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Home , Aba Island, Dongola, Mahdism, Mahdist State, Omdurman, Reginald Wingate

The Royal African Society

The Establishment of Neo-Mahdism in the Western , 1920-1936 Author(s): Awad Al-Sid Al-Karsani Source: African Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 344 (Jul., 1987), pp. 385-404 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/722749 Accessed: 07/11/2010 21:35

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http://www.jstor.org THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEO-MAHDISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN, 19201936

AWADAL-SID AL_KARSANI

THE RESURRECTIONOF the Mahdist movement in the twentieth century following the crushing defeat of the by the Anglo-Egyptian re-conquest of Sudan has been one of the most extraordinary features of modern Sudanese politics, as well as a unique form of Islamic revival. The messianic revolt of Ahmad al-, which overthrew Turco- Egyptian rule and ended with the death of General Gordon at in 1885, 1 was not only a ma jor chapter in Sudanese history, but one of the great uprisings of Muslims in modern times. As a result Sudan's British con- querors remained suspicious of the possible recrudescence of Mahdism, even though they had obtained a crushing victory at the battle of in 1898, and they kept a watchful eye not only on Sudan's Muslim peoples, but possible developments right across the . Following the re-conquest the remaining Mahdists were carefully moni- tored, and the Mahdi's surviving son, born posthumously, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, lived quietly under supervision in Omdurman. However, in the First World War he was encouraged by the government to emerge from obscurity and rally his father's old supporters as a counter to the call of the Ottoman Sultan for a against the British throughout the Middle East, because Mahdism was associated with anti-Turkish sentiment in Sudan. As a reward for his loyalty he was allowed after the war to develop his estates at Aba Island in the White , where his father had first declared himself to be the Mahdi, with the authorities intending that his commercial activities would deflect him from any religious or political ambitions. However, Abd al-Rahman soon showed himself to be an acute observer of both the political and religious scene. He set about organizing a revival of Mahdism, but not one which would attempt a revolt against the all-conquering British, rather it would be a peaceful movement whose influence would be such that the authorities would have to collaborate with it. Eventually, it was widely believed, he sought to become King of the Sudan, like other British-backed Middle Eastern monarchs. As a result of this abandonment of revolution- ary aims and expectations on the part of its followers, the movement Abd al-Rahman established has been dubbed neo-Mahdist, for it built on the beliefs of the old Mahdists though now directed toward very different goals to those of the nineteenth century revolt. 1 The authoris lecturerin PoliticalScience, . 1. Peter Woodward,'In the footsteps of Gordon:the Sudan Governmentand the rise of SayyidSir Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi, 1915-1935', African Affairs 84 (1985),pp. 39-51. 385 386 AFRICANAFPAIRS in turning to the Abd al-Rahman also built on his father's achievements al-Mahdi had originally westernSudan for support. his declaration that he comefrom in the far north, but following of and wasthe true Mahdi, it was to the western Sudan provinces where he rallied the Kordofanthat he had turned in search of support, and In turn Abd armywhich defeated Hick's Pasha and captured Khartoum. recruits for his neo- al-Rahmanrealised that the main body of potential there by the sense of Mahdistmovement also lay in the west, but he was faced Mahdist state, and a politicalconfusion following the overthrow of the and semi-nomadic resultingreligious turmoil among the region's nomadic in the western Sudan peoples. In establishing his new Mahdist movement contending forces, afterthe First World War Abd al-Rahman faced three sufiorders. Britishofficials, individualfakis (holymen), and established to terms with the The Sudan government was aware of the need to come conquered peoples, but variousmanifestations of popular among its inherent in the religion, constantlyfeared the dangers it regarded as virtually by the Mahdi's andwhich it was believed had been amply demonstrated the strategy of his neo- revolt. As a result Abd al-Rahman's ambition and his loyalty in the First Mahdistmovement posed a dilemma. He had shown intention and capacity WorldWar and afterwards begun to demonstrate his was regarded by the toextend his neo-Mahdist movement in the west, which both because of the British as the most dangerous area for Muslim revolt early years of British Mahdi's uprising and numerous local uprisings of the to extend its influ- administration as well. If neo-Mahdism was allowed movement, or might it ence unchecked would it remain a loyal collaborative threat than the pose in time a more concerted and thus more dangerous existing Muslim forces? had to contend in It was not only the authorities with which neo-Mahdism there, which represen- the west, but the other Islamic forces already at work not just in Sudan but in ted preceding phases in the development of Islam, was that of the much of Muslim . The oldest of these traditions to the region from individualfakis (holymen) who had first brought Islam century revolt of the late Middle Ages onwards. Following the nineteenth were strong in the Ahmad al-Mahdi, messianic and millenarian expectations Mahdism or other west, and such fakis, who often borrowed ideas from both before and after sects, were associated with a number of local uprisings the First World War. orders (turaq,sing. Sudan had also been penetrated by a number of the sufi Sunni Muslims, tariqa) which were widespread organizations among outside Sudan. The especially in rural areas, and most of which originated started in Morocco, and strongest in the west was the Tijaniyya which had as 1810. Following eventually came to Sudan via the western Sahel as early in west Africa in the the destruction of Umar al-Futti's Tijani states ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 387 1860s many Tijani migratedeastwards and were particularlyinfluential in Darfur, and there were adherentsalso in northernKordofan. The inter- national characterof such turuqwas particularlyworrying for the Sudan governmentwhich thought that they might act as agents of hostile powers. It was just such a concern which had led to the rehabilitationof Abd al- Rahmanal-Mahdi in the First WorldWar; while in northernNigeria trouble with various Islamic groups in the same period was ascribedin part to the work of Germanagents from the neighbouringCameroons. (The Sudan governmentexchanged information with British colonial governmentson Islamicmatters, mainly with Nigeria.) Thus in seekingto build his neo-Mahdistmovement with backingin the west Abd al-Rahmanwas contendingnot only with the suspicions of the authorities, but other Islamic forces. Furthermorehe was seeking to extendthe influenceof his peacefuland collaborativemovement in what the governmentregarded as the most dangerousregion of the northernSudan, with its unsophisticated and potentially 'fanatical' population amongst whommessianic and millenarianexpectations were rife. In orderto under- standthe successof neo-Mahdismit is necessaryto see how Abd al-Rahman succeededin the face of these contendingIslamic forces and aspirations.

