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Monthly Forecast January 2021 Monthly Forecast 1 Overview Overview 1 In Hindsight: Looking Back to Look Ahead 3 Status Update since our Tunisia has the presidency in January. It has cho- meeting on developments in Yemen, and the quar- December Forecast sen to hold an open debate on the challenges faced terly debate on the Middle East, including the Pal- by countries in fragile contexts, in particular on estinian Question. On Syria, there will be a meeting 5 Mali the African continent. Possible briefers include covering the political and humanitarian situations 6 Colombia UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Chair of as well as on the use of chemical weapons. 8 Syria the AU Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat and On African issues, there will be updates on the 10 Maintenance of former President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. activities of UNSMIL (Libya) and MINUSMA International Peace and Tunisia is also organising a debate on threats to (Mali). The Council may also adopt a resolution Security: Challenges international peace and security caused by terror- supporting the compliance of all national and of Maintaining Peace ist acts, focusing on international cooperation in international stakeholders with the 23 October and Security in Fragile combating terrorism, to commemorate 20 years 2020 ceasefire agreement between the parties to Contexts since the adoption of resolution 1373 in 2001. The the Libyan conflict. 11 West Africa and the anticipated briefers are Under-Secretary-General Meetings on situations in South America and Sahel for Counter-Terrorism Vladimir Voronkov and Europe are also expected in January. The Council 13 Counter-Terrorism CTED Executive Director Michèle Coninsx. will be briefed on the Secretary-General’s 90-day 14 Yemen Tunisia’s two other signature events are expect- report on the UN Verification Mission in Colom- 15 Cyprus ed to be briefings on the implementation of reso- bia. On Cyprus, Council members will be briefed 16 Cooperation between lution 2532, which demanded a cessation of hos- on the latest report on UNFICYP, and the Coun- the UN and the League tilities in all situations on the Council’s agenda cil is expected to renew the mandate of the mis- of Arab States to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, with the sion by the end of the month. 18 COVID-19 Pandemic Under-Secretaries-General for political, peace- The Council is expected to receive updates keeping and humanitarian affairs as expected on the activities of two UN regional offices: 19 The Middle East, briefers; as well as on cooperation between the UNOWAS (West Africa) and UNRCCA (Cen- including the Palestinian Question Council and the League of Arab States (LAS) tral Asia). with the UN and LAS Secretaries-General as Council members will most likely closely fol- 20 UNRCCA (Central Asia) likely briefers. low developments in the Central African Republic, 22 Libya Regarding the Middle East, there will be the Ethiopia and South Sudan, although no meetings regularly scheduled meetings on Syria, the monthly on these issues were scheduled at press time. In Hindsight: Looking Back to Look Ahead Every January, five new members take their seats unusual situation of being unable to meet at the for a two-year term on the Security Council. In UN because of restrictions imposed as a result 2021, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico and Norway of the COVID-19 pandemic in New York City, are the incoming five (I-5) replacing departing the Council had to find ways of continuing its members Belgium, Dominican Republic, Ger- essential work, particularly the adoption of resolu- 30 December 2020 many, Indonesia and South Africa. tions extending mission mandates and sanctions This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. While we don’t have a crystal ball, the events regimes. Within two months, the Council recre- of 2020 may provide an indication of what these ated most of its meeting formats and developed For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please members can expect in 2021. a written procedure for voting, which, although subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” The new members enter the Council follow- more cumbersome, allowed for the adoption of series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. ing an extraordinary year. Forced to confront the resolutions and presidential statements. It also Security Council Report Monthly Forecast January 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Looking Back to Look Ahead found a way of agreeing on other decisions in exploring the advantages virtual convening the last bastions of Council unity, counter- without in-person meetings. offers for high-level participation and engag- terrorism, fell when the US vetoed a draft The statistics for 2020 confirm that the ing briefers outside of New York. China and resolution on the prosecution, rehabilitation Council maintained its essential work. Over- Russia have in the past expressed reservations