." plex [must] ... be undertaken promptly and .. . Holocaust," and insisted that Israel's security To produce plutonium, Israel would need a fa­ be as thorough as possible." should be protected by joint external security cility to separate it from spent reactor fuel, and Within days, this presidential request was guarantees, to be extended by the U.S . and the NIE acknowledged that at the time U.S. in­ translated into diplomatic action. On April the Soviet Union. Why did Ben-Gurion make telligence had "no evidence to confirm or deny 2, Ambassador Barbour met Prime Minister this fantastic and unrealistic proposal at this the existence of a separation facility." The NIE Ben-Gurion and presented the American time? He was probably trying to provide the noted that the Israelis had made contradictory request for his "assent to semi-annual vis­ U.S . with a tacit rationale for the real purpose statements about a reprocessing plant, including its to Dimona [among themselves American of Dimona, without explicitly stating it and statements in 1961 (during the Ben-Gurion-Ken­ referred to them as 'inspection visits'] per­ without directly countering or rejecting Ken­ nedy meeting) that they planned to build a pilot haps in May and November, with full access nedy's demands. one, and in 1962 (apparently during the second to all parts and instruments in the facility, Kennedy, however, was determined not to let Dimona visit) that they had no such plans. As our by qualified U.S. scientists." Ben-Gurion, Ben-Gurion change the subject. On May 4, he collection indicates, the Israelis told the U.S. in­ apparently taken by surprise, responded by replied to the prime minister, assuring him that spectors in January 1964 that they had delayed saying the issue would have to be postponed while "we are watching closely current devel­ constructing a pilot plant for reprocessing. until after Passover, which that year ended opments in the Arab world," the Israeli leader's Reacting to the intelligence estimate, NSC of­ on April 15. To highlight the point further, alarm over the Arab Federation Proclamation ficial Robert Komer suggested that Israel "will two days later, Assistant Secretary Talbot was overstated. As to Ben-Gurion's proposal attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the summoned Israeli Ambassador Harman to for a joint superpower declaration, Kennedy next several years and could have a very limited the State Department and presented him dismissed both its practicality and its political capability by 67-68." In retrospect, and based on with a diplomatic demarche on the inspec­ wisdom. Kennedy was much less worried about earlier publications on this subject, we can say tions. This message to Ben-Gurion was the an "early Arab attack" than he was by "a success­ that that assessment turned out to be on target. first salvo in what would become the tough­ ful development of advanced offensive systems Komer informed the president that "we are plan­ est American-Israeli confrontation over the which, as you say, could not be dealt with by pres­ ning a better look [at Dimona] in the next month Israeli nuclear program. ently available means." or so." In tandem with the letter, Ambassador Bar­ By early February, American officials The Kennedy-Ben-Gurion bour met with Ben-Gurion to further clarify were characterizing the second visit to Di­ exchange the American request for semi-annual visits mona as a "fiasco" and urged fresh thinking to Dimona. Although records of this meeting within the AEC, State Department, and prob­ Ben-Gurion was expected to respond to remain classified, Kennedy and his advisers ably the White House about how the United the U.S . request on Dimona at his next meet­ suspected that Ben-Gurion was initiating a States could effectively and systematically ing with Ambassador Barbour, following process of bargaining over the Dimona visits monitor the reactor. One conclusion was that Passover. The Israeli premier was not ready - that is, by linking the visits to other possi­ an effective inspection regime would demand - politically or psychologically - to confront ble Israeli goals, such as obtaining a security 3/4 Friday, May 3, 2019 1Haaretz guarantee. Barbour was instructed to remind Kennedy, however, would not budge on tually a copy of the undelivered letter of June the Israeli leader that he and other senior of­ Dimona, and the disagreements became a 15 to Ben-Gurion, with just a few congratula­ ficials had already approved inspections un­ "pain in the neck" for him, as Robert Komer tory lines added at the top. Not since Presi­ conditionally. later wrote. The confrontation with Israel dent Dwight Eisenhower's message to Ben­ Kennedy's dismissive reply did not deter escalated when the State Department trans­ Gurion, during the Suez crisis in November Ben-Gurion. In another lengthy and highly mitted Kennedy's latest letter to the Tel Aviv 1956, demanding an immediate