TheMessianic fakis The defeat of the Mahdist army at Omdurmanin 1898 did not quell British fears that messianismwas still alive in Sudan, and that other indi- vidualfakis like MuhammadAhmad would in turn claim to be the Mahdi, or his successor, and lead further revolts. Sir Reginald Wingate, the governor-general,wrote in 1908 that 'no doubt there is plenty of latent Mahdismand until the generationborn and brought up in thatfaith has died out we shall be subject to these outbreaks'.2 His fears were particularly borneout by the frequencyof revoltsin westernSudan, where officials were alwayson the alertand tryingto assessthe danger. In northernKordofan the local administratorswere worriedby the many individualfakiswho settled amongthe tribes of the areapreaching Mahdist tenets and that the of the prophet 'Isa () was near. (Accordingto certain Muslim teaching the Mahdi will be followed by al- Dajjal, the anti-Christ,who will in turn be succeededby the second coming of Jesus, Nabi 'Isa.) The Meramrawere the largest tribal group who 'believed in MohammadAhmad as the true Mahdi'.3 Among the other tribesof the areathe local DC remarked:'I am afraidNorthern is not entirelyfree from the Mahdisttaint. . . The "ratib"[al-' prayer book] has been believedto be readby severalof the Gilaidatand Ferahna'.4 2. Quotedin G. Warburg,The Sudan Under Wingate, London, Frank Cass, 1971,p. 102. 3. DC NorthernKordofan to GovernorKordofan, Bara, 6 Feb. 1922,Kordofan 1/16/79. 4. ADC NorthernKordofan to GovernorKordofan, Bara, 13 Dec. 1926,Kordofan 1/16/79. \

AFRICAN AFFAIRS 388 WESTERN SUDAN - - -

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However,a surveyof northernKordofan (Table 1) showedthat othermajor tribes of the area were largely immune from Mahdism. The religious influenceof the Dawalibfamily, who produceda numberof Tijani leaders, helped to reducethe influenceof the individualfakisover many of the main tribes, especially 'the Shenabla of Dar Hamid'.s The Kababish tribe, which seemed to be much visited by fakis, hated the Mahdists because of their resistance to Ahmad al-Mahdi's revolt. The Majaneen and the Shenablaalso preservedtheir loyalty to the Tijaniyya order.6 Even the Kawahlatribe, who had been ardentsupporters of the Mahdist state, were 5. Inspector Northern Kordofan to Governor Kordofan, Bara, n.d. Bara files SCR/61-1. 6. Interviews with various informants in Bara and Khursi, Dec. 198>Jan. 1984. ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 389 now regarded as 'wealt' and described as 'liable to reject fanatic Mahdism'.7 Further, they were 'visited by emissaries of Yusef el Hindi [leader of another tariqa]but they were few in number'.8 TABLE 1 Makdist followers in Northern Kordofan9

Maramra Full Nawahia Majority Kawahla Majority Shenabla Verysmall AwladAgoi Mahdists(not fanatic) Hawawir Khatmi(there is no hope of embracinghis fanatictariqa [the Mahdists] in future Maganeen Tigana Kababish Hate Mahdists

However, in western Kordofan there was more concern especially when a former Mahdist preacher of the Ghersia section of che Jamar tribe, Abu Daqqal, tried on his own initiative to exploit the government's recognition of Abd al-Rahman. Abu Daqqal's efforts to organize the old Mahdists of Dar Hamar worried the local DC for, 'If it comes to fighting I believe he would have more influence with the Hamar tribes than their own Nazirs'. 10 Abu Daqqal asked for permission to erect a Mahdist tent at Mulid al-Nabi (Prophet Muhammad's birthday celebrations) to be called the tent of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, but he was refused.1 1 Underlining the concern of the British officials were the complaints raised to them by the native administrators-nazirs, omdas,and the tribal leaders who were held responsible for maintaining the peace locally and who were worried by the teachings of individual wandering fakis. Commenting on their pro- testations one A/DC noted that, 'propaganda appears to be spread in each district by strangers largely because they carry more weight than a prophet in his own country'.12 The situation was more dangerous in Darfur province. Atthe time ofthe re-conquest Darfur had re-gained its independence and it had been ruled by Sultan Dinar until the British invaded and overthrew him in 1916. Ali Dinar's rule had checked the influence of individualfakis, but following his downfall their influence kept recurring, as it had in other parts of Sudan before the First World War. Indeed the largest uprising anywhere by one of thesefakisoccurred at Nyala in southern Darfur in 1921. Faki Abdallah Al-Suheini's uprising, which killed the local British DC, had support from a 7. InspectorNorthern Kordofan to GovernorKordofan, Bara, n.d., Barafiles SCRl16. 8. BaraSCR/16. 9. Sub-MamurMerkaz Soderi to GovernorKordofan, 30 May 1926,Kordofan 1/16/82. 10. InspectorGillan to GovernorKordofan, Nahud, 12 Feb. 1915,Darfur 1/2/12. 11. InspectorWestern Kordofan to GovernorKordofan, 17 Dec. 1917,Kordofan 1/16/79. 12. Ass. DC Western Kordofanto GovernorKordofan, Nahud 21 May 1926, Kordofan 1/16/82. 390 AFRICAN AFFAIRS numberof local tribes,notably the Masalit,Merarit, Borgu and some tribal sections of the West African immigrants.13 The DC Southern Darfur noted that 'all the neighbouringtribes were sittingon the ferlceawaiting the result of this attackand had it been successfulthey would have joined the enemywhose numbersare estimated at five thousands'.14 The Arabtribes of SouthernDarfur such as the Habbaniaand the Beni Helba, who were in continuousrevolts duringche time of the Mahdist state 'were not going to join in-though of course they probablywould if the Faki had a success at Nyala'.15 The differenttribes of Darfurtried to exploitthe uprisingto stir up trouble and create turmoil and political upheaval. In neighbouring northern Darfur the Inspector summarizedthe aftermathof the Nyala uprising in his district as follows: 'I do not think the people of Northern Darfurare much affectedby Mahdism,but the Zagawawould dearlylove to starttheir wholesaleraiding of cattle should the governmentbe in any way weakened'.16 But whetherit was ,local discontent,or simply opportunismwhich gave rise to revoltsin the west, the repeatedinvolvement of individualfakisshowed the threatthey posed.