and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters all, the Council continued to hold regu- about this format, but in 2020 both chose to (FTFs). lar meetings on issues on its agenda and use it, in Russia’s case organising five Arria- Iran was another divisive issue. In August renewed mission and sanctions regime man- formula meetings. With the prospect of the 2020, the US introduced a draft resolu- dates. Fifty-seven resolutions were adopted in Council’s continuing to work remotely at tion that would have extended indefinitely 2020, exceeding the 52 adopted in 2019. The least in the early part of 2021, there may the existing arms-related restrictions under number of presidential statements, which had need to be further discussion of whether vir- resolution 2231. The resolution failed to be already been on a downward trend, dropped tual meetings should be considered official adopted due to insufficient votes. With the from 15 to 13. Given the deep divisions on an and of how to enable the larger membership change in the US administration in January, increasing number of issues, members may to speak during open debates. this is expected to become more of a consen- have chosen not to pursue outcomes in this Before the pandemic, relations among the sus issue in the Council. format given the need for consensus. Less permanent members were already fraught. A In a tough year, there have been signs of clear is whether COVID restrictions exacer- global pandemic might have been expected progress on some issues such as Libya, where bated pre-existing Council divisions to a point to unify Council members to address its a fragile ceasefire is holding at the time of where some outcomes were unattainable. consequences for peace and security, as hap- writing, and Mali, where following a coup The amount of time spent in meetings pened following the terrorist attacks in the last August, the country is moving towards a dropped drastically, down by more than 200 US on 11 September 2011. Instead, rath- political transition. Colombia continues to be hours compared to the 660 hours in 2019. er than narrowing the differences, it led to an issue that has overall Council support. In This reduction can be partially explained greater cleavages in 2020. Not being able to 2020, the Council oversaw the establishment by the fact that open debates, which have meet in person did not help. Divisive issues of a new mission, the Integrated Transition been held as videoconferences (VTCs) require face-to-face bilateral or small group Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), since May, have restricted speaking roles to negotiations in order to find compromises or and in South Sudan, long-term political rivals Council members and briefers. Other partici- creative language. came together in a new Transitional Govern- pants have had to submit their contributions Not surprisingly, in 2020 the Council con- ment of National Unity. While these are posi- in writing. The almost two-week period in tinued to struggle with obtaining unanimous tive developments, progress is fragile, and all March 2020 of no Council activity, followed agreement on Council outcomes. Twelve these situations will require the Council’s by more limited activities for a short period, resolutions were not unanimous. They cov- watchful attention in 2021. additionally accounts for the drop in meet- ered sanctions renewals (Central African Two presidential statements on children ing hours. Furthermore, it became harder to Republic, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, and and armed conflict were adopted in 2020, meet on more controversial topics in 2020: in Yemen), mission mandate renewals (Demo- showing strong support for this agenda. Oth- the past, such meetings have been informally cratic Republic of the Congo, Western Sahara, er thematic issues fared less well. The women, negotiated face-to-face or decided through Haiti, and Libya), criminal tribunals and the peace and security agenda continued to see a procedural vote during a formal meeting. Syrian humanitarian situation. Significantly, pushback from several permanent members. Given that the Council’s VTCs are not con- on a number of resolutions, the disagree- The issue of climate and security also met sidered official meetings, however, proce- ments were over language on human rights, with strong resistance from three permanent dural votes could not be held unless mem- gender, or climate and security rather than members, making an outcome impossible in bers were willing to meet in person. It is not core elements of the mission’s mandate or the 2020. However, members found other ways clear whether some issues that were discussed sanctions regime. to keep a focus on this issue. Germany, Niger in closed VTCs under “any other business” Several draft resolutions were not adopted and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines chose such as Hong Kong, the Grand Ethiopian due to a veto or the lack of sufficient number signature events with a climate and security Renaissance Dam, or Belarus might have of votes in favour.
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