Israeli with­ emotional reply to Kennedy's May 4 letter, embassy on June 15 for immediate delivery to drawal from the peninsula, had an American Ben-Gurion continued his earlier effort to Ben-Gurion by Ambassador Barbour. In the president been so direct in his demand with change the conversation while also indirectly letter Kennedy fleshed out his insistence on an Israeli prime minister. As Yuval Ne'eman explaining the true purpose of Dimona. When biannual visits with a set of detailed techni­ witnessed it, it was immediately apparent to senior Foreign Ministry official Gideon Ra­ cal conditions. The letter was akin to an ulti­ Eshkol and his advisers that Kennedy's de­ fael saw the draft, he advised against sending matum: If the U.S. government could not ob­ mands were akin to an ultimatum, and thus it, arguing that the letter "looks sick" (holani, tain "reliable information" on the state of the constituted a crisis in the making. in the original Hebrew), and that "the prime Dimona project, Washington's "commitment A stunned Eshkol, in his first and interim minister must not speak about something that to and support of Israel" could be "seriously response, on July 17, requested more time to seems sick." Ben-Gurion usually rejected edi­ jeopardized." study the subject and for consultations. Es­ torial advice and, true to form, he insisted on But the letter was never presented to Ben­ hkol confided to Ambassador Barbour his maintaining both its tone and length. Gurion. The telegram with Kennedy's letter "surprise" over Kennedy's statement that On the surface, the letter seems to ignore arrived in Tel Aviv on Saturday, June 15, the the U.S. commitment to and support of Israel Dimona entirely, as if the prime minister had day before Ben-Gurion's announcement of could be "seriously jeopardized." The pre­ either overlooked or entirely dismissed Ken­ his resignation, a decision that stunned his mier noted that while he hoped that U.S-Is­ nedy's letter and the recent U.S. requests for country and the world. Ben-Gurion never raeli friendship would grow under his watch, visits. Instead, in a tone of an old statesman "Israel would do what it had to do for its na­ who had seen it all, Ben-Gurion wrote of his tional security and to safeguard its sovereign impressions of Egyptian president Gamal Ab­ rights." Barbour, apparently wanting to miti­ del Nasser and his pan-Arabism, drawing an Ambassador Barbour reported gate the bluntness of the letter, assured Esh­ analogy between the Egyptian, together with kol that Kennedy's statement was "factual": other contemporary Arab leaders, and Hitler: home how Eshkol asked him Critics of strong U.S.-Israel relations might "Knowing them I am convinced that they are something that Ben-Gurion had complicate the diplomatic relationship if Di­ capable of following the Nazi example. Nass­ mona was left uninspected. er is in fact adopting the National-Socialist never asked: How would D.C. Later in the discussion, we learn from the ideology of the Nazis. For many years the react to an Israeli proposal to newly declassified documents, Eshkol asked civilized world did not take seriously Hitler's a blunt question that Ben-Gurion had never statement that one of his aims was the world­ 'consult in advance' with the U.S. dared to ask: How would Washington react wide extermination of the Jewish people. I 'in the event that, sometime in the to an Israeli proposal to "consult in advance" have no doubt that a similar thing might hap­ with the United States, "in the event that, pen to Jews in Israel if Nasser succeeded in distant future' ... developments sometime in the distant future," Middle East­ defeating our army." made it necessary to 'embark on ern developments made it necessary to "em­ Acknowledging Kennedy's view that a joint bark on a nuclear weapons program?" Bar­ U.S.-Soviet security guarantee was political­ a nuclear weapons program?' bour, of course, was not authorized to answer ly impossible, Ben-Gurion now suggested a such a hypothetical question, so he restated sweeping, bilateral U.S-Israel security agree­ the U.S. view that the "introduction" of nu­ ment that would include the following: a sup­ clear weapons into the Middle East would be ply of U.S. arms equivalent to what the Arabs explained, in writing or orally, what led him "especially grave." No doubt, Barbour under­ were receiving from the Soviet Union, the to resign, beyond citing "personal reasons." stood the significance of Eshkol's question: transformation of Jordan's West Bank into a He denied that his move was related to any He was hinting, openly but tentatively, that demilitarized zone, and "a plan of general dis­ specific policy issues, but the question of the there were conceivable circumstances un­ armament between Israel and the Arab states extent to which Kennedy's Dimona pressure der which Israel might "embark on a nuclear under a system of mutual and international played