Rival Visions The messianicfakis'different movements were generallycentred around the imminenceof greatupheavals leading to the Last Day, and a numberof rival interpretationswere advanced. Variousfakis announcedthat they themselves were Nabi 'Isa, or prophesiedthat he was about to come; but otherfakis, who did not recognizethe claimof MuhammadAhmad to be the Mahdi (andhence that Nabi 'Isa would follow him) preachedinstead of the appearanceof the true Expected Mahdi (al-Muntazar). Somefakis even specifiedthe names of the coming Nabi 'Isa or the Mahdi. In May 1923, Faki Ibrahim al-Tirjmawi, a Chadian immigrantto Kordofan, told his audiencethat 'the Dajjal is the BritishOfficer and Nabi 'Isa is SayedAbdel Rahman'.17 The authorityof these fakis was based on the controversial (prophetic tradition) which is well-known for its importance in Shiite teaching.18 Building on this hadith,many individualfakisfound a 13. In addition to Al-Suheini's religious appeal other explanations for the uprising included tax increases, cheating by Omdasof their people, personal jealousies, lack of appreciation of the need for stable government, as well as an epidemic of relapsing fever and a devastating outbreak of cattle plague which had almost wiped out the herds of the Rizaiqat. 14. Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, Fasher, 1 Oct. 1921, Darfur 1/1/3. 15. McNeill, DC Southern Darfur to Governor Darfur, Nyala, 22 Sept. 1921, Darfur 1/19A/ 102. 16. Arkell, Inspector Northern Darfur District to Governor Darfur, Kutum, 10 Oct. 1921, Darfur 1/2/7. 17. Director of Intelligence to Governor Nuba Mountains, Khartoum, 1 May 1923, Kordofan 1/1 6/79. 18. The SIadithstates that the allotted span of the World is 1,000 years from the time of Prophet Muhammad and he added 100 years for each of the khulafa,but in case of the Khalifa Ali he did not make a clear pronouncement. The theory holds that in the last 100 years are to occur all the changes prophesied such as the coming of the Dajjaland the Second Coming of Jesus, who will lead the world to Islam and the Last Day will come in 1,400 A.H. ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 391 religious cloak for their anti-colonialcriticisms, such as in Darfur where fakis attackednewly imposed taxes including the poll, hut and sanitary taxeswhich were alien to the people who had previouslypaid only a nominal tithe to their local leaders, especially during the Mahdist and Ali Dinar periods. An account of the ideologicalmanifestations of some early movements demonstrates that millenarian visions were the backbone of these movements. Al-Suheini, the leaderofthe Nyalauprising in 1921,declared that he was 'out to attackthe "turuk"[Turks, the commonname for foreign rulers], and that he is out for no wealth or earthly power, but solely for religious ends'.19 After the failure of his revolt rumours sprung up in northernDarfur that miraclesand signs of the imminenceof the coming of the Last Day beganto appear. The IntelligenceDepartment recorded one saying that a sword '40 dira'aslong [20 metres] fell from Heaven at Nyala and wiped out all the governmentthere'.20 This kind of rumourled many other individualfakisto exploit the circulationof the rumoursand spread their own brandsof Nabi 'Isa and Mahdistvisions; for instanceFaki Jebrin, who was reportedto reside near Wadi Hawarin northernDarfur, and was reportedto be 'makingtrouble' after the Nyala rising.21 The most importantfeature of millenarianvisions is the way they change to accommodatenew ideologicaland political developments. In Sudanthe millenarianmovement was a reactionto the defeat of SudaneseMahdism and the localized West African gihad movements during the first two decadesof this century. The highly elasticnature of Sudanesemillenarian- ism made many of its proponents extend their belief in Mahdism and allowed 'for temporarydefeat by foreseeingthe overthrowof the Chiliastic Kingdom establishedby the Mahdi throughthe agencyof the dajjal(Anti- Christ);al-Nabi 'Isa (the ProphetJesus) would then return,kill the dajjal and fill the earthwith justicebefore the End of Time'.22 This body of tradition was used by the individualfakis to justify the growingattention given to Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi, who was increasingly spoken of as 'the Nabi Isa and that the day of his appearancehas become near'.23 Another vision, in 1924, claimed that CJesusis even now on the earth,and will appearamong us shortly'.24 A system of signs was describedin the differentversions of the visions aboutthe appearanceof the Mahdi,Jesus, or the variousevents which would

19. DC SouthernDarfur tO GovernorDarfur, Nyala, 22 Sept. 1921,Darfur 1/1/3. 20. Arkell, InspectorNorthern Darfur District to GovernorDarfur, Kutum, 10 Oct. 1921, Darfur1/2/7. 21. Directorof Intelligenceto GovernorDarfur, Khartoum, 10 Oct. 1921,Darfur 1/2/7. 22. MarkDuffield, Maiurno: Capitalism and RuralDevelopment in Sudan,London, Ithaca Press, 1981,p. 18. 23. Directorof Intelligenceto DC WesternKordofan, Khartoum 15 OCt. 1925, Kordofan 1/16/79. 24. DC SouthernDarfur to GovernorDarfur, Abu Gabra,1 March1924, Darfur 1/19/100. 392 AFRICAN AFFAIRS lead to the Last Day. In one of these versions, there was a belief that in 1921, as a sign, 'a she camel with a black and white tail would come from the east. In swishing its tail the black hair would fall on some of the people and bring them misfortune and white hairs would fall on the chosen one. If this camel came then all must join without delay. If it did not come in Regab, Keysayer, Rarnadan,etc. there would be no sign and the day would not be till 1350 [1930]'.25 Another vision gave in detail the description of the Dajjal: 'he wears a crescent on his hat and gaiters on his legs and puffs smoke like the smoke of hell and the donkey of the Daj jal is black and puffs smoke and has two lines before it'. 26 In fact this is a description of the British DCs and the coming of the railway to E1 Obeid in Kordofan, and encouraged the expectation that Nabi 'Isa would follow. Individual Sudanesefakis were not the only ones using visions to advance their cause. It was reported that Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi 'consciously employs various fakis to write on his behalf to various parts of the country exhorting people to follow the true religion and be ready for that day is at hand'.27 Also many foreigners, especially those from West Africa, were suspected of being connected with the circulation of the visions and organiz- ing anti-British movements. Many of these foreigners were ordered to leave the country or were deported from rural areas to towns where they could be watched more closely. The 1922 Closed District Ordinance was applied to deport foreigners who were considered politically undesirable, including the roving Shanaqitt (Mauritanians) and Fulani fakis who were suspected of preaching sedition and of organizing movements against the administration. The Intelligence Department was occupied with hunting the 'undesirable' Haji 'Umar Toro, who was at Al-Fasher just before the Nyala uprising and described as 'preaching sedition here'.28 On hearing the 'news from Nyala he left hastily and he is now in Sokoto'.29 The administration thought that some fakis came not only from West Africa but , Syria, Arabia or Turkey, and that some at least were employed by Egypt, Germany or the Bolsheviks to spread visions for anti-British purposes. Faki Ahmad Qamr of Timan village, near Al-Fasher, and 'who is a recent convert from the Tijania to the Mahdist sect has relations in Nigeria to whom he wrote recently, asking them to join him as the hour is nigh', was arrested by the authorities'.30 One official, G. J. Lethem, who

25. DC SouthernDarfur to GovernorDarfur, Abu Gabra,21 May 1924,Darfur 1/19l10O. 26. Director of Intelligenceto Governorof Nuba Mountains, Khartoum, 1 May 1923, Kordofan1/1 6179. 27. DC SouthernDarfur to GovernorDarfur, Nyala, 5 March1925, Darfur 1/23/130. 28. L. H. G. Andrews,ADC El-Fasher,to GovernorDarfur, El-Fasher, 22 Jan.1922, Darfur 1/23/130. 29. Andrewsto Governor,22 Jan. 1922,Darfur 1/23/130. 30. Deputy GovernorDarfur to Director Intelligence,El-Fasher, 18 March 1922, Darfur 1/22/124. Lethemlater visited Sudanfrom Nigeria tO studyMahdism. ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 393 shared the fears of an international conspiracy and prepared a report on the fakis' activities, regarded Faki Ahmad as 'the link between Al-Azhar (in ) and Nigeria'. 31 The administration thought that a certain ' Fodio, who was the agent of Muhammad Bellu the deposed heir of the former Tijaniyya state of Sokoto in exile in the Hijaz, had come to the Sudan to stir up trouble.32 The relationship between some individual Tijanis in Sudan and their fellow tariqa members internationally, most of whom held anti-British sentiments, was a source of concern to the administration in the 1920s and 1930s.33 However, in its efforts to restrict the influence of thefakis over the ordinary illiterate, rural people, the administration exploited the differences between the exiled leaders, and also won Alfa Hashim, a leading Tijani from , to its side.34 (See Table 2) Lethem noted that in 1919 Alfa Hashim issued a manifesto stating that 'he had been approached by certain Egyptians who offered him ?E4,000 to 'open a road to the West'.35 This indicates Alfa Hashim's refusal to be used by anti-British forces, and in 1925 he visited Sudan and preached to the Tijanis telling them not to follow Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi or any otherfaki.36 A detailed examination of some of the different versions of the visions shows that they were composed to serve various interests and purposes such as political activism, social reformism or mere personal material ambitions. The propagators of visions used religious means to achieve political aims and to diffuse their authors' propaganda.37 At the same time, many illiterate people participated in disseminating visions out of fear of religious punish- ment if they refused; and rewards in this world or the next for those who did take part. Another kind of vision, which was more acceptable to the administrators in their attempts to curb the political messages, concentrated on criticizing the social and moral ills of society brought about by the beginnings of a consumer capitalist society in the country. One such states that: The selfish-rich is too engrossed in his own luxury to care for his poor brother and every kind of corruption, usury, disregard in meticulous 31. Fidder, DC Central District to GovernorDarfur, El-Fasher, 7 April 1923, Darfur 1/32/167. 32. MuhammadBallu was describedby Lethemas 'the most influentialFellati at Meccawho lives with El-GhaliGayeh a veryold Fellataholyman. MohamedBelu has been instrumental in causingtrouble in the Sudan. He has sent lettersto leadingFellatas. . . He is extremely fanaticaland dangerous.' 33. Compiledfrom Darfur 1/2/7, 1/32/167, Kordofan1/12/56 and 1/12/60. 34. Alfa Hashimwas the nephew of 'Umaral-Futi who fought the Frenchfor many years. AlfaHashim was the Muftiof the overthrownTijaniyya state in Sokotowho fled Nigeria in 1903 and residedin Medina in the Hijaz. He was spokenof everywherein Sudanand Jeddahas advisingobedience to Europeangovernment Compiledfrom the files:Darfur 1/19/ 100, 1/2/7, 1/23/130;and BaraNo. 1/X/15133. 35. L. H. Andrews,DC El-Fasherto GovernorDarfur, 22 Jan. 1922,Darfur 1/2/7. 36. Interviewswith variousinformants in WesternSudan, June 1983-April1984. 37. For the differentversions of the visionssee Darfur1/2/7 andDarfur 3/2/12. .

394 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TABLE 2 Listof undesirableFaki in WesternSudan :34

Country and Name qualifications Remarks

Sherif Abdel Shinqetti, speaks Servedin GreatWar for two and a half years Rahman Mohd. Hausa, Fellata, a in West Africain Gunners,went to Mecca, very little English. returned to Dar Ta'aisha. He had some dealings with the German Frobenius-the head of the German SS Intelligence-the AfricanBranch during the war.

Sherif Ali Abu E1 1 unls I cannotdiscover that he is in anyway danger- Jaslmz . ous, nor that he has been spreading sub- versive propagandabut I considerhis pres- ence in Darfurundesirable. Haj 'Umar Toro Hausa Was at Al-Fasher just before the Nyala rising.. . On hearingthe news from Nyala he left hastilyand he is now in Sokoto. Ahmed Ibrahim Yemen A poorYemani, who livedon charityand was orderedto leavethe country. Fiki Yusuf E1- Hausa He is reportedto have been stoppingFellata pilgrimsand telling them not to go to Mecca or Maiwerno... A less reliable informant tells me that Yusuf have come with Pan- Islamic propagandafrom Egypt promising help from the Kemalistif the WesternArabs will join in a holy warto driveout the infidel. Fiki Mohamm e de in A Fulaniof Tigania He is a religiouslunatic and not responsible Abdel Rahman tarikaof Nigeria forhis actions. He is beingrepatriated to his countrythrough Kordofan and Darfur Osman Fodio Hausa,Tijani An agentof MohommedBelu in Hijazcame to stirup problems.

weightsand measures and drinkshave been done. SheikhAhmed warns them that the wrathof the Lord will fall on their heads and the doors of Mercyare closed.38

This potentiallyexplosive combinationof millenarianexpectations and the presenceof individualfakis,often in competitionwith one another,thus focused on differentdoctrinal interpretations or emphasesas advancedin various visions. Doctrinally the major division was between those who eschewed the nineteenth century Mahdist movement and looked still for al-Muntazar, the expected Mahdi, and those who increasinglyidentified Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi as Nabi 'Isa. But whateverthe teaching, the 38. A/GovernorDarfur to Civil Secretary,Fasher, 7 May 1925,Darfur 3/2/12. ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 395

common millenarian theme was a source of concern to the British officials who found themselves seen not only as alien rulers, the Turuk,who might be overthrown like their nineteenth century predecessors, but even as al-Daj jal against whom Nabi 'Isa would arise and lead the people into battle once more.