a role remains open to speculation to weapons program." inspection and control." the present day. On August 19, after six weeks of consulta­ This was a laundry list of unrealistic ideas and tions that generated at least eight different proposals. Again, Ben-Gurion may have meant to Eshkol's first crisis drafts, Eshkol handed Barbour his written convey to Kennedy his rationale for the Dimona reply to Kennedy's demands. It began by re­ project, while avoiding expressing it explicitly. On July 5, less than 10 days after Levi Esh­ iterating Ben-Gurion's past assurances that By reminding Kennedy that another Holocaust kol succeeded Ben-Gurion as prime minister, Dimona's purpose was peaceful. As to Ken­ was possible and suggesting (indirectly) that Is­ Ambassador Barbour delivered to him a first nedy's request, Eshkol wrote that given the rael could not feasibly obtain a credible external letter from President Kennedy addressing special relationship between the two coun­ security guarantee, he was effectively signaling him as Israel's new leader. The letter was vir­ tries, he had decided to allow regular visits to the president why Israel wanted a nuclear de­ tually a copy of the undelivered letter of June of U.S. representatives to the Dimona site. terrent in the first place. 15 to Ben-Gurion, with just a few congratula­ On the specific issue of the schedule, Esh­ In his monumental new biography of Isra­ tory lines added at the top. Not since Presi­ kol suggested- as Ben-Gurion had in his last el's first prime minister, "Ben-Gurion: A State dent Dwight Eisenhower's message to Ben­ letter to Kennedy - that late 1963 would be at Any Cost," due out in English this summer, Gurion, during the Suez crisis in November the time for the first visit: By then, he wrote, Israeli historian Tom Segev reads this letter 1956, demanding an immediate Israeli with­ "the French group will have handed the reac­ as if Ben-Gurion was actually considering drawal from the peninsula, had an American tor over to us and it will be undertaking gen­ giving up Dimona in return for some sort of president been so direct in his demand with eral tests and measurements of its physical security guarantee. We do not believe that an Israeli prime minister. As Yuval Ne'eman parameters at zero power." Ben-Gurion ever seriously entertained giving witnessed it, it was immediately apparent to Eshkol was explicit that the first Ameri­ up the nuclear project. Yes, Ben-Gurion was Eshkol and his advisers that Kennedy's de­ can visit should be held before the start-up pushing for security guarantees, but realisti­ mands were akin to an ultimatum, and thus stage, but was vague on the proposed fre­ cally he must have known that goal was not in constituted a crisis in the making. quency of visits. Eshkol disregarded Kenne­ the cards, so long as Israel neighbors did not A stunned Eshkol, in his first and interim dy's demand for biannual tours, while avoid­ recognize her. From Kennedy's perspective, response, on July 17, requested more time to ing a frontal challenge to Kennedy's request. providing Israel with security guarantees study the subject and for consultations. Es­ "Having considered this request, I believe would have been a clear sign of favoritism hkol confided to Ambassador Barbour his we shall be able to reach agreement on the toward, and would have undermined U.S. re­ "surprise" over Kennedy's statement that future schedule of visits," Eshkol wrote. In lations with the Arab states. the U.S. commitment to and support of Israel sum, the prime minister split the difference: 4/4 Friday, May 3, 2019 1Haaretz

To end the confrontation, he assented to "reg­ For Ben-Gurion, Dimona was the most pre­ ular visits" by U.S . scientists, but he did not cious project he was involved in during his accept the idea of the prompt visit that Ken­ last decade in office. The establishment of nedy wanted and avoided making an explicit the Negev Nuclear Research Center was the commitment to biannual inspections. Kenne­ result of the prime minister's deepest anxiet­ dy's appreciative reply did not mention these ies about Israel's future, the fears of an old divergences, but assumed a basic agreement man that he attempted to share with Kennedy on "regular visits." in his letter of late April 1963. The Dimona The ambiguities of Eshkol's reply were project was probably also the most divisive, understood in Washington, but played down. challenging and ambitious endeavor that he In a detailed memo that the acting secretary had dared to tackle as Israel's leader. of state, George Ball, wrote to Kennedy, the Rightly or wrongly, Dimona, in Ben-Gurion's overall assessment was positive: Eshkol's re­ eyes, was necessary to ensure that another Ho­ ply, "although not entirely what we wanted, locaust could never happen to Israel. If Kennedy probably represents the most we can hope." had prevailed in his demand for biannual inspec­ Eshkol's vagueness