Abdal-Rahman al-Makdi's ascendancy The potential dangers from the individualfakis led the senior members of the Sudan Government to further review relations with Abd al-Rahman. In view of his loyal and useful role in countering the Sultan's call for a jihad in the First World War he was now permitted to send representatives to the west with the expectation that he would use his influence to calm the situation, and he seized his chance with enthusiasm. By 1921 the auth- orities believed he had paid agents who operated 'by the dissemination of instructions by the faithful and the collection of funds'.39 However, this official recognition of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's religious status and the presence of his agents caused much confusion and apprehen- sion both among British officials on the ground and the local tribal leaders who they were trying to groom into full blooded native administrators, since they were less sanguine than Khartoum about the effects of neo-Mahdism, thinking that it might only provoke more unrest. These local worries in time contributed to vacillation over policy towards Abd al-Rahman's activities by central government. The ADC Northern Kordofan referred to 'the growth of the activities of the Mahdists agents, with special reference to the agents of Sayed Abdel Rahmanand calling on the governor to inform the Nazirs of the Government policy on the matter'.40 Thefakis who acted as Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's official agents continued to infiltrate northern and western Kordofan, preachingMahdist ideas and collecting zeka(alms) from the villagers. The ADC Dar Kababish arrested twofakis who were collecting zeka for Abd al- Rahman al-Mahdi and wrote to his superiors asking for 'instructions from you as to their disposal'.41 But there was little clarification on policy available, while the confusion at district level persisted. The presence of Adam Hamid, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's agent in Al-Fasher district, increasingly unsettled the people duringthe years 1922-1924. In 1923 a list of 24 persons was submitted to the ADC of Al-Fasher and it stated that these persons 'would take their orders from Adam Hamid. Further, they refused to water the Omdas'

39. SudanIntelligence Reports, No. 330, Jan. 1922,Darfur 1/15/81. 40. C. S. ArmstrongA/DC NorthernKordofan to DC Dar Kababish,Bara, 26 May 1923, Barafiles, SCR/128. 41. Maclaven,A/DC Dar Kababishto GovernorKordofan, Safia, 14 Feb. 1923, Bara SCR/9. files 396 AFRICAN AFFAIRS animalsas they were Christiananimals and that they had made large pay- ments to Adam Hamid'.42 The Governorof Darfur, who was critical of the agent's presencein his province,described their freedomto operateas perceivedin the people'sminds as:

being preparatoryto the withdrawalof the Governmentfrom Darfur.... As this idea is getting about, Omdas, etc. are finding more and more difficultynot only in gettingtheir orders obeyed, but in collectingtaxes, as the people say 'Whatis the good of payingtaxes to a Governmentwhich will soon be replacedby another'.43

Yet for their partAbd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi's agents deliberately sought to avoid antagonizingthe administrationand insteadacted as trusted collab- oratorsreporting the activitiesof manyindividualfakis to the authorities.44 AdamHamid in particularreported on the activitiesof manyindividualfakis includingTijanis and even some unrulyMahdists to the administration.45 In western Kordofan Mahdism was considered, 'the natural belief of every Arab. All the Arabs there seem to have a blind belief in Mahdism unshaken by anything.... Apart from the Kababish and other Arabs such as the Jellaba and Awlad el-Balad, the greater part of the people are Mahdists'.46 The ADC Western Kordofan, who was against the presence of Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi's agents in his district, warnedhis superiorsthat 'two-thirdsof the Hamartribe and 50% of the HamarAghrab (foreigners),the Jekheisatand the Wailia(Degigum) are probablythe most ardentsupporters of Abdul RahmanEl-Mahdi'.47 A furthersign of the growthof Abd al-Rahman'sinfluence was the grow- ing numbers of people who made the pilgrimagefrom the west to Aba Island. Up to 15,000 went each year and often returnedin a very excited concltson.. . As a resultof such developmentsin Kordofanand Darfurthe government changedposition and decidedto orderAbd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi in August 1923 'to withdraw all his wakils or mandubs [agents] from Kordofan Provinceand in futureno one actingin this capacitywill be allowedto enter Kordofan'.48 The administrationassured the people that it would not 'prevent anyone from following the tariqa of Abdel Rahmanfor

42. A/DC. El-Fasher to Governor Darfur, Fasher, 20 April 1923, Darfur 1/23/125. 43. Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, Fasher,20 April 1923, Darfur 1/22/123. 44. In 1921 there were twenty-four agents, mainly in Western Sudan, on Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's pay-roll. 45. Sudan Inteligence Reports, No. 345, April 1923, Darfur 1/23/125. 46. DCWesternKordofantoGovernorKordofan,Nahud, l August 1923,Kordofan 1/16/82. 47. Ass. DC Western Kordofan to Governor Kordofan, Nahud, 21 May 1923, Kordofan 1/16/82. 48. D . Newbold, DC Northern Kordofan to Sheikh Ali El Tom, Nazir of Dar Kababish, Bara, 2 August 1923, Bara files SCR/9. SUDAN NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN ESTABLISHMENTOF 397 of the put a stop to the misuse of the name religiouspurposes but intends to of bad character for seditious purposes'.49 Mahdiby fikis and mandubs was agents from going into Kordofan The banning of Abd al-Rahman's to one official wrote of the growing threat extendedto Darfur in 1926, when thewest as a whole: and immediate steps to curb the If the government does not take drastic will within a period of five to ten movement in the West Neo-Mahdism the suppression of which will extend years be an anti-Government force to their furthest limit.50 the Government and its resources where were withdrawn, especially from Darfur, However, when his agents and were no longer available to contain theNyala rising had taken place, they and the ban soon relaxed. reporton the activities of individualfakis, used by Abd al-Rahman, and of the main means of exercising control One the people, was his mess- millenarian expectations of many of reflectingthe to begin the await the Ishara (the proclamation agethat they should told that he groups of Mahdists who were then jihad).He would recognize sign at the and that they should await his alonecould give the Ishara, and he organized his illiterate followers appropriatetime. In this way leadership, reducing in the pro- ensuredtheir obedience to his centralized on the local people. cessthe influence of the individualfakis in Zaleingei, in western Darfur, in During the Faki Muhajjrin uprising Faki Muhammad, the of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi wrote to 1927, trouble, the time had , 'not to rise if there were any Nyala'sprincipal letter was con- The spirit of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's notyet come'. 51 be an uprising as feeling in Darfur that there would traryto the general spread by versions of the 'Shaikh Ahmad vision' propagatedby the various Abd belief in the imminence instead of the individualfakis. However, the in weakening the influence of such al-Rahman al-Mahdi's Isharasucceeded was an example of one of Abd al-Rahman individualfakis. Faki Muhaj jrin very nervous while waiting for the Ishara al-Mahdi's followers who became and told his followers that: of he [Muhajjrin] was not the real head He was not the Mahdi but also that on Zaleingei was successful he [Ab the movement stating that if the attack out of the North and a general rising dal-Rahman al-Mahdi] would come Masalit and Western Darfur.52 would then take place all over Dar had developed in the west into a leader By 1927 Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi expectations to his advantage, thus who could manipulate local millenarian 2 August 1923. 49. Newbold to E1Tom, Kordofan, Nahud, 21 May 1926, Kordofan 50. ADC Western Kordofan to Governor 1/16182. 16 Feb. 1927,Darfur 1/19/100. Darfurto GovernorDarfur, Nyala, 1/12/118. 51. DC Southern Darfur,Nyala, 27 March1927, Darfur 52. DC WesternDarfur to Governor 398 AFRICAN AFFAIRS reducingthe dangerto the authoritiesof individualfakis. And after con- siderablevacillation the Sudangovernment was connivingat neo-Mahdism and trustingthat Abd al-Rahmanwould remaina loyal collaborator.

Sectarianrivalry: the Tijaniyyaand theMakdists The increase of Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi's influence in the western Sudan re-opened old religious and political feuds between the Tijaniyya tariqa and the Mahdists left over from the days of Mahdist rule in the nineteenthcentury. During Ali Dinar'srule, when Darfurwas savedfrom the individualfakisactivities, the Tijaniyyaorder had preservedits mastery thereand throughthe continuousinflux of the West Africanimmigrants the orderexpanded in the province. The annexationof Darfurin 1916 to the restof the Sudanmeant that the Tijaniyyaorder faced a returnof the danger of Mahdism. Also the manyindividualfakis who propagatedthe Nabi 'Isa and the millenarianvisions of the 'nearnessof the hour' added a further element to the religiousturmoil of Darfur as well as to Kordofan. While many of the individualfakis advancedthe Ti jani concept of al-Muntazar, the ExpectedMahdi, which was contraryto the beliefsof the localMahdists, a growingnumber of them consideredAbd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi's religious charismato be an extension of his father's nineteenth centuryjihad and began to propagateAbd al-Rahman'scause. For many of thesefakis, the Mahdist creed's internationalismin its relationto the Islamicjihad move- ment was an attraction. Many West Africanimmigrants to the ruralareas in Kordofan and Darfur also joined Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's cause becauseof the similarityof SudaneseMahdism's economic structures, with theirreceipt of freefood, lodgingand spiritual sustenance in returnfor work, to those of their homelands'in the emiratesof NorthernNigeria. Furthermore,the co-operationbetween some Tijani fakis and Abd al- Rahmanal-Mahdi made large groups of ruralTijanis desert the order and follow that of Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi. For exampleit was reportedof Faki IbrahimTha'albli, a noted Tijani that:

It has lately become his habit to go into retirementin his house . . . last yearon emergingfrom retirement, he relatedthat he had seenthe Prophet and the Mahdi sitting on an angreeb[bed] togetherand they told him to readthe ratib[the Mahdi'sprayer book]53

The crushingof manyof the individualfakis'attempts at revoltled a large number of these rural Tijani fakis and ordinary people to profess Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's brand of Mahdism and to wait for his Ishara (proclamation). This was clear in the Governorof Darfur's letter to the

53. Governor Darfur to DC El-Fasher, Fasher, 24 Feb. 1923, Darfur 1/32/167. ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 399

Civil Secretary stating that 'nearly all Fikis and Imans of local are abandoning their own tariqa [sect] and adopting the ratib'.54 This pro-Mahdist conversion was often at the expense of the Tijaniyya order. Shaikh Babiker Badri, of the Education Department who toured Darfur in 1926, found that:

the majority of the people here, about 75?/Oof them, are Mahdists, the remainder of different tarikas [sects] . . . 10 ?/Oof them believed that Abdel Rahman is to be Nebi Isa whilst the others respect him as the son of the Mahdi. 55

Figures given by the omdasfor kAlawi(elementary religious schools) in their omodiasaround Al-Fasher stated that: '62 per cent are Mahdists, while at A1- Fasher there is a balance, 2 Tijanis and 2 Mahdists'.56 The list of Khlawi inspected by Shaikh Babiker Badri shows the shift of the Tijaniyya fakis from their order to the Mahdist cause;57 and che report by one DC, A. J. Arkell,58 on Mahdism in Darfur clearly illustrates the attempt to monitor the trend towards Mahdism (see Table 3). In Western Kordofan, the judge of Al-Odaya town, Ibrahim al-Tijani, who was on leave in Omdurman in 1925, said that the conversion was caused by the spread of alleged rumours that Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was 'the Nabi Isa and the day of his appearance has become near'.59 The Director of Intelligence noted that the judge's description of the 'abundance of the white arms [knives] in their hands as well as the large number of horses astonishes the kadi who does not know why the Government keeps silent'.60 The ADC Western Kordofan described the judge's report as written:

in a spirit of exaggeration due to his parentage and connections, which naturally makes him very bitter against any rival religious element. Sheikh Ibrahim el-Tigani is the most ardent supporter of his father's tarika and holds in his house meetings for reading, which are attended by the Fellata [foreign] element of El-Odaya who follow his persuasion.61