about Kennedy's most tions, that goal might never have been obtained. important demand, twice-yearly visits to Di­ For Ben-Gurion, abandoning Dimona would have mona, was well recognized, but "we prefer cast a huge shadow on his legacy. to give him [Eshkol] the benefit of the doubt, From a contemporary perspective, it is relying on our interpretation, the prime min­ difficult, maybe impossible, to understand ister's oral statement that future agreement just how vulnerable and uncertain the fu­ 'will give no trouble."' It turned out that Ken­ ture of the Dimona project was during the nedy's insistence of biannual visits was never spring and summer of 1963. Had the United accepted, although it remained on the U.S. States been truly determined to suspend its agenda. "commitment to and support of Israel's well­ In the wake of Eshkol's letter, the first of being" if Ben-Gurion did not comply with Kennedy and Ren-Gurion. Their m ~ tingin May 1961 helped to clear the air but did not remo\'C the long-sought regular inspection visits to Kennedy's demands - Israel probably would lingering American doubts and suspicions about Israel's nuclear intentions. Dl'AIAFI' Dimona took place in mid-January 1964, two not have been able to complete the Dimona months after Kennedy's assassination. The project as planned. The crisis was also a can inspections of the Dimona nuclear com­ Israelis told the American visitors that the crisis of mutual confidence: Both sides were plex, once a year between 1964 and 1969. reactor had gone critical only a few weeks highly committed to their goals, but neither They were never conducted under the strict earlier, but that claim was not accurate. Isra­ wanted to rupture the bilateral relationship. conditions Kennedy laid out in his letters. el acknowledged years later that the Dimona We will never know how unwavering Presi­ While Kennedy's successor remained com­ reactor became operational in mid-1963, as dent Kennedy would have been on the issue mitted to the cause of nuclear nonprolifera­ the Kennedy administration had originally of Dimona, had he lived to serve his full term tion and supported American inspection vis­ assumed. (or even two terms) as president. His resolve its at Dimona, he was much less concerned Both the U.S. and the Israelis kept the was never fully tested, although we can see about holding the Israelis to Kennedy's visit secret, with leaks to the press effec­ that he was quite determined. terms. In retrospect, this change of attitude tively contained for over a year. The inspec­ It turned out that Kennedy's insistence may have saved the Israeli nuclear program. tion took place over the course of a single on biannual visits to Dimona was not imple­ day instead of the two days sought by the mented. U.S. government officials remained Avner Cohen is a professor of nonproliferation studies inspectors. The shorter time line meant at the Middlebury Institute ofInternational Studies interested in such a schedule, and President at Monterey (California), and the author of"Israel that some buildings and parts of buildings Lyndon B. Johnson did raise the issue with and the Bomb." William Burr is a senior analyst at were not seen, although the inspectors re­ Eshkol, but he never pressed hard on the sub­ the National Security Archive, George Washington ported that the visit was "as comprehensive ject the way that Kennedy had. University, where he directs the Archive's Nuclear and thorough as the time permitted." Their In the end, the confrontation between Documentation Project and edits its web page The findings raised no suspicions of weapons­ President Kennedy and two Israeli prime Nuclear Vault. related activities, but it was "the impres­ sion of the team that the Dimona site and the equipment located there represented an ambitious project for a country of Israel's capabilities." Looking back The issue of Israel's possible reprocessing of spent fuel for plutonium continued to bedev­ il U.S. intelligence throughout the 1960s. No one was sure whether Israel already had a se­ cret reprocessing site or had yet to build one. In retrospect, however, the 1963 exchange of letters between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion and Eshkol was the climax of the battle the U.S. leader waged against the Israeli nuclear project throughout his presidency. For Ken­ nedy, the stakes were higher than the status of Israel's nuclear program. At issue was the fate of his effort to halt global nuclear pro­ liferation. Israel was the first such case the Kennedy administration had to face in which it had some political leverage. If Kennedy failed to halt Israel's nuclear aspirations, how could he stop others, such as India? The reactor at Nahal Sorek. After two visiting Atomic Energy Commission scientists had inspected this small, U.S.-supplied facility, they were unexpectedly offered a sightseeing tour- that ended with a stop at Dimona. A/o11 R011