Many of these converts, because of their relative literacy and knowledge of religion compared with che illiterate Hamar locals, became the future agents 54. GovernorDarfur to Civil Secretary,Fasher, 20 April 1923,Darfur 1/22/123. 55. Sheikh BabikerBadri to IntelligenceDepartment, Khartoum, 18 June 1926, Darfur 1/24/134. 56. Ass. DC El-Fasherto GovernorDarfur, Fasher, 6 Oct. 1926,Darfur 1/24/134. 57. Badrito Intelligence,18 June 1926. 58. Arkell,DC SouthernDarfur to GovernorDarfur, Nyala, 19 Feb. 1927,Darfur 1/24/134. 59. Directorof Intelligenceto DC WesternKordofan, Khartoum, 15 Oct. 1925, Kordofan 1/16/79. 60. Intelligenceto W. Kordofan,15 Oct. 1925. 61. A/DC WesternKordofan to Directorof Intelligence,E1 Odaya, 20 Dec. 1925,Kordofan 1/16/79. 400 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TABLE 3 Mahdismin DarfurProvince, 192758

Religious Attitudeof Tribe leaning triballeader Remarks

Beigo Non-Mahdist Loyal Tribe of no account Bergid-Kajjar Have Mahdist Loyal Unlikely to cause trouble unless rising Centres at Dara is general and Beringil Bergid-Dalli Contain a few Loyal The fines imposed by the Shartia in Mahdists 1923 has made Mahdism unpopular Dago Used to be Tijanis Weak and fool This tribe could be cowed but becoming Mahdists Fellata Half-Mahdists Loyal This tribe are reputed to be loyal, but they are of a fanatical temperament, must not be together Fur Ignorant of Six tribal These people are so ignorant that they Islamictenets headsmostly might believe anything of Zaleingei and creeds loyal trouble Gimr Partly Mahdists Weak and fool These people might easily be carried away as they were in 1921 Habannia Mahdists and Disloyal If trouble arises this tribe would prob- Tijaniyya ably come to blows among themselves Beni Helba Very Mahdist ? If trouble arises this tribe would probably come to blows among them- selves Maalia A few Mahdists ? Tribe of no account Beni Mansour A few Mahdists A weak leader Would cut no ice either way

and religious wukula(deputies) of Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi in Western Kordofan. While the Tijanis were disintegratingin the countryside,they were also weakeningin the towns. The growthof marketsin the towns as a resultof the expansionof tradeencouraged the rise of Tijani merchantswho became less concernedwith providingreligious leadershipin town or countryand increasinglystood aside fromthe religiousrivalries of westernSudan. One exampleis providedby Tijani centresin Al-Fasher,capital of Darfur where a numberof Tijani leaderssuch as AhmadWad Karrarand Khalifa Muhammadb. Sidi Salma ignored both the effortsof Abd al-Rahmanal- Mahdi and the administrationto curb the activities of individualfakis. They also ignoredAbd al-Rahman'sefforts to persuadethem to join him. Similarly,Khalifa Muhammad was reportedto haveproved himself neutral though his followers,especially among the West Africanimmigrants in the town, were reportedto have joinedAbd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi's side. The explanationgiven was Abd al-Rahman'spractice of sendingletters tofakis, prominentpersonalities and triballeaders, which brought him the loyaltyof many in these groups. These letters were of a general nature: they expressedAbd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi's desire to extend his influencein the ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 401 western Sudan and illustratedhis desire to win them to his side without jeopardizingthe administration.62 Though informantsrelate that neither Wad Karrarnor Khalifa Muhammadbothered to reply to any of these letters,Abd al-Rahmandid succeedin winningover Faki Abd al-Maiid,one of the Imamsof the town's main mosque and a disciple of Sidi Salma, a formerleading Tijani. Faki Abd al-Majidbecame one of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi'smost importantagents in the town, thoughhe retainedhis loyalty to the Tijaniyya order while eventuallybecoming the chief agent of Abd al-Rahmanin centraland northernDarfur. In some towns there was resistanceto Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi. In An-Nahud, a centrefor gum arabicand ground-nutsin westernKordofan, many of the West African immigrants,who had fled Darfur during Ali Dinar'sreign, co-operated with the administrationin the initialpreparations to conquerDarfur.63 The fact that a largenumber of the immigrantsinto the town were from Chad,where Islamicmilitancy was limited, madethem less susceptiblethan the Nigerianimmigrants to the appealof Mahdism;and their reaction to the individualfakis with their millenarianactivities was governedby other factors. Firstly, the three leadersof the West African immigrantsin the town, Ahmad Ya'qub al-Azhari,Faki Kursi and Faki Jaddid, succeededin controllingthe variousimmigrants and discouraging them from participatingin the individualfakis'activities. The individual fakis, who insistedon distributingthe millenarianvision leaflets,notably the 'Shaikh Ahmad Vision', were secretly advised to stop their activities or compelledto leavethe townbefore being discoveredby the administration.64 Secondly, the cosmopolitanbackground of many of the town's immigrant leadersallowed them to integrateinto the town's society and they became more tolerantof the Britishadministration. The stabilityprovided by the Sudangovernment in this growingcommercial centre meant the expansion of the economic interests of these immigrants. Thus these urban West Africanimmigrants shared a feeling of resistancetowards Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, not because of his Mahdist ideas but because they thought he connoted an element of potential instabilityin the area. This is why the three leadersof An-Nahud's West Africanimmigrants participated in the administration's anti-sedition activities in eastern and southern Dar Hamar. Informantstell stories of how An-Nahud's local Ulama (official Islamic teachers)and a number of Tijani leaders from inside and outside Sudan visited the western Kordofantowns of Al-Odaya, Abu Zabad and neighbouringvillages and preachedagainst both individualfakis activities and supportfor Abd al-Rahmanal-Mahdi. 62. These letters are found with many inividual and religious families in western Sudan. 63. Interviews with various informants, Al-Fasher, March-April 1984. 64. The Shaikh Ahmad was the keeper of the Sacred Mosque at Mecca and the tradition of his vision is associated with protest against religious laxity and immorality on the part of Muslims. It was extended by Shiites and other political sects to raise their political grievances. 402 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

The rivalry between the Tijanis and the Mahdists reached new levels when some of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's followers spread a forged letter from Alfa Hashim, the Tijani leader in the Hijaz, approving the Mahdism of Abd al-Rahman and urging the West African elements in Sudan to join his cause and move to Aba Island.65 This forgery did bring large groups of West African immigrants to Aba and led the administration to bring a genuine letter from Alfa Hashim repudiating it.66 The government even brought Alfa Hashim himself to Sudan in 1925 to contain the different trends among the followers of the Tijaniyya order. Informants report the administration's encouragement of many Tijanifakis in the western Sudan to visit him in Khartoum and Sennar.67 However, Alfa Hashim's health and old age did not allow him to travel widely as scheduled. Alfa Hashim's call to the Tijanis to keep loyal to their faith and not to follow others was countered by some Nigerian immigrant supporters of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, who ventured to attack the Tijaniyya and justify their conversion. Sa'ied b.Hayatu, of the defeated ruling dynasty in Sokoto, tried to argue for the validity of Sudanese Mahdism in the nineteenth century.68 The author also accused the Tijanis of factionalism because their, 'Practices were against the normal behaviour of the people. They alone perform prayers by adopting the habit of raising their hands before and after kneeling to prayers'. The Tijanis were attacked by the orthodox, puritan Mahdists as heretics and a source offitan(strife) and therefore they 'are to be excluded from the main body of the community'.69 The development of the Tijani-Mahdist rivalry reached its climax in the early 1930s when the impact of a depression on the prices of gum , the major export of the region, left the local rural population unable to pay their taxes.70 The locals expressed their dissatisfaction with the harsh measures adopted by the native administrators, who were mainly Tijanis, in collecting taxes and arrears, by spreading the story that, 'the Tijani, the members ofthe ' Ushur(tiche) committees, and those who propagate the coming of another Mahdi are all in the everlasting Fire'.7 1 Thus the balance in western Sudan was shifting away from the loosely organized Tijaniyya order and towards neo-Mahdism. The decline of the influence of the urban Tijani centres, especially in the face of growing com- mercialism, and the attraction of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's millenarian slogans to the impoverished rural population who were benefiting less from 65. J. E. Phillipsfor A/Directorof Intelligenceto GovernorKordofan, Khartoum, 15 Sept. 1923,Bara files No. D.1 /X/ 15133. 66. DC SouthernDarfur to GovernorDarfur, Nyala, 5 March1925, Darfur 1/23/130. 67. Interviewswith variousinformants in westernSudan, June 198SApril 1984. 68. Sa'iedB. Hayatu,Kitab Sahihal-Khabr a'n al-Imamal-Muntazar (The True Reportof the ExpectedImam), Khartoum, 1925, pp. 98. 69. Hayatu,Kitab, p. 2. 70. Hayatu,Kitab, p. 9. 71. Interviewswith various informantsin western Sudan, June 198SApril 1984. The referenceto 'anotherMahdi' indicates believers in al-Mantazar,including the Tijanis. ESTABLISHMENTOF NEO-MADHISM IN THE WESTERN SUDAN 403 the developing 'colonial' economic system, were the major factors producing this shift.

Conclusion By the 1930s it had become clear that in spite of the Sudan government's wish to restrict Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi to a commercial role which would distract him from politics, he had in fact taken advantage of their worries over security in the western Sudan, and their consequent vacillation with regard to himself and his agents, to develop a body of support for neo- Mahdism in the western Sudan. The government's vacillation had initially been due to doubts about his reliability and loyalty as a collaborator, but neo-Mahdism was to dispel those fears. Instead of build ng a body of supporters in western Sudan who might stage a religious revolt, fulfilling the widespread millenarian expectations and following in the footsteps of nine- teenth century Mahdism, Abd al-Rahman deliberately changed the charac- ter to that of neo-Mahdism, a peaceful movement which would collaborate with government. A Mahdist faki, questioned at Nyala, by officials summed it up when he recounted Abd al-Rahman's words to him: I am all for the Government and you must pay your taxes and do every- thing that the Government says, even down to handing over your sons and daughters. He even agreed that the collection of presents depends on the Nazir's consent.72 The peaceful character of neo-Mahdism was also brought out in Abd al- Rahman's religious teachings. The idea that he alone could give the Ishara, (proclamation) for jihad, limited the influence of the many individual fakis who had sought to encourage local revolts. Furthermore jihad itself was seen as a peaceful effort, and many westerners were encouraged to fulfil their expectations by moving to Aba Island and working for a pittance on the Mahdist estates. That religio-economic structure also had an appeal to some of the West African immigrants, especially those of ex-slave strata for whom they resembled arrangements in their homelands in northern Nigeria. At the same time the weakening of the Ti janiyya in the west as a result of neo- Mahdist activity and social and economic change brought more adherents to Abd al-Rahman's movement. The bedrock of support for neo-Mahdism was thus laid in the western Sudan, and could have been laid in no other part of the country. The more sophisticated riverine Sudanese lacked the millenarian expectations on which to build; in the east the sect was a far more formidable organization than the Tijaniyya; while the south was overwhelmingly non- Muslim and positively anti-Mahdist, with memories of the violence of the 72. DC SouthernDarfur to GovernorDarfur, Nyala, 13 June 1936,Darfur 1/19A/lOl. 404 AFRICAN AFFAIRS attackson the region by the Mahdist state. With a growingbody of sup- portersin the west, and with westernersproviding most of the labourfor his estates at Aba Island and its surrounds,Abd al-Rahmanhad the influence and the money to furtherhis ambitions. During the late 1930s he courted the emergingintelligentsia and at the end of the SecondWorld War founded Sudan'sfirst political party, the Umma Party. Both beforeand afterinde- pendencethe Umma Partydrew for electoralsupport predominantly on the western Sudan and the , where the Mahdi family and other Ummaleaders had extensiveestates. EvenAbd al-Rahman'sdeath in 1959 did not end the influenceof the movement and as recently as April 1986 Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandsonof Abd al-Rahman,led the Umma Party to an electoralvictory based predominantly on seatswon in the westernSudan in Sudan's first democraticelections for eighteen years;73while ten years earlier, in July 1976, Sadiq had organizedan armed attack by the , supportersof Mahdismfrom the west, which had come close to capturing Khartoumand overthrowingPresident Nimeiri. None of this would have beenpossible if his grandfatherhad not firstmasterminded the resurgenceof Mahdismin the west, convertedit into neo-Mahdismestablishing a proto- nationalistmovement in the process,and then formedthe Umma Partywith its durablebase in Darfurand Kordofan. 73. 54 of the Umma Party's100 geographicalseats in the 1986 electionswere in Darfurand Kordofan(with 29 morein CentralRegion, mainly on the WhiteNile).